Security attacks on smart grid scheduling and their defences: a game theoretic approach

Mastaneh Davis

doi:10.1007/s10207-019-00460-z

Security attacks on smart grid scheduling and their defences: a game theoretic approach

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Abstract

The introduction of advanced communication infrastructure into the power grid raises a plethora of new opportunities to tackle climate change. This paper is concerned with the security of energy management systems which are expected to be implemented in the future smart grid. The existence of a novel class of false data injection attacks that are based on modifying forecasted demand data is demonstrated, and the impact of the attacks on a typical system’s parameters is identified, using a simulated scenario. Monitoring strategies that the utility company may employ in order to detect the attacks are proposed, and a game-theoretic approach is used to support the utility company’s decision-making process for the allocation of their defence resources. Informed by these findings, a generic security game is devised and solved, revealing the existence of several Nash equilibrium strategies. The practical outcomes of these results for the utility company are discussed in detail, and a proposal is made, suggesting how the generic model may be applied to other scenarios.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	427 - 443
Journal	International Journal of Information Security
Volume	19
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-019-00460-z
Publication status	Published - 2020

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10.1007/s10207-019-00460-z

Cite this

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title = "Security attacks on smart grid scheduling and their defences: a game theoretic approach",

abstract = "The introduction of advanced communication infrastructure into the power grid raises a plethora of new opportunities to tackle climate change. This paper is concerned with the security of energy management systems which are expected to be implemented in the future smart grid. The existence of a novel class of false data injection attacks that are based on modifying forecasted demand data is demonstrated, and the impact of the attacks on a typical system{\textquoteright}s parameters is identified, using a simulated scenario. Monitoring strategies that the utility company may employ in order to detect the attacks are proposed, and a game-theoretic approach is used to support the utility company{\textquoteright}s decision-making process for the allocation of their defence resources. Informed by these findings, a generic security game is devised and solved, revealing the existence of several Nash equilibrium strategies. The practical outcomes of these results for the utility company are discussed in detail, and a proposal is made, suggesting how the generic model may be applied to other scenarios.",

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AB - The introduction of advanced communication infrastructure into the power grid raises a plethora of new opportunities to tackle climate change. This paper is concerned with the security of energy management systems which are expected to be implemented in the future smart grid. The existence of a novel class of false data injection attacks that are based on modifying forecasted demand data is demonstrated, and the impact of the attacks on a typical system’s parameters is identified, using a simulated scenario. Monitoring strategies that the utility company may employ in order to detect the attacks are proposed, and a game-theoretic approach is used to support the utility company’s decision-making process for the allocation of their defence resources. Informed by these findings, a generic security game is devised and solved, revealing the existence of several Nash equilibrium strategies. The practical outcomes of these results for the utility company are discussed in detail, and a proposal is made, suggesting how the generic model may be applied to other scenarios.

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