Abstract
Radical constructivists appeal to self-legislation in arguing that rationalagents are the ultimate sources of normative authority over themselves. I chartthe roots of radical constructivism and argue that its two leading Kantianproponents are unable to defend an account of self-legislation as the fundamentalsource of practical normativity without this legislation collapsing into a fatalarbitrariness. Christine Korsgaard cannot adequately justify the critical resourceswhich agents use to navigate their practical identities. This leaves her accountriven between rigorism and voluntarism, such that it will not escape a paradoxthat arises when self-legislation is unable to appeal to external normativestandards. Onora O’Neill anchors self-legislation more firmly to the self-disciplining structures of reason itself. However, she ultimately fails to defendsufficiently unconditional practical norms which could guide legislation. Theseendemic problems with radical constructivist models of self-legislation prompt areconstruction of a neglected realist self-legislative tradition which is exemplifiedby Christian Wolff. In outlining a rationalist and realist account of self-legislation,I argue that it can also make sense of our ability to overcome anomie anddeference in practical action. Thus, I claim that we need not make laws but canmake them our own.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1153–1173 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | European Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Early online date | 25 Aug 2013 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2015 |