TY - JOUR
T1 - Psychological insights for judging experts
AU - Martire, Kristy A.
AU - Neal, Tess M. S.
AU - Chin, Jason
AU - Edmond, Gary
AU - Berengut, Jonathan
AU - Gobet, Fernand
PY - 2024/11/6
Y1 - 2024/11/6
N2 - This review addresses a critical societal problem that psychology is uniquely positioned to address: the challenge of distinguishing genuine experts from pseudo-experts. Determining which experts to trust is essential for both routine and high-stakes decisions, yet evaluating expertise can be difficult. We examine the cognitive processes that underpin genuine expertise—such as learning, information search, memory, problem-solving, and skill transfer – and explore the disconnect between psychological insights into expertise and the practical methods used to evaluate it. In settings where expertise must be evaluated by laypeople, such as adversarial legal trials, laypeople face significant challenges, including knowledge disparities hindering analysis, communication barriers that impact the clear explanation of expert methods, and systemic constraints that limit the scrutiny of expert evidence. These challenges complicate the assessment of expert claims and contribute to wrongful convictions and unjust outcomes. To assist, we distinguish between ‘show-it’ and ‘know-it’ expert performances. The key difference is in their visibility, measurability, and immediacy: ‘know-it’ performances are particularly challenging and critical to interrogate. This distinction serves as a heuristic for identifying when evaluations of expertise require greater care and should incorporate a range of diagnostic factors including foundational and applied validity. Finally, we highlight key knowledge gaps and propose promising directions for future research to improve evaluations of expertise in a range of contexts.
AB - This review addresses a critical societal problem that psychology is uniquely positioned to address: the challenge of distinguishing genuine experts from pseudo-experts. Determining which experts to trust is essential for both routine and high-stakes decisions, yet evaluating expertise can be difficult. We examine the cognitive processes that underpin genuine expertise—such as learning, information search, memory, problem-solving, and skill transfer – and explore the disconnect between psychological insights into expertise and the practical methods used to evaluate it. In settings where expertise must be evaluated by laypeople, such as adversarial legal trials, laypeople face significant challenges, including knowledge disparities hindering analysis, communication barriers that impact the clear explanation of expert methods, and systemic constraints that limit the scrutiny of expert evidence. These challenges complicate the assessment of expert claims and contribute to wrongful convictions and unjust outcomes. To assist, we distinguish between ‘show-it’ and ‘know-it’ expert performances. The key difference is in their visibility, measurability, and immediacy: ‘know-it’ performances are particularly challenging and critical to interrogate. This distinction serves as a heuristic for identifying when evaluations of expertise require greater care and should incorporate a range of diagnostic factors including foundational and applied validity. Finally, we highlight key knowledge gaps and propose promising directions for future research to improve evaluations of expertise in a range of contexts.
M3 - Article
JO - Nature Reviews Psychology
JF - Nature Reviews Psychology
ER -