DOCTORAL THESIS

Sport spectacle, globalisation and nation
A case study of South Korean women’s narratives of the 2004 Olympic Games and the 2006 FIFA World Cup

Oh, Miyoung

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Sport Spectacle, Globalisation and Nation: 
A Case Study of South Korean Women’s Narratives of 
The 2004 Olympic Games and the 2006 FIFA World Cup

By
Miyoung Oh

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 My Journey to ‘Sport Spectacle, Globalisation and Nation’

At 3 o’clock on the morning of 05 June 2002, wearing a red T-shirt with the ‘Be the Reds’ logo on it, my body wrapped up with a large national flag Tae-geuk-gi, my face embroidered with national symbols, I was in downtown Seoul, the capital of South Korea, with hundreds of thousands who forgot to return home, chanting, singing and dancing. The previous night, our national football team snatched a 2-0 victory over Poland and quenched our thirst on the first ever World Cup triumph. I was simmering with joy, excitement, and national pride. In the afternoon of 22 June, I was once again in City Hall Plaza, a major cheering point in Seoul during the 2002 FIFA World Cup. With friends I was again enveloped with our national flag with full face paintings and in the ‘national uniform’ of the red T-shirt. It was a scorching day with the murderous heat of 35 degrees but we did not even blink. Our national team was about to have a quarterfinal match against Spain. The agitated scoreless 90 minutes, injury time and extra time brought the nerve-breaking penalty shoot-out, and hundreds of thousands of us who packed the Plaza all stood up and held our breath kept in suspense, glaring at the gigantic screens. At last, South Korea 5 and Spain 3. Our nation became one of the final four. I again became hysterical, laughing, crying, hugging (whoever neared me), jumping up and down, screaming and dancing. A super-sized Tae-geuk-gi passed on overhead by our hands and we repeatedly sang together the rock version of our national folk song Arirang. With heart full of pride and celestial happiness, we marched into the night, continuing street celebration. Fireworks decorated the night sky, and my friends
and I again spent the night on the street. Once again it was a honey-sweet, dreamy and glorious night.

South Korea, ‘the land of calm morning’, was transformed in June 2002 to a ‘sea of Reds’ and a ‘sea of Tae-geuk-gi.’ The most loved, ear-piercing, staccato roar, Dae-han-min-kuk (the Republic of Korea in Korean) was chanted across the nation, and air was resonant with a spellbound sense of joy, pride and confidence. In total, 22 million South Koreans took to the streets during the 2002 World Cup with the great majority of them clad in red (02 July 2002, The Sportsseoul). From a toddler to an octogenarian, we South Koreans under the simple name of being South Korean gathered on the streets, in the parks, at schools and community halls around the nation and shook the small land with deafening shricks, chants, songs and dances. For the whole month of June 2002 I ate football, breathed football and slept football. I floated in a trance that I wished would last forever. I had simply lost my marbles and was overthrown by happiness and national pride. A ‘paradise’ was thus found in me, and it was a very special gift that the 2002 World Cup presented to me.

Sport has been claimed by some to provide the world’s diverse populations with a universal culture and language, and Nike founder Phil Knight proclaimed that sport is ‘the culture of the world’ (Katz, 1994: 86). Ironically, however, what I experienced and witnessed most notably during the biggest international football tournament was not ‘the culture of the world’; rather, it was the ‘culture of my own’. Amid many other nations, peoples and cultures, my main concern and interests rested in ours and this newly found appreciation left me to ruminate over my roots and identities. What also astonished me during the 2002 World Cup was South Korean women’s extraordinary level of enthusiasm and passion for football, which ran counter to a common perception of women’s disinterest in sport. Before I proceed further, I would like to clarify that,
throughout this thesis, the terms ‘South Korea’, ‘Korea’, and ‘North Korea’ will be used frequently. While ‘South’ and ‘North’ Koreas are self-explanatory, ‘Korea’ is being used inclusively, referring to both South and North Koreas as a united nation often prior to the division in 1948.

Under the rigid influence of Confucian ideology, which will be examined in chapter 2, Korea and South Korea have long been highly patriarchal. Women have been assigned to domesticity and the private space, and their roles, obligations and identities have been socially prescribed. In this social milieu, sport, regarded as an activity of the public space, has been rather matter-of-factedly considered exclusively as men’s spectacle and entertainment. South Korean women, accordingly, have been played down as insignificant fans when sport was concerned, as H. M., Kim argues (2005). Their disinterest in sport had been widely assumed, and their zeal and sincerity as the sport spectator trivialised and devalued. The 2002 World Cup brought substantial changes in such common perceptions. As mentioned earlier, approximately 22 millions of South Koreans are reported to have taken to the streets during the tournament in order to root for their national squad. With the South Korean team’s progress to the semi-final, the number of street supporters increased at an astonishing rate from 500,000 for South Korea’s first match against Poland to 770,000 against the U.S., 2,790,000 for the Portugal match, 4,200,000 for Italy, 5,000,000 for the quarter-final against Spain, and finally 7,000,000 for the semi-final against Germany (H. M., Kim, 2005). Not only the number but the components of the supporters were refreshingly surprising since ‘half or two thirds of those cheering the game were women’, who ‘filled the stadium and the streets with style and vibrant energy’ (H. M., Kim, 2005: 228) and who were sincere, passionate, heterogeneous fans of sport that deserved more respect (H. M., Kim, 2005). Considering South Korea’s traditionally conservative,
patriarchal culture, their active and enthusiastic participation in the 2002 World Cup spectacle was more than a simple wonder and bewildered many people. Witnessing the women’s behavioural and emotional explosion during the tournament, I also became intensely interested in issues of women, nation and sport.

Hence, my academic journey to the field of sport sociology, especially focusing on women, globalisation, national identities and sport spectacle, was born largely out of this personal experience. Reinharz maintains (1992) that a researcher’s personal experience can offer the starting point of a study, from which she can develop research questions or find people to research. This characteristic, she contends, bestows a special value upon research. According to her:

An aspect that distinguishes feminist research from conventional is that feminist authors and researchers frequently begin their writing with the personal connection and that their troubling or puzzling experience became a ‘need to know’ (1992: 261).

The 2002 FIFA World Cup was certainly an eye-opening and thought-provoking experience to me since it played a decisive role in my choice of research interests, questions and methods.

Indeed, during and after the tournament, greatly astonished by the sheer overwhelming size of female participants in street supporting, endless questions came across to my mind: why did I and other women take to the streets and sit on the boiling asphalt under the sweltering heat? Why did we cry over the victories on the football pitch? Why were the victories so important to us? What did we feel proud of exactly through football? How influential would the 2002 World Cup experience be on our lives and identities? Would it affect the way we were? If so, in what ways would it be so? What is the significance of the international sport events to us today? How do the
nation and the global intersect in the international sport competitions? How do they help us understand ourselves and others in the globalising world? As Reinharz asserts (1992: 261), these questions became an intense ‘need to know’ to me, and therefore, I carefully selected my research questions. In general, I wanted to ask questions about relationship between sport spectacle and the construction and/or maintenance of South Korean women’s gender and national identities in a global context. My specific research questions will be articulated in section 2.5 in chapter 2.

In addition, I believed that answers to my research questions can be best obtained through qualitative research, interviews in particular for my investigation. It is from my firm belief that the finer or fuller details of various aspects of human life can hardly be adequately explained by numbers, figures or statistics. The rich descriptions of people’s daily lives and insight into their thoughts on the meanings of their existence can be procured most ideally through conversation with them, and this positions interviewing as the best methods for my research objectives. Also, quantitative research often marginalises or trivialises opinions or views expressed by a small number of people in favour of those by a greater number, which made quantitative methods unsuitable for my interrogation. Since I was interested in finding out South Korean women’s narratives as varied as possible within the chosen participants, qualitative research appeared again most appropriate for my research, and it was, subsequently, selected as the main technique for the research. Another point I would like to emphasise in relation to this is that post-structuralist tradition was the stance I have adopted as the principle of my attitudes towards the interview participants and their responses. It symbolised my pledge for equal respect and treatment in value for all of the comments and remakes made by the participants. The details of my methodology and methods will be delineated in chapter 3.
Generally, feminist research, which is the main character of my research, is hardly interested in searching for ‘pure truth’ (Harding, 1987: 8). Instead, it aims to uncover underlying forces behind oppression imposed upon marginalised groups in society in order to ultimately bring about a political recognition and changes in society (Harding, 1987). By documenting and presenting a variety of the experiences and opinions of the interviewed women on issues of gender, nation and sport, I hoped that my findings would contribute to the heightening of interest in female sport spectators, women’s sports and sportswomen in South Korea and beyond, which could and would invite improvement in both the media and public treatment of women sport spectators, women’s sports and sportswomen. The details of the contribution and achievements of my research will be addressed in chapter 7.

1.2 Women and Sport Spectacle

Maguire (1999: 176) asserts that when international sports contests were developed in the late 19th century, they became a form of patriot games in which ‘particular views of national identities and habitus codes’ were constructed and represented. ‘Sport’, he continues to argue (1999: 176), ‘remains an arena where processes of habitus/identity testing and formation are conducted’. What is significant is that ‘the particular views of national identities and habitus codes’ Maguire talks of are heavily gendered: male-centred, universalising male experiences and perspectives. From its very inception, modern sport has displayed (white, middle-upper class and heterosexual) male-dominant, male-exclusive features. According to Messner (1988), the creation of modern sport had been driven by the white middle class men in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries who encountered the swirl of social and political changes which
threatened their status quo. They felt dire needs for an ideology to create, strengthen and/or reinforce their ‘natural superiority’ over women and over race-and-class-subordinated groups of men. Thus was born modern sport, closely linked with men and masculinity. The long-standing close connection between sport and masculinity has since strategically promoted the naturalisation of the ‘common sense’ that sport is a for-men-and-by-men activity. This has resulted in sport culture, sport fandom and sport spectatorship being routinely considered as an arena that provides ‘important forms and occasions, through which many people, particularly males, attribute meaning to their lives’ (Roche, 2000: 166-7; my emphasis). Repeated foregrounding of male experiences and perspectives as the mainstream of sport culture and spectacle has produced the distortion and misunderstanding of women’s interest in, and passion for, sport and sport spectacle.

The marginalisation of women in sport has also taken place in Korea and South Korea. Coupled with Korea’s and South Korea’s conservative, patriarchal culture, modern sport greatly contributed to the naturalisation of gender differences and relations. Modern sports, such as gymnastics, track and field, football, baseball, basketball, tennis, swimming, ice skating, and cycling, were first introduced to Korea as a school curriculum by Christian missionaries in the late 19th century, when Korea’s last dynasty Chosŏn opened harbour Pusan for the first time to western countries (Korea Sport Council, 1990 cited in J. Y., Lee, 2002: 74). It was a period when, under strict patriarchal codes, women in Korea were not sent to school. It is, therefore, not difficult to imagine that modern sport introduced to Korea around that period was predominantly designed for men, and played and watched by men. Korea was colonised by Japan in the early 20th century for 35 years, during which Koreans expressed their nationalistic sentiments and resistance to Japan through sport, particularly on the
football pitch (J. Y., Lee, 2002). Again, it is readily imaginable that Koreans’ resistance and patriotism through football matches were expressed predominantly by Korean men, not women.

During the nation-building period (from the 1960s through the 1980s), Confucianism was repackaged by the state as the ‘authentic’ South Korean culture and facilitated gender hierarchy and differences (S. S., Moon, 1998). As well, after the experiences of colonisation and foreign domination, the state’s principal policy centred around militarism, preserving or solidifying male superiority (H. J., Jung, 2005; S. S., Moon, 1998), and this has in turn significantly shaped and determined women’s experiences of sport. Hence, throughout Korean and South Korean history, strict gender codes have been in operation, and this has considerably affected the way South Korean women understand and experience sport and nation. H. M., Kim (2005) notes two topics South Korean women are said to feel bored to hear or discuss most: one is men talking about football and the other men talk about their lives in the military army. What bores them most is, she goes on to say, said to be men talking about their experiences of playing football at the military army. This is a joke one often hears in South Korea. Nevertheless, it conveys a sentiment prevalent among South Koreans, women and men alike. Women have long been assumed to be disinterested in sport; therefore, their ‘possible’ interest has been disregarded and devalued. Sport in South Korea has been popularly regarded as a by-men-and-for-men activity, thus highly influential in ‘making gender’ (Dworking and Messner, 2002: 17).

However, throughout my life I have met a number of South Korean women who have shown equal or greater interest and passion in sport spectacle than men. Those women and my own personal experience as a sport fan have puzzled me over the alleged relation between women and sport spectacle. The widespread assumption is,
‘Sport audiences divide along gender lines more markedly than most program forms’ (Whannel, 1998: 222). In other words, women have been supposed to be drawn more to soap operas while men more to sports. A consequence of such supposition has been the marginalisation of female audiences by the mainstream sport media. However, as will be discussed throughout the thesis, women’s relations with sport are far more complicated than what has been widely assumed. Many women are passionate sport fans who enjoy watching sports and are willing to (re)arrange their daily routines to accommodate sport viewing. Of course, many women I interviewed expressed their general disinterest in sport, preferring soap operas or other entertainment programmes. They complained that the Olympics-saturated South Korean media during the Olympics was too excessive or unbearable. Indeed, during the Athens Olympics, regular television programs were often cancelled, interrupted or moved to another time slot to broadcast live Olympic coverage, leaving audiences few options to choose from. What was noteworthy from the research was that, nevertheless, the Olympics and the qualifying matches for the 2006 FIFA World Cup did draw willing and voluntary viewership from the majority of the interviewed women. Even those who claimed to be far from being a sport fan watched the Olympics and the qualifying matches. Findings of this research will indicate that sport viewing is a conscious and deliberate choice of many women, unlike the common assumption.

Perhaps of even greater significance within the findings of the research is the discovery of sheer zeal and enthusiasm many interviewees revealed about sport spectacle. Many women who participated in the interviews actively accommodated sport viewing in their daily routines during the Olympic period and the World Cup qualifying matches. They gladly had their sleep disturbed or deprived, or their schedules rearranged to watch the sport. Some employed various techniques for the
viewing: setting an alarm clock not to miss certain games, listening on the mobile phone for live coverage on the way home, searching for restaurants that showed the games on television, or waiting till 2 or 3 in the morning in spite of having to get up early in the morning for work. A number of them were in fact obsessive followers of the Olympics or the qualifying football matches. These findings challenge the popular assumption of the remote relations between women and sport spectacle and instead, it supports that ‘if audience size is taken into account, far more women than commonly assumed watch the sports’ (Whannel, 1998: 223).

This research will also reveal a diversity of sport women enjoy watching, which stands to refute the claim that women are attracted more to slow-paced or less brutal sports while men are drawn more to contact, high-performance or fast-paced sports (Wenner and Gantz, 1989). The interviewees’ favourite sports were found to range from ‘traditionally’ feminine or non-contact sport, such as gymnastics, swimming, diving and tennis to ‘traditionally’ masculine sports, such as marathon, 100m sprinting, shooting, judo and wrestling. Regardless of the involvement of South Korean delegates, several women were found to closely follow their favourite sporting events including the World Athletic Championship, the English Premier League and the European football league. They were also knowledgeable about the players and/or rules of sports they followed. With these empirical findings, I hope to open up the commonly assumed relations between women, sport and nation to re-interrogation.

1.3 Nation and National Identities

Greatly promoted by global media technology, international sport events have become global cultural practices and connected a vast part of the globe, establishing a
sense of connectedness that transcends physical distance. A large number of the global population have become able to take part in them on various levels in various manners, most commonly by rooting for their national delegates via the media. The international sport context is two-fold in character. It promotes the idea of a connected, interdependent ‘one world’ that transcends cultural, political or ideological differences. It encourages the temporary forgetfulness of conflicts or strife and attempts to paint the future of the world as rosy. Under the ideal of the promotion of global peace and harmony, nations around the world come together and compete before global eyes to achieve or solidify global recognition and respect. South Korea is not an exception in this regard. It dispatches at great expenditure a large number of delegates to the Olympic Games every 4 years, partaking in almost all of the Olympic sports, including those with no prospect of winning any medal. Qualification for the FIFA World Cup has also become the nation’s mission.

On the other hand, by bringing nations together on the single stage, international sport events foreground the nation and national identities. Sugden and Tomlinson claim (2003) that an international football match, for example, reminds people of their national belonging. Replete with national symbols and images, global sport contests appear to unite people of a nation and bring them closer to one another. There is surely something special and meaningful about the ‘nation’ in this sense. The ‘nation’ has been particularly strongly felt and meaningful to many South Koreans due to a series of ‘national crises’ in the Korean and South Korean history, such as the history of colonisation, the Korean War, the partitioning of the peninsula and the confrontation with North Korea. Particularly in recent years, South Koreans have seen a succession of upheavals of patriotic or nationalist sentiments over issues that were closely related to their nation and their own identities.
An example that emphatically demonstrated South Koreans’ deep concerns about their nation and its future was the so-called ‘Gold Collecting Movement,’ which took place after the initial shock of the economic crisis, which hit the economy of several Asian countries including South Korea hard in 1997. The South Korean currency was depreciated to a third within weeks, national debts sharply multiplied and South Korea’s businesses were shaken from the core. In these circumstances, the national economy was barely saved by loans from International Monetary Fund (IMF). It was during this period when millions of South Koreans across the nation voluntarily donated gold or golden jewellery they possessed to help out their debt-ridden government pay off the national debts. According to The Hankyoreh (9 January 1998), gold collected within 5 days since it began mounted to close to 25 tons, donated by 200,000 people nationwide; later that year, The Chosun Ilbo revealed (19 October 1998) that foreign currency that was earned in exchange for the gold collected through the movement was about US$2 billion. With such outpouring of patriotic sentiment and financial assistance from the public, the South Korean government repaid its foreign debts ahead of schedule (2 June 2002, The Observer), and this incident was mentioned by several interviewed women as one of the proudest moments in their lives about their nation and fellow citizens.

South Koreans’ worries and deep concerns over their nation and its future were also forcefully expressed by their overwhelming surge of bitterness and resentment on the abandonment of the South Korean nationality of some South Koreans with dual nationalities. In May 2005, young South Korean males with dual nationalities rushed to give up their South Korean citizenship in a bid to avoid the mandatory military service. A new law, which was passed on 4 May, stipulated that a male with more than two nationalities must finish the obligatory military service before he be allowed to desert
his South Korean citizenship. As the new law was to take effect in the following month, many minors with dual nationalities or their parents rushed to abandon their South Korean nationality. The statistics revealed that, during the less than 3-week grace period, 1,692 people gave up their South Korean citizenship (25 May 2005, The Hankyoreh), nearly all of whom were young males (7 June 2005, The Hankyoreh). In spite of the relatively small number, the issue flared vehement resentment across the nation in May and June 2005. In an era when individual rights are highly respected, celebrated and often prioritised, and when global migration or movement routinely takes place, such response may appear unreasonable. Along with other issues intimately interlinked, such as gender and class, at the heart of the dispute were the future and continuity of the nation, which was perceived by many to be in great danger, more crucially, not by foreign hands but by its own. The significance and implications of the issue were likewise deeply concerned about the nation and once again offered an opportunity to contemplate upon meaning of the nation to many South Koreans including myself.

Additionally, South Koreans’ anxieties, fears and dreams about their nation were clearly manifest over the rise and fall of Dr. Hwang Woo-suk. In May 2005 Dr. Hwang announced his success in the creation of the first clone human embryo, which was believed to bring medicine a step closer to the possibility of curing illnesses such as Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s and diabetes. Dr. Hwang’s landmark research was expected to revolutionise modern medicine and accordingly, generated enormous global applaud and respect: ‘one of the greatest hopes of the stem cell field’ (20 May, 2005, The New York Times,) and one of the biggest medical news of the year (5 December 2005, Time). In August 2005, he astonished the world again by unveiling Snuppy, world’s first cloned dog. He burst into international prominence as world’s leading cloning king, and
also quickly emerged among great many South Koreans as one of the greatest national heroes. He and his research came to symbolise ‘the pride of South Korea’.

That national and international superstar was by the end of 2005 subjected to fierce national and international controversies, initially over his ethical lapses in his research and later over the fabrication of his research. The disputes were triggered by a television program, which questioned his ethical practices involved in his research, eventually leading to the scientist’s admission and apology for ethical lapses in his work. What was striking and noteworthy was many South Koreans’ response after Dr. Hwang’s apology. The TV program and television station suffered incessant and indiscriminate abuse and threat, being blamed for having damaged the nation’s prestigious reputation in the globe. The closing-down of the program was stubbornly and persistently demanded, and a campaign to sabotage the program’s sponsors took place, which resulted in the sponsorship withdrawal from all of its 11 corporations.

Despite the discovery of Dr. Hwang’s fatal and crucial mistakes involved in his research and his admission, those who were not siding Dr. Hwang were regarded as a national traitors. The BBC was correct to point out (25 November 2005) that ‘with patriotic sentiment running so high [in South Korea], it was hard for skeptics to get their voices heard’. Months later, the same television program broadcast a sequence, which claimed, more shockingly, that Dr. Hwang’s findings were not ‘findings’ but ‘fabrications’, which was also eventually found to be correct. As a consequence, South Korea’s reputation in the international science community has been severely dented. A key issue throughout the incident was South Koreans’ worries, hopes and dreams about their nation, and their strong desire for global recognition and respect, however blind, irrational or unreasonable it seemed under the circumstances.
The incidents such as the gold-collecting movement, nationality abandonment and Dr. Hwang all demonstrate South Koreans’ concerns, dreams and longings regarding their nation. They also exhibit South Koreans’ strong identification of their own future and continuity as intricately linked to those of their nation. Bairner (2001) argues that each nation demonstrates unique nationalism and national identities due to its own social, cultural, historical and/or political backgrounds. South Korea’s unique socio-cultural, historical and political backgrounds have formed an expression of nationalism and national identities that differ from those of others. This research intends to examine what ‘South Korea’ means to the interviewed women, and what are the forms and characteristics of their national identities.

1.4 Nationhood and Ethnicity

A most distinguishable feature of South Koreanness through those incidents mentioned above is, no matter how irrational or immoral it seems, South Koreans’ powerful unification in times of perceived national crisis, and this brings us back to South Koreans’ enthusiastic street supporting during the 2002 World Cup. By the 2002 World Cup began, South Korea’s economy had considerably recovered from the economic shock hit in the late 1990s; nevertheless, many South Koreans perceived their nation’s reputation still staggering due to the reminiscent of that blow. The 2002 World Cup coincided with a time when South Koreans felt urged to demonstrate to the world their nation’s successful rebound in such a short period, and they perceptively conceived the World Cup as a golden opportunity to do so. Their enthusiastic street cheering was, therefore, their symbolic and emphatic announcement of their ‘comeback’. The 2002 World Cup evidences that sport can exercise a forceful binding
power. Indeed, international sport events may be one of the few forces that can mobilise people to unite to an overwhelming degree. As mentioned earlier, sport and international sport competitions remind people of their belonging. This belonging is, however, not clear-cut for many South Koreans due to the presence of North Korea.

South Koreans’ perceptions of North Korea have been shifted rather dramatically since the mid 1990s. Since the division of the Korean peninsula in 1948 until recently, the images of North Korea had been constructed to degrade and demonise the communist regime. During the Cold War era, North Koreans had routinely been depicted as half human, red-skinned devils or communists that threatened the South’s national survival and identities, that is, it had been portrayed mainly as South Korea’s deadly foe. Naturally, South Koreanness in this period was greatly defined by ‘not being North Korean.’ Sport had been a battleground between the two Koreas. The two Koreas had refused to partake in sport events where the other participated; when both met, rivalry was fierce because victories were conceived as a symbolic representation of one’s political and ideological superiority to the other. Recent years, however, saw considerable shift in South Koreans’ perceptions and attitudes towards North Korea, primarily due to the political thawing mood between the two Koreas, initiated largely by the South Korean Government’s ‘Sunshine Policy’, which emphasises peace and reconciliation on the Korean peninsula. South Koreans have since become able to express their personal opinions or sentiments for North Korea more openly and publicly than before, and sport also saw its effect. During the 2004 Athens Olympics and the qualifying matches for the 2006 FIFA World Cup, the South Korean media presented North Koreans in an extremely friendly term, and a number of South Koreans displayed an unprecedented level of support for the North Korean delegates and teams, which was also manifested in the interviews I conducted.
An interesting finding from the interviews was the drastic shift in the women’s perceptions of North Korea: from a demon and prominent ‘Other’ to ‘half sister’ country related to South Koreans by blood. The responsibility for such a quick shift in their perceptions was purported to be their perceived ethnic tie between the two Koreas. Of course, the interviewees’ perceptions of North Korea were diverse, ambiguous and contradictory. While several interviewees considered North Korea as a separate state that had hardly anything to do with South Korea, many more revealed their confusion and ambiguity in their definitions of North Korea and some others identified the North as their own. Overall, the majority of the interviewees exhibited sympathy for North Koreans on the basis of an ethnic tie and, therefore, were willing to assist. A form of their assistance was their support for their Government’s bountiful aid to North Korea and also their support for North Korean delegates and teams at the Athens Olympics and the World Cup qualifying matches. The majority of the interviewees also welcomed and applauded the South Korean media’s friendly representations of the North.

While South Koreans’ perceptions of North Korea have often been ambiguous and confusing, those of Japan have remained relatively singular: Korea’s and South Korea’s old enemy. Such a reputation for Japan has been established by its frequent invasions to the Korean peninsula throughout Korean and South Korean history and consolidated by its colonisation of Korea in the early 20th century. It has also become more intensified in recent years for South Korea and Japan have repeatedly collided and engaged in fierce political controversies, such as the sovereignty over Dok-do (an inhabited island situated in East Sea), Japan’s distortion of its history textbooks and its former Prime Minister’s repeated worship at Yasukuni shrine. These recent political hot potatoes have confirmed and reinforced Japan’s image as South Korea’s old enemy. Japan has,
accordingly, remained South Korea’s prominent ‘Other’, against which South Korea must achieve triumphs in and beyond sport. Such perceptions were, nevertheless, found to be in the process of change and remaking with the emergence of new socio-cultural and political relations between South Korea and Japan. This research was designed in part to unravel the interviewees’ perceptions of North Korea and Japan to better grasp the women’s identities, and this also revealed their anxieties, concerns, hopes and dreams about their nation, as well as their distinctive national identities.

1.5 Summary

The thesis consists of seven chapters. Following this Introduction, the Literature Review chapter will introduce a variety of theorisations relevant to the themes of this research, which ranges from the nation, national identities, globalisation and gender. At the heart of this chapter are themes and issues of national, ethnic and gender identities. Globalisation provides the overall framework of this research. The nation and national identities will be theorised in the context of globalisation, and the complex relations between the nation, globalisation and sport will also be examined in detail. South Korea’s socio-cultural, historical and political environments will be followed by the theorisations of its relations to North Korea and Japan. The final several sections will discuss the conceptualisations of gender, nation and sport, and their relations to one another, along with South Korea’s founding myth, Confucian culture and militarism. Complex relations between the nation, national identities, globalisation and gender will thus be comprehensively theorised in this chapter, which will end with the presentation of the research questions.
The Methodology chapter opens with the introduction of the paradigm of the research, which is feminism and feminist scholarship. As will be explained in the chapter, my primary intention in the research was to offer South Korean women an opportunity to speak about their experiences of nation and sport and to document them. That intention of mine is deeply political and makes this research a profoundly feminist one. Research methods selected for the research, such as the focus group and individual interviews, will be discussed and rationalised. Additionally, media studies and audience reception studies will be conceptualised since their techniques were also employed as part of the research methods. Crucially, the chapter will present the theories of the interpretive research. This stemmed from my understanding that, despite my every intention to document the interviewed women’s voices as they were said, it was eventually my own interpretation of the interviews, upon which the discussions were predicated. My personal background accordingly, will be briefed as it clearly has an impact on my interpretation. As well, coming from the post-structuralist feminist tradition, an effort has been made throughout the thesis to avoid categorising the interviewees as a single group of ‘women’. They were treated as individuals, who have come from particular stories and backgrounds.

The Discussion of the thesis consists of three chapters, the first of which interrogates the relations between globalisation and national identities. Globalisation theories, particularly those of Giddens (1990) and Tomlinson (1999), have been adopted as the main theoretical tools to explore the interviewees’ perceptions and understanding of their nation and themselves revealed through their spectacle of the 2004 Athens Olympics and the qualifying matches for the 2006 FIFA World Cup. The debates and narratives of the women’s arguments and/or personal stories will uncover their anxieties, pride, hopes and longings about their nation in the global context. Moreover,
the ways in which they make sense of the meaning of ‘South Korea’ and envisage their nation will be examined, and their ideal nationhood will also be investigated at the end of the chapter. This chapter will also interrogate the ways in which the global and the interviewees’ global consciousness change the meanings and values of the international sport events and ultimately their own existence.

The second discussion chapter explores the interviewees’ perceptions of South Korea’s two most prominent ‘Others’, North Korea and Japan. As noted earlier, North Korea can never be conceived of without ambiguity for many South Koreans due to the perceived ethnic tie. The first half of the chapter will investigate how the interviewees perceive North Korea and how their perceptions influence their identities. National identities in relation to North Korea will be theorised on the basis of an ethnic tie and the nation as a historical community that shares founding myth, values, history, customs and history (Hastings, 1997; Smith, 1990, 1991, 1998). On the other hand, the interviewees’ perceptions of Japan will be conceptualised mainly by Hall’s theorisation (1990) of cultural identities as a product of the narratives of the past. Old and newly emerging relations between South Korea and Japan will be looked at in a broader network of South Korea’s society, culture, history and politics. Equally important is the discussion over shifts in the women’s perceptions of the two ‘Others’. In so doing, I will argue that identity involves a journey or a process that is subject to change and is always in constant (re)-negotiation.

The final discussion chapter deals with the interviewees’ gender identities, considered through their debates about sportswomen and sportsmen. The media representations of sportswomen and sportsmen will also be analysed and more importantly, the interviewees’ various readings of the media images will be extensively examined to identify their understandings of femininities and masculinities and of
womanhood and manhood. I focused on the different ways similar qualities and characteristics of sportswomen and sportsmen were read and how such readings contributed to envisaging the interviewees’ idea of nationhood. Furthermore, shifts in the interviewees’ perceptions of gender will be interrogated, indicating that identities are not static or fixed but flexible and subject to change. All of the discussions will be contextualised within South Korea’s socio-cultural, historical and political contexts.

The conclusion chapter summarises this extensive discussion and more importantly, it analyses implications and significance of the research findings. I conclude by underscoring the intersectionality of nation, ethnicity and gender in the construction of the South Korean women’s identities because nation, ethnicity and gender are facets of their identities that operate simultaneously and/or alternatively on various levels. The chapter ends with the presentation of the achievements and contribution of the research to existing knowledge, together with the suggestions for further research.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Today, identities are claimed to be ‘in crisis’ (Mercer, 1990; Wheaton, 2000). The argument runs that, in ‘traditional’ society, one’s identity was relatively fixed and stable, predicated largely upon a range of identifiers such as work, gender, ethnicity, religion, and age (Kellner, 1992). Whether or not one’s identities were ever once fixed and stable is arguable; nevertheless, identities in today’s world certainly have different characteristics from those in the past. That is, the traditional collective sources of identities, membership or belonging have been fragmented, individualised and displaced today due largely to post-modernity and globalisation. Consequently, identities are said to become fragmented, diversified, multiple, personal, self-reflexive and subject to exchange and innovation (Featherstone, 1991, 1995; Hetherington, 1998; Kellner, 1992; Mercer, 1990; Wheaton, 2000). Accordingly, a number of scholars have strived to define ‘identities’ in non-essential and non-deterministic terms. Among numerous positions, post-structuralists and post-modernists define identities as a process, a life-long journey, which shifts from day to day, and throughout one’s life time (Ang, 1996; Butler, 1999; Hall, 1990).

One of the characteristics of post-modernity is argued to be the break-down of the master narratives, which denies any all-conquering narrative (Harvey, 1989; Lyotard, 1993). In other words, one’s identities nowadays are so finely fragmented at the intersection of gender, class, race, nation, ethnicity, sexuality and so on. A problematic of this assertion is that, so many people today appear committed to, and even willing to make a sacrifice for, their nations, and so many people define themselves primarily on the basis of gender, nationality, ethnicity and race. On the other hand, the influence of
globalisation on people’s daily routines and their existence is unavoidable, and in this new social world, transnational or global identities are claimed to be emerging or have emerged, changing people’s relation to themselves, others and their nations (Giddens, 1990; Robertson, 1990, 1992; Tomlinson, 1999).

In this chapter, a variety of conceptualisations of the nation, national identities, globalisation, gender and sport will be introduced. A number of theories of the nation and national identities will be first explored in the context of globalisation. Following these are the theorisations of gender and sport, feminist scholarship in sociology of sport and the research questions for this study. The interviewees’ identity construction will be interrogated within South Korea’s socio-cultural, historical, political contexts, as well as its relations to North Korea and Japan. More importantly, sport will be the vehicle through which all these conceptualisations are applied and tested.

2.2 Theorising the Nation, National Identities and Globalisation

Weeks (1990) and Hetherington (1998) suggest that identities are fundamentally about belonging. If so, one can have numerous groups, affiliations or communities that she feels a particular sense of belonging to, and one notable community is nation, which creates a sense of nationality in her. Indeed, the notions of the ‘nation’ and national identities have generated numerous heated scholarly debates, having been claimed to be ‘the most pertinent form of collective identity nowadays’ (Triandafyllidou, 1998: 593). Before proceeding any further, it is important to distinguish the terms the ‘nation’, the ‘state’ and the ‘nation-state’ from each other. The definition of the state is relatively straightforward, compared to that of the ‘nation’.
Gellner (1983: 3) defines the state as ‘one special, clearly identified, and well centralised, disciplined agency within society’, ‘among the various sanctions of the maintenance of order’. For him (1983: 4), the ‘state’ also means an ‘institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of order’. The classical Weberian definition of the state proposes that the ‘state’ is:

[T]he political organization where ‘its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order’ within a given territory (Weber, 1948 cited in Smith, 1998: 70).

As a result, there appears to be a consensus that the meaning of the ‘state’ centres largely upon its being an institution with various functions: administration, bureaucracy, enforcement of order and/or centralised power.

On the other hand, defining the ‘nation’ is notoriously difficult and evasive (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Tishkov, 2000; Triandafyllidou, 1998). Alter (1989: 11) suggests that the ‘nation’ is a historically, linguistically, culturally, religiously and politically related social group, which ‘has become conscious of its coherence, political unity and particular interests’. Giddens, on the other hand, refers a nation as:

[A] collectivity existing within a clearly demarcated territory, which is subject to a unitary administration, reflexively monitored both by the internal state apparatus and those of other states (1985: 116).

The elusive and evasive nature of the definition of the nation frustrates Seton-Watson, who found himself:

[D]riven to the conclusion that no ‘scientific definition’ of a nation can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists. All that I can find to say is that a nation exists when a significant number of people in
a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one (1977: 5).

Additionally, ‘When a significant group holds this belief, it possesses ‘national consciousness’, he asserts (1977: 5). ‘National consciousness’ throughout the thesis refers to Alter’s definition (1989: 12): ‘the sense of belonging to a political and social community which constitutes, or wishes to constitute, a nation organized as a state’. He (1989: 5) also considers ‘the value of the nation’ to be ‘its capacity as the sole, binding agency of meaning and justification’.

The ‘nation-state’ is the congruence of nation and state (Gellner, 1983). Alter (1989) and Yuval-Davis (1997) suggest that the ‘nation-state’ is, in fact, a fiction. Alter maintains that, although the creation of the nation-state is ‘the culmination of individual self-determination and of the sovereignty of the people’ (1989: 66), ‘the multitudes of ethnic variations and distortions make it to all practical intents and purposes impossible for cultural nation and state perfectly to overlap’ (1989: 80). Since the French and American Revolutions, ‘the nation-state has become the sole legitimating principle of the order of states’ (Alter, 1989: 67) and also become the ‘dominant vehicle of collective identity’ (Smith, 1998: 70). Since a nation-state is constituted by the complete correspondence of nation and state, as mentioned above, it is a rarity in today’s world. According to Alter (1989: 6), ‘a nation may certainly exist without its own state, and also a state without a unified nation’. Some nations have never had their own states, such as the Palestinians; some others are divided across several states like the Kurds; nations, such as Scots, Tamils, Sikhs, Basques, Tibetans, Catalan and Welsh, do not have their own states (Alter, 1989; Yuval-Davis, 1997). Moreover, a number of nations, such as Belgium, Romania, Switzerland and Russia, clearly belong in the multinational category (Alter, 1989). The Korean peninsular, in this sense, is a nation
with two states. Gellner claims (1983: 6) that nations and states are ‘a contingency, not a universal necessity’, but they are not the same contingency. He goes onto argue (1983: 6) that ‘nationalism holds that they were destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete and constitutes a tragedy’. According to Alter (1989: 66), ‘nationalism locates the identity of the nation and the state in the nation-state’.

As the concept of the ‘nation’ is ever evasive, some scholars such as Tishkov (2000) suggest denouncing the concept itself. Attempts to define the ‘nation’ may be frustrating because, as discussed, the nation and nationalism ‘appear in an ever greater diversity of forms and configurations, changing and constantly reinventing the phenomena’ (Triandafyllidou, 1998: 594). Therefore, as Alter notes (1989: 6), despite the enormous attempts, ‘none has been accepted as a generally valid concept’. Yet, because of the immense influence nation, nationalism and national identities have exerted on the modern world, ‘the nation’ has been ‘one of the most discussed concepts in modern social and political thought’ (Bairner, 2001: 2), and continuous endeavours have been made in academia to conceptualise the term. Among many, two contrasting theoretical positions, so-called the modernists and the primordialists, have gained weight in the debates on the nation, which will be introduced in the following two sections.

2.2.1 The Modernists - The ‘Nation’ as Social Construct

The modernists define the nation as a social construct, dating its birth to the 18th or the 19th centuries. The proponents of this stance include Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983) and Hobsbawm (1983, 1990). Hobsbawm argues (1983: 13) that ‘the nation’ is an ‘‘comparatively recent historical innovation’ with its associated phenomena: nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, histories and the rest.’ His
conceptualisation of the nation is deeply related to ‘invented traditions.’ The invention of traditions is by no means a modern phenomenon, he admits (1983), because it took place in past ages as well; however, it is expected to occur more frequently nowadays due to fast-moving and rapidly transforming aspects of today’s society, in which ‘new’ traditions are expected to replace ‘old’ traditions that appear no longer adequate or appropriate. Invented traditions are, for Hobsbawm, essentially constitutive of the nation. ‘Modern nations’, he argues (1983: 14), seem to be ‘the opposite of constructed, namely human communities so ‘natural’ as to require no definition other than self-assertion’. However, the concept of the nation ‘must include a constructed or ‘invented’ component’ and that ‘the national phenomenon cannot be adequately investigated without careful attention to the ‘invention of tradition’, he asserts (1983: 14). He reiterates this argument again in Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (1990), in which he claims that ‘in its modern and basically political sense, the concept nation is historically very young’ (1990: 17-18).

Anderson (1983) also advocates ‘the nation’, along with nationalism and nationality, as a social construct and cultural artefacts. For him, it is a ‘recent’ modern phenomenon, which originated in the late 18th and the early 19th centuries. He states (1983: 46) that ‘the large cluster of new political entities’ ‘sprang up in the western hemisphere between 1778 and 1838, all of which self-consciously defined themselves as nations’. These nations, he continues (1983: 46), were ‘historically the first such states to emerge on the world stage’, providing ‘the first real model of what such states should “look like”’. The nationhood, according to him (1983: 22), emerged out of, and replaced, religious communities and dynastic realms because ‘a fundamental change was taking place in modes of apprehending the world, which more than anything else, make it possible to ‘think’ the nation’. This change was brought forward by the emergence of
print technology and capitalism, and the convergence of the two was what made it possible to ‘imagine’ the nation.

Anderson maintains (1983) that the ‘imagined’ nationhood becomes ‘real’ through representations, notably the newspaper and the novel, which began to be widely circulated among the European public in the 19th century. The novel and the newspaper provided ‘the technical means for ‘re-presenting’ the kind of imagined community that is the nation’, Anderson insists (1983: 25; italics in original). The structuring and stretching of the imagination of the nation was, he goes on to argue (1983: 36), greatly benefited from ‘print-capitalism, which made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways’. He (1983: 6-7), therefore, proposes the nation as ‘an imagined political community’.

Defining the nation is more difficult than defining the state, Gellner argues (1983). He presents two provisional definitions of the nation, one of which defines the ‘nation’ in a cultural term in which culture means ‘system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating’ (1983: 7). The other definition notes that a nation is also formed when members of the nation recognise one another, their ‘mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it’ (1983: 7).

These cultural and voluntaristic definitions are unsatisfactory as both bring ‘far too rich a catch’, Gellner concludes (1983: 53, 54). The first definition is not adequate because of the fuzziness of cultural boundaries or differentiations while the second is failing unsatisfactory as it can apply to any other groups, teams, parties or communities. Accordingly, instead he suggests (1983: 55) that ‘nations can be defined in terms of the age of nationalism’. He further argues (1983: 55) that ‘it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round’ and that nationalism very selectively
uses the pre-existing, historical cultures and often radically transforms them. Hobsbawm (1990) shares the view with Gellner and maintains that nationalism is what invents nations. For him (1990: 177), nationalism means ‘nothing without the creation of nation-states’.

2.2.2 The Primordialists – The ‘Nation’ as Historical Community

Vigorous challenges to the modernists’ view come from those who claim ‘the nation’ as a historical community with common myths, memories, histories and cultures. Smith (1990, 1991, 1998), Hastings (1997), and Hutchinson (1994), as well as sport sociologist Hargreaves (2002), are some of the proponents of this position. Smith defines the nation as:

[A] named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members (1991: 14).

According to him (1998), the historical and linguistic narratives of national communities are essential to their survival, renewal and continuity. They, however, contain much more. They contain ‘symbols, myths, values and memories, attachments, customs and traditions, law, institutions, routines and habits’, all of which Smith (1998: 138) claims to make up ‘the complex community of the nation’. For him, the power and significance of nation lie in its ability to bind and mobilise people on the basis of those components, which deeply resonates with the majority of its population. He is adamant in his assertion (1998) that one’s awareness of her identities, survival and destiny being profoundly bounded up with her nation motivates her to feel devoted and make sacrifice for her nation when it is perceived in danger. More crucially, this strong sense
of allegiance or loyalty to the nation can hardly be achieved by simply ‘imagining’ nationhood, thus he forcefully counters Anderson.

Smith partially accepts the possibility of ‘inventing’ traditions to serve particular class or ethnic interests; however, he underscores (1998: 130) that ‘inventing traditions does not, and cannot, by itself enable elites to forge a national community out of ethnically heterogeneous populations’. In other words, invented traditions will only survive and flourish as part of national culture, ‘if they can be made continuous with a much longer past that members of that community presume to constitute their ‘heritage’’ (Smith, 1990: 178). For him (1990), being able to package ‘national’ imagery and disseminate it via global media technology to help a population imagine their nation is a very different issue from ensuring that the imagery exercises such great power to move and inspire the population, who has different histories, cultures and backgrounds. ‘The meaning of even the most universal imagery for a particular population derives as much from the historical experiences and social status of that group as from the intentions of purveyors’, Smith asserts (1990: 179).

Whereas Hobsbawm (1990) undermines the significance of ethnic tie in nationhood, Smith (1991, 1998) essentialises ethnicity as constitutive of the nation. An ethnic group means:

[A] type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasizes the role of myths of descent and historical memories, and that is recognized by one or more cultural differences like religion, customs, language or institutions (Smith, 1991: 20).

Defining ethnicity as such, Smith claims that it powerfully exerts a mobilising power on people even in the modern world. Appadurai also maintains (1990) that ‘primordia’, based on ethnic politics, whether linguistic, racial or kinship-related, have become
prevalent and globalised today and that an appeal to ethnic tie can evokes sentiments that could be translated to vehement political movements, inducing unity or solidarity among a group of population. Thus, ‘the sense of cultural intimacy deriving from ethnic tie binds the various classes and strata, and can provide, and has so often provided, the basis for forging a modern nation’, Smith insists (1998: 128-129). He thus offers insight into the complex affinity between cultural, ethnic and national identities as intricately constitutive of nationhood.

Hastings (1997) also rigorously counter-argues the modernists’ claim on the nation. Tracing English nationalism as early as the end of the 10th century, he challenges the modernists’ concept of ‘the nation’ as a modern social construct. In his book The Construction of Nationhood, Hastings delineates the existence and forms of English nationalism throughout English history to reinstate that English nationalism and England as a nation predate long before the 18th century. In so doing, he (1997: 6) dismisses Anderson’s claim of the English nation having emerged only in the 19th century as ‘totally implausible’. Hastings is emphatic in insisting:

[T]he defining origin of the nation needs to be located in an age a good deal further back than most modernist historians feel safe to handle, that of the shaping of medieval society (1997: 11-12).

As well, in a bid to challenge Hobsbawm’s and Gellner’s claim that nationalism precedes and engenders the nation, Hastings (1997) demonstrates the historical examples of nationalism. He insists that the expressions of nationalism are found prior to the 18th century, a period the modernists claim to be the origin of the nation. By providing the historic incidents of the outbursts of nationalism throughout English history before the 18th century, when people were largely unaware of the concept of ‘the nation’, Hastings refuses to accept the modernists’ assertion on nationalism.
Hobsbawm, from his understanding, has failed to notice the forms of nationalism expressed before the 18th century, therefore, for him (1997: 11), ‘Hobsbawm wrote a history of 19th and 20th century nationalism, but not a history of nationalism’. He goes on to criticise (1997: 11) that Hobsbawm’s ‘denial of the first half of the story has skewed the whole; in particular it impairs an understanding of the nation-nationalism relationship’.

The theories of the nation have significant implications for understanding national identity. That is, the comprehensive characteristics and components of ‘the nation’, discussed above, lead to the complex and abstract nature of national identity. Smith claims that ‘a national identity is fundamentally multi-dimensional’ (1991: 14) and provides a list of the fundamental features of national identity:

1. an historic territory, or homeland
2. common myths and historical memories
3. a common, mass public culture
4. common legal rights and duties for all members
5. a common economy with territorial mobility for its members (1991: 14)

Triandafyllidou (1998) also argues for the double-edged character of the national identity. She asserts (1998: 599) that, on the one hand, national identity emphasises ‘a set of common features that bind members of the nation together’; on the other hand, it underlines difference, through which a nation seeks to differentiate itself from others. Thus, she foregrounds the crucial role of ‘Others’ in the construction of national identity. Additionally, Barker suggests (2000: 198) that national identity is ‘an identification with representations of shared experiences and history told through stories, literature, popular culture and the media’, thereby bringing focus on the
narratives of the nation. Likewise, the precise nature of national identity is hard to articulate; nevertheless, Smith claims that a sense of national identity helps people define and locate their individual selves in the world. In other words, ‘through the prism of the collective personality and its distinctive culture’ and ‘through a shared, unique culture’, people come to understand ‘who they are’ (Smith, 1991: 17).

Discussion over the nation, nationalism and national identities is incomplete and partial unless it is contextualised in the broader context of globalisation. Globalisation has considerably changed the socio-cultural, political and ideological landscapes of many nations today and often compelled people to form new perspectives on themselves and their nation, as well as others. Accordingly, various theorisations of globalisation, presented below, argue that globalisation is integral nowadays to an investigation into one’s sense of belonging, allegiances or loyalty to her nation and ultimately into her identities.

2.2.3 Theorising Globalisation

‘Globalisation’, Tomlinson argues (1999: 1), ‘lies at the heart of modern culture’ and ‘cultural practices’ ‘at the heart of globalisation’; Giddens (1990) calls it ‘a consequence of modernity’. Given its huge influence on society and people’s lives nowadays, globalisation has been a vital subject among academics, and much of the debate has centred on two polemic positions: cultural homogenisation and cultural heterogenisation (Appadurai, 1990; Hargreaves, 2002; Jackson, 2001). The proponents of the cultural homogenisation perceive globalisation as inevitable, unidirectional and inexorable, and anticipate the emergence of the world of a globally shared, universalised culture (Jackson, 2001; Hargreaves, 2002). This is the implication of Hobhouse’s rhetoric, ‘Humanity is rapidly becoming, physically speaking, a single
Many processes are said to be involved, but the expansion of the market or consumer-oriented capitalism is pointed out as the prime globalising force (Hargreaves, 2002).

Conversely, counter conceptualisation refute such determinist views of globalisation and argue instead for a celebration of local cultures and recognition for the heightened level of interconnectedness (Hargreaves, 2002; Jackson, 2001). Appadurai (1990), Giddens (1990), Hannerz (1990), Robertson (1990, 1992) and Tomlinson (1999) advocate this position. They argue that no single force including the market or advanced capitalism drives globalisation but that a number of factors steer global development (Hargreaves, 2002; Robertson, 1990). Appadurai, for instance, insists (1990: 296) that ‘the new global cultural economy has to be understood as a complex, overlapping, disjunctive order’. He also observes (1990) that the homogenisation arguments frequently centre on an argument about Americanisation or commoditisation, which is very often closely linked with each other. However, these arguments, he points out:

[F]ail to consider that at least as rapidly as forces from various metropolises are brought into new societies, they tend to become indigenized in one or other way (1990: 295).

Robertson (1992: 135) articulates globalisation as ‘in its most general sense as the process whereby the world becomes a single place’. He is, however, cautious to emphasise (1992: 135) that he does not mean ‘globalisation involves in and of itself the crystallization of a cohesive system’. Globalisation, Robertson asserts (1992: 135; italics in original), ‘involves the development of something like a global culture, not as normatively binding, but in the sense of a general mode of discourse about the world as a whole and its variety’. He repeatedly stresses (1992: 172; italics in original) that
globalisation ‘produces variety and diversity’ and that ‘in various respects diversity is a basic aspect of globalisation’. Robertson (1990, 1992) also talks of the complex relationship between ‘local’ and ‘the global’. He considers that the distinction between the global and the local is very complicated and problematic; therefore, he suggests (1990: 19) that people should now speak in such terms as the ‘global institutionalization of the life-world and the localization of globality’.

The complex relationship between the local and the global has been conceptualised in terms of ‘deterritorialisation’ (Appadurai, 1990; Tomlinson, 1999) and ‘disembedding’ (Giddens, 1990). Tomlinson defines globalisation primarily as ‘complex connectivity’ (1999: 2), which refers to ‘the rapidly developing and ever-densening network of interconnections and inter-dependences that characterise modern social life’, and deterritorialisation as ‘the major cultural impact of global connectivity’ (1999: 30). In this regard, he argues that the aspects of the global are connected to, and interwoven with, one another in a complex, multi-dimensional way, which defies any single, straightforward conceptualisation of the phenomenon. Although globalisation encourages active physical mobility to the extent that has never been before, its crucial cultural impact is found in the transformation of localities, Tomlinson maintains (1999). Complex connectivity brought by globalisation, according to him, removes people’s relationships out of their local environments and re-places them in the global context on various levels, thereby undermining the ties of culture to place and reconfiguring people’s everyday lives. This, Giddens (1990: 14) theorises in terms of ‘time-space distanciation’, which is ‘the condition under which time and space are organized to connect presence and absence’. Giddens argues (1990: 18-19) that the emergence of modernity increasingly tears ‘space’ away from ‘place’ by fostering relations between ‘absent’ others, thus reducing place to becoming increasingly ‘phantasmagoric’, and
also forcing local life to be determined by distanciated relations. People are in this setting ‘disembedded’, being “lifted out” of their social relations from their local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space’ (Giddens, 1990: 21). Whether or not people are physically ‘on the move’ or firmly grounded in their local settings, “the global” increasingly exists as a cultural horizon, within which people (re)frame their existence, Tomlinson stresses (1999: 30).

Tomlinson insists (1999: 148) that “the condition of deterritorialisation is an ambiguous one that combines benefits with costs”. Deterritorialisation, he continues to argue (1999: 148), brings with it the ‘various existential vulnerabilities’ to people whose identities and sense of security become threatened by the globalising process. It is in this context that the terms ‘reembedding’ (Giddens, 1990) and ‘reterritorialising’ (Tomlinson, 1999) can be understood. People experiencing the rapidity and intensity of globalisation nowadays may seem to be displaced or disembedded, and their daily existence or identities may look confused or threatened. Yet these same people are resilient. They look for ways for ‘reembedding’ or ‘reterritorialising’ their lives, endeavouring to establish a new way of life, re-producing and re-discovering the meanings of their lives and identities in a given situation. Thus, Giddens argues (1990) that the disembedding mechanisms may remove people’s social relations from their local environments but at the same time, they provide new opportunities for their reinsertion. Tomlinson (1999: 148-149) also perceives ‘the drive towards reterritorialisation’ as ‘in various attempts to re-establish a cultural ‘home’”, attempting to generate ‘new identities and narratives of personal meaning out of them’.

Furthermore, according to Tomlinson (1999), connectivity has provided people with cultural awareness that was lacking before. Overall, he (1999: 30) points out the two-fold nature of the penetration of localities: ‘it dissolves the securities of locality’, and ‘it
offers new understandings of experience in wider, ultimately global, terms’. He (1999) also asserts the importance of the understanding of the nature and significance of this global consciousness to examine culture and globalisation, and their co-relations.

Globalisation is thus commonly conceptualised as dissolving the geographical boundaries and promoting physical and imaginative mobility of people. It has been argued that it has dramatically transformed people’s perceptions and relations to themselves and their nation, as well as to others. Globalisation and the nation are, as shown above, profoundly inter-connected. Globalisation is integral to a discussion about the nation and vice versa. This means that a better understanding of one’s identity construction requires both the analysis of the nation and how people understand their existence in the global context. The next section will consider theoretical background on the nation, its future and national identities under globalisation.

2.2.4 The Nation and National Identities in Global Context

The demise of the nation-state and its power has long been prophesied (Triandafyllidou, 1998). The nation-state has been considered to be obsolete or soon-to-be obsolete, and national identities to give way to all-conquering global, transnational identities (Hargreaves, 2002). This is especially true among the proponents of global homogenisation, who perceive the ‘world-as-a-whole’ or world system as an inevitable effect of globalisation. Hobsbawm (1990), for instance, claims for the power of the nation is to be on the decline. Encountering the larger ‘world economy’, he claims:

The ‘nation’ today is visible in the process of losing an important part of its old functions, namely that of constituting a territorially bounded ‘national economy’ (1990: 173).
He goes on to argue (1990: 174), ‘since the World War II … the role of ‘national economies’ has been undermined or even brought into question’. Two factors are named as the cause. One is ‘the major transformations in the international division of labour’, which is ‘transnational or multi-national’ in its characteristics and the other is the ‘development of international centres and networks of economic transactions’, which lies ‘outside the control of state governments’ (Hobsbawm, 1990: 174). Since the role and power of the nation are diminishing, he perceives (1990: 181, 183) that ‘nationalism is historically less important’, ‘past its peak’, compared to what it was in the 19th and the earlier 20th centuries. He (1990: 182), therefore, anticipates the decline or fall of the nation-states, nations or ethnic/linguistic groups primarily ‘before, resisting, adapting to, being absorbed or dislocated by, the new supranational restructuring of the globe’. Nations and nationalism, he claims (1990), will assume subordinate, minor role today.

On the other hand, a number of scholars argue for the resilient power of the nation. ‘Nation-ness’ is ‘the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our own’, for Anderson (1983: 3), and Hutchinson also claims (1994: 1) that the nation is ‘the most dominant form of political organisation’ today. Despite the emerging transnational, global society, Alter insists (1989: 89), ‘The nation-state still plays an important role in political and social life’ and that ‘as the framework of the political, legal and social order, the nation-state penetrates deep into the lives of its citizens’. Smith also asserts (1991: 170) that, among all of the collective identities such as gender, class, race, religion and so on, national identity is ‘the main form of collective identification’ and anticipates that ‘national identity and nationalism remain powerful and explosive global forces’ in the future.
Also, theorists such as of Appadurai, Robertson, Tomlinson and Giddens that celebrate or recognise the power and resilience of local cultures and the multi-dimensionality of global flows, the nation and nation-state will not be weakened nor their power declined by globalisation, although they may need adaptation and reconstruction as a result of global forces (Hargreaves, 2002). Furthermore, as part of the emergence of a global culture, global expansion is argued to generate ‘global’ or ‘transnational’ loyalties and identities that transcend local identities including national identities. Hargreaves (2002: 31-32), however, insists that this line of argument is flawed as it fails to recognise the ‘entrenchment of national identities’ and that ‘nationalist sentiment places strong limits on the development of global identity and global culture’. The power and resilience of the nation and national identities faced with globalising forces have also been observed by sport sociologist Bairner (2001). He considers the resilience of national sentiment a result of globalisation processes themselves, arguing that the persistence of nationalism and the identity politics of formerly submerged nationalities and ethnic groups are in fact unexpected outcomes of globalisation.

Global expansion has thus been argued by many scholars to steer the world towards global conformity and cultural homogenisation, under which over-arching global or transnational identities overshadow local identities and nations or the nation-states lose their role or power considerably. Globalisation, at the same time, is said to be the driving force for the unification of ethnic groups or nations, foregrounding difference, local membership, allegiance and solidarity. In this respect, sport offers an excellent example to interrogate the intricate relations the nation and national identities have with globalisation for it is a major platform where both globalisation and the solidarity of ethnic groups or nations are witnessed simultaneously. The following section will
discuss the significance of sport as a source of affirmation and confirmation of national sentiment and belonging in the globalising world. More notably, it will be argued that, in and through sport, especially mega international sport events, nationalisms and national identities are strengthened, confirmed or celebrated, and have successfully resisted globalising forces.

2.2.5 The Nation, National Identities and Globalisation in Sport

The relationship between globalisation, national identities and sport has been a popular topic for scholars, such as Archetti (1996), Bairner (2001), Gordon and Helal (2001), Hills and Kennedy (2006), Jackson and Ponic (2001), Maguire (1999), Miller, Lawrence, McKay and Rowe (2001), Moorhouse (1996), Sugden and Tomlinson (2003), Rowe (2003), Vidacs (2000; 2003) and Whitson (1998). These authors have interrogated the influence of sport on national identities, and many of them have incorporated globalisation into their examination of national identities in and through sport. In so doing, they have identified various forms of nationalism and national identities in sport, as well as the diverse contexts in which they occur. They have also unravelled the ways in which the nation and national identities intersect or compete with globalisation and global identities. Commonly found in their arguments is their celebration of power of the nation and national identities in resisting the globalising force. Bairner, for example, argues (2001) that sport is an important arena to celebrate national identities and to contemplate upon one’s national identities. Sugden and Tomlinson (2003: 178) support this by defining sport in general, football in particular, as ‘significant theatres for the working-up and expression of national identity’ along with nationalism’.
National identities have been especially closely linked to international sporting events since their birth. According to Roche (2000: 168), the development of international sport in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries provided the new urban middle classes and industrial working classes with the idea of nationalism and national identity. Maguire also contends (1999: 176) that ‘international sport contests, as they developed in the late 19th century, became a form of patriot games in which particular views of national identities and habitus codes’ have been ‘constructed and represented’. He (1999) thus argues for the close association between the rituals of national identity practices and the sporting events in the construction of particular national habitus or identities. Arbena (1996) also suggests that watching international sport could eradicate ethnic and nationalist divisions and promote a greater sense of global or transnational community, which Rowe (2003) perceives as improbable.

For one, given the way international competitions are organised and carried out, it is nations that compete against one another, highlighting national character, value and identities; they are also an avenue in which ‘the nation’ is imagined and becomes ‘real’ (Vidacs, 2000). Bairner (2001: 176) agrees with this, maintaining that ‘international events, such as the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup, ensure’ that ‘national sporting identities remain to the fore’. Rowe also argues (2003: 288) that as such, international sporting events have become ‘a key marker of national fantasy or aspiration’ and that sport generates ‘a symbolic entity that comes into being by affixing a notion of identity’, thereby serving to counter globalising processes. Indeed, as Kellas (1991: 21) asserts, ‘the most popular form of nationalist behaviour in many countries is in sport, where masses of people become highly emotional in support of their national team’. ‘It is for this reason’, Bairner emphasises (2001: 176), ‘we can talk about nationalism having successfully resisted the encroachment of globalisation’s
homogenizing tendencies’. He then concludes (2001) that sport greatly helps nationalism and national identities resist globalisation. Dyreson (2003) also contends that the globalisation of modern sports has fuelled nationalism and strengthened national identities.

It has thus been argued that global sport and global sporting events help raise or broaden ordinary people’s conceptions of, and interests in, the world beyond their nations (Roche, 2000). Nevertheless, global sport is first and foremost ‘a form of patriot games in which images and stories are told and retold’ to people, about themselves, as well as others (Bairner, 2001: 90). Sport is thus argued to offer people an opportunity to create and narrate stories, whether glorious or shameful, joyous or sad, satisfying or resentful, about themselves and their nation and help them produce or make sense of the meanings of their own and their nation’s existence. Sport is thus claimed to help create stories that can be passed onto generations after generations, conveying a sense of destiny and continuity, (re)producing or reinforcing a sense of national belonging and loyalty.

‘How precisely does that process develop?’ Bairner asks (2001: 1). He points out that, despite widely accepted recognition of the linkage of sport and nationalism:

[T]here has been a lack of precision in terms of the types of nationalism involved and also precise ways in which nation, nationalism and nation identities interact with sport’ (2001: 163).

As he asserts (2001), the link between sport and national identities are never straightforward or universal, that is, sport is multifaceted. It is, therefore, crucial to explore particular cases in order to identify and uncover various nationalistic expressions and identities. Only when we examine specific examples, can we come to fully grasp the complexity of the relationship between sport and nationalism and
national identities. Moreover, as identities do not operate outside of socio-cultural, historical and political networks, it is imperative that they be contextualised in those broader networks (Hwang and Jarvie, 2003).

Most of the theorisations introduced throughout this thesis on the nation, national identities, globalisation and sport are produced and developed predominantly by Western scholars whose research centres around Western people’s experiences and perspectives on the issues. My intention in this thesis is to apply them to interrogate the forms of nationalism and national identities expressed by the South Korean women, who participated in the focus group and individual interviews. Scholarly research into these issues has only begun to develop and flourish in South Korea in recent years. Therefore, the existing rich conceptualisations produced by scholars who base their research on Western experiences and viewpoints are the main theoretical tools I employ in my research, and from which I believe great benefit will be drawn. Moreover, what can and will be achieved in this way is the applicability of the theories developed from Western views and experience to the South Korean setting and the 26 South Korean women interviewed. Also to be tested is to what extent they can be of use in making sense of the women’s nationalistic sentiments and identities, and their identity construction. Having introduced various theorisations of the issues, the following section provides socio-cultural, historical and political backgrounds of Korea and South Korea, especially from the late 19th century, in conjunction with the historical development of modern sport in South Korea.

2.2.6 Historical Development of Modern Sport in South Korea

Korea and current South Korea, a nation of 5,000-year history, underwent a modernisation process in the late 19th century when secluded Chosŏn, Korea’s last
dynasty, opened Pusan harbour for the first time to western countries in 1876. As with most nations, Koreans had a variety of their own sports, but this was when so-called modern sports, such as gymnastics, track and field, football, baseball, basketball, tennis, swimming, ice skating, and cycling, were first introduced by Christian missionaries as a school curriculum to Korea (Korea Sports Council, 1990 cited in J. Y., Lee, 2002: 74). Since its introduction, modern sport in Korea and later South Korea has been closely linked to political and ideological purposes, which became intensified during the colonisation by Japan for 35 years in the early 20th century, when sports functioned as an instrument to express Koreans’ nationalistic sentiments and resistance to Japan (J. Y., Lee 2002). In 1945 Korea achieved independence from Japan and in 1948 it became divided into the current two states: democratic South and communist North. In 1950 the 3-year Korean War broke out, demolishing the entire peninsula. The couple of decades of the post-war period saw South Korea’s heavy reliance on foreign aid for its national defence and the provision of staples to its people. Naturally, in this transitional period, sports and physical education remained outside national and public attention (J. Y., Lee, 2002).

The rise of the Park Jung-hee’s military regime through a coup d’état in the early 1960s (May 1961- October 1979) heralded significant advances in the fields of economy, education, society and sport (Ha and Mangan, 2002). Under his administration, South Korea began a nation-building project in the 1960s, throughout the 70s and the 80s, which has brought robust economic prosperity to the nation. In sport, perceiving the important role of sport in enhancing the national prestige and international reputation of a country, Park’s government founded many of the existing sporting bodies and national games, and promoted ‘elite sports policy’ and a ‘popular sports policy’ (Ha and Mangan, 2002). Park’s innovations had nationalism as an
ideological foundation; he hoped to put an end to foreign domination, end internal discord and re-establish a united country, and sport stood at the centre of this aim (Ha and Mangan, 2002). Another military regime Chun Doo-hwan’s Fifth Republic (March 1981-March 1988) and Roh Tae-woo’s Sixth Republic (February 1988- February 1993) also promoted sport for national solidarity and international recognition. As a result:

With political endorsement, government resources, an effective strategy, public support and an enthusiastic educational system, in less than 50 years a revolution in sport in schools occurred in the interests of national defence, national self-reliance, national visibility, and national prestige (Ha and Mangan, 2002: 217).

The efforts of these various regimes culminated in South Korea hosting the Asian Games in 1986 and 2002, the Summer Olympic Games in 1988, and the Football World Cup Finals in 2002 (J. Y., Lee, 2002).

Globally, South Korea in the early 21st century is the world’s 12th biggest economy (23 October 2006, The Hankyoreh). The country is home to multinational, world-class technology companies (Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics), automakers (Kia Motors, Hyundai Motor), steelmakers (POSCO) and shipbuilders (Hyundai Heavy Industries) (7 November 2005, TimeAsia) and it is a global leader in IT-related technology. Culturally, South Korea in recent years has been known for the remarkable popularity of its cultural products, such as movies, TV programs, pop singers and Internet games, in much of Asia and also beyond Asia, shaping new cultural landscapes especially across Asia. The popularity of South Korea’s entertainment, dubbed as ‘Han-ryu’ (the Korean Wave), is so huge that some Asian nations including Japan, China and Taiwan have started to express concerns over South Korea’s cultural domination over their local cultures.
Internally, South Korean society has been also undergoing rapid and radical transformation and diversification. Various foreign cultures have been introduced, mingling and co-existing with ‘authentic’ local cultures. Foreign labourers and businesses have flooded in from around the world. As of the end of 2004, about 420,000 foreign workers are officially employed in the locale, and the number is expected to exceed a million when illegal workers are counted in (H. J., Jung, 2005). Cross-cultural and international marriage takes place routinely. Statistically, 8 out of 100 who are getting married are involved in international marriage nowadays (H. J., Jung, 2005: 67). Long suppressed homosexuals under the rigid heterosexual culture have become more visible and vocal, and patriarchy, long-upheld as the social norm, has been criticised and challenged. One outcome of that challenge is that children no longer have to adopt their father’s surname only, and divorce rate has increased sevenfold over the 34 years (H. J., Jung, 2005: 87). Equal opportunities in education and employment outside the home have heightened women’s status in society and have also become responsible partly for South Korea’s birth rate falling markedly to 1.15-1.17 per woman, the world’s lowest (H. J., Jung, 2005: 67). To accommodate these social, cultural and political changes, South Korean laws have been in constant revision. More importantly, these changes are occurring in the ‘present progressive form’, signifying that South Korean society and culture are unstable, fluid and subject to change.

Regarding sport, South Korea first participated in an international event at the London Olympic Games in 1948, and in 1954, its national football squad made its first appearance in the World Cup Finals in Switzerland. South Korean sport, especially the South Korean football team, has been a dominant force in Asia, representing the continent 7 times at the Olympics: in 1948, 1964, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004 (Association for Development of Korean Soccer, 1990; Korea football association,
2001 cited in J. Y., Lee, 2002: 80). The South Korean squad has also appeared 7 times in the FIFA World Cup Finals: in Switzerland in 1954, Mexico in 1986, Italy in 1990, America in 1994, France in 1998 (J. Y., Lee, 2002) as well as Seoul in 2002 and in Germany in 2006, becoming one of the most frequently participating teams in the world. In terms of achievements, South Korea won its first Olympic gold medal in 1976, and since 1988 South Korea has remained one of the top 10 on the medal chart at the Summer Olympic Games (J. Y., Lee, 2002) till 2004, except for at the Sydney Olympics when it slipped down to the 12th. In football, South Korea was one of the semi-finalists both at the World Youth Football Competition held in Mexico in 1983 and the FIFA World Cup Finals in 2002, both of which are the best records among Asian nations.

Despite South Korea’s long history, very recent events (the colonisation by Japan, partitioning of the Korean peninsula, the Korean War, a series of the military governments, economic and cultural development and success) have made particularly significant impacts on Koreans’ and South Koreans’ consciousness, and their nationalism and national identities. Bairner (2001) suggests that, due to its unique socio-political and historical background, each nation has its individual forms of nationalism and national identities. The events and political turmoils described above have ingrained deep-seated humiliation, remorse or pride in South Koreans, producing a certain national consciousness and national identities, which differ from those of other nations. This research will identify and document the kinds of nationalism and national identities expressed by the women interviewed.
2.3 South Korea and ‘Others’: North Korea and Japan

2.3.1 Theorising the ‘Other’

While a series of the historical incidents and political turbulence have shaped South Koreans’ consciousness and identities in a particular way, South Korea’s ‘Others’, most notably North Korea and Japan, have had a vital influence on the way South Koreans are today. Barker (2000), Hall (1997), Said (1978) and Triandafyllidou (1998) bring attention to the significance of the ‘Other’, be it an individual, or a nation, in the production of identities. As a crucial element involved in national identity construction, Triandafyllidou (1998) foregrounds the role of ‘significant others’, from which the in-group members become distinguished and form solidarity, and from which the nation seeks to differentiate itself. This implies that ‘national identity has no meaning per se’; instead, ‘it becomes meaningful in contrast to other nations’, Triandafyllidou argues (1998: 599). According to her (1998), ‘others’ become significant when they are perceived as threat to a nation’s survival, identities, distinctiveness, authenticity and/or independence, thus they influence the development of a nation’s identities. Similarly, Saussure and his followers contend, Hall notes (1997), that the presence of the ‘Other’ is essential in meaning making processes as it provides the vital source to create ‘difference’, without which meaning could not exist. In other words, it is the ‘difference’ that marks, signifies and carries meaning, which again points to the importance of the ‘Other’ (Hall, 1997). Barker (2000: 195) also suggests the crucial role the ‘Other’ plays in identity production by asserting that ‘what we think of as our identity is dependent on what we think we are not’.

While these scholars emphasise the necessity and significance of ‘Other’, Said brings attention to the purposeful manufacturing of particular images of ‘Other’ in
creating meaning or identities. In particular, he underscores the political and ideological constructedness of stereotypical images of the Orient as ‘Other’ by the West as part of the West’s identity construction scheme. ‘The Orient’ in this way, he argues (1978: 2), ‘has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting images, idea, personality, experience.’ Said also points out (1978) the comprehensive efforts made by Western ‘discourses’, in Foucault’s term (1977, 1980), including institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, traditions, conventions, agreed-upon codes of understanding, to construct the images of the Orient in a particular way.

The ‘significant other’ Triandafyllidou (1998: 600) speaks of refers to ‘another nation or ethnic group’ that ‘threatens, or rather is perceived to threaten, its ethnic and/or cultural purity and/or its independence’. She goes on to argue (1998: 600) that, throughout history, each nation has more than one nation or ethnic group that becomes its significant other, against which it ‘seeks to assert itself and which, in turn, influences its identity’. In fact, a most crucial factor that needs addressing to grasp South Koreans’ consciousness and identities is the presence and the significance of arguably its most notable ‘Others’, North Korea and Japan. Interrogating the role the two neighbours have played to South Koreans is indeed vital to understand what constitutes South Koreanness and what it means to be South Korean. For this to be achieved, it is essential to examine the popular images of North Korea and Japan which South Koreans have constructed and stereotyped over the years, and this is discussed in the following two sections.

### 2.3.2 ‘Us’ or ‘Other’?: North Korea and Ethnic Identity

South Koreans’ relations with, and perceptions of, North Korea is not straightforward. Instead, it is highly ambiguous and fluctuating on individual and
governmental levels alike. Indeed, for South Koreans, North Korea had been ‘us’ for the majority part of their history up until 1948. South Koreans are taught that, throughout history, ‘Koreans’ encountered numerous invasions from its neighbours, mostly ancient China and Japan, against which they united to fight and defend their nation time after time, making sacrifices for their nation’s survival. They are taught that, during the colonisation period, ‘Koreans’ were forcefully united to preserve their language, tradition, ethnicity and culture, and fought to regain the sovereignty of their nation from Japan. These incidents of national crisis helped ‘Koreans’ realise their own future was profoundly bound with that of their nation, which in turn helped confirm and reinforce their nationalistic sentiments and national belonging. In these, ‘Koreans’ were all ‘us’. South Koreans are also educated that, despite the incessant invasions from ‘others’ throughout the 5,000-year history and despite Japanese annexation in the early 20th century, ‘Koreans’ have successfully maintained relatively single, unified culture, language, customs, history, traditions, memories and ethnicity.

All that changed in 1948, when the Korean peninsula was petitioned into two, establishing two separate states, and the stereotypical images of North Korea began to be constructed, closely linked particularly to the Korean War, which was waged on 25 June 1950, initiated by the North backed by China. The United Nations troops helped the South hold off the communist North and its allies. The War ended on 27 July 1953 with the declaration of armistice between Russia and the U.S. Estimates vary, but at least two million Korean civilians, up to 1.5 million communist forces, and around 400,000 South Korean, 30,000 American and 1,000 British troops are believed to have died (www.bbc.co.uk). Since the armistice, the two Koreas have confronted each other with heavily armed military forces along the 38th parallel. A consequence of the Korean War and the 38th parallel is countless separated families and relatives, most of whom
are till today unable to learn about, or meet with, their kin members living in the North. The Korean War, thus, has left irreparable psychological and emotional trauma to South Koreans.

Many nations have been, and are, divided in various senses: Germany, Catalonia and Spain, South Africa, India, Quebec and Canada, and the UK to name but few. Scholars, such as Bairner (2001), Bairner and Darby (2000), Guelke and Sugden (2000), Hargreaves (2000), Harvey (2000), McDonald (2000), Merkel (2000) and Moorhouse (1996), have interrogated nationalisms and national identities of those cases exhibited through sport. In so doing, they have identified different forms of nationalism and national identities each case demonstrates. The case of South and North Koreas is also unique in its own. It is commonly argued that the two Koreas share the predominantly same ethnicity, language, culture and history, at least up until 1948. They are also technically still at war. The standoff between the South and the North is yet to end because a peace treaty has yet to be signed.

Since the division in 1948, images of North Korea, which did not exist prior to the division, had to be constructed, and they have been constructed first and foremost as South Korea’s main enemy that invaded in 1950 and that constantly seeks to repeat that history, that is, as a menace to South Korea’s national survival. They have been commonly manufactured and stereotyped as sub-human, furtive, warlike and distrustful communists. Consequently, the ‘South Korean’ identity has often transcended other rival identities, and South Koreans have been defined first and foremost as ‘not being North Korean’ and as having contrasting values, qualities and character. Simultaneously, even during the Cold War era, South Koreans’ relations and perceptions of the North were ambiguous due largely to the perceived ethnic tie between the two Koreas, which worked to remind South Koreans of what they have lost
and what it might have been if they were not petitioned. The reunion of the separated families, which began in the early 1980s during the Cold War era, is a case in point. It compelled many South Koreans, whether or not they had families in the North, to contemplate the meanings of North Korea to them in a different light. Significant changes in South Koreans’ perceptions and attitudes to North Korea have occurred especially since the mid 1990s, when the South Korean Government has adopted the peace-and-reconciliation-oriented ‘Sunshine Policy’ in its dealings with the North. The South Korean media have responded to the thawing political mood between the two Koreas by portraying the North in a much friendlier and much more positive term, which has propelled many South Koreans to rethink North Korea and North Koreans. South Koreans have also become able to publicly express their personal feelings or opinions on the North much more freely and openly than before.

Sport has seen the effects of shifts in political relations between the two Koreas. During the Cold War era, two Koreas often refused to participate in the sporting event where the other participated, claiming each represented ‘Korea’. When they met and competed against each other, it was a must-win game, for victory was regarded to symbolise the moral, political and ideological superiority each upheld. In recent years, particularly since the mid 1990s, however, the two Koreas have been seen in a much more harmonious term. Both participate in the same sport contests, are said to often practice together and frequently co-enter at the opening and/or closing ceremonies of major international sport events including the Olympics or Asian Games. They have even been in talks to form a unified team for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, which, at the time of writing, is yet to be resolved.

South Koreans have in recent years shown great support and sympathy for North Korean delegates or teams competing at international sport events. This I refer to as
‘pan-Korean’ identification, which could evoke pan-Korean nationalism and produce pan-Korean identities. Smith (1990: 186) talks of ‘a form of nationalism’, ‘coupled with political goals of regional peace and prosperity’, which ‘may afford a basis for the rise of regional cultures’. He means the so-called ‘Pan’ nationalisms’, which is defined as the attempt to unify in a single political community several, usually contiguous, states on the basis of common cultural characteristics or a ‘family of culture’. Pan-Turkism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism and to a lesser degree Pan-Latin Americanism are his examples of such nationalisms. The pan-Korean identification I argue is predicated upon shared history, tradition, myth, memories, cultural intimacy, and most crucially, ethnic ties between the South and the North, and it expands South Koreans’ identity choices to choose from. By asserting this, I strongly advocate the premordialists’ conceptualisation of the nation as a historic community, and moreover, I adopt Smith’s underpinning of the ethnic tie in the construction of nationhood, which has been discussed in chapter 5.

2.3.3 Eternal ‘Other’ Japan and Post-colonial Identities

While North Korea rather freely travels in and out of South Koreans’ ‘we-group’, largely depending on political situations, Japan is for many South Koreans an eternal foe. History between the two nations accounts for such sentiment. Japan has been perceived as a ‘significant other’, in Triandafyllidou’s term (1998), mainly due to its constant invasions throughout Korean and South Korean history and its colonisation of Korea in the early 20th century. That perception has become intensified in recent years because of a series of political controversies between South Korea and Japan, regarding the Dok-do issue, Japan’s distortion of its history textbooks and former Prime Minister Koizumi’s repeated worship at Yasukuni shrine, all of which has been perceived by
South Koreans as an indication of Japan’s aggression and ambition and also its unapologetic attitudes towards its colonial inhumanity. In particular, a consequence of the colonial past had been a complete ban of the import of Japanese cultural products, such as movies, songs, dramas etc, into South Korea until the late 1990s. Globalisation may have facilitated the free-flows of goods, people, ideas, images and so on across the globe, but that process had long been considerably restricted between South Korea and Japan. Only since 1997, slowly and gradually have Japanese cultural products been officially available to South Koreans.

South Koreans’ psychological wounds inflicted by atrocities committed by the Japanese during the colonial rule do not easily heal, McCormack contends (2002). Owing to the deeply rooted wounds and resentment, the Japanese governments’ gestures, moves or comments on that history almost always bring many South Koreans’ blood to boil instantly and provoke vehement anti-Japanese sentiments on both civic and governmental levels, often resulting in staging street protests or sabotaging against Japanese products. South Koreans’ perception of Japan is thus often hostile and bitter, and Japan is seen primarily as an object of disdain and abasement. As a result, constructive relations between the two nations have been severely fettered and it is likely to remain so unless the past which is ‘yet to end’ between the nations is resolved. Since Japan is commonly considered by South Koreans as their ‘significant other’, much of South Koreanness has been defined by ‘not being Japanese’. Representations of Japan have, therefore, been in accordance with such popular perception. Popular images of Japan have been produced and stereotyped in a particular way, which has ultimately contributed to the construction of South Korean identities as having ideal and positive values and characteristics, contrast to those of Japanese.
The significance of the past on identities, notably in the terms of post-colonial identities, has been explored by a number of scholars, such as Hall (1990), Moore-Gilbert, Stanton and Maley (1997), and Said (1993). Hall’s theorisation (1990) of the intimate relations between the past and the present offers a particular insight into the understanding of post-colonial consciousness. He considers identities as a ‘production’, which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation (1990: 222); he also defines cultural identities as a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as of ‘being’ (1990: 225). His emphasis on cultural identities as a process links the past, present and future as a tripod in identity construction. He also stresses that identities are not transcendent or universal, that is, it is culture-and-history specific. ‘Cultural identities’, he continues (1990: 225), ‘come from somewhere, have histories’; ‘but, like everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation’, ‘subject to the continuous ‘play’ of history, culture and power’. He maintains (1990) that our cultural identities can be understood in terms of ‘positionings’, produced by the narratives of the past and concludes that it is only from these positions that the trauma of the colonial experience can be properly comprehended.

Korea’s colonised history may be relatively brief, compared to that of other nations, such as India, Ireland or most of African and Southeast Asian countries. Duration is not the issue, however. The focal point is that the colonial history has left indelible psychological trauma to South Koreans, and deeply and perhaps irreparably hurt their national pride, implanting deep-seated shame and resentment in them. Understandably, it is extremely difficult for South Koreans to openly express any sense of envy, admiration or jealousy about Japan’s economic and political success and leadership in the international community. Instead, Japan evokes intense rivalry, a sense of
indignation and contempt. In this regard, it drives South Koreans to hone and maintain their competitive edge to equal, or achieve triumph over, Japan in every sphere, and sport as one of the spheres has felt its full effects.

In 1969, C.L.R James published his insightful narrative of post-colonial identity and sport in *Beyond a Boundary*. Nevertheless, while post-colonial analysis has received great academic attention in the humanities, it has been discussed much less within sport sociology. Only very recently, Bairner (2003), Hector and Wagg (2005), Hutchins (2005), Sen (2005), Williams (2003) Vidacs (2000; 2003) and many others have begun to interrogate sport from post-colonial perspective. Considering the vast surface of the globe has been affected by colonial history, the post-colonial analysis of sport needs more scholarly attention. Bairner argues (2001) that, in the interests of establishing national solidarity, rival identities are often transcended in sport. In South Korea, other competing identities such as class, gender and sexuality are often superseded by an over-arching ‘South Korean’ identity in sport, especially when South Korea confronts Japanese teams or players. Dubbed as ‘the Britain versus Ireland of East Asia’ (McCormack, 2002: 30), sport matches against Japan bring out the highest competitiveness from many South Koreans since it commonly stands for a war against the old enemy that must not be lost.

South Koreans’ fierce rivalry with Japan traces back to the colonial period, during which sport was used to express Koreans’ anti-Japanese feelings and to bring them together (J. Y., Lee, 2002). The extremely heated competition displayed by South Koreans to win the hosting of the 2002 World Cup over Japan till the co-hosting was announced, which has been explored by Butler (2002), also exemplifies South Koreans’ competitiveness against their former colonial ruler. South Koreans’ competitive edge against Japan often stretches to situations where there is hardly anything to do with
South Korea/Japan rivalry. For instance, the clash between Manchester United and West Bromwich at Carling Cup on 1st December 2005 was hyped by South Korean media as Korea versus Japan match only because South Korean player Park Ji-sung was with Manchester United while Japanese Inamoto was playing for the other. With Manchester United’s win, the South Korean media ran news articles, such as ‘Park Ji-sung defeated Japanese Inamoto’ (1 December 2005, *The Sportsseoul*). Vidacs (2003) argues that victories of the former colonised nation over its former coloniser could signify the inversion of the existing power relations between them. South Koreans’ extreme competitiveness over Japan can be then understood as their strong desire for the symbolic inversion of power relations existing between the two countries and prove their national superiority, not only to the Japanese and the world, but also to themselves.

**2.3.4 Summary**

South Koreans’ identities are hardly properly understood without the consideration of North Korea. There was a time when South Koreans identities were defined first and foremost by being ‘South’ Korean, that is, by not being ‘North’ Korean. This may still remain the case. However, things have never been clear-cut with respect to North Korea due to the perceived ethnic tie between the two states. North Korea easily becomes part of ‘us’ for many South Koreans but also easily becomes their deadly ‘foe’, which points to the intersection of national identity with ethnic identity. This intersection provides the foundation for ‘pan-Korean’ identity, and this explains South Koreans’ support for North Korean teams or delegates in international sporting events. ‘Pan-Korean’ identification is also clearly demonstrated when Japan is involved. As an old enemy to South Koreans, Japan brings attention to not only ‘South’ Korean identity but ‘Korean’ identity. Against the former coloniser, South Koreans are easy and eager to embrace the
North as their own, and this also accounts for South Koreans’ support for North Korea when it confronts Japan in sport. Against Japan, they also exhibit the highest competitive edge and fierce rivalry. South Koreans’ victories in every sphere including sport become inserted into a larger socio-political framework and come to symbolise their superiority to Japan, which reveals South Koreans consciousness that was considerably shaped by the colonial history, as well as current political controversies with Japan, which are also connected to this colonial history. All this will be discussed in length in chapter 5.

A number of theories and discussions about the nation and national identities have been introduced so far. It is significant that, as mentioned earlier, most of the theorisations have been developed by Western scholars based on their research on Western civilisation, cultures and histories, as well as Western people’s national identity construction. One of my intentions for this research is, therefore, to test the theories by applying them to the South Korean contexts. Equally importantly, or perhaps more crucially for this research, an overwhelming number of the conceptualisations on the nation and national identities have been developed predominantly by male scholars who, consciously or subconsciously, have ignored or trivialised women’s role in the construction of nationhood and the construction of their national identities. The concepts of the nation and national identities have automatically been assumed to be men’s issues, and as a result, the gendered aspects of nationhood and women’s national identities have hardly been explored till very recently.

The following sections interrogate the ways in which nations are gendered and genders are nationed (Yuval-Davis, 1997); more importantly, what it implies in relation to one’s identity construction. So far, South Korean identities have been examined in terms of the ‘South’ Korean, Korean and ethnic identities, together with their
intersection. However, one has multiple identities, such as gender, sexuality, race, class and ethnicity, some or all of which often take place simultaneously or alternatively. Gender, as one of the most salient identifiers, has a formidable impact on the way one is, and more importantly, gender is intricately related to the way a nation is. Again, for more complete understanding, gender identity and its intersection with other identities will be analysed in the larger network of South Korea’s socio-cultural, historical, political and ideological contexts.

2.4 Gender and Nation

2.4.1 Theorising Gender and Nation

Hall, Lewis, McClelland and Rendall (1993), Yuval-Davis (1997, 1998) lament that most of the theorisations of nation, nationalism and national identities, whether they be from the modernists, such as Anderson, Gellner and Hobsbawm, or from the premordialists, such as Hastings and Smith, have paid little attention to gender relations or gender differences. Hall et al. (1993: 159) charge that Anderson fails to acknowledge that ‘women and men may imagine such communities, identify with nationalist movements, and participate in state formations in very different ways’. Yuval-Davis (1997) is astonished by the fact that even the primordialists’, who regard the nation as a historic community that has been reproduced over the years, have ignored women in their discussions; instead, intellectuals or bureaucracy have been credited to the production of the nation. However, she forcefully argues (1997: 2) that ‘it is women, not just the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia, who reproduce nations, biologically, culturally and symbolically. Therefore, Hall et al. argue (1993: 159) for the recognition of ‘the different ways in which women and men may become national subjects’, and for
the need to interrogate gender consciousness in the production of national consciousness and nationhood.

As these scholars perceive, women’s role in the construction of nationhood and national consciousness and their national identities have been marginalised and invisible in most of the discourses on the nation and national identities. The question that needs asking is then, ‘Why are women usually ‘hidden’ in the various theorizations of the nationalist phenomena?’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 2; 1998: 23). The ideology that divided the social space into the private and the public has been argued to be greatly responsible for it (H. J., Jung, 2005; Minister, 1991; Pateman, 1988; Yuval-Davis, 1997, 1998). The ideology of the private/public division, which was strengthened in the West, especially in the 18th and the 19th centuries with the introduction of modern capitalism, has ascribed women to the private and men to the public (H. J., Jung, 2005). With women being assigned to occupy the private domain, which is not seen as politically relevant, their role and contributions to the nationhood and their national identities have been considered to be irrelevant (Yuval-Davis, 1997, 1998). Moreover, the exclusion of women from the public space has ‘affected their exclusion from that discourse as well’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 2; 1998: 24).

However, many scholars, such as Enloe (1989), Hall et al. (1993), H. J., Jung (2005), Wilford (1998), and Yuval-Davis (1997, 1998), argue that nation is profoundly gendered and, accordingly, they demand that scholars examine the relevance of gender in the construction of nationhood and national identities. Yuval-Davis insists (1997: 21) that ‘a proper understanding of either [gender or nation] cannot afford to ignore the ways they are informed and constructed by each other’. Only very recently and very partially, have women been included in the mainstream discourses around the nation, nationalism and national identities (Yuval-Davis, 1997), and this is a neglect that
‘feminist scholars have sought to remedy by demonstrating that gender is central to the project of fashioning national identity’ (Wilford, 1998: 8).

2.4.2 South Korea, Androcentric Nation: Founding Myth, Confucian Ethics and Militarism

As discussed above, a number of scholars, usually female, have begun to explore the implications of gender in the construction of nationhood and national identities, arguing that the ‘constructions of nationhood usually involve specific notions of both ‘manhood’ and womanhood’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 1). In Korea and South Korea, the specific notions of manhood and womanhood have been considerably affected by its official founding myth the Tan’gun myth, Confucianism and militarism, which display the deeply androcentric character of the nation, which in turn have significantly decided women’s cultural, political and ideological positions in society.

The Tan-gun myth narrates that the Korean nation was founded by legendary Tan-gun wang’gom approximately 5 millennia ago (S. S., Moon, 1998). According to the myth, Hwanung (literally meaning ‘heavenly male’) descended on earth with his entourage and magical power. Anxious to become humans, a bear and a tiger one day asked Hwanung to fulfil their wishes, and he ordered them to live in a cave without sunlight and to eat garlic only for one hundred days. The tiger failed to follow the order, but the bear did successfully and became a woman. Then Hwanung married the bear-woman and begot Tan-gun’ (S. S., Moon, 1998). Although this kind of androcentrism is also found in many other nations’ identity construction projects, the representation of gender is significant in this story, S. S., Moon asserts (1998). In the myth, she goes onto argue (1998: 41), it was clear that ‘women’s only contribution to the creation of the
Korean nation was the provision of a proto-nationalist womb’, implying that ‘the Korean nation is ultimately the community of men, created by an extraordinary man, in which women exist only as its precondition’.

Moreover, South Korea’s particular notions of manhood and womanhood are greatly influenced by its patriarchal culture, and this has been explored by C. M., Choi (1998), H. J., Jung (2001, 2005), E. H., Kim (1998), T. Y., Kim (2003), Y., Kim (2005), S. S., Moon (1998). These scholars commonly attribute South Korea’s ‘traditional’ patriarchal culture and gender hierarchy to the influence of Confucian ethics. There is no exact record as to when the Chinese philosophy found its way to Korea, but it is believed to be before the year 372 during the Three Kingdoms period (J. T., Keum, 2000). Although it has been influential in the lives of Koreans since its introduction, it was in the 15th century when the newly revised Confucianism became the ruling principle of the nation and began to hold a firm grip over Koreans’ way of life (T. Y., Kim, 2003).

Confucianism centres on heterosexuality and patriarchy. With gender as the key stabilising principle, it essentialises gender hierarchy and biological differences between women and men (S. S., Moon, 1998; T. Y., Kim, 2003). Severely controlled, regulated and policed, Korean women were extremely limited in their identity choices and were socially and politically ascribed to be daughters, wives and mothers. Furthermore, they were actively encouraged to cultivate so-called ‘female’ virtues, such as selflessness, patience, humility, forgiveness and sacrifice (T. Y., Kim, 2003), and the attribute valued most in women was her reproductive function, particularly her potential capacity to bear sons (Cha et al., 1979 cited in T. Y., Kim, 2003: 100). As Wilford (1998: 5-6) points out, ‘What matters is … the role(s) women are assigned as cultural markers of national identity and propriety’. Pettman (1996: 49) also observes,
‘In a complex play, the state is often gendered male and the nation gendered female’. In other words, women are commonly constructed as the symbolic representation of the nation whereas men are regarded as its chief agents as its major beneficiaries (Wilford, 1998). Under Confucianism, women’s anatomy became their destiny and they were thus relegated to their body (T. Y., Kim, 2003). Also importantly, they were seen as the symbolic embodiment of their nation, who do not need to ‘act’, and this has impacted South Koreans’ gendered national consciousness to a great extent. During the nation building period since the 1960s, Confucianism was re-shaped and re-invented as South Korea’s ‘authentic’ tradition to serve the state’s ideological purposes (S. S., Moon, 1998), and a consequence is that gender-appropriateness has continued to dominate South Koreans’ way of life till today.

Coupled with Confucian ethics, South Korea’s consecutive military regimes and their militarism are significant contributors to the construction of South Korea’s androcentric nationhood (H. J., Jung, 2005; S. S., Moon, 1998), by reinforcing and celebrating its hyper-heterosexuality and gender hierarchy. Yuval-Davis (1997) points out the problematics of women’s citizenship, especially in nations in certain situations, such as in war. ‘Women’s citizenship in these communities’, she argues (1997: 24; 1998: 27), ‘is usually of a dual nature: on the one hand they are included in the general body of citizens; on the other hand there are always rules, regulations and policies which are specific to them’, and these policies can express different ideological constructions of gender (Yuval-Davis, 1998: 27). In South Korea, the compulsory military service is a case in point.

Since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, post-colonial South Korean administrations have adopted nationalism as an ideology of political legitimation, and at the centre has stood androcentrism tinted with militarism, which
values male-bonding and solidarity; this, in turn, has significantly determined national value, morality and consciousness to its citizens (S. S., Moon, 1998). This is most explicitly implied through South Korea’s military service. South Korea’s Constitution mandates four citizenship duties that all citizens must comply with, one of which is a duty to protect their nation; however, a sub-legislation on the military service manifests that it is exclusive, only applying to men (H. J., Jung, 2005: my emphasis). Men must serve the duty, but women collectively are exempted. The rise of General Park Jung-hee’s regime in the early 1960s and General Chun Do-hwan’s in the 1980s, both of which came to the power through a coup d’état, were heavily male-and-military-oriented (S. S., Moon, 1998). In addition, South Korea’s still technical war state against North Korea, which makes the Korean Peninsula ‘one of the most militarised regions in the world’, has reinforced a unique milieu of gender relations, gender hierarchy and biology determinism in South Korea (S. S., Moon, 1998: 45), significantly shaping South Korean women’s and men’s identities.

Enloe declares, ‘When a nationalist movement becomes militarized..., male privilege in the community usually becomes more entrenched’ (1989: 56), and:

[M]ilitarization puts a premium on communal unity in the name of national survival, a priority which can silence women critical of patriarchal practices and attitudes; in so doing, nationalist militarization can privilege men (1989: 57-58).

H. J., Jung (2005) also observes that, under the South Korean regulation that governs the military service, women can only be situated below men in social status, positioned as the protected, rather than the protecting. In this regard, as the bear-woman in the founding myth, South Korean women are reduced to their biology and constructed as ‘carriers of nationalist wombs to deliver heirs and potential warriors who can defend
the nation’ (S. S., Moon, 1998: 52). In South Korea’s patriarchal culture, as H. J., Jung insists (2005), it is inconceivable that women, objects of protection, fight for the nation along side with men because it is taken as a serious threat to South Korean men’s identities. Also, the foregrounding of the petitioned state on the Korean peninsula has put an emphasis on ‘South’ Korean identities over others and has effectively silenced women’s voices that have demand gender equality.

South Korea’s founding myth, long standing Confucian tradition and male-only compulsory military service have promoted patriarchy and gender hierarchy to become widely and unquestionably accepted by the public (S. S., Moon, 1998). Furthermore, the industrialisation of South Korea, which began in the 1960s onwards, has been highly gendered in a sense that women have been assigned again to subordinate positions in society (C. M., Choi, 1998; S. S., Moon, 1998). In all these socio-cultural, historical and political contexts, ‘the order of the nation’ has been ‘firmly rooted in essential and hierarchical differences between women and men’ (S. S., Moon, 1998: 57), and women have effectively and strategically been relegated to their anatomy. Hall argues (1990) that identities are the product of narratives of the past and also of the interplay of history, power and culture. South Korean women’s national consciousness and identities have been heavily affected by the androcentric narratives and ideologies of South Korea’s past, which has contributed considerably to the construction of particular notions of manhood and womanhood, and, therefore nationhood. In recent years, many scholars, particularly in the West, have begun to interrogate the gender implications of nation, nationhood and national identities. This, however, has hardly been the case in the South Korean context, and this is the neglect I hope to redress through my research. The next section provides a brief background of South Korean
women’s achievement in sport to help understand how the androcentric nature of South Korea has affected relations between women, nation and sport.

2.4.3 South Korean Women, Nation and Sport

Under the rigid patriarchal culture, South Korean women have long been marginalised or invisible in sport. Their participation in sport had been extremely restricted, and their indifference or disinterest in sport spectacle commonly assumed. Scraton and Flintoff argue:

> How we understand and explain gender and sport is influenced by social, political and economic change and by developments both within and outside sport (2002: 30).

Throughout history, South Korea’s patriarchal culture has substantially limited women’s dreams, hopes and aspirations. Women’s status in Korea, however, has grown remarkably since the 1960s, most noticeably in the educational and economic sectors. According to Korea National Statistical Office, the educational gap between women and men is extremely narrow with, in 2004, 79.7% of female students were enrolled in college – 57.5% for 4-year university while 82.8% of male students were enrolled in college (60.4% for a 4-year university degree); in the workforce, 49.8% of Korean women are employed outside the home (30 June 2005, *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*). Marriage, which has been regarded as an essential path, is no longer seen to be so. A recent survey shows that only 12.8% of single women perceived marriage as essential whereas 29.4% of single men deemed it as mandatory (15 January 2006, *The Chosun Ilbo*). Having long been repressed under strict patriarchal culture, South Korean women in a relatively short span of time have achieved a great deal in society and sport has benefited.
South Korean sportswomen have begun their successful story on a global stage since the 1960s. The first global recognition came in 1967, when Park Shin-ja was awarded as Most Valuable Player (MVP) at the Women’s World Basketball Championship (9 October 2005, *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*). Their first Olympic medal, a bronze, was won in volleyball in Montreal in 1976, which was South Korea’s first medal from team sports. South Korean women won their first Olympic gold medal in 1984 in archery, which was the beginning of their outstanding accomplishments. Since first participating in 1948, South Korea has won 56 gold medals in total at the Summer Olympics, 23 of which have been collected by women (27 February 2006, *The Ohmynews*). Considering their late start, it is truly a remarkable achievement. The LPGA, which has been witnessing a strong South Korean presence in recent years, also exemplifies South Korean sportswomen’s success. Sport has promoted conventional gender relations and at the same time it has been a prime site for women to empower themselves. That is, sport is an important social institution through which domination is imposed and also contested (Carrington, 2002: 143; Hargreaves, 1994; Scraton and Flintoff, 2002). South Korean women’s achievements in sport both reflect and are reflected by socio-political and economic changes of South Korean society. Women’s sport in South Korea has certainly benefited from the modernisation and economic success of the nation; moreover, in and through sport, South Korean women have continuously strived to gain equality and fair share in society.

The discussions so far on the gendered characteristics of the nation, women’s nationhood and national identities, along with South Korean women in sport, are predicated upon the ‘traditional’ conceptions of sex and gender. In the West, the ‘traditional’ distinction between sex and gender (men = masculinity, women = femininity) has long been the taken-for-grant assumption in the feminist gender theories.
In addition, sex has been considered as biologically determined while gender as socially constructed. These conceptions, however, have been conceptually challenged since the 1990s by post-structuralists and post-modernists (Scraton and Flintoff, 2002), who perceive gender identity as a ‘journey’, a ‘process’, which is multiple, flexible and subject to change, rather than as a fixity or finality. The following section will provide post-structuralists’ theoretical conceptualisations of sex and gender.

2.4.4 Post-structuralist Understandings of Gender

Post-structuralist and post-modernist scholars have begun to question and interrogate the widely assumed conceptions of the binary gender oppositions (femininity and masculinity) and the relations between sex and gender. Instead, they focus on difference and diversity. Ang (1996), for instance, raises an objection to taking ‘women’ as a straightforward, single category with its meaning inherent in biology. She (1996: 118), therefore, argues ‘against a continued research emphasis on ‘women’s’ experience, ‘women’s’ culture, [or] ‘women’s’ media consumption’, which disregards differences among ‘women’. It has been recognised that gender is not a coherent category and that the lives of those classified collectively under the label ‘woman’ can themselves be very different (Maynard, 2002). ‘The very term ‘women’’ is thus argued to have ‘little significance in the fragmented and changing world that we live in today’ (Scraton and Flintoff, 2002: 40). Post-structuralist feminist theorisations have, therefore, powerfully questioned the orthodox ‘essentialist and reductionist view of sexual difference underlying the assumption of fixity of gender identities’ (Ang, 1996: 119). Post-modernists, on the other hand, underscore difference, and the multiplicity of voices, meanings and configurations (Ang, 1996; Harvey, 1989; Lyotard, 1993). Difference in this body of work also refers to ‘the multitude of different subjective
positions which constitute the individual’, and in this way, challenges the essentialist conceptualisation of one’s identities (Maynard, 2002).

Post-structuralist and post-modernist discourses celebrate flexible selves, the journey traversed rather than origins or lasting determinations (Ang, 1996). West and Zimmerman (1987), for instance, assert that gender is a performance or display and suggest that it is far more flexible and malleable than the gender dualism definition allows for, and, therefore, they claim that individuals “do” gender. Post-structuralists also assert that ‘subjectivity is non-unitary, produced in and through the intersection of a multitude of social discourses and practices’ (Ang, 1996: 119). They continue to argue:

[A]n individual’s subjectivity is never finished, constantly in reproduction as it were, as s/he lives out her or his day-to-day life and engages herself/himself with a variety of discourses and practices encountering and positioning her/him (Ang, 1996: 119).

Butler also asserts (1999) that gender is flexible and open for negotiation, not fixed or final. She (1999: 4) also maintains that ‘the very subject of women is no longer understood in stable or abiding terms’. Defining gender as the ‘repeated stylisation of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame’ (1999: 43), Butler claims (1999: 33) that gender is ‘performative’. She is emphatic in her assertion (1999: 33) that ‘there is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very “expressions” that are said to be its results’. Likewise, post-structuralist feminists challenge the femininity/masculinity dichotomous conceptualisation and instead argue for the diversity of femininities (Scraton and Flintoff, 2002). As well, ‘women’, according to them, cannot and should
not be defined as a single category, and individual subjectivities and identities that may differ from one woman to another should be recognised.

The arguments that perceive gender identities as performative within socially sanctioned boundaries or individual subjectivities as constitutive of daily routines foreground the importance of culture. Alsop, Fitzsimons and Lennon (2002) and Butler (1999) argue that, nevertheless, what counts as a performance of masculinity or femininity is highly contextual and varies according to social contexts over time and cross-culturally. Butler argues:

Gender is not always constituted coherently or consistently in different historical context and because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalities of discursively constituted identities (1999: 6).

As a result, she maintains (1999: 6), ‘It becomes impossible to separate out “gender” from the political and cultural intersections in which it is invariably produced and maintained’. These scholars, therefore, call for a close examination of socio-cultural, historical and political climates to come to terms with ‘gender’ in a particular time period to better ‘identify the factors that have promoted, maintained or reinforced the traditional views on gender in a society’ (Butler, 1999: xv).

One’s identities are fundamentally a political project and a product of power struggle. Weeks acknowledges (1990: 89) that ‘identities are not neutral’. Indeed, they are extremely political in nature. Hetherington (1998) also points out that people cannot (re)arrange their identities and identification in partial and contingent ways. These claims suggest social constrains involved in people’s identity choices. Ang (1996: 94) also talks of ‘consequences’ by claiming that ‘in real life, the choice for this or that subject position is never without consequences’. As identities are intricately related to
power, gendered identities are also profoundly tied up with the relations of power. Although there is a variety of ways in which gender can be performed, there remain certain dominant ideals that reinforce the power of certain groups; consequently, gender is heavily policed, Butler (1999) and Alsop et al. (2002) argue. The gendered performance in which one engages is performance in accordance with scripts, and these scripts have been produced by society, rigorously policing individuals. The scripts, however, can be variable and can change over time (Alsop et al., 2002).

Post-structuralists’ rejection of the ‘conventional’ binary gender opposition, their focus on difference and diversity of gender and their understanding of gender as fluid, becoming and process have opened up a new understanding of sex and gender and their relations to each other. These conceptualisations have been supported by a number of sport sociologists recently. Sport has long promoted and enhanced the biological differences between women and men and the polarisation of binary gender oppositions. Over the last couple of decades, however, sport sociologists have begun to apply the post-structuralist and post-modernist understanding of sex and gender to their approach to sport. The next section presents an overview of discussions on sex and gender in and through sport.

2.4.5 Theorising Gender, Nation and Sport

Sport has been one of the key institutional sites for the social construction of gender (Ang, 1996; Archetti, 1996; Bairner, 2001; Hargreaves, 1994; Kane and Lenskyj, 1998; Manzenreiter and Horne 2002; Messner 1988; Miller et al., 2001; Pirinen, 2002; Sabo and Jansen, 1998; Theberge, 2002). In and through sport, seemingly inherent links between gender and sport have been advocated, naturalised and celebrated, and this ‘gender-making’ process began at the very beginning of modern sport history.
According to Messner (1988), the creation of modern sport was driven by white middle class men in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries who encountered social, political changes which threatened their status quo. In the swirl of socio-cultural and political upheaval, they felt dire needs for an ideology that would create, strengthen or reinforce their ‘natural superiority’ over women and over race-and-class-subordinated groups of men, thereby creating modern sport.

A powerful association between sport and masculinity, hegemonic masculinity in particular, was, thus, established from the dawn of modern sport, and women felt its effects. Gender segregation has been persistent in nearly all sports, and sports women can compete in have long been considerably restricted; as a result, women’s participation in sport, especially in ‘masculine-appropriate’ sports, has been dreadfully slow, Hargreaves observes (1994). The history of female participation in the Olympics reveals the power struggle women have had to undergo. It also provides evidence that ‘women’s sports are ‘lived cultures’ which embody tensions, conflict and contradictions’ (Hargreaves, 1994: 91). Manzenreiter and Horne (2002) also point to the gender discrimination and the highly gendered nature of football. ‘Football, along with virtually all other team sports’, they argue (2002: 21), ‘has long been popularly imagined as a sport for male competitors played for the enjoyment of male fans’. Archetti (1996; 213) also speaks about the gendered characteristics of Argentinian football, which was, according to him, created as ‘a symbolic and practical male arena for national pride and disappointment, happiness and sorrow’. Women were, he states (1996), excluded from the discourse and practice of football.

The naturalised connection between gender and sport has also significantly affected women’s consumption of sport spectacle. Women’s indifference and disinterest in sport have been assumed, and this in turn has greatly influenced the media representations of
women’s sports, sportswomen and sportsmen. The crucial role the sport media texts play in constructing, reinforcing and reproducing the perceptions of gender in general has been recognised in the West with numerous scholarly attempts having been made to critically interrogate media texts or representations of gender and sport, such as Bernstein (2002), Christopherson and Janning (2002), Duncan and Messner (1998), Kennedy (2000a, 2000b, 2001), and Pirinen (2002). These, as well as many other, researchers have helped unravel specifically the ways in which sportswomen, and their achievements and athleticism have been marginalised and trivialised by sport media. These issues are discussed further in chapter 6.

As discussed so far, modern sport has been strongly associated with maleness, centred on men and masculinity. As a result, male experiences and perspectives have been deemed as the norm and worthy of research, and this has led to the marginalisation or devaluation of women’s experiences and perceptions of sport. In addition, this has resulted in a lack of research on women in relation to sport, such as their consumption of sport spectacle, their identity construction, most notably national identities, in and through sport and their interpretations of media images of sportswomen and sportsmen. Women have thus been largely invisible in the world of sport.

Scraton and Flintoff (2002: 30) argue that our understanding of gender and sport is ‘influenced by social, political and economic change and by developments both within and outside sport’; sport, in other words, ‘can be altered by shifting gender relations’ and at the same time, can ‘be part of the processes that challenge and shift hegemonic notions of gender’. With socio-cultural and political changes in their societies, women in much part of the globe have made their presence noticed and felt, often strongly. Over the past few decades, the number of sports open to women has expanded
considerably, and nowadays an increasing number of women enter ‘traditionally’ male sport (Hargreaves, 1994; Pirinen, 2002; Wesely, 2001), and their power and influence in sport have grown.

Gender relations in sport I have discussed so far imply gender as ‘a given category’, as a fixed identity, which people are ‘always-already fully in possession of’ (Ang, 1996: 117). What is also implied is the polarisation of gender identities and the conventional link between sex and gender. In fact, researchers in sport sociology in the 1970s and the 1980s often essentialised gender (Sabo and Jansen, 1998). Influenced by the new conceptualisations of gender presented by post-structuralists and post-modernists, many scholars in sport studies including Wesely (2001) have become more sensitive to ‘differences’ and ‘diversity’ of gender. These scholars have investigated individuals’ flexible and multiple gender identity that frequently subvert the orthodox gender norms and challenged the essentialist positions. Consequently, the notion of ‘women’ as a totalising, given category has been widely dispelled. It is significant that increased exploration that underpins difference and the diversity of gender have raised new questions and issues. These are, Scraton and Flintoff observe (2002: 31), ‘questions relating to gendered sporting bodies, diverse and fluid identities and the potential of sport to transgress the traditional boundaries of femininity and masculinity’. New insight into new relations between gender and sport are needed to better grasp the ways in which one’s gender identities are played out.

In the West, women’s relations to sport have affected by the ideology of the private/public division, greatly responsible for the trivialisation or invisibility of women as participants, fans or audiences of sport. The private/public division has also been a major factor that has produced gendered nationhood and national consciousness. As explored earlier, women have been largely absent in the discourses on the nation and
national identities, and this is also clearly evidenced in sport. A number of sport sociologists including Archetti (1996), Bairner (2001), Hargreaves (2002) and Miller et al. (2001) point out gendered aspects of national identities. Miller et al. argue (2001: 87) that white, heterosexual males represent the nation and nationhood of countries, such as Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Australia and the USA. As Archetti observes (1996: 213), ‘The question of national identity in sport and politics seems to be a domain reserved for the male imagination’, nevertheless, he contends the possibility of change because ‘it is a kind of arbitrary selection’. Hargreaves (2002) also acknowledged the absence of women in the media’s expression of national identities. He argues (2002: 37) that ‘little or no direct evidence on the fans’ or on the wider audience’s national sentiments is presented. It is simply assumed, rather than demonstrated empirically’.

Hargreaves (1994) traces the emergence of feminist perspectives within sport sociology in North America to the 1970s, rapidly increased by the 1980s but many theoretical conceptualisations were developed only in the 1990s. The U.K. provides a different picture, she argues. According to her, in the U.K., sociology of sport has:

[G]rown out of a more general concern with women’s leisure and with
the relationships between class, patriarchy and culture emanating from
women’s studies, cultural studies and social history (1994: 25).

Hall (2002: 12) also considers the feminist paradigm in the sociology of sport as ‘an emerging one’, which is ‘not much more than 20 years old’. Since then, feminist sport scholarship has been ‘a substantial challenge to the sexist bias of all social science, both in content and methodology’ (Hall, 2002: 12), and has centred on the ‘efforts of practicing sportswomen to unmask discrimination and to equalize opportunities with men’ (Hargreaves, 1994: 25). Hall is sanguine (2002) that feminist scholarship and
research are transforming, and will continue to transform, individual and specific discourses in the sociology of sport and also the discourse of gender and sport. The objectives of feminist scholarship are, Hall argues (2002: 13), ultimately to ‘bringing about fundamental change in the world of sport’ to recognise and counter ‘not just exploitation and oppression based on gender but also on race, class, age, ethnicity, and so on’. Similarly, Hargreaves maintains:

> The general failure of the past to incorporate gender relations of power into analyses, to relate them to other structures of power in society, and to deal with conflict and change, needs now to be tackled thoroughly (1994: 26).

Sport sociology is a very young academic discipline in South Korea, although it has examined a wide range of issues and themes in sport. However, the majority of research have been male-centred, conducted by men based on male perspectives or experiences of sport (K. S., Cho, 2004), and to redress this imbalance is precisely what I hope to achieve through this research. Through the research, I will challenge the universalised male-centred view on the nation and national identity in the South Korean sport context. By exploring women’s experiences and perspectives of sport and the nation, I will also reveal underlying power relations that have forced South Korean women to be invisible and unheard in the discourses of nation and sport, and also bring attention to their individual understandings of the issues involved in the construction of their gender, ethnic and national identities.
2.5. Research Questions

At the initial stage of the research, I assumed that women develop different relations to themselves and nation from men and that gender plays a crucial role in their understandings of sport and nation. I planned to interrogate, and shed a new light on, the extremely unexplored issues of women, nation and sport. Supposed binary oppositions have been at work to produce and reinforce the popular assumption of women’s relations to sport spectacle. Women have been assumed to be drawn to soap operas or other entertainment programs, and to have a natural disinterest in sport. As a consequence of this, women’s experiences and perspectives of sport and nation have been undeservedly under-researched by the mainstream sport studies.

Upon beginning the research, I hypothesised that relations between women, sport and nation are far more complicated than they are largely assumed to be and that they defy straightforward analysis. D. Y., Lee has provided me with a point of departure when he argues (2005) that neither passion or responsibility as the hosting country nor the unexpected success of the South Korean team at the 2002 World Cup adequately explains the phenomenon of South Koreans’ World Cup fever and enthusiasm demonstrated through their passionate street cheering. Neither of them accounts convincingly for the outburst of passion South Koreans, particularly South Korean women for my research, displayed for their nation during the tournament. Furthermore, South Korean women’s enthusiasm and zeal are found regularly during the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup; therefore, they deserve academic attention and interrogation.

Given many South Korean women’s passion for sport spectacle, especially of international sport competitions, what I intended to interrogate through my research was:
1. How do they perceive themselves and their nation in the globalised world? What role do international sport events play in such perceptions? In other words, how do international sport contests help them understand themselves, their nation and the meanings of their existence?

2. What are their stories about their experiences and perspectives of gender and nation exhibited through their sport spectacle of international sport competitions? In what ways are those stories related to their identities?

3. How do the nation and the global interest at international sport events? In what ways do the global and/or the nation become foregrounded at such sport events? What exactly do international sport competitions signify to them in relation to their identities?

Furthermore, Miller et al. argue (2001: 87) that, ‘in Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Australia and the USA, the most valorised sporting body-as-national-exemplar is male, white and heterosexual’. In this regard, a question that has captured my interest and curiosity was, as they have asked:

What happens when one or more of these characteristics is manifestly absent in representations of the nation, or when subordinated female, coloured, or homosexual bodies behave transgressively? (Miller et al., 2001: 87)

I have asked a similar question with respect to South Korea. The national heroes of former Korea and South Korea have predominantly been ethnically Korean male. In a similar vein, South Korea’s national sporting heroes have often been ethnically Korean, young, able-bodied, heterosexual, males. Their courage, determination, competitiveness, work ethic and morality have been praised as examples other South Koreans should strive to emulate. I hope to critically investigate:
1. What happens if the national hero is female? First of all, can women become South Korea’s national sport heroes? Would there be any double perception of hero status between sportswomen and sportsmen?

2. How would the women come to terms with the images of sportswomen and their achievements? How would they read the symbolic meaning of South Korea’s nationhood represented by South Korea’s sportswomen?

3. What are underlying forces that have shaped their perspectives as such?

South Korean women and their sporting experience have existed in a scholarly wilderness and in and outside South Korea. This research will illustrate and document the 26 South Korean women’s personal experiences of, and perspectives on, the international sport events in their own voices and discover the impact and influence of the international sport competitions upon their gender, national and ethnic identity construction. The following methodology chapter will introduce research methods I have adopted to conduct the research and rationalise my selections. In addition, it will discuss my approach as a feminist, as well as interpretative, research.
Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The objectives of this research were to provide South Korean women with an opportunity to speak about their personal experiences and perspectives of gender, nation and sport in the public space and to add them to existing knowledge. Under strict Confucian ethics, South Korean women have long been confined in domesticity, which has substantially limited their hobbies, lifestyles and identities. This research was intended to offer them a chance to publicly express their opinions on the issues surrounding sport. A variety of research methods were employed to best suit such intention. Most notably, a feminist approach was selected as the ideal paradigm for my investigation of the interviewed women’s experiences and views of gender, nation and sport, with which this chapter begins.

Research methods were chosen with a careful consideration to best accommodate my intention and produce rich data, and this will be also examined. In addition, to help unravel the ways in which the interviewees constructed their gender, ethnic and national identities, a number of media representations were presented to the women in the interviews. Accordingly, an overview of media studies and audience reception studies will be discussed and theorised, followed by an examination of the feminist understandings of the relationships between the researcher and the researched.

I participated in the research as a ‘person’ who has a specific personal and social histories and backgrounds, thus distancing myself from the ‘traditional’ approach that perceives the researcher as being, or having to be, objective, detached and value-neutral. I, however, strongly advocate that knowledge is always specifically situated and embodied; therefore, no such ‘objective’ stance is possible as there is no ‘objective’
knowledge or ‘Truth’. This, together with the nature of the ‘insiderness’ of the researcher, will be comprehensively explored in this chapter.

The chapter will end with the conceptualisations of the interpretative research. Eventually, the interview material became meaningful and valuable through my own interpretation. Interpretation is, thus, a power-ridden activity, which is deeply political in nature. The activity of my interpretation was, indeed, my activity of constructing a ‘reality’ of the interviewed women in my own terms, which required a keen sense of responsibility from me. These thoroughly political aspects of the interpretive research will also be discussed in this chapter.

3.2 Feminist Research as Research Paradigm

The spirit and principle of this research comes from the feminist tradition: ‘by women, on women and for women’ (Webb, 2000: 43). Women have long been subjects of academic investigation; nevertheless, Harding argues:

> Studying them from the perspective of their own experiences so that women can understand themselves and the world can claim virtually no history at all (1987: 8).

It is undeniable that male experiences and perspectives, particularly those of bourgeois, white men, have long been the spectrum through which the social world has been defined, explained and interrogated (Harding, 1987). However, feminist critiques since the 1960s have questioned and challenged the male-centeredness of social science and partial knowledge produced by it; and they have begun to examine the world from women’s point of view, striving to redress the existing imbalance in the academic
research and identifying structural and systematic social inequality (Harding, 1987; Millman and Kanter, 1987; Webb, 2000).

In all these claims and arguments, however, stood centred positioning of white, bourgeois women, who spoke ‘authoritatively for the ‘silent majority’ of women’ (Ang, 1996: 114), and sisterhood, as ‘the idea that women as a group share certain similar life experiences and social roles’ (Olson and Shopes, 1991: 189), has been the key concept to feminist research. ‘Sisterhood’ may have produced a collective political empowerment, nevertheless, it has understated or categorically ignored critical differences that exist among women, such as race, ethnicity, class, age, sexuality and nationality; feminist researchers in the 1980s and the 1990s, most notably post-structuralists, have, therefore, challenged the white, bourgeois Western women-centred perspectives of the social world and called for an attention to women with different backgrounds, thus undermining any homogeneity in the term ‘women’ was thought to entail. (Ang, 1996; Etter-Lewis, 1991; Harding, 1987; Olson and Shopes, 1991; Priest, 1996; Reinharz, 1992; Webb, 2000). Thus, they have cast epistemological question ‘who can know’ (Webb, 2000: 43), and consequently, the more recent feminist research has been characterised by an awareness of diversity, centring around various experiences of women.

Now it is clear, as Ang asserts (1996: 114), that ‘feminism cannot presume to possess the one and only truth about women’, and this recognition has greatly validated and celebrated ‘‘ordinary’ women’s experiences through research’. Reinharz also argues (1992: 255) that research that fails to recognise diversity of race, age, ethnicity, class, and sexuality is inadequate and more importantly, it is ‘a sign of methodological weakness and moral failure, impermissible reflection of a lack of effort and unwitting prejudice’. As Harding stresses:
It is ‘women’s experiences’ in the plural which provide the new resources for research. That is, women come only in different classes, races, and cultures: there is no ‘woman’ and no ‘woman’ experience’ (1987: 7, italics in original).

Feminists have been highly critical on ‘mainstream research in all the disciplines for its blindness to women’s diversity’ (Reinharz, 1992: 252), and have recognised that ‘different women tell different stories and they each have validity’ (Webb, 2000: 47). Harding argues (1987: 8) that feminist research is ultimately and profoundly about power struggle since what an oppressed or marginalised group seeks is rarely a ‘request for so-called pure truth’. She argues (1987) that instead, it is about recognising the oppression, attempting to find solutions to change it, identifying underlying forces behind it and striving to redress power imbalance and achieve emancipation.

Feminist movement in South Korea began to appear in the 1980s, a little later than in the West. The rigidity and tenacious stronghold of Confucian ethics have significantly delayed the arrival of feminist consciousness in South Korea. Moreover, emphasis on the confrontation with North Korea and the state’s support for the ideology of nationalism have effectively suppressed and silenced women’s voices for equality. As Enloe perceptively states, in a nation that is in military conflict:

Women who had called for more genuine equality between the sexes … have been told that now is not the time, the nation is too fragile. The enemy is too near. Women must be patient, they must wait until the nationalist goal is achieved; then relations between women and men can be addressed. ‘Not now, later’ is the advice that rings in the ears of many nationalist women (1989: 62; italics in original).
Women in South Korea have for so long been subjugated by patriarchal institutions, laws, regulations, customs and traditions. Men and women occupy different social space, therefore, they experience nation and sport differently from men. However, South Korean women have been spoken for by men, and their experiences and perspectives ignored for centuries. It was, therefore, my strong intention from the very moment of designing this research to provide an opportunity for South Korean women to speak about their experiences and views on gender, nation and sport and document them. This intention makes this research of mine deeply political and feminist. Moreover, coming from the post-structuralist feminist tradition that respects the diversity of women’s experiences, I have made every effort throughout the thesis to avoid categorising the interviewed women under the over-arching impersonal, singular group of ‘woman’. Instead, I have endeavoured to treat and respect them and their stories as individuals who have come from different socio-cultural, historical and political backgrounds. Qualitative research methods were most appropriate and ideal to fulfil these intentions, and therefore, they were selected for the research. This will be examined in the following sections.

3.3 Qualitative Interviews as Main Technique

Qualitative interviews refer to “interviews of a semi-structured type with a single respondent (the depth interview) or a group of respondents (the focus group)” (Gaskell, 2000: 38). Qualitative interview is a technique intended to discover the wide range of different opinions of the issues in question and also what underlies and justifies these different viewpoints (Gaskell, 2000). Feminist researchers often find qualitative research very appealing for various reasons (Priest, 1996; Reinharz, 1992; van Zoonen,
1994). Most notably, ‘it brings the focus on individual voices of the interviewee’, enabling researchers to ‘access to people’s ideas, thoughts, and memories in their own words rather than in the words of the researcher’ (Reinharz, 1992: 19). Thus, it is ideal to uncover ‘how the world looks from a point of view (that of women)’ (Priest, 1996: 209, italics in original). It is valued also because it allows to explore ‘the ways in which people interpret the world and their place within it’ (Lawler, 2002: 242). These aspects are deemed particularly significant, given that women have long been spoken for by men (Reinharz, 1992). Therefore, to unravel the interviewed women’s experiences and perspective of nation and sport from their own point of view, I chose qualitative interviews as the main technique for this research. The following sections will examine them in detail.

### 3.3.1 Snowball Sampling and Focus Group Interviews

Two phases of the interviews were conducted for the research through 2 different qualitative interview forms: the focus group interview for the 1st phase and the individual interview for the 2nd. The focus group interviews were conducted during the 2004 Athens Olympics, which was held from 15th till 29th August 2004. Prior to my arrival in Seoul, I had arranged the focus groups, by requesting friends, relatives and acquaintances of mine to recruit their friends, colleagues and/or acquaintances and form a group of 3 to 6 ethnically South Korean women for the group interviews. The purpose of the interviews was explained to my primary contacts so they could explain it to others upon recruiting. In the end, 7 groups were formed: 3 groups consisting of 3 women, 2 of 4 women, 1 of 5 and another of 6. In total, 26 women participated, aged between 19 to 36, all of whom were friends, colleagues or acquaintances of my initial
contact. More detailed backgrounds of the participants will be discussed in section 3.3.3 (also see appendix 12).

The method I adopted to recruit the interview participants is termed ‘networking’ or ‘snowball technique’, which usually starts out with contacting an acquaintance or friend, who is then asked to bring together specified number of other people, who live up to certain specified characteristics (Arber, 2001; Burton, 2000; Schröder, Drotner, Kline and Murray, 2003). It is known as most suitable for obtaining samples of numerically small groups who share similar interests (Arber, 2001). Schröder et al. point out (2003) that focus groups composed of people who are acquainted with one another display different characteristics from those composed of strangers. One of the concerns raised is regarding the potential influence of existing formal or informal power relations among participants upon discussions, preventing some participants from expressing their opinions (Krueger, 1988; Priest, 1996). Furthermore, van Zoonen points out (1994) that discussions in groups formed by strangers may not be effective unless the participants can feel comfortable in each other’s presence. The 7 groups, comprised of friends, acquaintances or colleagues of one another, appeared non-hierarchical and non-threatening and produced a positive and constructive atmosphere, promoting willing and open exchanges of ideas and opinions among the participants. The interviewees appeared to be relaxed and eager to speak about their experiences.

Coupled with the advantages of the ‘snowball technique’, the focus group interview added a number of benefits to this research. First of all, I was able to gather a wide variety of data from the interviews. However, Priest points out (1996) that the real advantage of the focus group interview comes from participants’ interaction with one another. Through the interaction among the participants, focus groups interviews help to investigate what participants think. The participants are often compelled to explain,
justify or rationalise their views to the other participants, and in this regard, focus group interviews are extremely useful to uncover why they think the way they do (Morgan, 1988; Oates, 2000). Gaskell shares the view (2000) that the participants of the group interviews often stimulate one another to talk or respond, to examine further and to compare experiences and opinions. Interaction among interview participants is also beneficial, Gaskell (2000: 46) argues, because ‘people in groups are more willing to entertain novel ideas and to explore their implications’. Priest also points out (1996) that interaction amongst the participants promotes more voluntary exchanges of opinions among them that they may not bring up in an individual interview. Furthermore, it facilitates the participants to more easily ignore or forget the presence of the researcher and thus produces ‘their conversations and reactions more closely approximate normal conditions’ (Priest, 1996: 66). Likewise, the participants’ interaction often ‘replaces their interaction with the interviewer, leading to a great emphasis on participants’ points of view’ (Morgan, 1988: 18). Moreover, group interviewing gives ‘insights into the emerging consensus and the way people handle disagreements’ (Gaskell, 2000: 47).

Gaskell points out (2000) that traditionally, focus groups consist of 6 to 8 people. Schrøder et al., however, recommend (2003) that the small group of 3 or 4 participants should be appropriate if the researcher is relatively inexperienced in the management of the interview situations. Initially I designed the groups to have 6 to 8 people, but taking my inexperience in interviewing under consideration, I reduced the number to 3 to 6, which I felt comfortable in managing. The 7 groups consisting of familiar faces of one another did create an active, positive, friendly and constructive interaction and produced rich data. The women in the focus group interviews looked relaxed and eager to express their personal opinions or impressions on the issues in question. They were
often forced to explain or rationalise their views by me but more often by the other participants, which at times gave rise to a consensus or disagreement among them, which was extremely beneficial to my research. All of the interviews were video-taped and lasted between 1.5 hour and 2 hours.

3.3.2 Individual Interviews

The individual interviews were conducted between 27th March and 9th April 2005, during which the South Korean national football team was playing 2 of its final qualifying matches for the 2006 FIFA World Cup. I selected 10 women among those who participated in the focus group interviews, based on their general interest in, and insight into, gender, sport and nation. All of the interviews were an hour-long and all were again video-taped. Nine of them were single, their age ranged from 27 to 35, and their professions were as various as the ones in the focus group interviews, which will be explained in the next section.

The individual interviews for the 2nd stage were designed to gather more personal, in-depth accounts on gender, nation and sport. ‘In-depth interviewing is the most popular method in feminist media studies and cultural studies’, van Zoonen claims (1994: 136). It involves relatively unstructured and open-ended conversations with interviewees about the subject of inquiry, and the researcher only decides on a broad conversation theme and issues. In other words, the particular take-on the theme and the direction of the conversation are determined considerably by the persons being interviewed, which brings focus on the perspectives, interpretations and experiences of the interviewees in their own terms (Marshall and Rossman, 1995; van Zoonen, 1994). It was virtually impossible to give particular attention to a particular individual in the
focus group discussions, therefore, individual interviews were found to be complementary to the focus group interviews.

General questions were prepared prior to the interviews, but some questions were based in part on the 10 women’s responses during the focus group interviews. Reinharz maintains (1992: 37) that multiple interviews are likely to be more accurate than single interviews because of the opportunity to ask additional questions and to get feedback on previously obtained information. Some of the questions which were asked in the focus group interviews were repeated during the individual interviews, hoping for their elaboration of their previous responses. Also, when necessary, I recounted or showed them the scripts of their previous replies, through which the women were able to revisit their responses, and reiterated or modified them. In this way, the interviewees somehow exerted control over my interpretations of their comments. Furthermore, the individual interviews allowed me to explore issues that came up during the analysis of the focus group interviews (Morgan, 1988), and this will be further discussed in section 3.3.4.

In the beginning of each focus group and individual interviews, I distributed the consent form of the interview participation to all of the interviewees and collected them from them. I also explained to the women about the purposes and objectives of the interviews, and pledged to them that each individual’s subjective perspective and remarks would be treated as equally valuable and important. I encouraged them to inquire if any of my questions were unclear or if they had anything to ask me in relation to the themes of the research. Overall, the focus group and individual interviews proceeded in a relaxed, positive and friendly atmosphere, which produced rich data for the research, I believe. For confidentiality, the interviewees’ identities were disguised
in the discussions of the thesis. Their names have been changed and their personal backgrounds, such as occupation and education, have been slightly modified.

### 3.3.3 Interview Subjects and Their Passion for Sport

I stated in the beginning of methodology that the spirit and principle of this research is predicated upon feminist tradition: on women by a woman through women’s own voices. Although this stands as true, to be precise this research comes from post-structuralist tradition; therefore, I argue that it is imperative to make explicit some of the backgrounds of the interview participants to help better comprehend their stories and comments. The 26 participants were all ethnically Korean, living in Seoul, and of them, 4 women were married. They varied in age, from 19 to 36, and their educational background ranged from high school graduates to postgraduate degree holders. All of the participants were either university students or employed full time outside the home except one who was then in between jobs. Their professions were as diverse as laboratory researcher, social worker, English/Korean language translator, ceramic artist, office worker, fashion designer, physio-therapist, IT engineer and banker, and several of them were in managerial positions in their companies. In addition, the majority of them were frequent travellers, not only within South Korea but abroad, and eight of them had an experience of either living or studying in a foreign country. Overall, the characteristics of the interview participants were specific: young, largely single, professional, cosmopolitan, educated, well travelled and financially independent.

These backgrounds of the interview participants imply that their responses to the interview questions, and their opinions and perspectives of issues concerning gender, nation and sport are specific and particular and do not represent those of the general population of South Korean women. What I hoped from the interviews was to gather as
diverse stories, opinions and experiences as possible, and I never intended to collect representative figures or statistics for South Korean women on those issues. This is also precisely one of the reasons I have chosen the focus group and individual interviews as the main technique for this research. I stress again that the findings of the interviews were from the 26 women who have specific identities, structured by specific age, education, region, profession and life experiences and that they do not pretend to represent the general opinions of South Korean women.

In the recruiting processes of the focus group and individual interviews, all of the women had been informed by myself or my initial contacts of what the interviews were about, which indicated, although varied, the level of interest they had in sport. Nevertheless, a surprising finding from the interviews was many of the women’s enthusiasm about sport, which defied a common sense assumption of women’s disinterest in sport. Due to long standing, close association between sport and masculinity, sport has been routinely considered as a for-men-and-by-men activity. Not only has it attributed sport culture and sport fandom to be commonly regarded as a platform ‘to provide important forms and occasions, through which many people, particularly males, attribute meaning to their lives’ (Roche 2000: 166-7; my emphasis); but it also has had an enormous effect on the relations the sport media have with the audience. One consequence is the argument that:

Sport audiences divide along gender lines more markedly than most program forms… Only sport and soap operas show a marked gender preference, with more men for sport and more women for soap operas (Whannel, 1998: 222).
Women’s disinterest in sport has been thus assumed, woman audiences considerably marginalised by the mainstream sport media and their interest in, and concern about, sport ignored and trivialised.

Indeed, during the focus group interviews some of the women expressed their general indifference in sport, preferring soap operas or other entertainment programs. As mentioned by many of the interviewees, the South Korean television programs were Olympics-saturated during the Olympic period. Many of the regular programs were cancelled, frequently interrupted or moved to another time slot to accommodate the live Olympics broadcasting, considerably reducing many audiences’ program choices. 19-year old, office worker Shin Mi-sook, for instance, grudgingly admitted her involuntary viewing of the Olympics when she said, “Only the Olympics are on TV these days. I watch it only because I have no other choice”. Disinterest in sport many of the women exhibited refused straightforward analysis, however, as most of them still watched the Games, voluntarily. Yang Hye-soo is a case in point. She claimed to be far from being a sport fan in general but professed to constantly switch the television channels to watch the Olympics:

If I have choice among a soap opera, an entertainment program and the Olympics, I watch the soap. But while watching the soap, I jab the channels to see the Olympics. I am normally not interested in watching sport, but I watch the Olympics because it is competition against other nations. It is fun.

An interesting finding from the interviews was that sport was the willing and deliberate choice of many of the women interviewed. Sun Young-ran, a married woman with a 6 year-old daughter, offered a prime example. She said, “Soap operas and the Olympics are all that are being televised these days. As I do not like soap operas, I
watch the sport”. Sun, thus, made a conscious choice of watching sport over soap operas. As Ang asserts (1996: 94), Sun confirmed that ‘not all women are attracted to melodrama, or not always’.

Perhaps a more surprising finding is the sheer zeal and enthusiasm many of the women revealed about sport, which has been largely unexplored or undocumented previously. In fact, a number of the women I interviewed were very proactive in their efforts to accommodate the Olympics in their daily routines during the Olympic period. An office worker Lee Mi-jin’s daily schedule, for instance, revolved around the Games. To watch her favourite games, she would avoid making plans for the evening and “return home straight [from work], putting everything else aside”. Kim Mi-jung, on the other hand, “set the alarm clock not to miss the archery final” or listened on her mobile phone to her husband’s live broadcasting of men’s table tennis final on her way home while a 19-year old university student Jung Kyung-soo “waited till 2 or 3 in the morning to watch” some of her favourite games. Park Sang-kyung was out, meeting with friends when the men’s table tennis final between a South Korean and a Chinese was broadcast:

We chose a restaurant that showed the final. We had to watch it. It was already on and we forgot about the meal. I was so tense and nervous and, when the match was over, I felt severe pain in my shoulders.

Kim Jung, an office worker, was a passionate Olympics fan:

I watch it really a lot. All day long, I watch it whenever I have break. I sit through the night if it involves our country even if I have to take a break at work the following day. I watch [all of] our nation’s matches although I dislike those particular sports. If our national delegates are playing, I watch it even though I am ignorant of the rules of that sport.
In addition, many of the women I interviewed had their sleep disturbed or deprived, or their daily schedules rearranged to watch the Olympics.

Post-modernists claim that a multitude of different subjective positions constitute the individual (Maynard, 2002; Ang, 1996). In relation to gender, ‘being a woman’ today, Ang maintains (1996: 94), ‘can mean the adoption of many different identities, composed of a whole range of subject positions’. The investment of time and enthusiasm of the women commented above suggested that, as Ang observes:

Femininity and masculinity are not enduring subject position inhabited inevitably by biological women and men, but that identity is transitory, the temporary result of dynamic identifications (1996: 96).

Those who watched the Olympics with such zeal were adopting a masculine-identified subject position by consuming the passion and excitement sport generates.

The research also revealed a diversity of sport the interviewed women took interest in, often even in the absence of their national team(s) or player(s). Their favourite sports ranged from ‘traditionally’ feminine or non-contact sport, such as gymnastics (Yang Hye-ran), swimming (Shin Mi-sook), diving (Lee Jung-ran) and tennis (Lee Mi-ra) to ‘traditionally’ masculine marathon and 100m sprinting (Kim Mi-jung), and judo and wrestling (Park Shin-jin). Also, Kim Mi-jung found, “Shooting is very interesting too”. Independent of their national delegates’ involvement and whether or not South Koreans excel in them, most of those women closely followed international tournaments and watched their favourite sports. Park Sang-kyung, for instance, enthused about her love for track games, sports in which South Korea displays less than mediocre performance:
I just so love [watching] sprinting. To watch not only the Olympics but the World Athletic Championship, I sit through the night till in the morning. It is just so fun, so wonderful to watch.

Also as a big fan of marathon, she was “very sorry” that she “missed women’s marathon” at the Athens Olympics. Lee Mi-jin, on the other hand, was a passionate football fan who would “watch [football] at the Olympics and other tournaments like European football”. These women were found not only to intensely follow world-class tournaments of their favourite sports but to be knowledgeable on the players, rules and regulations of those sports. These empirical findings suggested the common assumption of women’s disinterest in sport to be re-interrogated; they also stood to refute the claim that men are drawn to contact, high-performance and fast-paced sports whereas women are attracted slow-paced and less brutal sports (Wenner and Gantz, 1989).

What these findings implied and what will be revealed in the discussion chapters are the high level of affection and passion for sport spectacle among many interviewees, something that has been largely unexplored in academia. These women were active audience members that were willing to rearrange their daily routines or make a sacrifice to accommodate sport spectacle in their lives. Sport spectacle was undoubtedly integral to their lives. With their unexpected high interest in sport, the atmosphere of the focus groups and individual interviews was very chatty, spirited, eager, cheerful and entertaining. The interviews also made me realise the few opportunities South Korean women in general have to publicly express their opinions and perspectives on issues of gender, nation and sport. During and after the interviews, several women spoke of their excitement and delight in their participation in the interviews and in discussing their views on those issues with other people. I was please that the research design allowed them to voice their perspectives in this way.
3.3.4 Interview Questions

Jovchelovitch and Bauer (2000) argue for the need for the researcher to familiarise herself with the field under study. I arrived in Seoul in mid July 2004 and gave myself a month for the preparation for the focus group interviews. I also returned to Seoul in early March 2005, about three weeks before the individual interviews were intended. During those periods, I collected the media extracts to be used during the interviews and closely followed the media on the Olympics and the football qualifying matches. It was also in these periods when I selected the interview questions, based on my observation and preliminary studies on these sport events, matches and players, together with my research objectives. The interview questions were not excessively specific since I intended the interviews to be open-ended so that the participants could have flexibility and control over the discussions to some extent. The general questions prepared for the focus group interviews were themed around gender and nation. They were:

1. Do you watch the Olympic Games? If so, why do you watch it?
2. Do you think South Korea should participate in the Olympics? If so, why?
3. Do you believe winning is important? Is winning a gold medal more important than winning a silver or bronze medal? Why?
4. Which sport do you think represents South Korea best and why?
5. What is your favourite sport to watch and why? Who is your favourite player and why?
6. Of men’s and women’s games, which do you prefer to watch and why?
7. What do you think of women taking up ‘traditionally masculine’ sports, such as boxing, wrestling or weightlifting?
8. Do you support North Korean delegates at the Olympics? If so, why? What do you think of South and North Koreas’ joint march at the opening/closing ceremonies of the Olympics?

The general questions prepared for the individual interviews also centred upon gender and nation. Noteworthy is that some questions for the individual interviews were influenced by the outcome of the focus group interviews. Particularly, during the focus group interviews, the questions pertaining to North Korea were highly popular and hotly discussed. Reflecting the intensity of interest the focus group interview participants exhibited, the number of the questions with respect to North Korea and the North Korean football team increased in the individual interviews. The questions prepared for the individual interviews were:

1. Do you think that South Korea must qualify for the 2006 FIFA World Cup? If so, why is the qualification important?

2. Do you believe that South Korea will qualify despite its disappointing performances so far? Explain why.

3. Who is your favourite player and why do you like her/him?

4. What do you remember about the 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup?

5. Do you support the North Korean football team? Do you wish North Korea to qualify? Why and why not?

6. What do you think of North Korea’s possession of the nuclear devices? What do you think of North Korea in general? How do you perceive South Korea’s relation to it?

7. Are you interested in Japan’s matches? Why or why not?

8. Do you watch women’s football? Why or why not? What do you think of women playing football?
Thus, broad themes of the questions were decided prior to the focus group and individual interviews and were asked to each focus group or individual participant(s).

However, it is argued that, in qualitative interviews, the researcher explores a few general topics to help uncover the participant’s perspective, but otherwise respects ways in which the participant frames and structures the responses (Gaskell, 2000; Marshall and Rossman, 1995; Priest, 1996; van Zoonen, 1994). Gaskell (2000) also points out that, while the broad content is framed and structured by the research questions, the interview questions are largely to invite the participants to speak in their own terms. The researcher may begin with a particular set of questions or concerns, but she is free to explore the issues in question in response to the interviewees’ replies and interests. Thus, the qualitative interviews greatly promote and allow for the researcher’s flexibility to investigate issues that surface during the interviews.

The high level of interest and enthusiasm surrounding sport spectacle and issues of gender and nation in sport that many of the participants displayed during the focus group and individual interviews made a big impact on my specific interview questions. The broad themes of the questions prepared in advance were asked in all of the focus groups and individuals; nevertheless, many of my specific questions were unrehearsed responses to the interviewees’ answers to my previous questions. A consequence of such an interview structure was that certain particular questions were posed to certain focus groups or individuals as interesting topics to discuss while the same questions were left out in some other interviews due to the absence of interest among the participant(s).

In addition, each focus group and individual interview often had some specific questions to respond which had not been touched on in the previous interviews also because both the focus group and individual interviews took place during the Olympics.
and between South Korea’s 2 qualifying matches. That is, particular examples were added to the interview discussion as new issues or concerns arose while the Games or the football matches proceeded. For instance, the questions and concerns regarding the controversy between a South Korean male gymnast and an American gymnast were raised only in the last 3 focus groups as it took place in the second week of the Olympics. Furthermore, the questions over South Korean female weightlifter Jang Mi-ran were not asked in the first 3 focus groups as her performance began after the 3rd focus group interview. Similarly, specific questions and examples were gradually added to each individual interview as new issues concerning the football matches were brought into the media limelight. Accordingly, half of the interviewees were not asked, for example, about the controversial incident with respect to the crowd riot during a North Korean match held in Pyung-yang, the capital of North Korea.

Thus, each focus group and individual interview often had different specific and particular examples to discuss as those sporting events went on and as new issues surfaced. Nevertheless, the specific questions and issues all remained relevant to the general themes of my research: gender and nation. In other words, the focus group and individual interview questions, be it general or specific, were structured under the themes of gender, nation and sport, and within that boundary, the interview participants had relative autonomy to frame and steer their conversation. This open-ended, semi-structured interview styles I believe greatly enriched the interview data, helping me gather more insightful personal recounts of experiences from the participants who were very willing to speak about their own stories.
3.4 Audience Reception Studies

3.4.1 News and its Ideological Nature

The media is vital in contemporary societies, and people’s lives are increasingly revolving the global media technologies. Mediated images of international sport contests, such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup, are delivered to the global audience via media technologies, presenting mediated images of individuals and/or nations. Considering the influence of the media in people’s daily lives today, extracts from South Korean newspapers that concerned the 2004 Athens Olympics and the 2006 World Cup qualifying matches were shown to the interviewees during the focus group and individual interviews. Newspaper articles were collected from 4 South Korean broadsheet sport-specific newspapers: The Sports Seoul, The Sport Chosun, The Sport Today and The Ilgan Sports. Upon arriving in Seoul, I started to collect news clips to be used in the interviews. Since all of the focus group interviews except for one were conducted during the Olympics and the news clips were gradually added more as the Olympics proceeded, the number of news articles presented in each focus group varied. While only 6 news articles were shown to the first focus group, 10 were given to the last group. For the individual interviews, 10 news clips were presented to the first interviewee, and this number increased as the matches went on. News clips were shown to the interviewees to stimulate and promote discussion in the interviews and to examine ways in which they negotiated and interpreted the media narratives of gender, nation and sport. Törrönen (2002) argues for the necessity of rigorously analysing texts prior to their use as stimuli in interview situations. Prior to the interviews, I analysed the media texts, based on the principles of semiotics. The analysis was focused
particularly on the combination of signs of nation and gender in the media coverage of the Olympics and the qualifying football matches.

It has to be mentioned that the news articles presented during the focus group and individual interviews centred upon gender although several also featured stories on North Korea. None of the news extracts were concerned directly with Japan or globalisation. Prior to the interviews, I expected few problems with discussions concerning nations such as North Korea, Japan or America. Given the demographic backgrounds of my primary contacts that formed the focus groups, I assumed that my interview subjects would be predominantly professional, educated, well travelled and cosmopolitan. I, therefore, expected them to be well informed about South Korea’s relation to those other nations and current social and political issues between them. I had thus assumed that there would be no need to provide supplementary references regarding them. On the other hand, considering the dominant discourses on gender in South Korea, I expected discussions on gender to be more difficult. Accordingly, I prepared a number of gender-related news articles for the interviews in order to stimulate their discussions on gender, nation and sport. As a result, no media extract was used for discussions on globalisation or Japan while several clips were actively used for discussions on North Korea and gender.

‘The focus of semiotics is the signs found in texts’; ‘because nothing has meaning in itself, the relationships that exist among signs are crucial’ (Berger, 1998: 13: italics in original). Bignell notes (2002) that signs in the media, such as linguistic, visual, colour, music and editing codes do not simply denote something but trigger various connotations. The signs brought together and their connotations work to construct or solidify ‘myth’ in Barthes’ term (1973, 1977, 1999). Myth here refers to the ‘ways of thinking about people, products, places or ideals which are structured to send particular
messages to the reader or viewer of the text’ (Bignell, 2002: 16). ‘Myth is not an innocent language’ Bignell claims (2002: 17) because the function of myth is to purposefully make or reinforce particular ideas natural, inevitable and common sense. It thus enhances dominant ideologies since, if certain ideas are taken as natural, universal or common sense, they are less likely to be resisted or fought against (Bignell, 2002). A semiotic analysis is effective in revealing the ways in which signs and media codes construct mythic social meanings of masculinity, femininity, national identity and nationalism.

Van Zoonen admits (1994: 78) that, ‘despite the systematic nature of the semiotic approach, there is no clear methodology of semiotics, unlike content analysis’. ‘One could, however’, she continues, ‘translate the different elements of semiotics into systematic ‘steps’ to carry out the analysis’, which includes ‘the identification of the relevant signs and their dominant aspects (1994: 78) and ‘an analysis of the codes by which the combination of signs is governed’ (1994: 79). One can then ‘arrives at an understanding of the different processes of signification in the text: denotation, connotation, myth and ideology’, she asserts (1994: 79). Bignell also maintains (2002) that semiotic analysis is extremely effective in revealing the ways in which meanings are produced and communicated by signs and the ways in which they are related to social codes and ideologies.

News is commonly believed as something that is natural and neutral. This common sense belief, however, has been refuted and the ideological nature of news has been argued by many scholars, such as Bell (1998), Berger (1998), Bignell (2002), Emmison and Smith (2000), Hall (1973), Kress and Leeuwen (1998), Loizos (2000) and Machin (2002). Denouncing news as natural happenings or events, Machin (2002) claims that it is the product of professional thinking, manufacturing and designing. It is highly
ideological since the content of news depends ‘heavily on official sources and definitions’, serving to naturalise, idealise and legitimise the bureaucratic vision of the world, he maintains (2002: 106). Hall also insists upon the ideological characteristic of news. He asserts:

Via ‘news angles’, the newspaper articulates the core themes of bourgeois society in terms of *intelligible representations*. It *translates* the legitimations of the social order into faces, expressions, subjects, settings and legends (1973: 181, italics in original).

News is highly ideological, neither natural nor neutral, excluding or trivialising perspectives of those who are not the dominant group of society. In order to identify the complexity and ambiguity of news and to unpack its ideologies, Bell suggests ‘a close analysis of the news text’ (1998: 65). Such an analysis, he insists (1998), will reveal that even most simple, innocent looking news stories or events are often complex and deeply ideological. As a tool for close examination of the news text, Bell (1998: 66) suggests the employment of the ‘five Ws and an H’: who, what, when, where, why, and how. He claims (1998: 66) that it will lead us to consider ‘why particular events have been reported at all, and why they have been gathered together into a single published news story’. In other words, it will ultimately enable us to unravel ideological significance behind news.

News is representations produced in language and other signs like photographs; therefore, a semiotic analysis of news discourse will have to include discussions of the visual signs used in news stories. Kress and Leeuwen argue (1998) that the visual arrangement of news is essential in constructing mythic messages and warn that, therefore, any form of textual analysis which ignores this is failing to adequately account for all the meanings expressed in texts. In fact, most of the news extracts
shown to the interviewees were accompanied by photographs, and all of the signs used in the photos were also rigorously studied and analysed according to the semiotics. Photographs that have been published in newspapers are seen by millions of viewers. This makes the analysis of news photographs more crucial as it points to the fact that the media are ‘not only an indicator of shared beliefs and ideologies but also are also presumed to have considerable influence in shaping them’ (Emmison and Smith, 2000: 66).

Loizos (2000) asserts visual data can be distorted as readily as written words, but in specific ways. In other words, ‘manipulation of the visual image can be more subtle and covert, but distinctly ideological’ (Loizos, 2000: 95). In fact, photographs commonly appear that they simply record the ‘world out there’. However, they are as highly ideological as the messages of the written texts since they are also purposefully selected, designed and processed to generate particular connotations, thereby to construct myth (Bignell, 2002). They are indeed ‘objects that have been worked on, chosen, composed, constructed, treated according to professional, aesthetic or ideological norms’ (Barthes, 1977: 19). Thus, photographs are a ‘social construction, consciously or unconsciously, manipulated images which can serve ideological ends’ (Emmison and Smith, 2000: 4).

Hall argues (1973) that photographs should be studied as the indicators of underlying cultural forces. Drawing on the work of Barthes, he maintains that images should be decoded in terms of connotation and denotation. Denotation is ‘precise, literal, unambiguous’ whilst the codes of connotation ‘are more open-ended’ (Hall, 1973: 176). For Hall (1973: 241), the extraordinary power of the news photograph lies in its ability to obscure its own ideological dimensions by appearing as a ‘literal visual-transcription of the real world’. As Emmison and Smith (2000) and Bignell (2002) perceive, selection and alteration made by professionals such as photographers and
editors are often ignored, and people tend to regard photographs as transparently reflecting happenings and events, and this points precisely to photography’s deeply ideological nature. Equally crucial is not to forget that ‘ideological values embodied in news photographs might vary from place to place and time to time’, thus, they are culture-and-history specific (Emmison and Smith, 2000: 48; Kress and Leeuwen, 1998).

Hall also suggests (1973) that, in determining which connotation is valid, we have to draw upon our stock of common-sense knowledge. This can involve knowledge about our society, the meanings of its symbols and the codes that govern face, body and posture. Moreover, captions accompanying news photographs function to direct readers’ connotative understanding, which is, compared to denotation, ‘more open, subject to more active transformations, which exploit its polysemic values’ (Hall, 1994: 206; italics in original). Barthes (1999: 37) also asserts that ‘all images are polysemous’ implying ‘a floating chain of signifieds’. Barthes argues:

Hence in every society various techniques are developed intended to fix the floating chain of signifieds in such a way as to counter the terror of uncertain signs; the linguistic message is one of these techniques (1999: 37; italics in original).

3.4.2 Media as Dominant Social Institution

As argued so far, the media as a dominant social institution contribute to the perpetuation of deeply embedded habits that feed the stereotypical values and worldview of those who hold power (Ang, 1996; Minister, 1991; van Zoonen, 1994). Especially, ‘in feminist terminology, the media are thought to transmit sexist, patriarchal or capitalist values to contribute to the maintenance of social order’ (van Zoonen, 1994: 27). What this suggests is that:
The relation between gender and communication is primarily a cultural one, concerning a negotiation of meanings and values that informs whole ways of life and which is vice versa was informed by existing ways of life, with configurations of power and economic inequities being a key element within them (van Zoonen, 1994: 148).

Mass media as ‘technologies of gender’ (van Zoonen, 1994: 108) are ‘central sites in which these negotiations take place’ (van Zoonen, 1994: 148). Some feminists charge the media with maintaining and reinforcing sex role stereotypes while some others claim that the media, pornographic media in particular, instigate men into aggression and violence against women; employing insights from psychoanalysis and theories of ideology, some others assert that the media contribute to the overall acceptance of dominant ideology by the public (van Zoonen, 1994). These claims are, however, premised upon an assumption that audiences, especially female, are passive individuals and victims of patriarchal and capitalist hegemony (van Zoonen, 1994). If it is true that ‘dominant ideology expressed by mass media keeps women in their subordinated position’, as some scholars argue, ‘it is in women’s own interest to identify the ideologies embedded in popular culture and to refrain from their own consumption of it’ (van Zoonen, 1994: 106-7). As Bell argues, ‘the media are important social institutions’ (1998: 64); ‘they are crucial presenters of culture, politics and social life, shaping as well as reflecting how these are formed and expressed’ (1998: 64-65). Media discourse is important because it reveals a society and also because it itself contributes to the character of the society (Bell, 1998).

As will be delineated in detail in the discussion chapters, the news articles presented during the interviews were rife with the signs of South Korea’s national symbols, images, aspirations and traditions. In addition, South Korea as a nation was
conceptualised as possessing particular qualities and characteristics, which were implied through various images South Korean delegates and teams, and the bodies of sportswomen and sportsmen. They also presented multiple forms of femininities and masculinities; however, certain types of femininity and masculinity were tactfully highlighted and idealised. Also the semiotic analysis of the media text helped identify South Koreans’ collective ideals, hopes and dreams, and the ways in which South Korea was gendered and male-centred, celebrating certain forms of masculinity while heavily stereotyping femininities in a ‘traditional’ sense.

Van Zoonen argues (1994: 152) that ‘much of the media output – popular culture in particular - is not about reality but about collective memories and dreams, desires, hopes and fears’. Film, television, and (popular) literature, she continues to claim (1994), construct an imaginary world that builds on and appeals to individuals and social fantasies. Curran and Sparks (1991, 231) also suggest:

[E]ntertainment features promote social integration within a ‘model’ of society in which the existence of fundamental differences of interest is tacitly denied and commonality of interest and identity is regularly affirmed (1991: 231).

These issues raise a number of questions that need addressing in the context of my research. When the media construct an imaginary world that builds on and appeals to individual and social fantasies, whose imaginary world is being built and appealed to? Whose social fantasies are being talked of? And who are the ‘individuals’ being referring to? It is apparent that the ‘individual’ in question refers to men and it is ‘male’ social fantasies’ and a ‘male’ imaginary world that are being implied. It is indisputable that the media produce and reproduce men’s collective memories, desires, hopes and fears. At the same time, it should be noted that ‘women’ are not the only category being
marginalised. Indeed, ‘social integration’ theory and the idea of the ‘commonality of interest and identity’ have been challenged by scholars such as black feminist critic bell hooks (1989, 1990), who demonstrates the attempt of the media, the dominant white TV entertainment system, to exclude and marginalise the experiences of black people in the mainstream media. The media clips selected for my interviews portrayed South Korea as young, healthy, powerful, robust and dynamic and also having a rosy future and great potential. In doing so, it was clear that certain groups of social members were being marginalised or stereotyped in the images, strategically and effectively promoting any notion of ‘social integration’.

Showing the news articles to the interviewees allowed to investigate the ways in which they negotiated and interpreted the mediated media images and also the ways in which they utilised the media references for constructing their identities. In this respect, this research draws on established approaches to the analysis of audience reception of media content. Within this work, audiences have been recognised as active ‘decoders’ who do not necessarily accept the encoded meanings and positions which are on offer, and this will be discussed in the following sections.

3.4.3 Audience as Active Interpreter

People watch the same images and programmes produced by the media. However, Schrøder poses the critical question (1987: 19), ‘Do people who watch the same programme actually see the same programme?’ The study of audience reception was included as part of my research methods as I was interested in discovering how the media images of gender, nation and sport were interpreted by my interviewees. Audience reception studies means ‘the empirical study of the social production of meaning in people’s encounter with media discourse’ (Schrøder et al., 2003: 147)
through the qualitative research interview (Alasuutari, 1999; Ross and Nightingale, 2003; Schrøder et al., 2003). Thus, the focus group and individual interviews I conducted were arguably the most suitable ways to illuminate and unravel the ways in which the audience reads and decodes signs and images the media portray and also how they made them meaningful in their daily lives.

Audiences had been commonly perceived as passive, simply consuming popular messages without critical awareness or investigation. However, the audience as a category started to attract academic attention since Stuart Hall’s (1974 in 1994) breakthrough paper, *Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse* (Alasuutari, 1999; Ang, 1996; Gray, 1999; Machin, 2002; Ross and Nightingale, 2003; van Zoonen, 1994). Hall (1994: 207) underscores the media’s ‘dominant or preferred readings’, which has the ‘institutional/political/ideological order imprinted in them and have themselves become institutionalized’. According to Hall, preferred meanings are ‘the product of institutional processes, working within the broader cultural and ideological world’ and ‘working within the dominant ideology’ (Gray, 1999: 27).

After the claim to the privileged position of the media texts as the dominant definitions, Hall endows relatively autonomous power upon audiences to determine the meanings of media messages, by questioning what happens to the dominant or preferred messages when they reach the audience. ‘If no ‘meaning’ is taken, there can be no ‘consumption’. If the meaning is not articulated in practice, it has no effect’, Hall argues (1994: 201). In other words, the meaning of the programme or cultural work was seen as ‘incomplete until the audience had both consumed and reproduced it in a way that makes sense within the contexts of everyday life’ (Ross and Nightingale, 2003: 37).

Hall (1994) thus recognises audiences as active producers of meaning, who negotiate messages transmitted by the media, but made it clear that their negotiations
are, however, operated within cultural codes and contexts. According to Hall (1994), therefore, audience activities are thought of:

[L]ess as the activity of individuals, and more as activity through which culture in general, and the particular cultural location of the respondent in particular, was expressed (Ross and Nightingale, 2003: 37).

As meanings are deeply social, cultural, political and ideological, Hall insists (1994) that the revelation of the workings and processes of denotation, connotation and audience activity of interpretations of the media messages will unravel ideology and hegemony in a given society. Hall, accordingly, urged researchers to rigorously investigate audiences’ interpretations and negotiations of meaning and also to examine the culture and community in question (Machin, 2002; Ross and Nightingale, 2003).

Hall’s breakthrough encoding/decoding model has engendered a wave of audience reception studies from the early 1980s onwards, the first one of which was David Morley’s *The Nationwide Audience* (1980). Morley interrogated and identified difference readings by different groups of people; in so doing, he demonstrated that ‘encounters between texts and viewers are far more complex than the textualist theory would suggest’ (Ang, 1996: 38). Following Morley’s seminal study were a series of audience reception studies, which includes Radway (1984), Ang (1985) and Gray (1987). All these empirical studies have underscored that audiences, socially situated on the basis of their own individual backgrounds, do actively negotiate and interpret the meanings transmitted by the media to make sense of them in their daily routines.

Power between the text and the audience has been a contentious issue among scholars. Some including Ang (1985, 1996), Fingerson (1999), Morley (1980), Radway (1984) and van Zoonen (1994) advocate the audience’s autonomy in their readings of the media text while some others such as Pearce (1995) place more weight on the text’s
preferred meaning. However, critics are generally sceptical of the existence of ‘preferred meanings’ and, therefore, recent academic interest tends to perceive the audience as autonomous and interactive, who actively produce and negotiate media messages. Van Zoonen forcefully argues (1994: 108) that ‘audiences should be understood as producers of meaning instead of as mere consumers of meaning taking up prescribed textual audience positionings’. Lewis also claims:

> If we are concerned with the meaning and significance of popular culture in contemporary society, with how cultural forms work ideologically or politically, then we need to understand cultural products (or “texts”) ‘as they are understood by audiences’ (1991: 47 italics in original).

Both theoretically and politically, the debates over the preferred meaning of the text construct ‘a more dynamic conception of the relation between texts and viewers’ since it ‘acknowledges the fact that factors other than textual ones play a part in the way viewers make sense of a text’ (Ang, 1996: 20). What is crucial here is that this more dynamic conception necessitates the examination of socio-cultural and political contexts (Ang, 1996). If audiences are perceived as producing or negotiating the meanings of media messages according to their personal experiences and backgrounds, their reception activities should be contextualised in the broader networks. That is, the complex social, cultural, historical and political forces have to be interrogated to adequately grasp the significance and implications of audiences’ consumption of media representations.

Audience reception studies was incorporated into my research to help unravel the interviewed women’s gender, ethnic and national identity construction. An analysis of the ways in which they made sense of the media representations of gender and nation,
and the ways in which they made those representations meaningful in their lives effectively unveiled the way they constructed their identities. Their interpretations and negotiations were contextualised in South Korea’s socio-cultural, historical and political complexity, because, as noted above, the interviewees’ understandings of those images and signs are structuring, and also being structured, by the broader contexts.

3.4.4 Audience Ethnography as Research Method

The inclusion of audience reception research as part of my research methods offered double benefits. Feminist media researchers are usually interested in unravelling mundane media representations and audiences’ subconscious construction of the meanings of those representations, and this can be revealed only by ‘methods sensitive to the cues of common behaviour, speech and experiences’ (van Zoonen, 1994: 135), which brings focus to qualitative research. Qualitative techniques of data gathering, such as in-depth interviewing, participant observation and a range of others, are ideal to collect the subtle, round and thick descriptions of people’s daily routines and social engagements and, therefore, it has been hailed to be ‘most adequate to gain insight into the meanings of everyday life’ (van Zoonen, 1994: 135), which includes the ways in which people consume the media and their representations in their day-to-day environments.

Along with an increasing number of empirical audience reception studies, gradual shifts have occurred in the whole reception paradigm, leading to the emergence of a new audience ethnography paradigm (Alasuutari, 1999). In fact, in audience reception studies, David Morley (1980) was first to attempt to develop an ‘“ethnography of viewing”, by sorting out the different readings or decodings made by different groups of viewers … in relation to a specific set of texts’ (Ang, 1996: 20). His book (The
nationwide audience (1980)) has paved the way to the increasing popularity of ethnographic approaches to the analysis of media audiences, which has been employed as the research techniques by many feminist scholars because, as Priest argues (1996), ethnographic methods are most ideal to those who are concerned with the identification of the media’s role in everyday social life and its meaning within a particular cultural context.

A comparison between qualitative studies of media reception and the tradition of anthropological and sociological research may seem stretching a point too far. This comparison raises a question as to ‘whether there is anything very ethnographic about ‘the new audience ethnography’’ (Moores, 1993: 4). As Moores points out, ‘Sessions spent talking about television in the sitting rooms of eighteen south London homes’, for instance, are ‘evidently quite different from two years living amongst the Trobriand islanders’ (Moores, 1993: 4). In general, audience reception studies are not based on extensive fieldwork conducted in distant lands; nevertheless, Moores insists (1993) that it can still be properly called ethnographic for several reasons, one of which is the similar aims between anthropological research and audience reception studies. Despite differences in the means of investigation, their objectives have ‘often been to understand a culture ‘from the native‘s point of view’, trying to get to grips with people’s subjective apprehensions of the social environment’ (Moores, 1993: 3). Anthropological research and audience reception studies also share a similar concern over the production of meaning and social context (Moores, 1993). Scholars involved in qualitative audience research, like those in anthropology, have frequently sought to account for the significance of people’s lives and their social practices by contextualising them in their socio-cultural, historical and political frameworks.
Ethnography is an excellent means of examining the finer details of everyday life and everyday knowledge, partly because of its sensitivity to human behaviours (Machin, 2002). The adaptation of the ethnographic gaze means that the researcher approaches cultural explanations ‘as never being rational, natural or inevitable’ (Machin, 2002: 35). As addressed above, ethnography seeks to account for the significance and implications of meanings and practices within the network of socio-cultural, historical and political environments of a culture in question. It is thus aware that the significance and implications of meanings and practices differ culturally and historically, and this necessitates the vigorous interrogation of the culture in question for proper understanding of research data. ‘Ethnography is often criticized for not being representative in that it tends to involve relatively small detailed samples’ (Machin, 2002: 85). These small samples are, however, extremely effective in examining finer and fuller details about people’s every day lives, their motives and behaviours (Machin, 2002). In addition, the purpose of qualitative research is, not to count or quantify opinions, but to explore ‘the range of opinions and the different representations of the issue’ (Gaskell, 2000: 41).

In South Korea, research on sport media texts and audience reception studies in relations to sport are largely absent, having begun to attract scholarly investigation only very recently. Moreover, academic interest in gender, media and sport in a South Korean context have concentrated primarily on content analysis or quantitative research as conducted by K. S., Cho (2003), S. S., Cho (1996) and Y. R., Kim (1998), having left audience reception studies, especially with women viewers, virtually unexplored. It is this absence that my research attempts to redress. South Korean women have, for so
long, been subjects of academic studies and research; nevertheless, having been spoken for by men over centuries, they have hardly been given opportunities to speak publicly about their own experiences and perspectives of South Korea’s socio-cultural or political issues including gender, nation and sport. My research was designed to provide them with a chance to express their personal opinions on these issues and to document them as valuable and insightful data in understanding South Korean society and culture from their own point of view, as well as their identity construction.

3.5 Interview Data Analysis

3.5.1 Interview Settings, Video-taping, Transcribing and Translating

Schrøder et al. claim (2003: 150) that one should aim to find a setting in which interview participants are likely to feel ‘at home’. Following their suggestion, the focus group and individual interviews were preceded at places where the participants could feel relaxed and comfortable and in the evening or on the weekend since most of them were employed outside the home. Seminar rooms at cafes, meeting rooms at some participants’ workplaces and an interviewee’ house were used for the interviews, and I believed that most of the interviewed women found these arrangements non-threatening, comfortable and friendly.

With consent from the participants, all of the focus group and individual interviews were video-taped. ‘Talk’ is constituted through both verbal and non-verbal acts in social, material settings (Heath and Hindmarsh, 2002; Kress and Leeuwen, 1998). People articulate message not just with words, but ‘through a complex interplay of speech-sound, of rhythm, of intonation, accompanies by facial expression, gesture and
posture’ (Kress and Leeuwen, 1998: 186). Video-recording is in this regard effective in capturing the fine details of facial expressions, body language, interaction with others and subtle gestures of answering, such as nods, smiles, pause or hesitation, which the interviewer may not be aware of or which cannot be recorded on the audiotape (Heath and Hindmarsh, 2002; Kvale, 1996). The video-taping hence enables the revelation and analysis of ‘tacit, ‘seen but unnoticed’ aspects of human conduct which would otherwise be unavailable for systematic study’ (Greatbatch, 1998: 165; Heath and Hindmarsh, 2002: 103).

Mindful of the wide range of benefits of video-taping, however, I have to clarify that the video-taping was intended in my research only to observe the interviewees’ non-verbal gestures or facial expressions to better grasp meanings they tried to convey. Comprehensive and extensive exploration of the intricate workings of non-verbal expressions was not an intention for the research. It was simply to assist in determining, for example, speakers that were speaking simultaneously and their emotions in agreeing or disagreeing with others. Thus, the video-taped records have rather restricted usage for my research. In the beginning of the interviews, the participants seemed conscious about the camcorder recording them; however, most people appeared to soon forget the video-taping. Gaskell (2000: 51-52) notes an additional benefit video-taping brings to the research. That is, video-taping ‘allows for the interviewer to concentrate on what is said rather than the taking of note’. Indeed, not only I but also the interviewees were able to concentrate better on listening and understanding one another as I did not have to write down during the interviews.

After the focus group and individual interviews, I assumed the responsibility of transcribing the interviews. Jovchelovitch and Bauer (2000) argue that transcribing, boring as it may be, is useful for getting a good understanding of the research data, and
therefore, recommends that ‘researchers do at least some transcriptions themselves, as it is actually the first step of analysis’ (2000: 69). I, in fact, transcribed all of the interviews myself, and I tried to record conversation as accurately as possible, including gestures and facial expressions of the participants. While transcribing, I often had to struggle to understand what was being said because ‘natural conversation contains far more gaps, omissions, misstatements, and errors than one may have realized’ (Priest, 1996: 186). ‘Even well-educated people don’t normally speak in clear, grammatically correct sentences, and this makes transcription more difficult’ (Priest, 1996: 186). I meant to be thorough, but many times two or more people talked simultaneously, or other noises such as laughing or clapping overlapped conversations. In these circumstances, precise transcription looked like a ‘mission impossible’.

Priest also suggests (1996) that focus group transcripts should include remarks made not only by the participants but by the researcher as part of the interviews. Every conversation that was exchanged between myself and the interviewees, such as my questions to them and my responses to their questions, was also recorded word by word. Overall, the transcripts contain nearly all of the conversation and non-verbal expressions among the participants and between myself and the participants. When the transcribing work was completed, I felt satisfied and rewarded because I became more familiar with the interview scripts and also because I became more insightful into the data, which greatly helped my analysis.

I also translated the interview scripts into English. Translation requires a thorough knowledge of cultures and societies in question, along with languages. I believed that my fluency in Korean and English and my firsthand experiences of Canadian and British cultures for almost a decade qualified me to undertake the translation work. I spent many weeks struggling to find most appropriate words and/or expressions. I like
to stress that, during the translation, I was very conscious about my power and authority over the interview material since I was the one who chose a particular word or expression over others. No matter how cautious and careful I was in searching for most adequate words and expressions, I understand that it ultimately fell on my shoulder to decide one over others, which indicated my power in the research process.

3.5.2 Analysis Process of Interview Data

The transcription and translation of the focus group and individual interviews were carried out separately. That is, after all of the focus group interviews were completed in Seoul, I returned to London and began to transcribe the interviews. In the first step, I transcribed each focus group interview, writing down nearly everything what was said or exchanged including my questions and/or responses to the participants. As a result, 7 interview transcriptions were produced in Korean after several weeks of my labour, and I immediately translated them into English, which took another month or so. The next procedure I took was to categorise the interview data broadly under 5 themes: nation, gender, North Korea, Japan and America. Each thematic category also had sub-categories for finer classification. The detail is below:

1. Nation: National pride
   - Anxiety over national reputation
   - Tae-kwon-do
   - Archery

2. Gender: ‘Traditional’ gender identities
   - Women in ‘masculine’ sports
   - Women in ‘feminine’ sports
   - Non-traditional gender identities
Co-existence of both perceptions

3. North Korea: Support
   Enemy
   Co-existence of both perceptions

4. Japan: South Korea’s old enemy
   Emerging perceptions
   Co-existence of both perceptions

5. America: Envy
   A sense of resentment
   Co-existence of both perceptions

The transcription, translation and categorisation altogether took several months to complete. By the time they were finished, it was almost time for me to leave London for Seoul again for the individual interviews. While transcribing the focus group interviews, I had selected 10 women who were very enthusiastic about sport spectacle, who were knowledgeable not only about sport but South Korea’s relations to North Korea, Japan, the U.S., and China, as well as other nations, and also who articulated their opinions in a clear manner. I had contacted 5 women myself via emails as I had their email addresses and traced the other 5 through my initial contacts. All of the 10 women were successfully reached and agreed very willingly to participate once again in the individual interviews.

I flew to Seoul in early March 2005 and conducted the 10 individual interviews between the end of March and early April, during which the South Korean football team was playing 2 qualifying matches. Immediately after all of the interviews were completed, I returned to London and began to transcribe and translate the interviews and categorise the interview data, taking the same steps I had taken previously with the
focus group interview material. The translated interview data were categorised again into the similar themes under nation, gender, North Korea and Japan but no America this time as America was hardly discussed in the individual interviews due largely to the nature of those qualifying matches, that is, they were qualifying matches for the Asian region. Each theme also had sub-categories that were similar to those for the focus group interviews. The thematic classifications for the individual interviews were:

1. Nation:
   - National pride in football
   - Anxiety over national reputation in football
   - The 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup

2. Gender:
   - Women’s football
     - ‘Traditional’ gender identities
     - Non-‘traditional’ gender identities
     - Confused/co-existence of both perceptions

3. North Korea:
   - Support
     - Enemy
     - Co-existence of both perceptions

4. Japan:
   - Enemy
     - Emerging perceptions
     - Co-existence of both perceptions

After I finished the categorisation of the individual interview data, I combined the focus group and individual interview data under the same thematic headings or sub-headings like below:

1. Nation:
   - National pride in the Olympics
     - National pride in football
     - Anxiety over national reputation in the Olympics
Anxiety over national reputation in football

Tae-kwon-do

Archery

The 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup

2. Gender: ‘Traditional’ gender identities

Women in ‘feminine’ sports

Non-traditional gender identities

Women in ‘masculine’ sports

Women in football

Co-existence of both perceptions

3. North Korea: Support in the Olympics

Support in football

Enemy regarding the Olympics

Enemy regarding the football

Co-existence of both perceptions

4. Japan: South Korea’s old enemy

Emerging perceptions

Co-existence of both perceptions

5. America: Envy in the Olympics

A sense of resentment in the Olympics

Co-existence of both perceptions

All of the focus group and individual interview data were thus organised under those themes and sub-themes, which greatly helped me locate the interviewees’ phrases or comments in the later stage of the analysis. Moreover, during these periods of transcribing, translating and thematically organising the interview data,
I also revised my Literature Review chapter, and this helped me more readily and clearly find links or relations between the interview data and existing theorisations of globalisation, the nation, national identities and gender I looked at.

3.6 The Personal, Subjective Researcher

3.6.1 The Researcher as Subjective Insider

Growing up watching sport a great deal, I have always been an enthusiastic sport spectator and participant. As I explained in the Introduction chapter, however, my personal intellectual curiosity arose from my personal experience of the 2002 World Cup. My own experience became the major motivation that led me to inquire into the issues of women, nation and sport and, subsequently, to take up this project. Personal experience as a foundational drive for research, however, is argued to create a certain anxiety. Reinhart is concerned (1992: 261) that ‘it violates the conventional expectation that a researcher be detached, objective, and “value-neutral”’. Traditionally, researchers are expected to be objective and value free, and it has been deemed as vital in producing objective truth or the Truth, or protecting and preserving the integrity of research (Harding, 1987). Harding (1987: 9), however, insists on the need to ‘avoid the “objectivist” stance that attempts to make the researcher’s cultural beliefs and practices invisible’. She argues:

Only in this way, can we hope to produce understandings and explanations which are free (or, at least, more free) of distortion from the unexamined beliefs and behaviours of social scientists themselves (1987: 9).
Haraway also asserts (1988: 582, 583) that ‘objectivity’ is nothing but ‘a partial perspective’ and a ‘particular and specific embodiment’ of the social world. For her (1988: 583), especially ‘feminist objectivity is about limited location and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting of subject and object’. She forcefully claims that knowledge is thoroughly situated and embodied and argues against the ‘immortality and omnipotence’ of the privileged ‘objective’ perspectives in social science and technology that have long spoken for all humanity.

Research motivated by the researcher’s personal experiences may seem also problematic since it may appear that the researcher is (unfairly) taking advantage of, or exploiting, her position as the researcher. However, her motivation is not a form of ‘opportunism or exhibitionism’, Reinharz claims (1992: 234). According to her (1992: 234), it is the expression of the researcher’s desire ‘to eradicate the distinction between the researcher and the researched’ by including herself as part of her own empirical research.

Research such as mine that started from the researcher’s own experiences brings attention to another critical issue, which is the researcher’s ‘insiderness’. Webb issues a warning (2000: 47) that ‘‘insiderness’ can lead one to become blind to the ways one is using one’s common-sense knowledge’. However, Evans asserts (1979) that the position of ‘insiderness’ can greatly help the researcher to better understand what her interview subjects have to say in a way no outsider could. Despite the concerns raised over the researcher’s insiderness, it seemed to me that the advantages of being an insider outweighed the disadvantages, and, therefore, I actively sought to utilise and take advantage of my insider knowledge to better come to terms with what my interviewees had to say. Indeed, having been born and grown up in Seoul, South Korea, I have comprehensive knowledge of South Korea’s society, culture, history and politics.
to an extent that few outsiders could claim to have. I believe that my insider knowledge has been extremely beneficial in my investigation into the meanings and implications of the interviewed women’s comments and stories.

Harding (1987), Machin (2002) and Sangster (1994) urge the researcher to acknowledge the influence of her own culture, class position, political worldview and other backgrounds on shaping the interviews, and also to actively take advantage of it for her research. Such acknowledgement means a recognition of the interview as ‘a historical document created by the agency of both the interviewer and the interviewee’ (Sangster, 1994: 10: italics in original). A research project then becomes a collaborative work of both the interviewer and the interviewees (Laslett and Rapoport, 1975 cited Oakley, 1981), and this argument leads to examine the relations between the researcher and the interviewee.

3.6.2 Developing Non-Hierarchical Relationship between Researcher and Researched

I participated in the interviews primarily as the researcher. From the very beginning of the interview process, however, I consciously distanced myself from the ‘traditional’ attitudes of the researcher and sought to establish non-hierarchical or less hierarchical relations with the interview participants. To accomplish that, I participated in the interviews more or less as both an interviewee and interviewer. In addition to my effort to form relatively equal relations with the interviewed women, many of the participants also contributed to the establishment of such relations between us. For instance, they often asked me questions, requesting my personal perspective on certain issues, which I did not hesitate to express. I did not hesitate because I hoped that my openness would
relax them and also stimulate discussions more. It was also because of my belief that it was only fair that I responded to their questions with sincerity and honesty since it was what I expected from them. The interview participants and I at times had heated debates over our similar or contrasting perceptions of certain issues, and some women challenged my views and requested explanations. In an interview situation like this, I often found myself both interrogating and being interrogated in the interviews.

Prior to the focus group interviews in particular, I had little understanding of what could or would happen during the interviews since they were my first experience of interviewing others. However, I somehow anticipated a more traditional type of interview environments in which I would pose the interviewees questions, to which they would answer. Many of the participants, however, projected images that were very different from my anticipation. They frequently threw questions at me and/or to other participants, often countering arguments or analysis that was in conflict with their own. Most of the participants were very active, cheerful and interested, and striving hard to articulate their opinions and to make their voices heard. A sense of intimidation or nervousness was hardly discernible, and several of them openly expressed their excitement at participating in the interviews. In these situations, I did not feel in any sense superior to them. I was simply grateful that they had agreed to participate in my research and showed great enthusiasm and eagerness. All of these phenomena may seem antithetical to the traditional sense of the relations between the researcher and the researched.

Traditionally, interviewers define the role of interviewees as subordinates, and getting involved with the interviewees has been considered to ‘jeopardise the hard-won status of sociology as a science’ and to be ‘indicative of a form of personal degeneracy’ (Oakley, 1981: 41). Feminist theorists have, however, greatly ‘unsettled the power
relationship between the researcher and researched’ (Webb, 2000: 42). In other words, ‘feminist researchers are particularly sensitive to the power differential that exists between the researcher and the object of that research’ (Priest, 1996: 209). Some feminists regard the division between the researcher and the researched as another attempt to produce, dominate and maintain artificial power hierarchy between more powerful people and less powerful ones, thus manipulative and exploitive. They, accordingly, ‘reject the subject-object distinction inherent in experimental work’ (Reinharz, 1992: 209). Oakley also maintains (1981) that social research conventions about the uninvolved interviewer should be subverted by feminist interviewers so that women’s voice can be heard. This can be achieved, she goes on to argue (1981: 41), when ‘the relationship of the interviewer and interviewee is non-hierarchical and when the interviewer is prepared to invest his or her own personal identity in the relationship’.

Scepticism, however, of equal, non-hierarchical relationships between the researcher and the researched has been addressed. ‘While a detached objectivity may be impossible, a false claim to sisterhood is also unrealistic’, insists Sangster (1994: 11). Judith Stacey also points out (1991) that feminist research is inevitably unequal and exploitative because of the inherent different positionings between the researcher and the researched. Maria Mies (1978 cited in van Zoonen, 1994: 129) presents a solution to this problematic, by claiming that inequalities and exploitation could be prevented if feminist researchers integrate a double consciousness into the research process, that is, a consciousness of their own oppression as women and their privileged position as researchers. A double consciousness is, van Zoonen argues (1994: 129), to promote ‘a partial identification of the researcher with the research subject’, diminishing the power imbalance between them.
Additionally, Olson and Shopes suggest (1991) that the choice of research projects related to the researcher’s personal, subjective self helps diminish the social distance between her and her interview subjects and that the intent and commitments she brings to her research also shape the interpersonal dynamic, contributing to more egalitarian relations between her and her interviewees. In fact, even those who are sceptical of the establishment of equal interview relationship between the researcher and the researched do not recommend abandoning this methodology since at least they see the potential for feminist awareness and understanding outweighing the humbling recognition that it is currently impossible to create an ideal feminist methodology which guarantees equal and non-exploitative relations between the researcher and the researched (Sangster, 1994).

From the beginning of the research design, I was keenly aware of hierarchy and power imbalance between myself as a researcher and the women as my interview subjects, and accordingly, I sought to reduce it as much as possible. My active participation in the discussions during the interviews and willingness to reply to questions posed by the participants were evidence of my endeavours to diminish a sense of distance and hierarchy between us. It would be an exaggeration to insist that no hierarchy existed between myself and the interviewees; nevertheless, I believe that the imbalance between us was substantially broken down through my involvement in the interviews and was replaced with a more egalitarian dynamic between us. I was also well aware of my position as a member of a traditionally marginalised, repressed group of ‘women’ in South Korea’s patriarchal culture, and this enabled me to more easily identify the sharing of certain commonality with my interview subjects. I argue that this research is a collaborative work of myself and the interview participants and that the dynamic we had in the interviews certainly differed from the traditionally hierarchical
relations between the researcher and the researched, which added an element of
feminist characteristic to my research.

3.7. Politics of Interpretation

As argued above, the eradication of hierarchical relations and power inequality
between the researcher and the researched could be achieved by the researcher’s
conscious effort to create an egalitarian atmosphere. However, the imbalance of power
still remains on the level of the interpretation of the interviews as making sense of
language in the researcher’s final written text is ultimately an interpretative and power
laden activity (Ang, 1996; Sangster, 1994). Interpretative research is defined as ‘an
inductive procedure to arrive at empirically grounded understandings and explanations
interpretative research is equated with doing qualitative research and comprehensively
covers a variety of research traditions that investigate people’s experiences,
perspectives and way of lives, with ethnography being the most notable example (van
Zoonen, 1994).

The collection of data, either quantitative or qualitative in form, is always
intimately related to interpretation and can never be separated from it; ‘this
consideration leads to another, more politicized conception of doing research’ (Ang,
1996: 46). It now becomes clear:

It is not the search for (objective, scientific) Truth in which the
researcher is engaged, but the construction of interpretations, of certain
ways of understanding the world, always historically located, subjective
Furthermore, if interpretation is profoundly and inevitably about constructing certain ways of understanding the world, it can never be objective, neutral, value-free or merely descriptive (Ang, 1996; van Zoonen, 1994). After all, the ‘empirical’ findings, ‘captured in either quantitative or qualitative form, does not yield self-evidence meanings’ (Ang, 1996: 46); it is through an interpretive process by the researcher that ‘empirical’ findings become meaningful and understood (Ang, 1996; Sangster, 1994; van Zoonen, 1994). Here, then, what is revealed is ‘the thoroughly political nature of any research practice’; that is, ‘what is at stake is a politics of interpretation’ (Ang, 1996: 46). ‘Interpretations are always there in multiplicity’ (Pratt, 1986: 52) because each individual with her own unique backgrounds produces interpretations that differ from those of others. Interpretations, thus, imply conflict and power struggle. In other words, ‘To advance an interpretation is to insert it into a network of power relations’ (Pratt 1986: 52).

Throughout the research process, I had every intention of allowing the interviewees to express their personal experiences and perceptions, and to document them as truthfully as possible. I realised, however, that it was ultimately my own interpretation through which their experiences and views became understood, presented and documented. That is, it was eventually my privilege and position as the researcher that permitted me to interpret the interview data. The individual interviews, which followed the focus group interviews, offered the selected 10 women an opportunity to elaborate further or defend their personal opinions on issues expressed in the focus group interviews. They provided me with chance to double-check or confirm those women’s intended meanings of certain comments. My interpretations were at times corrected or modified in response to their clarifications. It was, nevertheless, limited, I admit, because only some issues re-surfaced or were re-discussed while many others remained
unexamined. Moreover, those who were not included in the individual interviews did not have chance to clarify their comments or amend my interpretations of them. Thus, the power to interpret the interviews was largely in my, the researcher’s, hands. It was doubly so for this research since I was the one who translated the interviews from Korean to English. I was the one who chose one word or expression over another, thus consciously and subconsciously exercising power endowed on me as the researcher. I was acutely aware of my position and privilege involved in the process of interpretation of the interviews as the researcher and translator, therefore, consciously and constantly endeavoured to minimise the exercise of such power.

3.7.1 Myself as a Real, Historical Individual Researcher

A major factor that affects the researcher’s interpretation is, according to Harding (1987), Machin (2002) and Sangster (1994), her personal backgrounds such as gender, race, education and culture. I, therefore, believe that it is necessary to state my personal backgrounds briefly. I am cosmopolitan in a sense that I was born and grew up in Seoul, South Korea, which is a large, urbanised metropolis. My parents are from families of South Korea’s traditional land owners, which made them middle-upper class called ‘Yang-ban’ in the past. During my childhood, my mother was the breadwinner and figure of authority for me and my brother in large part due to my father’s absence as he worked outside Seoul. When he returned home upon leaving his work, his conservative and patriarchal attitude and my individualistic, liberal and independent spirits would collide on numerous occasions. On the other hand, my relationship with my mother has been the very opposite, and she is one of my role models. She is self-sufficient, understanding and independent, imbued with a great work ethic. My mother has been
employed outside the home since before I was born and has been the chief provider and protector for me and my brother.

I had a relatively decent job at a bank in Seoul until I left for Canada for further studies. My decision was met with my father’s strong disgruntlement and opposition but mother’s full support. I settled down in Calgary and enrolled at the University of Calgary, majoring in English again – my first BA was in English Literature in Seoul. Once I moved to Calgary, I started to travel a lot. I travelled to many Canadian, American and European cities, and this has greatly helped me to learn and appreciate the diversity of cultures and people. This diversity is, in comparison, relatively absent in South Korea since, although much more diversified today than ever before, South Korea is still an ethnically and culturally homogeneous society. Upon graduating, I returned to Seoul for a year, at which time I joined the fever of the 2002 World Cup thoroughly. Afterwards, I moved to London for a Master’s degree and proceeded to acquire a doctorate degree.

As noted above, South Korea consists predominantly of people of Korean heritage despite the fact that globalisation is the country’s core ethos. I cannot pinpoint exactly when I began to ruminate over my national and/or ethnic identities, but it is no doubt that my life overseas has drawn me into issues of identities. Living abroad, I am frequently asked where I am from, to which I usually reply, “I am from Korea” or “I am Korean”. I have realised that I hardly insert ‘South’ in my response unless I am specifically asked. For a while, I believed that my reply stemmed from my assumption that, needless to say, Korea would mean South Korea to most foreigners. As time went by, however, I started to wonder if there may be any deeper meaning to my reply. I grew up being taught that North Korea was pure evil. I was taught that it was furtive, inhumane, hostile and bellicose and that it was our deadly enemy that invaded us in
1950 and constantly seeks to repeat that history. North Korea has long been to me our horrifying foe, against which we South Koreans must achieve triumph in every sphere including sport. When watching sport with my father since childhood, I would pray for ‘us’ to beat North Korea as desperately as I hoped we beat Japan.

It has been, however, many years since my intense competitiveness against North Korea died out. In fact, my antagonism to North Korea has disappeared to an extent that I have come to very willingly accept North Koreans as part of ‘us’, although I do not condone the communist regime. My sympathy for, and identification with, North Koreans are so great that I felt extremely insulted and upset when G. W. Bush announced North Korea as part of the ‘axis of evil’. I was delighted to find many other South Koreans were also angered by his declaration. I believe South and North Koreans are fundamentally one people and should form one nation. I, therefore, wholeheartedly celebrate North Korea’s success at international sport events. During the 2004 Athens Olympics, I enthusiastically supported North Korean delegates and during the World Cup qualifying matches, I sincerely hoped both South and North Koreas would quality. I believe that my personal views on North Korea have influenced the research questions and my analysis of the interview data as much as my feminist orientation has influenced them.

My sentiments towards Japan have also shifted considerably over the years. In my childhood, I hated and despised Japan a great deal because of the atrocities and great pain it inflicted upon Koreans during the colonial era. My sentiments were very well articulated through sport viewing as I desperately hoped we beat Japan. This perception and my feelings have undergone changes as I have gained more maturity. I am still resentful for Japan’s cruelty during colonisation, however, I believe that what happened is what happened and that history should not hold us, South Koreans and the Japanese,
back. Something needs to be done, however. Japan, I strongly advocate, needs to acknowledge and sincerely apologise for its wrongdoings and pains it caused to not only Koreans but also other Asians. Compared with Germany, Japan has been extremely irresponsible and unapologetic for the inhumanity it committed to people in Korea, China and other Asian countries in the early 20th century. I find it impossible to accept or tolerate their unwillingness to assume responsibility for it. At the same time, I regret and find reprehensible blind hatred and antagonism that some South Koreans show towards Japan and the Japanese. I believe the two countries have much more to gain through more mature, responsible, reasonable and understanding attitudes to their histories and each other’s, and I look forward to such an era.

It is with these personal values, beliefs and political colour that I approached the research. In other words, I approached it, not as an objective, detached and invisible researcher, but as ‘a real, historical individual with concrete, specific desires and interests’ (Harding, 1987: 9). What this involves is again the politics of interpretation. The researcher’s aims in pointing out certain features or in making connections between interviewees’ narratives and larger cultural formations may at times differ from the original narrator’s intentions, therefore, they could be challenged as Borland (1991) experienced while conducting her research. The encounter of strong resistance from her narrator regarding her (mis)interpretation of her stories forced Borland (1991: 70) to inquire ‘who controls the text?’ I also had similar experiences. My personal views were contested and rejected by some of the women who I interviewed. For instance, I was aggressively challenged by a woman who criticised me for being ‘too feminist’. As noted earlier, I involved myself in the research as a ‘person’ who upholds particular qualities and beliefs, which was considered by several interviewees radical, progressive or feminist. For instance, my insistence that the same benefits and pension
be given to all Olympic medallists, regardless of the colour of their medals, was regarded by some interviewees as unreasonable or too radical. My identification with North Koreans was too left-wing for those who considered the North as the South’s arch-enemy. My critique of the smaller size of a news photo of a sportswoman compared to that of a sportsman was deemed by several women as excessively or unnecessarily feminist.

Charged by the original narrator with the distortion of her original intention, Borland stresses (1991) that it was her framing of the narrative informed by her consciousness shaped by her social and historical reality and backgrounds that differed from that of her subject. ‘When researchers do interpretations’, she reiterates (1991: 73), ‘they bring their own knowledge, experience, and concerns to their materials, and the result is a richer, more textured understanding of its meaning’. Machin even suggests (2002: 89) the researcher to actively use her ‘baggage as a resource in itself’. I approached the research with an acute awareness of the influence of my personal background on the research. I was conscious that interview questions, and the analysis and discussion of the newspaper clips would inevitably be affected by my own gender, education and ethnic background, as well as my political colour. Moreover, I have attempted to take advantage of them to analyse the interview data.

Van Zoonen argues (1994: 134) that the researcher’s task is ‘to reconstruct … meanings and understand the processes behind them and the processes that arise from them’. ‘It is precisely this element’, she goes on to argue, ‘which makes an interpretative research design such a ‘natural’ choice for feminist scholars’ who seek to ‘save women’s experiences from oblivion by making their lives visible and their voices heard’. She also points out the unequal distribution of power and its crucial role in maintaining such inequalities:
The power to define situations and identities, to frame issues and problems, to legitimize interpretations and experiences is unequally distributed along lines of gender, ethnicity, class, and a range of other social and discursive formations and (re)produces such inequalities at the same time (1994: 134).

Therefore, she (1994: 134) suggests that what feminist research adds to interpretative research strategies is ‘a notion of power, an acknowledgement of the structural inequalities involved in and coming out of the process of making meaning’.

3.8 Summary

There are many ways to research women and their lives. E. H. Kim (1998), for instance, has interviewed South Korean men to explore South Korean women and their identities. I, however, hoped to research South Korean women and their identity construction through their own voices, and this led me to select South Korean women as the subjects of the interviews. I thus designed the research with a clear intention to offer South Korean women a chance to speak about their experiences of gender, nation and sport, that is, to make their voices heard and their experiences counted. This intention of mine, deeply feminist, convincingly led me to choose qualitative methods, the focus group and individual interviews, as the main techniques for the research since they are deemed in the research literature as the most appropriate for interrogating individuals’ various opinions.

To help unravel the ways in which the participants understood gender, nation and sport, an additional research method was employed, namely audience reception studies. Feminist studies of media reception has been considerably gendered. It has ‘often dealt
with genres popular among women such as soaps, romances or women’s magazines, neglecting other genres such as news or sports’ (van Zoonen, 1994: 9). Therefore, a considerable gap exists in audience reception studies regarding ‘non-feminine’ genres, and this was precisely one of the gaps I intended to fill through this research. Newspaper extracts of the 2004 Athens Olympics and the qualifying football matches for the 2006 World Cup were collected from sport-only broadsheet newspapers and were shown to the women during the focus group and individual interviews in order to stimulate discussions. Many scholars have undertaken content or text analysis of media representations on sport and uncovered various underlying forces that shape, and also are shaped by, the cultural contexts in question (Bernstein, 2002; Christopherson, Janning and McConnell, 2002; Duncan and Messner, 1998; Hills and Kennedy, 2006; Kane and Lenskyj, 1998; Kennedy, 2000a, 2000b, 2001; Pirinen, 2002; Rowe, McKay and Miller, 1998; Sabo and Jansen, 1998). With assistance from the existing literature, I set out to unravel how women as audiences would actually read the media images of gender, nation and sport. I sought to examine the ways in which they negotiated and interpreted the media representations of those issues in making their daily lives meaningful.

The use of multiple research methods has added strength to the interpretive framework of this research. ‘Ideally, interpretative research does not rely on a single type of data but takes advantage of triangulation’ (van Zoonen, 1994: 139), which is ‘the use of multiple methods in a single study’ (Reinharz, 1992: 197). The use of multiple methods brings many advantages to research. First of all, it is an expression of ‘the commitment to thoroughness’ and increases ‘the likelihood of obtaining scientific credibility and research utility’ (Reinharz, 1992: 197) by adding layers of information. It also enables to use one type of data to validate or refine another, or ‘modify the
weaknesses of each individual method, and thus greatly enhance the quality and value of interpretative research projects (Reinharz, 1992: 197; Zoonen, 1994: 139). Triangulation thus strengthens the quality of research project (Morgan, 1988).

The research methods adopted for this research, the focus group and individual interviews, and audience reception studies, point to my attempt to bring attention to each of the interviewed women’s personal accounts and opinions. Moreover, coming from the tradition of post-structuralist spirits, I insist that all of the responses were treated with equal weight and that each of them was regarded as equally valid. Another point I would like to underline is that this research does not pretend to represent South Korean women’s general opinions on the issues in question. It was never intended to do so. As noted earlier, each of the interview participants came in with a variety of different backgrounds, be they educational, professional or age based, accordingly, this research highlights a wide range of the opinions of specific groups of women. Furthermore, I am fully aware that, no matter how hard I struggled to deliver exact meanings of the women’s narratives, it was ultimately my own interpretation of their stories that mattered most. Therefore, my personal backgrounds, preferences and political colour had a significant impact on the way the women’s narratives were selected and interpreted, and as such, this research can be called an interpretive research.
Chapter 4 : South Korean Identities and Global Consciousness

4.1 Introduction

Globalisation, however it is defined, is penetrating deep into people’s daily routines, significantly changing the way they live, understand the world and interact with others. Due to constant globalising processes, a sense of security or certainty has been lost, and new meanings and values are being constantly re-produced. Events or identities no longer make sense without contextualising them in a global context. People’s values and morality become meaningful only when others become considered and when the global is under consideration. This chapter will interrogate the ways in which globalisation is changing the interviewees’ perceptions of themselves and their nation, or the ways in which they come to terms with events around them. More crucially, it will examine how the interviewees strive to live in this new social milieu, how they re-produce meanings and values to make sense of their existence in the new social world. The conceptualisations of globalisation presented by Giddens (1990) and Tomlinson (1999) will be the key concepts employed to explore the interviewees’ perceptions of themselves and their nation revealed in and through their accounts of their experiences of the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup.

The first sections will explore the interviewed women’s fears and anxieties over their self-perceptions of the insignificance and the lack of positive national images of South Korea in the world. The Olympics will be discussed as an important arena to raise a nation’s images and profile globally, and construct, reinforce and/or disseminate a favourable national reputation worldwide. On the other hand, the interviewed women’s overwhelming sense of national pride and confidence will be interrogated in
and through the sports of archery, tae-kwon-do and football. It will also become apparent that the interviewees had a fear of losing the global prestige and privilege South Korea has gained in those sports. The final sections will investigate the women’s longing for a powerful nation. The values, qualities and morality the women hoped South Korea to possess will be inspected. South Korean delegates at the Olympics and the stories of South Korean footballers will be explored as the embodiment and disseminators of South Korea’s national character. Throughout the chapter, globalisation will provide the context within which meanings and values are constructed, confirmed or changed.

4.2 Longing for Global Recognition

4.2.1 “Where is South Korea?”: Fear and Anxiety

Giddens (1990) and Tomlinson (1999) argue that, due to globalising phenomenon, people’s daily routines are radically being transformed and that, accordingly, the values, morality or meanings of their lives are also radically changing. Globalisation has enabled people to be ever more mobile, if not physically, imaginatively, and this sense of mobility has compelled them to become increasingly conscious about others’ gaze. As a result, new kinds of anxiety or fear have emerged, as well as pleasure and joy, affecting the meanings of their lives and their identities in a significant way. Globalisation thus has brought dramatic changes in the ways in which people relate to themselves and their nation (Appadurai, 1990; Giddens, 1990; Robertson, 1990, 1992; Tomlinson, 1999). International sport contests, in this regard, provide an important platform to interrogate how people’s global awareness impacts on their understanding of themselves and their nation, as well as their dreams, values and fears.
Since the creation in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, international sport events have accelerated the processes of globalisation by helping people ‘construct elements of a popular international awareness’ and make them aware of ‘the social world beyond their communities including nation-states’ (Roche, 2000: 168). Such awareness is made possible most often through global media technology, for the physical mobility of most people is still very much restricted to their locality. International sport competitions, such as the Olympic Games, are indeed a golden opportunity to showcase the nation globally. It is so in part because of the sheer size of the audience it attracts across the globe. The 2000 Sydney Olympics, for instance, was watched by 3.7 billion people worldwide (15 September 2000, *The Dong-A Ilbo*) and the 2004 Athens Olympics by 3.9 billion (14 October 2004, *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*). The Olympics, therefore, is an extremely attractive venue for nations to construct or present their images favourably to the global community. K. S., Cho observes (2004) that emerging nations or the ‘Third World’ nations have strategically used international sport contests to establish favourable global reputations. He (2004) speculates that African countries such as Kenya, Nigeria and Ethiopia, or small island countries like Jamaica, Dominican Republic and Trinidad would be less globally recognised now if they had not participated in highly visible international sport events.

The findings of the focus group interviews, conducted during the 2004 Athens Olympics, confirmed this argument. Many interviewees spoke of their awareness of certain nations through watching the Games. First of all, the recognition of other nations, as K. S., Cho argues (2004), was achieved simply by the presence of national delegates marching at the opening ceremony. Jung Eun-sung stated:
When each country enters the stadium at the opening ceremony, there were so many countries I did not know. Then I come to realise such nations exist, thinking some of their names are quite unique.

Recognition was also gained by competing at highly visible or popular sports (K. S., Cho, 2004). The excellent performances of a gymnast from a previously unknown nation induced Kim Jung-jin to inquire about the nation:

I watched rhythmic gymnastics the other day with my sister. The 4th spot was taken by a nation which my sister or I did not know at all. So we asked around and learned about that country for the first time.

In addition, nations that competed against South Korean players or teams drew the interviewees’ attention. For instance, Mali, little known to Jung Eun-sung previously, gained her recognition after the South Korean football team played against it at the Olympics. She confessed, “I didn’t know a country called Mali before. But now, although I don’t know exactly where it is located, I know it exists”. For this global visibility and recognition, K. S., Cho argues (2004), many nations participate in sports where they have little chance of winning any medal.

The interview findings thus confirmed many of the women’s recognition of previously unknown nations to them, and what it also revealed was many of the participants’ anxiety over the significance of their nation to the global viewers. Repeated in the focus group interviews were the women’s self perceptions of South Korea as being ‘unknown’ or ‘powerless’ on the global stage. Wie ji-sook, a 19-year-old university student, who had never travelled abroad, lamented, “Foreigners do not know about our country well” and Kim Jung-jin, who studied in Canada in the late 1990s, also reflected on her shock at many Canadians’ ignorance of South Korea. As well, the assumed lack of positive images of South Korea in the international
community was a source of regret to Kim So-mi, who deplored, “We have very few occasions to present ourselves and our nation positively to the world”. These sentiments, which were shared by many of the women interviewed, are arguably quite serious understatements considering the recent rise of South Korea’s economic and cultural influence around the globe. Nevertheless, many women perceived South Korea as unknown and inconsequential globally and felt that there were few occasions for South Korea to present itself favourably to the world. What these findings suggested was their acute awareness of the global gaze and also the significance of such consciousness in the construction of the meanings and values of their nation, which was believed to be profoundly bound up with those of their own existence.

The origins of those pessimistic self-perceptions are hard to pinpoint, but a review of key events in Korea’s and South Korea’s history may be insightful. The national humiliation of the Japanese annexation of Korea in the early 20th century has left deep psychological wounds in South Koreans, and the traumatic experience of the 3-year Korean War in the early 1950s has also had a serious impact on South Korean consciousness. Apparently incapable of holding off enemies on its own, South Korea had to reply on foreign hands for its survival. Another traumatic consequence of the war was the division of the Korean peninsula. A ceasefire was agreed and the land was partitioned by an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1953. The war also left the entire nation demolished, literally and figuratively, leaving South Korea heavily subject to the generosity of foreign aid not only for national defence but also for daily staples. If these historical events crushed the interviewed women’s national esteem, the 3-decade-long succession of the military dictatorship from the early 1960s through the late 1980s may also be held accountable for their lack of positive self-image of their nation.
Giddens argues (1990) that the advent of modernity has fostered ‘relations between ‘absent’ others’, geographically apart from one another and also structured people’s lives in a radically different manner. Lives of locales are thoroughly penetrated and shaped by events taking place miles away from them; people are disembedded, being removed out of social relations from their local contexts of interaction, and as a result, the meanings of their lives now have to be reframed in a wider global context (1990: 18-19). Tomlinson (1999: 29) also observes the ‘penetration of local worlds by distant forces and the dislodging of everyday meanings from their ‘anchors’ in the local environment’. This phenomenon, he finds (1999: 29), is ‘troubling’ since people’s existence is increasingly less definable in a ‘traditionally’ recognised sense as local context is increasingly losing its power to anchor it. Tomlinson maintains (1999: 30) that the global, thus, has become ‘a cultural horizon’ within which people ‘frame their existence’.

The findings of the focus group interviews revealed the women’s contextualisation of the meanings and values of the Olympic Games in the broader global network. The globe constantly existed in their minds, and they keenly felt the gaze of the rest of the world. Furthermore, despite South Korea’s economic and cultural success in recent years, many of the interviewees assumed that others perceived South Korea as unknown, insignificant or in negative terms, and this assumption in turn substantially destabilised their national pride and confidence. They longed for global approval or positive recognition, and the participation in the Olympic Games was believed to help raise the nation’s profile globally. For this reason, South Korea’s participation in the Olympics was strongly endorsed. The following two sections will examine this connection by inspecting the various ways in which the interviewees envisaged their nation in and through the Olympics.
4.2.2 “We are Middle Class”: South Korea Envisioned: (1)

Olympic Participation

Partaking in the Olympics was considered by the majority of the interviewees as an avenue to gain favourable international recognition. For one, it was regarded as an important platform to showcase South Korea’s economic power and capability to the world by dispatching a large number of players and teams to the Games. South Korea regularly sends sizeable delegates to the Olympics. For instance, it sent 396 delegates to Sydney in 2000 to compete in 23 sports out of the total 28 Olympic sports (24 August 2000, The Chosun Ilbo); it also sent 376 to Athens for 24 sports (20 July 2004, The Chosun Ilbo). In many of these sports, South Korea had extremely low chances of winning a medal; nonetheless, the state committed to sending a large number of players and teams. As usual, South Korean athletes participated in most of the Olympics sports at the Athens Olympics, which was positively received by several women including Kim Hyun-sook. Kim compared South Korean delegates to those from other nations marching at the opening ceremony and felt proud of her nation:

[Watching the opening ceremony] When I saw deplorably tiny countries that sent a small number of delegates, I felt very sorry for them. Our country among them looked like middle class. Looking at the number of our players and their decent outfits, we are middle class.

This comment suggested that Kim’s sense of national pride was based upon her perception of the visibility of South Korea’s economic capability as manifest by the large number of South Korea’s well attired delegates. June Eun-sung also believed that other nations would build a favourable impression of South Korea from the number of its delegates:
People from other nations will think, “Oh, there is a nation called ‘The Republic of Korea’, it sent so many delegates. Will they not get that kind of feeling?

What was implied repeatedly in the focus group interviews was the women’s consciousness of the global gaze on their nation. ‘Global consciousness’, Tomlinson insists (1999: 30), alters ‘the context of meaning construction’. The value of taking part in the Olympics was measured primarily in terms of imprinting the name South Korea and displaying its economic power on the minds of the global audience.

4.2.3 South Korea Envisioned: (2) Olympic Medal Ranking

4.2.3.1 South Korea’s Obsession with the Gold Medal

The interviewed women’s longing for positive global recognition of their nation was found to justify South Korea’s obsessive pursuit of gold medals at the Olympics since they believed that gold medals would bring with them global approval. In principle, the IOC does not recognise a global ranking of participating countries. It publishes an official medals report ‘for information only’. However, the report is based on the number of medals won, with gold medals taking priority over silver and bronze (www.olympic.org), which ironically implies that a gold medal is worth more than multiple silver or bronze medals. Some nations such as the U.S. rank nations according to the total number of medals won, regardless of their colour (16 August 2004, The Hankyoreh). South Korea, on the other hand, prioritises gold medals and ranks nations by the number of gold medals won.

Gold medals can symbolise a nation’s potential and capability. According to Heinila (1970 cited in Maguire, 1999: 89), success in international sport in the late 20th century
depends on several elements, such as ‘the availability and identification of human resources, methods of coaching and training, the efficiency of the sports organisation and the depth of knowledge of sports medicine and sports sciences’. Maguire (1999: 89), however, finds these insufficient to explain international sport success and adds that ‘less developed nations tend to under-utilize their talent and performers and/or lose them to more powerful nations in the global sports figuration’. Success at the Olympics is arguably then a culmination of a nation’s technology, medicine, science, human resources and power in the international community.

Hargreaves observes (2002) that most nations have employed sport ideologically in order to create and promote nationalism and national identity. Sport has been ‘exploited’, he argues (2002: 32), ‘as a way of enhancing their state-nation’s prestige and influence internationally’. The 1936 Berlin Olympics, the 1980 Moscow and the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics are some of the notable examples of states’ political and ideological manipulation of the event. Research by Hwang and Jarvie (2003) also illustrates how the Chinese Government attempts to ideologically exploit sport to construct national identity and gain international visibility. The South Korean Government is not an exception. It has always utilised sports politically and ideologically to promote national integration, nationalism and to seek international recognition (M. S., Ahn, 2002), and at the centre has stood the development of, and heavy investment in, elite sports rather than mass sports since the early 1960s (Ha and Mangan, 2002). These efforts began to bear fruit from the 1970s. South Korea won its first gold medal at the 1976 Montreal Olympics, and has, since 1988, remained one of the top 10 elite participants at the Summer Olympic Games (J. Y., Lee, 2002). Having slipped down to 12th at the 2000 Sydney Olympics, the state eyed a re-entrance to the top 10 list in 2004 and indeed, successfully clawed back to 9th. South Korean sport is,
as Ha and Mangan state (2002: 223), ‘the outcome of state agencies playing a far greater role than private agencies during a period of authoritarian rule’. Behind this state authoritarianism, they go on to argue (2002: 223), has been ‘a nationalistic ideology’ ‘in the need to ensure national survival in the future after the humiliation of colonization and the traumas of civil war’.

Successive South Korean governments have thus invested heavily in elite sports and pursued gold medals at the Olympics also to earn international recognition. The interview findings showed that many women supported this obsessive pursuit. Forcefully emphasising the priceless value of gold medals, Jung Eun-sung rationalised such a fixation:

> Gold medals make our national anthem played and our nation standing at the centre [of the podium and attention]. So it’s very different [from winning silver or bronze medals]. It’s the ‘winner takes it all’ principle.

Kim Mi-jung also overwhelmingly favoured gold medals because, when it is won, “[South Korea’s national flag] Tae-geuk-gi is waved”. Miller et al. note (2001: 61) that the hierarchical arrangement of both the podium and national flags, and the playing of the national anthem of the winning athlete/team can signify hierarchy among the nations and reinforce the ‘visual supremacy’ of the winning nation ‘with aural presence’. The gold medals were infinitely preferable for those women as they enabled them to imagine global applause for South Korea at the centre of the global media limelight.

Globalisation is transforming local order and the nature of localities in a profound way (Giddens, 1990; Tomlinson, 1999). Unfettered by physical boundaries, many people now can freely travel and visit other cultures, peoples and nations, if not in reality, in their imagination, forming new relations with ‘the absent’, in Giddens’ terms
Globalisation has likewise substantially liberated and stimulated people’s imagination, which in turn changes the significance of events around them. The research findings indicated the establishment of imaginative relations and/or interaction of the majority of the interviewees with absent others. It also revealed that these relations affected what they valued, dreamed of, or aspired to be.

4.2.3.2 Olympic Medals Ranking as Synonym for Global Ranking

The women’s acute consciousness of the global gaze of their nation made it more important to showcase South Korea’s power in an emphatic manner, such as being one of the top 10 medallist countries at the Olympics. A recurrent theme in the focus group interviews was the assumed equation of a nation’s high ranking in the Olympic medals chart with its power in the international community beyond sport. The high rankings of nations such as the U.S., China and Japan were frequently cited as the proof of this equation. Park Sang-kyung claimed, “I think that, invisibly, a nation’s power is felt through the [Olympic] medals ranking”. After all, as noted earlier, success at the Olympics is a powerful demonstration of a nation’s technological, medical and scientific and human resources, as well as its standing and influence in the international community. Shin Mi-sook, therefore, wished South Korea to appear among the elite group:

I want us to be one of the top ten like the U.S., China and Japan. I want us to compete well with those nations. I wish to win over them, but if not, I want us to be among them.

Overwhelmed by self-pity and a sense of deprecation of their nation as being unknown and inconsequential globally, many women pined for global respect and appreciation.
South Korea’s re-entrance to the Olympic top 10 ranking was believed to bring global acknowledgement of South Korea’s capacity in and beyond sport from global viewers. With the common conception of “Eventually, sport powerhouses are the world powerhouses” (Kim Jung), many women extremely prioritised gold medals over the others, and supported and rationalised their state’s obsession with them. As a result, those who failed to win gold medals were subjected to unsympathetic and harsh criticism. Jung Kyung-soo blatantly proclaimed her disinterest in non-medallists, and Kim Mi-jung harshly criticised even those who won silver or bronze medals:

I am sorry to say this but I don’t think they [silver/bronze medallists] did well. I want them to have tried a bit harder. I want to hear our national anthem. I want to hear it as often as possible.

Her strong desire to hear South Korea’s national anthem played and its national flag waved before the worldwide audience could be satisfied only by gold medallists. Accordingly, silver or bronze medallists were of no significant to her.

The women’s longing for global recognition was also revealed through their delight at the fact that South Korean multinational corporations, such Samsung, LG, Hyun-dai Motor and Kia Motors have become the sponsors of high profile global sport events. Jung Eun-sung, who was studying marketing in Sydney when Kia Motors won the major sponsorship deal for the Australian Open Tennis Championships in 2001, told of her pride when her professor used the marketing strategies Kia adopted to win the sponsorship as class material. Multinational enterprises’ sponsorship of global sport events commonly takes place today, but several interviewees including Jung took a particular pride in South Korean companies’ sponsorship of international sporting events. It was precisely because the sponsorship was read as an indication of global approval of not only the South Korean corporations but South Korea in general. Hence,
those companies were regarded as a symbolic representation of South Korea’s technological advancement and economic success, which produced or disseminated positive images of South Korea to the globe.

4.2.3.3 Summary

The focus group interview findings revealed some of the women’s fears and anxieties over South Korea’s global ‘insignificance’. They also revealed many of the women’s longing for global recognition and appreciation. Also importantly, recognition was believed to be achievable in and through mega international sport contests. Many women equated success in international sports competitions with global power and respect, and positive representations of their nation. Accordingly, they emphatically endorsed their government’s obsessive pursuit of gold medals and the huge expenditure from the national budget on international sport contests and the development of elite athletes.

Ironically, however, despite the fact that South Korea eventually took the 9th spot at the Athens Olympics, many interviewees refused to identify it as a confirmation of South Korea’s power in the global community. Such a correlation was insisted upon for some nations, such as America and Japan. The belief in that equation was the very reason for their desire for South Korea to level the playing field with these countries at the Olympics. That connection, however, was denied for the South Korean case. South Korea’s successful re-entry to the top 10 ranking at Athens did not seem to symbolically empower many interviewees since a sense of self-deprecation was still found to prevail among the women who were interviewed after South Korea secured the 9th. Despite South Korea’s accomplishment at the Olympics, particularly since the
1988 Seoul Olympics, sentiments such as ‘We are not a sport powerhouse’ continued to resonate among many interviewees. The search for global power and recognition thus appeared to be ever elusive and evasive.

The interview findings suggested that the women sensed themselves as disembedded or deterritorialised (Giddens, 1990; Tomlinson, 1999). That is, the women’s values, morality and dreams were being lifted out of their locality and reconfigured in the global context; subsequently, the meanings or values of events around them and their existence were considerably structured and determined by their global consciousness and also by their imaginative relations with the absent. The women were found to quest for a sense of certainty as an anchor for their identities. Globalisation has, however, brought a sense of uncertainty of values, morality, qualities and identities. The women’s search for stable value and identities were, therefore, guaranteed to be almost impossible in today’s world, which appeared to be a constant source of frustration.

On the other hand, despite the prevalent sentiments of self-pity and perceived powerlessness of their nation, the vast majority of the women in the focus group interviews did express an overwhelming sense of national pride in relation to South Korea’s unrivalled achievements in archery and tae-kwon-do. Thoroughly conscious of global eyes, the huge success at these two sports was perceived as a basis for South Korea’s global prestige and privilege and, accordingly, bolstered the women’s self and national esteems to the fullest. The following sections will interrogate the interviewees’ linking of their national pride and confidence to South Korea’s success in archery and tae-kwon-do.
4.2.4 South Korea Envisioned: (3) Archery and Tae-kwon-do

4.2.4.1 “We are the World Best”: Archery

Certain sports become a nation’s particular treasure and national pride, helping to construct and disseminate particular images of the nation globally. Football and Brazil may be a case in point. Gordon and Helal (2001) demonstrate the ways in which football has become embraced as Brazilians’ ‘national’ game and pleasure. Football may be imported from England, they claim (2001: 139), but it has now become what Brazilians refer to as ‘the national passion’, hoping to call it ‘practically Brazilian property’. Brazilians’ bold claim to the ownership of football stems from the supremacy of ‘Brazilian football’ in the international stage, which appears ‘unquestionable and indestructible’ (Gordon and Helal, 2001: 147). Similar hyperbole was found in the interviews on archery, grounded upon South Korea’s unmatched supremacy in this sport.

Supremacy in archery is a product of South Korea’s heavy concentration on elite sport. A very small number, about 1,500, are registered as archers in South Korea (19 August 2004, The Chosun Ilbo), and it has very few fan followings most of the time. Every four years, however, South Koreans are reminded of their archers’ global domination and become overwhelmed by national pride in their success. South Korea’s success in archery is truly outstanding. South Korean archers brought home 13 out of 16 gold medals at the World Archery Championship from 1989 to 2003, and they hold all of the 26 world records in archery (13 August 2004, The Chosun Ilbo); South Korean female archers have won 9 out of 9 gold medals on offer at the Olympics until the 2000 Sydney (19 August 2004, The Chosun Ilbo). Understandably, national
expectations of archery skyrocket at every Olympics, and gold medals are regarded as ‘having already been won’ even before the tournaments begin.

South Korean women’s reign continued in Athens. On the 19th and the 20th of August 2004, South Korea’s all-conquering women won the gold medals at both the individual and team tournaments again. To put it simply, South Korean women had collected every single gold medal offered in the individual and team tournaments since the events were introduced to the Olympics in 1984 and 1988 respectively. South Korean male archers’ success at the Games is also remarkable, having won gold medals in 1988, 2000 and 2004. However, failure to equal the women’s ‘perfection’ makes them fall short of national expectations; consequently, they remain undeservedly sidelined in both the media and public attention. Due to South Korea’s exceptional accomplishment in archery including the men’s, the interviewed women’s national pride and self-respect were naturally enormous.

The interviewees’ delight in 2004 was greater since the gold medals came after tougher competition than at the previous Olympics. The 2004 Olympics introduced new rules in certain sports including archery and table tennis, which was arguably designed to stop certain nations from monopolising them: South Korea at archery and China at table tennis. New regulations for table tennis mandated that the finalists could not be compatriots, and match schedules were arranged accordingly. Rule changes were also made in archery, such as the introduction of knock-outs rounds after the preliminary stage. Nevertheless South Korean archers, especially women archers, swept all of the gold medals on offer, confirming their unquestionable, unrivalled supremacy. Not surprisingly, therefore, the sentiment that ‘we are the world best’ was almost tangible, and most of the women in the interviews claimed to South Korea’s ownership of the
sport boldly and proudly: “we South Korea own archery” (Lee Mi-jin), and “archery means South Korea” (Kim So-mi).

4.2.4.2 “Our Sport” Tae-kwon-do

Tae-kwon-do has a different meaning to the women than archery because of South Korea’s reputation as its birthplace. The interviewees’ discourses on tae-kwon-do were found to revolve around South Korea’s national character and identities. Tae-kwon-do was pronounced to be a sport “for everyone” while archery was deemed to be “for a particular group of people”, and it was claimed to “live in our daily lives” (Kang Eun-jin). Also, Choi Bo-suk conceded:

I think there is something to it. No matter how poor we are, we send our children to tae-kwon-do class. We have something like that in our national character.

This ‘everyone’s sport’ in South Korea has a prominent global following. The tae-kwon-do population in Europe is reported to exceed 10 million (7 March 2005, The Kyunghyang Shinmun), and 50 million worldwide (21 November 2005, The Hankyoreh). Nevertheless it was only at the 2000 Sydney Olympics when it was granted status as an Olympic sport. Tae-kwon-do’s debut at the Olympics shows the West’s ‘control over the content, ideology and economic resources associated with sport’ (Maguire, 1999: 91). While elitist minority sports like equestrianism and yachting feature as Olympic sports, ‘sepak takraw, akin to a blend of soccer, volleyball and gymnastics, played and watched by millions of South East Asians, … is excluded’ (Beh and Leow, 1999 cited in Miller et al., 2001: 27). On the other hand, according to Miller et al. (2001), tae-kwon-do was granted as an Olympic sport because of a
‘particular’ relation the President of World Tae-kwon-do Federation (WTF) had with Samaranch, then President of IOC. Thus, granted by the IOC, which was governed largely by western officials, tae-kwon-do debuted in the 2000 Sydney with a limitation of 4 players per nation. South Korea won 3 gold and 1 silver medals.

The claim to the ownership of tae-kwon-do raises high national expectations of gold medals at the Olympics. Four gold medals are routinely regarded as having already been won, as in archery. At the Athens, South Koreans won 2 gold and 2 bronze medals in tae-kwon-do, and this result failed to impress Kim Jung. She was, however, delighted to hear about the great popularity of tae-kwon-do in Greece. Tae-kwon-do was very popular in Sydney as a complete ticket sell-out was reported (22 January 2007, *The Taekwondo News*), and its popularity was said to be as high in Athens (27 August 2004, *The Sportstoday*). Kim Jung found this state of affair extremely satisfactory:

> What surprised me a lot is that tae-kwon-do is on for 4 days and they are all sold-out. I hear tae-kwon is very popular in Greece. It is hard to be sold-out in all matches. 

Miller et al. (2001) argue that the globalisation of nation-based sport triggers or stimulate national sentiment. The fact that what is considered ‘everyone’s sport in South Korea has become a global sport may have been sufficient to celebrate. However, its surprisingly high popularity in Athens added special value and meaning to the sport and South Korea, conveying or reinforcing Kim’s sense of national pride.

### 4.2.4.3 Archery and Tae-kwon-do as National Pride

The previous sections looked at the interviewed women’s lack of self and national esteems. A sense of self-pity and deprecation was found to be prevalent and, in many
women’s minds, South Korea was relegated to the status of a marginalised, inconsequential nation. South Korea’s outstanding success in archery and tae-kwon-do on the international stage, and plaudits and respect from other nations, however, were found to restore and heighten the women’s self-respect and national pride. Kim Hyun-sook stated:

When foreigners say on television that Korea is the world best in archery and tae-kwon-do, I feel very proud. Such an impression has been deeply implanted in them and I feel very proud to be Korean.

Archery and tae-kwon-do were believed to enhance South Korea’s profile to a global audience, and yet, some women found gold medals in archery dearer due to archery’s lack of an ‘inherent’ association with South Korea, unlike tae-kwon-do. Park Sang-kyung claimed:

Tae-kwon-do is Korea’s and judo is Japan’s, but archery doesn’t have that sort of birth country or it’s not known. Despite that, we are exceptionally good at it. I think it’s because we have some special know-how on training or something like that. In that sport, we have been number one exclusively for over 20 years. When we look at sport history, I don’t think any country has been exclusively dominating all areas of a particular sport. 6 consecutive wins, for 24 years. That’s really something (her emphasis).

Most all of the women interviewed expressed their pride in archery, and indeed, archery seemed to be transformed into South Korea’s ‘national’ sport. McDonald (2000) makes similar observation concerning the ways in which cricket is invested with more significance than hockey in India, despite the fact that hockey is often seen as India’s premier sport. He reasons that it is primarily due to India’s decades’ long domination of
international hockey. Similarly, South Korea’s greater international success and prestige in archery resulted in many women, without hesitation, naming archery as South Korea’s ‘national’ sport alongside or even before tae-kwon-do.

Observing the domination of the West in sport, Maguire states (1999: 91) that ‘either in terms of hosting events or when the relevant decisions are taken, it is the West that dominates in international recognition, respectability, status and prestige’. Regarding success in sport, he argues:

The more high tech and commodified the sport, the more reliant success is on the elements of the global sport figuration. As a result, the West tends to win out (1999: 91).

This argument makes South Korea’s achievement in archery even more meaningful. Success in archery, with no apparent structural or cultural advantage, unlike tae-kwon-do, could serve as a pure confirmation of South Korea’s advanced technology, know-how and resources. Overall, the interview findings suggested that archery and tae-kwon-do were treasured as they allowed the name ‘South Korea’ to be repeated, its national anthem to be played and national flag to be raised in the full glare of the global media. The women’s awareness of the evaluative global gaze and their hopes to foster a favourable national image seemed to be continually at the back of their minds. Physically they may have been firmly situated in their local environments, but their minds were freely traversing the globe, comparing and evaluating their nation’s reputation, upon which their self perception appeared to so greatly depend.

South Korea’s achievements in archery and tae-kwon-do were also widely celebrated because they were recognised as transmitters of South Korean people, language, made-in-Korea equipment, technologies and cultural identity. South Korea’s reputation in those sports has led to some South Korean archers and tae-kwon-do
coaches being sought after by other nations. Indeed, at the Athens Olympics, 30 nations participated in archery, 8 of which had South Korean as their head coaches (11 August 2004, *The Hankyoreh*); in tae-kwon-do, 23 out of 60 nations were headed by a South Korean coach (25 August 2004, *The Sportsseoul*). The movement of performers, coaches, administrators and sport scientists within and between nations is a characteristic of the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century sport, and this has become ‘a decisive feature that structures the experience of sport in different societies’ (Maguire, 1999: 89). However, such movement has been primarily in one direction: from the West to the non-West, reflecting the West’s domination of sport. Breaking this pattern, South Koreans and South Korea’s scientific knowledge would seem to confirm South Korea’s status and leadership in those sports.

Many of the women in the focus group interviews were eager to point out their proudest moments associated with archery and tae-kwon-do. Kim Jung recalled her enthusiasm upon hearing a foreign television commentator uttering a Korean word in relation to archery. It meant, for her, “That much, internationally archery means Korea”. Moreover, Lee Mi-ra found it pleasurable that foreign archers used made-in-Korea equipment. She said:

Our players use made-in-Korea bow. I heard that in the past, made-in-Australia was used. Because we [South Korean archers] use our own bows and win the gold medals, [foreign players] also started to use made-in-Korea bows.

Maguire observes (1999: 92), ‘The West remains dominant in terms of the design, production and marketing of sports equipment; new innovations emerge within the West’. In archery, however, a number of foreign archers were reported to have switched their bows and arrows to made-in-Korea products since the 2000 Sydney
Olympics. It seemed that many archers were convinced by the approach of South Korean archers and the merits of their made-in-Korea equipment; four years later in Athens, about 30% of the archers were seen to use made-in-Korea equipment (23 August 2004, *The Chosun Ilbo*).

South Korea’s success in archery and tae-kwon-do also drew global respect and attention to South Korea’s broadcasting technology. South Korean technology delivered the television broadcasting of these two sports to the world, and it provided an additional source of pride for Kim Jung: “we have been recognised that much”. Furthermore, archery and tae-kwon-do were valued because it seemed to engender global interest in South Korea and South Korean cultures. Many foreign archers and tae-kwon-do players were reported to have sited South Korea to train and hone their skills. For example, several women commented proudly on a television programme broadcast in Greece that detailed the visit of a Greek tae-kwon-do player who won a gold medal in 2000 Sydney to South Korea to train and improve his technique. This athlete in this context served as a demonstration of South Korea’s privilege in international tae-kwon-do, and the women felt that this further displayed to a global audience *their* (and South Koreans’) ownership of the sport. The perceived reception of this programme was that it heightened South Korea’s status, even though it was essentially about a Greek athlete. Hence, the interviewed women’s national pride and confidence were found to be greatly strengthened by South Korea’s accomplishment in archery and tae-kwon-do as it had offered South Korea not only heightened global visibility but, more meaningfully, ‘global appreciation’ of South Koreans, their language, equipment, technology, and cultures. For the majority of the interviewees, South Korea was envisioned through these sports as a proud country that has a lot to offer to the world.
In the discussions above, the Olympic Games were seen as a site where most of the nations, small or big, powerful or powerless, gathered together and competed against one another for variety of purposes. Nations were recognised, compared and evaluated through their delegates’ performances and achievements, and their images formed, reinforced or modified. The Olympic ranking was equated by the interviewees with each country’s global power ranking, which in turn was seen to create local interest and legitimation for South Korea’s participation in the event and it was also linked to the development of the elite sports. On the other hand, the FIFA World Cup was considered in a different manner. The next two sections will explore the interviewed women’s fears and anxieties over South Korea’s reputation in relation to football and particularly the FIFA World Cup. In doing so, their hopes and dreams for their nation will also be discussed.

4.2.5 South Korea Envisioned: (4) Football

4.2.5.1 “We are the Best in Asia”

The FIFA World Cup is another global sporting event, which enjoys a worldwide following. According to FIFA, an accumulative 28.08 billion people across the globe watched the 2002 World Cup (www.fifa.com) and this number was expected to rise to 40 billion for the 2006 World Cup, which is 10 times bigger than Olympic audiences (5 June 2006, The JoongAng Ilbo). It is an exclusive and elite event since only the 32 qualifying nations could partake. Being one of the 32 nations, therefore, could symbolise something special.

South Korea’s historical records show that Ch’ukku, a version of football, was imported from China and became a popular sport played by the nobility and soldiers.
during the Samguk or Shilla era (BC 57-AD 935) (B. S., Kim, 1988; J. S., Lee, 1987).
However, the most widely accepted account of the import of football, in its modern
form, to Korea is that the sport was first introduced in 1882 by the crew of the British
ship, HMS Flying Fish. While waiting for permission to enter Inch’on port, the English
sailors played football near the pier, being watched by curious Koreans. The ship left
without entering the Korean port, leaving a football behind (J. Y., Lee, 2002; Petrov,
2002).

Sugden and Tomlinson argue (2003: 195) that, despite football’s relative
homogeneity in form and style worldwide, ‘the place and meaning of football in a
society can vary widely’. ‘It is’, they go on to argue (2003: 195), ‘open to cultural and
political forms of appropriation. It can mean different things in different places’.
During the Japanese annexation, football provided an arena in which Koreans displayed
their unity, resilience and resistance. Since the mid 20th century, South Korea has
prevailed in football in the Asian region and formed a degree of football supremacy.
‘Known for its unbeatable fighting spirit and mobility’, it dominated Asian tournaments
at both club and national level, particularly during the 1980s, and firmly secured its
place in the region to the extent that it ‘came to be admired and dreaded by other Asian
teams, who referred to it by the nickname of the ‘Asian Tiger’’ (J. Y., Lee, 2002: 79).

As far as FIFA rankings are concerned, South Korea is not Asia’s best. Japan and
Iran have been consistently ahead of South Korea in the FIFA rankings. However, as
Manzenreiter and Horne suggest (2002: 18), ‘The consciousness of being Asia’s
football powerhouse is still prevalent among large parts of the population in South
Korea’ for several reasons. It stems from the historical record that since 1945 South
Korean football has represented Asia 7 times at the Olympic Games: in 1948, 1964,
Football Association, 2001 cited in J. Y., Lee, 2002), as well as 2000 and 2004. The South Korean squad has also represented Asia 6 times at the World Cup Finals: in Switzerland in 1954, Mexico in 1986, Italy in 1990, America in 1994, France in 1998 (J. Y., Lee, 2002) and as a co-host in 2002, making South Korea one of the most frequent World Cup participants.

In the individual interviews, conducted during the 2006 World Cup qualifying matches, the majority of the women were found to have a sense of undisputable supremacy concerning the place of their nation’s football team in Asia. Many declared, without hesitation, this sentiment, “We are supreme in Asia” (Kim Jung). It was uttered in spite of the South Korean squad’s disappointing performances throughout the preliminary stages of the 2006 World Cup Finals. Many of the women viewed the tough route to the qualification was only a hiccup, and the qualification for the 2006 World Cup would be eventually secured. In their minds, it was beyond doubt. In the emphatic words of Park Sang-kyung:

We have continued to compete at the World Cup Finals, no matter how hard it was. I just feel that we will qualify. I never think we won’t. Because I believe we are the best in Asia. No other [Asian] nation can do it if we don’t do. I feel that it has to be us. Some European countries like Germany have at times failed to qualify. Things have happened like that, but we have not had such experiences. It (preliminary stage) is competition among Asian countries. So I believe we will go through and go [to Germany] (her emphasis).

Park’s remark represented a common sentiment among the interviewed women. The belief that ‘no other nation can do it if we don’t do’ was a forceful statement on the place of South Korean football in Asia. In her mind, as far as the number of successful
qualifications goes, South Korea was superior even to Germany, 3 times champion and the runner-up in 2002. South Korean football was likewise believed to be Asia’s unmatched elitest.

It was not only the number of qualifications South Korea has won that bolstered the women’s confidence and national pride. It was also based on the outcomes at each of the competitions. FIFA (Federation Internationale de Football Association), the single largest sport association in the world with 204 member countries as of 2004 (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004: 2), illustrates ‘its significance as a barometer of international relations’ (Sugden and Tomlinson, 2003: 175). If football serves as a ‘barometer of international relations’, then South Korea assumes leadership in Asia’s international relations partially because it holds Asia’s best records in football. South Korea has advanced to the semi-finals at both the World Youth Football competition in 1983 and the Finals in 2002. Success at international sport events is argued to symbolise something special for the nation and is hailed as a ‘landmark for a nation’s capability and potential not only in football but also in other spheres’ (Archetti, 1996: 214). Victories at the FIFA World Cup can be interpreted as ‘confirmation of an ‘imagined’ and elusive superiority’ (Archetti, 1996: 214). In this light, Argentina’s triumph at the 1978 World Cup, for instance, was viewed as Argentinians’ ‘realization of a national dream’ and ‘the historical confirmation of an ‘imagined’ and elusive superiority’ (Archetti, 1996: 214). Maguire also argues (1999) that global sporting success reinforces national esteem at the local level. ‘Global sport’, he asserts (1999: 90), ‘involves a form of patriot games in which images and stories are told and retold to ourselves, about ourselves and about others’. Through football, the interviewed women envisaged South Korea as Asia’s undoubtedly most elite and even, at times, as superior to global football powerhouses. They also fondly spoke of the success story of the
South Korean squad in 2002 with pride, re-visiting national memories and myths. A firm sense of national pride and esteem resonated in most women to a degree similar to the discussions of archery and tae-kwon-do sparked. These were stories about their nation and about themselves, stories that they prided themselves on, which would be retold to future generations.

4.2.5.2 “We must qualify”: Fear of ‘Falling from Grace’

South Korean football has proven to be Asia’s finest over a long period of time; however, as Murray points out (1995: 145), South Korean football is ‘a long way short of international class’. In spite of its frequent appearances at the World Cup Finals, South Korea had not won a single match prior to the 2002 World Cup. South Korea’s advancement to the semi-finals at the 2002 World Cup, understandably, came as a great astonishment both to the nation and international football community, and it has since become a goal for South Korea and other Asian nations to repeat or exceed. That achievement was a frequent reference point for the interviewees’ remarks on their football experience, their national pride, aspirations and dreams. It was, on the other hand, a status that they dreaded losing, and as a result, it created a deep anxiety in them.

The success of the South Korean team in 2002 invoked in the women a keen sense of awareness of the global media’s finger-pointing or insinuations. South Korea’s success at the 2002 tournament was heavily tarnished by a series of foreign media’s allegation that had largely credited South Korea’s stunning achievement to home ground advantage, most notably favouritism of the part of the referees. With the 2006 World Cup nearing, similar accusations resurfaced. For instance, Adebayor, a striker of the English Premier League club Arsenal who is also part of African representative
Togo, (a nation grouped with South Korea, France and Switzerland in the 2006 World Cup Finals), claimed that South Korea’s success was as a consequence of referees’ ‘assistance’ (24 May 2006, The Segye Ilbo). Having been haunted by such allegations, many of the interviewees desperately longed for vindication and for ‘truth to be told’ in Germany. Mindful of the world’s disapproval and suspicious gaze on South Korea’s outcome in 2002, they hoped South Korea would repeat the successful story in Germany and quiet the world. For that, qualification was an absolute prerequisite. Ardent football lover Kim Jung-jin spoke of her fear:

It [disqualification] is a national humiliation. I don’t want to hear that “because it was held in Korea and there were home advantages they were able to advance to the semi final”. I will feel very offended if I hear such things. We must qualify. The dishonour.. I think the [world] media will report like that [South Korea had home advantage] (her emphasis).

For a nation which has yet to stamp its presence firmly on the international football scene, one time success is a precious treasure whose loss would be deeply felt. Vidacs notes (2000), in her exploration of Cameroonian national identity, that, upon Cameroon’s elimination from the 1994 World Cup, Cameroonian lamented most over the loss of Cameroon’s prestigious image, which had been gained in the previous World Cup in 1990. This was precisely what many of the interviewees including Kim (above) feared most: the loss of hard-won prestige and perhaps more painfully, confirmation of the allegations. South Korea’s qualification for the 2006 German World Cup was, therefore, regarded as a national mission that must be accomplished to vindicate and solidify prestige on foreign soil, where no home ground advantage could exist for the South Korean team. Maguire argues (1999) that shared experiences, sorrows, triumphs and disasters are what gives meaning to the notion of nation and
national identity. The rhetoric and sentiments associated with the football qualifying matches were replete with the women’s desperate desires for their nation to clear its name in international football circles and position it as a deserving former semi-finalist.

4.2.5.3. Summary

Globalisation may not necessarily propel people to be physically ‘on the move’; however, it does broaden the horizon of people’s imagination and promote the development of new ways of interaction with people who are geographically thousands miles away from them. In other words, people’s social world is deterritorialised, their social relations removed from local contexts and reinserted into the global context (Giddens, 1990; Tomlinson, 1999). This complex connectivity, according to Tomlinson (1999: 30), ‘furnishes people with a cultural resource that they lacked before its expansion’, that is ‘a cultural awareness which is, in various senses, ‘global’’.

The interview findings suggested that the women’s self-perception of themselves and their nation constantly shifted and was unstable largely due to the impact of globalising forces. The global has been imposed upon them as a new cultural context to consider in order to make their lives more meaningful. Compelled to be conscious of the global gaze, their consciousness of others’ perceptions of themselves and their nation was continuously driving and haunting them into a search for stable and improved images of themselves and their nation. This imagined nationhood was found to be forever elusive and uncertain, for the signs of the nation constantly changed meanings, values and qualities that they held most dear. Thus the women were found to be in a never-ending pursuit for certainty and security, and the search itself was continually shaking and shifting their pride, self-esteem and confidence.
Moreover, as implied in the women’s sentiments, concerns, worries and hopes, the women had an acute understanding of the globe as inextricably networked. Also revealed were the ways in which they reframed or reinterpreted the meanings, values and morality of events in a wider context. The interview findings revealed various ways the women attempted to make sense of their experiences in an ever-broadening social context. The women’s self esteem and confidence may have been shattered, boosted, or restored, based on geographically distant events and happenings. However, they were clearly and actively struggling to find the meanings of their existence within this expanded self-and-global awareness. Global connectivity may suggest a dissolving sense of security or certainty, but ‘simultaneously, it offers new understandings of experience in wider, ultimately global, terms’ (Tomlinson, 1999: 30). In other words, globalisation has brought ‘new opportunities and new risks’ (Tomlinson, 1999: 128), within which people struggle to re-define the significance of their lives. They, thus, ‘reterritorialise’ (Tomlinson, 1999: 148) or ‘reembed’ (Giddens, 1990: 141) their lives in order to ‘live’ in the new social world, to make it ‘home’ and to come to terms with the meanings of their existence.

My discussions have thus so far centred on the interviewees’ worries, concerns, anxieties, hopes and desires for their nation. They indicated the interviewees’ strong desire for South Korea to become a powerful nation, a nation that can be globally recognised and acknowledged. Upon closer examination, however, their dream was not simply to become a powerful nation for the sake of the label. The interviewees’ responses suggested a set of aspirations. Their ideal nation had to possess specific values, qualities and characteristics. The following sections will interrogate their ideals of nationhood and the specific values and morality that underpin what is, I suggest, deeply South Korean in character.
4.2.6 Longing for an America

4.2.6.1 ‘America Envy’

To many South Koreans, one nation stands out as the symbol of global power and global domination. It is a name that South Koreans seem to desire to symbolically adopt some day. That name is America. However, due to its condescending attitudes towards South Korea, America often generates strong resentment or hatred among many South Koreans, and especially since the 1980s it has often been severely criticised. In general, South Koreans’ anti-American sentiments are well known and pervade the nation. Simultaneously, long seen as ‘Big Brother’, who watches out for South Korea, primarily against North Korea and its allies, America engenders a deep sense of appreciation and respect. Since Korea’s independence from Japan in 1945, America has been highly influential on South Korean society, culturally, politically and ideologically, and it is fair to say that many South Koreans have developed ‘American envy’. For example, obtaining an American passport has been seen as highly desirable. A poll conducted among Korea University students has revealed that they may dislike America but many would still like to have an American passport (6 October 2003, The Chosun Ilbo). America is also a favourite to study in or visit. According to the US Department of State, South Koreans obtained the largest number of the U.S. student visa during the 2005 fiscal year; South Korean students who are currently studying in America accounts for the 12.5% of the total number of foreign students in the U.S. (2 December 2005, The Chosun Ilbo). As well, South Koreans have been reported to spend over $10 billion annually in the U.S for studies or sightseeing (30 November 2005, The Nocutnews).

Seoul and Washington have been close allies since 1945. After gaining independence from Japan, Korea, being incapable of self-administering, had to rely on
America for administration for the next three years. In 1948, partitioned South Korea enacted its own Constitution and organised its own government. In 1950, the Korean War broke out. Americans with other United Nation troops fought for the freedom of South Koreans. By an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1953, a ceasefire was announced, and South and North Koreas have since remained in technically a state of war, which has justified the ongoing presence of about 38,000 American military troops in South Korea (18 February 02, The Korea Times). American influence on South Korea was further strengthened after the Korean War, as it furnished poor South Koreans with military and economic aid, which helped established its image as their friendliest ally.

America has long been equated by many South Koreans as the western and global power. It was mentioned earlier that many of the interviewed women equated the medal ranking of the Olympics with nations’ global power and standing, and that America was frequently named as evidence of the validity of this equation. Given its global influence and domination, America’s standing at the top of the Olympic medals ranking was taken for granted, as a symbolic display of the might of American power beyond sport. Several women expressed their deep desire for South Korea to level the playing field with the U.S. someday as it would serve as a confirmation of South Korea’s global power. It should be noted that it was not China or Japan but America alone that many interviewees hoped South Korea would emulate. China was perceived as fast emerging, reshaping the world’s economic and political geography and as levelling the playing field with America on the Olympic medals chart. However, it failed to generate a sense of envy or awe in the interviewees. Instead, its outstanding success in international sport contests was roundly condemned. This condemnation stemmed from the notion
that China’s success was first and foremost the outcome of the communist government’s political manipulation of sport. Sun Young-ran claimed:

It [China’s success in sport] is the government’s power because players are chosen and trained by the government to meet its political purpose. In other nations, sportspeople who excel in certain sports become national delegates. But it’s not the case for China. The Chinese government invests, controls and manufactures players. It is doing a political business with sport. To maintain the regime while boosting national pride.

China, thus, symbolically represented the communist regime and a government’s abuse of power, and represented the absence of free competition, all of which South Korea and South Koreans stand politically and ideologically against. Chinese sportspersons were, accordingly, seen as victims of their government’s exploitation and as part of its ‘political business’. Japan, on the other hand, stands for an old enemy in South Korean mind, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 5. For these reasons, it is America alone that resembles the kind of nation the women hoped their nation would become.

4.2.6.2 Disapproval for America

Interestingly, however, America failed to offer images of an ideal nationhood to many women in the focus group interviews as it was seen as seriously lacking many specific qualities, morality and values they saw as most important. South Koreans’ America envy was noted in the previous section; however, as also noted, South Koreans’ perceptions of America are quite ambiguous. According to a survey by a Korean publication, the U.S. was ranked as the third most disliked country by South Koreans, following North Korea and Japan. Quite tellingly, it was also ranked as the
second most admired (26 February 2002, *The Korea Times*). South Koreans’ sense of bitterness directed at the U.S. is often grounded upon America’s responsibility for, and involvement in, the division of the Korean peninsula, Japan’s unapologetic attitudes towards its colonial rule of Korea in the early 20th century, its support for a series of South Korean military dictatorships and the delayed arrival of democracy on South Korean soil.

Socially, crimes committed by American soldiers stationed in South Korea, ranging from assault, break-in, theft, fraud, rape and murder, have mounted and fuelled South Koreans’ distaste of America over the years. This was evidenced by outrages in the South Korean media in recent years: ‘Fighting anytime, anywhere: What on earth is the matter with U.S. soldiers?’ (19 July 2005, *The Hankook Ilbo*), ‘Asia helpless at American soldiers’ ‘crime immunity card’’(4 January 2006, *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*), ‘Government that keeps silence at U.S. troops’ crimes is “guilty”’ (9 November 2005, *The Ohmynews*), and ‘Our reality, incapable of punishing American criminals, is deplorable’ (12 January 2006, *The Hankyoreh*). What these reports refer to is the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the unequal legal code governing U.S. troops based in South Korea, which effectively prevents South Korea from trying American soldiers in South Korean court. Recently, South Korea has demanded to revise SOFA, which America refused. SOFA is often deemed to symbolically represent America’s arrogance, abuse and manipulation.

In the focus group interviews, America’s selfishness, arrogance, and exploitation were popular topics. Several controversial sport incidents between South Korea and America were mentioned. The most frequently mentioned was the short-tract speed skating at the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics. In a short-tract event during the Games, American Apolo Anton Ono was vilified by many South Koreans for taking the
gold medal, following the hotly-disputed disqualification of South Korean skater Kim Dong-sung. Kim crossed the line first in the men’s 1,500m final but was eliminated for blocking Ono’s way. Many South Koreans believed that Ono fooled the Australian referee with his overreaction while trying to pass Kim in the last turn (9 June 2002, The Korea Times). This incident gave rise to one of the most serious instances of anti-American sentiment among South Koreans since Seoul and Washington established diplomatic ties.

Many interviewees felt that another gold medal was taken away from them by an American at the 2004 Athens Olympics. This time it happened in gymnastics. The story runs that South Korean gymnast Yang Tae-young was stripped of the gold medal in the final of the men’s all-round event due to the judges’ mistake which eventually favoured American gymnast Paul Hamm. The mistake was that all of the three judges failed to notice the wrong setting of the starting value for Yang’s performance. If it had been set correctly, he would have won the gold medal, not Hamm. South Korea protested, and the International Federation of Gymnastics (FIG) publicly confirmed that there was an error in recording Yang’s score on the parallel bars. However, the FIG did not accept any protest on the decisions already made nor did it change any decision (21 October 2004, The Korea Times). Hamm, accordingly, retained the gold medal and Yang was placed third. This infuriated most of the interviewees who were interviewed after the incident. They perceived it as America robbing South Korea of a gold medal unfairly once again, which was ultimately identified as a clear reflection of relations between the two nations.

Several women speculated that American power and influence were behind the FIG’s final decision. Power struggles and (the supposed) close connection between a nation’s domination of a particular sport and its administrative privilege of a governing
body has been examined by Williams (2003). Looking into Pakistani nationalism in cricket, Williams insists that the privileged position of English cricket in the administration of international cricket can work to sustain unequal power relations between nations. The Yang-Ham incident was identified by Park Sang-kyung, similarly, as an instance of American power and abuse. She exclaimed, “After all, who is the real power at international gymnastics bodies? It’s America”. Speaking of another controversial performance in gymnastics where the American Hamm again won a gold medal, Kim Mi-jung expressed her resentment:

Paul Hamm’s performance was worse than his [Hamm’s Russian rival], and his [Hamm’s] landing was terrible. But he got a better score [than the Russian]. So [the audience] booed at him. But [the judges] didn’t lower his score. This is America. I didn’t watch it because I was mad (her emphasis).

She justified her sense of bitterness by claiming, “We are not the only one that felt that way [cheated by Americans] because we are a victim. The world feels that way too”. If that were true, it again proved, if anything, the might of American power as they could easily disregard the discontent and disgruntlement of other nations. In fact, the American manipulation of the Olympics was argued to exist on many levels. Americans were seen as having controlled the schedule of the Olympics for the convenience of their viewership (Lee Mi-ra). It was argued that they had increased the number of gold medals on offer and that they had modified the regulations in the Olympic sports in which they excelled for their own benefit (Kim Mi-jung and Park Sang-kyung). Again, what these pointed to was the perceptions and practices of American power and domination in sport.
The focus group interview findings revealed that many women dreamed of a powerful nation that has an emphatic global presence and authority. Conceiving of the global sport powerhouses, such as America and Japan, as global powerhouses in international relations, they wished their nation to stand side by side with them in and beyond sport. It seemed, therefore, that they desired a powerful nation that could exercise a great deal of influence on the world’s socio-cultural, political and economic realms. It appeared that they wished for South Korea to become a powerful nation like America. Power alone was, however, found to be insufficient to satisfy their ideals of nationhood. Power had to be accompanied by certain values, qualities and characteristics, and America in this regard failed to measure up to the women’s expectations. The following section will explore the nature of these desired values, qualities and characteristics.

4.2.6.3 An America with South Korean Character

As discussed earlier, many of the women in the focus group interviews valued gold medals considerably higher than the silver or bronze medals. Obtaining gold medals was assumed to be a powerful demonstration of South Korea’s power and capacity to worldwide viewers. However, many other women raised concerns over South Korea’s elite-centred culture. South Korea was conceived of as excessively favouring elite athletes. Park Chang-sun succinctly remarked, “Being number one is very important in our country, like you have to be a top student at school and you have to enter the top university etc”. Kang Eun-jin agreed, “Samsung’s old TV advert copy “No one remembers second” is the correct reflection of our society”. Kim Jung also defined the ‘no one remembers second’ attitude as South Korea’s “national character”. South Korea’s focus on elitism may have contributed to its remarkable economic growth and
sporting achievements over a relatively short period. A number of the interviewees, however, problematised this cultural ideal and called for more relaxed, flexible and open-minded attitudes. South Korea’s excessive interest in gold medals and the qualification for the 2006 World Cup were, accordingly, often severely criticised. Kim Hyun-sook insisted that participation was more important than winning medals at the Olympics, and Kim Jung-jin was highly critical of the South Korean media’s almost total lack of interest in those who failed to win gold medals in Athens. In a similar vein, Kim Yong-jin exhibited deep appreciation and respect for players’ hard work and effort than their gold medals. As well, Park Sang-kyung complained about South Korea’s extreme fixation on re-entering the top ten ranking at the Athens:

Since when have we set the aim at being one of the top ten? We could be one of the top ten and could be the 12th. Did we do badly if we were the 12th? Nothing will happen even if we are not included in the top ten. I don’t understand why we must.

Kim Jung accepted it was “okay to lose after doing our best”, and Lee Mi-ra also argued, “We cannot always be the number one, and not everyone can be the number one”, and Sun Young-ran was worried that South Korea’s obsession with elitism would “know no rest”.

Frequently, hard work and doing one’s best were sought after as qualities most valued and also as proving the national image to bolster others’ perceptions of South Korea. An incident in tae-kwon-do offered an example. As discussed earlier, South Korea’s domination in tae-kwon-do was a great delight to most of the interviewees. Two gold medals were won in Athens, but how they were won was equally, if not more, important to several women. In this sense, South Korea’s female tae-kwon-do player Jang Ji-yun was talked about as having disgraced the spirit of the sport and
nation despite winning a gold medal. According to Park Chang-sun, Jang’s performance was far from being ‘true sportsmanship’. Park was very critical of Jang:

While watching the women’s final of tae-kwon-do, I switched the channel. I was upset. Why is she [Jang Ji-yun] doing that? She was just jumping back and forth, hoping time passes by. Because her score was high enough to secure her the gold medal, she must have known if she could just spend time like that. Any careless attack may just jeopardise her almost-won gold medal, so she was just spending time up there, jumping left and right, back and forth. Watching her, I wondered if that was a true sport, if she was only after the medal.

Maguire claims (1999: 178) that ‘specific sports are seen to embody all the qualities of national character’. The example he provides is cricket, which is said to embody the habitus of male upper-class Englishness: the qualities of fair play, valour, graceful conduct on and off the pitch and steadfastness in the face of adversity. Thus cricket is, according to him (1999: 178), ‘seen to represent what ‘England’ is and gives meaning to the identity of being ‘English’. Tae-kwon-do meant something special to most of the interviewees in the focus groups. It was the sport that South Korea should not and could not be beaten because it was ‘their own’. It was a sport that they hoped South Korea would dominate and solidify its unrivalled global reputation. Yet, victories or gold medals had to be achieved in style, style that expressed the distinctiveness of South Koreaness. Park Chang-sun regarded the Olympics as a golden opportunity for South Korea to display its supreme tae-kwon-do technique and ‘national’ character. She also regarded tae-kwon-do as a golden platform to showcase what South Korea could offer to the world. She, therefore, argued that South Korean tae-kwon-do squads should have demonstrated to worldwide audiences the proper manner of conduct, as well as correct
technique. Unfortunately, Jang Ji-yun’s winning style was perceived as being far from satisfaction. She was seen as having failed to display South Korea’s national values and spirits, such as hard work, doing one’s best and fair play, thereby jeopardising and tarnishing South Korea’s global image. Consequently, Jang’s gold medal was significantly reduced in value to Park.

Several others also demanded that South Korean delegates who were participating in many other ‘non-national’ sports, such as judo, football and gymnastics, display performance indicative of South Korea’s national character. Kim Jung complained about the South Korean football squad’s performance against Mali in Athens. She suggested that the South Korean team did not try their hardest because the squad knew that they had already secured a place in the next round. For these women, victories had to be achieved in a style that displayed the unique national character and values of South Korea. Furthermore, in the interviews voices in favour of meritocracy were also frequent, often transcending nationalist sentiment. Park Chang-sun articulated, “If we are good enough, then we go [to Germany]. If we are not, we can’t go. It’s as simple as that”. Several women, regardless of how strongly they hoped for South Korea’s qualification, asserted that the best ones should qualify and that South Korea should not be one if it was not good enough. Finally, Kim Jung identified South Korea’s extreme “winner-takes-it-all” mentality as “our problem” and showed grave concerns at its prominence.

The interview findings revealed that, although many hoped South Korea would win gold medals and level the playing field with the bona fide sport powerhouses of the U.S., China and Japan, they also emphasised that gold medals should be won ‘in South Korean style’ that embodied South Korea’s distinctive national character. Sportswomen and sportsmen were, accordingly, expected to assume that responsibility seriously and
manifest it through their performances and conduct in sport. In both the focus group and individual interviews, sports stars were often discussed in terms of their successes and failures, achievements, performances and their perceived personality. Among them, one footballer stood out as the embodiment of South Korea’s ‘national’ character: Park Ji-sung. In the next section, I will explore the narratives concerning his identity in order to show how it exemplifies a narrative of an idealised South Korean national identity.

4.2.6.4 Park Ji-sung as Narratives of Nation

Sport stars are argued to be ‘in many ways a source of collective identity and pride in both national and supra-national settings’ (Archetti, 2001: 154), and ‘teams and players, and their performance are regarded to reflect the character of the communities they represent’ (Whitson, 1998: 59). Park Ji-sung was one of the key players that produced South Korea’s astonishing achievement in the 2002 World Cup. He was playing for PSV Eindhoven (in the Dutch league) at the time of the focus group and individual interviews, and at the moment of writing, was playing for Manchester United in the English Premier League. Park Ji-sung was the overwhelming favourite of most of the interviewed women and generated a great deal of respect and admiration.

Park Ji-sung’s enormous popularity among the interviewees was based on the perception that he held the values and qualities that were most cherished by the women. By most standards, he is ‘plain-looking’. He is by no means thought of as being as attractive as David Beckham, and his popularity seemed to stem from perceptions of his personality and character. Kim Hyun-sook found him to be:

Always doing his best. Always steady and constant. Always humble. I feel his sincerity from the way he plays, and when he is interviewed, despite his young age, he is very sincere.
Park Chang-sun also regarded him as being “very diligent, very sincere”, on top of being a good footballer and exhibited great admiration and respect for him:

In the match against Saudi Arabia [at the Olympics], other players just walked around, not running after the ball, but he alone ran continuously chasing the ball.

Above and beyond his footballing skills, Park Ji-sung’s sincerity, hard work, steadfastness and humility were repeatedly named as qualities that he possessed and as reasons for their admiration. If Wayne Gretzky was ‘Canada’s ambassador’, as Jackson argues (2001: 180), Park Ji-sung, as one who was deemed to possess respected personal values and qualities, could be said to be ‘South Korea’s ambassador’, who introduces, reinforces or changes the ‘national’ image of South Korea to global audiences.

Other players who were perceived to possess similar qualities were also respected and appreciated. Lee Young-pyo, for instance, a player at Tottenham Hotspurs in the English Premier League, was applauded for being a “sincere, unselfish, and true team player” (Lee Jung-ran). Cha Doo-ri, another South Korean footballer playing in the German league, was praised because, “although he’s less a good footballer, I can see that he’s trying to do his best. He runs constantly” (Park Chang-sun). On the contrary, Lee Dong-guk, who plays for Middlesbrough in the English Premier League, was harshly criticised by several women. Lee Jung-ran defined him as being “very lazy, arrogant in his attitudes towards his senior players, and full of showing off. He’s immature”.

The focus group and individual interview findings revealed that South Korean sport stars were believed to be rich symbolic representations of South Korea’s nationhood. They were thought to carry South Korea’s national values and characteristics, as well as representing South Korea’s power and capacity. Accordingly, many interviewees
demanded that their national delegates participating in international sporting events or those playing overseas must demonstrate South Korea’s unique ‘national’ character and endeavour to disseminate positive images of South Korea globally. Victories or gold medals that were not won in ‘South Korean style’ were devalued and undermined, or even blamed for having tarnished South Korea’s image. It emerged that respect for sportspersons also seemed to stem from their perceived personal characteristics and less so the levels of their sporting abilities. Kim Hyun-sook’s comment in this regard clearly conveyed a common sentiment among many interviewees: “I have to be able to like him/her [sportsperson] as a ‘person’ first to be able to like him/her as a sport player”.

The women’s ideal vision of nationhood that emerged from these findings was that of a powerful nation with qualities that included hard work, doing one’s best, adherence to ideals of fair play, sincerity, humility, unselfishness and respect for team mates and others.

4.3 Summary

This chapter interrogated the interviewees’ perceptions of their nation, their anxieties over the reputation of their nation and their dreams for the future their nation. What was discovered from the interviews was the constant presence of the gaze of ‘others’ in the women’s minds, which had an enormous impact on the way they constructed the meanings or values of their lives. A sense of self-pity and deprecation were found to be prevalent among many of the women as highlighted by their assumption of the insignificance of South Korea on the world. Here, their sorrow or resentment was structured and became meaningful only in the global context. However, certain sports like archery, tae-kwon-do and football were found to convey to them an
overwhelming sense of national supremacy and pride. Again, these sports offered such
happiness and pride to them precisely because the appreciative global gaze was
assumed to be focussed on South Korea through these sports. That is, global applause,
appreciation and respect were based on their own assumptions, yet these sports brought
them an immense sense of self and national esteem.

In addition, the women’s anxieties over, and hopes for, their nation were meaningful
only when the global was considered. Their longing for a powerful nation was a
manifestation of their global awareness because a powerful nation could have
significance only when ‘others’ were seen to acknowledge that status. Moreover, their
global consciousness revealed a desire to demonstrate in international sporting events a
distinctively South Korean character to the world. South Korean values, qualities and
morality would not have meaning if no ‘others’ existed to appreciate it. Their demands
that South Korean delegates demonstrate unique South Koreanness to global audiences
can be also understood in the same regard. Confirmed throughout the chapter were the
women’s global consciousness, and its influence on the way they constructed the
meanings and values of the international sport contests for their sense of selves.

All these findings suggested the process of their reterritorialisation, their way of
making things or events meaningful in the new social milieu, their endeavour to ‘live’
in an ever unstable, uncertain world. Globalisation is certainly changing how people
conceive of themselves, their nation and the world. However, the women were also
learning or trying to learn to ‘live’ in the new social surroundings. Globalisation may be
constantly destabilising the meaning of their existence, thereby their identities;
however, they were also constantly constructing or struggling to search for new
meanings and embody new values.
Chapter 5: South Korea and ‘Others’:

North Korea and Japan

5.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates the ways in which North Korea and Japan, as South Korea’s ‘Others’, have conditioned and shaped South Korean consciousness and identities. Triandafyllidou argues (1998) that, despite the significant role ‘others’ play in constructing identities, the relationship between the nation and the Other has largely been ignored. She (1998) argues that national identities are often defined by the construction of ‘Others’, through which boundaries are established and whom are used to distinguish the national value and character of a community from others. Barker (2000), Hall (1990) and Said (1978) also point out the importance of the ‘Other’ in identity politics. The first half of the chapter will focus on when and to what extent North Korea becomes ‘us’ and not the ‘Other’ to the interviewees. The discussion will be predicated mainly upon two arguments: that the nation is a historic community with shared history, cultures, language, myths and memories and secondly, that ethnic ties are essential to nationhood.

The second half of the chapter will interrogate the women’s perceptions of Japan’s part in the construction of their identities. I will draw primarily on Hall’s conceptualisation (1990) of identities as a product of history, power and culture. The colonial history and the current political tension between South Korea and Japan have certainly affected the women’s attitudes to Japan and their consciousness. I will explore the extent to which such history and political incidents have conditioned and shaped their identities. In an equally crucial regard, I will also examine the shifts in their
identities, together with implications of these shifts. The final section will discuss the women’s desire for a powerful nation. This was explored at the end of chapter 4, and it will be revised here in light of the characteristics North Korea was perceived to possess.

5.2 One Nation, Two States: South Koreans’ Ambiguous Identities

5.2.1 Othering North Korea

‘Difference’ is ‘essential to meaning; without it, meaning could not exist’, (Hall, 1997: 234), according to the approach associated with Saussure and his followers. ‘Difference’, Hall (1997) maintains, is marked by the ‘Other’. He goes onto argue (1997: 234), ‘We know what it is to be British’, not only because of certain national characteristics, but also because we can mark its ‘difference’ from its ‘others’. South Korean identities in this regard can be said to be defined by a host of ‘Others’. Most notably, since the division in 1948 South Korean identities have been defined by ‘not being North Korean’, and differences, accordingly, have been created to distinguish South Koreanness from North Koreanness. Difference can be created in both a positive and negative fashion. In *Orientalism*, Said underscores the purposeful manufacturing of unfavourable images of the ‘Other’. He emphasises the constructedness of stereotypical ‘images’ of the Orient by the West as part of the West’s identity construction scheme. He insists upon neither the term Orient nor the concept of West as having ontological stability and instead, asserts, “Each is made up of human effort, partly affirmation, partly identification of the Other’ (Said, 1978: xii). These fictions lead easily to manipulation and the organisation of collective passion. What this points to is
ultimately an important feature of ‘the socially constructed and hegemonic basis of identities’ (Jackson, 2001: 168).

World War II ended thirty-six years of Japanese colonisation in Korea, but it came with a cost: the partitioning of the country. In 1948 South Korea held elections under the supervision of the United Nations and adopted a Constitution for the Republic of Korea. Simultaneously, North Korea was (re)born as the Democratic People’s Republic and Kim Il-Sung was selected as the leader of the state (M. S., Ahn, 2002). In this new political milieu, ‘South’ Korean identity, nonexistent prior to 1948, had to be constructed. To produce ideal South Koreanness, an ‘Other’ that represented contrasting ‘ideas’ or ‘images’ was required, and North Korea, which stood in stark contrast to what South Korea stood for, democracy against socialism, freedom against totalitarianism and so on, was immediately defined as a key figure. An hegemonic and ideological reframing of North Korea and North Koreans was promptly created and penetrated deeply into South Koreans’ consciousness.

Said asserts (1978, 1) that ‘the Orient was almost a European invention’. He repeatedly stresses that ‘representations’ of the Orient were created for the West to project itself as an ideal. ‘The Orient’ in this way ‘has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting images, idea, personality, experience’, he insists (1978: 2). What Said makes clear was also the comprehensive effort made by all parties including institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, traditions, conventions, agreed-upon codes of understanding for their effects (Said, 1978) to manufacture the dominant images of the Orient as it did.

A similar process has occurred in South Korea regarding North Korea and North Koreans. For the project of ‘South Koreanness-making’, images of ‘North Korea’ had to be contrived in such a way as to highlight the values, qualities, morality and
character of ‘South Koreanness’. Indeed, they were made forcefully and vigorously in multiple ways, one of which was the demonisation of North Koreans. North Koreans have been commonly portrayed as sub-human or animal. Lee Mi-ra recounted her childhood memories on North Koreans:

When I was little, North Koreans were described as a monster or wolf in our textbooks. [In the past] A lot of distortions made us see them [North Koreans] that way.

If and when they were to be seen as human, they were represented as South Korea’s deadliest foe over which South Korea must triumph. North Korea and its Communist regime had been routinely portrayed as a cunning, furtive, over-ambitious, dangerous enemy that constantly sought every opportunity to disrupt or break down South Korea’s national defence and to invade the South. 27-year-old Park Chang-sun related:

In the past, I was like, ‘Those Communists [North Koreans] should all be wiped out’ or when I was in elementary school, I would draw posters like, ‘Let’s crush Communists’.

These were not simply by-gone images of the past Cold War ideology. North Koreans were still considered to be ‘different’. For one, they were considered barbaric and inhumane.

In North Korea, they still publicly shoot and kill attempted escapees while on-lookers are clapping their hands, and we [South Koreans] are talking about demolishing the capital punishment. We are so different in a lot of things (Park Chang-sun).

Other common representations of North Korea talked about in the interviews were closely associated with its famine, poverty and dictatorship. Yang Hye-soo, for instance, observed, “They [North Koreans] look poor and don’t look happy”. The North
Korean dictator and/or the society were perceived as intolerant and irrational, and this evoked sympathy from Kim So-mi. She, therefore, wished that North Korean delegates at the Athens Olympics would win “because I worry that, if they lose, they would get into serious trouble when they return home”; images of destitute North Koreans also offered grounds for Kim Hyo-sung to support North Koreans in the Games:

- Probably they [North Korean delegates] have no supporters [in Athens]. [Who could afford to go to cheer], spending their own money? They are not well off economically. So we [South Koreans] should [support them].

North Korea and North Koreans have, thus, been stereotyped to contrive image of South Korea and South Koreans as free, peace-loving, democratic, civilised, rational, humanistic, morally superior ‘normal’ human beings. Moreover, the ‘othering’ of North Korea and its people has occurred on every level of discourses, in Foucault’s term (1977, 1980). Educational institutions, law, the home, the media and the workplace have all taken part in regulating and policing South Koreans’ thoughts and behaviour over the last 5 decades.

**5.2.2 Constant Shift of ‘Other’ Boundary**

‘Meaning does not inhere in things in the world; it is constructed, produced’, Hall argues (1997: 24; italics in original). According to Saussure:

- The relation between the signifier and the signified is not permanently fixed. Words shift their meanings, and the concept, signifieds, to which they refer also change, historically; every shift alters the conceptual map of the culture, leading different cultures, at different historical moments, to classify and think about the world differently (Hall, 1997: 32).
Hall points out the significant implications of this argument for a theory of representation and for our understanding of culture. If the relationship between a signifier and its signified is the result of a system of social conventions specific to history and culture, then ‘all meanings are produced within history and culture, and they can never be finally fixed but are always subject to change, both from one cultural context and from one period to another’ (1997: 32). Also crucially, he goes on to argue (1997: 32), ‘This opens representation to the constant ‘play’ or slippage of meaning, to the constant production of new meanings, new interpretations’.

Hall’s assertion is important in investigating the meaning of North Korea to South Koreans. Ideological and hegemonic ‘othering’ of North Korea has at times been blurred with the emergence of certain issues and shifts in political tensions between the South and the North. The reunion of families who became separated during the Korean War is one event that has compelled many South Koreans to relate to North Koreans in a different manner than what might be suggested by popular stereotypes. The media representations of the family reunions that first started and aired on national television in the early 1980s softened South Koreans’ attitudes and forced them to ruminate over what North Korea could mean to them. It was the Cold War era, a time when South and North Koreas were heavily involved in confrontations with each other militarily, politically and ideologically. In this context, the witnessing of such emotionally-charged scenes of family reunions on television brought a stir, confusion and a moment of contemplation to many South Koreans. The family unions are ongoing; nevertheless, many of the families in the South still have been unable to find or meet with their families in the North. These events evoked great sympathy from Yang Hye-ran, who had no family members or relatives in North Korea:
North Korea reminds me of separated families and it makes me feel sympathetic [for them]. There are many families that haven’t met yet. [Some elderly people] still have family members in the North. Bad feelings we had in the past [about the North], I do not know, because I didn’t experience them. I just hope those families meet their separated families.

Whether or not they have family members or relatives living above the 38th parallel, it has become increasingly difficult for South Koreans to consider the North, solely, as an enemy. And it is, in fact, the case that many South Koreans do have familial ties in North Korea. The boundary of the ‘Other’ with regard to North Korea is thus in constant negotiation, never fixed and indeterminable.

Hall claims (1997: 32), ‘Words shift their meanings’ historically. Significant changes have occurred in South Korea regarding North Korea since the mid 1990s, which has considerably affected South Koreans’ attitudes to the North. The representations of North Korea have, rapidly and dramatically, become favourable largely because the South Korean Governments’ mode of addressing and dealing with North Korea took a radical turn to being pro-North Korean. In particularly, former President Kim Dae-jung’s ‘Sunshine Policy’, which promoted peace and reconciliation on the Korean peninsula, has had a huge impact. Consequently, South Koreans have become increasingly able to express their personal sentiments and opinions on North Korea much more freely and publicly than before. The ‘Sunshine Policy’ has also been adopted by current President Roh Moo-hyun. The Roh administration, in fact, officially no longer considers the North as its ‘main enemy’. In the 2004 national defence White paper, the Ministry of National Defence deleted the term ‘main enemy’, regarding the North, and instead used ‘direct threat’. This label served to tone down the negative
connotations of North Korea and highlighted the changed security situation on the Korean peninsula and the special relationship between the two Koreas (28 January 05, *The Korea Times*). However, it did also spark diplomatic friction with America.

Said argues that ‘each phase and era produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics’ (Said, 1978: xvii). With the development of the South Korean governments’ pro-North Korean policies, hegemonic and ideological bars that had forced North Korea into the position of the ‘Other’ have eased considerably. North Korea has been depicted in positive terms, and as a consequence, there is a much diminished sense of ‘distance’ that many South Koreans feel in relation to North Korea. The majority of the women in the interviews also displayed friendliness towards the North. Choi Bo-suk, for instance, claimed: “I feel much closer to them [North Koreans] than before. I feel they are like my next-door neighbour”. More importantly, many of them identified North Koreans as their own. Lee Yoo-ri stressed, “Although we live in different countries, we are the *same* people” (my emphasis), Kim So-mi underlined the idea that South and North Koreans had the “*Same* blood” (my emphasis), and Kim Yong-jin even claimed, “We are the *same* people, citizens of the same country” (my emphasis). Underlying such claims is the belief in a single nationhood based on a perceived ethnic tie between the South and the North. Such intense focus on the sharing of nationhood and the ethnic ties had been severely repressed by anti-Communist ideology since the division, especially during the successive military regimes. The shifts in the South Korean governments’ policies, however, have to a large degree liberated South Koreans’ expressions and sentiments, leading them to revise their relationship with North Korea. The meaning of North Korea has thus changed considerably, and sport has felt the effects of this political
thaw. The following sections will discuss the interviewees’ changed and changing perceptions of North Korea exhibited in and through sport.

5.3 ‘Pan-Korean’ Identity

5.3.1 “Blood is Thicker than Water”: Support for North Korea

There was a time when the two Koreas had insisted that only one of them could represent Korea and as a result, they refused to participate in any competition where the other took part (Murray, 1995). This antagonism appears to be history, at least for now, and an indication of reconciliation and peace between the two Koreas has been found in the area of sport. South and North Koreans have appeared together under the unification flag as a unified nation at the opening and/or closing ceremonies of several recent international sport events, such as the 2000 and 2004 Olympic Games, the 2006 Winter Olympics, the 2002 Asian Games, and the 2003 Winter Asian Games (13 October 2005, The Kyunghyang Shinmun). Improved relations between the two Koreas have also been confirmed on an individual level, as evidenced by South Koreans’ tremendous support for North Korean delegates during the 2004 Athens Olympics and the preliminary football matches for the 2006 World Cup.

As discussed in chapter 4, international sport events, most notably the Olympic Games, are employed as vehicles through which nations demonstrate their nationhood, cultures and power. They have also been conceptualised as an arena in which nations gain international recognition of their existence from global viewers. In this regard, the Olympics were found to have a two-fold in significance. The research findings suggested that the Games confirmed to several interviewees the ongoing significance of
the division of the Korean peninsula. It reminded Park Chang-sun, greatly sympathetic with North Koreans, of the separate statehood of North Korea:

   We think that North Korea is not a separate country but part of us as [we are] the same people. But at the Olympics, I come to recognise it as a [separate] nation.

Park seemed to believe in the idea of one nation on the Korean peninsula and identified North Korea as belonging to her ‘we-group’. The Olympics, however, awoke her to another reality. Acknowledging North Korea as a separate Olympic participant, most of the interviewees expressed their keen interest in North Korean matches and participants and wished them well. A friendly mood between the South and the North in Athens was reported on numerous occasions, one of which was the sharing of a practice court. Park Chang-sun spoke of the news with delight:

   I hear that when we hire practice court, we practice together with North Korean players. Especially in table tennis and judo. In the past, there may be tension because they are from the North. But nowadays, [South and North Korean] players are very very close to each other and inquire after each other when they meet. I really like that.

Smith (1990: 186; 1991) suggests that there may be ‘a form of nationalism’, which, ‘coupled with political goals of regional peace and prosperity’, ‘may afford a basis for the rise of regional cultures’. He has in mind the so-called ‘Pan’ nationalisms’, which is defined as:

   [T]he attempt to unify in a single political community several, usually contiguous, states on the basis of common cultural characteristics or a ‘family of culture’ (1990: 186).
Some historical examples of this type of nationalism include ‘Pan-Turkism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism and to a lesser degree Pan-Latin Americanism’ (Smith, 1990: 186). A case in point in sport has been presented by Vidacs (2000), who has explored Cameroonians’ pan-African identification.

According to her research (2000), after Cameroon was eliminated from the World Cup Finals in 1994, Cameroonians quickly shifted their allegiance to Nigeria, the only remaining African nation in the competition, despite a continuing border dispute Cameroon had had with Nigeria. She reasons:

Cameroonians’ shift of allegiance was a reflection of ‘Africans’ perception of a commonality of fate vis-à-vis Europe, which is the product of their colonial history, of being dominated and exploited by Europe (2000: 113).

She contends (2000) that it is also a reflection of their recognition of the continuing structural imbalance and inequality between themselves, and Europe and the United States today’. As such, ‘sport, and especially football’, she claims (2000: 112), ‘incites the loyalties of people on various levels’. Vidacs concludes (2000) that an inclusive Pan-Africanist sentiment can, thus, coexist as an available identity choice for Cameroonians, together with nationalist and ethnic sentiments depending on situations.

Smith’s concept of pan-nationalism offers a valuable framework to analyse South Koreans’ perceptions of North Korean players and/or teams during the Athens Olympic Games and the World Cup qualifying matches. The South Koreans’ behaviour can be understood in light of a ‘pan-Korean’ identification, which embraced North Korea as ‘us’. During the Olympics, many South Koreans at the stadia in Athens or in front of their televisions in South Korea are reported to have supported North Korean delegates with great zeal. For example, during the regional qualifying matches for the 2006
Football World Cup, some of the North Korean matches were broadcasted live in South Korea, almost an unprecedented treatment, and the matches were followed closely and extensively by the South Korean media, reflecting, and reflected by, ever more favourable relationships with the North.

The pan-Korean identification was found to be pervasive among the interviewees. First of all, North Korean matches at the Olympics were watched and closely followed by many of them. “I always watch North Korean matches” said Hwang Hee-sun. Perhaps more shockingly, for a match between South Korea and North Korea, Park Chang-sun professed her equal support for both sides: “when players from the South and the North play against each other, I will support both of them. I do not care who wins”. The defeat of North Korean judo player Gye Soon-hee at the final made Kim Jung feel “very sorry”. During the World Cup preliminary stages, the North Korean team received a surprising amount of interest and support from both the media and the public in South Korea. The phrase ‘[the South and the North], let’s go to Germany together’ was routinely repeated by the media and many South Koreans as Lee Jung-ran pointed out:

People of our nation want North Korea to qualify, as well as us. We want the South and the North go to the World Cup together. We very much hope North Korea to do well.

During the focus group and individual interviews, several news clips reporting on North Korean delegates or the North Korean football squad were shown to the interview participants. The front page of The Sportsseoul on 17 August 2004 featured the smiling faces of South Korean judo player Lee Won-hee and North Korea’s Gye Soon-hee, side by side with a large heading ‘Well done! Lee Won-hee, Sorry! Gye Soon-hee’ (Appendix 1). This positioning of the headlines implied that Lee’s
acquisition of a gold medal and Gye’s silver were relatively equal. The news article displayed another heading ‘Gold, Silver’ in an enormous yellow font, together with a subheading ‘Both Brother and Sister from South and North won medals’. Gye Soon-hee again appeared in the second page of the same newspaper in a medium-sized photo in a pose after receiving the silver medal, waving her right hand, smiling, towards a large number of frantic South Koreans supporters with a huge South Korean national flag before them (Appendix 2). Its subtitle says, ‘Gye Soon-hee: “South Koreans, I thank you for your support”’.

Furthermore, On 25 March, 2005, during the World Cup preliminary matches, a large article in The Sportsseoul presented a large-sized picture of the North Korean football players’ practicing (Appendix 3). The article had a big-font heading: “North Korea: “Hey, Bahraini and Iranian folks, Do not dream of snatching win in Pyung-yang [the capital of North Korea]” in North Korean dialect. As well, The Sportsseoul for 26 March 2005 dedicated the entire front page to reporting on the North Korean squad, who had just lost to Bahrain. A gigantic bold italic heading exclaimed ‘Ah! North Korea’, and the subheading announced ‘2-1 loss to Bahrain, North Korea in crisis’ (Appendix 4). A large photo of a North Korean player stumbling surrounded by three opponents was indicative of North Korea’s small chance of qualifying for the Finals. More than half of the second page of the same newspaper also featured North Korea. A group of dejected North Korean supporters with a large North Korean national flag in front of them were seen with the caption, ‘Well played but...’ (Appendix 5). Another media extract presented to the interviewees was from The Sport Chosun on 31 March 2005, which captured a big photo of the delighted South Korean squad after scoring a goal against Uzbekistan. Shown next to it is a smaller size of a photo of the North Korean players protesting to the referee for not awarding a penalty kick to them. North
Korea lost that match to Iran, further limiting their chance for qualification. The heading for that article said, “Sang-am smile wipes Pyung-yang tears” (Appendix 6). Sang-am is the name of a football stadium in Seoul, and it is synonymous with South Korean football whereas Pyung-yang is the capital of North Korea.

Compared to media images before the thawing mood began in the mid 1990s, these representations of North Koreans were strikingly favourable and positive, highlighting intimate ties between the two Koreas. Park Sang-kyung was astonished at the drastic and rapid changes in the manner of the South Korean newspapers’ reports on North Korea. More than anything, however, the fact that the North Korean news was on the front page of a South Korean newspaper could be considered quite shocking. However, it surprised very few of my interviewees and hardly anyone found such attention excessive. The women’s sense of pan-Korean identification and ethnic ties was found to be powerful enough to allow them to readily imagine and embrace the idea of one nation on the Korean peninsula. Jung Eun-sung, 31-year-old self-proclaimed nationalist, was convinced that these types of representations were only natural because “It [North Korea] is our sister country. It’s our country. We are sisters naturally” (her emphasis). For the same reason, she wholeheartedly welcomed the phrase “Sang-am smile wipes Pyung-yang tears” as it was “talking about reconciliation”:

Sang-am and Pyung-yang are the symbols of football of the South and the North respectively. But this means more [than that]. It’s like saying that we should become the relation that could offer comfort and be comforted by each other.

“I think it’s natural” was the most repeated sentiment and remark concerning the North Korea-related news extracts. The general lack of comments on those media clips was astounding to me. However, it was not because they did not have things to say about
North Korea. In fact, discussions of the North were one of the most popular topics that many participants engaged in very actively, willingly and enthusiastically. Their lack of responses or relative silence, therefore, can perhaps best be understood in the context of pan-Korean identification. Jung Eun-sung’s remarks above were representative of most interviewees, who found the ‘favourable’ images of the North Korean players and team simply ‘natural’. Those favourable representations were received by the women in a rather taken-for-granted manner, as a natural phenomenon that they felt no need to justify or explain. Their readings of the North Korea-related news articles again revealed their conscious or subconscious belief in one nationhood.

All of these rhetoric and the readings of the news extracts foregrounded the women’s strong sense of pan-Korean identification based on their perceived ethnic ties. Hobsbawm proclaims (1990: 168) that ‘the call of ethnicity or language provides no guidance to the future at all’. However, Hastings (1997) and Smith (1991, 1998) are critical of Hobsbawm’s lack of understanding of the relation between ethnicity and nationhood. What is ethnicity then? Hastings defines it as:

An ethnicity is a group of people with a shared cultural identity and spoken language. It constitutes the major distinguishing element in all pre-national societies, but may survive as a strong subdivision with a loyalty of its own within established nations (1997: 3).

‘An ethnicity’, he goes on to argue (1997: 169), ‘is in origin constituted by, more than anything else, a genetic unity, partly real, partly mythical’. The interview participants’ belief in this ‘partly mythical’ ethnicity was found to have a formidable influence on their perceptions of North Koreans. As mentioned earlier, South Koreans are taught that, throughout their history, ‘Koreans’ had fought and defended their country, having never surrendered their nation to any other until 1910 and as such had always
successfully defended and preserved their unique culture, language, traditions and
ethnicity. As Manzenreiter and Horne point out (2002: 19), ‘The claim of a monolithic
culture can easily be repudiated when the manifold encounters and exchanges with
China are taken into account’. Nevertheless, the belief in the single ethnicity, language,
culture and history has continued to have a stronghold, feeding the imagination of one
nationhood in the minds of the many interviewees as Park Chang-sun claimed: “it
[North Korea] too is our country although we may be divided on the map”.

The 5 youngest interview participants, who were 19-year-old undergraduate students
at the time of the interviews, displayed the least emotional attachment to the North. Cho
Soo-jung had no sense of identification with North Koreans; therefore, she did not
necessarily root for North Korean delegates during the Olympics. Wie ji-sook
expressed a mediocre support for the North by saying, “It’s better if they win than other
nations win”. None of these five women believed the South and the North constituted
one nation. Hwang Hoo-sun and Jung Kyung-soo preferred the present separate
statehood and did not wish for unification. This was, however, for 31-year-old Lee Mi-
ra, a central concern. Lee, whose father was from the North, was particularly
sentimental about the issue:

My father’s hometown is in the North, so I know a little bit about how
sad it is not to be able to visit one’s hometown. But after my generation,
my next generation may not know such remorse and pain. It [the
division] is nation’s sadness. They may not consider we [people in the
South and the North] are the same people. Before it’s too late, before
people forget, I hope we unite as one nation.
She also remarked, “People say blood is thicker than water. Although we are separated, I find it’s very moving to support [North Koreans] as *our own people*” (my emphasis). For her, North Koreans were undoubtedly ‘our own people’.

Alter claims (1989: 67) that when ‘the cultural nation and the state are not allowed to be identical, people can only feel resentment’. ‘A culturally and linguistically homogeneous people’, he goes on to argue (1989: 67), ‘loses its liberty and its identity if it is divided between different states’. Remorse and resentment were certainly discerned from several women regarding the division of the Korean peninsula as Alter suggests; however, not everyone was sorry for the current division although many were sympathetic towards North Koreans. Moreover, also contrary to Alter’s assertion, the division did not engender the loss of identification for the interviewees. Certainly, they were confused as some regarded North Korea primarily as a foe and some others as their own, while many were unable to establish a clear-cut definition of the North. However, the division clearly provided the women with another identity option, which is a pan-Korean identification, thus broadening their identity choices. In addition, the women’s construction of the meanings of North Korea unveiled the coexistence of contradicting or conflicting identities not only among the interviewees but also in oneself, which Weeks (1990) argues to be a characteristic of today’s identity politics. In all these debates, nevertheless, an ethnic tie was repeatedly implied, uttered and emphasised by a number of participants including those who preferred separate statehood.

It is thus ethnicity-bound pan-Korean identification by which the women related themselves to North Koreans. The majority of the interviewees, including even those who expressed fear or hostility towards the North, hoped to see North Korea win or do
well. Their reason for their support for North Korean players and teams seemed to require no explanation as it was seen as ‘natural’.

Kim Jung rhetorically asked:

Isn’t it natural? I think it’s natural. Although living in different systems, I don’t think they are ‘other.’ When I saw we [South Koreans] are rooting for them, I was very much moved. I felt, ‘Ah, we are the same people (my emphasis).

According to Smith (1998), this ‘feltness’ is an underlying force in the formation of a nationhood. He argues:

The concept of the nation is not only an abstraction and invention, as is so often claimed; it is also felt, and felt passionately, as something very real, a concrete community, in which we may find some assurance of our own identity and even, through our descendants, of our immortality (1998: 140; my emphasis).

Modernists’ conception of the nation as a recent social construct clearly falls short in accounting for South Koreans’ sentiments towards North Korea because the relevance of ethnic ties and shared history was repeatedly mentioned in the interviews. The next section will explore the women’s perceptions of their Government’s bountiful aid to North Korea and what it could ultimately mean in their national dream.

5.3.2 Hope for Unification

As discussed above, many of the interviewees articulated an ethnic bond to North Korea through their passionate support for North Korean delegates at the Olympics and its football team during the World Cup qualifying stages. It was also expressed through their support for their Government’s aid to North Korea, whose famine is internationally notorious. The BBC reports have revealed (27 May 2005; 27 October
that the regime has been severely suffering from a famine that has killed up to 2 million since the mid-1990s due to natural disasters and bad economy. Over the years, South Korean Governments have been pouring cash, rice, corn, wheat, fertiliser, cement and other materials into the North even though the controversial issues surrounding North Korea’s nuclear weapons remain. South Korean Governments have also assisted North Korea in times of catastrophes. For example, when the North Korean town Ryong-chon suffered a massive explosion in April 2004, which saw at least 161 deaths and over 1,300 injuries, the South Korean Government provided the North with all of the requested items, estimated to be worth up to U$25 million. This was four times higher than the total aid offered from the rest of the international community (29 April 2004, The Korea Times). Many South Koreans are supportive of the Government’s aid to the North. Indeed, 6 out of 10 South Koreans are said to consider the current level of their Government assistance to North Korea adequate or even insufficient (31 March 2004, The Korea Times).

Sport is one area that South Korea has provided aid to North Korea over the years. A newspaper extract shown to the interviewees during the individual interviews featured the [South] Korean Football Research Centre, one of whose main projects was to help North Korean football in various manners and promote relations with the North (15 March 2005, The Sportsseoul). The news article reported on humanitarian aid provided by the Centre to North Korea including the sponsorship of football products and national uniforms for its squad. Social worker Kim Jung-jin, who was a severe critic of the Communist regime among the interview participants, expressed her disapproval of aid to the North in general. However, it soon became clear that she felt for North Koreans who were suffering under that regime. She sympathised, “They [North Koreans] shouldn’t be living like that”, and approved, although reluctantly, of
South Korea’s aid to the North in sport: “because we are the only one they could rely on, I agree we should [help them]” (my emphasis). Her sense of obligation was thus predicated upon the ethnic tie she perceived the South shares with the North.

In the focus group and individual interviews, several women suspected the North Korean Government’s misuse of the South’s provision, by purchasing military artillery, instead of feeding its people. Nevertheless, the general consensus was approval, almost entirely grounded upon their sense of an ethnicity-based bond and belonging to ‘one nation’. Park Sang-kyung, for instance, was in great favour of South Korea’s assistance:

Because we are much better off. As part of [former President] Kim Dae-jong’s ‘Sunshine Policy’, [late Hyundai Group CEO] Jung Joo-young gave cows and etc [to the North] and we have been assisting them [North Korea] a lot through the Mt. Keum-gang project. I do not have any objection to such aid. I believe we should become one nation some day and that, only when the gap between the South and the North is reduced, will the time come. I rather hope that we increase the amount of aid.

The interviewees’ sense of moral obligation to North Korea stemmed largely from the fact that South Korea is ‘much better off’ economically. Strictly speaking, South Korea’s economic superiority to North Korea does not necessarily follow that it is morally strongly obliged to offer unconditional help to the North other than through humanitarian good will. The bridge was an ethnic tie as Lee Mi-ra acutely and succinctly pointed out: “if they were Japanese, would we do that? Of course, we wouldn’t. Would we do such things if they were the U.S? No.” The profound belief in the single ethnicity, which may or may not be true, was thus found to move the women deeply and gear their political acts in favour of North Koreans.
South Korea’s bountiful provision in sport is also found in that it has assumed full financial responsibility in recent years in co-marching with the North at international sport events. Reflecting the thawing mood between the two Koreas, recent years have witnessed the joint entry of the two Koreas under a unified flag at the opening and/or closing ceremonies of major international sport contests, such as the Olympics or Asian Games. However, South Korea has been said to be the sole provider of all the expenses. Kim Hyo-sung, who felt the need to showcase to the world the ethnic-relatedness of the two Koreas, regarded the “co-marching with North Korea” was “important because we then can let the world know that we are the same people and same country”. She, therefore, approved of the South Korean Government’s benevolent gesture. Park Chang-sun was also in favour, for she perceived the co-entering as a golden opportunity to display to the world peace and reconciliation emerging in the Korean peninsula. Kim Jung, on the other hand, deemed South Korea’s current level of aid excessive; nevertheless, she approved of it:

I felt annoyed to hear that we had to finance everything to march together with the North [at the opening ceremony in Athens], North Korean delegates’ uniforms included. I thought we were trying too much. But if we think about it in the long term, it’s necessary, I think.

What Kim suggested here was apparently the unification of the two Koreas. Indeed, a survey poll, conducted among over 1,000 university students in Seoul in November 2005, revealed that 68.6% hoped South and North Koreas would be united while only 18.2% wanted the current division to continue (7 December 2005, The Hankyoreh). Many of the interviewees also considered unification is the ultimate future for the two Koreas. Therefore, South Korea’s aid was seen as a necessary path to unification or less hostile relations between the two Koreas.
Through aid, unification can be achieved without much shock or collision. East and West Germanies had plenty of exchanges prior to unification, but they still underwent hard time when they united. What we are doing is to lessen shock that would come in the future. How much we give to the North is fine by me. Even if we couldn’t become one nation, when such aid or exchanges take place, it will lead us at least to a situation where we won’t try to kill each other (Park Chang-sun).

This sympathy, compassion and sacrifice cannot be convincingly explained by the propaganda of politicians and intellectuals, or invented traditions as Hobsbawm insists (1990), ‘unless ritual and propaganda expressed and amplified pre-existing popular sentiments which saw the ethnic nation as the family’ (Smith, 1998: 130).

It has to be noted that, although the sense of ‘distance’ many South Koreans feel about the North has been considerably diminished in recent years, it is undeniable that North Korea is still at times regarded by many as the ‘Other’. The interviewees routinely characterised North Korea as an undeserving, foxy, self-centred, distrustful, greedy liar. “They just take, take, take [from us] and return nothing [to us]”, said Lee Jung-ran; “they say we are the same people only when they need something from us,” Lee Mi-ra complained; “sometimes I trust them and some other times I don’t” admitted Kim Hyun-sook. What was striking was that, after all these outcries and discontent, the rhetoric would often return to the ethnic tie with the North Koreans. Lee Jung-ran’s statement was perhaps best testament to such sentiment. Accounting for her support for the aid to North Korea despite her sense of discontent over North Korea’s ungratefulness, she said: “but, no matter how mean your brother is, he is still your brother, and you should still be nice to him”.

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The difference between the South and the North was thus not forgotten or ignored. Kang Eun-jin recounted her acquaintance’s recent visit to North Korea and his realisation of the considerable differences between the South and the North. She, accordingly, warned:

They [North Koreans] may speak the same language as us and they may look like us in appearance. But when you actually meet them and talk with them, the difference is huge.

Kang was, however, sanguine and hoped that sport would help or facilitate the mood of unification:

It will take a very long time to overcome [such differences]. Things like sport help. Their role is very significant. Sport makes us feel closer to them. There is hardly any other chance to meet them.

Underlying in her remark was a sense of the need to eradicate the difference as much as possible. Discussions on North Korea clearly revealed many women’s regret over the ‘reality’ - the division - and more importantly, their hope for the eradication of the differences between the South and the North and for the ‘national’ dream of unification. Sport, in this picture, was viewed as playing a critical role as it provides one of the very rare opportunities to feel a ‘pan-Korean’ identification.

5.3.3 Summary

Smith argues (1998) that the modernists’ emphasis on imagination or imagined community fails to adequately account for a strong sense of identification people feel for their nation. While defining the nation as a historic community that has shared history, culture, tradition, myth and memories, he places a particular significance on ethnic ties that the majority of the community members share. The interview findings
indicated a strong sense of ethnicity among many of the participants, which generated a pan-Korean identity. North Korea is a source of ambiguity for many South Koreans. On the one hand, it is perceived as the ‘Other’, which threatens South Koreans’ survival, but on the other hand, it generates a deep sense of belonging based on an ethnic tie. Noteworthy is that these opposite perspectives and sentiments coexist among the interviewees and also in oneself. Moreover, the nation and nationhood imagined by many women were inclusive of North Korea, which implied an ultimate dream of unification for their and their nation’s future. This was articulated on various levels, one of which was through their support for North Korean delegates at the Athens Olympics and for its football team during the World Cup qualifying matches. A number of the women were delighted, sorry, sad or sympathetic over North Korea’s success or failure in the sporting events. Sport was, thus, found to remind, foreground and at the same time refute the reality of ‘one nation, two states’ on the Korean peninsula, frustrating and encouraging many women’s hope for ‘one nation, one state’.

While North Korea can move in and out of the ‘Other’ boundary rather freely in relation to situations, Japan cannot. Japan has also been one of South Korea’s prime ‘Other’ throughout Korean/South Korean history, and that perception was solidified by its annexation of Korea in the early 20th century. Furthermore, the current political tension between South Korea and Japan has also greatly intensified this perception. In the next sections, Japan will be investigated as South Korea’s ‘Other’, which has shaped South Koreans’ consciousness a great deal. The meaning of Japan to the women and its influence on their identities will be examined.
5.4 South Korea and Japan: Their Different Positionings

5.4.1 Eternal ‘Other’ Japan

Triandafyllidou (1998) relates the importance of the ‘significant other’ to the construction of national identity. Claiming that ‘the history of each nation is marked by the presence of significant others’, she (1998: 600) defines ‘significant other’ as ‘another nation or ethnic group’ that ‘threatens, or rather is perceived to threaten, its ethnic and/or cultural purity and/or its independence’. Historically, Japan has been perceived as a threat to the national defence and identity of Korea and South Korea. Numerous invasions from Japan throughout Korean history and the Japanese annexation in 1910 have formed and reinforced South Koreans’ perception of Japan as their ‘significant other’, endangering South Korea’s independence and sovereignty. Furthermore, political tension between South Korea and Japan in recent years has strengthened such a popular perception. Spring 2005 saw the re-surfacing of political turbulence between the two neighbours, shaking their ever-fragile relations.

First of all, it was provoked by the Japanese Government’s claim to the ownership of Dok-do, an inhabited tiny island situated in the East Sea. Long regarded by South Koreans as former Korea’s and now South Korea’s territory, Japanese Governments’ successive claims to the island, which has been persistent in recent years, once again flared up bitter resentment and an outpouring of anti-Japanese feelings in South Korean. This time, the signal was a Japanese provincial council’s push to designate “Takeshima Day” (Takeshima is the name Japan calls Dok-do) on its calendar in an attempt to bolster its claim to the islets. Coupled with the Dok-do issue, the Japanese Government’s involvement in Japanese schools’ selection of their history textbook was
regarded as posing a threat to South Koreans. The fierce disputes between South Korea and Japan were ignited again when the Japanese Government in April 2005 approved, as available choices for Japanese schools, of textbooks that described Dok-do as islets belonging to Japan.

Written by a group of right-wing nationalist scholars, the ‘‘Fusosha’’ textbook, was heavily criticised in South Korea when it was first published in 2001. Its revised 2005 version, which was to be used from 2006 if they were to be selected by schools, was considered to glorify Japan’s colonial past more cunningly than the first version. Japanese colonial rule banned Koreans from using their own language in public places and forced them to adopt Japanese names; hundreds of thousands of Koreans were also mobilised as forced labourers for Japan, all of which the textbooks allegedly failed to mention (13 March 2005, The Korea Times). The internationally recognised issue of so-called ‘‘Comfort Women’’ – the use of c.130,000 young girls and women from Korea, China and other Asian nations as forced sex slaves for Japanese soldiers during the colonial rule (Buckley, 2000; McCormack, 2002) – was also omitted in the revised textbooks as the theme was deemed to be ‘‘not appropriate’’ to teach to young Japanese students (13 March 2005, The Korea Times).

Furthermore, Japan’s then Prime Minister Koizumi’s repeated visits to, and worship of, Yasukuni shrine, a memorial in central Tokyo, had been the subject of dispute in South Korea and China. As The New York Times reported (18 October, 2005), Yasukuni is not merely a memorial to Japan’s 2.5 million war dead. The shrine and its accompanying museum are considered to promote an unapologetic view of Japan’s atrocity-scarred rampages through Korea, much of China and Southeast Asia during the first few decades of the 20th century. Koizumi’s open and repeated visits to the shrine were, therefore, widely interpreted by South Koreans as Japan’s desire to perpetuate the
imperialist legacy and use it as fertiliser to make Japan a military power and, therefore, compete for supremacy in East Asia.

Hastings notes (1997: 3) that ‘nationalism arises where and when a particular ethnicity or nation feels itself threatened in regard to its own proper character, extent or importance’. For South Koreans, who have been demanding Japan rethink its history, the Japanese Government’s renewed claim to Dok-do and its continued refusal to acknowledge responsibility for the atrocities it committed during the colonial period, as well as the Prime Minister’s visits to Yasukuni, were seen as the signals of Japan’s dangerous aggression towards their nation. Naturally, it rekindled nationwide strong anti-Japanese sentiments in South Korea, further aggravating diplomatic friction between the two countries on both civil and governmental levels. As a result, a series of street protests and sabotages of Japanese goods were organised nationwide.

On a governmental level, in early April 2005 before the U.N. General Assembly in New York, Kim Sam-hoon, South Korea’s ambassador to the United Nations, openly opposed an increase in permanent members on the Security Council, initiating a pointed bid to block Japan from gaining a seat on the powerful international body (8 April, 2005, The Korea Times). Moreover, the South Korean Government cancelled President Roh Moo Hyun’s visit to Japan, which was scheduled for December 2005 and pledged that no summit talks would occur between the two countries during Koizumi’s remaining days in the office. Thus, the strained relationship between South Korea and Japan in the spring of 2005 was recorded as at its worst since World War II (30 December 2005, The Kukmin Ilbo).

As McCormack (2002) notes, after 20 years of frozen antagonism following Korea’s independence from Japan in 1945, South Korea and Japan established diplomatic, economic and political relations in 1965. However, as he points out:
Absent was the dimension of forgiveness, mutual understanding and respect at the people’s level, and recognition of the suffering of countless individual victims (2002: 33).

‘The issues’, he continues (2002: 33), ‘have remained unresolved, postponed for a half century, commonly forgotten in Japan while constituting a deep memory in South Korea’. The research findings also revealed strong hatred and aversion, together with envy and jealousy, towards Japan. Due to recurring political turbulence in the spring of 2005, such sentiments seemed ever more intense in the individual interviews, which were conducted during that particular period. Kim Jung spoke of her sense of bitterness:

When I think of Japan, the first thing that comes up to my mind is that ‘it is a very offending country’. Given everything from what has happened in the past and what is happening at the moment., I can’t like it [Japan].

Furthermore, Japan was also described as “infuriating,” (Lee Jung-ran) and “a dangerous country” (Sun Young-ran), and the Japanese were seen as “the people that harmed us” (Kim Jung-jin). Also interestingly, Lee Mi-ra, a frequent traveller overseas, reflected her irritation when she was asked in foreign countries if she was Japanese. She chided, “Why on earth Japanese when there are many other nations in Asia?” Her annoyance would have been much less if nationalities other than Japanese were mentioned. Japanese colonialism may have been a positive force in several respects, McCormack argues (2002). As he points out, it led to an increase in the population and social and economic transformation, it quickened modernisation and industrialisation, and established order (Lone and McCormack, 1993). These considerations are not, however, what is remembered first by South Koreans, he correctly perceives, but ‘humiliation’ is, together with:
The ‘crushing of Korea’s nationalist resistance, and the imposition of policies and practices designed to incorporate, assimilate, and thereby extinguish Korea as a separate political, national identity (2002: 33).

Crucially, ‘the psychological wounds of all this do not easily heal’, McCormack anticipates (2002: 33). In fact, in individual interviews conducted with 1,500 South Koreans of 20 years old or older in March 2005, 63% of them revealed their hatred towards Japan. It also confirmed South Koreans’ deep-seated distrust of Japan (27 April 05, The Dong-A Ilbo).

Such a sense of detestation and bitterness was articulated by several interviewees through their conscious and deliberate rejection of what was considered to be ‘Japanese’. Jung Eun-sung talked of her experience:

I liked Japanese stuff, Japanese dramas etc before. But looking at the Dok-do and the history distortion issues, I have come to think that, if I lose my culture, it’s like that I am losing my core spirit. So, even though I like their stuff, I consciously refuse to read or watch it.

Furthermore, ceramic artist Kim Hyun-sook, who speaks Japanese fluently and had travelled to Japan frequently, confessed her delight at the re-emergence of the Dok-do issue, for it could be the wake-up call for some South Koreans:

I was glad that the Dok-do issue was surfaced again. Young generations these days have become too Japanised. Even our children have become too familiarised with Japanese things, from cartoons to game consoles. They have become all Japanised. So many people are studying Japanese these days. To be able to read gossips on Japanese actors, singers in the magazines, they study Japanese. So when the Dok-do issue was brought up again, I felt like, ‘See? That’s Japanese people. Look closely’. I
should not feel like this, especially in the face of globalisation, but when it comes to Japan, I can’t help. I can’t be generous (my emphasis).

As Kim pointed out, Japanese cultural products, such as movies, dramas, songs and games have enjoyed great popularity in South Korea. However, South Korea had been the one of the few countries in the world ‘where Japanese cars were not to be seen, films viewed, song heard, novels and magazines bought and sold’ (McCormack, 2002: 35) until well into the 1990s’ because ‘Japanese’ products had been completely banned by the Government. Only from 1998, did South Korea remove the restrictions on Japanese cultural products through 4 stages, slowly, gradually and cautiously, with consideration for the South Koreans still obsessed with the nightmare of Japanese atrocities during Japan’s colonial rule. Yet, long before the deregulation, Japanese cultural products had penetrated deep into the lives of many South Koreans, particularly the younger, post-war generations with satellite broadcasting and the Internet. In the individual interview, Kim Hyun-sook deplored, “More than half of the cultures we have nowadays are Japanese. Much of what has become naturalised as ours is mostly Japanese, I think”. She considered the cultural invasion of Japan as a serious threat to South Korea’s ‘authentic’ cultures and future. Accordingly, she wished more South Koreans to reject consciously the consumption of Japanese cultural products. Kim Hyun-sook’s worries are precisely what Appadurai (1990) refers to when he points out that, for people of certain nations, Americanisation as a fearful homogenising force across the globe is less worrisome or threatening than other cultural absorption. Indonesianisation evokes much more anxiety and worry for the people of Irian Jaya, Japanisation for Koreans, Indianisation for Sri Lankans, Vietnamisation for Cambodians and Russianisation for the people of Soviet Armenia and the Baltic Republics (Appadurai, 1990).
The research findings revealed a strong ‘fear of cultural absorption’ (Appadurai, 1990: 295) and concerns over possible loss of ‘South Koreanness’ through Japanisation. The colonial rule in the early 20th century put the Koreans in danger of losing their language, culture, nation and identities, and Jung Eun-sung and Kim Hyun-sook considered South Koreans as again in a similar danger. Only this time it was worse because it appeared to be willing and voluntary, not forced. These anxieties and worries over the possible loss of their cultures, identities and therefore, future, led them to deliberately refuse to indulge themselves in Japanese cultural products and to rejoice in the resurfacing of the thorny political issues between South Korea and Japan. These women’s consciousness and struggles constitute South Korea’s ‘national culture’, according to Fanon (1963). The consumption of Japanese cultural products was their battleground to preserve their national character and identities.

5.4.2 Positioning Shaped by Colonial History

The grudge against Japan has instilled the ‘must-win’ mentality in many South Koreans and helped South Koreans hone their competitive edge, and this is often strongly felt in sport, especially in football. As J. Y. Lee (2002) examines, Koreans’ competitiveness in football rode high during the colonial rule, and it has since remained so. Dubbed as ‘the Britain and Ireland of East Asia’ (McCormack, 2002: 30), the fierce rivalry against Japan was found to be pervasive in the interviews, especially in football. Park Sang-kyung’s comment was exemplary:

We and them… inevitable relation. We have to go [to Germany], but, if Japan is going, then we must go. When we are in danger and they are doing well [in football], I get very upset. Japan is our comparison object (her emphasis).
The Japanese team’s misfortune or defeat would bring joy to Kim Hyun-sook, who unapologetically talked of her feelings, “Because we have so much [against Japan] throughout history, I so hope it [Japan] loses. When I hear Japan has lost, I feel very happy”. ‘Othering’ Japan was reinforced as the Japanese were said to wish for South Korea’s loss. Kim Jung-jin said: “Japan wished us to lose. When I heard it, I thought, ‘we are inevitably old enemy’. I don’t like Japan to win either”. Proud of South Korea holding Asia’s best records at the World Youth Football Competition in 1983 and the FIFA World Cup Finals in 2002, Jung Eun-sung hoped South Korea would maintain its superiority over Japan.

The interviewees’ intense rivalry with Japan was also easily discerned from the focus group interviews, conducted during the Athens Olympics. Of Japan’s success at swimming at the Games, Shin Mi-sook displayed her envy and annoyance, along with disappointment at the South Korean swimmers:

At this Olympics, Japan did quite well in swimming. I was a bit upset by it. Although we could also do as well as they did, we didn’t do well. I want to win over them [the Japanese] [in swimming].

A sense of competitiveness against Japan was also routinely repeated regarding the Olympic rankings, which, as discussed in chapter 4, was commonly considered to indicate national power and standing in the international community. Yang Hye-ran exhibited her strong sense of rivalry against Japan: “we have to be better than Japan”.

Manzenreiter and Horne speculate (2002) that, for many South Koreans, losing against Japan may be a greater humiliation than harsh regulations imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) when South Korean was hit by the economic crisis in the late 1990s. No matter whether or not this is a true reflection of South Koreans’ attitudes
towards Japan, such mentality and sentiment do exist and, June Eun-sung defined them as “inevitable Korean grudge”.

Hall’s conceptualisation (1990) of cultural identities as a product of discourses of history, power and culture is insightful into understanding the ‘inevitable Korean grudge’. According to Hall (1990: 226), cultural identities are ‘the points of identification’, ‘which are made, within the discourses of history and culture. Not an essence but a positioning’. That is, cultural identities are another name for a positioning, which has been shaped by ‘the narratives of the past’ (1990: 225), which is always constructed through memory, fantasy, narrative and myth’ (1990: 226). Only from this position, he concludes (1990), can the traumatic character of the colonial experience be properly understood. Indeed, it is this ‘positioning’, from which C.L.R James rhetorically casts the poignant question: ‘what do the British people know of what they have done there [British colonies]? Precious little’, says he (1969, 33). ‘Cultural identities’, Hall insists (1990: 225), ‘come from somewhere and have histories’. James’ cultural identities, Hall would argue, have come from Trinidad’s colonial history and power relations Trinidad has had with its former ruler. It is also his own positioning, shaped by Algeria’s colonial past, from which Fanon inspirationally talked of the anti-colonial struggle in The wretched of the earth (1963).

The grudge or sentiments over Japan displayed by many women interviewed have largely come from Korea’s colonial past. It is a product of the historical and political, as well as power, relations that Korea and South Korea have had with Japan throughout history. The colonial past has initially positioned the interviewees as the invaded and oppressed, and the continuing (unequal) power relations between South Korea and Japan have reinforced their positions as such. Today, the interviewees found themselves to be in a familiar position, once again as the victims of Japan’s aggression and political
ambition and as the invaded and harmed, by the former oppressor. It is from this perspective that the women’s antipathy to, and fierce rivalry against, Japan can be properly understood.

5.4.3 Positioning Shifts

Can one’s cultural identities change? Can her positioning shift? Hall’s response is affirmative, when he argues (1990: 225) that cultural identities are ‘not something which already exists, transcending place, time, history and culture’. Since he argues for cultural identities being culture-and-history specific as such, he is simultaneously opening up the possibility for shifts or transformations in cultural identities and positioning. Indeed, he asserts (1990: 225) that cultural identities are a matter of ‘becoming’, as well as of ‘being’, that is, they are a process, subjected to the continuous ‘play’ of history, culture and power.

The research findings detected changes in the women’s positionings in relation to Japan. South Korea’s economic growth and the popularity of ‘the Korean Wave’ across and beyond Asia were found to have considerably boosted many of the women’s self and national estees. Lee Mi-ra, for instance, spoke of her pleasant surprise to witness South Korea’s fame and popularity in Singapore and many others spoke about the great popularity of South Korean actors, movies and television dramas in Japan. The global recognition and prestige endowed upon South Korea and its cultural products not only had heightened a sense of national pride but also had provided a new context and opportunity to reconstruct identities for the interviewees. Kim Yong-jin was delighted at the success of the Korean Wave:

If we take a look at the ‘Yon-sa-ma [Japanese nickname for a South Korean actor] boom’ in Japan, through a single star Bae Yong-joon they
[the Japanese] wish to have been born in Korea, visit our country and
learn our language. Like this, it [the Korean Wave] has produced a
considerable value.

The interviewees’ cultural identities were found to have changed and be in the
constant process of remaking due to the shifting landscapes of South Korea’s economy
and culture, and of its power relations with Japan. With their growing confidence in
themselves and their nation, they were reconstructing the meanings and values of their
existence in relation to Japan, thus re-producing their cultural identities and positioning
against Japan.

Confident and empowered by relations being reshaped between South Korea and
Japan, a number of women called for a new attitude towards, and new perspective of,
Japan. Amid prevalent aversion or antagonistic sentiments, many women demanded
that the South Korean Government and South Koreans approach Japan and Japan-
related issues more rationally and reasonably. Arguing against jingoism, Lee Mi-ra
stated:

I don’t think we should dislike [Japanese stuff] because of our relation to
Japan. We should accept what’s good for us and reject what’s not. It’s
totally not necessarily to reject things only because they are from certain
countries.

Sun Young-ran also called for more open-minded, mature and diplomatic attitudes
towards Japan:

We can’t just drop all the relations we have with Japan now. I think
responding to Japanese people too emotionally is problematic. When a
Japanese official say something indiscreet, we just need to respond
diplomatically. But mistreating Japanese people [because of that] is wrong.

In addition, while some of the interview participants deliberately refused to consume Japanese cultures, more women prioritised their personal preferences, tastes or values over their antagonism to Japan in their consumer choices. In other words, they did not intentionally avoid consuming Japanese cultural products simply because they were Japanese. Park Sang-kyung, who exhibited strong rivalry against Japan in sport, professed her inclination to Japanese movies, dramas and books:

I don’t feel resistance to things only because they are Japanese. I often watch Japanese movies. When I watch them, I realise our sensitivities are quite similar, compared to western movies. A lot of books I read happen to be [written by] Japanese authors. Reading them, I feel their emotions and sentiments are very similar to ours.

Lee Mi-ra also admitted to an interest in Japan: “I hate it [Japan]. But honestly, Japan is one of the countries I like to visit.” Or, at least, the women did not have to choose one national sentiment over another all the time. Yang Hye-ran, for example, would not let her nationalism determine or dictate her consumption of Japanese cultural products; her sense of rivalry against Japan was found to have influence only in sport. Thus, many of the interviewed women displayed that their nationalistic sentiments could easily give way and be swayed by many factors in their daily routines.

These findings supported Hastings’ argument (1997) that national value or nationalist sentiment does not always take priority in people’s lives and that other values or loyalty may claim their prior recognition. Weeks’ assertion (1990) of the co-existence of contradictory or conflicting identities in oneself also provides insight. As society has become ever more complex in contemporary society, he maintains (1990:
people increasingly live with ‘a variety of potentially contradictory identities’, which battle within them for allegiance. Then, the above women’s willingness and preference for the consumption of Japanese cultures despite their antagonism towards Japan, and their fondness of Japan and yet fierce rivalry in sport, are characteristics of contemporary identity politics.

5.4.4 Two Koreas United against Old Enemy Japan

As discussed earlier, the mood of reconciliation between the two Koreas facilitated South Koreans’ strong support for North Korean delegates at the 2004 Olympics and for the North Korean football team throughout the World Cup qualifying stages. South Koreans’ support for the North Korean football squad became more enthusiastic especially during the final stage of the World Cup qualification because North Korea was grouped with Japan, along with Bahrain and Iran. It was also the time when strained relations between South Korea and Japan caused by the issues of Dok-do, the Japanese history textbooks and the then Japanese Prime Minister’s repeated visits to Yasukuni shrine fuelled anti-Japanese sentiments in South Korea.

The political tension between South Korea and Japan and anti-Japanese feelings were evident in the individual interviews, conducted during that particular period of political turmoil, highlighting a pan-Korean identity and strong ethnic ties. Moreover, a report that North Korea had publicly sided with the South against Japan’s claim to the ownership of Dok-do moved several women including Kim Hyun-sook to identify with the North more strongly:

Especially because of the Dok-do issue, I felt a lot closer to North Korea. When [Japan] insisted it be their land, North Korea publicly said, “It’s clearly South Korea’s. Your [Japan’s] insistence is absurd”. It
[North Korea] was on our side. Through that incident, I have built a bit more trust in the North.

Jung Eun-sung also expressed her delight at North Korea’s support:

The Dok-do issue is Japan’s psychological invasion. And many people were very delighted when the North stood by us on that issue. Throughout our history, outsiders’ invasions have always helped us to unite. Japan is just reminding that to us once again (italics my own).

Jung’s comment was particularly revealing in that it represented how North Korea was conceived. The ‘us’ in her comment was double-folded. It meant South Korea alone in the beginning but included North Korea later, indicative of the ambiguity of her perception of the nation and nationhood. The two women’s satisfaction and gratitude were articulated through their passionate support for the North Korean football team, particularly strongly against Japan, which was commonly declared as “our [South’s and North’s] common enemy” (Kim Jung-jin). Japan thus provided the women with an opportunity to construct or reinforce their pan-Korean identification and a strong sense of ethnic ties.

Support for North Korea was also demonstrated forcefully when North Korea encountered FIFA’s penalty for its crowd riot at the North Korea versus Iran match, held in Pyong-yang on 30 March 2005. By the time the individual interviews were completed, the FIFA had yet to finalise penalties on North Korea. In this circumstance, Japan, scheduled to meet North Korea in Pyong-yang for its next match in early June 2005, had been reported to be lobbying aggressively to change the venue for the match to a third country. Greatly sympathetic to North Korea, Park Chang-sun chided Japan as opportunistic, and Lee Jung-ran fiercely defended North Korea, arguing that it should
not be punished. Jung Eun-sung also decried Japan and demanded the issue be reviewed based on fairness and football regulations. She argued:

If North Korea should be penalised [for the crowd riot], the same rule should apply for Hooligan riots too. And, what? The match at a third country? There is no precedence of that sort.

These women had previously showed great sympathy for North Korea in the focus group interviews. In the individual interviews, their support for North Korea became augmented, and their pan-Korean identification was played out more intensely as the enemy was seen as ‘Korea’s’ old foe Japan. Japan was once again perceived as their cunning enemy that was endeavouring to manipulate the situation against their “half sister” North Korea (Jung Eun-sung). The ethnic tie was thus underlined and their idea of the nation and nationhood was imagined based on a pan-Korean identification.

5.4.5 Summary

Hall asserts (1990: 222) that identities are, not ‘already accomplished final products’, but a ‘production’, which is never complete, always in process’. The research findings indicated that the interviewed women’s cultural identities in relation to Japan were in constant re-making and their positionings in constant negotiation according to newly emerging relations of power, culture and history between the neighbouring countries. The women were attempting to establish new meanings and values regarding Japan and, therefore, their identities. It is an extremely positive change according to H. J., Jung (2005), who urges South Koreans to transcend a sense of injury and inferiority complex against Japan. Pointing out the foreign labourers largely from Southeast Asia who are working in South Korea, she warns (2005) that, when such feelings make up South Koreans’ consciousness, South Koreans’ ‘post-colonial’ future
is a far-fetched dream and that they are likely to become incapable of contemplating on their position as an offender.

5.5 Longing for an America with ‘Korean’ Character

Smith argues (1998) that people’s understanding of the close affinity between the nation and their interests, identities and survival is what makes them feel deeply bounded to their nation, which in turn generates devotion to, and sacrifice for, their nation. Understanding that connection is two-fold for South Koreans. Due to the perception of North Korea as the ‘Other’, which poses a threat to their national survival and their very own identities, South Koreans feel strongly bounded up to ‘South’ Korea and its survival. On the other hand, many of their hopes for unification, and a strong sense of pan-Korean identification based on ethnic ties encouraged them to become involved in North Korea’s destiny emotionally, psychologically and politically. North Korea’s interests and future are in this sense considered to have direct link to their own interests and future.

The interviewees’ strong desire for a powerful nation was discussed in chapter 4. Their hopes for South Korea to be recognised as one of world’s leading nations were displayed through their hopes to find their nation high up on the Olympic medals ranking. However, it was not simply a mighty nation they dreamed of. Their powerful nation had to possess certain qualities that were believed to convey positive South Koreanness, such as hard work, doing one’s best, humility, sincerity and fair play. My research findings from the discussions on North Korea revealed more depth to the women’s concept of an ideal nationhood.
On 10 February 2005 North Korea declared publicly for the first time that it possessed nuclear weapons. North Korea’s possession of the nuclear devices had long been speculated, nevertheless, the announcement alarmed the international community exceedingly. While the news sent a warning signal around the globe, many women in the individual interviews, which were conducted soon after the announcement, welcomed the news. Their warm welcome of the news was first of all derived from their belief that the nuclear weapons were aimed at other nations, not South Korea. Kim Jung was, therefore, defensive of North Korea’s possession of the ‘nuke’:

[When I heard the news] I didn’t feel frightened or feared. Instead, I wanted other nations to be feared. I don’t think the nuclear devices are to [destroy] us. It’s for self-protection against other nations.

That “other nations” included America, said Park Sang-kyung, who was also delighted at the news:

I was glad. Because it [the nuclear weapons] is to aim at the U.S., not us.

I thought, ‘they [North Koreans] are doing well to protect themselves’, and *I felt relieved* (my emphasis).

Furthermore, she chided international pressure and reprehension directed at North for its ‘nuke’ possession as a form of abuse of those who possess nuclear weapons. The defensiveness and relief these women expressed once again point to their strong identification with North Korea.

In fact, perceived as strong-willed, self-determined and independent, characteristics that South Korea was seen to be lacking by several women, North Korea was admired, respected and envied. “I like North Korea standing strong with its head high up. I wish our country does that too”, said Lee Jung-ran enviously. Jung Eun-sung agreed that:
I exclaimed, ‘Oh yes’ and I was very very glad to hear it [the news]. As a matter of fact, [North Korea] does what we [South Korea] cannot do. We pay too much attention to what other nations say about us and to us. But since the division, North Korea has lived, displaying its own determination. Honestly, we don’t do that.

North Korea’s perseverance in obtaining the nuclear weapons was thus greatly respected and appreciated, in contrast to South Korea’s lack of self-determination and autonomy. Several women, therefore, hoped that the two Koreas could and should unite and grow stronger together, complementing each other. South Korea may be considered economically superior to the North, but it was thought of as lacking self-determination or free will. The combination of the two Koreas’ capabilities was believed to be in South Korea’s best interest. Accordingly, Jung Eun-sung hoped for unification sooner rather than later. She enthused:

We have to unite soon. We tried to develop the nuclear device during Park’s administration [in the 70s] but failed to do that. Look how dangerously our country is positioned. China and Japan, and even the U.S., a far distanced country, tell us what to do. In such a situation, we have to develop device to protect ourselves.

This remark revealed Jung’s sense of frustration with her Government’s inability to challenge America’s interference in South Korea’s internal affairs. It also revealed her wishes for her nation to be capable of self-protection. One of the best ways to “to protect ourselves” would be for South Korea to own nuclear artillery as Park Sang-kyung wished: “I wish that somewhere in our country, someone is secretly developing nuclear weapons”. Since it seemed very unlikely, the next best option was seen to be to unite with the North and share its nuclear device. North Korea’s announcement of the
nuclear weapons frightened Yang Hye-soo but, interestingly conveyed comfort, relief or satisfaction to all other individual interview participants. Unification was commonly argued to empower ‘Korea’ just like “Germany has become stronger after East and West Germanies united” (Lee Mi-ra). Thus, the announcement highlighted the women’s hopes for a powerful nation, as well as their ethnicity-based sense of belonging to North Korea.

The interviewees’ longing for a powerful nation was also detected from their wishes to participate in the Olympic Games as a single nation. The two Koreas once fielded unified teams for the World Table Tennis Championships and the FIFA World Youth Championship in 1991 (8 September 2005, The Kyunghyang Shinmun; 28 March 2007, The JoongAng Ilbo), but have never unified for bigger international sport contests, such as the Olympics or the Asian Games. Kim Hyun-sook hoped for a unified team for the Olympic Games because she believed that she would then, “feel there would be nothing we couldn’t do”. A unified team was likewise claimed to empower South Korea at the Olympics. As such wishes had yet to be realised, Kim Hyo-sung in her imagination would secretly combine the medals won by both South and North Koreas and gauge a united Korea’s ranking at the Olympics. She confessed:

When I look at the medals ranking, if the North has won a gold medal, I add it to ours and gauge our ranking. I combine the medals and see where we stand. I always do that when they win a medal. And then I wish that we could compete as one nation.

These women’s wishes for the unified team were a symbolic representation of their wishes for unification, and in Kim Hyo-sung’s mind, the strength of the unified team was symbolically identified as the power and potential of the united Korea in
international community. Thus, it serviced as an indication to her ‘what it might have been’ or what it could be’ if the two Koreas were one.

5.6 Summary

In this chapter, North Korea and Japan were examined as South Korea’s ‘Others’, which have considerably impacted on South Korean consciousness and identities. The interviewees’ perceptions of North Korea radically differed from those of Japan in that a pan-Korean identity and ethnic ties were often emphasised in relations to the North. The interviewees’ idea of the nation and nationhood often expanded to include North Korea as their own, which indicated the significance of a perceived common history, language and a monolithic culture in constituting the nation and nationhood. This perception also accounted for their wishes for the unification of the two Koreas. North Korea’s interest, survival and identities were believed, therefore, to be closely tied to their own interest, survival and identities. The research findings revealed that North Korea was both the ‘Other’ and their own in relations to specific situations. This created ambiguity in the women’s identities but at the same time, offered another option for their identity choices.

In contrast, the colonial history and the recent political turbulence between South Korea and Japan underscored the women’s hatred, bitterness and anti-Japanese sentiments, solidifying the perception of Japan chiefly as their old foe. Interestingly, however, that perception was found to be in the process of remaking, and new identities, therefore, in the process of remaking as well. Changes in relations between the two neighbouring countries, South Korea’s economic growth and the popularity of the Korean cultural products in and beyond Asia were discovered to have greatly
boosted the women’s self and national esteem to an extent that many of them reprehended some South Koreans’ extremely nationalist or indiscriminate manners in dealing with Japan and the Japanese and called for more open-mindedness and maturity.

As mentioned above, North Korea generated ambiguity and confusion. However, it was perceived clearly as their own when Japan was standing on the other side of equation. In such cases, a pan-Korean identification was played out powerfully and most women were found to be firmly standing by North Korea against ‘Korea’s’ old enemy. What all this suggests is the characteristics of contemporary identities. The research findings on North Korea and Japan again confirmed that one’s identities are never fixed, final or stable, but always changing, personal, multiple and open for negotiation. It also implies that multiple identities intersect with one another and occur simultaneously or alternatively, depending on situations.
Chapter 6 : Shifting Gender Identities

6.1. Introduction

In traditionally patriarchal South Korean culture, gender has been a significant determinant that has shaped and affected the way women and men understand themselves, others and events around them. Historically, women in South Korea have been restricted considerably in their choices of lifestyle, hobbies, education, profession and dreams. South Korea, however, has transformed greatly during the last 5 decades socio-culturally, politically and ideologically. Today’s South Korea is experiencing a mixture of ‘traditionally’ local and foreign cultures and ideologies. In this new era, women in South Korea have achieved greater access to the public sphere, for example, in education, employment outside the home, politics and law. With increased access to the public sphere, women nowadays are changing the ‘traditional’ gender norms and finding new ways of understanding themselves, others and the world. This chapter aims to investigate the interviewed women’s gender identities revealed in and through sport spectacle in this new social milieu.

The first three sections will provide backgrounds on South Korea’s androcentric character and some of the socio-cultural factors that have influenced substantially the interviewees’ understanding of gender and sport. The women’s arguments and perceptions of gender, nation and sport that are in harmony with South Korea’s ‘traditional’ gender norms will be discussed first, followed by an examination of some of their opposing perceptions that resist those ‘conventional' views. As well, their interpretations of several media extracts will be analysed throughout the chapter to explore further the women’s perceptions of gender and sport, as well as their understanding of nationhood. The chapter will end with an analysis that interrogates the
women’s emerging gender identities. The women’s support for individual rights, irrespective of one’s sex or gender, and their challenges against gender discrimination and double standards will be examined in the final sections.

6.2 South Korea, an Androcentric Nation: Founding Myth, Confucian Ethics and Militarism

South Korean women’s, as well as men’s, identities are deeply affected by South Korea’s deeply androcentric orientation. As discussed in chapter 2, this orientation is evident in Korea’s founding myth, various ideologies, such as Confucianism and nationalism and in the socio-political circumstances on the Korean peninsular. Korea’s founding myth centres upon gender polarisation and hierarchy between women and men. Maguire observes (1999: 178) that ‘national culture and identity are represented by an emphasis on origins, continuity, tradition and timelessness’. South Korea’s founding myth in this sense underlines that ‘the Korean nation is ultimately the community of men, created by an extraordinary man’ and woman’s role in, and contribution to, the nation is ‘the provision of a proto-nationalist womb’ (S. S., Moon, 1998: 41). It thus displays the deeply male-centred nature of the nation.

South Korea’s Confucian culture has also been a major contributor to South Korea’s androcentric character and hierarchical gender relations (C. M., Choi, 1998; H. J., Jung, 2001, 2005; E. H., Kim, 1998; T. Y., Kim, 2003; Y, Kim, 2005; S. S., Moon, 1998). As discussed in chapter 2, Confucianism upholds patriarchy, naturalising and essentialising gender differences and hierarchy, which is predicated upon the constructions of heterosexual identities. Under strict Confucian ethics, women’s identity choices were limited to being a daughter, wife or mother. Women were
encouraged to foster so-called ‘feminine’ virtues, such as selflessness, patience, humility and forgiveness, moreover, a woman’s most valued attribute was her potential capacity to bear sons (Cha et al., 1979 cited in T. Y., Kim, 2003: 100). During South Korea’s modernisation period, Confucianism was re-shaped and re-packaged as South Korea’s ‘authentic’ tradition and continues to exercise a stronghold on many South Koreans (S. S., Moon, 1998).

South Korea’s consecutive military regimes and their militarism have also deeply contributed to hierarchical gender relations (S. S., Moon, 1998). Since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, nationalism has been the State’s ideology and at the centre has stood militarism. This heavily values male-bonding and solidarity which, in turn, have significantly shaped national values and morality for South Koreans (S. S., Moon, 1998). Militarism was accelerated during the consecutive military regimes from the early 1960s until the end of the 1980s. In addition, South Korea’s state of war against North Korea has provided a unique milieu for the enhancement of ‘traditional’ hierarchical gender relations (S. S., Moon, 1998). The military confrontation has served to position women, who are excluded from soldiering, as ‘the protected’ and as an inferior or less valued social group (H. J., Jung, 2005). It has also constructed women first and foremost as the ‘carriers of nationalist wombs to deliver heirs and potential warriors who can defend the nation’ (S.S., Moon, 1998: 52).

The founding myth, long standing Confucian tradition, male-exclusive compulsory military service and the state of war on the Korean peninsula have helped patriarchy and a gender hierarchy become widely accepted by the public in South Korea (S. S., Moon, 1998). Furthermore, South Korea’s industrialisation from the 1960s onwards has been a highly gendered process of social transformation in and by which women have been assigned subordinate positions in the nation (C. M., Choi; 1998). In all these
socio-cultural, historical and political contexts, South Korea has been ‘firmly rooted in essential and hierarchical differences between women and men’ (S. S., Moon, 1998: 57), and this, in turn, has been impacted upon South Koreans’ identities, women and men alike. The following sections will interrogate the ways in which South Korea’s androcentric orientation is part of the interviewed women’s social worlds, affecting their understandings of gender, nation and sport.

6.3 ‘Traditional’ Gender Identities

6.3.1 “Women and Men are born differently”: Biology and Gender

The focus group interviews uncovered a number of issues in the interviewees’ perceptions of gender and sport, one of which was a belief in biological, physiological and gender differences between women and men. Many women routinely assumed men’s ‘naturally’ superior physique and mind, and a ‘natural’ propensity for domination and aggression, while women were considered to represent the opposite. Kang Eun-jin regarded woman’s biology and her ‘feminine’ gender as innately related:

By birth, women are not born to rule others using physical power. They are not born with that kind of thinking. I think it also has to do with women giving birth to a baby. That’s why they are not interested in going out to fight or challenge. They are by birth more inclined to nurturing, embracing, harmonising.

Sun Young-ran also argued for men’s ‘naturally’ stronger mentality by claiming, “Men are more used to the ‘fittest survives’ mentality. I think biology has a lot to do with it.
Somewhere in their genes”. Ham Yoo-ri defined “women” as the ones who “need to be protected because they are weak”.

Many women including those above, identified aggression, self-confidence, domination and competitiveness as male attributes, inherent in the male hormones. Women, on the other hand, were deemed to have distant relations with physicality, aggression, or self autonomy by nature. Instead, they were seen to be closely associated with harmonising, nurturing, giving birth and being protected as the physically and mentally weaker sex. These findings demonstrated the women’s naturalisation of the ‘conventional’ belief that ‘sex determines gender’. Women and men were defined in stark contrast to each other with distinctive attributes and no overlapping features. These remarks showed no room for ‘negotiating’ or ‘transgressing’ the ‘traditional’ gender stereotypes. ‘Conventional’ gender relations, promoted especially by Confucian ethics, were clearly resonant in those comments. Confucianism has long policed and regulated Korean and South Korean women’s behaviour and thoughts, and provided them with a major perspective to understand the world. After all, ‘identities become identities only when and if social actors internalize them and construct their meaning around this internalization’ (Castells, 1997: 7).

The women’s beliefs in biological, physiological and gender differences between women and men were argued to be in direct relation to their perception of women and sport. Kang Eun-jin insisted:

The reason men are more enthusiastic about sport is that they are innately more violent. I don’t believe education is responsible for women’s disinterest in sports. Women prefer unity, harmony. I think it’s genetic.
If competitiveness, domination, physicality and violence were believed to be the characteristics of sport, it is undoubtedly in conflict to South Korean idea of ‘traditional’ womanhood. Likewise, women’s biology and their gender attributes were seen as, by nature, antithetical to the qualities sport promotes.

### 6.3.2 High Emphasis on Appearance

Coupled with the belief in biological and physiological differences between women and men, many interviewees expressed an obsession with physical appearance that also played a key role in their attitudes towards gender and sport. South Koreans’ excessive interest in looks has recently drawn global attention. *Time Asia*, for instance, ran an article on 5 August 2002 on South Koreans’ obsession with appearance and the plastic surgery boom. The article reported that many South Koreans’ way of life was no longer exclusively or substantially dictated by Confucian ethics, and presented the plastic surgery boom as evidence of this. In so doing, it pointed to South Koreans’ excessive interest in appearance. For example, a South Korean plastic surgeon proclaimed in the article that “looks are important for success” in South Korea. The BBC also reported on South Korea’s plastic surgery boom (4 February, 2005, *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*) and claimed that about 50% of South Korean women in their 20s had undergone cosmetic surgery and that 70% of men had considered surgery.

South Koreans’ concerns over appearance include an obsession with slimness. It is, however, by no means a purely South Korean phenomenon. As Bordo summarises, the preoccupation with fat, diet and slenderness is:

Women’s ‘war’ against the ‘perfect’ body has been well-documented by a number of scholars including Bordo (1990; 1993), Eichberg (1995) and Markula (1995, 2001). What makes the South Korean case interesting is how quickly and intensely physical ‘beauty has become a requirement of decorum for women’ in South Korea (T. Y., Kim, 2003: 107; italics in original).

T. Y., Kim (2003) links the emergence of the new social significance of beauty to the arrival of capitalist consumer culture in South Korea. She maintains (2003: 103) that, in the process of South Korea’s modernisation from the 1960s, Confucianism, although repackaged during the period, was ‘replaced by capitalism and democracy as the dominant state ideology’. In this new era, she goes on to argue:

Women have become extraordinarily visible in Korea, free to be observed and appreciated in the public space. Beauty has become the new standard of a woman’s value (2003: 103).

Furthermore, as Bordo asserts (1993: 169-170), the advent of movies and television increasingly facilitated this cultural transmission through standardised visual images; as a result, ‘femininity itself has become largely a matter of constructing’. A consequence is that, as T. Y., Kim observes (2003: 98), in pursuit of re-shaped or improved appearance, South Koreans’ long-standing aversion to manipulation of the body, which is rooted in Confucian culture, ‘seems to have been whole-heartedly abandoned in the last few years of proliferating plastic surgeries and various other manipulations of the body’.

Discussions about appearance were certainly popular, especially during the focus group interviews, conducted during the 2004 Athens Olympics, largely due to the greater visibility of sportswomen at the Olympics than in football tournaments. Many interviewees endeavoured to make sense of South Korea’s extreme obsession with
looks. Favouritism of good-looking people and more social benefits were perceived as major driving forces of the obsession. Lee Jung-ran argued:

In every country stereotypes against fat people exist. Especially in our country, a lot of things are decided based upon one’s appearance, from very trivial occasions to big occasions like job employment. There is so big favouritism over slender people. When a slim, pretty person asks of a favour, it’s received well. But when a fat person asks, that person is easily ignored and is not treated as a human being… an idea that women being fat is guilt is prevalent.

Pointing out the double-disadvantage suffered by women who were born with less than divine looks, Kim Jung-jin echoed Lee:

Our culture gives more opportunities to pretty women. Women in general are disadvantaged by virtue of being women. With good looks, they can live a bit easily.

According to Bordo (1993: 20), these women were ‘correctly’ discerning that ‘norms’, the beauty norms in this case, ‘shape the perceptions and desires of potential loves and employers’. ‘They are’, her argument continues (1993: 20), ‘neither dupes nor critics of sexist culture; rather their overriding concern is their right to be desired, loved and successful on its terms’. ‘Correct’ or ‘appropriate’ forms of femininity for women and masculinity for men have long been powerfully in operation in South Korea, pressuring women, as well as men, to conform. Then, the question is:

When, how and why … do male and female persons keep identifying with positions that are defined as properly masculine or feminine in dominant discourses? (Ang, 1996: 120).
It is maybe, Ang argues (1996), that their gender choices always entail consequences in real life. The interview findings revealed that overt or covert penalties or punishments resulting from nonconformity or violation of socially ascribed gender norms induced many women into conforming to ‘traditional’ gender norms.

6.3.3 “She has given up to be a woman”: Weightlifter Jang Mi-ran

Considering the outpouring of concern about appearance, it was not surprising to find many of the women in the interviews directed their attention to sportswomen’s faces and bodies, rather than their accomplishment at the Olympics. During the focus group interviews, the interviewees were presented with an article on Jang Mi-ran, a 19-year-old South Korean female weightlifter, who won the silver medal in the over 75kgs level at the Athens Olympics (24 August 2004, The Sportsseoul) (Appendix 7). The article was accompanied with a black and white photo of her brightly smiling, waving her right hand with the medal around the neck. The title “‘Bloody fight’ You are Beautiful” referred to her indomitable fighting spirit symbolised by her hand that showed a trace of dried blood due to an injury she had during a performance. The article was published after she won the silver medal and was full of sanguine encouragement.

Nevertheless, many of the women in the interviews were not impressed by her achievement. Instead, their main focus was on Jang’s weight (113.34kgs) and appearance – she was known to have put on over 30kgs for her sport. While her outstanding effort and achievement as a weightlifter often remained unnoticed or
trivialised, her weight and looks dominated the discussion. Kim Hyo-sung, for instance, deplored Jang’s loss of femininity:

She must be happy with herself. She must be happy to have won the medal. She must have worked so hard. But what I think is that I would like if women look feminine and men looks masculine.

Kim So-mi anticipated Jang’s regret in the future:

It’s nice to do things one likes when she is young. It’s nice to gain weight for the sport she likes… but I wonder if she won’t regret later… Gaining weight for weightlifting may be okay when she is young. But the silver medal she won would not be remembered forever… When she becomes 50 or 60 years old, she may regret… Why did I gain that much weight?.. What for?... I wonder if one should dedicate herself to sport to that extent... too much of ruining herself… No femininity

Hwang Hee-sun was worried if Jang “could ever get married” due to her looks. Jang’s weight 113.34kgs was clearly seen as fatal to these women’s idea of ‘true’ womanhood, greatly endangering her marketability as a woman. Concerned, Hwang, therefore, advised that “she [Jang] should be more concerned about her future. She can’t do the weightlifting forever”. Similarly, claiming that female weightlifters were more likely to damage their reproductive organs, Sun Young-ran was worried whether Jang could conceive a child. For these women, who regarded a ‘traditional’ life path – marriage and giving birth - essential in a woman’s life, Jang’s success and achievement as a weightlifter was inconsequential or regrettable. Respect, admiration, and encouragement for her courage, dedication and achievement were, accordingly, hardly uttered by these women. Jang was, for them, primarily an over-weight, self-destructive woman who abandoned ‘femininity’ in pursuit of an unworthy sport. Indeed, Jang was
pronounced to be a woman who “has given up to be a woman” (Cho Soo-jung). These outcries also suggested South Koreans’ deeply rooted heterosexual normative culture. Jang’s heterosexuality was automatically assumed and was never put to doubt. Ang argues (1996: 121) that ‘the construction of gender identity and gender relations is a constant achievement in which subjects themselves are complicit’. In this regard, those women who perceived Jang as antithetic to the ‘correct’ form of gender identity were not only constructing their gender identities as opposite to Jang’s but compliant in the perpetuation of South Korean ‘traditional’ gender relations and hierarchies.

6.3.4 Gymnasts’ Body Admired, Envied and Unenvied

In contrast to their responses to the image of Jang Mi-ran, many women displayed admiration for, and jealousy of, the looks of female gymnasts, divers and swimmers. Accordingly, these ‘feminine-appropriate’ sports were among their top favourites to watch. Hargreaves argues:

Body presentation which makes more visible the form and sexuality of
the female body has become increasingly noticeable in particular female
sports (1994: 159).

She is referring to those sports that ‘emphasize balance, co-ordination, flexibility and grace, such as gymnastics, ice-skating and sychronised swimming’, which have been routinely ‘characterized as ‘feminine-appropriate’ because they affirm a popular image of femininity. Those sports, Hargreaves goes on to argue (1994: 159), also ‘demonstrate their essential difference from popular images of sporting masculinity’. Three media extracts involving sportswomen in ‘feminine-appropriate’ sports were shown in the focus group interviews to explore the interviewees’ perceptions of sportswomen and femininity.
A medium-sized photo article ‘Like a Butterfly’ displayed a white Ukrainian female rhythmic gymnast, who had just thrown a ball up and was fully stretching her arms and legs in the air (27 August 2004, *The Sportsseoul*) (Appendix 8). Another photo image entitled ‘Centipede women?’ featured several Chinese female rhythmic gymnasts whose limbs were so trickily intermingled and twisted to an extent that it was hard to determine which limbs belonged to which gymnast (28 August 2004, *The Sportsseoul*) (Appendix 9). Also, a large article ‘Greek Goddess would be jealous: world eyes drawn to ‘beautifuls’’ photographed three female athletes while praising them as some of the most beautiful sportswomen at the Olympics (Appendix 10). In this photograph, a white American pole vaulter was captured in a motion of fully stretching backwards; a smiling white Russian rhythmic gymnast holding her twisted leg up and a Chinese diver re-arranging her bikini line (13 August 2004, *The Sports Chosun*). These women were all in their sport gear, that is, they were scantily attired. In this way, their nearly ‘perfect’ bodies were foregrounded.

These media representations undeniably focus on the looks of the sportswomen and their sexuality, rather than their performances as sportspersons, thereby relegating their athleticism as secondary. In so doing, they divert attention from women as strong and competent athletes and reduce them to sexual objects, which serve to minimise the symbolic threat that sportswomen pose to male hegemony (Duncan and Messner, 1998; Hargreaves, 1994). At the same time, these portrayals demonstrate the homogenisation of ‘feminine’ images across the globe. Hargreaves asserts (1994: 163):

> Although there are national and regional differences in the representation of gender in the media between and within different countries in the West, there is an accelerating process of homogenization of images of femininity and sexuality.
In fact, as Bordo observes, the construction of femininity is:

[A]lways homogenizing and normalizing, erasing racial, class, and other differences and insisting that all women aspire to a coercive, standardized ideal (1993: 168-169).

The Ukrainian, Chinese, American and Russian women in those media clips displayed the homogenising and normalising images of a ‘perfect’ or flexible female body and femininity, which are almost unobtainable and unrealistic, but which the South Korean women in the interviews looked at with awe. A big fan of gymnastics, Yang Hye-soo admitted her admiration for the ‘feminine’ images gymnasts displayed:

I like gymnastics because of many beautiful women. Their bodies are so gorgeous. Russian gymnasts are very pretty. I watch it, curious about what should be done to have such body. I also like their small faces. I like watching them

Their sexualising poses were accepted as beautiful and ‘feminine-appropriate’ by Kim Jung:

I don’t know how it is in other countries, but mostly women value beauty. Shape or beauty. If I were these players, I would want to be shown nicely, beautifully. Wouldn’t the athletes also want to be seen in a pretty pose? Audiences would want to see feminine looks, gestures or postures from sportswomen. If a woman is howling or roaring, it would be a bit…

These South Korean women identified the multi-national body images and the femininity they symbolised as standard. This demonstrates the global naturalisation of a certain type of body and femininity. Another point to make regarding the representations of the divers, gymnasts and pole vaulter is that hardly any of the women
made comments on, or were interested in, their athleticism or achievement as sportswomen. In other words, the sportswomen were primarily treated as women with pretty faces and a desirable body. In that sense, they were not treated as any different to supermodels. Emphasis on their appearances, thus, certainly shifted attention away from their sporting prowess to their body, significantly devaluing their athletic talent.

It was found that such excessive attention to sportswomen’s appearances and admiration for the ‘perfect’ body made several interviewed women dissatisfied with their own ‘imperfect’ feminine bodies in comparison. 19-year-old Shin Mi-sook, for instance, expressed her fear of being ridiculed in the public due to her ‘unfit’ body. Although this was not the case, she insisted her thighs were too large, and this fear had prevented her from taking up swimming: “I have yet to learn how to swim because I am not confident enough to wear swimming suit”. Her response was an indicative of social malaise prevalent in South Korea. According to research (14 November 2005, The Kyunghyang Shinmun), South Korean adults are the slimmest among those of OECD member countries with only 3.2% measured as obese. However, a survey conducted among women in 10 Asian countries has revealed (26 September 2005, The Hankyoreh) that a mere 1% of South Korean women was confident about their appearance with 43% considering themselves as overweight. The survey also showed South Korean women’s overall dissatisfaction with their own bodies. Owing to social beautification of excessive femininity and a slim body, many of the interviewed women longed for the unobtainable, ideal bodies and femininity as a way of seeking social approval.

As shown through the images of weightlifter Jang Mi-ran and the female gymnasts, divers and other athletes, the correlation between sex and gender (women and femininity) was fundamentally assumed by many interviewed women. This supposed
correlation led to the belief that other arrangements of sex and gender were wrong. For Lee Mi-ra, for instance, if men pursue femininity, “It’s a bit strange”. Kim Jung also talked of her sense of resistance to such ‘odd’ gender representations:

Like women look ugly when they pursue men’s sports like wrestling, if men take up rhythmic gymnastics, throwing a ribbon or ball into the air,

I feel “That is weird”.

What was confirmed from these remarks was again the deep-seated belief in the links between women and femininity, and men and masculinity. Roche argues (2000) that sport mega-events and sport culture provide cultural resources for people to resist the threats to their personal identity. In an era when diverse forms of femininity are on display and are presented as identity options to choose from, sport was found to provide a cultural resource to help them maintain or reinforce their gender identities.

An interesting discovery from the focus group interviews was that, although the images of a ‘perfect’ body or femininity were awed and idealised, not all of the women interviewed were in pursuit of them. Lee Jung-ran claimed:

I am not envious. It would be nice to look that good. But I am not like, “I want to be like them”. Being pretty would be convenient. Pretty women have a lot of benefits, I know. But I wouldn’t like to have plastic surgery to become prettier.

While Lee Mi-ra found the gymnasts’ waists too flat, therefore, not ideal, Park Chang-sun realistically acknowledged tremendous work and effort required to produce and maintain such a body. She was not envious either, insisting:

I wouldn’t like to have that kind of body. How hard they must be working to make and maintain this shape? I just like a body that I can
live with confidence in my life. I wouldn’t like to have stress or be pressured to maintain a particular body shape.

All these findings revealed the ways in which the interviewed women utilised the media images of sportswomen to construct, contradict or reinforce their gendered selves. The body images of weightlifter Jang Mi-ran were abhorred by many women because she was regarded as having lost ‘femininity’, which was deemed vital or essential to their ideas of womanhood. Most discussions on her centred upon her appearance and life as a woman. Her weight and her choice of sport were viewed as incompatible with ‘femininity’ and a ‘woman’s life’. In so doing, her sporting prowess and achievements were substantially ignored or marginalised. The ‘perfect’ bodies and ‘femininity’ displayed through the images of the diver, rhythmic gymnasts and pole vaulter in the news article were, on the other hand, admired and idolised. Again, however, these women’s athleticism or achievements as sportswomen were considerably undermined and trivialised due to the excessive attention paid to their bodies and appearance. Surprisingly, these ‘perfect’ bodies were not an object of envy to many of the interviewed women. What was uncovered through the readings of those sport media images was many women’s internalisation of the ‘traditional’ gender norms and hyper-heterosexual culture. In addition, the findings referred to the ever-elusive images of the ‘perfect’ feminine body and femininity, as well as a general devaluation of sportswomen’s athleticism and performance.

As explored above, many women in the focus group interviews expressed their admiration for certain types of ‘femininities’ and body shapes. Ironically however, many of them also grunted and expressed their dissatisfaction with the South Korean media’s excessive attention to the appearance of sportswomen and the marginalisation of their athleticism or achievement as sportswomen. Frequently discussed in this regard
were golfer Michelle Wie and tennis player Maria Sharapova. America-born, Korean-American Michelle Wie is frantically followed by the South Korean media on and off the golf course, and several women including Park Chang-sun attributed Wie’s enormous popularity from the South Korean media to her appearance:

As far as golfing ability goes, Kim Mi-hyun and Pak Seri are much better. But Kim is short and Pak is too masculine. So although they are much better golfers, [the media] focus is not on them.

Considering her less-than-expected achievement in the LPGA in the 2006 season and, in contrast, her South Korean-born South Korean rivals’ success, the South Korean media’s attention dedicated to Wie was criticised by many women as excessively appearance-focused, greatly marginalising other South Korean female golfers’ success in the LPGA. Disapproving of such unfair media treatment, Jung Eun-sung demanded that 2 prominent South Korean golfers Kim Mi-hyun and Pak Seri receive more media attention and respect. A similar view was found in association with tennis star Sharapova. Of the South Korean media’s obsession with Sharapova’s looks, Kim Jung-jin complained:

There was such a bustle when Sharapova visited [Seoul] a while ago.

But it was all about her looks or her outfits. Her photos were all very revealing her body. Her pretty face and sexy body were what was mostly talked about, not her tennis skills. I dislike the talk about it.

The media representations of sportswomen presented during the focus group interviews were largely centred upon their appearances and bodies, significantly trivialising their sporting prowess, physique and accomplishment as sportspersons. The interviewees’ discussions of these media representations or sportswomen in general also revolved around the sportswomen’s looks and outfit, exhibiting little respect for
them as sports players. Whether they were over-weight or ‘divinely’ fit, ‘ugly’ or the personification of Greek goddesses, or in ‘traditionally’ masculine or feminine sport made little difference to many of the interviewees. Those sportswomen were judged and evaluated by many interviewees almost solely on their appearance and body. They were considered first and foremost as women, women of a admirable face and body or an ‘unfortunate’ face and body. In this sense, sport as their profession was hardly relevant to the interviewees. On the other hand, the South Korean media’s representations of sportsmen were radically different. They were first and foremost defined as sportsmen, and their athleticism, achievements and determination were all foregrounded in the media texts. The following section will examine the South Korean media’s different portrayal of sportsmen, exemplified by the images of Park Ji-sung. More importantly, it will investigate the interviewees’ readings of the media images of Park in comparison with those of Jang Mi-ran. Such comparison will eventually help uncover their ideal nationhood as represented differently by women and men.

6.3.5 Park Ji-sung as South Korea’s Gendered Self

Miller et al. (2001) call for an interrogation on who stands for the nation in gender, as well as racial, terms. Observing that ‘gender and sexuality pose problems for constructing unified notions about the nation’, they assert:

Ambivalence about the ‘national sportswoman’ among spectators, as well as many male players, is symptomatic of the gendered value structure of the sports body. When sportswomen represent the nation, tensions are evident in both individual and team sport (2001: 87). As explored in the previous sections, weightlifter Jang Mi-ran’s image raised concerns, anxieties and a sense of uneasiness. Moral panic was also discerned among many
interviewees. Her image was largely perceived as self-destructive, disturbing and problematic. Many women worried most about her future as a ‘woman’: would she be able to find a male suitor, get married and give birth? These worries revealed the deeply gendered nationhood. Jang’s image was read as very troubling as it could be a threat not only to the national image but more crucially, to the continuity of the nation. What if she could not find a male suitor? What if she could not get married? As conceiving a baby outside of marriage was almost unimaginable to most of the interviewees, marriage was essential to bearing ‘sons’, who would protect and preserve the South Korean nation and its nationhood. Jang’s image, which was perceived as antithetical to ‘traditional’ femininity, therefore, was regarded as potentially harmful to the nation.

Standing in stark contract to Jang’s image and its implications were representations of the South Korean footballer Park Ji-sung, the overwhelmingly favourite sport star among the interviewees. A full-page news article on Park Ji-sung was shown in the individual interviews, published in *The Sports Seoul* on 15 March 2005 (Appendix 11). Reporting on Park’s performance at a game of the Dutch league, the article was头lined ‘Big Ji-sung’ in a large font, followed by several sub-headlines, such as ‘goals in 3 consecutive match’, ‘Man of the Match’ and ‘Champagne congratulations from colleagues’. Accompanying the written report was a gigantic photo of him in an action shot dressed in the PSV uniform. His facial expressions conveyed his determination, focus and seriousness. As well, his leaning backwards pose was sexual as it highlighted his strong thighs, legs and groin area. In a society in which masculinity is typically defined as ‘strong, active, in possession of the gaze, and femininity as weak, passive and to be looked at’, Park’s image could be seen as ‘utterly problematic’ because the male body was subjected to the gaze of others, going ‘over to the other ‘feminine’ side’ (van Zoonen, 1994: 98). However, this kind of sports photography
displays patriarchal limits and compromise to the visualisation of the male body, because, ‘the male body tolerates the transformation into an object of visual desire only when it is in motion’ (Ang 1983 cited van Zoonen, 1994: 99). Park Ji-sung’s body in this sense seemed to ‘resist straightforward visual eroticisation’ (van Zoonen, 1994: 101). Moreover, Sabo and Jansen (1998) note that the visualised impact of making men bigger, larger than life, is designed to amplify the ritualised displays of hegemonic masculinity. Park’s huge photo, the headlines in large font and sub-headlines, as well as the content of the news, all spoke of his success and achievements as a footballer and respect from team-mates, promoting a particular type of masculinity. These representations gave an unmistakable impression of his strength, domination, competitiveness and will to succeed, as well as sexualising him.

Interestingly, only one interview participant (Jung Eun-kyung) perceived the photo as sexual. Most women inferred from the image ‘traditional’ male qualities, such as liveliness, dynamic, power, work ethic and seriousness. Park Sang-kyung found Park’s representation as “very lively, very dynamic”; Lee Jung-ran liked it “because it is dynamic. He looks giving his best”, and “Powerful” was a description given by Kim Hyun-sook. Park Ji-sung was commonly depicted as a player who always gave his best while other players “just walk around the pitch lazily” (Park Chang-sun). The most frequent descriptions of Park were that he was dynamic, powerful, lively, active and determined. Most women regarded him very highly as a footballer and read the media images as “appropriately” or “quite correctly” (Kim Mi-jung) portraying him. Asked to imagine a sportswoman in the same pose, Sun Young-ran replied:

I would feel very sorry for her because she’s working too hard. Women should be protected. So when women do sports, flying like this, not protecting herself, I wonder if it won’t affect her reproductive faculty. I
think motherhood, motherly instinct are very important. [Women] are the ones that will give birth someday. So I think they should protect their body somehow (my emphasis).

She then went on:

Too rough sports like Jang Mi-ran. When I saw her, I worried that ‘she should be careful’. Lifting heavy stuff or doing tough sports can affect it [giving birth]. It’s a big happiness as a woman. Of course there is a life as a professional but there is also a life as an individual.

The repeatedly expressed anxiety or fear over Jang Mi-ran and her image in the focus group and individual interviews focused on her potential to lead ‘a woman’s life’. On the other hand, Park Ji-sung did not raise any of those concerns. Interestingly, no women spoke of his appearance, body or personal life. His future was not worried about, and his present and/or future personal life as a man was never an issue. He was almost solely discussed in terms of his professional career, athleticism and footballer. The women’s readings of Park were, thus, profoundly gendered.

The two sportspersons, Jang Mi-ran and Park Ji-sung, have achieved a great deal in their chosen sports. Both have displayed strength, determination and athleticism. Their personal qualities were seen as similar. Both were portrayed by the media as humble, sincere and hard working people. They also have won international recognition and have made the name South Korea recognised globally. Jang Mi-ran’s sporting success, especially, had made South Korea’s national flag raised in front of a global audience, a dream many interviewees desired strongly. Nevertheless, her achievement and personal qualities were substantially trivialised and undermined due to the interviewees’ excessive focus on her appearance. On the other hand, Park Ji-sung received a flood of praise and admiration.
Miller et al. argue (2001: 31) that ‘sporting bodies are taken to represent the condition of the nation’ through a number of symbolic roles, one of which is ‘the nature of appropriate gender identities’. Images of Jang Mi-ran and Park Ji-sung were examples of what could be considered as ‘appropriate’ femininity or masculinity. As well, they represented a sense of deeply rooted nationhood for the women. When South Korea was represented by Jang Mi-ran, it was troubling and problematic, as discussed earlier. Her personal qualities or character were rarely regarded as an embodiment of national character, since the focus was on her appearance, and its consequences for the nation. When South Korea was represented by Park Ji-sung, it was seen as promising, healthy and positive. The nation was defined not only by his success and achievement as a footballer but also by his personality: his dedication, determination, humility, hard work and success. South Korea and its nationhood were thus differently conceived of through the representations of by Jang Mi-ran and Park Ji-sung.

In this section, Park Ji-sung and his image were examined to identify the interviewees’ gendered readings of sportswomen and sportsmen. However, as Maguire asserts (1999: 179), it is not only sportsmen’s individual bodies but ‘male sport’ which ‘appears to play a crucial role in the construction and representation of national identity’. This argument was clearly supported by many of the interviewees’ almost total lack of interest in women’s sport, in particular women’s football. ‘Gender discrimination is the most eye-catching rupture in the ‘people’s game’, Manzenreiter and Horne observe (2002: 21) and the South Korean context is not an exception. Despite the low popularity of K-League - South Korean professional football league - South Korea’s men’s national football team draw great interest, publicity and attention from the public and the media, and many footballers enjoy stardom or celebrity status on and off the football pitch. In contrast, the South Korean women’s national football
squad and matches remain virtually unnoticed by both the public and the media, revealing the highly gendered nature of football spectacle. Manzenreiter and Horne summarise (2002: 21), ‘Football, along with virtually all other team sports has long been popularly imagined as a sport for male competitors played for the enjoyment of male fans’.

Indeed, disinterest in women’s football was pervasive among the interviewees in both focus group and individual interviews. Even those who claimed to be passionate sport and football fans hardly showed any interest in women’s games. “Awkwardness” was a description given by Kim Jung, an enthusiastic sport fan, to describe her feelings for women’s football and female footballers. She argued:

It didn’t look pretty to see big women kicking the ball, running around the pitch. But watching it once and twice, I have realised, ‘Ah, women’s football…women, of course, play football…we can watch it…it’s on TV, they have international tournaments, too…’ So now it’s much less awkward to see women’s football.

Her realisation of the existence of women’s football, nevertheless, failed to spark her interest in it or generate positive images of female footballers. It might take her a while before the “big women kicking the ball, running around the football pitch” could draw her interest, Kim admitted. For Kim, as with the Jang Mi-ran case, these “big women” in the football pitch stood against socially ascribed gender identities. Images projected by female footballers were also found to be incompatible with South Korea’s ‘appropriate’ gender norms.

Miller et al. observe (2001) that many nations including Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Australia and the USA are typically represented by a heterosexual, white male sporting body. They, therefore, question (2001: 87), ‘What happens when one or more
of these characteristics is manifestly absent in representations of the nation?’ The interview findings suggested that, should this be the case, it could be deeply problematic due to double-standards and the ‘conventional’ gender appropriateness. The same qualities in sportswomen and sportsmen were judged differently due to their perceived different social roles and responsibilities. Significantly, those who failed to conform to the ‘traditional’ gender norms were perceived as disturbing, worrying or troubling. These findings are related to H. M., Kim’s argument (2005). Examining South Korean women’s passionate fandom demonstrated in the 2002 World Cup and their social status, she maintains (2005: 240) that South Korean women have ‘no chance of reaching the status of the Great Absolute warriors’ in South Korean society and asks if they should then go on living as the ‘hot blooded cheering warriors’? (H. M., Kim, 2005: 239; my emphasis).

Discussions on sportswomen and sportsmen, and their media images revealed the interviewees’ internalisation of ‘traditional’ gender relations and hierarchies. Sportswomen and sportsmen, and their media images were evaluated according to socially ascribed gender norms of femininity and masculinity in South Korea. Therefore, similar qualities and character in women and men were judged differently. Sportspersons’ sex and gender in these discussions were found to be the most significant feature that fundamentally determined the interviewees’ perceptions of them and their interpretations of their media images. The interview findings, however, also revealed changing perspectives on gender and sport. The following sections will discuss the interviewees’ perceptions of women in competitive or combative sports, demonstrating important shifts in their understandings of gender and sport.
6.3.6 Females in Competitive/Combative Sports

Many of the interviewees’ taken-for-granted assumptions of biological and physiological differences between women and men, along with their commitment to ‘traditional’ gender stereotypes, led them to classify competitive and combative sports as ‘masculine-appropriate’; accordingly, the unsuitability of those sports for women was asserted. A news article written by a male report, who expressed his desire for the maintenance of the institutional ban on women’s boxing at the Olympics, was presented during the focus group interviews for discussion on women in competitive and combative sports.

In the article, “Women and the Olympics”, published during the Athens Olympics, the journalist argued for the ban on women’s boxing at the Games (24 August 2004, The Sports Seoul). The article charted the introduction of women’s judo in 1992, women’s football in 1996, women’s tae-kwon-do (introduced at the same time as men’s tae-kwon-do) in 2000 and women’s wrestling in 2004 as Olympic sports. Disapproving of the looks of women wrestlers who displayed tangled hair, bruised or torn face, blood-covered arms, the journalist proposed that boxing should never be an Olympic sport for women. In his account, it was clear that combative sports like wrestling and boxing were profoundly masculine in nature, therefore, not suitable for women.

The history of female participation in the Olympics is a history of struggle and diversity as Hargreaves delineates (1994). From the start, she states, the modern Olympics was an arena for institutionalised sexism, severely hindering women’s participation. The founder of the modern Olympics, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, for instance, was firm in his opposition to women’s participation in Olympic competitions. The first modern Olympics that took place in Greece in 1896 excluded women from the Games. Various groups of women, however, have fought hard to be able to compete at
the Olympics; as a result, grants have been awarded to women, and slowly but gradually, the number of sports they participate in has increased.

Nevertheless, due to its supposedly intrinsic masculine qualities, it has taken longer for women to take part in competitive and combative sports than in more ‘feminine’ sports, Hargreaves argues (1994). She also states:

Competitive sports are celebrations of physical differences between people of the same sex, but also, and in a most profound way, between males and females (1994: 145).

These sports are believed to be primarily suited to men because men have been thought to possess ‘inherent’ athletic abilities, such as competitiveness, strength, dominance and aggression. Consequently, the supposedly ‘intrinsic’ limitations of women’s biological make-up have long been used to justify restricting the number of women’s competitive sports and events at the Olympics. Hargreaves also asserts (1994) that women’s biology, especially their procreative organs, has often been used, and is still used, as reasons for and against female exercise. In particular, ‘traditionally’ masculine sports, such as the triple jump, the pole vault, boxing and weight-lifting, have excluded women based on the rationale that ‘women’s reproductive systems are vulnerable to injury in these sports’ (Hargreaves, 1994: 217).

Despite vehement resistance, women found their way in to those ‘masculine’ sports, and the popularity of boxing among women has grown considerably in recent years (Hargreaves, 1997). This has happened in South Korea too, creating contentious debates. Clearly mindful and supportive of ‘traditional’ gender stereotypes, the male journalist cited above exhibited in the news article his deeply cultural, personal notion of ‘appropriate-femininity’. His views found several supporters among the interviewed women. Kim Yong-jin expressed her discomfort at women in combative sports:
I don’t like women doing wrestling or boxing or any other combative sports. Women involving in such sports are not feminine. I watched women’s Greco-Roman wrestling the other day. I didn’t like it at all. When man does that sport, I can just go ‘It’s okay because they are men’, but seeing a woman’s neck being twisted under another woman’s arm… I thought if I were her, I wouldn’t do it.

Kim attributed her resistance to women’s combative sports to her unfamiliarity with female boxing. She commented:

What we have seen so far is that men grow up, fighting, but it is okay because they are men. So when men fight, we are not that shocked. But when women do, it is strange.

What is crucial in her remark is that routine cultural practices have had such an influential role in forming her perceptions. This concurs with Hargreaves’ argument:

The ethics of arguments to ban dangerous sports such as boxing are, strictly speaking, as appropriate to men as they are to women; the reason they are applied only to women is cultural, not biological (1994: 217).

Those who resisted women taking up combative sport based their belief on biological and physiological differences between women and men. Wie Ji-sook, for instance, claimed, “I think some sports are suitable for men and some others for women. Women have weak faculties in their body, so boxing is not…” She thus regarded boxing’s aggression, violence and danger as being at odds with ‘femininity’.

Several women, including Wie, argued that boxing, as well as other combative sports such as wrestling, were deeply gendered, as masculine, and therefore unsuitable for women.
Furthermore, due to the common assumption that boxing is a male-appropriate activity, female boxers were often found to generate confusion and disturbance. It was discerned that some of the interviewees were confused as to how to make sense of the radical, unorthodox images portrayed by female boxers. Kim Hyo-sung revealed her ambiguous feelings:

They [women] are doing such sports [combative sports] because they like doing them. No one should stop them from doing what they like. But at the same time, it doesn’t look good. Women who are taking up boxing in our country… They look just like a man with short hair. They do not have any femininity. Is that person man or woman?

All of the responses above pointed to the deep penetration of heterosexuality and ‘traditional’ gender norms into the consciousness of these women who are living in a culture where gender intelligibility is considered as essential in constructing and maintaining their cultural identities. Also, again, the respondents’ total lack of interest in the above mentioned female boxers’ boxing skills or achievement was apparent. Over and over again, it was the socially sanctioned ‘proper’ feminine appearance and attributes that were emphasised in the discussions about sportswomen. While Jang Mi-ran’s weight and choice of sport defined her ‘unfeminine’, short-haired and male-looking female boxers and wrestlers were also labelled as ‘unfeminine’.

The research findings, as examined above, revealed the deep-seated dichotomous polarisation of gender. Bordo observes:

Today, intellectuals often urge that we “go beyond” dualisms, calling for the deconstruction of the hierarchical oppositions (male/female, mind/body, active/passive) … and scoring others for engaging in “dualistic thinking” (1993: 15).
However, responses such as above reveal that ‘it is not so easy to “go beyond dualism”‘ as she points out (1993: 15). Sport seems to be deeply involved in producing and maintaining stereotypical gender norms and ideologies. What Dworking and Messner argue (2002: 17) may be valid in this sense: ‘sport as a cultural and commercial production, constructs and markets gender. Besides making money, making gender may be sport’s chief function’.

On the other hand, there were contradictions in the women’s responses to the images of the female boxers and Jang Mi-ran, between their views on the individual’s right to choose and play sports s/he likes and South Korean traditional gender norms. Examining contemporary identities, Weeks (1990) examines the co-existence of different and often conflicting values between different communities, but also within individuals themselves. The ambiguous attitudes exhibited by some of the women about females taking up competitive and combative sports can, then, be explained as symptomatic of today’s South Korean culture, which is experiencing the co-existence of ‘traditional’ South Korean and foreign cultures. At the same time, such ambiguity and confusion point to the arrival of new attitudes towards gender norms. It was apparent that gender could no longer be stereotyped as it had been in the past nor could it be defined in a straightforward way in present-day South Korea.

6.4 Emerging New Gender Identities

6.4.1 Resistance to Biology-Determinism

Over the past few decades, the number of sports open to women has expanded greatly and women now compete in most official national championships and are entering traditionally all-male sports in increasing numbers (Hargreaves, 1994). Today,
it is very difficult to justify the barring of women from traditionally masculine sports.

As Hargreaves observes:

By their improved performances in high-level competition, women have themselves done a great deal to dispel myths about female biology and sporting potential (1994: 217).

The historically widely upheld assumption of ‘women being the weaker sex’ was rejected by a number of the women interviewed. Kang Eun-jin, for instance, asserted;

Biology improves. As men continue to set new records, women’s physicality improves markedly, too. I think, men, naturally, feel a sense of fear, unknown fear, although they believe they will win, because challenge itself is a threat to them. When women play football, men ridicule them. But, when professional women footballers play amateur men footballers, women are most likely to win. The women’s team will greatly outplay the men’s. Then, it’s not about gender. There is so much potential for women nowadays than in the past.

This comment was in accord with Hargreaves’ claim (1994: 283) that ‘there are far greater differences within a sex than between sexes’. She asserts (1994), in fact, some females are better athletes than some men, and some females are bigger and more physically suited for sport than some men. Moreover, there are other factors that could transcend the sex factor, such as ‘the fitness factor, levels of skill, agility and co-ordination’ (1994: 283). Park Sang-kyung named opportunity as another:

In the past, not many sports were open to women. If women had been exposed to, and encouraged to play, sports as men have been, their abilities would have been much better than they are now. Women
haven’t have opportunities. But, as more opportunities have been given to them, the pace of them chasing or passing men looks very fast.

In fact, Sun Young-ran believed in potential of South Korean women’s football. She argued that South Korean women’s football would outshine South Korean men’s football in achievement in the near future because South Korean women had usually outperformed in sport once they were given the opportunity. She speculated that South Korean women’s football would have achieved greater success than its male counterpart if equal investment and attention had been given.

These remarks were revealing as the women attempted to understand the issues of women and sport in the context of political power struggles between women and men. Hargreaves claims (1994: 91) that ‘women’s sports are invested with meanings which are imposed on women, but which women also create for themselves’. Many of the interview participants refused to be swayed by the ‘conventional’ gender norms that had, for so long, restricted women’s lives in South Korea. Aware of the injustices imposed upon women in a patriarchal society, they questioned and challenged these restrictions, hoping to achieve some form of emancipation. More importantly, they appeared confident and sanguine about their abilities and potential.

### 6.4.2 Rise of Individualism: Support for Women in ‘Masculine Appropriate’ Sports

As discussed in chapter 5, Hall’s conceptualisation (1990) of cultural identities as shaped by history, power and culture understands the transformation of identities as a process, which can change as history, culture and power change and as the trio’s inter-relations change. The research findings indicated that the interviewed women’s
identities were in the process of remaking. Scraton and Flintoff notes (2002: 30) that ‘the way we understand gender and sport is influenced by social, political and economic change and by development of both within and outside sport’. ‘Sport itself is’, they continue, ‘dynamic and can be altered by shifting gender relations and can itself be part of the processes that challenge and shift hegemonic notions of gender’. Although South Korean women still have a long way to go, they have achieved considerable gender equality at the home, workplace, and school. Women’s status in South Korea has been improved remarkably, especially since the 1960s, most noticeably in the educational and economic sectors. According to research published by Deutsche Bank Research Centre, 95% of South Koreans graduate from high school (secondary school), the highest among OECD countries (8 August 2005, The Yonhap News). Moreover, women’s enrolment to university is almost as high as men’s. In 2004, statistics revealed that 79.7% of female students were enrolled in college – 57.5% for 4-year university degree programmes - while 82.8% were men (60.4% for 4-year university courses). In addition, women accounted for 41.4% of those who attained postgraduate degrees in 2004 (30 June 2005; The Kyunghyang Shinmun). In the workforce, 49.8% of South Korean women are reported to be employed outside the home (30 June 2005, The Yonhap News).

The interviews highlighted shifting attitudes towards the relationship between women and sport, reflecting wider changes in South Korean society. The news article on ‘Women and the Olympics’ generated contentious and divisive discussions during the focus group interviews. Whereas several women found the male writer’s desire for the maintenance of the institutional ban on women’s boxing at the Olympics a reasonable option, opposing voices were also present. First of all, dismayed by the reporter’s disgust at the sight of female wrestlers’ ‘unfeminine’ looks, Kim Mi-jung
challenged the double-standards and questioned, “Then, is it okay for men to have tangled hair and bloody? Men look good and women look weird?” Kim Hyun-sook felt “sorry that women are not allowed to box at the Olympics”. She thus deplored the institutional ban and insisted that “boxing should be allowed to women”.

Moreover, Lee Jung-ran complained about general social pressures imposed upon women:

When women fight, get bruised, hit each other, men question if it is what women should do. Men force women to have certain ‘feminine-appropriate’ images as woman. They try to confine us like that. They demand that you should look like this or that. I don’t like that. It is an attempt to re-create us as someone else he likes. I really dislike that.

In this statement, women were regarded as objects of a male gaze and pleasure. In a culture in which many women are aspired to ‘look’ good, rather than ‘feel’ good, it was not surprising that images of women boxers or wrestlers were under severe scrutiny and criticism due to their ‘unfeminine’ looks. Lee’s remark also questioned South Korea’s ‘traditionally’ hierarchical gender relations. Hierarchical relationships between women and men, or favouritism of one sex over the other were, however, rejected by many women in favour of respect for individual rights. For these women, sex no longer offered a rationale or justification to constrain women’s gender identities, choices or lifestyles. Lee Mi-ran also expressed her strong opposition to the double-standards.

I like women doing combative sports. Common sense is that it is okay for men to do such sports while it is not appropriate for women to participate in them. Women who take up those sports are seen as cold-blooded, fierce, etc. But it is wrong to discriminate against gender. If men play a certain sport, women can play that sport too. People expect
women to look neat and nice while accepting men looking a bit messy. But men and women are the same human beings. If women should look neat and nice, men should look neat and nice too. Women can take up kick boxing if she wants. It’s a matter of personal choice. If I like a certain sport and therefore, do it, who can say anything about that?

It is noteworthy that many of the women in the interviews demanded equal and fair respect for an individual rights, irrespective of one’s sex or gender. Kim Jung’s argument “Which sport I play is purely my personal choice. What business do other people have in my choice?” was a common consensus voiced by these women. Thus, many women found the institutional prohibition on women’s boxing upsetting and resentful. Although many viewed women boxers ‘unfeminine’ or unlikable, they agreed that it should be left to one’s personal choice, and not determined by an institution or other people. Central to these protests was the concept of individual rights, not women’s or men’s. The right to play the sport one likes, regardless of sex and/or gender, was thus strongly advocated, and discrimination based against gender differences was heavily criticised. Such individualism provided further grounds for criticising the double-standards between women and men.

Alsop et al. (2002) and Butler (1999) maintain that what counts as a performance of masculinity or femininity is highly contextual and varies according to social contexts over time and cross-culturally. The research findings indicated that, armed with equal or higher education to men and success in their profession, these women were exuding confidence in their identities and refused to tolerate injustice and gender discrimination both in and beyond sport. As Hargreaves asserts (1994: 31), the idea of ‘feminine-appropriate’ and ‘masculine-appropriate’ sports, which ‘locks people into a fixed concept of the natural, is blind to history and ignores changing feminine and masculine
identities and different gender relations’. The women’s demands for equal individual rights, irrespective of one’s sex, were clearly signalling the emergence of a new era and new gender identities, which are more flexible than ever before.

6.4.3 Criticism on Double-Standards

Many interviewees’ strong demands for individual rights and equal respect, irrespective of sex or gender, often led to criticisms of double-standards, especially concerning weightlifter Jang Mi-ran. Jung Eun-sung, for example, fiercely disagreed with those remarks that discounted Jang’s achievement due to her appearance. She argued:

If a man gained 30 kg to do weightlifting and won a silver medal at the
Olympics, people would have highly praised him like, ‘He is extraordinary, very courageous etc’.

Regretting the common public response that highlighted Jang’s looks and trivialised her accomplishment, Jung claimed Jang was ‘pretty’. Many other women claimed that they were proud of Jang’s effort, determination and achievement as a sportswoman. Her passion for weightlifting was greatly appreciated and she was viewed as embodying true sportsmanship. Park Chang-sun insisted:

The way she gave her best to do the sport she likes.. gaining 30kgs at the
sensitive age of 19 when one would normally pay attention to how she
looks...a vein in her hand was torn during a match, but she didn’t care
and did her best…That is true sport.

Lee Mi-jin predicted that Jang would receive enduring respect from many South Koreans.
The player who will be remembered long to people is Jang Mi-ran.

These women [female gymnasts in the three articles] look good only during their play. They look pretty and gorgeous only during their performance. The real person who will be remembered for a long time is Jang Mi-ran.

Hargreaves observes (1994: 274) that ‘many sportswomen playing ‘men’s sports’ still face harsh criticism and ridicule’. ‘It is, however’, she also point out, ‘undeniable that a new form of gender relations has emerged’. Post-structuralist feminists also argue for the deconstruction of the term ‘woman’ in understanding the diversity of femininities (Ang, 1996). In South Korean society, which is based upon hyper-heterosexuality and hierarchical gender relations and which also places a high value on appearance and ‘traditional’ gender norms, Jang Mi-ran projected a radical form of femininity. She was heavy and strictly speaking, not good looking; she was a successful and confident weightlifter who was proud of her profession and achievement. She showed non-conformity to ‘traditional’ gender stereotypes and she was unafraid, unashamed and unapologetic of it. She demonstrated that a woman like her was not necessarily in conflict with ‘femininity’ and that ‘femininity’ was, in fact, fluid, unstable, and open to negotiation. Equally important, her ‘feminine’ images were accepted and supported by many women in the interviews.

Miller et al. argue:

Sporting bodies can connote agency, individuality, freedom, and resistance, while also producing a habitus, characterized by self surveillance, obedience and social control (2001: 32).

Jang Mi-ran and female wrestlers, boxers and footballers demonstrate diverse and fluid gender identities and the potential of sport to transgress the traditionally polarised
boundaries of gender. The comments from the women above clearly display a departure from the traditional way of conceptualising gender towards an understanding of the varied, flexible and multifaceted approaches to gender in South Korean culture.

6.5 Summary

The research findings revealed that conventional perceptions of women and gender still prevalent among a number of the women. Many of the discussions on sportswomen and sportsmen and the media images of them were, therefore, centred on their belief in the biological, physiological and gender differences between women and men. This belief also appeared to lead them to distinguish what appropriate feminine/masculine sports were. This, however, was in opposition to their strong support for individual rights, in this case, a right to play a sport one likes, irrespective of her sex or gender. In relation to this, many interviewees defended women participating in ‘traditionally’ masculine sports, arguing what sport they took up should be their personal choice. The interview findings also showed that sportswomen and sportsmen were believed by a number of women to represent nationhood differently. This, however, was also contested by the women who demanded equal treatment and respect between women and men. Thus, while the interview findings demonstrated women’s adherence to South Korea’s ‘traditional’ gender norms, they also showed that their identities were contradictory and ambiguous.

The interview findings also suggested that the interviewees’ identities were fragmented, multiple, personal, fluid and subject to change. South Korean society has undergone dramatic changes over the last 50 years socio-culturally, politically and ideologically. The interviewees’ perceptions of gender and sport were found to be
deeply influenced by these changes. The ‘traditional ways’ of understanding gender and sport were often disapproved and problematised, and radical or unorthodox femininities were advocated. A number of the women also articulated contrasting identities in themselves. Unable to come to terms with gender identities which were perceived as antithetical to ‘traditional’ ones, many women displayed confusion and ambiguity. What was certain from the interviews was the emergence of new gender norms and identities, and the women’s struggle to make sense of them in relation to their own social position, thought and beliefs.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

7.1 Longing for Global Recognition

Globalisation is an almost unavoidable phenomenon that is significantly influencing the way people live, interact with others and understand the world. South Koreans are also experiencing the impact of the ever-increasing globalising forces upon their lives. The first discussion chapter of this thesis interrogated the ways in which the ‘global’ produced new worries, concerns, aspirations and hopes in the interviewees. It also explored how their global consciousness or their imaginative relations with distant others affected their worries, anxieties, hopes and dreams. The global was found to be constantly changing, producing and reproducing the meanings of events around them, constantly destabilising their identities.

The interview findings revealed that the ‘global’ was always a context through which the women made sense of occurrences around them and developed new understandings of these phenomena. Global sporting events, such as the Olympic Games and the World Cup preliminary matches, were found to be an ideal arena to examine these new dynamic relations. First of all, the interview findings demonstrated the ways in which the women’s global consciousness (re)constructed the meanings attached to the international sport competitions. Perceiving their nation as globally insignificant, many women hoped that the Olympics and the World Cup qualifying matches would serve as a platform through which South Korea’s power, influence and significance were positively represented to a global audience. South Korea’s Olympic participation delighted some women because they were able to visualise their nation as a ‘middle class’ nation. South Korea’s capacity to dispatch a sizeable number of delegates, in decent outfits, to the Athens Olympics was perceived as a symbolic
representation of South Korea’s national strength. The women’s global consciousness was clearly manifested here. The number of South Korean delegates or their fine outfits would have no meaning or value if the global gaze was not taken into account, if the women were not conscious about other nations’ gazing on their nation. A large number of well attired South Korean delegates produced satisfaction and national pride because of the women’s keen sense of global consciousness.

The research also showed that many women’s obsession with gold medals could be understood as their longing for global respect and appreciation. For political and ideological purposes, South Korea has heavily invested in the development of elite sports for decades; as a result, since 1988 it has been one of the top 10 medallist nations at the Summer Olympics except in the 2000 Sydney. The nation’s goal at the 2004 Athens Olympics was, therefore, re-entry to the top 10 ranking. Obsession with winning gold medals and the regaining of the top 10 medallist status was found to be strong in many interviewees since they believed that gold medals and the top 10 status would bring the nation into a global focus. It was commonly argued that, after all, gold medals would make the South Korean national flag be displayed and the national anthem played before global viewers. In addition, many women equated the Olympic ranking with nations’ influence in international power relations, and this propelled them to rationalise further their and their nation’s extreme fixation on winning gold medals. Sport elite nations, such as the U.S., China and Japan, appeared to evidence that equation, and many of the women wished South Korea to be on a level-playing field with these nations.

What these findings indicated was the interviewed women’s acute sense of global awareness. The South Korean national flag could be waved and the national anthem played at any time or in any where if they wanted. However, they desired to see them
waved and played before global audiences and not just in a domestic context. The display of the national flag and the playing of the national anthem became valued only or significantly more, when they were shown and played before global eyes. The ‘global’ thus changed the meanings of the national flag and anthem. In another context, they would have different meanings or be less valued. Moreover, the global power that America, China or Japan were perceived to possess would be meaningless outside the context of the global. Their international influence or domination only had meaning when the presence of ‘others’ was assumed, others who would respect, fear or appreciate the power. The interviewed women’s worries, anxieties, satisfaction and dreams about their nation thus changed in nature and meaning when they were reinserted into the global context. However, precisely because of the unstable nature of globalisation, their worries, concerns or hopes were in constant change and negotiation, destabilising their sense of certainty and their identities.

It was also their acute sense of global awareness that made South Korea’s international success at archery and tae-kwon-do meaningful, delightful and satisfying. Global recognition and appreciation of South Korea manifested in and through these sports were, in fact, a realisation of the women’s dreams. Those sports made the name South Korea repeated worldwide, its national flag waved at the top and its national anthem played. They were also believed to produce or consolidate positive images of South Korea in front of global eyes, drawing global attention to South Korea’s technology, made-in-Korea equipment, language, people and cultures. Therefore, these sports became extremely valuable and significant to most of the interviewees. The meanings and values of archery and tae-kwon-do were thus (re)produced in the global context. At the same time, the ‘global’ and their globally conscious mind created new worries and fears: that South Korea might lose global prestige or that its unrivalled
supremacy might be overtaken by others in those sports. The global was thus seen as constantly creating and recreating the meanings, values, worries and anxieties in the women’s lives, making a sense of security and certainty virtually unachievable.

While the Olympics is an event where most of the nations, small or big, powerful and powerless, could partake, the FIFA World Cup is an exclusive contest, arguably only open to the world’s 32 best footballing nations. The qualification for the Finals, accordingly, could symbolise the membership of a world class footballing elite. The interview findings revealed the women’s extreme pride of South Korea’s achievements in international football. As mentioned earlier, South Korea has represented Asia 7 times at the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup respectively, making it one of the most frequently participating nations in the world. It also holds Asia’s best records at the World Youth Football Competition in 1983 and the World Cup Finals in 2002 by advancing to the semi-finals in both events. Again, these figures and records were cherished only because they symbolised South Korea’s domination in football in and beyond Asia. They became significant only when the global gaze was keenly felt. The global likewise provided a context in which the women found a new sense of national pride and satisfaction in relation to football. However, it also gave them new fears and anxieties, as archery and tae-kwon-do did. South Korea’s stunning success at the 2002 World Cup came with accusations in the global media that South Korea’s achievement was a outcome of a home-ground advantage, undermining the achievement and tarnishing the nation’s reputation. Haunted by such allegations, many interviewees desperately hoped for South Korea to qualify for the 2006 World Cup and be vindicated on foreign soil where there was no home-ground advantage to the South Korean team. The qualification of the 2006 World Cup Finals, thus, acquired a new meaning in the global context. Likewise, the women’s understanding of themselves and their nation, as
well as the football matches, was considerably influenced by their acute awareness of global audiences who were assumed to evaluate them and their nation.

All these worries, concerns and anxieties were indicative of the interviewees’ desire for a powerful nation, a nation that could be recognised as a global power like America, China or Japan. However, the women’s global consciousness was very cautious about how their national images would be interpreted by global audiences. For example, China and Japan could be disqualified for being communist and South Korea’s old foe respectively. Even America was found to be disappointing since it lacked certain qualities and character the women considered important; it was often viewed as abusive, selfish, unjust, manipulative and arrogant. The interview findings suggested that the women’s ideal nationhood, a nationhood they hoped others would see South Korea as, should be embedded with specific values and characteristics, such as hard work, humility, doing one’s best or sincerity. Performances of South Korean sportspersons and their personality were considered crucial in this regard as they were thought of as vehicles to construct or disseminate South Koreanness to the globe. South Korean sportspersons were, accordingly, expected to demonstrate ‘appropriate’ South Korean character, and those who failed to do so encountered harsh criticism. The global was presented here again as a context in which the women (re)created the meanings and values of their national delegates and teams, and their performances at international sport contests. Furthermore, their desire for a powerful nation embedded with distinctive South Korean character would be of no significance if the presence of other nations were not assumed. Only when the global was under consideration, could the dream of a powerful nation with South Korean character become meaningful.

Tomlinson argues (1999: 30) that ‘‘the ‘global’ increasingly exists as a cultural horizon’ within which people frame their existence. ‘It dissolves the securities of
locality’, he goes on to argue (1999: 30), and it also ‘offers new understandings of experience in wider – ultimately global – terms’. Globalisation certainly offers a new, broadened context in which people can re-examine or re-construct the meanings of their existence. The research revealed that the global and the women’s global consciousness significantly transformed the meanings and values of the international sport events and sportspersons and that they produced new understandings of them. Also, through these new understandings and perspectives, they sought to find a sense of security or certainty and construct their identities. At the same time, the global was an underlying force that constantly compelled them to create new worries, concerns and anxieties, thereby destabilising their sense of selves. All these can be understood in terms of reterritorialisation. The women’s struggles to invent and re-invent, and come to terms with, the meanings of their national delegates, their performance and the international sport competitions were indicative of the reterritorialising processes, evidence of their efforts to ‘live’ and find ‘home’ in the new social milieu.

7.2 South Korea and ‘Others’: North Korea and Japan

7.2.1 North Korea

The second discussion chapter examined the interviewed women’s perceptions of North Korea and Japan as South Korea’s ‘Others’, which has significantly impacted upon their consciousness. North Korea and Japan were, however, conceived of differently. Internationally, North Korea has been defined as part of the ‘axis of evil’ and has been persistently seen as a global threat. This perception has been intensified through its announcement of nuclear weapons in the spring of 2005, the test-firing of missiles in July 2006 and the explosion of a nuclear device in October 2006. The
interviewees’ relationships to North Korea were, nevertheless, highly ambiguous and confusing for various reasons, most notably due to their sense of ethnic ties to North Koreans.

A new era began on the Korean peninsula in 1948, when the land was partitioned and, as a result, differences between the two Koreas started to be constructed and highlighted. With a great emphasis of anti-Communist ideology in South Korea, North Koreans have been typically portrayed as sub-human, evil, cunning, and hostile communists. In South Korea, everything associated with North Korea has been denied, dreaded, degraded or devalued. Anti-Communism has been South Korea’s main State hegemonic policy that has defined the meaning, value and morality of South Koreanness, and the most important identity for South Koreans has often been ‘South’ Korean. North Korea has hence penetrated deep into South Koreans’ way of life and consciousness. This, however, has changed rather dramatically since the mid 1990s when the South Korean Government adopted the ‘Sunshine Policy’, which geared the relationships between the two Koreas towards peace and reconciliation. Ethnic, as well as linguistic and other, ties with North Korea have since been underlined, and, although it is still regarded as South Korea’s enemy, in recent years North Korea has been depicted and regarded in a much friendlier term by the South Korean media and public.

The research findings revealed that many women were supportive of, and sympathetic with, North Korea largely based on their sense of an ethnic tie. Sport has always been a reflection of relations between the two Koreas. When the relationship was hostile, they would refuse to participate in the sport event where the other participated, each insisting that they were representative of ‘Korea’. When they met, a victory was vital since it would symbolise moral, political and ideological superiority over the other. Since the mid 1990s, however, political thawing between the two
Koreas has often been demonstrated in sport. For example, the joint entry of South and North Korean delegates at the openings and/or closing ceremonies of various international sport contests, although they compete separately, is a significant indication of the relationships between the South and the North. Despite the fact that the South Korean Government has assumed the full responsibility financially for the co-marching, the joint entry was supported by many women who insisted upon the necessity of displaying the two Koreas’ peaceful relations to global viewers. Symbolic images like this were believed to construct positive images of South, as well as North, Koreas to worldwide audiences. In this context, the women’s national, gender and ethnic identities were simultaneously in operation and produced such beliefs and sentiments. The interviewees’ global consciousness was also discerned, (re)producing the meanings of co-marching at international sport competitions. Co-marching on the international stage became important because it was regarded to create favourable representations of South and North Koreas globally.

The interview findings showed that the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup preliminary matches served to confirm the separate statehood of North Korea despite the joint entry but, at the same time, they were seen as an arena where ethnic ties between the two Koreas became foregrounded. The majority of the interviewees displayed great concerns over, and support for, North Korean delegates at the Athens Olympics and its football team throughout the World Cup qualifying matches, almost entirely based on their perceived ethnic ties to North Koreans, thus displaying a pan-Korean identification. This pan-Korean identification allowed them to identify with the success or failure of North Korean players or teams as if they were their own, feeling joy, disappointment or resentment. A pan-Korean identification was also the grounds for the majority of the women’s support for their Government’s aid to North Korea in
and beyond sport. This ethnicity-based identification, thus, compelled them to feel morally obliged to concern with the lives of North Koreans. Moreover, North Korea’s fears, anxieties and future were identified by several women as intricately related to those of their own, and this has an important implication concerning the women’s ideas of nationhood.

The interview findings exhibited many women’s wishes for the unification of the two Koreas. While some women preferred the separate statehood, many others envisaged the unified Korea as the ideal future on the Korean peninsula and hoped that the two Koreas could participate in the Olympics as one team. It had yet to happen in reality, but it happened in some women’s imagination through a symbolic form of the unification. In other words, some women confessed to add medals won by North Korea to those of South Korea secretly in their imagination and reorganise the Olympic medals ranking. The Olympics hence helped them envision ‘what might have been’ if the two Koreas were united. It could mean a higher ranking at the Games, no more ‘national’ sadness, and a step closer to their dream of a more powerful nation.

The meanings of North Korea to the interviewees were found to be multi-layered. On the one hand, North Korea was viewed by several women as their nation’s enemy and, on the other hand, it was perceived by some others as part of them; it was also seen as both by many of the interviewees, generating confusion and ambiguity in them. North Korea thus brought the women’s national and ethnic identities to the fore.

The previous discussion chapter revealed the interviewed women’s desire for a powerful nation embedded with South Korean character. The interview findings from the discussions on North Korea indicated that, in addition to the perceived South Korean characteristics, their ideal nationhood would embody certain qualities that North Korea was seen to possess. Despite the international condemnation of its nuclear
devices, North Korea was applauded by the majority of the women in the individual interviews for having successfully developed the nuclear weapon. The nuclear weapons came to symbolise North Korea’s strong independent spirit, determination and military power, which South Korea was perceived as lacking. North Korea’s possession of the ‘nuke’, accordingly, compelled several women to more strongly wish for unification as it was regarded to empower the nation greatly more. The global was a context in which the women established their arguments and understandings of North Korea and its nuclear weapons because the nuclear devices would have no significance without the presence of other nations, who would fear or respect them.

The ideal nationhood the interviewees envisaged was hence a powerful nation that possessed a distinctively ‘Korean’ character, which would be appreciated, feared and respected globally. North Korea’s intentions and ambition are still unclear and South Korea still remains on high alert for any possible military confrontation with the North. Indeed, South Korea is one of the top 10 nations in terms of expenditure on national defence (Jung, 2005) and North Korea is a main reason. The relations between the two Koreas are unstable, constantly changing, in relation to political situations. One thing that is certain is that an ethnic tie will always play a crucial role in South Koreans’ perceptions of North Korea, destroying or raising their national dreams on various levels, in various manners.

7.2.2 Japan

While North Korea was perceived as ambiguous and confusing to many of the interviewees due to their perceived sense of ethnic ties to North Koreans, Japan was typically seen as South Korea’s perennial threat and old enemy. Hall (1990) claims that one’s identities are greatly shaped by the narratives of the past and argues that the
colonial experience has to be understood in this light. The research also suggested the deep penetration of Korea’s colonial history with Japan into the interviewees’ consciousness. Together with the colonial history, the recent political controversies between South Korea and Japan, such as Japan’s claim to the ownership of Dok-do, the distortion of its history textbooks and the former Prime Minister’s repeated visits to Yasukuni shrine, have shaken the ever fragile relations between the two neighbours and consolidated the women’s perceptions of Japan as their dangerous enemy. The interview findings revealed that most women’s opinions of Japan were fraught with contempt, resentment and a sense of bitterness, and this led to several women’s conscious refusal to indulge in consuming Japanese cultural products. Given the huge influence of Japanese cultures in South Korea, such restraints would require great commitment and sacrifice, and accordingly, they indicated the level of resentment they felt with regard to Japan.

Japan is indisputably one of world’s most developed nations and a leading nation in international relations. Owing to the history between South Korea and Japan, however, it has been hard for many South Koreans to admit to Japan’s superiority. The majority of the interviewed women also showed little respect or awe for Japan’s success in and beyond sport. When they did, it was expressed rather unwittingly or subconsciously. Japan was, nevertheless, acknowledged as one of the global sport elites and as one of the nations several women hoped for South Korea to compete on a level-playing field with. Being on a par with bona fide sport powerhouses on the Olympic medals chart was thought to signify South Korea’s leadership in sport. Thus Japan reminded them of the ‘global’ and stimulated their global consciousness. Moreover, triumphs over Japan at the international sport contests were regarded as revenge for the colonial rule and also a symbolic inversion of the actual power relations between the two nations. As
South Korea’s old foe, Japan frequently provoked the women’s national identities to be highlighted. The women’s strong sense of national identities, expressed against Japan, was often intersected with their ethnic identities during the individual interviews, particularly through their enthusiastic support for the North Korean football team, which was grouped with Japan for the World Cup qualification. The North Korea versus Japan games were popularly perceived as a battle between ‘Korea’ and its old enemy Japan, therefore, bringing out the women’s national and ethnic, as well as gender, identities to the fore.

Such vehement resentment to Japan was, however, found to be in a process of remaking and change. Hall argues (1990) that identities are a process, which is never finished or fixed. If one’s identities are shaped by history, power and culture, as he argues, her identities are open-ended, subject to change. As historical, cultural and power relations between South Korea and Japan are being remade, so are the women’s identities regarding Japan. The interview findings indicated the emergence of new attitudes towards Japan. Although resenting Japan’s colonisation of Korea, several women were critical of many South Koreans’ blanket antagonism to Japan and called for a more mature, open-mined and forward-looking approach. The interview findings pointed to a decreased sense of rivalry against Japan in and beyond sport, acknowledgement of the cultural similarities between the two nations and the women’s willingness to consume Japanese cultural products, prioritising their personal preferences and tastes over nationalist sentiment. Furthermore, Japan was perceived as South Korea’s partner in the globalising world, with who South Korea was intimately inter-related and inter-dependent in multiple ways. As mentioned above, the discussions about Japan highlighted the women’s national identities; when this involved North Korea, their ethnic identities were also foregrounded. That is, the
interviewed women’s national, ethnic and gender identities were constantly being played out, intersecting with one another simultaneously or in particular contexts. Japan was also closely linked to the women’s global consciousness. It was after all regarded as one of the nations they hoped South Korea to level playing with in and beyond sport.

Restrictions between South Korea and Japan are, as noted above, constantly shifting and being remade. On the one hand, conscientious South Korean and Japanese scholars have published a joint women’s history textbook in both countries in the summer of 2005 (1 November 2005, The Hankyoreh), which featured colonial histories that were argued to be largely missing in many other Japanese textbooks. On the other hand, in March 2007 the Japanese Government repeated its denial to acknowledge the forced prostitution of Korean, Chinese and many other Asian women during World War II, on which the South Korean Government, as well as many nations across and beyond Asia, expressed its deepest regret. Relations between South Korea and Japan are thus unstable and unpredictable, and this impacts on how the women construct their identities.

7.3 Gender Identities

If Korea’s colonial history with Japan in the early 20th century has substantially shaped South Koreans’ identities, South Korea’s founding myth, Confucianism, militarism and the confrontation with North Korea have all also influenced the construction of the nation as patriarchal and androcentric. In addition, the arrival of capitalist consumer cultures in South Korea since the 1960s has created or accelerated many South Koreans’ obsession with appearance, affecting deeply their understandings of themselves and others.
The interview findings revealed many women’s internalisation of South Korea’s ‘traditional’ gender norms. The belief in biological, physiological and gender differences between women and men was prevalent. ‘Traditionally’ feminine sports were, accordingly, upheld to be suitable for women while sportswomen in ‘traditionally’ masculine sports were viewed unfavourably. Many interviewees’ conformity to the ‘conventional’ gender norms in South Korea also resulted in different evaluations of similar qualities displayed by sportswomen and sportmen. ‘Traditionally’ masculine characteristics, such as competitiveness, physicality, athleticism, determination and achievements, were highly regarded and valued for sportmen, but they were seen as secondary to appearance for sportswomen. Discussions on sportswomen regularly revolved around their appearance and body, trivialising their athleticism and accomplishments in their chosen sports.

A prime example was 19-year-old South Korean female weightlifter Jang Mi-ran. The debates on Jang were exemplary of many women’s adherence to ‘traditional’ gender identities. Jang was perceived by them as a ‘woman’ in a ‘wrong’ sport. Her weight 113.34kg was commonly viewed as ‘unfeminine’, disturbing or worrying, and her choice of sport, weightlifting, was ‘unfeminine’ and unfortunate for a woman to be involved in. The combination of the two was deemed as destroying her ‘femininity’ and being potentially harmful to her life ‘as a woman’: to find a man to marry and conceive a baby. She was even pronounced as a woman who gave up on being a woman. The media extract on Jang Mi-ran shown to the interviewees was exceedingly encouraging, affectionate and proud of her accomplishment, which was a silver medal at the Athens Olympics. However, a number of the participants exhibited little interest or respect for her achievement and instead, they underlined her ‘unfeminine’ appearance, which they saw as prohibiting her attainment of ‘true’ womanhood. Several women voiced that
Jang should be concerned about her ‘future’. For them, the ‘future’ meant a life as a woman after her retirement. In their discussions, Jang was primarily perceived as an over-weight, not-so-good-looking woman who took up a ‘wrong’ sport, greatly jeopardising her marketability as a woman. These discussions also pointed to South Korea’s hyper-heterosexual culture. Jang’s heterosexuality was automatically assumed and, in fact, none of the interviewees doubted it. Their gender and sexual identities were found, thus, to be greatly affected by the ‘conventional’ gender norms and patriarchal culture that have governed Koreans’ and South Koreans’ way of life for centuries.

In contrast, foreign sportswomen in ‘feminine-appropriate’ sports, such as rhythmic gymnastics, swimming or diving, were greatly admired and appreciated particularly for their appearance and body. The homogenisation of a beauty standard across the globe was discernible in the women’s discussions. The sportswomen in the media images shown during the interviews were, not South Korean, but Ukrainian, Chinese, Russian and American. Nevertheless, their looks and bodies were agreed by many interviewed women as ‘everyone’s’ dream. Their discussions were focused overwhelmingly on those sportswomen’s appearance and bodies, and hardly any interviewee paid attention to their athleticism or achievement as athletes. Just like Jang Mi-ran’s case, these women were first and foremost perceived as ‘women’, not professional athletes. Unlike Jang, however, they were seen as blessed with great bodies and looks. The debates on sportswomen and their media images likewise heavily centred on their appearance, relegating them to women with or without enviable appearance and bodies.

On the other hand, discussions on Park Ji-sung and his media image focused predominantly on his sporting prowess, achievement, determination and perceived personal qualities. He was highly admired and respected as a footballer and person, and
hardly any women mentioned his appearance or body. Thus, he was perceived first and foremost as a footballer, which stood in stark contrast to the sportswomen noted above. Women and men were likewise seen as representing different forms of nationhood. The radical and unorthodox feminine image of Jang Mi-ran was regarded as detrimental to, or potentially harmful for, South Korea’s future because her image raised an anxiety and concern over her potential as a national womb. Thus, the readings of her image were deeply gendered and cultural. On the other hand, Park Ji-sung’s active, dynamic, powerful, young and successful image offered relief, pride and satisfaction to the interviewees as it helped them envisage their nation’s future as promising, healthy and powerful. Moreover, his personal qualities were highly applauded as respectfully South Korean. Thus, he was deemed as a positive symbolic representation of South Korea’s ‘ideal’ nationhood. Jang Mi-ran and Park Ji-sung shared several similarities. Both were successful sportspersons whose athleticism and sporting prowess were globally recognised; both were also perceived by the media to have similar personalities: modesty, hard work and dedication. Nevertheless, they were seen very differently by the interviewees. At the centre of this division stood the women’s conformity to South Korea’s long-standing gender norms, integral to their gender identities.

Many interviewees’ excessive interest in sportswomen’s bodies and appearance, and their trivialisation of the sportswomen’s athleticism and achievements were also revealed through their support for the news article written by a male journalist who insisted upon the continuing institutional prohibition of women from boxing at the Olympics. Viewing boxing as deeply masculine in character, many women agreed that boxing was physiologically unsuitable for women. Moreover, exhibiting their anxieties over the unorthodox feminine images of female boxers, wrestlers and footballers, they argued those images were culturally unacceptable for women. Just like Jang Mi-ran,
sportswomen in ‘traditionally’ masculine-appropriate sports were seen as in the ‘wrong’ sport. Also, just like Jang’s case, the majority of the interviewees did not show an interest in those women’s athletic abilities or achievement. Again, comments on the sportswomen often revolved around their appearance and body images, revealing the interviewees’ gendered perceptions of sport and the world. Several women also displayed a sense of ambiguity and confusion in trying to make sense of the ‘untraditional’ feminine images, which was in conflict with their common sense ideas of gender.

The discussions so far assumed ‘conventional’ gender norms as ‘natural’ or ‘inevitable’, making it unthinkable or unimaginable to cross the ‘traditional’ gender boundaries. However, changing attitudes were also evident, significantly affecting, and affected by, South Korea’s socio-cultural and political changes. Many women wanted and demanded gender equality and respect for individual choices. Although they cited biological, physiological and gender differences between women and men, they argued in principle against institutional restrictions imposed on women. Irrespective of their opinions about women in ‘masculine’ sports, they argued that the decision as to which sport to play should be left to the individual. Thus, individual rights were strongly upheld, instead of women’s or men’s.

In relation to this, double-standards, which had been frequently adopted to undermine sportswomen’s athleticism and accomplishment, became the subject of severe criticism, and many women called for their revision. Furthermore, some women believed that women’s physiques could improve to be equal or superior to those of many men. Several of the interviewees acknowledged cultural influences and power struggles between women and men in sport and were confident that, as ‘traditionally’ unequal gender relations were gradually revised, South Korean sportswomen would
soon outshine and outperform men in achievement on the international stage, making South Koreans proud. The new understandings of gender were thus found to be emerging, and this was evident in that a number of the interviewees expressed their great respect for weightlifter Jang Mi-ran for her professionalism, courage, determination, dedication, confidence and passion for her sport. Her achievement was admired and she was expected to enjoy enduring respect from many South Koreans. In addition, the images of sportswomen in ‘traditionally’ masculine sports were also found to be gaining recognition and support.

Changes in South Korea’s socio-cultural and political realms since the 1960s have brought about a new context in which women have developed the new perceptions of themselves, their society and nation. The interview findings demonstrated that the ‘traditional’ gender norms were still at work, exercising formidable influence on the way many women understood sport and more broadly, their lives. Simultaneously, new insights into gender were found to be on the rise and were given more significance than before. A consequence of this was the co-existence of ‘traditional’ and newly emerging gender identities in contemporary South Korea, as well as confusing and contradicting ones not only within the group of women but within themselves. The women’s gender identities were thus found to be unstable, flexible, personal, contradicting and subject to change.

7.4 Contribution and Suggestions for Future Research

The 2004 Athens Olympics and the 2006 FIFA World Cup have now become distant memories, and the next year’s 2008 Beijing Olympics is a hot topic these days. South Korea achieved its goal at the Athens Olympics by eventually taking the 9th spot on the
medals chart, and it was qualified for the 2006 Germany World Cup, in which it exited at the end of the first round with 1 win, 1 draw and 1 loss. On the other hand, to many South Koreans’ disappointment, North Korea failed to qualify and met a harsh penalty for the crowd riot: a match in a third country and behind closed doors.

The research suggested that the interviewed women’s identities were complex and ambiguous, defying straight-forward analysis. Both the global and the nation were found to provide important contexts for understanding the women’s identity construction today. Indeed, the interrogation of one’s identities would be incomplete if either was not taken into account. In addition, the ‘nation’ was found to be double-layered for many interviewees as their sense of ‘we-ness’ often extended to include North Korea on the basis of their perceived ethnic tie. The research thus found that North Korea was deeply situated in most of the women’s consciousness on various levels, offering another significant context for the discussion of their identities. Japan, on the other hand, was typically perceived as South Korea’s and Korea’s old foe, which could be easily used to bind or mobilise South Koreans. The women’s conceptions of gender were also found integral to the ways they perceived and understood gender, nation and sport, ultimately themselves.

The research demonstrated that the women’s national, ethnic and gender, as well as many other, identities often occurred simultaneously or in different measures, depending on the context or situation. Their identities were multiple, personal, fragmented and fluid. Moreover, none was static or enduring. They were all found to be transient and subject to change. In other words, none of the women lived as South Korean, Korean or women all the time. Different identities were foregrounded in relation to contexts, and often in a contrasting manner. Furthermore, as South Korea’s socio-cultural, economic, political and ideological environments were in constant shift,
the women’s identities were also in constant remaking. Their identities were thus found to be social, as well as personal.

With the completion of the research, I believe that my empirical findings will make significant contribution to existing knowledge on the nation, national identities, globalisation and gender in relation to sport. First of all, as I pointed out in Literature Review, academic theorisations and research on those themes have been substantially imbalanced. That is, most of the conceptualisations and research on the nation, national identities, globalisation and gender in sport have been produced predominantly by male Western scholars based on Western cultures and histories, and Western men’s experiences and perspectives. My research, which has been carried out by a South Korean on South Koreans’ experiences of gender and nation in the South Korean contexts with respect to sport spectacle, will help redress the scholarly imbalance on themes of national identities, globalisation and sport spectacle. It will help bring focus on non-Western views and experiences of sport spectacle and their influence on one’s identity construction, and in so doing, it will challenge or contest existing Western-centric, especially Western male-centric, knowledge.

Moreover, I have no doubt that my research will be a valuable addition to existing knowledge in the field of South Korea’s sport sociology. As I also mentioned in chapter 2, sport sociology as an academic discipline has emerged only very recently in South Korea, and scholarly investigation has been sharply on the rise. My research, which has interrogated the issues of gender, nation, globalisation and sport spectacle, will undoubtedly be a great value, significantly enriching existing theorisations in sociology of sport in South Korea. Furthermore, another important aspect of my research lies in methodology. The majority of research on sport, sport media or sport spectacle in South Korea have relied heavily on content analysis or quantitative research, leaving audience
reception studies greatly under-researched. Hence, my research, conducted through qualitative research and audience reception studies, will fill existing gaps in terms of not only theoretical frameworks but also methodology. It is a comprehensively developed and theorised empirical research on gender, nation, globalisation and sport spectacle, contextualised within South Korea’s socio-cultural, historical and political contexts, a research which has hardly been conducted in South Korea. Here lies another aspect of significance of my research.

Also crucially, most of scholarly examination on the nation, globalisation and sport spectacle both in the West and in South Korea has been dominated by male scholars predicated upon male experiences, universalising male perspectives. It is to this point that my research adds another great value. My research has been carried out by a woman on women’s experiences of gender, nation and sport spectacle. I have shed light on, and documented, women’s perspectives of gender, nation, globalisation and sport spectacle in their own voices, bringing attention to women’s opinions as equally legitimate and valuable to men’s. Especially, audience reception studies that investigates into women’s experiences of sport spectacle is almost unprecedented in South Korea’s sport sociology. I believe that my research will contribute to the academic demands of the rigorous exploration of the varied conceptions and everyday experiences of women in South Korea or other nations on sport spectacle in their own voices.

In general, in the West or South Korea, women and globalisation, women and the nation or national identities, and women and sport spectacle have been extremely unexplored, and this bestows an additional significance upon my research. As mentioned above, an overwhelming amount of scholarly investigation on nation, national identity, globalisation and sport spectacle has been developed based greatly on
assumptions that universalise male experiences and perspectives, whose consequence has been the trivialisation of women’s relations to their nation in the ever globalising world, the gendered aspects of nationhood and the construction of their identities. My research has examined South Korean women’s experiences of globalisation, the nation and sport spectacle with rich descriptions and profound insight. I believe that I have considerably enriched existing knowledge and sincerely hope many others to follow. It is my hope that my research promotes many other researchers, South Koreans and non-South Koreans, men and women alike, to interrogate the greatly under-researched issues and themes of women, national identities, globalisation and sport spectacle.

As well, I hope to have broadened, or broaden, the ways of understanding gender, nation and sport. As revealed in my research, especially in chapter 6, the ‘conventional’ gender norms are powerfully in operation as the dominant gender discourses in South Korea, continuing to shape or reinforce many women’s viewpoints or experiences of the world. Accordingly, it came as no surprise that their understandings of the sport events and sportspersons, and their readings of the media images were predominantly predicated upon the polarisation of women and femininity, and men and masculinity. I hope that my research has shown people in and outside South Korea that there are others ways of seeing or experiencing the world, beyond the dominant discourses. Dominant discourses are constantly challenged by other small voices, and I hope that my research will contribute to the challenges to the dominant gender discourses or so-called ‘common sense’ of South Korea and many other nations and help eventually bring better, or more equal, treatment and respect for women and men in general.

After all, as Harding argues (1987: 8), what an oppressed or marginalised group seeks is rarely a ‘request for so-called pure truth’, therefore, feminist research such as mine is ultimately about power struggle intending to recognise oppression and injustice,
identify underlying forces behind them and bring about political actions to change status quo. My research has revealed women’s passion and love for sport spectacle, which stand to contradict the ‘traditional’ assumption of women’s disinterest in sport. It is my wishes that empirical findings from my research help propel South Korean, as well as other, societies to rightly and justly recognise women’s high level of interest and enthusiasm about sport and sport spectacle in a socio cultural and political sense and that they compel the society and the media to dedicate more attention and space to women spectators and women’s sports. I also hope that my findings force the society and the media to take under serious consideration women spectators’ interest in various sports and also their tastes and preferences in sport viewing and accommodate them in their, for instance, decision-making processes of televising sports or the general representations of sportswomen, as well as sportsmen.

On the other hand, having finished this research, I would like to suggest several areas for further research. Sportspersons who were discussed in the focus group and individual interviews for this research were all ethnically Korean. This means that South Korea was represented only by ethnic Koreans. What I wonder now is how their significance would change if their ethnicity were different; and how would the media represent them and how would South Koreans read such media images? Could ethnically non-Korean sportswomen or sportsmen become a national icon or hero for South Koreans? If so, how differently would the nation be envisaged by them? What issues and concerns would be raised should this be the case? H. M. Kim’s research implies (2005) that ethnicity is a key element to becoming national heroes of South Korea. What about North Koreans then? Could North Korean sportspersons become South Koreans’ national heroes? If they could, to what extent could they represent South Koreanness? What significance would it have for South Koreans in relation to
their global consciousness? This may be an interesting question as South and North Koreas have been engaged in talks to form a unified team for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. If and when that happens, it will certainly be an intriguing issue to explore.

In addition, different interview subjects in terms of sex would or could produce different research outcomes. E. H., Kim (1998) acknowledges the multiple ways of researching South Korean women’s lives and identities, and she has chosen to interview South Korean men. In contrast, all my interview subjects were women. It was clearly intended to be so when I designed the research. Now I wonder if the interview findings would have differed if the interview participants were men, or men and women mixed. As men occupy different social spaces and assume different social and political positionings, I expect the research outcomes would have been different. It will be interesting to investigate South Korean men’s identities revealed in and through sport spectacle and compare them with the findings from this research.

As well, all of my interview subjects were young, educated, cosmopolitan, professional, largely single and well travelled, all of whom were living in Seoul, the capital of South Korea. Inevitably, their comments and stories reflected their personal and social backgrounds. This research was not designed to present South Korean women’s general opinions on gender, nation, globalisation and sport. Instead, it was to gather a variety of opinions on these themes from a specific number of women. If the interview subjects were selected differently, for instance, women from a smaller city, less travelled or less educated, married and/or staying-at-home, the research outcomes would have been different. Discussions on gender, nation and sport with interview subjects from different backgrounds would definitely enrich existing knowledge greatly.
Lastly, I hope that my next, or others’, research on South Koreans’ identities would use a larger number of interview participants than mine and also produce statistical figures that could represent South Koreans’ general views on issues in question. As I intended, I did gather a wide range of perspectives on gender, nation, globalisation and sport, and I have no regret adopting the research methods I have used. Nevertheless, it is my curiosity now to learn what would be the representative opinions of South Koreans on the issues I have dealt with in this thesis, such as the meanings and values of the international sport competition or particular sports, the meanings and perceptions of North Korea and Japan, the perceptions of women in ‘masculine’ sports and shifting identities. An adaptation of both qualitative and quantitative research would supplement each other’s weaknesses and strengthen each other’s advantages, and produce a great addition to existing knowledge.

7.5 My Journey Continues

I opened this thesis with ‘My journey to Sport Spectacle, Globalisation and Nation’, and with the completion of the thesis, now I am reaching the end of a journey in my life. It has been very satisfying and rewarding, and at the same time, painful, emotional and exhausting physically and psychologically. I am, on the one hand, extremely excited to see it ending but, on the other hand, feel slightly lost. This research has been a vital part of my life for the last three years, demanding so much dedication, commitment and hard work from me. I am, therefore, exceedingly delighted that it is nearing the completion. The nightmares, worries, sleepless nights, lost appetite and cancellations of social engagements I have experienced, all of which I characterise as a life of a research student, are becoming distant and fond memories. I am already
looking forward to a new journey after this, although it may take several months before I become able to live without this thesis.

I started this research with an ambition. I hoped to write about South Korea and South Koreans in English so more people could read and learn about them. Also, I wanted to talk about South Korean women and their experiences of sport. Standing at the end of this long journey, I feel extremely grateful to all of the women who very willingly and voluntarily participated in the focus group and individual interviews and produced rich data, and I hoped I did justice to their stories and comments in the thesis. There were issues I did not want to bring about because it was too painful, emotional or shameful to think or write about, such as the issues of Comfort Women and Korea’s colonial history in general, and there were issues I enthused more than others, most notably about North Korea and Japan. And there are issues I would like to develop further, such as relations between gender and nation. Standing at the finishing line of this particular journey, I realise a new one is opening up. My academic journey will, therefore, continue.
Appendix 1

‘Well Done! Lee Won-hee, Sorry! Gye Soon-hee’
‘Gold, Silver’
‘Both Brother and Sister from South and North won Medals’
Appendix 2

‘Gye Soon-hee: “South Koreans, I thank You for Your Support”’
Appendix 3

‘North Korea: “Hey, Bahraini and Iranian folks, Do not Dream of Snatching Win in Pyung-yang”’
Appendix 4

‘Ah! North Korea’
‘2-1 Loss to Bahrain, North Korea in Crisis’
Appendix 5

‘Well played but …’
Appendix 6

‘Sang-am Smile Wipes Pyung-yang Tears’

(North Korean protesting)
Appendix 7

‘Bloody fight’, You are beautiful”
Appendix 8

‘Like a Butterfly’
Appendix 9

‘Centipede women?’
Appendix 10

‘Beautiful appearance, outstanding abilities, “Greek goddess would be jealous: world eyes drawn to ‘beautifuls’”’
Appendix 11

‘Big Ji-sgn’
‘Goals in 3 Consecutive Match’
‘Man of the Match’
‘Champagne Congratulations from Colleagues’
## Appendix 12: Backgrounds of the Interview Participants

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</tbody>
</table>

Names in bold are the ones who participated in individual interviews
Names are written in the Korean way: Last name first, followed by first name


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