Political Theory, Applied Ethics, and Animals Conference

Description

Speakers: Angie Pepper & Rich Healey

Title: Reproducing injustice: abolition, procreative liberty, and future generations

Abstract: All philosophers concerned with the plight of nonhuman animals recognize that significant reforms to our practices involving animals are morally necessary. The only real question is how we should reform existing practices. One view is that we should abolish all practices that involve the deliberate positioning of nonhuman animals in asymmetric relations of power, vulnerability, and dependency, including our practice of living with pets or companions (Healey and Pepper, forthcoming).

A common objection to abolitionist views of this kind is that it requires huge amounts of unjust coercive interference in the reproductive lives of domesticated animals (e.g., Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, p. 80; Nussbaum 2022, pp. 199-200). Our aim in this paper is to defend the abolitionist position against two versions of this objection. Importantly, the paper cedes that all sentient animals have significant interests in procreative liberty, but argues that, while
regrettable, reproductive interference is nonetheless justified.

The first version of the objection maintains that abolition will necessitate an unjustifiable interference with the reproductive interests of existing individual animals. In response, we first observe that those who press this objection also freely admit that restrictions on the reproduction of domesticated animals will continue to be necessary if we are to continue to live with them. For example, Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that as citizens, domesticated animals have the responsibility to exercise their rights in ways “that do not impose unfair or unreasonable costs on others” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, p. 147). Where they are unable to do so, we may impose limits on their reproduction. Next, we argue that if animals' interests in reproduction can be balanced against other interests and considerations in this way, then they can also be balanced against the interests of future animals who would be - according to the abolitionist - unjustly positioned within a socio-political hierarchy. Given this, proponents of this objection to abolitionism face a dilemma. Either individual animals’ interests in reproduction can be balanced against the interests of others, in which case the abolitionist is entitled to the same claim; or they cannot be balanced in this way, leaving them without a justiϐication for the restrictions that they admit will be necessary.

The second version of the objection maintains that “through domestication, [domesticated animals] have acquired a birthright in this shared society” (Kymlicka 2022, p. 222). In response, we consider three interpretations of the objection. One might think that existing individuals have a birthright in this shared society, and that entails a right against reproductive interference. That interpretation is vulnerable to the argument just discussed. A second interpretation suggests that possible future animals have a birthright to experience the benefits of our shared society; a claim to the social legacy created and shaped, in part, by their ancestors. Against this, we argue that individuals of possible future generations have no claim against us to exist. A third interpretation suggests that domesticated animals comprise a social class that has a collective right to persist in society. Against this, we argue that domesticated animals do not comprise a class in the sense needed to ground a collective birthright.

Having defended the abolitionist position against these objections, we conclude by turning the tables: Assuming nonhuman animals have the kinds of significant interests in reproduction that the opponents of abolition claim, how well can these interests be served within an ongoing interspecies community? We argue that the answer is: badly. We conclude that appealing to the reproductive interests of nonhuman animals is not the silver bullet against abolitionism that it is held to be.

Estimated audience numbers (if applicable)

30

Period	16 Jan 2025 → 17 Jan 2025
Held at	University of Sheffield, United Kingdom
Degree of Recognition	International