Between Orthodox Theism and Materialist Atheism

Fiona Ellis

Between Orthodox Theism and Materialist Atheism

Fiona Ellis

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

Abstract

Tim Mulgan’s aim is to explore two alternatives which occupy a middle ground between orthodox theism and atheism, and which are intended to be preferable to either of these extremes. Ananthropocentric theism posits a morally perfect creator God who has no interest in the fate of individual human beings, but the position incorporates its own ‘non-human-centered non-natural values’. Axiarchism is non-theistic in the sense that it involves reference to impersonal goodness rather than to a personal God, and Mulgan adds to it an ananthropocentric dimension as a way of dealing with the problem of evil. He ends by proposing ananthropocentric purposivism as a rival to both atheism and orthodox theism.
I agree that defending a plausible middle-ground in this context is a central philosophical task, and that it is inextricably tied up with the question of value. I agree also that orthodox theism as Mulgan understands it raises difficulties, although I am less clear about what counts as orthodox, and how its limits are to be comprehended. I begin with some objections to Mulgan’s position. I then present a summary of my own expansive naturalist version of a middle ground as presented in God, Value, and Nature. I explain how expansive naturalism makes room for a loving God, and offer some reasons for favouring it over Mulgan’s position.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Current Controversies in Philosophy of Religion
Editors	Paul Draper
Publisher	Routledge
ISBN (Print)	9781138183469
Publication status	Published - 8 May 2019

Keywords

theism, axiarchism, ananthropocentric theism, naturalism, expansive naturalism

Cite this

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title = "Between Orthodox Theism and Materialist Atheism",

abstract = "Tim Mulgan{\textquoteright}s aim is to explore two alternatives which occupy a middle ground between orthodox theism and atheism, and which are intended to be preferable to either of these extremes. Ananthropocentric theism posits a morally perfect creator God who has no interest in the fate of individual human beings, but the position incorporates its own {\textquoteleft}non-human-centered non-natural values{\textquoteright}. Axiarchism is non-theistic in the sense that it involves reference to impersonal goodness rather than to a personal God, and Mulgan adds to it an ananthropocentric dimension as a way of dealing with the problem of evil. He ends by proposing ananthropocentric purposivism as a rival to both atheism and orthodox theism. I agree that defending a plausible middle-ground in this context is a central philosophical task, and that it is inextricably tied up with the question of value. I agree also that orthodox theism as Mulgan understands it raises difficulties, although I am less clear about what counts as orthodox, and how its limits are to be comprehended. I begin with some objections to Mulgan{\textquoteright}s position. I then present a summary of my own expansive naturalist version of a middle ground as presented in God, Value, and Nature. I explain how expansive naturalism makes room for a loving God, and offer some reasons for favouring it over Mulgan{\textquoteright}s position. ",

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