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Conflict and Development in Nigeria
Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Strategies towards the Niger Delta and Boko Haram Conflicts

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Conflict and Development in Nigeria: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Strategies
towards the Niger Delta and Boko Haram Conflicts

By

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD

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Abstract

Nigeria has seen an upsurge in violent conflicts leading to insurgency and terrorism since it returned to civilian government in 1999, following sixteen years of military rule. The Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies stand out among conflict groups in Nigeria as they have produced global consequences, hence provoking domestic and international counter-insurgency efforts. Military responses remain primary, but development responses are being increasingly employed. Addressing issues of poverty, exclusion, injustice and underdevelopment is considered to be more fundamental to solving contemporary conflicts. In this sense, development and security are linked, and human, rather than state security is seen to be prioritised.

However, the nexus between development and security is fraught with contradictions and the notion of human security is vague. Development intervention appears to be securitized such that it becomes a tool for protecting the strategic interests of external interveners and a tool of control by domestic interveners. Therefore, this thesis explores the prospect of a human rights approach to development as a means of mediating the tension between development and security. It attempts to intellectually consider the triad among the three concepts in relation to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts. The study explores how the internal and external development interventions towards the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts have been developed and the issues that have arisen concerning their effectiveness.

The exploratory study uses a triangulation method that includes interviews, focus group, documentary analysis and observation. The thesis finds evidence of a paradigmatic shift towards a rights based approach to development in the internal and external interventions, but one that still yields to securitization and corruption and adversely affects sustainable development. Nonetheless, responses to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts produce ramifications that justify general as well as specifically targeted responses to individual conflicts. More so, the study shows that the relationship between Nigeria and its external development partners seem to be less vertical.

Key Words: Nigeria, Niger Delta, Boko Haram, development, security, human rights, securitization, counter-insurgency
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Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my parents: “Sir” Rufus Ogbogbuike Nwankpa (late) and Rhoda Chinyere Nwankpa. And my two lovely children: Malcolm Onyekachi Nwankpa and Eliana Adaeze Nwankpa.
List of Abbreviations

ADB. Africa Development Bank
AFRICOM. African Command
Al. Amnesty International
AMIN. Assembly of Muslims in Nigeria
ATA. Anti-Terrorism Assistance
BGT. Breakdown Grievance Theory
BPD. Barrels Per Day
CAN. Christian Association of Nigeria
CBO. Community Based Organisation
CDP. Community Development Project
CEPID. Centre for Peace Initiative and Development
Cl. Counterinsurgency
CISLAC. Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre
CJTF. Civilian Joint Task Force
CPR. Civil and Political Rights
CS. Case Study
CSE. Corporate Social Enterprise
CSI. Corporate Social Investment
CSO. Civil Society Organisation
CSR. Corporate Social Responsibility
CSSF. Conflict Stability and Security Fund Framework
CT. Counterterrorism
CTS. Critical Terrorism Studies
CVE. Countering Violent Extremism
DDR. Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration
DFID. Department for International Development
DoD. Department of Defence
DoS. Department of State
DRF. Development Results Framework
ECCAS. Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS. Economic Community of West Africa States
ECSR. Economic, Cultural and Social Rights
EEGM. Experts and Eminent Group Meetings
EiE. Education in Emergency
ENACTUS. Entrepreneurial Action Us
ESR. Economic and Social Rights
EU. European Union
FCO. Foreign Commission Office
FCT. Federal Capital Territory
FEWS NET. Famine and Early Warning Systems Network
FG. Federal Government
GA. General Assembly
GCERF. Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund
GCTS. Global Counter Terrorism Strategy
GDP. Gross Domestic Product
GON. Government of Nigeria
GT. Grounded Theory
GWOT. Global War on Terror
HCT. Humanitarian Country Team
HDI. Human Development Index
HRP. Humanitarian Response Plan
ICC. International Criminal Court
ICISS. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICRC. International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP. Internally Displaced Persons
IMN. Islamic Movement of Nigeria
INGRA. Initiative for Grassroots Advancement in Nigeria
INTERPOL. International Police
IFI. International Financial Institutions
IMF. International Monetary Funds
IPCR. Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
IRI. International Republican Institute
IS. Islamic State
ISIS. Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
IYC. Ijaw Youth Council
JFA. Justice for All
JTF. Joint Task Force
MADE. Market Development for the Niger Delta
MDG. Millennium Development Goals
MDTF. Multi Donor Trust Fund
MEND. Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MNDA. Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs
MNJTF. Multinational Joint Task Force
MNOC. Multinational Oil Company
MOSOP. Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
MSTF. Multi Stakeholder Trust Fund
NACTEST. National Counterterrorism Strategy
NADECO. National Democratic Coalition
NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDA. Niger Delta Avengers
NDAP. Niger Delta Action Plan
NDDB. Niger Delta Development Board
NDDC. Niger Delta Development Commission
NDDF. Niger Delta Development Forum
NDI. National Democratic Institute
NDPI. Niger Delta Partnership Initiative
NDPVF. Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force
NDRMP. Niger Delta Regional Master Plan
NDV. Niger Delta Vigilante
NE. North East

NEDC. North East Development Commission

NEEDS. National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy

NEMA. National Emergency Management Agency

NGO. Nongovernmental Organisation

NHRC. National Human Rights Commission

NIPSS. National Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies

NNPC. Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation

NPF. Nigeria Police Force

NRC. Nigerian Red Cross

NRDF. Northern Nigeria Regional Development Framework

NSA. National Security Adviser

NSRP. Nigeria Stability Reconciliation Programme

NSS. National Security Strategy

ODA. Overseas Development Assistance

OMPADEC. Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Economic Commission

ONS. Office of the National Security Adviser

OPC. O’Odua People’s Congress

OPEC. Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries

P4P. Partners for Peace

PAVE. Partnership against Violent Extremism

PCNI. Presidential Committee on North East

PDI. Poverty Development Index

PHCF. Petroleum Host Communities Fund

PIB. Petroleum Industry Bill

PIND. Partnership Initiative for the Niger Delta

PINE. Presidential Initiative for the North East

PRSP. Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

PSF. Peace and Security Forum

PST. Purposive Sampling Technique
VSF. Victim Support Fund

WB. World Bank

WWII. World War Two
Chapter One: Introduction

We will not enjoy security without development, we will not enjoy development without security, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. (United Nations, UN, 2005, p.20).

In 1999, Nigeria returned to civilian government after sixteen years (1983-1999) of successive military administrations. The return to democratic government inspired protests and riots including inter-ethnic conflicts that have been otherwise repressed during the military era. Sadly, the long years of military rule greatly undermined the capacity of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) and law enforcement to deal with such disturbances, hence, the rise of self-help or armed vigilante groups. Each of Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones had (and, in some regions, still continue to have) an armed non-state group policing its region in the absence of effective law enforcement.

The return to democratic rule also increased existing tensions and conflicts between different ethnic groups such as Ife/Modakeke in the South-West of Nigeria, Ijaw/Itsekeri in the South-South and across the Middle Belt of Nigeria including Plateau and Benue States. The Nigerian government, under President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), a former military Head of State (1976-1979) responded to these conflicts using mostly military force, a conflict response strategy that continues to be popular, sadly. Nigerian soldiers were deployed to these conflict hotspots leading to some of the worst records of human rights violation by the Nigerian military. The Zaki-Biam, Zango Kataf and Odi massacres are some of the famous military invasions. For instance, in Odi, a small town in the Niger Delta state of Bayelsa, the Nigerian military allegedly killed up to 2000 people including women and children and destroyed virtually all the properties, in a reprisal attack for the killing of twelve security personnel.
It is now eighteen years since Nigeria returned to civilian government with three successful
democratic handovers, yet conflict remains rampant. Nigeria, therefore, illustrates the notion
of contemporary conflict or war. Contemporary wars are considered to be different from wars
of the past. While past conflicts were primarily inter-state and fought in the battlefield,
contemporary conflicts are mostly civil wars or intra-states, fought between, at least, one
non-state armed group against the state or between two or more non-state armed groups.
Nonetheless, these intra-state conflicts present consequences that extend beyond the state (a
fuller discussion of “new” and “old” war is attempted in Chapter 2) .There are several
conflict groups in Nigeria, but two remain clearly dangerous: the Niger Delta and Boko
Haram.

The Niger Delta conflict, which is underlined by the pursuit of self-determination and greater
economic autonomy, consists of several militant groups that engage in insurgent acts of
kidnap-for-ransom, sabotage of economic production through bombing of oil facilities, piracy
and armed ambush against security forces. Boko Haram, which was considered to be the
deadliest terrorist network group in 2015 based on the number of casualties (Global
Terrorism Index, GTI, 2015), is an Islamic fundamentalist insurgent group whose activities
include armed assaults, arson, kidnap and suicide bomb attacks on civilians. Although these
groups emerge from a combination of factors including the dearth of governance and other
socio-political and cultural conditions in Nigeria, excessive use of military force, as in the
case of Odi, plays a significant role in the rise and transformation of the Niger Delta and
Boko Haram insurgencies.

These conflicts have wider implications as they produce consequences (for example, mass
external displacement/forced migration, links with transnational terrorist networks and
disruption of global economy) that extend beyond the borders of Nigeria. Hence, they have
required both internal and external counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism responses that involve military (hard power) and development (soft power) interventions.

At the global level, we began to witness a radical shift in the orientation and approach to these internal conflicts and the threats-local and global that they engender. The most visible is the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of 2000. The MDGs signal the shift towards a preventative approach that includes addressing the underlying factors such as poverty, exclusion, inequality and underdevelopment that create these conflicts. According to the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan (2005), today’s threats are “not just international wars, but also civil violence, organized crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction; they also include poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation” (p.66).

A clear link between development and security is shown, one that began in the early 1990s following the end of the Cold War. In line with this thinking, the Nigerian government and its international partners including foreign governments and external development organizations are now applying a soft approach or a development strategy (non-kinetic methods) towards conflicts such as the Niger Delta and Boko Haram. Yet, military intervention remains in use. At best, military interventions are aligned with development strategies. As stated before, the insurgent activities of the Niger Delta and Boko Haram groups produce consequences that are felt beyond Nigeria in such a way that security is globalised.

The idea of globalized security blurs the boundary between nation-states and the international community. While the state has the primary responsibility to protect (R2P) the people within its territorial and sovereign border, globalized security, especially the notion of human security extends this responsibility to the international community, particularly within the context of state failure (Annan 2005). However, the concept of human security is vague and
the connection between development and security is fraught with contradictions leading to an impasse (Duffield, 2010, p.53; see also Paris, 2004; Buzan, 2004).

Essentially, development intervention tends to be securitized such that the motive for intervening is less about the need to improve the material condition of the recipients but a means of containing the disorder caused by the inhabitants of the “non-insured” societies and securing the lifestyle of the intervener (mostly Western developed countries) that the insecurity and underdevelopment of those in the developing countries threaten (Duffield 2006, p.11; 2007). Although this is not always the case as there are examples of external interventions that were less driven by strategic interests (Shaw, 1999), yet the practical, procedural and power dimension of external intervention remains problematic (Hurrell, 1999). At the domestic front, development interventions also tend towards abuse, as they are used by the political elites as tools of control and manipulation (Ake, 1996).

Therefore, a human rights based approach to development has been promoted as an important tool to mediate the conflicting nexus between development and security. This study is underscored by the triad between development, security and human rights. The study engages the debates surrounding the rather intricate relationship between development and security, development and human rights, and the combination of the three concepts as a single unit. As a single unit, each concept has a fairly acceptable and longer ontological and epistemological basis, but as a combined unit, the nature, knowledge and application are more recent and less established.

This study therefore seeks to explore how the internal and external development interventions towards the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts have been developed and the issues that have arisen concerning their effectiveness. It explores the idea of a human rights based approach to development intervention, one that is potentially gainful towards the de-
securitisation of development intervention and compatible with the Nigerian socio-cultural reality.

1.1 Situating the Problem of Study I: The Local Context

Nigeria is rife with conflicts which include ethno-religious, social and political violence. There are a growing number of armed militant groups including state-supported vigilante
groups such as O’Odua People’s Congress (OPC), Bakassi Boys, Mambilla Militia group, as
well as the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies (Oyeniyi, 2010). The Niger Delta and
Boko Haram insurgencies stand out from the pack as their activities produce both near and
far dire consequences. For instance, during the peak of the Niger Delta insurgency (2004-
2009), there was a high spate of bombing of oil installations and facilities, kidnapping of
foreign oil workers and local executives, piracy, illegal oil refining and bunkering, inter-
ethnic conflicts and near daily armed battle between militants and security operatives. These
militant activities affected the Nigerian government and the international community badly.
For the Nigerian government, its oil production reduced drastically from 2.4/2.6 barrels per
day (BPD) to around 700,000 BPD. This had a devastating effect on its gross revenue as
Nigeria relies on oil for about 80 percent of its total revenue. From the international
perspective, the Middle East crises, especially the war in Iraq and sanctions on Iran (for its
nuclear programmes) meant that the global economy would be more affected than usual by
the reduction in Nigeria’s oil production capacity.

On the other hand, the Boko Haram insurgency, while seeming to have fewer direct economic
consequences than the Niger Delta insurgency, as its activities are concentrated in the north-
east (NE) of Nigeria, nonetheless portend serious consequences. For instance, it creates a state
of insecurity that discourages potential local and foreign investors from investing in the north
as well as other parts of Nigeria. Boko Haram also disrupts the economic livelihood of millions of people in the Northeast (up to 20,000 people have been killed and over 3 million displaced since 2009) leading to a humanitarian crisis that sucks Nigeria’s neighbouring countries and the international community into the conflict. A regional army, Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of 8700 armies of the Republics of Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Benin was formed in 2015. Boko Haram presents a regional threat as it has expanded its terrorist activities to the Republics of Chad, Cameroon and Niger as well as an international threat based on its public alliance with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and suspected connections with other al-Qaeda networks. Therefore, external actors mainly states and international development agencies have intervened in conflict-ridden zones like Nigeria based on the humanitarian crises that these conflicts engender and their threats to international security and global economy (rather than the often trumpeted cause of human security).

On 11 September 2001 (9/11), there was a terrorist attack on the United States (U.S.) mainland, carried out by al-Qaeda. Since 9/11, external interventions in conflict zones around the world have been largely based on the idea of the global war on terror (GWOT) inspired by President George W. Bush. Certainly, 9/11 represents a turning point in the discourse of international terrorism and, equally international intervention, yet international humanitarian intervention predates 9/11. The U.S., the United Kingdom (UK), China, Israel and the international community, including international development agencies such as the Department for Foreign Investment Development (DFID), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) have contributed to Nigeria’s fight against insurgency and terrorism.

The Nigerian government has also, since the return to civilian rule in 1999, initiated several local reforms such as the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDs) and the State Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (SEEDs) initiated by President
Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), Vision 20:20 by President Musa Yar’Adua (2007-2010) and Transformation Agenda by President Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015). These economic policies and programmes aim to address the push factors such as poverty, unemployment, inequality, essentially, human development challenges that produce grievances that lead people to insurgency and terrorism. Some scholars argue that these national economic policies were inspired by the promise of foreign aid and external development assistance, rather than the genuine intent for national development (Paden, 2005; Omeje, 2007). It is difficult to prove this, but it is not unlikely that the domestic economic policies are direct or indirect response to the UN’s appeal to states.

In setting out the UN new vision, Annan (2005) charges states to establish “practical national strategies to meet the Millennium Goals” and that “donors must also ensure that developing countries that put such strategies in place really do get the support they need, in the form of market access, debt relief and official development assistance (ODA)” (p.72). Picciotto, Clarke and Olonisakin (2010) describe this agenda under the global “partnership for development” requiring poor countries to “prepare poverty reduction papers for review by international financial institutions-a prerequisite of debt reduction and increased aid” (p.2). Perhaps, one is prone to see the national macro-economic policies established by President Obasanjo, President Yar’Adua and President Jonathan as been less motivated by the genuine need to solve domestic development issues, considering the debt relief secured by President Obasanjo and the CT assistance received by President Yar’Adua and President Jonathan. However, in direct response to the Niger Delta crisis, the different administrations, including past military regimes, have applied development strategies such as the creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the Ministry of Niger Delta, and other non-kinetic approaches including the granting of amnesty to the Niger Delta militants. This is besides the
use of military force, as carried out by its Joint Task Force (JTF) comprising the nation’s military, police, and security force.

The Boko Haram conflict has also attracted a mixed response involving an overt military counter-terrorism as well as other non-kinetic approaches. The non-kinetic approaches include political engagements such as several attempts at dialogue and potential negotiation (and even the promise of a replica of the Niger Delta-style amnesty) and a clamour for a northeast development commission. It is important to note that while Boko Haram and the movements in the Niger Delta may be differentiated in terms of their motives, targets of attack, local support, and organisational structure (Sampson, 2013), the differences fail to conceal abject poverty, endemic corruption, ethnicity and bad governance that appear as common denominators to both these and other conflicts. Focusing on the Niger Delta conflict, Oluwaniyi (2011) views it as “a microcosm of the larger Nigerian state within the context of equity, access to oil resources and power by oil-rich communities, self-determination, ethnic autonomy, lack of political participation and democratic accountability, underdevelopment and widespread poverty” (p.49). Some scholars however give more priority to ideology (Islamic fundamentalist drive) than economic motivations in their analysis of the Boko Haram conflict (Alao, 2013; Cook, 2014).

Evidently, the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts have attracted a military as well as a development approach from the Nigerian government and external interveners. In the specific instance of the Niger Delta conflict, successive Nigerian governments, external governments, and their agencies have preferred a development approach to a military response, as indicated by the robust development policies tailored towards solving the region’s problems (Akanji, 2009). Yet, crisis in the Niger Delta persists (although it is largely underreported). Similarly, the Boko Haram’s conflict has continued for eight years (since it turned violent in 2009) despite
combined efforts by the armies of Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria, and the security assistance from the U.S., U.K, Israel, China, Russia and other external governments.

1.2 Situating the Problem of Study II: The Triad of Human Development, Human Security and Human Rights

Apparently, development intervention is one of the instruments applied towards countering insurgency and terrorism. As the UN charter expresses, Freedom from Want is as important as Freedom from Fear (Annan 2005). For instance, Annan (2005) posits that support for human rights and democracy must go hand in hand with serious action to promote development” (p.71). The state is charged with the primary responsibility of protecting its citizens from fear and want. For Annan (2005) “when states fail to live up to this responsibility, it passes to the international community” (p.69). However, a deterrent approach which includes development intervention, broadly speaking, is mainly applied. It is only “when prevention fails, and all other means have been exhausted, we must be able to rely on the use of force” (Annan, 2005, p.68). Hence, the use of force (military intervention) is only considered as a last resort, and must be authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC), in the case of external intervention. It is against this backdrop that this thesis considers both the domestic and external commitment to this responsibility.

The thesis seeks to combine human rights, development and security as a single unit of analysis, which is unique especially in its application to the Nigerian conflict situation. As previously stated, although each concept has its own peculiar ontological and epistemological history and development, scholars have established relationships and connections, for instance, between development and security, and between human rights and development. Relationship among these three concepts is also fore-grounded in the UN’s statement quoted in the beginning of this chapter and in the publication by Moser et al (2001). Precisely, the
thesis’ uniqueness resides in its attempt to intellectually consider the triad among the three concepts in relation to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram Nigerian conflicts. As Annan posits, the frontiers of global security threats have expanded to include poverty, inequality and underdevelopment. Hence, development and security are connected and the Millennium Development Goals (and now, Sustainable Development Goals, post-2015 goals) are reflective of the “need to combine security and development efforts” (Picciotto et al, 2010, p.3). It is therefore unsurprising that most Western governments such as the US, UK and Canada have now integrated the policies of their several agencies, including development and aid, diplomacy, defense and intelligence into a single coherent policy.

Ultimately, soft power including political solutions, economic assistance as well as sanctions, diplomacy, intelligence and the use of multilateral or international cooperation is harnessed with traditional military approaches (drone attacks, airstrikes, and special squads) in response to the perceived global threat of terrorism. Specifically, there is a shape shifting in security such that, in principle, human security is prioritised above state security, but in practice, the state still remains the primary agent for implementing international human rights laws. This involves guaranteeing and protecting the human rights of all people within its territory. The forces of globalisation and more so, the nature of contemporary conflicts (one that is generally within and across states, religious or ethnic in character and excessively violent and cruel to civilians) have aided and abetted the rationalisation of human security. While the state remains the primary duty bearer with the responsibility to guarantee the security of the people within the state, external governments, especially governments of developed countries and international organisations are also considered duty bearers. However, for the latter, the motive for intervention in ineffective and developing countries is less about the security and development of the people in those countries but more about protecting their own security and way of life (Duffield, 2007; Buzan, 2004).
Nevertheless, development intervention in developing countries such as Nigeria is based on an economic growth model. The orthodox liberal intervention in developing nations seeks to transform traditional subsistence economies defined as ‘backward’ into industrial, commoditized economies defined as ‘modern’ using economic growth metrics such as GDP and relying on a top-down logic favouring large capital investment, expert knowledge (usually Western and hence external), and advanced technology and privatisation. Essentially, development interveners perceive development to be the “fundamentally un-contentious business of organising decent lives for the presently disadvantaged people of the Third World”. (Preston, 1999, p.24).

Equally, the neo-liberal policies (for example the Structural Adjustment programmes, SAP) of the early 1980s furthered the principles of the economic growth model. The international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) championed the objectives of the neo-liberal principles including the liberalisation of the market, expansion of free market, privatisation and reduction in government spending. Nonetheless, as Preston notes, the austerity measures the receiving governments were expected to oversee “have usually required parallel programmes of political repression” (ibid. p.64).

However, new ideas, as reflected in the post-development and post-security theories, have now supplanted the economic growth approach. Since the 1990s, the concepts of human security and human development have dominated the policies and practices of development agencies, including traditional global mainstream institutions such as the WB, particularly since 2000, following the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report (2000). While economic indicators such as GDP and gross national product (GNP) continue to be relevant, the UN has now introduced newer metrics for measuring development such as human development index (HDI), poverty development
index (PDI) and gender-related index. The new metrics underscore the shift from a narrowly conceptualised market-based concept of development to a broader conceptualisation of development where “what is going to count as development will have to be locally determined” (Preston, 1999, p.24).

However, developed countries consider many states in developing countries to be ineffective and incapable of providing development and by extension security to their citizens. They often lack capacity to effectively design and implement sound and coherent development policies, regulatory quality, and the condition of states’ institutions. The argument here is that many African states have weak and dysfunctional institutions (electoral, judicial, constitution, financial) that undermine constitutional democracy, stifle economic, social and political development, and deepen inequality) (Le Sage, 2007; Chau, 2008; Forest & Giroux, 2011).

The notion of human security therefore “embodies a mobilising relation of governance able to bridge the worlds of sustainable development and international security” (Duffield, 2007, p.111). This justifies international intervention and explains the activities of government development agencies such as DFID and USAID as well as other international and UN humanitarian agencies.

Ironically, before 9/11 and the growing terrorist threats and attacks on Western soil and against Western targets, external development interventions have been based less on entitlements but more on moral grounds, which Preston (1999) describes as “moral responsibility”( Preston 1999, p.157-8) following the end of colonisation in the late 1940s. The West, particularly states in the North were wary of the new claim for economic and social rights (ESR) in the 1980s by developing countries and organisations in the South sympathetic to their cause. Therefore, the Right to Development Declaration of 1986 presented only a partial integration of development and human rights. However, with the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, the integration between human rights and development has
become deeper. However, intervention is no longer driven by moral responsibility (and moral responsibility may even not have been the driving force as Preston opines); rather it is a tool of control or a “bio political technology” for grouping human kind into developed and underdeveloped societies with the aim of maintaining the status quo (Duffield, 2007). The phrase “bio political technology” is likely derived from the concept of “biopolitics”, closely related to Michel Foucault’s “biopower”, which relates to several techniques a state uses to achieve social and political control of populations (Foucault 1976, p.140)

Globalisation is seen as a force for maintaining such control, as it has produced an unjust world order with far reaching impact on the lives of people all over the world, with the Third World countries, especially Africa bearing the brunt of the negative side (Pogge, 2002; Greig. A, Hulme. D & Turner. M, 2007). There is a wide margin between the rich and the poor, “with the poorest fifth of the world’s population receiving 1.4 percent of the global income, while the richest fifth receives 85 percent” (Hausermann, 1998, p.23). Picciotto et al, (2010) aver that “the same characteristics of open societies that facilitate the global reach of multinational companies have induced rising inequalities, social tensions and natural resource depletion… as well as rise in violent conflict, weapons proliferation, international crime, and transnational terrorism”(p.3).However, not everyone agrees with the view that globalisation is responsible for the poverty, inequality and crises in the developing world (Collier, 2007). For instance, Collier (2007) believes that developing countries are as much responsible (if not more responsible) for their condition, but he does agree that intervention is essential.

Patently, the relationship between development and security is complex as development interventions tend to become securitized (Stewart, 2004; Duffield, 2007, 2010; Stern & Ojendal, 2010). Therefore, a rights-based approach has been proposed as a bridge between development and security such that development is freed of unhelpful consequences (Hausermann, 1998; Sano, 2000; Hamm, 2001; Uvin, 2007). A rights based approach can
achieve de-securitisation of development intervention, as it focuses not just on the outcomes of intervention, but more so, on the processes. And this should be based on human rights principles of participation, inclusion, equality, non-discrimination, transparency, accountability and rule of law. The challenges facing external interveners include the reason for intervening and the set of assumptions that guide intervention. In this regard, the proponents for the rights based approach to development have argued for the inclusion of external interveners as duty bearers, not as a condition of moral responsibility, but as a legal condition (Sen, 2004, p.340-342; Sen, 2010; Sengupta, 2010; Boesen & Sano, 2010; Picciotto et al 2010). Yet, as Sen (2004) and others note, a legalistic condition of development as human right may not be the most effective approach (Sano, 2000; Uvin, 2007). The argument whether development should be seen through the prism of economic growth or from that of human development (involving well-being and capability) presents another contention.

Yet, whether seen as economic growth or as human development, the state remains the global agent for securing humans within its territory. According to some scholars, the state has the elective power and mandate that put it in a good position to take on this role, unlike civil society organisations (CSO) and other non-state bodies (Thomas, 2001; Hausermann, 1998). While the rights based approach to development recognises other duty bearers such as international and local non-governmental organisations (NGO), and development and human right bodies, human rights remain “a global vision backed by state obligations” (Hausermann, 1998, p.25). Conversely, the central role that the state continues to play contradicts the idea that human security is prioritised over state security. It inadvertently supports the economic growth logic of wealth trickling down (a view that has not succeeded so far in developing countries). For example, Nigeria is the second largest economy in Africa, but a majority of its citizens remain among the poorest in the world. Thus, the relationship between development and security and, between human rights and development is fraught with contradictions.
Despite the benefits that a rights-based approach offer, including high visibility into the policies and practices of duty bearers towards protecting human security and the growing cooperation between development agencies and human rights bodies such as Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), there are still significant challenges. These include the controversial role of the nation-state as the primary duty bearer, the implication of global security (external intervention) on state sovereignty and securitised development, the role of NGOs and CSOs and the prevailing partial and implicit theory of human rights. However, the literature is steadily growing and showing strong potential to correct the many defects currently observable in both the external and internal domestic development interventions. More so, the empirical nature of this study offers the opportunity to contribute to the enrichment of the concept of a human rights approach to development as well as its nuanced manifestation in the Nigerian context.

The discussion of the triad among human rights, development and security opens up opportunities as well as challenges that a development approach to global security threats (such as terrorism) present. In terms of opportunities, addressing poverty, inequality and underdevelopment can be a useful counter-terrorism strategy, as it removes the conditions that can act as incentive for engaging in insurgents and terrorist’s acts. In this sense, development becomes “securitised” as security is “developmentalised” (Picciotto 2010, p.7). Hence, the challenge is that it also does lend itself to securitisation. Also, a rights-based approach to development can help towards the de-securitisation of development, but there is still divorce between principles and practices. Hence, it is worthwhile to intellectually engage with how development intervention is conceived and practised by internal and external duty bearers towards the Nigerian conflicts, particularly looking at how they conform to human rights principles.
1.3 Research Questions

This thesis therefore seeks to explore how the internal and external duty-bearers conceptualise and practice development in direct response to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts in Nigeria. It considers whether the development policies and anti-terrorism laws conform to human rights standards both in terms of outcome and process. And, finally, it engages with exploration of a potential approach that is compatible with Nigeria’s socio-cultural environment. The exploratory study is guided by three key questions.

Firstly, it will consider the question: How have internal and external development initiatives and interventions been developed in the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts and what are the issues that have arisen concerning their effectiveness? Secondly, do the anti-terrorism laws and development policies and programmes by the local and external interveners conform to human rights principles and what evidence is there concerning the ways in which they are both conceived and implemented? And, thirdly, how could a human rights approach to development that is compatible with the Nigerian socio-cultural be developed?

The first question aims to investigate how the internal and external development initiatives and interventions are developed based on the requirement of the rights-based approach: that is, that the process of development is as important (if not more important and feasible) as the outcome—which is human rights (Sengupta, 2010; Boesen & Sano, 2010). This approach is important as it presents the possibility of eliminating the inclination towards securitisation of development intervention or unintended consequences of development interventions.

Essentially, this thesis seeks to explore the potential that a soft power approach, (in more specific terms, a development and rights-based approach, as adopted by this study) holds to solving the insurgency and terrorism problems that the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts produce in Nigeria. It recognises the fact that poverty, discrimination, inequality and
underdevelopment are constantly linked with (in) security. Hence, development interventions are increasingly becoming a form of security response. They are now more than a humanitarian concern, as traditional development agencies and institutions are tied with defence institutions and programmes tending towards securitised development.

“Humanitarian and development advocates harbour legitimate fears that the aid business could be ‘taken over’ or undermined by a defense establishment partial to military solutions and committed to state-centric security doctrines.” (Picciotto et al, 2010, p.4). Therefore the rights-based approach seeks to achieve de-securitisation of development. Yet, in the rights-based approach there is less unity between its principles and practices- a situation that can undermine the chance of victory against insurgency and terrorism in Nigeria. Development interveners are becoming increasingly aware of the need to adhere to the principles of human rights (including participation and inclusion, accountability and the rule of law, and equality and non-discrimination) in their development interventions. It is therefore important to study what issues development interveners have or are likely to encounter in the design and implementation of the development initiatives towards the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts.

Basically, a rights-based approach advances the idea that human rights determine the process and outcome of development. Therefore, human rights principles and instruments provide the framework for development interveners and anti-terrorism legislators. It is against this backdrop that the second research question is advanced. In this instance, the thesis is concerned with how development policies and interventions can have unintended and unhelpful consequences especially in protracting the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts. For example, some militants and ethnic communities in the Niger Delta have expressed their anger and frustration at being left out from the amnesty given to about 30,000 Niger Delta
militants. It will therefore be productive to see how a rights-based approach that promotes inclusion can correct such anomaly.

However, human rights are dynamic. There are still notable reservations against human rights conventions and legislations. A classic example is the frustration of the U.K judges with the European Convention on Human Rights (that overrules some of the national rulings) which is one of the concerns of the United Kingdom, one that partly informed the decision of the UK to leave the European Union (EU). Evidently, there is no unanimous agreement on the effectiveness or utility of international human rights instruments. While they lend themselves as useful legal concrete tools for ensuring rights based approach to development, they are at the same time dynamic in nature (Hausermann, 1998; Donnelly, 1999). In addition, a rights-based approach to development does not necessarily require a legal instrument. Non-legalistic means such as public discussion, advocacy (the activities of AI and HRW illustrate this point); monitoring and other administrative measures can be more effective than a coercive human rights legislation (Sano, 2000; Sen, 2004; Uvin, 2007). More so, as post-development theories such as human development suggests, the socio-cultural environment and perceptions are essential to how we construct development and growth. Research question three is based on this argument.

This last question is very important as these insurgencies have persisted despite massive national military campaign and growing international cooperation in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. For instance, initiatives by local community networks such as the civilian joint task force (CJTF) in the northeast of Nigeria and other vigilante and community groups have yielded fruitful results. It is not unlikely that such results are based on their local knowledge of the socio-cultural conditions, besides the need to protect themselves from the Boko Haram carnage and the Nigerian military’s initial collective punishment approach. It is therefore crucial to explore how these initiatives (which are
mostly non-legalistic) can be adopted and adapted as a coherent framework to solving the insurgency and terrorism problem in Nigeria.

1.4 Outline of Thesis

Following this introductory chapter are seven chapters. The next chapter, “Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks”, provides a deep and full criticism of the key concepts and theories applied in this thesis. It maps the debates in the literature on terrorism/insurgency, counterterrorism/counterinsurgency, development and security, development and human rights, and the human rights approach to development. This chapter is crucial to the thesis as it provides the theoretical rationale and conceptual clarifications from which this empirical study justifies its stance and/or point of departure.

Chapter three engages with the literature on Nigeria, firstly considering a much more general literature on the responses to Nigeria’s conflict and, then the specific literature on the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts. In the final part of the chapter, there is an attempt to draw out parallels and differences between Niger Delta and Boko Haram. In the general literature on Nigeria, the chapter provides an overview of the Nigerian conflict architecture including the responses with their ramifications. Quite distinctly, it offers a critique of some of the historical non-military approaches particularly the principle of consociation applied by successive Nigerian government as a form of conflict stabilisation and management. The specific literature on the two selected conflict groups reveals the gamut of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts and recommendations as well as the gap that this thesis seeks to cover.

Chapter Four discusses the methodological basis of the study. Here, the research design (primarily qualitative study), data collection and data analysis processes are clearly described.
The study relies on a case study, comparative study and Grounded Theory design. In this chapter, the population, sample and sampling technique and the interview participants are explained. A total of 52 participants, including a 10 participant and a 5 participant focus groups were involved. This is in addition to documentary analysis and observation. The ethical implication and limitations of the study are also discussed.

Chapter Five focuses on the Niger Delta case study, beginning with a brief discussion of the history of the insurgency and an assessment of the internal development initiatives and interventions. The assessment starts with a discussion of the military intervention, one that appears to follow an untypical trajectory when compared to the chronology of responses to the Boko Haram insurgent group. The chapter then progresses to the analysis of external development initiatives and interventions and the issues that have arisen concerning their effectiveness. The Chapter concludes that the motivations for the Niger Delta conflict remain unchanged as the general belief (among interveners) that the region requires special development attention and intervention remains uncontested. However, there is a sense that past development interventions cared less about producing a lasting solution in the region, an attitude that is gradually eroding with the new development intervention strategies.

Chapter Six concentrates on Boko Haram. Chapter Six has a similar structure to Chapter Five beginning with an analysis of the military responses. The chapter concludes that a military strategy remains predominant in the responses to the Boko Haram insurgency. Unlike the Niger Delta, the findings here show that the military approach produces some notable level of success as much as it continues to escalate the conflict and produce other negative trends. It also identifies a growing awareness of a rights-based approach to development intervention, yet, one that remains susceptible to securitisation and produces unsustainable development.
In Chapter Seven, a comparative analysis of both insurgencies is conducted. The comparative analysis of the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflict groups includes a discussion of the similarities and differences in the nature and characteristics of the groups (such as the type, motivations, popular support and method of operation). The similarities and differences in the responses to the conflict groups are also presented in this chapter. The Chapter concludes that both conflicts require general as well specific development interventions that recognize the peculiarities of each conflict. Lastly, the Chapter draws out parallels and ramifications for future occurrence of conflicts and the Nigerian state capacity to cope. Three key propositions were made: defining the place of religion in Nigeria, addressing Nigeria’s complex federalism, and adopting human rights based approach to development.

Chapter Eight, the concluding chapter, briefly restates the arguments that guided this thesis as well as discusses the key findings. Some of the key findings include evidence of knowledge and application of a rights based approach to development intervention; genuine lack of capacity by the Nigerian state with its CSOs; little attempt by external interveners to mask strategic interests as motivation for intervention, and the unhelpful consequences (unsustainable development) that the funding policies adopted by external interveners produce.
Chapter Two: Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks

2.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses key concepts and debates that provide the framework for the empirical study of Boko Haram and Niger Delta. The key concepts include terrorism, insurgency, counter-terrorism (CT), counter-insurgency (CI), development, security and human rights. For instance, different labels such as cults, militants, insurgents and terrorists have been used to describe Boko Haram and the violent movements within the Niger Delta. However, the conflict groups do not always fit such categorizations and these are often overlap. For example, Boko Haram fits the description of terrorist group based on its indiscriminate and deliberate act of terror against the civilian population, but there has been no evidence of direct and deliberate attack on civilian population in the Niger Delta, except by the Nigerian military. Yet, both conflicts show abundant evidence of insurgency or guerilla warfare including the use of ambush, hit-and-run, sabotage and kidnap. It is therefore pertinent to critically engage the literature on terrorism and insurgency, with a view of mapping similarities and differences, but ultimately, this study supports the view that terrorism is only a tactic of insurgency. Hence, in order to tackle the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurrections, there is a need for a soft power approach.

Soft power approaches are more inclined to CI than CT in a way that shows interplay between the delineation of terrorism and insurgency and the responses they elicit. Therefore, the discussion of terrorism and insurgency naturally progresses to debate on CT and CI. Next, the chapter focuses on the established nexus between development and security; development and human rights; and the three concepts combined.
2.1 Terrorism and Insurgency: Assumptions and Debates

Evidently, there is no universally agreed definition of terrorism. However, there are several attempts in the literature to form consensus around the discourse of terrorism. Some of the key characteristics of terrorism are: the use of or threat of the use of violence, deliberate targeting of civilians/non-combatants/the innocent, deliberate production of fear, terror and anxiety in a group, tool for communicating acts of violence to a larger audience, goal of intimidation, coercion and/or propaganda, and a predominant political motive (Schmid, 2005). For example, Schmid and Jongman (1988) define terrorism as “an anxiety-inspired method of repeated violent action, employed by semi-clandestine individuals, groups, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons” (p.28). Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler (2004) define terrorism as “a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role” (p.786). O’Neal (1990, p.24) defines terrorism as “the sustained use of violence against symbolic or civilian targets by small groups for political purposes, such as inspiring fear, drawing widespread attention to a political grievance, and/or provoking a draconian or unsustainable response” (p.24, as cited by Kiras, 2007).

There are others like Ganor (2002) who argues for an objective and internationally accepted definition of terrorism. He looks to international laws and conventions as guiding principles and moral compass for the definition of terrorism that will apply to international as well as domestic terrorism. Ganor (2002), offers such an objective definition of terrorism: “the intentional use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians or against civilian targets in order to attain political aims” based mainly on the means applied as well as the aim (which must be ‘political’ to qualify as terrorism) (p.294). Nonetheless, the conceptualisation of terrorism remains subjective (Hudson & Majeska, 1999).
The lack of consensus in the definition of terrorism takes on an additional twist when we consider the axiomatic expression that one man’s terrorist can be another person’s freedom fighter. There are those who view terrorism as a distinct form of warfare or conflict (Hoffman, 1999; Kaldor, 1999; 2005; Laqueur, 1996; Kalyvas, 2005) and those that only see terrorism as a tactic/strategy of warfare (Merari, 1993; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Tilly, 2004; Schmid, 2005; Smith, 2005; Angstrom, 2005; Walzer, 2006; Metz, 2007). Many of those who support the latter view claim that the nature of war and the conventional framework for analysing war (Clausewitz’s ‘logic of war’) remain unchanged; rather the difference between “old war” and “new war” is the intensification in the tactics of war. Others like Kiras (2007) categorises terrorism and insurgency as “irregular warfare” (see also, Kalyvas, 2005).

Kalyvas’ (2005) categorisation of civil wars as a specific kind of warfare: “symmetric non-conventional” is however different from those of the new war or new terrorism adherents as it acknowledges symmetry in the character of the new war. Smith (2005), publishing in the same volume, however, challenges Kalyvas’ categorisation, as it tends to support the new war belief, even if such support is only implied.

It is important to mention here that this thesis is less concerned about the typologies of war; hence there is no need to go into extensive debate about the different categories of war. However, it is equally important to state that the broad categorisation of war as either international (inter-state) or civil war is no longer sustainable. There are new trends of conflicts such that we can identify “wars between or among states; wars between a state and non-state forces outside the state, wars within states, and wars between or among non-state actors taking place outside of states” (Sarkees 2010, p.9). Essentially, there are old characteristics of warfare that remain valid as there are new manifestations of warfare.

Some scholars associated with the school of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) including the “Clausewitzians”, scholars that support the continuing relevance of Clausewitz logic of war
to today’s conflict such as Angstrom (2005) and Smith (2005) support the theory of “rational choice”. They use the rational choice theory to explain how terrorism can be utilised, by both state and non-state actors, as a tool or means to achieve a political end. The rational choice theory (RCT) is “a form of political behaviour resulting from the deliberate choice of a basically rational actor, the terrorist organisation” (Crenshaw, 1981, p.380). Notably, the political nature or outcome of terrorism is one of its defining characteristics. Terrorism therefore can serve to achieve several goals: nationalism, separatism, revolution and reformist agendas. Terrorist organisations often use terrorism to draw public attention to their perceived plights or demands. Hence, terrorism becomes a medium of communication to several audiences. However, its ultimate objective is to gain attention or public recognition (Crenshaw, 1981; Tilly, 2004; Schmid, 2005).

RCT can also be utilised at the strategic operational level. In essence, terrorist leaders are strategic thinkers that debate the utility or futility of using terrorism as a means of achieving their desired end. They consider the size of the organisation, the amount of resources available, the amount and quality of information, ideology, mass media coverage and internal group dynamics (Kalyvas, 2005; Wilkinson, 2000; Schmid, 2005; Walzer, 2006; Kiras, 2007). This utilitarian calculation in the use of terrorism may account for the challenge one encounters in trying to distinguish between terrorism and insurgency as different forms of conflict. For instance, Merari (1993), in defence of terrorism as a strategy of insurgency, argues that insurgents do not always make a rational decision in the use of terrorism. By implication, insurgents only employ terrorism most likely as an act of desperation. This study agrees with Merari’s view that terrorism is a tactic rather than a form of warfare, but disagrees with his other view that insurgents do not weigh the consequences of using terror tactics before applying terrorism, as the insurgents still have the choice to choose between using terrorism or not. Kiras (2007) argues that while terrorism and insurgency most often
present political goals, terrorism is not always about or rarely leads to political change, unlike insurgency. He also argues that local support and mobilisation, including external support are higher and significant in the case of insurgency than terrorism However, there seems to be no clear boundary between terrorism and insurgency, as most insurgent groups have utilised both guerrilla tactics (ambush, hit-and-run) and terrorist strategies (suicide bombing, kidnapping) at different stages in their life span. The rational approach to terrorism provides the distinctive marker between criminal terrorist act of violence and ordinary criminal violence (Schmid, 2005, Kiras, 2007; Walzer, 2006; Jenkins, 1999). Specifically, the victim(s) of terrorism are often not the political target, unlike criminal violence where a person that is assassinated, for instance, is often the intended target, and underlying the terrorist act of violence is a political motive.

Nevertheless, do terrorists always have a political agenda? Political outcome is a central feature in many of the definitions on terrorism. The proponents of the “Fourth Wave” or “new terrorism” recognise this key characteristic of terrorism in their argument that conflict actors in the fourth wave aim for political rather than military success (Hammes, 2005), even when they argue that terrorism may as well be used as an end in itself (Hoffman, 1999). As such, the assumption that terrorism or terrorists always have a political agenda is not entirely correct. We cannot always tell the motive of a terrorist group and in most cases, the motives change over time. We should not however assume that a terrorist group does not have a political agenda, as the clarity of political motive or the logic of means and ends may be clearer to some groups (Crenshaw, 1981; Walzer, 2006). Walzer’s (2006) suggestion that the stated goals of a terrorist group is perhaps more important for analysis than its act of violence runs the risk of overlooking a group’s transformation (which can be evident in forms of new goals), but it does foreground the idea of rationality that creates the opportunity for mediation (Duyvesteyn, 2005). If we define political objectives broadly: as seeking to influence the
organisation of society or the form of government in a territory, as well as influencing specific government policies, then most if not all terrorism can be seen to have political motives.

The Relative Deprivation theory (RDT) or the Breakdown-Grievance theory (BGT) is another prominent theory that has been applied to terrorism discourse (Ted Gurr, 1971). This theory covers the greed versus grievance debate. RDT or BGT defines a feeling or measurement of economic, social and political deprivation of a person or group of persons in relation to others. It considers deprivation in relative rather than absolute terms such that a deprived person (s) feels entitled to that which s/he is deprived of that others have. Relative deprivation is closely linked to poverty and social exclusion with major impact on the behaviour and attitude of the deprived. Hence, it often produces grievances that can lead the aggrieved into social vices such as crime, rioting, civil war and terrorism. Ted Gurr is the major proponent (Gurr, 1970, 1993). In response to this argument, some scholars and studies have found little causal relations between deprivation or grievance and terrorism (Collier 2007; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Such scholars have shown that terrorism or insurgency may be motivated more by greed than grievance or, at least, greed often displaces grievance as primary motivation (Collier, 2007; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Others maintain a modest or middle-of-the-road position in the sense that while admitting that grievance or deprivation alone does not necessarily lead to conflict, they offer a much deeper analysis of the greed versus grievance debate (Crenshaw, 1981; Schmid, 2005). According to Crenshaw (1981), “terrorism is neither an automatic reaction to conditions nor a purely calculated strategy”. (p.390). Terrorism is therefore much more a likely interaction of situational (preconditions or environmental conditions) and behavioural (precipitants or reactions/psychological) conditions.
Crenshaw (1981) uses the concepts of “preconditions” and “precipitants” to categorise and discuss prevailing existing conditions in the case of the former and, actions, especially overt counter-terrorism that precipitate conflict. She further breaks preconditions into two sub-categories: “enabling” and “permissive” or “root causes” and “proximate causes” (see Schmid, 2005, p.132), in his adaptation of Crenshaw’s categorising labels. Root causes are “long-term” and “structural” in nature, while proximate causes are “medium-term” and “situational”. Schmid (2005) breaks the proximate causes further into “accelerators” and “decelerators” based on the situation that facilitates or inhibits the chance of terrorism. The enabling conditions or root causes, in the view of Crenshaw and many others, do not necessarily cause terrorism. However, based on the permissive preconditions or proximate factors, we can argue that deprivation can engender grievance that can be a reason, rather than an opportunity for terrorism. Therefore, while poverty, lack of political participation, access to power, exclusion and marginalisation do not lead to conflict in themselves, a society with such manifestation is prone to terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Schmid, 2005).

The study carried out by Caruso and Scheidner (2011) lends further support to the importance of socio-economic conditions to terrorism and political violence, particularly the argument that a society with high level of marginalisation and inequality is more prone to conflict than one without marginalisation and inequality. Unlike most studies that investigate this phenomenon in the context of developing or poor countries, Caruso and Scheidner’s (2011) study focuses on 11 relatively developed countries in Europe. Hence, developed countries are, despite having high gross domestic product (GDP), not immune from terrorism and political violence as future rapid growth can create uneven development. This can create grievance among a section of the population (Caruso & Scheidner, 2011). Conversely, it is not always true that countries with lower GDPs will experience terrorism (Abadie, 2004). Ultimately, neither RDT nor economic growth theory (EGT) is adequate in explaining why a
people may resort to terrorism and political violence. However, in the case of EGT and even RDT, a government may intervene with deliberate and targeted policies based on the rule of law and other democratic principles to offset the imbalance (Caruso & Scheidner, 2011; Schmid, 2005; Walzer, 2006; Wilkinson, 2000; Hausermann, 1998; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Unsurprisingly, Fearon and Laitin (2003) favour state weakness marked by poverty, large population and instability rather than grievances such as inequality, lack of democracy and state discrimination based on religion and other cultural identities as likely causes of terrorism.

Evidently, scholars appear divided in their opinions and findings regarding the significance of RDT to terrorism. While there is some form of unanimity in the little support for socio-economic grievances or deprivation, we encounter slight variations in the scholars’ view. For instance, some variables score high in some studies, and low (in terms of importance) in other studies. For instance, Piazza (2006), like Fearon and Laitin (2003) identifies large population and state repression as key causal elements, but, unlike Fearon and Laitin, Piazza (2006) magnifies ethno-religious diversity and lack of political opportunities as major causes of terrorism. Abadie (2004) also finds political and civil factors such as level of political freedom more crucial than econometric measures. Further support for political oppression rather than poverty is evident in the study by Krueger and Laitin (2008).

Another crucial debate in the study of terrorism revolves around the concept of “new terrorism”. The new terrorism debate is akin to the “new war” argument and seen as a subset of it (Kaldor, 1999). Mary Kaldor’s book: New and Old Wars sets out the characteristics of new wars beginning from late 1980s and 1990s (distinctively post-Cold War era), as distinct from the two World Wars. Most wars under this label are described as internal or civil wars or “low-intensity conflicts”. New war scholars describe them as less ideological, nationalistic or geo-political in nature, but driven more by “identity politics”, that is “...claim to power on
the basis of a particular identity—be it national, clan, religious or linguistic” (Kaldor, 1999, p.6). The new wars also spurn the conventional mode of warfare that involves decisive battles often between conventional/standard armies with the aim of capturing territories through military advance. Rather, they embrace guerrilla warfare as well as counterinsurgency tactics that avoids battles and involves the control of territory through “political control of the population”. Unlike old type of insurgency, winning “hearts and minds” is not paramount, instead, the counterinsurgency tendency of controlling the population by sowing “fear and hatred” (mostly through eliminating people of other identities or people with differing opinions). Civilians are targeted indiscriminately tending towards genocide and its corollary effects such as mass displacement and refugee situation. Moreover, lastly, the new wars are highly decentralised in their organisation including operation and economies (Kaldor, 1999).

One characteristic of the proponents of the new war concept is their anti-Clausewitz disposition. They maintain that Clausewitz’s framework for understanding warfare is obsolete in explaining the new model of warfare (Creveld, 1991; Keegan, 1993; Kaldor, 1999; 2005). In the new war logic, economic motivation displaces politics (hence, the new reality is “economics by other means” rather than “politics by other means”), rationality yields to irrationality, contemporary civil wars are internal and the conflict actors are irrational. However, some critics promote the continuous relevance of Clausewitz idea of warfare in their argument against the new war logic (Angstrom, 2005; Smith, 2005; Duyvesteyn, 2005). They reject the idea that contemporary warfare is new, rather the couching of modern civil war as irrational, economically-driven, ethnically and religiously-inclined “is based on an uncritical adoption of categories and labels grounded in a double mischaracterisation” (Kalyvas, 2001, p.98). This reflects the West’s way of moralising and justifying its increased interventionism in developing countries since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s (Duffield, 2007; Angstrom, 2005; Duyvesteyn, 2005).
Kaldor represents the archetypal figure of the new war debate. Hence, new war critics direct their criticism at her mostly. Amongst other shortcomings identified in *New and Old Wars* is the attempt to de-emphasise the role of the state in organised violence and the analysis of privatised violence associated with non-state actors (de Graaff, 2005). Kalyvas (2001) challenges Kaldor’s exaggeration of the criminal elements in contemporary conflicts, while Shaw (2001) questions her argument that new wars are irrational, disorganised (in terms of purpose), violence is used mainly for mass mobilisation (hence, denying the genocidal intent in new war) and the analysis of globalisation as coterminous with the end of the Cold War. Shaw’s main criticism revolves around Kaldor’s limited theory of war, its limited historical model and the absence of a comprehensive analysis of the full range of contemporary warfare (see also Kalyvas, 2001; Picciotto et al 2010, p. 14). Kaldor (2005) responds to her critics by claiming that the analytical elevation of non-state actors and economic drives (over state and political motives) in her concept of new war is only in the context of state disintegration rather than state building.

The concept of new terrorism is similar to that of new war or the fourth wave. Fourth wave terror, according to Hammes (2005), is a post WWII manifestation of warfare, and to Rapoport (2002, p.2), a “Religious Wave” that began in 1979 (perhaps referring to the influential Iranian Revolution of 1979). It is characterised by the following: it aims at political rather than military victory (not a strategic or decisive victory), it is asymmetrical and hence difficult to defeat (cannot be prevented nor defeated but can only be contained), it is aimed at achieving strategic outcome by changing the minds of decision makers and it has a network structure unlike the hierarchical and command structure of old warfare (Lesser, 1999; Hoffman, 1999; Arquilla, Ronfeldt & Zanini, 1999; Hammes, 2005; Metz, 2007). There is more use of amateurs (Lesser, 1999, Hoffman, 1999). It is irrational in its objectives and use of violence (terrorism used as an end rather than as a means to an end), less cohesive
in its structure, religious and distinct in the increase in lethality, and the potential use of nuclear weapons (Hoffman, 1999). Terrorism is perceived as a weapon used by the weak as a coercive diplomacy (to influence decisions, policies and reforms by others-limited violence), terrorism as war to assert identity and to enforce a new world order often with possibility of using weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-total violence (Arquilla, Ronfeldt & Zanini, 1999). Arquila et al (1999), however, disagree with Hoffman (1999) on the issue of lethality. They suggest instead that the new terrorism will be less of physical annihilation, but more of non-lethal disruptive attack on information system and infrastructure- what they term “net-war”. The new terrorism is also characterised by ethnic/cultural and religious fanaticism, with religion (particularly Islam) being the defining factor in the fourth wave (Lesser, 1999; Rapoport, 2002). However, Rapoport traces its beginning to the late 70s beginning with the 1979 Iranian revolution, rather than the post-Cold War as often found in the literature on new terrorism.

The new terrorism argument has come under intense criticism (Kiras, 2007; Spencer, 2006). In addition to the criticism from the scholars sympathetic to Clausewitz logic of warfare (Smith, 2005; Angstrom, 2005), is the challenge from scholars associated with CTS. CTS is considered a sub-field of terrorism studies and its scholars use critical theory approach in their attempt to understand terrorism as a social construct. CTS stand in contradistinction to traditional or mainstream terrorism studies and criticise the latter for the lack of conceptual clarity regarding the definition of terrorism and for being methodologically and analytically weak. CTS also found mainstream terrorism scholars to be politically biased, engendered by their unfortunate alliance with state-controlled institutions, hence, leading to the skewed definition of terrorism found in many official documents (that strategically excludes state terrorism). In contrast, CTS promotes the use of critical theory in the study of terrorism; advocates the shift from state security and state-centric security policies to human security.
and people-centred security policies; demands a reframing and re-conceptualisation of gender roles that portray women as victims and men as perpetrators of violence. CTS also promotes the concept of emancipation to address whose voice is marginalised and which is empowered in the definition of terrorism (including who defines terrorism and the response to terrorism); and crucially, analyses state terror, cultural and structural violence (Carleton & Stohl, 1985; Chomsky & Herman, 1979, 1987; Tucker, 2001; Copeland, 2001; Burnett & Whyte, 2005; Gunning, 2007; Blakeley, 2007; McDonald, 2007).

“Political autonomy, control or power” is still at the heart of insurgency and terrorism (Kiras, 2007, p.205). Wilkinson (2000) attempts to debunk the claims promoted by the new terrorism scholars by de-emphasising the religious fanaticism associated with the new terrorism, arguing instead that, in most cases, such fundamentalist religious groups conceal political agendas. Contrary to the new terrorism scholars’ alarmist representation regarding the future of terrorism and the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, Wilkinson (2000) puts forward a counter-argument that is less pessimistic.

Apparently, the literature on terrorism reveals how the emotive word “terrorism” is broadly applied in some context and narrowly applied in other context. The fact that the concept of terrorism is never neutrally descriptive therefore presents a serious challenge to a terrorism scholar. Several definitions of terrorism reflect the bias of a terrorism scholar. We have identified two broad categories- mainstream terrorism scholars and scholars mostly affiliated with the Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS). The former are usually associated with states’ institutions and are instrumental to many of the official definitions of terrorism, while the latter promotes the idea of emancipation aimed at understanding terrorism from the prism of the oppressed as well as analysing state terrorism. But for the purpose of this study, this thesis will adopt a definition that combines elements from the definitions given by Ganor (2002) and Schmid & Jongman (1988): “the intentional use of, or threat to use, violence
against civilians or against civilian targets by semi-clandestine individuals, groups, or state actors, in order to attain political aims”. Combining elements from Ganor’s and Schmid and Jongman’s definitions means that state terrorism (which is often excluded from official definitions of terrorism and a target of criticism by CTS) and the indiscriminate targeting of civilians (a crucial element in most general definitions of terrorism) are captured.

2.2 Critique of Counter-terrorism and Counter-insurgency theories

The similarities and differences between terrorism and insurgency can be drawn from the rich debate on the idea of new and old war, as the previous section shows. Evidently, there are new manifestations of warfare but these do not necessarily qualify as a category of warfare, but denotes intensification in the acts of war. Hence, this study adopts the view of terrorism as a tactic of insurgency, rather than as a form of warfare. It does however recognise the different shades of opinion, which ultimately justifies the multiple theories of CI. More so, the distinction (or lack of it) between terrorism and insurgency plays out in the debate on CI and CT. In this study, CI will represent soft power approaches, while CT epitomises hard power approaches. However, CT is used as the general label.

There is not a single theory of counter-terrorism (CT). However, the authors of the European Commission (EC) project: *Theoretical Treatise on Counter-Terrorism Approaches* (2007) identify five broad perspectives that aid theorising about CT, in their inventory of CT approaches: policy, international relations, hard power versus soft power, communications, and economic perspectives. These perspectives offer general and broad frameworks for discussing virtually all the CT theories in the literature. However, such broad categorisations run the risk of glossing over important CT approaches that are useful as a stand-alone analytical theory. Therefore, I will avoid the temptation of reviewing the CT methods as a bloc. Rather, I will be evaluating how CT theories interact with the key points discussed in the previous section: Terrorism and Insurgency.
An important place to begin is the claim of political motives in the definition of terrorism. Many of the definitions on terrorism foreground the idea that terrorists project political goals. It is this idea that informs the argument by some scholars that terrorists are rational actors. Contrary, the new terrorism or new war scholars strip terrorists of any form of rationality in their description of contemporary non-state violent actors as irrational. Significantly, how we view terrorism is important to the way we construct our response. For instance, many of the new war or new terrorism scholars support the war on terror logic. However, a war approach is just one out of many CT approaches. Wilkinson (2000) highlights six theoretical approaches to countering terrorism including a military approach, political solutions, use of law enforcement and judicial control, and an educative methodology (that involves counter-narrative and other countering violent extreme [CVE] approaches).

Fundamentally, a war approach methodology presents a real risk of escalating violent conflict as there is little disagreement that government’s response to the threat and actual act of terror can escalate and protract violent conflict (a reaction that a terrorist or an insurgent group may have sought to provoke) (Crenshaw, 2000; Schmid, 2005; Kiras, 2007). While conventional armed conflict, especially of old wars, may have been guided by the Just War principle, applying the principle now is very challenging. There will be need for significant theoretical and conceptual adaptation to help us understand terrorism, according to Walzer (2006). Arguably, very few terrorist groups today will respect the doctrine of civilian or non-combatant immunity. One of the key features of terrorism is the deliberate attack on civilians. The targeting of civilian lives and properties is essential to the demarcation between insurgency and terrorism, and, of course, to the concept of “winning hearts and minds”. Insurgents need local support for victory, whereas terrorists’ attack on local civilians is indicative of the little need for winning hearts and minds.
This distinction is essential to the design of an appropriate CT or CI. For instance, Kiras (2007) stresses the importance for governments fighting violent armed groups to win the hearts and minds of the locals by addressing the root causes (basic needs) as well as promoting cooperation between the local civilians and military forces. He argues that such an approach will help to isolate insurgents physically and politically (Ibid). This approach will be more suited to insurgency than terrorism and likely defines the sentiment of the new terrorism scholars in their repudiation of the necessity of winning hearts and minds (Lesser, 1999; Hoffman, 1999). Paradoxically, Kaldor (2005), a new war proponent, supports the idea that civil society structures may be more relevant than the bureaucratic state and military structures to countering terrorism. This is very similar to Kiras’ argument for civilian and military coordination of CI (see also Crenshaw, 2000). The importance of civil society structures to countering terrorism is formed around the concept of legitimacy - the need for those countering terrorism to “maintain the moral high-ground in the struggle with terrorists by defending and strengthening the rule of law, good governance, democracy and social justice” (Schmid, 2005, p.144, 2013; see also Walzer, 2006; Wilkinson, 2000).

Particularly, in the war approach, states often adopt proactive and defensive measures, which may come in the form of pre-emptive strikes against terrorists’ strategic positions as well as efforts to fortify potential targets in order to nullify or minimise the damage caused by an attack (Sandler, 2005). However, the unintended consequences that can come in terms of collateral damage may undermine the expected positive outcome of such an approach, which can lead to escalation of terrorism. It is therefore possible for states to react in a disproportionate way that will play into the hands of the terrorists. The risk is higher in a state-led (and in a war approach) than in a civil society or in a situation involving coordinated effort between local civilians and the state forces. By involving the civilians and civil society organisations, responding states can isolate the terrorist organisations from the community
and deny them popular support and recruit as well as encourage defection (Schmid, 2005) and ultimately win “hearts and minds” of the local population- a necessary condition for CT/CI victory (Kiras, 2007).

Another way to achieve such success, according to Kiras (2007) is by addressing basic needs (or root causes). This involves addressing the situational or preconditions largely issues of deprivation, including poverty and inequality or social injustice and political exclusion that terrorists may manipulate to justify their acts of violence. Although most scholars agree that these conditions do not necessarily lead to terrorism, it is equally important to address them (Crenshaw, 1981, 2000; Schmid, 2005). Addressing the background issues or root causes is a necessary response that not only guarantees development and equality but, more so, removes the incentives for violent conflict (Crenshaw, 1981). Some scholars argue that a development-based response is useful to a “stable and peaceful future” (Aldrich, 2012, p.49).

From the foregoing, we can identify two broad patterns in the literature on CT and CI: a war model (hard power) and a non-war model (soft power). The hard power approach involves a military solution or punitive strategy, while a soft power approach involves a range of political solutions, including diplomatic and conciliatory measures. The preference for either of the approaches depends on how we define terrorism and by extension, the terrorists. The distinction between a hard power and soft power also mirrors that between CT and CI. Hard power relates more to CT and involves “operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to terrorism” (Rineheart, 2010, p.32), while soft power is closer to CI: “population-centric strategies such as state-building and CI, which focuses on winning the legitimacy of the local population and promoting good governance” (Rineheart 2010, p.37). The hard power measure is designed as a war paradigm and can be used proactively through pre-emptive strikes and defensively through air strikes and other forms of combat (Arquilla, Ronfeldt & Zanini, 1999; Rineheart, 2010). This approach has
been criticised for its tendency to be overt and disproportionate, often leading to a backlash that delegitimizes the state and, sometimes, sway public support for the insurgents (Crenshaw, 2000; Kaldor, 2005). However, the argument that states’ over-reaction is counter-productive is not necessarily true, according to Schmid (2013). Schmid (2013) uses the case of Latin America insurgency and counter-insurgency of the 1970s and 1980s to show how difficult it is to measure the impact of CI on the insurgency, although he concludes that “a proportionate response based on a minimal use of force appears to be wiser” (p.36).

However, many scholars support a holistic CT theory that will involve both military, intelligence, law enforcement, economic and political approaches (Wilkinson, 2000; Metz, 2007; Rineheart, 2010; Lesser, 1999), yet, the argument for soft power, including a political solution appears stronger (Walzer, 2006). Contemporary conflicts seek political rather than military success and often present limited rather than totalistic objectives (Kilcullen, 2006). Hence, a political solution is more suited to countering modern insurgencies and terrorism than a military strategy. Metz (2007) argues that the Clausewitz theory of warfare is irrelevant to contemporary insurgencies, as he draws distinction between twentieth and twenty-first century insurgencies (see also Kilcullen, 2006). The notion that warfare is economics by other means has replaced Clausewitz’s maxim that views warfare as politics by other means (see also Kaldor 2005, Collier, 2007). Contemporary conflict actors achieve considerable amount of economics and psychological benefits. It is therefore important to apply a CI measure that provides an alternative source of economic power and self-worth (Metz, 2007). He rejects the war thesis that guides the war on terrorism campaign.

However, the success for political or military approach hinges on timing (Wilkinson, 2000; Metz, 2007). It is therefore not enough to launch a blanket appeal for political (including conciliatory measures) or even military solution without a proper assessment of the potential outcome of the approach. It is important to consider a number of variables such as the stage
of the conflict, an understanding of the motivation driving each cycle and the strength or weakness of the conflict group. Ultimately, the asymmetrical nature of contemporary terrorist and insurgent conflicts means that they continuously transform and reproduce themselves based on the assessment of the information and resources available to them as highlighted in the previous section. Hence, those fighting terrorism and insurgency find the need to continuously assess their response and adapt it to the evolutionary and reactive character of the terrorist or insurgent group under scrutiny (Crenshaw, 2007; Kilcullen, 2006). In addition, this will involve proactive as well as combative/defensive strategies. The defensive stance is justified against the notion that it is very difficult and impossible to completely prevent or defeat terrorism for many reasons including the unconventional nature of modern warfare, that avoids battlefield, lacks a clearly defined army, clandestine and disregards all rules of engagement guiding armed conflict and the laws of war (Wilkinson, 2000; Crenshaw, 1981; Oberschall, 1978; Kilcullen, 2006; Metz, 2007).

For instance, the non-military approaches, including political, intelligence, law enforcement and economic approach will work best in the early stages of an insurgency (Metz, 2007). However, by-and-large, a soft power approach is likely to be more effective to CT/CI than a military approach (Metz, 2007; Kaldor, 2005; Walzer, 2006). For example, when greed (rather than an obvious political goal) drives an insurgency, a military approach will be unsuitable in that situation and at that stage. In such a situation where insurgency has degenerated into ordinary criminal activity, it is best to use law enforcement (police) than armed combat approach (Rapoport, 2002; Walzer, 2006; Metz, 2007). However, law enforcement and intelligence measures may be inadequate in preventing and resolving conflict, especially in societies where genuine grievances exists (Wilkinson, 2000). An economic approach may be ideal in such an environment, as “businesses started and jobs
created are as much ‘indicators of success’ as insurgents killed or intelligence provided (Metz, 2007, p. 30).

An economic approach is nonetheless more than addressing relative deprivation. Quite notably, the relative deprivation or grievance-frustration thesis has garnered little support in the literature as more studies prove that poverty and inequality do not necessarily cause conflict. Yet, it continues to be relevant as an analytical concept of conflict as conflict actors often manipulate it in pursuit of their own narrow interests. The exploitation of the economic conditions for selfish gains by violent conflict actors make the new war and new terrorism proponents accord economics more importance than politics as a motivation for conflict (Kaldor, 1999; Metz, 2007). Metz (2007) argues against the continuous relevance of the Clausewitzian nineteenth century logic of conflict. Instead, he advances the argument that modern insurgencies are likely driven by market needs denoted by profitability pursued most times by greed. Hence, the government should raise the opportunity or economic costs “and risks for those participating in the insurgency (or other forms of conflict) while providing alternatives” (Metz, 2007, p. 30; see also Sandler & Enders, 2004). This is reflective of cost-benefit logic, which is at the heart of the argument of the RCT. For instance, adopting a defensive strategy that protects targets from easy attack from terrorists may increase the cost for the terrorists, and consequently, deter them from attacking.

The state may also degrade the terrorist’s financial capabilities by targeting its sources of finances such as freezing the assets of terrorists and their supporters, as well as making it difficult for them to sell their stolen resources in the black market. However, economic sanctions and other CT policies aimed at degrading the terrorists’ financial power require a multilateral cooperation for it to be successful (Sandler, 2005). More so, freezing of assets and restrictions of movement and goods through visa denial may be less effective, as some terrorist groups, especially those operating in developing countries and fragile states do well
to avoid standard banking or benefit from the un-integrated and weak financial institutions in those places (Nwankpa, 2015a).

Apparently, the soft power approach has its own challenges. For example, a political solution that seeks to give concession to members of a terrorist group may become unsuccessful as core members of the group may have absolute objectives that cannot be satisfied by concessions. Even when they do present grievances, such grievances and demands may not necessarily be purely economical in nature. They may be civil and political in nature such as ethnic/linguistic marginalisation or question of autonomy (Wilkinson, 2000; Fearon & Laitin, 2003) Also, an effective law enforcement and judicial control measure require a strong democratic government, rule of law and judicial process (Wilkinson, 2000; Walzer, 2006; Kaldor, 2005). While this is often lacking in many conflict zones largely concentrated in authoritarian governments and developing countries, obtaining balance between the use of force and upholding the rule of law is no less a challenge in developed countries (Chomsky & Herman, 1979; Wilkinson, 2000).

Crucially, at the heart of CT and CI is the concept of legitimacy. It is becoming increasingly difficult even for developed countries (largely Western) to maintain liberal values of freedom, respect for rule of law and human rights in the fight against terrorism. The combination of efforts by state and civilian society structures is one way of guaranteeing legitimacy, as some scholars have recommended. Also essential to maintaining legitimacy in the fight against terror is the need for multilateral forces, what EU (2007) describes as the International Relations approach. A multilateral CT policy serves a dual purpose. On one hand, it confers legitimacy to the CT campaign and the allied governments, and, on the other hand, it helps to avoid the kind of collateral damage that a unilateralist policy may cause, which can delegitimize the government and alienate it from the support of its citizens and potential allies (Pressman, 2007).
Multilateral CT cooperation theory reflects another perspective beyond legitimacy and avoidance of collateral damage: that is the idea that contemporary conflicts, although largely internal, have grave implications beyond national boundaries. There are consequences such as refugees, forced migration; asylum, geographical spread of disease caused by displacement, as well as transnational organised criminal networks and cooperation including terrorism (Collier, 2007; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Kaldor, 1999; Duffield, 2007). The transnational nature of terrorism and organised crime have a major influence in the international cooperation between countries in a bilateral agreement, and among countries in a multilateral agreement. The activities of the international police (INTERPOL), international criminal court (ICC), and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) reflect the preference for a multilateral rather than a unilateral approach to counter-terrorism. “Security cannot be achieved within a single country. Intelligence, police and military efforts need to be coordinated and information exchanged in a secure and timely way” (Omand, 2005, p.10 as quoted by EU, 2007).

However, the relationship and cooperation between allies are often fraught with difficulties that range from distrust, suspicion, human rights violation, to the promotion of selfish national interest over the general purpose (Tilly, 2004; Wilkinson, 2000). This has the potential of offsetting the positive outcome of a multilateral approach, including restrictions on weapon sales and refusal to share vital information. Despite this shortcoming, an international approach to CT presents huge benefits. The cooperation can occur at the judicial level (for example, we have the European Court of Human Rights, as well as the Economic Community of West Africa Society, ECOWAS court of justice), political, diplomatic and military levels (Keohane, 2005).

Both insurgent and terrorist groups and state forces also pursue legitimacy through the means of narratives and counter-narratives. Unsurprisingly, there is unanimity in the literature
regarding communication or publicity as a defining element of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Schmid, 2005b; Weinberg et al, 2004). Terrorists seek publicity and attention, requiring mass media (easily accessible in this new age of technology) to advertise their acts of violence and to communicate their ideologies and demands to their audiences. A terrorist group often has different messages for different audiences. For the public, including local population, a terrorist group may aim to induce fear or mobilise support; for the government, a terrorist group may force it to react disproportionately, and a terrorist group may aim to communicate its power and strength to its members through its act of violence. The objectives range from attempt to gain internal control, prevent defection, and unify factions (Crenshaw, 1981).

More so, advancement in modern technology and the easy accessibility to the internet and the inexpensive cost of owning a phone, computer and other modern gadgets that ordinarily depict human progress also lend themselves to negative use/abuse (Hoffman, 1999; Arquilla, Ronfeldt, & Zanini, 1999; Kaldor, 2005). However, a communicative approach neither stresses the physical violent use of these materials – its lethality (Hoffman, 1999) nor its virtual use- cyber-attack or “net-war” (Arquilla et al, 1999) rather, it considers its non-lethality, but nonetheless destructive tool of propaganda important. Some scholars have argued for a counter-narrative to the subversive ideology of insurgencies and terrorist groups (Wilkinson, 2000; Casebeer & Russell, 2005; Aldrich, 2012). Casebeer and Russell (2005) explains how most terrorist groups use the logic of storytelling, involving a combination of history, myth and present grievances and biases, to present their ideology and, conversely, how the government can apply such logic in presenting a counter-argument to the often manipulated, fragmented and distorted narratives told by the terrorists. This relates to the battle for “hearts and minds” or for legitimacy.

A responding state is therefore required to adopt a policy and create a programme that will counter the violent extremism of the insurgents or terrorists. Many affected states have
formulated such policy and programme: countering violent extremism (CVE) aims at building “resilience to VEO (violent extremist organisations) recruitment and narratives in populations around the world” (Aldrich, 2012, p.49). Briggs and Feve (2013) present a comprehensive counter-messaging spectrum that requires cooperation between government and civil society groups in most cases, and a civil society-led or government-led intervention in some cases. Such a spectrum apparently goes beyond a counter-narrative measure that seeks to directly deconstruct and demystify (through counter-ideology, logic, fact or humour) the violent extremist’s narrative. It will involve a government strategic communication method that raises public awareness of government’s counter-terrorism efforts and practices, and, alternative narratives that reinforces the positive values of the society that the government is fighting to protect (Briggs & Feve, 2013).

In effect, it is not enough to formulate and create CVE programmes. Such laudable programmes, counter-narratives, and messages may be less impactful if the responding state produces actions that undermine its own values (de Graaf, 2009; Schmid, 2013). Suppression of human rights among other undemocratic behaviours may have unintended consequences on the outcome of formal counter-narrative and government strategic communication agenda. As rightly noted by Schmid (2013; p.60), “credibility and legitimacy are core ingredients of any political narrative hoping to catch the imagination of people at home and abroad.” The character and credibility of the messenger is as important as the message (Briggs & Feve, 2013). It is equally important to tailor the communications towards specific audiences (Leuprecht, Hataley, Moskalenko & McCailey, 2010). Lastly, the counter-narrative should not dismiss the history, myth and, particularly, genuine grievances that the violent extremist organisation (VEO) has manipulated in framing its violent campaign (Schmid, 2013).
2.3 Development and Security

Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, there has been more deliberate attempt to forge connections between development and security. Specifically, the terms “human development” and “human security” gained prominence as they were linked to the welfare and security of individual human beings (United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, 1994). The linkage between development and security manifested in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGS) in 2000 that were aimed at eliminating poverty, hunger, diseases, exclusion and promoting gender parity, education and environmental sustainability. Nevertheless, it was only in 2008 that the United Nation General Assembly recognised the security implication of the MDGS (Nwankpa, 2015). However, the nexus between security (as freedom from fear) and development (as freedom from want) may have been formed at the end of World War Two (WWII) corresponding with the creation of the United Nations (UN).

Apparently, not until the end of the Cold War did the nexus between development and security become explicit and even gave rise to the language of human development and human security that appeared in official documents. Yet, we can argue that while there was no explicit linkage between the concepts, security and development have always shown some interesting interplay (Hettne, 2010). For instance, the process of development follows a historical trajectory that is benign as is malignant, following three broad distinct phases: the drive for market/trade expansion in the Age of Enlightenment, colonisation (aggressive expansion) and decolonisation in the nineteenth and twentieth century, and the pursuit of development at the end of World War Two (WWII) (Preston, 1999). America’s intervention in the economic recovery of Europe (represented in the ‘Marshall Plan’) stimulated the new era of international development assistance and aid as a foreign policy. The Marshall plan was more than a gesture of goodwill to help a battered continent (mainly Western Europe
including the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy) recover from the human and economic devastation caused by the war. America’s political and economic interests (Binns, 2002; Rapley, 1996 as cited by Binn, 2002) underscored the $17 billion intervention. Hence, we can argue that post WWII rather than post-Cold War (as popularly claimed) marked the beginning of the linkage between development and security (though it was implicit).

America established the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as global or international financial institutions (IFIs) using loans, credits and investments in pursuit of a political agenda and to protect its own interests. This extended beyond Europe to Third World Development. The political agenda relates to the global spread of Western democracy, liberalism and capitalism and, conversely, to halt the spread of communism. The Cold War thus represents the battle of ideologies where, at the end, capitalism, or American hegemony triumphed over communism, represented by the Soviet Union. The economic agenda involved the creation of “a world economic order to its own desires [that seeks to] promote a suitable rate of growth in the receiving countries” (Preston, 1999, p. 157-158).

Preston (1999) argues further that development assistance to Europe was in the context of allies, whereas development assistance given to Asia aimed to halt the spread of communism, while moral responsibility (following decolonisation) guided development aid to Africa.

Contrary to Preston’s account, Hettne (2010) posits that international aid during this period was “aimed at stabilising the Third World, making it less threatening to Europe” (p.49). Similarly, Duffield (2007) avers that “development is a technology of security that is central to liberal forms of power and government [that] seeks to control and ameliorate the unintended consequences of progress such as destitution, environmental collapse or humanitarian disasters” (ibid, p. VIII). Duffield (2007) presents a grim account of development assistance as bio-political technology for grouping humankind into developed and underdeveloped societies with the aim of maintaining the status quo, rather than reducing
the wealth gap. Hence, development becomes “central to the new or culturally coded racism that emerged with decolonisation” (ibid, 2007, p. Viii, 2010).

“The self-justifying ideologies of superiority and responsibility” guided the colonisation of Africa and legitimised the use of violence to civilise the “uncivilised” and “backward” people of the Third World (Preston, 1999, p.142). Unfortunately, these prejudices inform the policies and practices of development theorists and practitioners (Preston, 1999). However, following the implosion of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, development theorists have advanced the idea of “human security”- one that looks at individuals and not the state as the primary unit of security analysis. Human security concerns itself with people’s well-being and has an impact on economic growth and poverty and on development in general. Human insecurity and by extension, lack of development or imbalanced development are major causes of conflict (Stewart, 2004). However, the concept of human security is conceptually flawed, as it is vague (Duffield, 2007) and lacking definitional boundaries (Paris, 2004).

In essence, the concept of human security contains contradictions as it theoretically supports the prioritisation of the welfare and well-being of individual human beings but is practically hamstrung by the “prevailing state-centric and realist orientation of the international relations discipline” (Paris, 2004, p.370). Duffield (2007, 2010) argues that the vagueness of human security makes it a bio-political technology of security. Human development (especially the socio-economic dimensions) inheres within the concept of human security such that it is unrealistic to measure the effect of human development (or underdevelopment) on human security (Paris, 2004). Buzan (2004) adds an interesting twist to the debate, as he points to the reductionist tendency in the concept of human security: one that excludes for instance non-human (environmental) security and attempts to blur the boundary between domestic and international security. The question that arises is, is this deliberate or inadvertent? As such,
does the vagueness of the concept help to justify Western governments’ liberal interventionism in perceived fragile states (Duffield, 2007)?

There is a linkage formed between human insecurity and underdevelopment and globalisation (Thomas, 2001; Pogge, 2002, 2005; Stewart, 2004; Duffield, 2007, 2010; Greig. A, Hulme. D & Turner. M, 2007; Picciotto et al 2010). The current global order presents inequalities that manifest between nations, peoples and within countries that ultimately precipitate conflict such as global terrorism. Therefore, human security is connected with the need to encourage inclusive development (Stewart, 2004) and create a just global order (Greig et al, 2007).

However, Collier (2007) does not agree with the perspective that poverty and inequality, especially in the poorest countries of the world, the “bottom billion” is largely due to an unjust global order. He argues that development can either be “ladders” (‘that some societies climb on to be successful’) or “chutes” (‘that some societies hit and remain stuck at the bottom’) as he uses the growth of China, Portugal and Spain to illustrate his support for the economic growth model (Collier, 2007, p.5).

Thomas (2001) classifies those that support the economic growth model as presenting orthodox views and their challengers as presenting alternative approaches. Interestingly, the orthodox have not been completely insensitive to the social implications of their development policies, as they have carried out internal reforms. Yet, the core values of the neoliberal politics remains unaffected. On the other hand, the alternative views differ in the way they conceptualise poverty, measure development/growth and process. However, the alternative view on human development and human security is in a dynamic state (Thomas, 2001). For instance, while the orthodox view relies primarily on the state and follows top-down logic, the alternative view still relies on the state (in addition to non-state) though it claims to follow bottom-up logic.
Evidently, the nexus between development and security is far from simple as it yields to different meanings that are reflective of diverse empirical experiences and rational thought processes (Stern & Ojendal, 2010). As distinct fields, development and security have longer intellectual histories, but as a combined intellectual discourse, “the ‘security-development’ terrain is comparatively novel” (Duffield, 2001, as quoted by Stern & Ojendal, 2010, p. 7). Stern & Ojendal (2010) narrate six different accounts of the nexus between development and security that make ontological and epistemological sense: Development/security as modern (teleological) narrative, broadening, deepening and humanising development/security, development/security as impasse/impossible, post-development/post-security, development/security as a technique of government, and development/security as globalised.

The first account is reflective of the economic growth model, hence, the state, rather than individuals, remain the primary focus of security. The assumption here is that the growth and development of the state will trickle down and ultimately guarantee security. The second account however focuses on the individuals as it merges human development and human security. As impasse, development remains elusive as long as the current global order persists, which only reinforces and sustains the global divide into developed and underdeveloped nations (see Duffield, 2010). The post-development and post-security account, just like the idea of development as impasse, emphasise the notion of securitised development that maintains existing inequality and injustice. Development, as a tool of security, categorises certain societies as dangerous, hence justifying intervention to counter the danger that they pose (see Duffield, 2007). Lastly, the globalisation of development and security furthers the argument for shift from the state to the de-territorialised and global individual in order to address common problems such as food security, natural disasters, global energy and water crisis.
The privileging of human rather than state security glosses over the fact that the state still remains the primary duty bearer charged with the responsibility to guarantee and protect human security (Thomas, 2001; Duffield, 2007). Human security, as such, presents itself as a “bio political technology” (Duffield, 2007, p.111). Hence, the concepts of “new war” and “new terrorism” promote the idea that contemporary conflicts are less between states but occur more within states threatening the security of humans within the conflict state as well as international security- hence, the globalisation of security and development. It is this that underscores the global war on terror [GWOT] and responsibility to protect [R2P] rhetoric.

The concept of R2P was formally adopted by the UN General Assembly (GA) in its resolution 60/1 following the World Summit of 2005. Paragraph 138 and 139 of the World Summit outcome document establishes the state (primarily) and the international community respectively as having “the responsibility of protecting its population (and “populations”, in the case of international community) from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. This global political commitment was reaffirmed in the GA resolution A/Res/63/308, of October 2009 and unanimously endorsed by all member states.

However, R2P emerged from the failure of the international community to intervene in the Rwanda genocide of 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre of 1995, and the round table discussions of the early 2000s, foremost is the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) established by the Canadian government. R2P presents benefits that minimise the tension between the principle of state sovereignty and external intervention by shifting the language from that of the “right to intervene” to “responsibility to protect”, having firm root in international law regarding peace and security, sovereignty, human rights and armed conflict (Bellamy 2006, 2008, 2011). Significantly, R2P stresses preventive measures including the use of diplomatic and other peaceful means, while the use of force is seen as a last resort.
In this sense, R2P becomes relevant to the relationship between development and security pursued in this thesis. It however attracts criticism which includes infraction on state sovereignty, issue of double standards and the proclivity towards abuse, lack of visible measure of success and genuine tendency to expand mandate (Paris, 2014; Chandler, 2005; Doyle, 2011). For instance, this new way of thinking about development and security justifies largely Western interventionism, but fails to conceal the drive to protect the “West’s way of life...rather than simply prioritising the security of people living within the territories of ineffective States” (Duffield, 2007, p.131). But this is not always the case.

Evidently, as our world gets ever inter-connected, the responsibility to protect extends naturally to external actors. Having established this, the most important question is asked by Bercovitch and Schneidner (2000) in their title: “Who mediates?” This question runs deep into the heart of the whole debate bordering on the issues of neutrality of external interveners and/or interests, besides the usual debate on the morality or legality of outside intervention in internal conflicts.

While some studies stress impartiality/neutrality and the type of political system (that is democracy or autocracy) (Nathan 1999; Doyle 1983; Regan & Aydin 2006), Bercovitch and Schneidner (2000) find these to be insignificant compared to the power of the intervener, including the amount of resources and capacity to influence change (see also Zartman & Touval 1985; Ayoob 2004; Walter 1997). Some of the resources that the mediator may have: include legitimacy and ideological/cultural similarities with the target state (Bercovitch & Schneidner 2000). Using dataset showing the number of international interventions in internal conflicts between 1950 and 1990, Bercovitch & Schneidner (2000) find other factors such as ex-colony irrelevant, contrary to other studies that find colonial powers’ intervention in their former colonies important (Rothchild et al, 1970). But unlike the studies by Bercovitch and Schneidner (2000) and Walter (1997) that concentrate on the power of
individual interveners, Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) consider the power and influence by any single intervener as dependent and affected by those exhibited by other interveners (see also Stedman 1993). For Nathan (1999), in relation to intervention in Africa, “political power, resources and exercise of leverage” (that is “coercive diplomacy”) are less important and (perhaps less) effective than “confidence-building mediation” (p.1, 14).

Evidently, there is no consensus on the right approach to international intervention, even when the new international regime or “the new interventionists”, to borrow from Stedman’s (1993) title, are ready to sacrifice sovereignty. Some scholars like Bercovitch and Schneidner (2000) have stressed the need for power (see also Walter, 1997) while others argue for the need for a correct understanding of the dilemmas, risks and outcomes of intervention as well as the character of the intervening body (Stedman, 1993), and others have canvassed for the use of professional mediators- that is, people with the right skills and practices of mediating (Nathan, 1999; Uwazie, 2011). Some of the approaches produce positive impact in some conflicts and at different stages of a conflict, as some yield confusion and contradiction. Example of the latter is Walter (1997)’s attempt at supporting the idea of an obligatory “powerful” outside intervener in the termination of an internal civil war, while at the same time suggesting the usefulness of domestic approaches (such as constitutional arrangement and power sharing approach to negotiated settlement).

Evidently, external intervention seems inevitable. Rather, the contention surrounding the notion of outside intervention in internal conflicts revolves around the issue of motivation, agency and power structure that relates to the preservation or erosion of sovereignty. These issues inform the reservation by “Third World” states to outside intervention (Ayoob, 2004; Williams & Bellamy, 2005). It is therefore not unlikely that external intervention can convey, directly or inadvertently, imagined or real, a sense of superiority and double standard that (besides other strategic intentions) relegates local cultures and institutions. The West’s
reluctance in intervening in Darfur (a conflict considered to be well-deserving of humanitarian intervention) (Williams & Bellamy, 2005) and the West’s supposed partiality in the Israel/Palestine crisis (Ayoob, 2004) for instance, make the question of motive in humanitarian intervention the more questionable.

However, other studies situate the West’s hypocrisy (not in its selective approach to conflict intervention) in the willingness to compromise its liberal principles for strategic gain (Doyle, 1983; Stedman, 1993). For instance, many African countries, including Nigeria, practiced authoritarian government mostly during the Cold War period, often with the tacit or explicit support of the world powers. This same logic can be applied to U.S.-led GWOT where oppressive states are condoned as long as they support the GWOT, and conversely, those who do not are punished. Crucially, it is needful to interrogate the motive for intervention in addition to unifying the objectives of all the external interveners (Lewis, 1995).

Contrary to Ayoob’s (2004) criticism of the West’s selective sense of justice, Stedman (1993) recommends intervention based on selective principles or strategic political and economic interests (See Walter, 1997; Licklider, 1995). Licklider (1995) only supports a limited consideration of strategic interest, but nonetheless, it does have ramification for when the war ends or not. There is an assumption of a global divide between the perceived “morally superior” intervener and the perceived “morally inferior” target states, the former relying on sanctioned authority from global institutions such as the United Nations Security Council and other coalitions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Ayoob, 2004; Stedman, 1993). Hence, one cannot rule out strategic interests (besides humanitarian motivation) as guiding external intervention in internal conflicts.

However, the argument that African leaders depend on external intervention is partly true. The other half truth is that outside interveners gain equally from their intervention in African
internal conflicts, and Africans know this (Elaigwu, 1977). For instance, Elaigwu (1977) argues that “from a ‘balance of power’ concept of international system, there has been a move to ‘bipolar’ structure, and then a ‘multipolar’ structure.” (p.215). For instance, new African states displayed capacity to exert some sphere of influence on the international system by either aligning with the Soviet Union or the West (largely U.S) during the Cold War. We may be seeing such dexterity in the cold war building up between the U.S. and China, especially in the scramble for Africa (Klare & Volman, 2006). For Ayoob (2004), it would be wrong to assume that the power (or double standard) exhibited by the third world states has the same level of influence as that demonstrated by the Western powers, as the former lacks the resources needed to exert such influence (see Bercovitch & Schneidner, 2000). We can deduce the same conclusion from Doyle (1983)’s assessment of the Hobbesian elevation of sovereign states over a global state-one where individual humans are considered equals but states are not.

While most of the studies consider external military intervention, other non-military diplomatic foreign policies are of no less importance. Doyle (1983) for instance, considers the export of liberalism- liberal principles and institutions (including free press, freedom of speech, civil and political rights) as a form of foreign intervention with potential to yield both positive and negative outcomes. For Doyle (1983), the most successful liberal interventions are seen when they are carried out from one liberal state to another liberal state, and, conversely, imposition of liberal principles and institutions in non-liberal state, at best, yields confusion (if not conflict). Here again, the issue of sovereignty and principle of non-interference play out, as imposition of external political structures on a non-liberal state can be read as a violation of the principle of non-interference. It is notable that most of the Western civil war scholars do not deny the instrumental motivation for external involvement
in internal civil war. There are even some that encourage intervention only when there is strategic interests (Stedman 1993; Licklider 1995).

For example, intervening in conflict regions and fragile states is more likely driven by a deliberate strategy to protect the intervening state from the consequences of the fragility and conflict in those places, which can range from terrorist attack to migration. However, some scholars have called for a re-conceptualisation of development in relation to migration (De Haas, 2005; Adamson, 2006; Sparke, 2006; Bakewell, 2008). Bakewell (2008, ) suggests, for instance, that international development agencies especially in Africa may still be constrained by “the sedentary nature of their concept of ‘development’ in Africa, which can be traced down to its roots in colonial practice” (p.1355; see also Preston, 1999). Hence, international development agencies are most likely intervening in Africa to discourage migration. This implies securitisation of development assistance, which sometimes manifest conspicuously in migration patterns that privilege the mobility of the rich over that of the poor (Sparke, 2006).

Linking development to security (in this instance, to how migration threatens the security of Western states) undermines the positive side of global mobility and forecloses the opportunity and discussion on how migration can benefit both the origin and destination states. In the light of the new global security environment, some scholars have argued that what is needed is not closing borders, but states need to “harness the power of migration through well-designed policies in cooperation with other states” (Adamson, 2006, p.199; see also De Haas, 2005). In essence, we need to aim for a precise definition of human security (Paris, 2004). In its present form—one that constructs human right as human security, security (of the intervener and the intervening state) is prioritised over development (of the aid recipient and recipient state), leading to the politicisation of human rights (Buzan, 2004; Hausermann, 1998). Rather, “human right is much better placed to support the idea that the
desired end is some form of de-securitisation down into normal politics” (Buzan, 2004, p.370).

2.4 Human Rights and Development

Scholars have linked human rights and human development together, with human rights reconstructed as human security (Buzan, 2004). However, human rights and human development have distinct trajectories of growth with deep historical root. Human rights have a much deeper root, while development is largely a post WWII phenomenon (Sano, 2000; Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004). Since the Millennium, both concepts have been described as having a similar vision, which is “to secure, for every human being, freedom, well-being and dignity” (UNDP, 2000, P.19). UNDP’s Human Development Report (2000) highlights seven fundamental freedoms: freedom from discrimination; freedom from fear; freedom of thoughts, speech, participation and association; freedom from want; freedom to develop and realise one’s human potential; freedom from injustice and violations of the rule of law; and, freedom for decent work.

Although human rights and development have a similar vision and share same goals as reflected in the seven freedoms highlighted above, it is wrong to assume that human rights have always been integral to development. Human rights have never been a deliberate consideration in the international field of development, as both fields are distinguishable ontologically and epistemologically (Sano, 2000; Nelson & Dorsey, 2003; Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Uvin, 2007). At best, human right was politicised in international development. This is evident in the foreign policies pursued by President Reagan and President Carter particularly in the Middle East and Latin America (Chomsky & Herman, 1979; Carleton & Stohl, 1985). The assimilation of human rights into international development began formally with the Human Rights Conference held in Vienna in 1993. Any relationship between human rights and development prior to the Human Rights
Conference was partial and incomplete (Sano, 2000). The Vienna conference and subsequent human rights declarations such as the UNDP’s human development report of 2000 raised the status of the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR) to the same level as Civil and Political Rights (CPR). This informed the combined advocacy by human rights and development agencies as well as the adoption of a rights based approach to development (Nelson & Dorsey, 2003).

Significantly, the convergence of human rights and human development indicate a radical approach to the new threats to human freedoms and world peace in the Twenty First century. These threats include discrimination, poverty, inequality, unemployment, and other forms of social injustice and oppression. Hence, to guarantee international security and to consolidate the advances in human rights and development in the twentieth century, “bold new approaches are needed to achieve universal realization of human rights in the 21st century—adapted to the opportunities and realities of the era of globalization, to its new global actors and to its new global rules” (UNDP, 2000, P. 19).

The nexus between human rights and human development is however far from simple. The relationship between them is “at once simple and complex” (Hausermann, 1998, p.23; see Nelson & Dorsey, 2003; Uvin, 2007). Gready and Vadenhole (2014), for instance, describe development work as “evidence based” dealing with “concrete problems and dilemmas” in a progressive manner, differentiated from human rights activism that is usually “governed by norms and laws” in a retrogressive way. Ultimately, the description of human rights as development, development couched here as freedoms, finds theoretical expression in the work of Amartya Sen: Development as Freedom (2001) and the UNDP’s Human Development Report (2000). Sen’s notion of development as freedom or as the expansion of human capabilities and UNDP’s attempt to link development to democracy is nothing novel, in the view of Uvin (2007); rather, their contribution to development theory and practices is
based on the question raised about why these previously known ideas were not acted upon. Hausermann (1998), on the other hand, views Sen’s notion of human rights as entitlements or as expanding human capabilities as laying the grounds for a much more comprehensive notion - the human rights approach to development. This latter approach complements existing models of development such as the Right to Development.

2.4.1 A Human Rights Approach to Development

The concept of a “human rights approach” to development is recent and largely unfamiliar to many academics and scholars. Interest in the concept and its promotion as a viable approach only began in 2003, according to Boesen and Sano (2010). There is however a sizeable amount of scholarly output on the concept. Among its scholars are Peter Uvin, Bridgette Hamm, Paul Gready, Wouter Vadenhole, Sano H.O, Andrea Cornwall, and Hausermann Julia. A human rights approach to development aims to integrate development with human rights. While the UN Development Report of 2000 is strategic to this new thinking, the background to this idea started from the early 1990s, at the end of the Cold War as evinced in the World Conference on human rights (1993) in Vienna, World Conference on Women (1995) in Beijing, and World Summit for Social Development (1995) in Copenhagen.

However, the pre-2000 discourse on development as human rights was championed by states in the South (a follow-up to the 1970s activism of newly empowered oil rich Third World states- Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC). This was a reaction to the perceived injustice, including inequality and poverty suffered from an unjust global order, including the dark history of colonialism (Hamm, 2001; Pogge, 2002; Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Uvin, 2007). Alternative rights such as Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCRs), that have received less attention in the North, started to emerge in mainstream thinking.
All of these started with the 1986 United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution that led to the declaration of the “Rights to Development.” The Right to Development discourse however offers a vague concept of right and lacks legal obligations and consensus. The rights under it are non-justiciable, the economic and social rights are not institutionalised and some states hold reservation against certain human rights treaties. One obvious limitation of the right to development declaration is the debate around the duty-bearer- for instance: Are Western countries or developed countries obligated to provide development assistance to poor and developing countries (beyond moral duty)? The declaration on the right to development failed to resolve this debate. Rather, development assistance, under this declaration had more moral than legal force (Hamm, 2001; Sen, 2004; Uvin, 2007).

Nevertheless, the recognition of ESR has gained much wider currency since 2000 finding its way into the development policies and agendas of the North as represented by the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as well as policy shifts in the activities of the WB and other development agencies. However, the market-oriented and modernisation perception of development as economic growth persist. For instance, Uvin (2007) describes the Western aid conditionality of human rights and good governance as “a continuation of the neo-liberal policy of economic conditionality of structural adjustment programme”- the politicisation of human rights (p.600; see also Chomsky & Herman, 1979; Chomsky, 1987).

A rights based approach to development therefore seeks to transcend the economic model logic (which is largely ethnocentric and Western-oriented) to include the social, environmental, political and cultural dimensions of development. Significantly, it has a moral as well as a legal force. The legal force behind this approach is based on international human rights covenants and treaties (Hausermann, 1998; Hamm, 2001). The international human rights instruments help to concretise human rights (beyond a mere moral force), yet, human
rights continue to be dynamic—“constantly being strengthened and expanded” (Hausermann, 1998, p.26).

A human rights approach to development addresses the challenge of political interest facing traditional development policies and practices especially one that attach negative conditionality to development aids. On the contrary, a human rights approach to development promotes positive conditions that utilise human rights principles and legal frameworks for concrete actions such as the elimination of poverty (Hausermann, 1998; Hamm, 2001). It entails a paradigmatic shift from “human wrongs (or needs) to human rights; from hand-outs to empowerment [and] from charity to rights [entitlements]” (Hausermann, 1998, p.32; see also Hamm, 2001; Sano, 2000; Uvin, 2007). A rights based approach is concerned with the end as well as the means of achieving development (Sen, 2001; Sengupta, 2010; Boesen & Sano, 2010). It stresses the need to respect and promote human rights based on the principles of participation, transparency and accountability (Sano, 2000; Hamm, 2001; Uvin, 2007).

A right-based approach to development offers huge potential to the way we perceive and practice development. Yet it presents limitations, one of which is the lack of a concrete procedure for achieving and measuring the impact of the rights on the people as reflected in this question: “what exactly are the values added and what policy or institutional changes are implied? (Boesen & Sano, 2010, p.46; Sano, 2000; Uvin, 2007). Although, Hausermann (1998) admits that human rights are dynamic, she foregrounds the concrete aspects based on the legal international instruments of human rights and human rights treaties. Hamm (2001), furthermore posits that international human rights instruments and treaties strengthen the rights based approach and sets it apart from past approaches. She views international human rights covenants and treaties as essential to the rights based approach to development. This is based on the idea that international human rights have a near universal acceptance as a
greater percentage of the states have signed and ratified (or at least signed) most of the international human rights covenants.

In recognition of the challenges that state reservation signifies to the rights based approach, Hamm (2001) recommends that states that have signed the covenants should be obliged to either ratify or withdraw their reservations as effort to expedite the legality of the treaty agreement. Hamm’s recommendation however runs the risk of presenting the unintended consequence of negative conditionality or of creating a “bio political” world order (Duffield, 2007; Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004), as she advises major donor states (that are conspicuously Western) to focus on recipient states that have ratified the treaties.

Sadly, there is no clearly defined theoretical framework of change in prevailing academic literature on human rights and development, especially in human rights discourse (where it is virtually non-existent) (Nussbaum, 1997; Sano, 2000; Sen, 2004; Gready & Vadenhole, 2014). The prevailing theories are rather implicit and partial, and, hence inadequate to the realisation of the human rights terms of development (Gready & Vadenhole, 2014). The lack of a conceptual framework or the incoherent articulation of a theory of human rights portends a serious challenge to the rights based approach to development making it look a little more than rhetoric. The legal status that international human rights legislation confers on human rights is not to be disregarded. Yet the motivation behind the legislation of human rights and the idea that a legislative route is neither the only route nor the most effective route to achieving the rights has been given substantive consideration (Sen, 2004; Uvin, 2007; Sen, 2010; Boesen & Sano, 2010; Andreassen, 2010).

Sen (2004) identifies three broad routes: “recognition route, agitation route and legislation route”. The recognition route entails acknowledged (but not institutionalised and legalised) rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the declaration of the Rights
to Development fall under this category. The agitation route, on the other hand, involves the work of human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) and development agencies such as Action Aid and Save the Children that put pressure on states to comply with recognised human rights as well as monitor human rights violations. The legislation route refers to specific human rights legislation such as the European Convention on Human Rights. Even when there is human rights legislation, there is still need for some level of activism to ensure compliance with the legislated law. Hence, public discussion, recognition, agitation/advocacy, monitoring and other administrative (essentially non-legalistic approach) measures may be far more effective means (than coercive legislation) of realising rights and holding duty bearers accountable (Sano, 2000; Sen, 2004; Uvin, 2007).

The medium of public or open discussion challenges the idea held by some scholars such as Hausermann (1998) and Hamm (2001) on the universality of human rights. Hausermann (1998), for instance, holds all human rights to be inherent (that is, universal) and dismisses the argument that “cultural relativity prohibits universal human rights [...] and that development cooperation results in the imposition of Western values on other states” (p.30). A contrary position is put forward; that is, the argument for an unhindered and informed public discussion across national boundaries regarding our basic need for survival and human rights (Sen, 2004; Uvin, 2007).

Another theoretic issue facing the rights based approach is the status of ESR, and this involves two broad criticisms: issue of “institutionalisation and feasibility” (Sen, 2004, p.345). The institutionalisation of ESR relates to the issue of duty-bearers, while feasibility refers to a duty-bearer’s (primarily a nation-state) capacity to fulfil the rights. For instance, Civil and Political Rights (CPR) are much more broadly accepted and considered inalienable than ESR, hence leading to a hierarchy of rights where some rights are seen as core and
others as periphery. However, “all human rights are core [as they are] indivisible, interdependent and inter-related” (Hausermann, 1998, p. 28). The failure to institutionalise ESR accounts for the continuous perception of development as charity rather than as rights, as most developed countries do not want to accept legal responsibility for providing development assistance to poor and developing countries. However, Picciotto et al (2010) argue that rich countries should acknowledge their share of the responsibility for global poverty reduction (p.14). On the other hand, developing countries are seen as incapable of meeting the ESR of their citizens.

Regarding the institutionalisation of human rights, particularly the fear of Western democracies in being perceived as legal duty bearers, Sen (2004) advances the concepts of “perfect obligations” (where the reasons for action for agents and the practical implications are justified and precisely characterised) and “imperfect obligations” (where reasons for actions are imprecisely characterised) (p.319; see also Andreassen, 2010). The imperfect obligation clause offers a way out of the dilemma for external duty bearers afraid of taking legal responsibility for fulfilling the ESR of poor countries. Significantly, imperfect obligations are no less important as the perfect obligations- “the acceptance of imperfect obligations goes beyond volunteered charity or elective virtues” (Sen, 2004, p. 319). Sano (2000) equally supports the argument that requires developed countries to accept some form of political responsibility for ESR seeing development as an entitlement (Picciotto et al 2010). In recognition of the incapacity of poor developing states to fulfil the ESR, Sen (2004) argues that this does not excuse them from fulfilling the rights as full provision is not an absolute condition; rather attempts should be made to build capacity for the fulfilment of those rights (see also Hausermann, 1998; Sengupta, 2010). Hausermann (1998) describes this as the “margin of discretion” allowed states, in recognition of the possibility of legitimate incapacity to ensure immediate realisation of all ESR (p.29; see also Thomas, 2001).
Ironically, the state remains important as either the primary duty bearer or the framework for ensuring the global vision (Hausermann, 1998; Thomas, 2001; Duffield, 2007). For instance, Hausermann (1998) defines human rights as “a global vision backed by state obligations” (p.25). Thomas (2001) makes a stronger case for the state as the most suitable instrument for respecting and protecting human rights. She argues that nation-states, unlike civil society groups, “are mandated to represent citizens, they are accountable to citizens and they are responsible for the human security of the citizens” (ibid, p.123). In contrast, Sano (2000) posits that accountability must be driven from the bottom rather than from the top. Hence, the state is an unsuitable mediator for human rights as there is often an existing bias in wealth distribution by state elites.

The top-down monitoring framework is therefore incompatible with the rights based approach. International organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are considered more appropriate to the realisation of development as entitlement, especially in relation to holding duty-bearers accountable (see also Sen, 2004; Andreassen, 2010). In addition, state legal instruments such as the courts (which are useful for seeking redress and accountability) may be out of the reach of ordinary citizens (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004).

The type of state: authoritarian, democratic, “neo-liberal”, “good governance state” and “developmental state”, is important in the relationship between human rights and development. In this regard, the rights based approach is limited as it places less emphasis on an ideal state (Gready & Vadenhole, 2014). In terms of the cooperation between states and NGOs, Gready and Vadenhole (2014) consider the implication an NGO-driven (or bottom-up) approach may have on a state’s legitimacy or sovereignty. Hence, the role of the state remains a controversial subject in the rights based discourse. However, rights based approach
offers immense benefit as it allows development agencies to combine their traditional service delivery with capacity building and advocacy (Gready & Vadenhole, 2014).

Evidently, a rights based approach lends itself to various debates that can be categorised into three broad layers: “normative”, “pragmatic” and “ethical” (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004). The normative account is captured in Hausermann’s (1998) words: “a vision of what ought to be...and emphasis on choices for people and solutions in terms of steps to be taken to achieve human rights and thereby development” (p.31). This is differentiated from Sen’s theory of rights as entitlements and capabilities that focus overtly on poverty viewed from the lens of the poor (Hausermann, 1998). International human rights instruments back the normative approach. Nussbaum’s (1997) capability theory is similar to the normative account of a rights based approach.

The pragmatic characteristic of a human rights approach to development involves the adoption of a right based approach in development programme designs that target disadvantaged individuals and communities, creation of awareness or education about human rights, participation and accountability (Nelson & Dorsey, 2003; Sano, 2000; Hamm, 2001). At this practical level, non-legalistic approaches such as dialogue may be more fruitful than the legal frameworks in advancing a human rights-based approach to development (Boesen & Sano, 2010).

A human rights approach to development can provide that practical and “coherent framework (crucial to the planning), implementation and evaluation of development programmes, and for ensuring cross-sectorial policy coherent in support of the rights and needs of poor people [based on human rights standards and criteria]” (Hausermann, 1998, p.24). It will, of course, involve analysis of a country’s commitment to international human rights standards and
frameworks, its goals and standard setting, plans and programmes, monitoring and evaluation, and participation (including ‘who’ is participating and ‘how’).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to define and clarify relevant concepts, including the contentious debates surrounding terrorism and insurgency and between new and old war. It has helped to clarify these concepts in a way that helps the study tease out how the Nigerian government and its external development partners’ development initiatives and interventions have been developed towards the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts, and the issues that may have arisen concerning their effectiveness. Additionally, the chapter provides the theoretical basis for subjecting the initiatives and interventions to a human rights compliance test, including the evaluation of human rights based approach to development and the potential of its adaptability to the local context.

Proper definitions and clarifications of these concepts are needed if we are to apply the appropriate CI/CT. For instance, defining terrorism as a new form of warfare suggests that terrorists are seen to be irrational and using terrorism as both a means and an end, hence justifying hard power CT methods. However, when seen only as a strategy of insurgency (as adopted in this study), insurgents are seen to be rational actors that can utilise terrorist strategies. Hence, a soft power approach or development strategies seem to be predominantly required. Yet, the connection between development and security is fraught with challenges including securitisation. As such, human rights have been proposed as capable of mediating the thorny relationship between development and security, but the relationship between human rights and development is no less problematic. From the foregoing, a triad is formed such that development is now clearly linked to human rights as much as it is linked to security. The nexuses between development and security and between development and human rights offer huge gains to policy construction as well as to an intellectual study. From
a policy perspective, development actors, including international development agencies and donors are showing increasing awareness of the security implications of their policies. For instance, the business of development intervention operates (even if this is still within the realm of principle) within a new climate of reasoning that may have shifted from Duffield’s concept of “bio politic technology” or what Preston (1999) describes as the “un-contentious business of organising decent lives for the presently disadvantaged people of the Third World” (p.24). There is a growing understanding among development institutions about the concept of a human rights approach to development intervention.

Yet, in practice, the understanding of development as rights and the process of operationalising a rights based approach to development appear weak. The focus on the pragmatic aspect of a rights-based approach underlines the argument that human rights are normative, pragmatic and ethical. There is a strong interaction between the normative and pragmatic dimensions of human rights such that a human rights-based approach to development is concerned with the outcome of development as well as the process of achieving development, which should be human rights. This is the core characteristic of a rights based approach, that is, its concern with outcome (end) and process (means), that sets it apart from previous approaches, particularly the declaration on the right to development. It is also this concern with the process of development intervention that informs my intellectual engagement with the research questions guiding this study.
Chapter Three: Literature Review on Nigeria, Niger Delta and Boko Haram

3.0 Introduction

This chapter situates, within broader and existing literature on responses to conflicts in Nigeria, the exploration of the triad between human security, human development and human rights in relation to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts. It follows up on the conclusion in the previous chapter that poverty, underdevelopment, inequality, and weak/failed states are increasingly perceived as security threats-threats that are globalised as are the efforts to combat them. Hence, national and international efforts are required to address the security threats. Conventional approaches, mainly military responses, appear inadequate for addressing these kinds of threats. Hence, soft power approaches are being harnessed with military approaches for better result. This chapter focuses on Nigeria, the second largest economy in Africa, but one still considered a weak state (Rice, 2003). The chapter considers studies that focus on the type of responses (including the conditions, processes and outcomes involved), internal and external, to these domestic conflicts. This helps in setting the proper context for answering the questions about how internal and external development initiatives to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts have been developed, and if such initiatives or policies adhere to human rights principles, and ultimately, if there is a chance for a human rights approach that is compatible with the Nigerian socio-cultural reality. The review is divided into two broad parts. The first part considers a much more general outlook on the internal responses to Nigeria’s conflict. The second part addresses the specific literature on the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts.
3.1 An Overview of the Nigerian Conflict: Domestic Responses and their Ramifications

Nigeria’s potential as a continental power (owing to its large economy, geographic size and other comparative advantages) is undermined by several conflicts. The conflicts range from perennial ethno-religious crises to insurgency and terrorism. Many of the past and recurrent conflicts have been linked to the history of the Nigerian state, the often-cited being its colonial history. Nigeria, like many states in Africa, except Liberia and Ethiopia, is a former colony of European colonial powers. Even Liberia and Ethiopia experienced foreign domination, however brief. Hence, Nigeria exhibits the characteristics of ex-colonies like many of the states in Africa today, and that is the arbitrariness of state creation by the European colonial administrators. The arbitrary state creation involves clustering multiple groups of distinct linguistic and cultural/ethnic identities into artificially created borders.

There would be few scholars (if any) that will disagree that this peculiar colonial history presents a great potential for conflict, and perhaps even constitute a great source of recurrent conflicts such as civil wars, insurgencies and other kinds of domestic crises in Nigeria as well as in many African countries today (Ekeh, 1975; Falola, 2009; Suberu & Diamond 2002). Many others argue however that the current conflicts in Nigeria, as part of a larger continental challenge, have little to do with their colonial legacy but more with the failure of African post-colonial elites to provide the right leadership needed for Africa’s development (Herbst 2000, 2014; Cooper 1994). However, conflict is not produced simply because of boundary issues or group differences, but more from disruption in the power structure that creates an uneven balance of power and influence between several ethnic groups (Rothchild et al, 1970).
The colonial narrative is however significant to my thesis only in the sense that it is often used as a reference point (directly or indirectly) to justify the requirement of development responsibility from external interveners, especially European Western governments, in the case of Nigeria, Britain, on one hand. On the other hand, the colonial heritage continues to play a role in Nigeria’s post-colonial political stage. For instance, Ake (1996) submits that development in Nigeria continues to be stunted by the political conditions- an absolutist state structure that its elites inherited from the colonial government and have since perfected the craft of violence through the politicisation of ethnic and other primordial identities to the detriment of development (see also Falola, 2009). Hence, the nature of the Nigerian state tends naturally towards the production of tension and conflict between state and society relations (Omeje, 2007). Therefore, the Nigerian state is a site for contest of power and conflict.

However, there are evidences of internal efforts at minimising the tension and conflict generated by the externally imposed political state system, one that is duly recognised by some of the staunchest critics of the continent’s dependency on Western intervention (Herbst, 2014; Zartman, 2000). In the case of Nigeria, as in many other African pluralist and even non-African pluralist states, the elites from the different ethnic groups have adopted the principle of consociationalism- that is, the use of constitutions and constitutional/institutional arrangements as a political technology that accommodates the rights and concerns of the various ethnic compositions with the view of eliminating ethnic domination and determining patterns of authority (Lijphart, 1969; Jinadu, 1985; Suberu & Diamond, 2002 ; Kuperman, 2015). Evidently, this reflects some implicit element of a development and human rights approach to conflict management.

Consociation as a conflict-regulating mechanism has its merits and demerits. In Nigeria, it takes the form of federalism and has been useful in mitigating the fear of ethnic domination.
and the consequences of ethno-religious conflicts (Paden, 2005; Adamolekun & Kincaid, 1991). While there has been useful progress, this conflict-regulating mechanism has also yielded negative tendencies such that consociation becomes a conflict-generating tool as well. Some of the limitations of consociation in Nigeria include a do-or-die (zero sum game) attitude to politics largely owing to the highly centralised nature of the Nigerian state and a flagrant disregard of the rule of law by political opponents that seek the total annihilation of one another- “a conception of the political marketplace at variance with the emphasis of federalism and consociationalism on compromise and checks on political excesses” (Jinadu, 1985, p.71). The politics of identity, largely primordial identity of ethnicity, has remained defiant to the consociation efforts (including the principle of ‘federal character’ that aims at ethnic balance in federal appointments) by the Nigerian political elites, such that ethnicity and regionalism form the tool for mobilising, organising and contesting access to state power (Ekeh, 1975; Jega, 2000; Ukiwo, 2003).

Nigeria reflects the weakness of the principle of consociation- that is, a self-absorbing and damaging consciousness of identities that yield a strong predilection towards centrifugal rather than centripetal ideals. In the Nigerian case, ethnicity is politicised and manipulated by opportunistic elites to advance personal and class interests (Oshita, 2007; Jinadu, 1985; Jega, 2000). Many Nigerian scholars trace the source of this deep ethnic consciousness and conflict to the colonial policy, especially the uneven and discriminatory policies towards northern and southern Nigeria, still evident today (Ojeleye, 2010; Jega, 2000). Interestingly, consociationalism calls for affirmative actions to achieve a balance of power among different groups in a plural society. Usually, these take any of these forms: “grand coalition”, “mutual veto”, “proportionality” and “segmental autonomy” (Lijphart, 1969).

Jinadu (1985) highlights five manifestations of affirmative action engendered by consociation that includes attempt at removing institutionalised barriers against certain ethnic groups, non-
institutionalised biases that deny access for certain groups into institutions, institutionalised systemic biases against some groups, quota system (usually non-elective) that guarantees appointment for certain number of an ethnic group, and proportional representation (usually elective) for ethnic groups (p.74). The fourth and fifth affirmative actions are considered to be commonly practiced in Nigeria (Jinadu, 1985). All of these somewhat resembles human rights principles especially of participation and non-discrimination. Regrettably, the consociation measures such as quota system have not been able to curtail ethnic considerations and biases in appointments (Ojeleye, 2010). In considering the limitations of this approach and especially of the anti-terrorism laws and development policies and programmes towards contemporary conflicts in Nigeria, it would be useful to evaluate their conformity with human rights principles including the processes and outcomes of their conceptualisation and implementation.

Nigeria’s consociation efforts at managing the challenges posed by the rather divisive and plural identities since independence are commendable, although the outcomes of these efforts have shown themselves to be inadequate towards stemming the persisting ethno-religious conflicts. Perhaps, we must learn to appreciate the constitutional and institutional arrangements as “experiments in collective action to structure patterns of dominance and authority” (Jinadu 1985, p.71-72). These efforts may have failed to produce an enduring solution because they are only considered as “compensatory measures”, according to Jinadu (1985) rather than seen as rights. Another possible reason is the fact that development itself is a façade exploited by the political elites as a means of reproducing political control (Ake, 1996) and accumulating wealth (Omeje, 2007; Egwaikhide and Isumonah, 2009; Ukiwo, 2003). Against this backdrop is the crucial need therefore to investigate how domestic and international interventions (primarily development approach) to the contemporary conflicts in
Nigeria (particularly the Niger Delta and Boko Haram) are been developed as well as the issues that arise concerning their effectiveness.

The need to investigate internal as well as international development interventions in the Nigerian conflicts reflects the argument that security threats (including securitised non-war issues such as poverty, underdevelopment and weak states) are globalised as is the security responses. Relatedly, a human rights approach relies mainly on universal concepts of human rights which also inform regional and national human rights covenants and documents. There are however contestations regarding the universal acceptance or applicability of human rights. It is against this background that the question about a human rights approach to development that is compatible with the Nigerian socio-cultural reality becomes relevant as a question of enquiry. It is also within this framework that alternative or traditional conflict resolution approaches are considered.

Despite the state being the primary duty bearer with the obligation to protect and guarantee security for its citizens, the right to protect extends to other stakeholders such as civil society organisations and the international development community, including external governments and international non-governmental organisations (NGO). While R2P brings up the issue of sovereignty and the contention between external interventions as a moral right versus external intervention as a legal right, most of the growing debates have centred on the orientation of the conflict resolution approaches, besides their effectiveness. It is generally believed, by mostly African scholars, that the existing conflict approaches are Western-oriented and are ineffective towards resolving African conflicts (Akinwale, 2010; Adesina, 2014; Amadi & Agena, 2014). Many of these scholars have been demanding the use of traditional or indigenous (in this case African) conflict approaches (Oshita, 2007; Adebayo, Lundy, Benjamin & Adjei, 2014; Paden, 2005).
But quite notably, there would be few (if any) works that recommend a complete rejection of the Western-oriented conflict approaches. Rather, what most studies recommend is a possible integration and cooperation between the standard approaches and alternative approaches. For Zartman (2000), the indigenous traditional conflict methods, with all its conceptual flaws, present huge potential for conflict resolution in the continent as much as limitations. Its limitations lie in the absence of a properly conceptualised and codified “traditional” approach (including a contestation about a homogenous ‘African’ conflict approach) and, more so, the rather exaggerated impact (considering the fact that there would not have been any need for external intervention, if the indigenous methods worked in the first instance) (see also MacGinty, 2008).

Zartman (2000) is therefore right in calling for a proper research into the effectiveness of indigenous traditional conflict resolution approaches and whether such mechanisms can work in tandem with Western-oriented or the standard approaches, towards resolving today’s conflicts (see also Lundy & Adjei, 2014; MacGinty, 2008). However, there are doubts regarding such collaboration, at best, for some is some form of co-option of indigenous approaches into the standard methods, rather than collaboration (MacGinty, 2008). There are more people with great optimism regarding the effective alignment of the standard and alternative conflict resolution mechanisms- (Paden, 2005; Oshita, 2007; Akinwale, 2010). All of these further reinforce the need to explore the prospect of a human rights approach to development that would be compatible with the Nigerian socio-cultural environment.

There is broad consensus regarding Nigeria’s democratic pre-colonial system (Paden, 2005; Tar, 2008; Elechi, 1999) that reflects a broader continental conflict resolution mechanism that is participatory and democratic in orientation and, more importantly inclines toward restorative (rather than Western-style retributive approach) justice and democratic governance (Paden, 2005; Tar, 2008; Oshita, 2007; Awe, 1999; Adebayo et al, 2014;
MacGinty, 2008). Such participatory politics and democratic governance system are nigh absence in post-colonial Nigeria, and, in their place is a massive alienation and disconnect between the citizens and the state, which inspires conflict (Idowu, 1999). Hence, one is persuaded to agree with the argument that colonialism was disruptive to Nigeria’s traditional structures as well as the long military rule (Jega, 2000; Paden, 2005).

According to Oshita (2007) one of the damaging consequences of colonialism is that it not only disrupted the traditional model of conflict resolution, it “intensified the expectation of help from the outside” (p.35). Nonetheless, the argument made by Cooper, Herbst, Zartman and others regarding the continued dependency on outside help remains true (Cooper, 1994; Herbst, 2000; Zartman, 2000; Stedman, 1993). But whilst there may be some grain of truth in the view about Africans using their colonial history as a pretext for transferring responsibilities to the West, it still does not erase that historical episode of plunder and violence against the colonial subjects. However, the colonial narrative seems a distant source of reference, as the scourge of terrorism, insurgency and other criminal activities such as drugs, human trafficking and even climate change have become internationalised with far-reaching global effects. International cooperation in the form of multilateral and bilateral fronts appear as standard approaches to countering global threats.

Hence, coming back to the salient question about how internal and external development initiatives are been developed and the issues surrounding their effectiveness, particularly in the context of neoliberal policies in Nigeria’s post-independence period, Tar (2008) looks into the relationship between external donors and civil society—the latter considered an alternative to the state. This is very essential as there is little contestation about the importance of civil society especially as the Nigerian state is not a neutral actor or mediator in internal conflicts (Paden, 2005; Oshita, 2007; Tar, 2008). But Tar (2008) dismisses the political conditionality placed on states and especially civil society by donors as based on a
false assumption that “Africa was lacking in the essential components for a spontaneous transition to liberal democracy and development” (p.211). Hence, Tar (2008) introduces an angle of power relations echoing Duffield’s (2007) argument in chapter one, which is development as a bio political technology of control that standardises and reinforces the superiority of Western ideals first through colonialism and now through the international financial institutions.

But besides the notion of power relations and the contest between sovereignty and the international responsibility to protect, liberal and neoliberal policies appear to be ignorant and dismissive of local structures and institutions that are already democratic in their structures (Tar, 2008; Ibrahim, 2000; Paden, 2005). It is however important that external interveners consider the peculiar historical and cultural characteristics and structures of the recipient community in the drafting and implementation of development interventions (Paden, 2005; Christelow, 2002).

In terms of the relationship between the Nigerian state (its political class) and the civil society as engendered by liberal and neoliberal politics including liberal democracy and market economy, Tar (2008) casts such relationship in class struggle, however differentiating anti-state and pro-state civil society. Hence the Nigerian state presents the capacity to be coercive as much as the civil society has the capacity to reproduce or challenge the state’s coercive powers. Contrary to Tar’s Marxist approach to Nigerian politics and development, Jega (2000) de-emphasises what he terms a “preoccupation with what can be termed as excessive ‘class determinism’” (pp.11-12; see also Bienen, 2013; Adamolekun & Kincaid, 1991). Also focusing on the neoliberal policies and the structural adjustment programmes (SAP) conditionality, Jega (2000), like Tar (2008) recommends a consideration of what he regards as “alternative and all-encompassing theoretical frameworks such as those offered by radical political economy” (p.12; see also Paden 2005). But unlike Tar (2008) whose analysis
highlights the class struggle and contradictions between the Nigerian political class and the emerging civil society, Jega (2000) focuses on the politics of identities, including ethnic, religious, gender, communal, labour and youth, which resurfaced under SAP. Hence, primordial identities such as ethnicity with other kinds of identities identified were mobilised for mass action against the economic hardship and violent state repression under SAP.

In line with most of the arguments in the literature, Jega (2000) holds the colonial administration responsible for creating the structural conditions that produce politics of identities through deliberate policies that highlight marked differences among the component ethnic groups and encouraged the pursuit of narrow gains based on particular identities (see Ekeh, 1975). While the majority of the views consider ethnic and religious identities as negative forces of political mass mobilisation (see Huntington, 1997), it is interesting to see that primordial identities and cultural values can equally serve a positive role (Osaghae, 2006; Paden, 2005). For instance, religion can lend itself as a tool of stabilisation (considering the increasing role of religious identity groups or interfaith groups in conflict resolution) rather than destabilisation (Paden, 2005; Christelow, 2002) as well as ethnicity (where ethnic civil society groups can serve as check to the excesses of the state with potential of serving as reform agents) (Osaghae, 2006).

There have been national responses to internal conflicts, especially in the Fourth Republic, starting from 1999 when Nigeria returned to civilian government after a long spell of military rule. Omeje (2007) considers these responses (including domestic economic and financial reforms, extractive industry transparency initiative, poverty reduction and wealth and value creation strategies) as a substitute of the neoliberal-conditioned SAP and transformation agendas of previous military regimes. Although internally-driven, these development interventions and strategies are externally motivated, as they seek to attract outside support through debt reliefs and foreign aids (Paden, 2005). Hence, they can be viewed as a
calculated attempt at transferring development responsibilities to the West. Perhaps, it is time for Nigeria, and by extension Africa, to look inwards to more local and micro-approaches to solving the persisting development and conflict challenges (Paden, 2005; Herbst, 2014). It is unsurprising that the macro-oriented and dependent development strategies of the Nigerian government in the Fourth Republic are impeded by their restrictions to the federal level showing lack of fiscal responsibility in the relationship between the federal, state and local tiers of government (Omeje, 2007). This appalling inter-governmental relationship is traced back to past military regimes for destroying the vertical relationship (Paden, 2005).

However, the inter-governmental relationship is not all that gloomy. There is reason to hope that Nigeria’s federalism and consociation efforts will yield enduring solutions. Hence, while there might be inequality among states in terms of the evidence of federal presence (that is, the amount of federal spending or expenditure in a state) (Adamolekun & Kincaid, 1991; Egwaikhide and Isumonah, 2009), this reality could have a reverse positive effect as it may inspire some states to be less reliant on federal allocation for their development needs. This offers such states some degree of independence and leverage to not only resist but also challenge some of the excesses of the central state. Evidence for such is found in the relationship between some states (especially those in the control of opposition parties) and the federal government and how the resistance (by these states) to the overbearing nature of the federal government (usually controlled by the dominant political party) create some form of checks and balance (Bienen, 2013; Paden, 2005; Suberu & Diamond, 2002). It is not surprising therefore that some scholars demand devolution of power and a strong but limited federal government (Adamolekun & Kincaid, 1991).

Whatever the gains achieved either by external intervention or internal intervention or by the combination of efforts, underdevelopment and conflict remain ubiquitous in the continent. Zartman (2000) rightly observes the need for improvement, although he notes that the general
(Western-oriented) conflict mechanisms appear to be properly conceptualised and organised than the African indigenous conflict approaches. There are however mixed reactions and outcomes regarding external intervention in African civil wars. Many of the studies have focused on how outside intervention in civil war prolongs the war or otherwise (Balch-Lindsay & Enterline, 2000; Collier, Hoeffer & Soderbom, 2004; Licklider, 1995; Heraclides, 1990). This is quite evident in the Nigeria-Biafra Civil War of 1967-1970 (Ojeleye, 2010; Stremlau, 1977; Elaigwu, 1977).

The role and influence of outside intervention in internal conflicts however continues to be hotly debated. For some observers, external intervention is a major condition for ending internal conflicts or negotiating settlement among the opposing forces (Balch-Lindsay & Enterline, 2000; Walter, 1997; Nathan, 1999; Regan & Aydin, 2006). While that may be the rule, there are exceptions and the Nigerian-Biafran Civil War is one exception. While it ended in victory for the Federal Forces, the post-civil war settlement was completely an internal affair (Stremlau, 1977). The FG’s demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programme constructed as the 3Rs: “reconciliation”, “rehabilitation” and “reconstruction” were carried out internally by General Gowon’s administration with no external involvement.

Quite notably, Nigeria’s post-civil war peace policy commands international respect and admiration because of its perceived non-discriminatory and targeted response to the structural conditions that caused the civil war (Paden, 2005; Stremlau, 1977). Aided by the oil revenue windfall of the 1970s, the government was able to conduct targeted and deliberate economic reconstruction, across the whole country (not just in the Biafran states) taking cognisance of the ethnic fissures and special social cleavages. The federal military government’s approach is a deliberate response to the perceived source of the civil war, a political past characterised by “believed oppositions, of dissent and distrust” (Kirk-Greene, 1971). Jega (2000) validates
the success of the 3Rs in his assessment of the 1970s as more successful in containing the politics of identities than in the previous decades or following decades. The Second National Development Plan (SNDP) was developed as a five year plan, 1970-1975 to facilitate the 3Rs, serving thus as a development approach to conflict regulation and resolution. SNDP continues the path of the first Six Year National Development Plan in 1962 that intensified the desire and efforts at national integration (towards creating a sense of national identity) (Kirk-Greene, 1971).

SNDP reflects some elements of consociationalism-an attempt to close gaps (such as education and economics) between ethnic groups, for example, by adopting a national education policy stipulating certain quota of federal investment (such as number of federal schools and institutions) in each state of the federation. However, there are flaws identified and this include a deliberate or inadvertent exclusion of key stakeholders including some sections of the affected society such as the women and children as well as the international community from designing and implementing the policy of the 3Rs. The policy, especially the Indigenisation Decree of 1972 strategically disempowered and marginalised the Biafrans (largely Igbos), as the lack of recognition for their currency excluded them from the Nigerian economy, hence, giving other ethnic groups unfair advantage. Ojeleye (2010) therefore argues that “the DDR exercise, though presented under the guise of justice and fairness, had inbuilt in it seeds that prevented the establishment of a harmonious inter-group relations in the country” (p.163; see also Ibrahim 2000). Quite notably, Nigeria has practised some degree of development approach to conflict prevention, resolution and management. But the persistent crises justify an investigation of a development and rights-based approach to conflict resolution.

From the domestic side, we can see a growing interest in African traditional methods, especially the huge support for traditional rulers as important conflict mediators (Paden,
Yet, despite the great potential that a development approach presents to conflict prevention and resolution as evident in the Nigerian case (particularly in the case of the 3Rs and SNDP), it has failed to produce an enduring solution. The reason for such abysmal failure may well be the overt focus on “tangible” rather than the “intangible” aspect of development (Ojeleye, 2010). Nigeria’s development interventions mostly focus on tangible things such as road construction and other material capital projects to the detriment of intangibles such as ideals of equity, justice and access to resources and development that are useful towards nation-building.

These development interventions are mere tokens that constitute tools of control rather than progression (Ake, 1996). This further proves that development can be a tool of suppression, that conceals “the struggle for power and survival” among the local elites; transfers development responsibility to outsiders (particularly the West), and ultimately sets itself up for imposition of Western “model of social transformation” (Ake 1996, p.9). Hence, the need for a human rights approach to development.

3:2 Niger Delta

The Niger Delta region has a long history characterized by struggle and resistance. The resistance against British colonial rule and domination by major ethnic groups (Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba) in an independent Nigerian-state crystallised into a violent conflict between the Nigerian state and a myriad of Niger Delta militant groups in early 2000s. By mid-2000, the Niger Delta struggle had morphed into a full-blown insurgency marked by extensive disruption of oil activities in the oil-rich region mainly through an almost daily oil pipeline vandalism, kidnapping of oil workers, hostage-taking, bombing of oil installations and facilities among many other insurgent activities.
The Nigerian state’s counter-response to the insurgency is, at once, a causative and reactive one. In other words, it follows a rather aggressive repressive pattern that is self-reproducing, evident in the use of violent force by the Niger Delta militants. The history of this struggle-turned-insurgency, including the causes, responses and the cumulative impact of all of these on the several stakeholders (Nigerian state, Multinational Oil Companies, global community and the Niger Delta communities) is well documented (see Watts, 2001; Obi, 2001; Ikelegbe, 2005; Okonta & Douglas, 2003). To traverse the gamut of literature on the Niger Delta conflict would be very daunting, to say the very least, as there is an astounding volume of academic publications. I must admit that the literature on Niger Delta is quite expansive and virtually every serious aspect on the topic has been touched upon. However, my research offers fresh insight into an important area—development that has gained serious attention in scholarly circles as well as in the policy arena.

More and more studies and research papers conclude by recommending a development approach to the Niger Delta insurgency, in repudiation of the often militarized approach applied by the Nigerian government (Ikelegbe, 2013; Osaghae, 1995). As there is substantial evidence of development policies and programmes initiated by the government and the MNOCs as steps towards addressing the conflict, a number of studies have focused primarily on critiquing the plethora of development strategies adopted towards the Niger Delta conflict (Ibaba, 2010). These studies have looked at the strengths and weaknesses of the development programmes. Development theory is no doubt a key element in many of the studies on the subject of Niger Delta. However, we can identify some major themes that run across the large body of work produced on the subject of Niger Delta including resource control and resource ownership struggle, poverty and underdevelopment, environmental degradation through the activities of the MNOCs, and lack of political participation and democratic accountability (Ahonsi, 2011).
These issues are often discussed under the theoretic guidance of political economy (greed versus grievance, ethnic identity politics), marginalization/deprivation theory and development and dependency thesis. The development theory, especially in relation to security and human rights, is of particular relevance to the research presented in this thesis. There are a substantial yet growing number of studies and papers that conceptualise and explicate a people-centred and people-driven grassroots development approach to the Niger Delta conflict. Noteworthy, is the chapter by Omotola (2010) and his use of the term “human rights approach to development” and his effort in explaining what it means and how it is applicable to the Niger Delta conflict.

However, Omotola’s chapter and similar papers appear to be methodologically weak, empirically questionable and sometimes historically irrelevant. While they recommend a bottom-up development approach and development policies and programmes, they fail to present “how” these can be achieved in practice. The few studies that attempt to explain how, either present contradictions (Ibaba, 2012) or less empirical evidence (Omotola, 2010). This study therefore seeks to probe deeper into the development approach to the Niger Delta conflict by investigating how internal (such as national programmes and civil society organisations’ CSO activities) and external (including MNOCs) development initiatives and programmes have been developed and the issues that have arisen concerning their effectiveness. The study will be looking out for evidence of a rights based approach to development that includes elements of participation, transparency, accountability and non-discrimination, and ultimately, explore how a human rights approach that is compatible with the Niger Delta socio-cultural reality can be developed.

Evidently, the literature on the Niger Delta struggle, which is largely, but not all, about oil, is extensive. Various studies have dealt with the causes of the conflict, including the repressive counter-response of successive Nigerian government to the Niger Delta struggle. (Watts,
Other studies have addressed government’s development commissions (Ibaba, 2010), and many other studies have written on the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) of MNOCs (Frynas, 2001, 2005; Zalik, 2004; Okonta & Douglas, 2003). Virtually all of the studies on Niger Delta recommend development intervention as an alternative to the self-reproducing character of the militarized approach oftentimes used by the Nigerian state and its ally-MNOCs. Yet, only a few studies go beyond what I call a footnote development recommendation. In this review, Ibaba (2010) and Omotola’s (2010) works have been singled out as illustration of the few studies that stand out in their development proposal.

It is perhaps right to conclude that development has been the dominant approach to countering the Niger Delta insurgency (Idemudia & Ite, 2006a). While this bold statement challenges the more popular view of state repression as the dominant response to the Niger Delta insurgency (Obi, 2001; Omeje, 2004), it would appear that it is not much of a challenge as there is no serious study (known to me) that have compared both approaches in a quantitative sense. What is clearly evident in the literature is a measurement of the impact of the two approaches on the transformation of the conflict, and this is often measured in a qualitative sense. Many studies and analysts hold the view that state’s repression, starting from the 1995 farcical trial and eventual killing of Ken Sarowiwa and the other eight Ogoni leaders by then-military Head of State, General Sani Abacha, to the Odi Massacre, and heavy militarization of the region, contributed massively to the transformation of the Niger Delta from a non-violent to a violent militancy (Osaghae, 1995; Nwachukwu, 2013; Ikelegbe, 2013; Idemudia, 2009). Yet, the impact of the development approaches taken is no less devastating. Many studies have also focused on the several development commissions established by successive Nigerian government with their negative impact especially in escalating and protracting the conflict (Idemudia, 2012).
Critics of the development interventions in the Niger Delta have often criticized the “top-down” pattern of these development commissions set up by the Nigerian state as well as the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) carried out by the MNOCs hosted in the Niger Delta region (Ikelegbe, 2005; Zalik, 2004; Obi, 2001). This approach is criticized for precluding the majority of the Niger Delta people, choosing instead to reward a few indigenes (Obi, 2001; Nwajiaku, 2005) and these few are selected from the traditional rulers and local community leaders, a reminder of the British colonial legacy of Indirect Rule.

From the Nigerian state’s development commissions to the multinational oil companies’ CSR and the circumstantial evidence of local communities’ involvement in the development programmes of both the state and the MNOCs, one can conclude that the development issues in the Niger Delta is not due to the dearth of development, but perhaps due to the irreconcilable perceptions of development between the oil host communities and the state and MNOCs (Boele, Fabig & Wheeler, 2001; Omeje, 2004; Idemudia & Ite, 2006b; Omotola, 2010). This poses a challenge to the ideas sponsored by some analysts- that peace and sustainable development can be achieved in the Niger Delta only through the cooperation of the three major stakeholders- state, MNOCs, and the host communities (Idemudia & Ite, 2006). The fundamental differences in the state-MNOCs and oil host communities’ conceptualization of development and expected outcomes of development interventions may not be unrelated to the top-down structure of the development strategies in the region (Ikelegbe, 2005) and the motives of the stakeholders (Zalik, 2004; Frynas, 2001).

Most studies in the extant literature have identified a hegemonic alliance between the Nigerian state and the MNOCs that puts them on one end of a spectrum in opposition to the ordinary people of the host community (Ibeanu, 2000; Frynas, 2001; Watts, 2001; Obi, 2010). The state conspires with the MNOCs not only in repressing the protest and resistance of the Niger Deltans but more so in undermining the positive outcomes of the development
Many studies describe the militarization of the region—the government’s use of excessive force and how MNOCs operating in the region employ force through government Forces, private securities and different groups of Niger Delta militia to protect their facilities (Watts, 2007). The Niger Delta people are often least considered and are therefore under-protected. Omeje (2004) however posits that the popular theory of state-MNOCs hegemonic alliance is far more complicated than is often presented.

The Nigerian state’s overt reliance on oil revenue starting from the oil boom of the 1970s and its creation of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), 1971, and the subsequent promulgation of the Land Use Act of 1978, has had a damaging impact on state-citizen relations. The impacts of these are well documented (and include turning Nigeria into a mono-economy). Not only did it destroy the growth of other non-oil resources that government could tax, it widened the gulf between the government and the people as power became centralized. The government’s NNPC holds a 60 percent stake in most of the MNOCs in Nigeria (Frynas, 2001). It is unsurprising therefore that there is an irreconcilable difference in the development agendas of the state with its business partner (MNOCs) and the development plans and expectations of the Niger Delta people. The Niger Delta people have been side-lined in this politico-economics arrangement, and as a non-stakeholder their views do not matter. Hence, it is difficult not to agree with Idemudia and Ite (2006) that the root causes of the Niger Delta insurgency are political and economic in nature, while the environmental and social factors are only trigger and proximate causes.

The state-MNOCs alliance is, as Omeje (2004), rightly observes, far from simple. The Nigerian state is in a compromised position with oil its major revenue and its high stake in the MNOCs, which means that the state’s development interventions, just like the MNOCs’ CSR, are hampered by its vested interest. Both stakeholders are profit-oriented, which makes their corporate objectives incompatible with the public goodwill that their development
projects aim to engender (Zalik, 2004; Frynas, 2001; 2005). It is therefore far-fetch to think that simply creating an enabling environment and setting up a regulatory system to regulate oil companies’ activities will guarantee sustainable peace and development in the Niger Delta region, as some works recommend (Idemudia, 2010; Akpan, 2008). Aaron (2010) maintains a different position to Idemudia and Wilson on the failure of development commissions and, particularly, CSR. He refutes the argument that the failure of government to provide an enabling environment is responsible for the little impact of CSR in the Niger Delta. Even more shocking is his preference for increasing the derivation principle to CSR.

Aaron’s views on CSR, although overtly critical, is perfectly in line with mounting criticisms on the CSR of oil multinational companies (especially Shell) operating in the Niger Delta (see Boele et al, 2001; Frynas, 2005; Okonta & Douglas, 2001; Zalik, 2004; Ikelegbe, 2013). However, the importance and contribution of CSR to development in the Niger Delta cannot be denied, even when it has indirectly inflamed the conflict and carries the potential of unintended consequences (Ite, 2004; Frynas, 2005). One unintended consequences is the failure of MNOCs to integrate their CSR with the broader and larger development agendas of the state and society (Frynas, 2005). “CSR appears to have marginalized debates on governance and macro-level solutions to complex society-wide problems” (Frynas, 2001, p.598). Ite (2004) puts it this way: “lack of national macro-economic planning and management backed by equitable resource allocation and an enabling environment, has significant implications for overall performance and sustainability of CSR efforts by MNCs” (p.9).

Most studies have mentioned the negative impact of centralization of power and resources on the Niger Delta people and have called for decentralization of power, increase in derivation principle, equitable resource distribution (Obi, 2001). Yet, other studies have shown how decentralization of resources or increased derivation principle fails to resolve the Niger Delta
conflict (Watts, 2007; Idemudia, 2012). These studies often illustrate the contradiction in decentralization giving the examples of some Niger Delta States’ government (Rivers State, Delta, and Bayelsa) who misused the Federal Government’s (FG) allocation coming from the 13 percent increase in the derivation principle. Watts (2007) describes the political economy of decentralization using the term “decentralization of corruption” (p.642). The corrupting influence of the rentier status of the Nigerian state exerts a new political economy at the state level. The state government has shown itself unfit as a conduit through which the Niger Delta people can enjoy the benefit accruing from the oil resources in the region. The Niger Delta people must therefore take direct charge of their destiny. This has been sought through violence in the past, but it is the legitimate and peaceful democratic participation of the Niger Delta people in the development processes and projects that most studies on the Niger Delta recommend (Ibaba, 2010; Omotola, 2010; George & Omotola, 2010; Omotola & Patrick, 2010’ Ikelegbe, 2013; Medupin, 2013).

Unfortunately, a significant portion of works that promote the idea of a development approach as an alternative and required response, development viewed, in this instance, as the conditional participation of the Niger Delta people in the development process and intervention, are, at best, guilty of reductionism (Agagu, 2013; Medupin, 2013). These works fail to recognize the complexity of participation, and therefore are to be differentiated from other works that acknowledge and discuss the problematic of the Niger Delta peoples’ participation in the development mechanism which includes internecine conflicts, issues of leadership and collective versus self-serving interests (Obi, 2001b; Ikelegbe, 2005; Nwajiaku, 2005; Zalik, 2004; Okorobia, 2010). These works show how host community participation in the development projects (projects that are largely initiated and driven by the government or the MNOCs) is fraught with contradictions, increasing the rate of dependency, pitting oil communities against each other among a host of many other challenges.
Very few studies have attempted an in-depth study and analysis of what a development approach to the Niger Delta means in practice (Ibaba, 2010) and even fewer on a human rights development approach to development (Omotola, 2010). For instance, Ibaba (2010) proposes a development framework that he considers to be people-centred and participatory in approach, but one that is methodologically weak as it construes development intervention largely in project terms, rather than processed-based. Similarly, Omotola (2010) stresses local ownership and partnership as key ingredients of a human rights approach to development. But his work suffers from lack of empirical evidence. Most other studies in the literature have merely catalogued the development commissions or interventions of the government, offering criticisms, and proffering citizen participation as the way forward, with little or no detailed description of what that really means in practice. The larger body of literature have rather dealt with the concept of development in a peripheral manner.

One may conclude that the parlous state of development in the Niger Delta is due to the failure of the government to see development as the fundamental rights of the people of Niger Delta. This is what other commentators have described as lack of state “recognition” (Watts, 2001; Ako & Okonmah, 2009; Frynas, 2005) which ultimately leads to identity politics and minority groups fighting against perceived subjugation by the majority groups (Obi, 2001; Watts, 2001).

The Niger Delta conflict may have been sustained by greed, but it is one primarily motivated by grievance (Ikelegbe, 2005). The development interventions including the CSR have been feeding the insatiable greed of all the stakeholders- the state (represented by the benefiting elites- through corruption and rent-seeking), the MNOCs (by reducing the incentive of direct host confrontation, hence maximizing profit, without actually empowering the people) and some Niger Delta elites and community leaders who put their selfish interests above the collective gain (Obi, 2001; Ikelegbe, 2005; Zalik, 2004; Frynas, 2001; 2005; Aaron &
George, 2010). Hence, when analysts say that the solution lies in addressing the fundamental issues, what they mean by that is: development policies and interventions that recognize the rights of the Niger Deltans and offer them the freedom to enjoy the benefit of their rights should be adopted.

Ultimately, participation as a development approach, and as a precondition for resolving the quagmire in the Niger Delta development commissions and projects, have been sported in many of the works on Niger Delta, as cited above. Unfortunately, the concept of citizen participation in the development architecture of the Niger Delta project most times appear vague, giving rise to a divorce between theory and praxis. Although the concept of citizen participation “may have helped the promise of public involvement gain purchase” (Cornwall, 2008, p.269), it would have gained a wider currency if it demonstrates “clarity through specificity” (Cohen & Uphoff, cited by Cornwall 2008, p.269). In other words, public involvement in the Niger Delta development processes has to go beyond merely creating a platform for Niger Delta citizens to participate. It would have to involve an actual measurement of the influence of the local participants on the outcome of the project (Cornwall, 2008).

Omotola’s paper is important in this regard, yet it does not offer us evidence of such an approach in the Niger Delta context. This much is admitted by Omotola. But his paper lays out the groundwork, which is still not detailed enough, but enough to get us thinking about a human rights approach to development. This thesis’ advantage is the practical evidence it aims to present through empirical research into this unconventional approach to development in the Niger Delta. At the moment, the development interventions in the Niger Delta are still predominantly “state-centric”—providing very limited space and opportunity for popular participation.
3:3 Boko Haram

The literature on Boko Haram is still developing, but already there are over 100 academic publications, including journal publications, book chapters, books and monographs (Marlatt, 2014). This is a significant amount of output for a conflict that only began around 2002 and became popular in 2009 with the extra-judicial killing of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, by the Nigerian police. Yet, there is a lot still unknown about this group. The research outputs on the Boko Haram insurgency bring us closer to understanding the group—its ideologies, objectives, motivations, financial sponsors, membership strength, affiliations and scope of support, but the poor and ineffective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism policies applied towards the conflict either prove that a lot written about Boko Haram are at best speculative, and at worst misleading. It is equally possible that the Nigerian state has deliberately chosen to ignore intelligence report and have shown little political will to act (Onuoha, 2010).

Interestingly, many of the studies on Boko Haram try to explain the motivation or causative factors. Andrew Walker’s title: *What is Boko Haram?* (2012) is quite illustrative (see also Johnson, 2011).

Still as effort to explain what Boko Haram is, other studies have shone light on its connections to other regional and transnational terrorist organisations, particularly al-Qaeda affiliated networks (Gournel, 2012; Connell, 2012; Zenn, 2014). These studies often try to analyse Boko Haram as a domestic terrorist organisation (focused on Nigerian interest) or as a foreign terrorist organisation (with focus on foreign targets or having the potential to attack foreign interests). The global-local dimension of Boko Haram is also seen in the light of a global resurgence of Islamic revivalism (Adesoji, 2010) and/or a particular northern Nigeria Islamic reform movement (Loimeier, 2012). Some studies have investigated the inter-religious perspective as well, particularly, the idea that Boko Haram is a conflict between Muslims and Christians, and by extension, anti-Western (Onapajo & Usman, 2015). The
counterterrorism policies and practices of the Nigerian government towards the Boko Haram insurgents have also received significant attention (Solomon, 2012; Sampson, 2013) with many of the studies offering policy recommendations and solutions that the government can adopt.

Alozieuwa (2012) attempts to categorise the discourse of Boko Haram under 5 theories: relational/vengeance theory, human needs/socio-economic theory, political feud theory; the Islamic theocratic state/global Islamic revivalism; and conspiracy theories. Debates around Boko Haram can be subsumed under these five broad categorisations. Hence, the topics that have been selected for review will be fitted under these theories. It is very important to note that these theories are in no way mutually exclusive as they each dovetail into another, such that one cannot discuss the religious dimension of the insurgency without bringing up its socio-economic perspective. In the same way, one cannot focus solely on the counterterrorism and/or counterinsurgency approaches without discussing the views on the causative factors of the insurgency.

There is little disagreement about the multi-causal motivation, and in consequence, multi-faceted solutions that the Boko Haram conflict requires. The only difference is that many Boko Haram analysts hold certain factors more applicable than the others. For Alozieuwa (2012), the political explanation is more tenable (see also Nwankpa in Amaliya & Nwankpa, 2014), for others, the religious aspect carries stronger weight (Cook, 2011; Alao, 2013) and for many others, the socio-economic perspective assumes more importance (Forest, 2012). The remaining part of this review will focus more specifically on these different perspectives. While each of the perspectives has some significant bearing on the overall logic of this thesis, the human needs/socio-economic theory has a more direct bearing on my concern.
Constructed in a broader sense, the socio-economic theory falls under the concept of development. It is noteworthy; therefore, that this approach is mostly recommended in the literature on Boko Haram- a rather surprising proposal for what is considered an Islamic fundamentalist conflict. Hence, the underlying logic of my thesis reflects new and growing thoughts on conflict mediation and resolution. While a development approach to security issues or conflict resolution may have entered the United Nations’ and other policy-driven agencies’ framework from the late 1990s, the concept is still very new and less widely applied (assuming it has been accepted) to confronting terrorism-in this case religiously-inspired terrorism.

3.3.1 The Religious Perspective

This section looks at the debate on Boko Haram’s anti-Western and/or anti-Christian stance and Boko Haram as a part of the global Islamic resurgence or as a particular evidence of the history of Islamic reform in northern Nigeria. In the same stroke, it considers the debate on Boko Haram’s transnational terror link- Is Boko Haram a transnational or local terrorist organisation? The local and international boundary of Boko Haram’s religious extremism is difficult to draw. Boko Haram is an outgrowth of Islamic reform movements in northern Nigeria (Last, 2012; Alao, 2013; Nwankpa, 2015; Loimeier, 2012; Brigaglia, 2012; Hill, 2013; Higazi, 2013). Loimeier posits that Boko Haram is “deeply rooted in northern Nigeria’s specific economic, religious and political development” (ibid, p.137). The northern region is characterised, as such, by a long history of religious contestation between different Islamic variants and sects (such as the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, Izala, and Maitatsine) which have risen to challenge the dominant Islamic authority (Nwankpa, 2015).

Boko Haram has been described as an offshoot of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria and specifically of the Izala (Adesoji, 2011), yet some analysts only view such relationship on ideological grounds alone with no operational or strategic alliance (Anonymous, 2012;

Boko Haram has also been viewed as a manifestation of the global Islamic revivalism – a contest between a traditional Muslim sensibility and modernity dominated by Western ideals, and, ultimately, a drive to reinstate the lost Muslim hegemony (Lubeck, 2011). As much as we will like to confine Boko Haram to its local root, the influence that the global Islamic activities in the Muslim world has had on Islamic reform movements in Nigeria, including on Boko Haram, is undeniable. The IMN, for instance, was hugely inspired both ideologically and materially by the Shiite government of Iran during the Iranian revolution of 1979, and by the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt (Ibrahim, 1989). The Izala also received ideological and material support from the Salafi-Wahhabi government of Saudi Arabia. Boko Haram’s ideology leans more towards the Salafi-Wahhabi creed, even when the goal of establishing an Islamic state is shared by both IMN and Boko Haram. The difference between these groups is observable in their methodology of reaching their end and level of tolerance of the Nigerian secular state (Nwankpa, 2015).

Boko Haram’s violent approach to achieving its goals not only pits it against non-Muslims in the north, it also alienates it from other Salafi-Wahhabi groups, most notably the Izala (Brigaglia, 2012). Its indiscriminate attacks on churches and Christians at the earlier period of
the insurgency led many to conclude that Boko Haram is a Muslim war against Christians. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and other international Christian lobby organisations campaigned for Boko Haram to be proscribed as a terrorist group. There is however enough evidence to disprove this claim. Boko Haram’s attacks are varied including the state, Christians and Muslims (Higazi, 2013), and more Muslims than Christians may have been affected (Chouin, Reinert & Apard, 2014).

There has also been argument about Boko Haram’s anti-Western stance and by extension its status as a transnational terrorist group aimed at attacking Western interests. Virtually all the opinions in the literature agree on Boko Haram’s anti-Western posture as well as its transnational terrorist status (Cook, 2011; Forest, 2012), yet many of these works conclude that Boko Haram’s local interests overrides its transnational agenda (Zenn, Barkindo & Hera, 2013; Forest, 2012). Forests (ibid), for instance, opines that while Boko Haram shares ideological stand with other regional terrorist networks and al-Qaeda affiliates, the degree of its strategic and operational relationship with these groups is unclear.

3.3.2 The Political Perspective

Here, the focus is on the power dynamics involving contest of power between a Fulani-Hausa hegemon and Kanuri particularism, and between the north and the south. There seem to be a contestation of power between conservative authority/elitism and popular radicalism/populism-a class struggle (Brigaglia, 2012; Loimeier, 1997). Boko Haram can be seen as disenchantment with northern Islamic and political leaders who have used Islam/religion/sharia to subjugate the talakawas (the poor masses). It is a challenge to the monopoly of power of the native authority (Lubeck, 2011; Forest, 2012; Sanusi, 2007; Loimeier, 1997; 2012). We cannot separate politics from the Islamic religion. There seems to be a marriage of political convenience between the Fulani aristocrats and the Hausa ethnic class, although this partnership is one full of unease and not without its challenges, there
seems to be a balance of power of interest between the traditional –bureaucratic authority and the commercialist-popular power. In other words, the talakawas or non-Aristocrat partners of the Fulani authority –the well-to-do Hausa commoners are used as propagandist tool of the Fulani elite (Sklar, 1963; Kukah & Falola, 1996). Hence, Boko Haram’s attack on religious scholars and politicians in Kano and Maiduguri may be an attack on the perceived collaboration of these people with the Sokoto traditional authority.

Most studies hold the view that Boko Haram is part of a historical-continuum of Islamic radicalism or, modestly put, Islamic reform movements in the Northern part of Nigeria (Last, 2012; Hill, 2013; Loiemier, 2012). The Nineteenth century jihad of Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio has largely been cited as the beginning of this reform (Cook, 2011; Last, 2012). While Dan Fodio’s original intent was to purify Islam of the impurities and innovations practiced by Hausa rulers of the day, many studies have noted that, at the end, there was political gain to the Fulani ethnic minority group, to whom Dan Fodio belong (Kukah & Falola, 1996; Cook, 2011). A Fulani-controlled Sokoto caliphate emerged. However, since the dawn of Nigeria’s independence from British colonial government, the Fulani has shared its hegemony with the numerically greater Hausa ethnic group, as a matter of political convenience, to protect the northern interest against competition from other regional powers as well as stave off the inherent internal contradiction in the promoted concept of “one north” (Sklar, 2004; Kukah & Falola, 1996).

The idea of one north was however threatened by the reality of a diverse region, diversified in religion, ethnicity and language. In other words, the idea that northern Nigeria has a uniform religion (Islam) and language (Hausa) presents false reality (Ibrahim, 1989; Kukah & Falola, 1996). After the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970, the military government of Gowon responded to minority threat by dividing Nigeria’s three big regions into twelve states.
Successive military governments will then go on to further fragment the country. Presently Nigeria is made up of thirty six states, with six geo-political zones corresponding to six states each, and a federal state. Since the 1970s, following the oil boom, the central government has assumed enormous power with control of resources and power largely centralised and re-distributed among the states. However, the fall in global oil price in the early 1980s and the subsequent Structural Adjustment Programme (an economic policy of austerity given as loan condition by the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and World Bank) overseen by the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida produced conditions that will have an excruciating impact on government’s ability to perform its social welfare and governance responsibility to the populace (Watts, 1987).

It is therefore unsurprising that many views on the causative factor of Boko Haram cite governance (Yusuf, 2013; Sampson, 2013; Isa, 2010). For instance, Anonymous (2012) challenges the often-cited relationship between Salafi-Wahhabi radicalism and violence or radicalism. He concludes that Boko Haram is more a local issue and that the excessive use of force by the Nigerian state is the radicalising force rather than the Salafi-Wahhabi ideology (which proponents of the Global War on Terror [GWOT] have come to support since 2001 in their promotion of moderate (Sufi) vs radical Islam (Salafi-Wahhabi) (see also Salaam, 2012; Yusuf, 2013; Isa, 2010) about the implication of framing the response to Boko Haram in the discourse of the GWOT). On effective counter-response, Anonymous rejects the securitisation (or militarisation) of the war on Boko Haram. He advocates for a non-military approach—“Radical violence is more of a political problem requiring wise political solutions rather than a crime or security challenge that could be solved by aggressive law-enforcement measures and security operations” (ibid, p.140).
The northern political and religious elites have been criticised for being ambivalent towards the Boko Haram crisis (Adesoji, 2010; Hill, 2013; Adegbulu, 2013). While some analysts argue that the Northern Muslim authority, especially the Sultan has always maintained a strong opposition and criticism of Boko Haram (Forest, 2012), others are of the view that northern political and religious elites, at most, only feebly condemned the sect (Adesoji, 2010; Adegbulu, 2013). Hill (2013) offers a useful explanation of the ambivalent attitude of the northern Muslim religious authority: the need for the traditional authority to remain neutral. It is important to note that both President Goodluck Jonathan’s federal government and Abubakar Shekau’s Boko Haram appealed to the Muslim traditional ruler to mediate in the fight between Boko Haram and the Nigerian state (Zenn, 2012; Hill, 2013). According to Zenn (ibid) and other accounts, the sect appealed to the Sultan to intervene in negotiating the release of its members and family members of Boko Haram that were detained, among other requests that are considerably modest and genuine (Last, 2012).

The failure of the northern conservative authority to rein in strongly in the conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian state, at the early period of the conflict, has been subjected to various interpretations. According to Hill (2013), it is the dilemma of appearing to support an unpopular government and/or support a terrorist group which threatens the authority of the northern traditional elites (see also Forest, 2012). To Harnischfeger (2014), it is the lack of moral authority (see also Kenny, 1990), and to Adegbulu, it is not far-fetched to assume that the northern elite as well as the FG aimed to gain politically from the conflict (see also Onuoha, 2010). But, does this ambivalence offer political gain to the northern Muslim elite? This crucial point is absent in Hill’s analysis. On the contrary, Hill posits (and I agree to some extent) that Boko Haram’s activities, its brand of Islam (Salafism) challenge the unitary authority of the Sultan and the traditional Muslim establishment. Hence, it is more in the
interest of the traditional authority that Boko Haram is defeated (Nwankpa, 2015). It is in this regard that the idea of Boko Haram as reflecting Kanuri particularism emerged from (Alozieuwa, 2012; Akinola, 2015; Tanchun, 2012). Boko Haram, as such may reveal an underlying ethnic battle for hegemon power between the Kanuri ethnic group of the northeast (representing the old Borno Empire) and the Fulani-Hausa of the northwest (representing the Sokoto Empire). The framing of Boko Haram in this bipolar form has been challenged by some analysts (Cook, 2014).

The northern elites were more vocal in condemning the federal government’s state of emergency which it misconstrued as a deliberate policy against the north and against the Muslim by a southerner and Christian-led presidency (Nwankpa, 2015a). While it is obvious that the Nigerian military committed a gross violation of human rights in its fight against Boko Haram, especially during the State of Emergency period (Amnesty International, 2014), it is also suspicious that the Muslim authority will turn around from late 2014 to 2015 to criticise the government for not doing enough, especially calling for popular uprising against the group (Emir of Kano, Sultan). We must therefore ask hard questions: did the northern elite benefit in any way from Boko Haram’s insurgency? We can view this in the light of the introduction of sharia penal code in 2000.

Hill (2013) concludes that the traditional Muslim authority holds the key—or will play a huge role in defeating Boko Haram’s threat. Cook (2011) shares this sentiment when he argues that in the final analysis, the demise of Boko Haram (after it must have been defeated militarily) will only happen when it is co-opted into the northern Nigeria mainstream Muslim structure. Adesoji (2011) and Forest (2012) make similar point in their call for a dynamic approach involving government partnership with several stakeholders-including Islamic
religious leaders who can help government in regulating religion, mainly through identifying, categorizing and monitoring religious groups that may be radicalizing. While I support this suggestion, it is instructive to note that the council of ulamas did warn the government and its security agencies of the activities of Boko Haram and other groups, but this was ignored (Onuoha, 2010). It is therefore not much about the knowledge, but how the information is processed and like Forest (2012) argues, the government must provide protection for these brave religious leaders, some who have been assassinated by Boko Haram for speaking against the sect. Also, this recommendation does not take in to account the internal struggle among the northern Muslim groups- the Muslim authority in the north is not unified. The Sufi Brotherhood (the dominant religious sect that the conservative Muslim authority belongs to) is divided between the Qadriyya and the Tijaniyya. The Salafi-Wahhabi group such as the Izala is also fragmented. The Boko Haram group is also factionalised. Hence, the prospect of such integration remains bleak, especially that sharia remains a sine qua non for political and economic gains to the Muslim north (Nwankpa, 2015). There is need to address the fundamental question of sharia in Nigeria’ public space—the views of the local people need to be taken-in a popular referendum.

3.3.3 The Socio-Economic Perspective: Greed versus Grievance?

There have been a few attempts at comparative study of the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies generally (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012) and specifically, in relation to the concept of amnesty (Nwankpa, 2014; Sampson, 2013). Some of the arguments put forward is that Boko Haram, unlike the Niger Delta insurgency, is driven by Islamic fundamentalism and hence cannot be swayed by the prospect of amnesty (Nwankpa, 2014); amnesty can be given but this has to be conditional and must not preclude the chance of justice for the victims of the terror acts and prosecution for perpetrators (Sampson, 2013; Nwankpa, 2014). Other
studies also promote amnesty as holding the potential of a non-kinetic approach to ensuring peace, especially a peaceful condition that creates room to design and negotiate a more lasting solution (Onuoha, 2011; Yusuf, 2013). Oyeniyi (2014), although recognising the possibility of dialogue, dismisses the potential of negotiation, while Walker (2012) dismisses the possibility of resolution through dialogue.

There is no doubt that force and even excessive use of force have been the main approach towards the Boko Haram insurgency. Virtually every study on this subject criticises the Nigerian government’s use of force. Most of the studies hold the government responsible for radicalising the group (Anonymous, 2012; Higazi, 2013; Forest, 2012; Walker, 2012, Johnson, 2011; Cook, 2011). The state’s excessive use of force, especially its extrajudicial killing of the charismatic founder and leader of the group, Mohammed Yusuf and over 700 sect members, including the destruction of its worship centre have been a cardinal point in the transformation of the group from a social movement to a terrorist group. While this is taken as a given, another argument that is gaining fast traction, and interestingly also implicates the Nigerian state, is the palpable lack of governance (Forest, 2012; Johnson, 2011).

The socio-economic context of the crisis seems to be as important, if not considered more important than the religious explanation, especially when it comes to the prospect of an effective counterterrorism response. More analysts are coming to terms with this reality (Isa, 2010; Adesoji, 2010, 2011; Sampson, 2013; Forest, 2012; Katsina, 2012; Adegbulu, 2013; Hansen & Musa, 2013; Omede, 2011; Mustapha, 2013; Agbibo, 2013; de Montclos, 2014), although some of the analysts subsume the economic factor under the religious factor (Cook, 2014; Alao, 2013). Scholars such as Oyeniyi (2014) believe that Boko Haram is driven by
greed, while others like Adegbulu (2013) presents contradiction in the attempt to strike a delicate balance between the greed and grievance argument.

While there might be no explicit reference to poverty and socio-economic conditions in the grievances tabled by Boko Haram and in most of its publications post-2009 (Cook, 2014), there is substantial evidence that substantiate the arguments of many other scholars that Boko Haram does express legitimate grievances that is dangerous to ignore. At the moment, Boko Haram is in a weakened position (that is if we consider the fact that it has lost ninety percent of its controlled territory to the government forces as well as a tangible reduction in its rate of attacks). The government force and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprising the armies of Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria have favoured the use of force, which has worked so far in pushing back Boko Haram gains. But the warning of Loimeier (2012) is one that is too real to ignore: Boko Haram will crop up again “if basic frame conditions such as social injustice, corruption and economic mismanagement do not change” (p.137). Other studies also express similar views (Saalam, 2012; Yusuf, 2013; Bamidele, 2012; Isa, 2010; Katsina, 2012). Katsina (2012) describes the Boko Haram security threat as a crisis of development where “…conditions of poverty, unemployment and inequality in the country […] lead to frustration, alienation and ultimately social discontent that spark violence and insecurity” (p.107).

Most of the studies have set as precondition the need for government to improve on governance in terms of meeting to its basic responsibilities including infrastructural provision, healthcare and social welfare that will improve its relationship with the citizens and give it legitimacy (Forest, 2012; Omede, 2011; Yusuf, 2013; Solomon, 2012). Although some scholars view the socio-economic conditions as intensifier rather than the main
grievance (Gourley, 2012), many more view it as the root cause and hence recommend that
the root causes (which is socio-economic) be addressed (Agbiboa, 2013; Osumah, 2013;
Danjibo, 2010; Forest, 2012). Some studies stand out in their attempt to construct a
development framework or architecture that will address the Boko Haram crisis (Yusuf,
2012; Salaam, 2012; Mustapha, 2013; Isa, 2010; Omede, 2011; Omale, 2013; Sampson,
2013).

These studies have been highlighted because of their recognition of human rights in the
context of development and security, and the role the people and/or civil society
organisations play. For instance, Omede (ibid) prefers an intelligence-led counterterrorism
that is less prone to human rights violation as the military approach, which will ultimately
restore the people’s trust and confidence in the state and its security apparatus. Sampson
(2013) and Omale (2013) both canvass for a robust and multifaceted counterterrorism
strategy that involves, among other things, citizen participation, or according to Omale
“community resilience against terrorism” (ibid). Adegbulu’s concluding statement is also
noteworthy: “the crucial agencies that can help in driving the needed political change are
those of the civil society and the ordinary people” (ibid). Forest (2012) offers even a broader
range of government-citizen collaboration, a comprehensive community approach that will
include the government, civil society organisations, religious and tribal leaders as
stakeholders.

Yusuf’s (2013) study is also distinguishable among the pack. Using the theory of Critical
Terrorism Studies, Yusuf (ibid) presents a development framework that lays claim to a
“rights-sensitive-approach”. He accurately observes that while the Nigerian constitution
stipulates some basic economic, social and cultural rights, these rights are just cosmetics and
not justiciable. In essence, the government is not legally bound to honour these rights, even when it has ratified several international human rights instruments. Yusuf’s study frames development in the language of human rights seeing development as a basic human right. While similar studies (Salaam, 2012; Bamidele, 2012) presents development as a preventive measure and as a condition for lasting solution, Yusuf, using the Niger Delta amnesty as a model, attempts to illustrate how development can be used in a reactive sense to achieve short term benefit.

There is already a growing interest in the idea of development as a formidable strategy to combatting terrorism, in this case, the Boko Haram insurgency. Some scholars have tried to undercut the relationship of poverty and poor socio-economic conditions to terrorism in Africa, often juxtaposing Africa with other places rife with poverty, yet terrorism appear absent. In the particular case of Boko Haram, its religious, especially its Salafi-Jihad characteristics appear to foreclose any chance that it may be driven by anything other than a fundamentalist imperative to establish a sharia state in Nigeria. It is therefore quite interesting that beyond the veil of a religious war is an avalanche of development crisis. It is therefore not unsurprising that a substantial number of studies on Boko Haram recommend a developmental approach. It is quite interesting that some of these proposals have a broad conception of development that goes beyond mere provision of basic economic needs, to include criminal justice, institutional reforms and human rights.

Yet, most of these studies’ recommendations are merely propositional. They do not offer concrete proof that is empirical or historically constructive. While useful lessons can be extrapolated from other crises and counterinsurgency and/or counterterrorism strategies (such as the Niger Delta amnesty, in all its imperfections) can be gleaned from elsewhere, the Boko
Haram crisis offers its own peculiarities. It is therefore important that an empirical study is carried out to explore the possibility of success for the development strategies being recommended. It is instructive to note that the Nigerian government has tried some of these approaches in the past, but with limited success (Sampson, 2013). My thesis therefore will be making a useful contribution to the literature as it will offer a practical and first-hand knowledge about the application of development to the Boko Haram crisis and by extension, the ethno-religious crises that have come to characterise northern Nigeria. My study will also go beyond Yusuf’s basic concept of a rights-sensitive-approach and many others’ call for involvement of the people, to explore the concept of a human rights approach to development. This is a step further than development as a right.

3:4 The Niger Delta and Boko Haram Conflicts: Establishing Connections

On the surface, the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts appear to be distinctively different from each other. As evident from the literature, the thematic focus of the Niger Delta insurgency or better still, the identified causative factors appear to be constant (Ahonsi, 2011), while those of the Boko Haram terrorist groups are ever shifting (Alozieuwa, 2012). Boko Haram is, in this regard, more unique than the Niger Delta crisis, because, unlike the Niger Delta insurgency, its motivations and transformations are more dynamic (Weeraratne, 2015). In the case of the Niger Delta, the grounds for struggle have not shifted, though the medium for seeking change transformed from non-violent to violent struggle.

Yet, despite this seeming difference, we can identify some structural conditions and counter-insurgency or counterterrorism responses that are similar to these two conflict groups. In terms of structural condition, especially at the socio-economic level, we can relate the Niger Delta insurgency to the Boko Haram conflict. Both conflicts appear to have similar underlying factors such as poverty, underdevelopment, lack of governance and environmental
degradation. While environmental degradation (largely caused by the activities of MNOCs in the Niger Delta region) constitute one of the core grievances of the Niger Delta struggle, environmental concerns or climate change (characterised by desertification and drying up of the Lake Chad—an important source of economic livelihood to the north-east Nigerian states and bordering countries around the Lake Chad Basin) is no less a factor in the Boko Haram crisis—although it is not mentioned by the group.

Both conflicts have also attracted a mixed response of military and development approaches. A joint task force (JTF) made up of the country’s military, navy, air force and other security agencies have been coordinating response attacks to the Niger Delta insurgency since 2009. Nigeria is also a part of several regional and inter-regional Integrated Maritime Strategies that address the maritime security challenges including oil theft, piracy, drug trafficking and other criminal activities off the Gulf of Guinea. Similarly, between 2011 and 2013, a JTF was established to combat the security threat posed by Boko Haram. There is also an ongoing multinational joint task force (MNJTF) comprised of the armies of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad fighting Boko Haram.

The non-military approaches are also alike. Although there is a much more developed soft approach to the Niger Delta crises starting from the National Development Board of 1963 to several development commissions such as OMPADEC, NDDC and an establishment of the Ministry of the Niger Delta, there are equally an increasing number of development interventions towards the Boko Haram conflict. Like the Niger Delta situation, the Nigerian government has made several attempts to dialogue and possibly offer amnesty to the Boko Haram members. While the Niger Delta amnesty yielded relative peace to the region, the proposed Boko Haram amnesty failed to materialise. However, the crises in both regions persist and continue to escalate, perhaps due to the fact that root causes are ignored and short term solutions are sought over long and lasting solution, amongst many other reasons.
From the foregoing, one can conclude that both conflicts present a great potential for understanding underlying factors that can help towards de-escalating the conflicts and preventing other conflict groups from emerging. It is also a fruitful research endeavour to compare and contrast these two distinct groups (distinct in orientation) yet similar not only on the fact they are both happening in one country, but more so having far more devastating effects beyond the borders of Nigeria, affecting regional as well as global security and economy.

### 3:5 Conclusion

Undeniably, the Nigerian conflicts—the Niger Delta insurgency and the Boko Haram terrorist groups produce consequences that are felt beyond the borders of Nigeria, whether calculated in humanitarian (refugees), political or economic terms. Nigeria is an important player both in its capacity as a global producer of crude oil and gas and its role in peace-keeping missions in Africa, particularly in the ECOWAS region. Hence, Nigeria receives external support through different bilateral and multilateral arrangements in its fight against insurgency and terrorism in the country. While these supports have come in the form of military assistance including the sales of military arms and equipment and training of security forces amongst other security assistances, there is also a significant amount of non-military assistance offered by international humanitarian and development agencies both government-affiliated and private agencies. All this cooperation and combination of efforts highlight the expansion of duty bearers.

Interestingly, the Nigerian state, due to its arbitrary creation—a manifestation of its colonial heritage, produces tensions that lead and continue to inspire ethnic, religious and other kinds of conflicts. Force, even excessive force has been used predominantly by the Nigerian
governments to quell the conflicts. But there is also evidence of development approaches such as constitutional engineering that have been used to address the structural factors that produce these tensions and conflicts. The Nigerian government has also attempted other development interventions directly towards specific conflicts. There is a plethora of development interventions towards the Niger Delta crisis starting from the colonial period: the Henry Willink Minority Commission of 1957, to the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) of 1963, to the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Economic Commission (OMPADEC 1992), to the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) of 2000, to the establishment of the Ministry of Niger Delta in 2008 and the granting of amnesty in 2009.

There is also a growing development intervention in the northeast of Nigeria in response to the Boko Haram crisis. The Nigerian government-federal, state and local, NGOs, CSOs, Community-based organisations (CBO), as well as international human rights bodies such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and international development agencies such as the World Bank (WB), African Development Bank (ADB), USAID, DFID, and the EU are developing and coordinating development interventions towards the Boko Haram conflict. Clearly, development approach is considered very important to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, if not more important than military approach, especially in developing countries such as Nigeria. However, the connection drawn between development and security continues to generate controversy which often revolves around the notion of securitised development. Hence, a rights-based approach to development has been proposed as the solution to securitised development. However, there are still challenges that persist.
It is against this backdrop that this thesis seeks to explore how these national (internal) and international (external) development interventions are being conceived and implemented and to discuss the issues that they generate especially those concerning their effectiveness. The Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgent groups have been selected based on their adoption of insurgent and terrorist’s tactics as well as their capacity to produce effects that go beyond the borders of Nigeria. Focusing on these groups, this study will be investigating the evidence of a rights-based approach (including participation, non-discrimination and equality) in the development intervention-policies and programmes (including the conditions, processes and outcomes) of the internal and external interveners. Finally, it will be looking at how a human rights approach that is compatible with the Nigerian socio-cultural reality can manifest.
Chapter Four: Research Methodology and Methods

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the research design, data collection and data analysis procedures, detailing both the practical and theoretical implications.

4.1 Research Design

This study was carried out using a qualitative research method. The qualitative research methodology is one of two kinds of research methods. The other is quantitative method, which relates to a measurement of the quantity, rather than the quality, of something using one or several statistical instruments. Both research methods attract different nomenclature as much as they differ in their epistemological frames. Quantitative research has been labelled “positivist” or “empiricist” as it “applies a natural science, and in particular a positivist, approach to social phenomena” while qualitative research is labelled “interpretivist” and “constructivist” as it requires a “commitment to seeing the social world from the point view of the actor” (Bryman, 1984, p.77). Hence, the choice of a qualitative method for this thesis is predicated on the empirical and exploratory nature of the topic. Significantly, the research questions reflect a probative enquiry that seeks to avoid the prejudice of existing theoretical explanation. Hypothesising about such a prickly discourse would have been unwise-hence, the preference for inductive reasoning. In other words, the intellectual enquiry was pursued in an inductive manner that involved the qualitative analysis of data and findings with the possible outcome of a theory of explanation of the phenomena under study.

Although theory-generation was not the primary concern, the qualitative approach, particularly the use of Grounded Theory (GT) and Case Study (CS) in this research tended
towards that. This most often times will involve the use of the iterative process, that is, the 
need to “collect further data in order to establish the conditions in which a theory will and 
will not hold” (Bryman, 2001, p.10). It may also very well be the use of established theories 
to compare and contrast with the result of the empirical data. Therefore, there is a sense of 
interaction between inductive and deductive reasoning (Bryman, 2001).

A key qualitative research design is the case study. Case study qualitative research presents 
itself among rigorous and in-depth approaches that “afford researchers opportunities to 
explore or describe a phenomenon in context using a variety of data sources” (Baxter & Jack, 
2008, p 544; see also Yin, 2003; Patton, 1990). In this particular study, data was sourced 
from documents (including reports, policy documents, terms of reference, newspapers and 
antiterrorism and counterterrorism laws) and interviews, focus groups and limited direct 
observation. The study used both exploratory and multiple case studies types. The 
exploratory case study approach was useful in capturing the different outcomes that the 
development interventions of both the local and external development partners produced, 
while the multiple case study design afforded a comparison between the Boko Haram and 
Niger Delta case to see if there are similar or contrasting results (Yin, 2003). The case study 
design was useful towards obtaining rich, robust and reliable data, but it proved to be time-
consuming and particularly expensive.

The grounded theory proved appropriate to the exploratory nature of this research as it saved 
me from the constraint of analysing the data from an already established theoretical construct. 
Rather, the sourced data provided the referent from which theory construction became 
possible. More details of how this was used are seen in the section under “Data Processing”. 

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Both CS and GT favour “Interpretivism” over “Positivism”. Positivism is mostly used in quantitative study and is guided by deductive reasoning based on a grand theory mostly, while interpretivism supports inductive reasoning. An interpretivist approach offered this thesis the unique opportunity to explore how individuals interpret the world without the preconceptions of a universal worldview. This epistemological position was particularly crucial to the exploration of how a human rights-based approach to development that is compatible with the Nigerian socio-cultural reality can be developed. It is essentially about seeing through the eyes of the people being studied. What does development mean to them and how do the laws and development policies and initiatives affect them?

From an ontological perspective, I applied a constructionist approach, basically looking at how development policies and anti-terrorism laws are constructed from the interaction between different social actors. This approach was useful to the exploration of the second question that relates to how anti-terror laws and development policies are conceived and implemented. Are these laws and policies inclusive? Do they exclude the rights of any group? What are the views of the excluded groups? These views were then related to the issues that have arisen concerning the effectiveness of internal and external development initiatives and interventions.

Ultimately, the main research design was case study and comparative analysis. The Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflict groups were the cases under study. These cases were selected because they manifest the characteristics of insurgency and terrorism. As scholars such as Bryman (2001), David, and Sutton (2004) argue, multiple case studies offer some form of credibility to the research as well as strengthen the generation of theory. The study of the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflict groups is therefore advantageous especially to the prospect of theory generation. While both groups appear different in their orientations, on the surface, with Boko Haram driven by Islamic fundamentalism, while the Niger Delta is
motivated by economic and self-determination pursuits, at the deeper level, there are more connections than differences. The comparative study of the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgency yielded substantive similarities as well as differences. Such a cross-cultural study within a nation-state rather than between countries is unique.

4.2 Population

In general, the setting of the study is Nigeria, but specifically, on the North-East (NE) and the South-South (SS) geo-political regions for the Boko Haram and Niger Delta conflicts respectively. Nigeria operates a federal system and currently has 36 states in addition to the federal capital territory (FCT), Abuja. The 36 states are divided into six geo-political zones made up of approximately 6 states each. Although Boko Haram’s reach extends to the North-West (especially in states such as Kano, Kaduna and Sokoto) and North-Central/Middle Belt (in Abuja and Plateau states largely) and even beyond Nigerian border (in the Republic of Chad, Cameroon and Niger), its main theatre of operation is in the NE states, particularly Borno, Adamawa and Yobe.
The Niger Delta insurgency, on the other hand, operates in the SS region, particularly in Bayelsa, Rivers and Delta state. Hence, these two regions provided the context for the population study. However, the actual population studied included organisations or individuals, both local and external, whose activities or interventions directly impact on the conflicts in the selected regions without necessarily having an office in the region. These included relevant government agencies, ministries and departments, local CSOs and CBOs, foreign government offices (embassies) and development agencies, international NGOs, religious leaders, community members, ex-militants, Boko Haram suspects and victims, and vigilante groups such as the civilian joint task force (CJTF).

4.3 Participants (Characteristics)

There were 52 participants in total, which includes two focus groups of 10 and 5 participants each, as well as group interviews of up to 2 and 3 participants, joint interviews of up to 2 and 7 co-questioners and individual interviews. A clear explanation of the breakdown of research participants is given in the section under data collection (4.6). The interview participants
include a wide range of people mainly community leaders and members drawn from credible community based organisations (CBOs), heads and representatives of civil society organisations (CSOs), heads and representatives of human rights organisations, representatives from USAID, DFID, British Foreign Commission Office (FCO), U.S. embassy, religious clerics (both Muslim and Christian), relevant government offices such as Amnesty Office, Ministry of Niger Delta. The respondents have been labelled with the Roman numerals I-XXVI, which amounts to 26 labels. However, some of the tags have more than 1 participant. For example, Respondents XXII is a focus group of 10 participants; Respondent XXIII covers the interview response of 12 detained Boko Haram suspects; Respondent XXV represents the views of 5 participants in another focus group; while Respondent XXVI represents the 3 U.S. interviewees.

Respondents I, XII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII and XXI are heads and key representatives selected from recognised CBOs, CSOs and local human rights organisation. They are selected based on their direct involvement in the responses to the insurgency, particularly through advocacy, training, peace and conflict research, public enlightenment and other humanitarian and development interventions including implementation of government policies such as victim support. More details of the respondents can be gleaned from the table below. Respondents II, IV and X are respected religious clerics, selected from the two most popular religions in Nigeria, Christianity and Islam. They have played direct roles in shaping the responses to the insurgency through their religious teachings, inter-faith dialogues and even direct participations in high profile Committees towards understanding and resolving the insurgency.

Others such as Respondents VII, VIII and XI represent relevant government institutions and commissions including the judiciary who are involved in several ways such as interpreting the anti-terrorism law, executing policies and shaping the counter-insurgency narrative.
Respondents IX and XII are senior security personnel who are directly involved in the military and security counter-terrorism operations against the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies. They are involved in the intelligence, strategic, tactical and operational fight against the insurgencies. Another set of respondents, Respondents XX, XXII, XXIII and XXV, is drawn from direct and indirect victims of insurgency, ex-militants and suspected insurgents detained in prison, community members, and local vigilante groups such as the CJTF (that is, group of local civilians that were formed as part of community resistance to the insurgents’ assault). The last set of respondents is selected from key regional and international development partners such as DFID, USAID, ECOWAS and UNDP. These participants are relevant to the study as they are engaged in development interventions towards the Boko Haram and Niger Delta insurgency, especially through setting of policies and strategies.

The wide variety of participants aligns well with the exploratory nature of the study especially the need to obtain rich, robust and reliable evidence. Hence, I was able to gather data from a wide variety of sources, data that reflect their different orientations and political leanings and how these shape their construction of reality in terms of policy, implementation, and output/outcome of development interventions in the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants/Respondents</th>
<th>Local/International</th>
<th>Individual/Organisational</th>
<th>Type of Organisation</th>
<th>Name of Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

116
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Local</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Chairman (PAVE)-</td>
<td>NGO Partnership</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>individual/organisation</td>
<td>against Violent Extremism</td>
<td>(PAVE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Clergy- Catholic Bishop /Presidential Committee member</td>
<td>Religious Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Top British Diplomat for Foreign government High</td>
<td>British High Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Northern Nigeria-organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Clergy-Arch-Bishop Anglican Church of Nigeria</td>
<td>Religious Anglican Church of Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Top British expat</td>
<td>Foreign government development organisation</td>
<td>Department for International Development (DFID), Abuja Office</td>
</tr>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Top British expat</td>
<td>Foreign government development organisation</td>
<td>Department for International Development (DFID), Abuja Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Top British expat</td>
<td>Foreign government development organisation</td>
<td>Department for International Development (DFID), Abuja Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>High Court Judge</td>
<td>Nigerian Judiciary</td>
<td>High Court, Jos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VIII Local Permanent Federal Secretary, Senior civil servant
Member, (government)
Presidential Committee on the
Northeast

IX Local Senior Government Nigerian
Commandant, (security) Police
defunct Joint Task Force (JTF) on
Force
Boko Haram

X Local Popular Islamic Religious
Cleric

XI Local Head of Media, Government Amnesty
Nigeria Amnesty Agency Office,
Office Amnesty Office, Abuja

XII Local Veteran Community CSO/CBO Niger Delta
Organiser

X111 Local Captain and Government Nigerian
Intelligence Officer, (security) Army
Nigeria Army
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Title and Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XIV</td>
<td>Senior Executive, CISLAC, Federal Secretariat, Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV</td>
<td>Head, Centre for Peace Initiative &amp; Development (CEPID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVI</td>
<td>Head, Initiative for Grassroots Advancement in Nigeria (INGRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVII</td>
<td>Head, Renaissance Lifeline Foundation (RELIEF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVIII</td>
<td>Administrator, Nigerian Red Cross (NRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXIX</td>
<td>External Programme Director, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XX</td>
<td>Local Boko Haram victim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXI</td>
<td>Local Chairman, PAVE, Kogi State Chapter CSO/NGO/Human rights advocacy Centre for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXII</td>
<td>Local Yobe Focus Group (10 participants) Mixture of CSOs, Boko Haram Victims, CJTF, and Northeast community members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXIII</td>
<td>Local Joint Prison Interview (12 interviewees) Detained Boko Haram suspects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4 Sampling

Unlike in the quantitative study, where the size of participants is important and where selection is often based on random probability sampling, the qualitative study is more about the richness of data, rich in detail and context (Patton, 2002). Hence, where numbers give quantitative study depth and breadth, for qualitative study, it is the attention to detail and context, rather than the number of participants. This study focused on a limited number of observation and interview/focus group respondents, but gained highly detailed and contextualised information from the personalised approach. I used the *Purposive Sampling Technique* (PST). PST is a non-probability sampling technique where participants are selected based largely on the researcher’s judgment (Marshall, 1996; Ritchie, Nicholls & Ormston, 2013). It is a selective or subjective sampling tool that relies on the interviewers’
judgment. Although, it lends itself to subject bias and error in judgment, PST was greatly useful in the strategic and purposeful selection of cases and respondents whose experiences and views are considered relevant to answering the research questions as well as capable of providing rich information. Hence, it is both cost and time-effective and appropriate for the context-based research. Additionally, considering the volatile nature of the conflict zones, a Snowball Sampling Technique (SST) was used. As such, most of the respondents were selected based on recommendation of initial participants sampled or by leveraging on the network and connections of colleagues and other researchers in the field.

4.5 Data (Collection) Procedure

4.5.1 Process of Data Collection

The process of data collection started with the submission of an ethic form to the Ethic Committee of Roehampton’s University Research Board. My research, obviously dealt with human subjects and more importantly focused on conflict zones including visiting terrorists’ hot spots, and interviewing both insurgents and victims of insurgency. The ethics application was approved in 2013. My fieldwork and data collection effort have spanned a 3 year period beginning in late 2013 till now. I decided to break my fieldwork and trips into short periods averaging 2 months per trip rather than take out one full year at a stretch. Below is a tabular breakdown of my research trips, amount of time spent, type of research conducted and location of research and the participants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type of Research</th>
<th>No of interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

123
Dec 2013- 2 months  Nigeria-Ife  Interviews  7
February 2014
[Osun State],
Kaduna state,
Abuja, Lagos,
Jos [Plateau St
Dec 2014  1 month  Kaduna  Archival  -
June-July 2015  2 months  Bauchi, Yobe, Anambra  Interview, Focus Group
Multiple (25)
January-March 2 months (9 weeks)  Adamawa,  Interviews, 20
2016  Abuja, Jos, observation,  
River State, documents
Delta State, Imo,
Gombe, Kogi

4.5.2 Documents
In the spirit of GT, collection and sorting of documentary data and analysis were done concurrently-an iterative process that aids theory generation grounded in data (Thornberg & Charmaz, 2013). I collected relevant documents ranging from government’s Legislative Acts, counterterrorism policies, antiterrorism laws, committees’ reports, development partners’ development policies and strategic documents including terms of reference, newspaper report, among many other kinds of documents. Many of the documents were publicly
available, especially the ones produced by international development partners and foreign governments. I downloaded most of the documents from their website.

Document proved to be very useful to this research especially towards the Niger Delta case study (Chapter 5). The analysis of the Niger Delta case study relies almost entirely on documents. This can be seen as a methodological weakness as documents analysis is most often combined with other methods achieving data triangulation. However, document can also be useful “as a stand-alone method for specialised forms of qualitative research” (Bowen, 2009, p.29). In the case of the Niger Delta, there was a focus group of 5 participants, 2 key specific interviews as well as indirect and direct responses to the Niger Delta insurgency from respondents that were responding primarily to the Boko Haram case studies, but documents were the main source of written data collection. Interviews were primarily used in the Boko Haram case studies (Chapter 6).

The Niger Delta insurgency has a deeper and longer life span than the more recent Boko Haram insurgency. Although the Niger Delta insurgency started from around 1998, the Niger Delta struggle and agitation date back to pre-Independence period, whereas, the Boko Haram movement started around 2002 and turned violent in 2009. The prolonged existence of the Niger Delta struggle and its interaction with the MNOCs has been gainful to the expansive organisational, activist, policy and academic production. Unsurprisingly, there is more information available on the Niger Delta than the Boko Haram. Hence, documentary analysis is an efficient method, cost-effective, readily available, having wider coverage and “unobtrusive” and “non-reactive” (Bowen, 2009, p.31) to the Niger Delta case study. There are also weaknesses with documentary analysis which include “insufficient detail”, “low retrievability” and “biased selectivity” (Bowen, 2009, p.31-32). Some of these weaknesses manifest in the data collection. However, as Bowen (2009) notes, “these are really potential
flaws rather than major disadvantages” (p.32). Below is a list of documents used in this study:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Producer</th>
<th>Nature/Type</th>
<th>Source &amp; Date of Production</th>
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<td>Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>Counterterrorism (CT) policy document</td>
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<td>Lake Chad Basin-Complex Emergency</td>
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The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency

International Development Association project paper on a proposed additional credit in the amount of SDR 88.2 million (US$125 million equivalent) and a global financing facility (GFF) grant in the amount of US$20 million to the Federal Republic of Nigeria

World Bank (WB) Report (NO: PAD1741)

World Bank Annex 6 (in Report No: PAD1741)

Federal Republic of Nigeria
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<th>Type</th>
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<td>Engaging Citizens through Mediation in Kaduna State, Nigeria</td>
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<td>Report</td>
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<td>for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions in Nigeria</td>
<td>(Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development)</td>
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<td>North-East Nigeria Summary Report 2016</td>
<td>Recovery and Peace Building Assessment</td>
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<td>Nigeria-EU Joint EU &amp; Nigeria 2008 Way Forward</td>
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Joint Declaration on a Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the European Union and its Members

The Cotonou Agreement European Commission 2008

Operational Plan Department for Policy and Strategy 2013
2011-2015 International document
Development, DFID
NIGERIA

60/288. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

National Human Rights Commission

(Amendment) Act,
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<td>Market Development in the Niger Delta (MADE)</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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Promoting Innovative Approaches for MSMEs Development in the Niger Delta

Supporting Poverty Reduction through Partnership

4th Niger Delta Development Forum: Unlocking Investment Opportunities in Agriculture in the Niger Delta for Regional Competitiveness

In-Review 2010-2013 NDPI (PIND, Chevron)
4.5.3 Interviews

Out of the 52 participants, 37 were involved in the semi-structured interviews that were conducted between the periods indicated. The interviews included group interviews, jointly-conducted interviews and individual (one-on-one) interviews. I conducted only 15 individual interviews. I also interviewed Respondents XVI and XVII together. The remaining interview respondents were jointly interviewed by me and others. For instance, Respondent XXIII represents 12 respondents who were detained Boko Haram suspects, at the time. The interview of the suspects was jointly conducted with the National Security Adviser (NSA) task team made up of security forces including a naval commander, military major, captain, police chief, lawyer, CSO’s language interpreters and myself (as an external researcher). The recording of the interview was not allowed, but notes were taken. The interview of Respondents V & VI (a group of two), and Respondent XXVI (a group of three) and others as indicated in the table below was jointly conducted by me and as part of the needs assessment of the NE carried out by the Global Community Engagement and Research Fund (GCERF)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
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<td>Group Interview (of 3)</td>
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<td>XXVI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Interview</td>
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<td>I, V, VI, XIV, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4.5.4 Focus Group

Two focus groups were conducted altogether. I conducted a focus group research in Damaturu, the capital city of Yobe state, one of the epicentres of Boko Haram’s terrorist attacks. The focus group was with 10 participants including a leader of a CBO, other CBO members, Boko Haram victims, a member of the CJTF, and community members including women.

I conducted another focus group interview with 5 participants in Port Harcourt, River State, all members of Entrepreneurial Action Us (ENACTUS). ENACTUS is an international organisation founded in the UK in 2001 that connects student, academic and business leaders through entrepreneurial projects.
4.6 Data Processing (Analysis)

An interpretive content analysis process in sync with the GT was adopted. The process started with Open Coding; in this case, I used the term Initial Coding. This involved comparing data and maintaining openness to exploring that what is being interpreted is happening in the data (Charmaz, 2006). Hence, short codes presented in gerunds (.ing) (which helps to avoid attention, according to Charmaz, 2006, p.157) were used to categorise and summarise points that emerge from constant comparing of data. Hence, a cluster of initial codes were established. From these initial clusters, more focused codes were developed, particularly from comparing codes. This is described as “Selective Coding” (Charmaz, 2013; see also Glazer, 2005). Selective coding involves identifying and selecting one core category “which refers to the most significant and frequent code that is also related to as many other codes as possible and more than other candidates for the core category” (Charmaz, 2013, p.158). Coding helped in reducing the data, reorganising and representing it in a more manageable and productive manner (Roulston, 2013).

The large chunk of my interview data was reduced to 15 focused codes. The evidence from the focused data, which are direct quotations from the respondents were used in addition to content analysis of relevant documents to support the answers to the research questions. Hence, I used data triangulation technique whereby the interview data is checked against the document data or used to support claims made in the interviews. Data triangulation was also useful in my analysis to identify variations in perspectives and views shared by respondents. Theories such as Relative Deprivation and Critical Terrorism Studies were also applied especially to see how information emerging from the data reinforces or challenges existing knowledge.
4.7 Quality Assurance

4.7.1 Credibility

This research pursued credibility by adopting a triangulation technique both in data collection and data analysis. In data collection, this was achieved using multiple sources of data such as interviews (using different types-semi-structured one-to-one, double interviews, and focus group), documents, and observation. In data analysis, perspectives from different respondents were compared for similarities and variations. This helped to corroborate or reinforce positions and/or to refute them. Same process and outcome are evident in the wide range of documents used in this study. As a qualitative study, the subjective nature means that investigator bias is somewhat unavoidable. In this case, although the goal is to obtain views based on how the respondents construct reality, it is important that the respondents have some considerable amount of experience to validate their opinions on the topic. The selection of respondents adjudged to be suitable was entirely the researcher’s decision and, to some extent, the suggestions made by other researchers in the field and some of the interviewees. But this bias would have been significantly minimised by the additional constraint of institutional bias. More so, the interview data (audio and transcribed) are available on request.

Additionally, some of the interviews were conducted with other colleagues. The sensitive nature of the subject brings up the gap that often exists between academics (limited in data but rich in theory) and policy makers (limited in theory but rich in data). It is in bridging this divide that I have collected some of my data alongside government’s agencies. For instance, I was given a rare access into one of the Nigerian prisons where about 47 Boko Haram suspects were detained, but the interviews were conducted jointly with a special task force attached to the behavioural counterterrorism unit under the Office of the National Security
Adviser (ONSA). I was only able to participate in the interview of a total of 12 suspects. I also participated in jointly interviewing some of respondents as part of the Global Community Engagement Resilience Fund (GCERF) 2016 Needs Assessment research team in Nigeria. There were two questioners including myself.

4.7.2 Transferability

This study, like most case studies, is highly contextualised. In other words, the findings and results are peculiar to the Nigerian environment. Research question three clearly demonstrates that such was the purpose-to explore how a human-right based approach that is compatible with the Nigerian socio-cultural reality can be developed. But we can make a generalizable claim considering the similarities between the Boko Haram and Niger Delta conflicts, which although occur within a geographical state, project different orientations. Boko Haram is often seen as an Islamic fundamentalist group pursuing Jihad and with the sole objective of establishing an Islamic state in Nigeria, while the Niger Delta group is seen as a group seeking self-determination and resource control among other economically motivated pursuits. Considering that conditions are not that different in most developing countries especially in Africa, it will be profitable to see how this study can be replicated and if similar findings and results can be obtained.

4.7.3 Dependability

The process, including data collection and data analysis, especially the former has been described in detail to ensure reliability. I believe a step-by-step replication of the process in the same context will yield similar results and findings in any future research.
4.7.4 Confirmability

It is difficult to avoid researcher prejudice. But, I strived hard to reduce it to a negligible level by ensuring that the findings are the result of the experiences and views constructed by the respondents. Objectivity was gained by the triangulation strategy adopted especially in data analysis. In essence, I compared and contrasted data from a variety of sources, including documents, interviews, observation and established theories such as RDT and CTS to either substantiate or refute an idea.

4.8 Ethics & Limitation of Study

This research, especially the sampling of respondents was restricted largely by limited time and financial resources, geographic restriction including linguistic barrier and free movement, accessibility of participants and access to confidential government documents. For instance, the focus group research conducted in Damaturu, the capital of Yobe state (Yobe state is a terrorist hotspot and was one of the 3 NE states under State of Emergency) was constrained by access to participants and limited financial resources. My local contact (a leader of a local CBO) and I decided to use a focus group research at the last minute as it was considered costly and time-consuming to interview the ten respondents individually. It was also not safe for me to go to them, considering the volatile nature of the place. Also, just about 5 out of the 10 respondents spoke English. Four of them could not speak English. They only spoke the local language, Hausa. My host tried sometimes to interpret.

Also, while I could easily access documents from the external interveners’ website, it was difficult to obtain local documents. Data culture is still very poor in Nigeria and this possibly skews official statement on performance, which consequently affects transparency and accountability. I could only access a small number of official documents online and this includes the Nigerian Constitution, the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA), and most
Legislative Acts such as the National Human Rights Commission Act (NHRC, 2010). Despite ongoing reforms since Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999 with noticeable improvement in general publication of government’s operations such as budget, public sharing of government information is still very low. Most government agencies, ministries and departments do not publish their activities for the public to access.

The Niger Delta proved surprisingly challenging in terms of accessibility to interview participants. I would have expected that the Boko Haram conflict would be much more impenetrable than the Niger Delta, as it is still ongoing, whilst there is relative peace in the Niger Delta. However, at present, violence is returning to the Niger Delta, with the rise of new militant groups. This could make it even more difficult to access data in the future.

Obviously, I had a more successful field experience in the Boko Haram than the Niger Delta. I was lucky to have a pretty much tight and well-connected network that I leveraged for the Boko Haram research. Also, within the period of research, Boko Haram received increased international attention, following the 14 April 2014 kidnap of 276 Chibok boarding school girls. Based on this global interest, I received two Fellowships in the U.S. I was invited by the Baker Institute of Rice University, Houston, Texas as an Academic Visiting Scholar for a semester (January-May 2015). I also received a one-year non-resident Fellowship from the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START) organisation at the University of Maryland (sponsored by the Homeland Security) (July 2015-October 2016). I also participated as a Research Consultant for the Nigeria (CVE) needs assessment carried out by Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) on behalf of the Global Community Engagement Resilience Fund (GCERF). While the funds and institutional support aided smooth access to data collection, I am also aware that they equally create a chance of institutional bias. This is in addition to the ethical challenges that can arise.
4.9. Conclusion

The qualitative research method has proved rewarding to this study, particularly given its fluid and flexible nature (Bryman, 1984). The fluidity and flexibility of the approach offered this thesis an advantage, which includes avoiding the conditions of “fixed measurement [and] by hypothesis testing” associated with the quantitative research methods (Bryman, 1984, p.78). The qualitative research approach sits well with the exploratory nature of the topic as its constructionist’s orientation made the gathering of rich and highly contextualised data possible. Hence, the reality of our world, in this case, the responses to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts, was gleaned from the point of view of the 52 research participants.

GT and case study research design support the subjectivity that underpins the qualitative method. Subjectivity is a crucial marker of the qualitative research, rather than a weakness. In this study, the negative tendency of a subjective inquiry is reduced by the variety of data sources applied, achieving triangulation. Data was sourced from interviews, focus groups and documents and compared and contrasted with one another. This process guaranteed that the results and analyses are less skewed, as well as producing reliable and valid findings. For instance, the focus group complemented the interviews, thus providing depth and breadth to the research query. Its interactive nature provided the opportunity for triangulating the views of the participants, particularly mapping the points of convergence and divergence, “rather than aggregating individual data in order to speculate about whether or why the interviewees differ” (Morgan, 1996, p.139). Documentary analysis also proved beneficial to this study both as a supplementary data as well as a stand-alone data source. Technological advance and accessibility such as the internet means that institutional and organisational documents are easily accessible, as long as they are in public domain. Many of the documents used in this study were readily available. It was also an efficient method as it is less time-consuming, durable and cost-effective.
Although it can be argued that this study gained objectivity through the triangulation process of data collection and analysis, one cannot rule out some weaknesses. For instance, the PST and snowballing technique lend themselves to selective bias, as the researcher’s discretion was heavily relied upon in selecting respondents considered relevant to answering the research questions. The focus group also raises the issue of participant bias which comes from the researcher’s moderating the process “in generating the data and the impact of the group itself on the data” (Morgan, 1996, p.139). The use of group and joint interviews lend themselves to the real possibility of cross-purpose, noted primarily in some of the distinctive goals and specific questions guiding the research agenda of the different researchers. In terms of documents, the study experienced great shortcoming as most of the internal documents were not publicly available. The documents also provided insufficient details and possibly skewed contents, reflecting the biases of the organisation. But these were easily rectified by the use of multiple data sources which includes interview, focus group and observation.
Chapter Five: Niger Delta

5.0 Introduction

This chapter considers the recent development initiatives and interventions towards the Niger Delta crisis, looking at how they depart from the interventions of the past, or not. The analysis relies on the assumption that the Niger Delta region presents structural conditions that tend naturally towards conflict. These conditions and fissures have been identified even prior to independence. Hence, since independence the area has attracted several development interventions. However, the issues persist, leading to the conclusion that past development interventions cared less about producing lasting solutions in the region. In this chapter, both the development initiatives and interventions by internal and external development agencies are considered, including primarily the Nigerian government (GON) and the multinational oil companies (MNOCs) (considered external actors) operating in the region. The analysis begins with a brief description of the history of the insurgency, and then proceeds to the discussion of the internal CI strategies starting with a critique of the military approach. Next, a critique of how external interventions are developed and the issues that have arisen concerning their effectiveness are explored, followed by an attempt to answer research questions two and three.

On the one hand, the chapter concludes that military intervention produced very little or nil positive effect on the Niger Delta crisis. Rather, it propelled the Niger Delta struggle into insurgency. On the other hand, the chapter concludes that recent development initiatives show more awareness of the principles of human rights (more participatory, inclusive, and less discriminatory), a clear departure from past development approaches. Yet, they remain susceptible to the drawbacks of past development interventions. We see therefore positive as much as negative indicators coming out from these more recent initiatives, but the current
approaches allow some glimmers of hope. However, it is still early to conclude, as some of
the programmes are on-going.

5:1 History of the Insurgency

The Niger Delta region covers nine states that fall under three geo-political zones in Nigeria.
The geopolitical zones are South-east (SE) (Abia, Imo), Southwest (SW) (Ondo) and South-
south (SS) (Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo & Rivers).

Map of Niger Delta
The bulk of the oil resources is situated in the SS, particularly Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers and Akwa Ibom. Unsurprisingly, these states have been the major theatre of the Niger Delta insurgency. There are about 140 ethnic groups in the Niger Delta, making the region a home to about half of Nigeria’s minority ethnic groups (Asunni 2009). The major ones are Ijaw, Ogoni, Itsekeri, Ibibio and Urhobo. In addition to inter-ethnic conflicts, some of the ethnic groups such as the Ogoni and Ijaw have played major roles in the Niger Delta struggle-later-turned-insurgency. The history of the Niger Delta insurgency can be charted under seven key periods: “Foundations” (1955-1960), “Civil War” (1967-1970), “Quiescence” (1970-1980),

Source: International Business Times

Contemporary conflict in the Niger Delta began in 1990 following the formation of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). This was led mainly by the Ogoni ethnic group, a tribe of about half a million people. The objective and compass of their resistance are couched in the Ogoni Bill of Rights (1990) presented to the Government of Nigeria (GON) and Royal Dutch Shell (the major oil company in the region at the time). MOSOP’s modules operandi was non-violent approach. The resistance led by the Ogoni people subsided following the execution of its main leader, Ken Sarowiwa, with eight other Ogoni leaders in 1995. But the murder of Ken Sarowiwa remains a watershed in the Niger Delta crisis. The next wave of resistance started around 1997, spearheaded by the Ijaw ethnic group (the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria, constituting 10 percent of Nigeria’s 170 million populations). In 1998, the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) published the Kaiama Declaration, declaring their intent for self-determination and resource control. Like MOSOP, IYC pursued a non-violent campaign. However, between 2003 and 2009, a full blown insurgency emerged in the Niger Delta with the establishment of armed groups such as the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)—an umbrella organisation for over 100 smaller militia groups.

From 1998 to 2003, the oil-rich region experienced a yearly average of 400 vandalisations on oil companies’ facilities, and another 581 between January and September of 2004. The oil revenue loss during this period is set at USD $1 billion annually. In 2006, when MEND emerged, we witnessed about 19 attacks on foreign oil operations in the first 6 months. From January 2006 to around mid-year 2009, over 400 expatriate oil-worker hostages have taken place; over 12,000 oil pipeline vandalisations and over 3000 oil spills (Joab-Peterside, Porter
Since the summer of 2009 when 30,000 ex-militants received Presidential Amnesty, relative peace has returned to the region. Yet, incidents of crime, oil theft and piracy have spiked, but usually underreported. For instance, from October 2012, Nigeria is accused of hijacking 12 ships, kidnapping over 30 sailors and killing a number of oil workers. From 2011 to 2016, a total of 90 actual and attempted piracy and armed robbery attacks on ships occurred in Nigeria (International Chambers of Commerce-International Maritime Bureau, ICC-IMB, 2016, p.5). MEND is likely behind these attacks. In recent times, there have been a resurgent of militancy and increase in new militia groups.

Historically, the Niger Delta region is prone to conflict. The discovery and exploration of oil since 1956 have contributed to the tension in the region, especially as the activities of the oil companies have produced grave environmental consequences that have affected the livelihood of the Niger Delta people. The Niger Delta people engage largely in subsistence farming and fishing. Responses to the tension and conflict have followed the setting up of Commissions of enquiry; the establishment of Federal Government Development Boards or committees; military strategies (formation of joint task force, JTF) and Presidential pardon (amnesty) to insurgents. Each of these responses has ramification for the intensity, escalation and reduction of the tension and conflict in the Niger Delta. For instance, the military response, usually involving disproportionate use of force by the Nigerian security, including its police and military is mostly responsible for the transformation of the Niger Delta resistance and struggle into a full-blown insurgency. The impact of the non-military intervention is no less significant to the escalation of the crisis.
5:2 Assessing Internal Development Initiatives and Interventions

5.2.1 The Military Response

The military response is seen to have escalated the Niger Delta crisis, and is almost solely responsible for transforming the largely peaceful and non-violent struggle into insurgency (Obi, 2001; Ikelegbe, 2005). Quite importantly, the Niger Delta crisis including its development challenges and militancy has a long historical root that dates back to pre-Independence period. Prominent Niger Delta rulers such as King Jaja of Opobo (1821-1891) and Chief Harold Dappa-Biriye (1920-2005) resisted colonial British government and fought for the development of the Niger Delta region. However, contemporary conflict in the Niger Delta, leading to insurgency, only started during the period identified as “militarisation/resistance”, 1990-1995 (Joab-Peterside, Porter & Watts, 2012), carried out by MOSOP. The Nigerian state responded forcefully to the activities of MOSOP. MOSOP carried out its resistance mainly through peaceful marches, dialogue and international activism. It aligned with international NGOs such as Unrepresented Nations and People Organization (UNPO), Greenpeace International, and Amnesty International (AI) to internationalise its grievances. MOSOP’s struggle was against the background:

That today, the Ogoni people have no representation whatsoever in all institutions of the Federal Government of Nigeria; no pipe-borne water; no electricity; no job opportunities for the citizens in Federal, State, public sector or private sector companies; no social or economic project of the Federal Government (Ogoni Bill of Rights, 1990, 11 (i-v)).

Clearly, the Ogoni, through MOSOP set the tone for contemporary struggle in the Niger Delta and this relates largely to agitation against exclusion, underdevelopment and a quest for
self-determination and development. It is therefore not surprising that “the Ogoni people wish to manage their own affairs” (Ogoni Bill of Rights 1990, 20).

However, the Nigerian government failed to engage the Ogoni people in dialogue. The Nigerian state responded with force to MOSOP’s public resistance and rally against SHELL and other oil companies in the region. The Nigerian military occupied the Ogoni area, used live mortar and ammunition against unarmed Ogoni protesters, razed entire villages (about 30 were torched) and killed hundreds of the inhabitants between 1993 and 1994 (Amnesty International, AI; Human Rights Watch, HRW 1999; Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission, HRVIC 2002). The 1995 farcical military trial and execution of Ken Sarowiwa, the internationally renowned activist, poet and Nobel Prize nominee alongside eight Ogoni leaders by General Sani Abacha, marked a watershed in the transformation of the Niger Delta struggle.

The killing of Ken Saro-wiwa undercut the influence of MOSOP, but in 1998, the Ijaw ethnic group, through the IYC emerged as the new heroes of the Niger Delta people. IYC published its creed-Kaiama Declaration in 1998. The activities of IYC were relatively non-violent, just like its predecessor. The period between 1998 and 2003, categorised as the militancy period, represents a turbulent period in the transformation of the Niger Delta conflict. It is quite unique because it was the turn of a new Millennium and the beginning of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. Nigeria returned to civilian rule in May 1999 following sixteen years of successive military rule. Unfortunately, this made little difference, as the new President, Olusegun Obasanjo, a former Military Head of State that served from 1976-1979, supported extreme use of force against the mostly non-violent Niger Delta agitators. During this period, protesters were shot at, Niger Delta states of Bayelsa and Delta were occupied by battalions of soldiers (10,000-15,000), a State of Emergency was declared, civilians were killed and
terrorized, whole villages were razed down and villagers massacred, including the famous Odi Massacre (HRW 2002).

Unsurprisingly, from 2004, Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, an Ijaw man and President of IYC (2001 - 2004), changed the dimension of the Niger Delta crisis by introducing armed conflict. “Dokubo-Asari went to the creeks and declared…since the government wasn’t ready for dialogue, then they would have to force the government to stop oil production by oil companies”, according to Respondent XI, the Director of media and communication, Niger Delta Amnesty Office. This led to the emergence of MEND. MEND coordinated the insurgent activities in the Niger Delta between 2006 and 2009 which includes consistent bomb attacks on oil facilities, kidnap of foreign oil workers, hostage-for-ransom, attacks on military stations and piracy. The government responded through a massive military crackdown using the JTF. The fruitlessness of this approach is captured in the following statements:

At the end of the day, Nigerian economy began to bleed because oil production at that time was 2.2M barrels per day. But at the height of the crisis in 2009, it has dropped to 700 barrels per day. And given that the Nigerian economy depends solely on oil production, as a way of generating revenue, you can see the effect… of that on the economy (Res XI).

The activities of MEND grounded economic production in the region and badly hurt the oil-dependent Nigerian state. The situation was remedied by a Presidential Amnesty granted by a new President, President Umaru Yar’Adua between June and October 2009. Ultimately, the military intervention in the Niger Delta failed to produce any serious impact besides transforming the struggle and escalating the conflict.
5.2.2 Development Commissions

Quite importantly, the Niger Delta region has always been identified with a special development challenge requiring special attention (Henry Willink Report, 1958). The Henry Willink Conference or Commission was established by the British colonial government to look into the fears of minority ethnic groups, including groups within the Niger Delta, in an independent Nigerian state. The Niger Delta indigenes had representation in the Commission. For instance, Dappa-Biriye advocated for the self-determination and development of the region and was a member of the Willink Commission (1957). Most of the reactions to the special development needs of the region and the responses to it have been non-violent and non-kinetic.

Significantly, “oil” is situated at the heart of the Niger Delta conflict. The despoliation of the Niger Delta oil resources and neglect of the development needs of the Niger Delta people including the adverse environmental impact of the activities of the MNOCs are often referenced as source of conflict. However it is important to note that while oil was first discovered in Oloibiri, Niger Delta in 1956 by Shell-BP, as at 1958 when the Henry Willink Commission submitted its report, the role of oil in the crisis would have been negligible. Nigeria’s first oil field produced only 5,100 barrel per day (BPD) in 1958 (Nigeria National Petroleum Company, NNPC, 2017). Today, Nigeria produces over 2 million BPD. Evidently, oil was not explored at a huge commercial level at this point, hence “somebody won’t say that it was because the region was producing oil” (Respondent XI).

Although oil may not have played a huge role in the struggles and conflicts during pre-independent and early independent periods, any attempt to reduce its predominance in today’s conflict, as can be adduced from the view expressed by Respondent XI, will be misleading. A correct assessment of the situation will be that, although oil is central to the
Niger Delta conflict, it is perhaps not the only factor and more so, the Niger Delta crisis has long established development needs free of current oil-related conflict.

Remarkably, there seems to be consensus about the cause of the Niger Delta agitation-turned-insurgency, which is as a “result of the gross underdevelopment of the region” (Respondent XI). The Henry Willink Report identified the Niger Delta region as “poor, backward and neglected” (Willink Report, Section 3(27) (1958, p.96). Arguably, the present day Niger Delta shows little improvement from the pre-independence period. Respondent II, a Catholic bishop and elder statesman that has served at high profile government commissions and committees including several inter-religious committees aptly describes Nigeria, and by extension, the Niger Delta as an area endowed with “so much resources, (sic!) they are so poor. They have no access to health, they have no access to good roads, no access to education, the things that the rest of the world, less endowed nations take for granted“. It is therefore predictable that the Niger Delta conflict would attract as much development response from the Nigerian government as the often touted military response that is seen by Niger Delta scholars to be responsible for transforming the Niger Delta struggle and agitation into a full-blown militancy and insurgency (Osaghae, 1995; Nwachukwu, 2013; Ikelegbe, 2013; Idemudia, 2009).

Notably, the majority of the responses to the Niger Delta conflict have been through development interventions. Interestingly, “over the years, there have been several commissions and boards set up because of the peculiar nature of that region” (Respondent XI). One of the earliest and significant development commissions is the Henry Willink Commission. The prevalent development approach to the Niger Delta conflict is based on the 1958 Willink Report. Willink Report made a convincing argument for the development of the Niger Delta which it designated “Special Areas” (ibid, p.96).
The recommendation made by the Willink Report provides the backdrop for subsequent Nigerian government’s development initiatives and interventions in the Niger Delta. For instance, “there was no administration in this country that did not have one committee or another set up to address the Niger Delta situation” (Respondent XI). Hence, starting from 1963, the Nigerian government established the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) and statutory declaration of 50 per cent mining royalty and rent to the region as well as other region of the Federation “in respect of any minerals extracted in that Region and any mining rent derived from the Federation during that year from within that Region” (Nigerian Constitution 1963, Section 140 (a & b)). The Presidential Task Force was established by President Shehu Shagari (who set aside 1.5 percent derivation revenue for the Niger Delta region) between 1979 and 1983. In 1992, the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) was established, a Decree promulgated by the military government of General Babangida (increasing the derivation principle to 3 per cent). The derivation formula was increased to 13 per cent by the transitional military government of General Abdulsalam in 1999.

A similar trend is notable in the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000. Following the return to democratic rule in 1999, after 16 years of four successive military governments, the civilian administration of President Obasanjo responded to the growing agitation in the Niger Delta region by enacting the NDDC Act 2000. NDDC repealed the existing OMPADEC. Evidently, the Nigerian government has always favoured a development approach to the Niger Delta crisis. There seems to be no contention that the region has a peculiar development need that requires special attention. According to Respondent XII, a veteran community project organiser in the Niger Delta, “the Niger Delta is not motorable. You only have motors running in some few areas. But basically, where the oil is been produced, you don’t have vehicles going there”. In essence, the development
interventions, primarily infrastructural development such as road construction carried out by the government development bodies such as the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and Ministry of Niger Delta (MNDA) are less visible in the rural areas where actual oil activities (drilling and mining) take place. Infrastructural developments are concentrated in the cities, and are even limited (Personal observation). The Niger Delta region lies in the coastal belt of mangrove swamps bordering the Atlantic Ocean. “Because of its gestalt nature, there has to be a concentration… some kind of attention that should be paid to the development of that region” (Respondent XI). The marshy wetland of the Niger Delta means that it would require an enormous amount of resources to develop. Hence, based on the centralised nature of the Nigerian State, such amount of resources will be difficult to get “unless the FG is directly involved in the development of that place” (Res XII).

One can only understand such position against the peculiar nature of Nigeria’s federal structure. Within the existing Nigerian structure, there is huge need for a national and macro-level solution to the Niger Delta development challenges (Ite, 2004; Frynas, 2005). Yet, resistance to such a federal (centralised) control of resources and intervention remains at the heart of the Niger Delta struggle. The Niger Delta struggle aims for resource control and ownership, which drastically reduced from a fifty per cent control during Independence (Nigerian Constitution, 1960) to its current thirteen percent. However, the need for a macro-level intervention becomes more pertinent when we consider how the state governors within the Niger Delta region mismanage the thirteen percent derivation funds they receive monthly from the FG. This has led to the “decentralisation of corruption” (Watt, 2007, p.642). There is massive evidence of state’s mismanagement of the derivation funds with some state governors diverting the money for private use (Idemudia, 2012). Regardless, the thirteen percent monthly allocation to Niger Delta states, according to Respondent XII, “is not enough” to meet to the development needs of the region. Should the derivation fund be
increased as recommended by Aaron (2010)? This will directly contradict the argument for more FG and macro-level intervention. Such is the dilemma of development intervention in the Niger Delta: Adopt a micro approach and risk decentralisation of corruption or support a FG national intervention-one that challenges the core of the Niger Delta resistance.

At the moment, such dilemma has remained irreconcilable. However, it is not one that plays a major role in the escalation of the Niger Delta insurgency. It only appears at the fringes of the conflict, despite its centrality to the whole Niger Delta narrative. Arguably, the Niger Delta insurgents and the wider Niger Delta citizens support a more robust FG involvement in the development of the region. The Nigerian state has responded to the development needs of the region by setting up development commissions and allocating funds that have undergone several increases and decreases, standing currently at thirteen percent. However, such development commissions have failed to make impact because of their top-down nature and disconnection from the Niger Delta people (Ikelegbe, 2005). The Niger Delta citizens’ participation in the design and implementation and monitoring of such development interventions range from minimal to non-existent. More so, the unfair approach to citizen participation (absence of a bottom-up and representative participation) leads to other negative consequences such as internecine conflicts and promotion of selfish (over collective) interests (Obi, 2001b; Ikelegbe, 2005; Nwajiaku, 2005; Zalik, 2004; Okorobia, 2010).

However, NDDC represents a departure from past development commissions in the Niger Delta, especially noteworthy in its establishment of the Niger Delta Regional Master Plan (NDRMP) in 2005. NDRMP emphasises multi-stakeholder partnership and cooperation and equitable distribution of development resources and interventions.

The main lessons for the future are that the Master Plan and all the programmes and projects it promotes must be based on a holistic plan for the development of the communities within the context of their respective states and the region. There is also need for clear criteria for
distributing development resources to emphasize the area most adversely affected by the oil activities and adherence in practice to those criteria as to douse the perceptions of neglect that have reached boiling points in recent years…… An open and transparent partnership between NDDC, Federal, State and Local Government, private sector organizations (including the oil industry), communities and civil society a partnership that ensures that all the main actors have a stake in the future development of the Region will also facilitate synergy among all parties and optimize use of scarce resources. (NDRMP, p.110).

As such, NDDC and NDRMP seem to be guided by the principle of sustainable development—a shift away from the unsustainable approach of past development interventions. One key feature of past development commissions and interventions is the little or “no requirement for community participation in planning and development of oil activities; corruption and inadequate compensation for damage to property; and lack of enforcement of environmental regulations. (Industry and Energy Operations Division West Central Africa Department, Vol II, 1995, p.46). It would have been naïve to expect the government to curb the excesses of the MNOCs, as some of “government agencies are rejected because they are seen as part of the problem”, according to Respondent XVIII, an administrator with the Nigerian Red Cross (NRC), an affiliate of the International Red Cross Committee (ICRC). More so, “it is government that control them. They have joint venture” (Res XII). Obviously, past development initiatives and interventions were constrained by the GON compromised position as a major stakeholder in the oil companies operating in the region. GON has a mandatory 60 per cent stake in the oil companies. This is likely responsible for the government’s inadequacy in regulating or enforcing environmental compliance of oil operations and protecting the rights of the Niger Delta people (Industry and Energy Operations Division West Central Africa Department, Vol II, 1995, p.45; see also Ibeanu, 2000; Frynas, 2001; Watts, 2001; Obi, 2010). Therefore, NDRMP represents a paradigmatic shift evident in the open and growing dialogue and partnership among the different stakeholders including the government, oil companies and the oil communities. This
multi-stakeholder cooperation means that the oil companies and the GON can no longer carry on business as usual.

Thus, NDRMP sets a new trend in the expansive cooperation and partnership among the stakeholders. For example, in designing the NDRMP, the Commission engaged in:

- Seven briefings at State capital level, twenty-seven needs assessment workshops in the Senatorial Districts and Participatory Rural Assessment involving fifty-four communities.
- There were also ten capacity building workshops in major towns, including State Capitals, and twenty-seven integration workshops at Senatorial District level. A final round of stakeholders' workshops was also held in each State to publicize and discuss the draft Master Plan, which was then presented to Federal Government committees (NDRMP, p.117-118).

This approach represents a massive departure from past development approaches as it pursues a holistic measure that seems to be inclusive. This is particularly notable in its inclusion of what is perhaps the most important stakeholder, the people of the Niger Delta, in identifying and designing the Master Plan. In the words of the former President, President Olusegun Obasanjo: “With contribution from this multiplicity of stakeholders, there is an absolute need for a Development Master Plan by which available resources can be effectively coordinated and utilized... (NDRMP, p.101)” Obvious from this statement is the fact that past development interventions by the Nigerian government, the MNOCs and the external development partners were largely disjointed and uncoordinated. This point was highlighted in the literature in the criticism of the CSR of MNOCs-one seen to be at variance or disconnected from the macro-development agenda pursued by the state and that of the society that it served (Frynas, 2005; Ite, 2004).
5.2.3 Presidential Amnesty

Following an unsuccessful military campaign against the Niger Delta insurgents, the Administration of President Yar’Adua settled for amnesty for repentant militants. On 25th June 2009, the late former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Musa Yar’Adua granted amnesty and unconditional pardon to the Niger Delta militants. The pardon was effective for a period of 60 days (25 June 2009-4 October 2009), requiring the militants to surrender every weapon and ammunition in their possession and to publicly denounce militancy. The President applied the Prerogative of Mercy, based on Section 175 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. Section 175 of Nigeria Constitution (1999) states that:

(1) The President may -
(a) Grant any person concerned with or convicted of any offence created by an Act of the National Assembly a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions;
(b) Grant to any person a respite, either for an indefinite or for a specified period, of the execution of any punishment imposed on that person for such an offence;
(c) Substitute a less severe form of punishment for any punishment imposed on that person for such an offence; or
(d) Remit the whole or any part of any punishment imposed on that person for such an offence or of any penalty or forfeiture otherwise due to the State on account of such an offence.

The Presidential Amnesty Programme had a lifespan of five years (2009-2015). In 2009, about 30,000 Niger Delta militants surrendered their arms between June 26, 2009 and October 4, 2009 for a government unconditional pardon and in return for training and rehabilitation. The Amnesty programme has been dubbed relatively successful as it helped to curtail the incessant attacks carried out by Niger Delta militants at the height of its insurgency between 2004 and 2009. Its most obvious success is the increase in oil production from 700 BPD at the height of the insurgency back to between 2.4 to 2.6 million BPD. Unfortunately, insurgency appears to be resurging in the region (more frequently in 2016) marked by
increasing attacks on oil installations and facilities and attacks on the military stationed in the region. The increasing attacks in the region raise an important question about the touted success of the Amnesty programme.

However, Respondent XI dismisses the attacks in the region as mere criminality: “a lot of people misconstrue piracy, oil bunkering or oil theft as militancy. They are not the same”.

It is important to distinguish between acts of criminality and insurgency in the Niger Delta, as it is very probable that criminal elements in the society will seize upon the genuine grievance and struggle of a group to perpetrate their acts of criminality. While this is undeniable, what becomes more important is removing such conditions that criminal elements can exploit for their own advantage. In this regard, it seems that the Nigerian state is doing little. But, Respondent XI posits that “the fact that there’s heightened criminality in the system is not an indication that the government is not doing anything to solve it. There’s no society that you don’t have criminality”. Respondent VIII, a federal permanent secretary and executive member of the committee on dialogue on the Boko Haram conflict supports this maxim: , “every society has criminal activities. And mostly all nations face security challenges” (ResVIII). Although true, it is quite difficult to separate criminality from insurgency in the Niger Delta. What is quite obvious is that the Amnesty programme did not completely stop attacks in the region, but the attacks were largely low-profile, underreported and, more importantly left oil production unaffected (even when a great volume of oil is lost to oil theft daily) . The Amnesty Programme failed to address the major cause of agitation—which is the underdevelopment of the region, but chose to reward militants. It is possible that the huge pay-outs given to the militants may be the incentive for their perceived surrender of arms. It may very well be that the Amnesty programme as Respondent XI avers is only meant as a short term security stabilisation.
The argument that the government’s Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rehabilitation (DDR) programme, known as the Presidential Amnesty Programme, is a security stabilisation tool is more acceptable. It produces a more persuasive explanation than the argument that “the amnesty programme is not about the development of the region” (Respondent XI).

Respondent XI expresses satisfaction with the outcome of the Amnesty programme especially that it has fulfilled its mandate of disarmament and demobilisation, if not full reintegration, and that it “has been able to train about 19,000. About 16,000 of them have graduated”. However, not everyone shares the same sentiment. Respondent I, the chairman of partnership against violent extremism (PAVE), a coalition of CSOs and NGOs in Nigeria posit that:

The response to the Niger Delta should not be the model, because if we do that as a model, we are simply going to incubate the insurgency. Amnesty programme for example defeated its aims, led to the army, the consolidation of the arms and the rest of that…The development challenges in the Niger Delta have been left unattended (Res I).

Possibly, the greatest challenge of the Amnesty Programme is its failure to address the root causes of the Niger Delta. The leaders of the militants such as Asari Dokubo have criticised the Amnesty Programme for this apparent failure. Respondent XI admits that “There are still issues of development in the region… We still have health challenges. Our people are dying. The infant mortality rate is still very high in the Niger Delta. We still have issues of poor housing”. The amnesty programme is most effective as a short term intervention. Despite its shortcomings, it does represent a landmark in the Nigerian state’s response to the development needs of the region. According to Respondent XI:

Before now, we never had any program that emphasises human capacity development. Previous committees were just ad hoc. This is an interventionist program. So, before, we only had people set up committee to come and identify the problems, to make recommendations, and the recommendations gather dust in the offices of the government. But, for once, the
government decided to move from reports and recommendations to being able to act on those (Res XI).

Hence, the Niger Delta amnesty, regardless of its weaknesses, does present some strength, especially when compared to past interventions. Notwithstanding that the Niger Delta amnesty enjoys constitutional support, it appears to have “little moral or persuasive force” (Sadat 2007, p.240), especially that it ignores the underlying development needs of the region. Perhaps we should accept the fact just as Respondent XI argues, that the Amnesty Programme was never designed to address the underlying development problems. For solution to the development challenges of the region we would have to look to NDDC, the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) and “other statutory agencies and ministries of government that are also taking care of the developmental needs of that region”. In this regard, development intervention (such as amnesty) by either local or external agency can represent a means of curtailing rather than resolving conflict.

As deducible from Respondent XI, some development interventions such as the Niger Delta amnesty may deliberately target short term security stabilisation. This is usually with the hope that it will pave way for the establishment and implementation of long-term development plans and policies. This resonates with the common approach taken by most external development partners such as DFID: security first, then development (Denney, 2011). But as Denney’s (2011) empirical study of Sierra Leone shows, the relationship between development and security is not as straightforward, improved security does not always produce expected development. It is perhaps more rewarding to adopt human rights based approach to development, especially one that takes cognisance of the human rights of all of the actors including the insurgents and victims. Hence, the granting of unconditional pardon to the Niger Delta militants means that the Nigerian State may have violated international law that requires it to prosecute gross violators of human rights, protect the
fundamental rights of victims and “establish a stable democracy that honours human rights and the rule of law” (Slye, 2002, p.182). The next section will therefore consider how the period of relative peace produced by the amnesty helped the Nigerian state implement its longer term development intervention. Is there evidence of human rights based approach?

5.2.4 Development Response

NDDC and MNDA are the two main vehicles through which the GON respond to the development needs of the Niger Delta region. NDDC and MNDA have focused largely on the physical or infrastructural development of the Niger Delta mainly building of roads, bridges, power installations, hospitals and other infrastructural projects. The large focus on infrastructural development again yields to criticism as it undermines other mostly non-tangible areas of interventions within its mandate (see Ojeleye, 2010). For example, Section 7 (a, h & i) of the NDDC Act (2000), identifies among the functions of NDDC, to

formulate policies and guidelines for the development of the Niger Delta; tackle ecological and environmental problems that arise from the exploration of oil mineral in the Niger Delta area and advise the Federal Government and the member States on the prevention and control of oil spillages, gas flaring, and environmental pollution and to liaise with the various oil mineral and gas prospecting and producing companies on all matters of pollution prevention and control.

More pertinently, there seems to be a parallel relationship in the mandates of the NDDC and MNDA. MNDA was established by late President Yar’Adua in 2008, also in response to the agitation of the Niger Delta region. It defines its mission as to “formulate and execute plans, programmes and other initiatives as well as to coordinate the activities of Agencies, Communities, Donors and other relevant Stakeholders involved in the development of the Region.” (MNDA 2017). But, like NDDC, its functions include: “Coordinate the Development Plan for the Region; Formulate policies and programmes for youth mobilization and empowerment in the Niger Delta Region; and Liaise with oil companies
operating in the Region to ensure environmental protection and pollution control; “(MNDA 2017). In line with its mandate, MNDA has designed the Niger Delta Action Plan (NDAP), which is similar to NDDC’s NDRMP.

Hence, we see evidence of duplicity of development agencies and mandates. Although there have been attempts to integrate NDDC and the Amnesty Office under the MNDA, there has been strong resistance against such move. Hence, despite the growing political will and improved development efforts by the Nigerian government, all these efforts are undermined by the multiplicity of development agencies with parallel functions. The government’s development intervention suffers from a lack of comprehensive and overarching development strategy and body.

NDAP, like NDRMP reflects a multi-stakeholder approach as it seeks to promote a united regional plan for action captured in the MNDA “Niger Delta Collaborative Development Framework” (2010). The Action Plan adopts three principles: a Development Results Framework (DRF), a Multi-Stakeholder Trust Fund; and an Institutional Framework (NDA, P.10). Its DRF is quite unique and clearly different from the funding policy and principle of NDDC. For instance, Section 14 of the NDDC Act sets out the funding of the Commission which includes mainly:

From the Federal Government, the equivalent of 15 per cent of the total Monthly statutory allocations due to member States of the Commission from the Federation Account; this being the contribution of the Federal Government to the Commission;

(b) 3 per cent of the total annual budget of any oil producing company operating On shore and offshore, in the Niger-Delta area; including gas processing companies;

(c) 50 per cent of monies due to member States of the Commission from the Ecological Fund;
In the case of the MNDA’s NDAP, the indicative US$10 billion programme, which is “the value of the required investment is comparable to the existing development budgets of the nine Niger Delta States.” (NDA, P.10). In essence, the Nigerian government provides all of the required funding for this development plan and this fund is within the remit of the statutory budget allocation for the region. This is quite important as the primarily locally-funded development plan avoids the issue of local ownership that often arises with external funding. It also reduces the chance or extent of securitisation of development which often characterise many of the donor-driven, donor-led and externally funded development projects.

Although it is principally funded by the Nigerian government, external development partners such as UNDP participated in the design and formulation of the development plan. The second dimension of the action plan, the multi-stakeholder trust fund (MSTF) with a projected US$200m is only meant to catalyse the market development investment whereby external development partners already working in the region can align their development projects and programmes with the action plan in a way to stimulate the market. The last dimension, the Institutional Framework seeks to “improve the accountability and responsiveness of Action Plan to the communities of the Niger Delta” (ibid, p.10) by establishing the Council on Niger Delta, Niger Delta Compact, Results Framework Scorecard and a Stakeholder Forum.

Hence, although NDAP has a five year mandate (2013-2017) just like the NDRMP, it does seem to present a more credible picture of how “the focused investment of existing funding could achieve tangible and measurable impacts to improve the quality of life of Niger Delta residents over a five year period.” (NDAP, P.10). The First Quarter Report (2016) by NDDC highlights a range of issues affecting the Commission ranging from under-funding to corruption, delayed budget, and limited stakeholder participation.
Since inception, the Commission has not been funded as stipulated in the NDDC Act of 2000... As at December 2015, the FGN owed NDDC over N900bn since inception... some oil companies had yet to make any contribution to the Commission since inception. Gas Processing Companies: They had been supposed to also contribute 3% of their annual budgets to the Commission but there has been no contribution since inception. Statutorily, the Ecological Fund is to contribute 50% of monies due the member states to NDDC but no such contribution had been made to NDDC since inception.

Although the financing bodies including the FG and the MNOCs fail to make consistent contributions, a substantial amount has been received by NDDC over the years, with little to show for in terms of development impact. Also, while the Action Plan established by the MNDA looks promising and unique in its approach, the unflattering performance of the Ministry since its inception in 2008 undercut our expectation of a successful implementation. It may therefore be the lack of political will that is mostly affecting the successful implementation of these development agendas and strategies. For instance, the MNDA has just released a damning report from its internal audit that shows that while the Ministry has received more than half of the NGR ₦700 billion budgeted for it from 2009 to 2015, most of the projects have had very little impact on the people that would have included “enhancing socio-economic activities, human capital development and environmental protection of the region” (Owete 2016, PremiumTimes). There are about “80% of the projects that are either on-going or abandoned after payments” (Owete 2016, PremiumTimes). The total number of completed projects, according to the audit report is 12 out of the 147 projects embarked upon since 2009. The development intervention by the MNDA is therefore marred by poor implementation, lack of transparent procurement procedure, and absence of efficient monitoring system.

Evidently, the development frameworks and interventions by the GON are still fraught with significant challenges. But, besides these obvious difficulties, the development frameworks are themselves positive development that represent a break away from past approaches. We
can trace the new development thinking and approach to Nigeria’s return to democratic government in 1999 and the need to re-integrate into the community of liberal governments which will involve subscribing to liberal values. For instance, President Obasanjo defends his administration’s signature economic programme- National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS) or Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) “as a way of letting the international community know where Nigeria stands—in the region and in the world—and how it wishes to be supported. (NEEDS/PSRP, IMF 2005, p.1). NEEDS was also established to fulfil the United Nations’ MDGs which includes eradicating poverty and hunger, ensuring environmental sustainability and developing a global partnership for development.

Interestingly, the motivation for a macro-economic programme such as NEEDS/PSRP may not be entirely independent of loan conditionality or a political calculation to secure external financing and funding as the PSRP is prepared “in broad consultation with stakeholders and development partners, including the staffs of the World Bank and the IMF” (NEEDS/PSRP, IMF 2005). This is however differentiated from the IMF loan conditionality of the 1980s where General Babangida, the then military Head of State, oversaw an austerity programme- Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) as part of conditions for financial support from IFIs. Contrariwise, NEEDS presents a short-term national economic plan (complemented by similar initiatives at the state and local levels of government-SEEDS, LEEDS) charged with “reorienting values, reducing poverty, creating wealth, and generating employment” (NEEDS/PSRP, IMF 2005, p.ix). NEEDS, SEEDS, LEEDS and subsequent economic development frameworks such as Vision 20:20:20 and Transformation Agenda (2011-2015) represent development efforts and frameworks by successive Nigerian leaders since the return to democratic government to set Nigeria on the path to sustainable development.
Undoubtedly, there is a noticeable change in the way development intervention in the Niger Delta is conceived, yet there seems to be divorce between a credible design and good intention and an effective implementation strategy. The Nigerian government is making effort to reduce some of these negative trends by embracing a broad and multi-stakeholder component including MNOCs, external development partners and the Niger Delta citizens in identifying the needs and designing the strategies. NDRMP and NDAP are laudable development initiatives with good prospect of guaranteeing sustainable development and lasting peace to the crisis-prone Niger Delta. But, the GON’s lack of political will and the fact that the development programmes still remain susceptible to some of the negative traits of past development approaches (such as a weak monitoring system, lack of transparency in contract, lack of capacity) undercut the benefits that such would have brought to the Niger Delta region.

But with concerted effort from the MNOCs and external development partners and, especially that all the stakeholders are uniting in their appreciation of a market model that focuses on non-oil sectors (mainly agriculture), whilst adopting a regional approach, one can expect that the development and conflict situation in the Niger Delta will improve. Although insurgency is resurging in the region apparent in the recent attacks by new militant groups such as the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), there is equally an increasing awareness and participation in the market development programmes supported largely by MNOCS such as Chevron and other external development partners and even local businesses and the government itself. We shall now look closely at ways external development initiatives and interventions have developed in the Niger Delta region and how effective or otherwise they have been.
5.3 Assessing External Development Initiatives and Interventions

Interestingly, external development initiatives and interventions in the Niger Delta area dates back to pre-Independence period noted in the 1958 Willink Commission Report. Sir Henry Willink, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, presented to the British Parliament in July 1958 Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying them. The Report designated the Niger Delta area as a special area requiring “The Development of Special Areas” (Henry Willink Minority Commission Report, 1958, p.96). It considered the area to be “poor, backward and neglected” (ibid) and recommended that a Federal Board be appointed to “consider the problems of the area of the Niger Delta” (ibid). Significantly, the Report recommended that the development project “should be financed by the Regional Government with a Federal contribution of one-third of the capital cost plus one-third of the recurrent expenditure for a period which might extend to ten years” (Section 3(29) (p.96). The colonial government therefore sets the stage for the prevalent development approach to the Niger Delta crisis.

However, since the advent of commercial exploration of oil in the region, MNOCs such as Shell have contributed to the development of the region as part of their CSR. CSR was conducted more in line with international requirement, national requirement for oil license and a moral obligation. Hence, development intervention known as community development projects (CDPs) by MNOCs in the Niger Delta followed a strategic pattern that offered token development to specific oil communities in the region, while allowing the oil companies maximise profit. The strategic approach to CSR by the MNOCS mean that some oil communities and ethnic groups (especially ones with more oil wells) in the Niger Delta region enjoyed more CDPs than others (those with non or less oil wells). Inter-community and inter-ethnic rivalry and competition ensued. Several militia groups emerged and were
employed by the MNOCs to protect their oil facilities, leading to rival gangs and groups war. The activities of the MNOCs militarised the region, in addition to the JTF activities.

In recent times, there has been a paradigmatic shift in orientation and practice of development intervention by the MNOCs and other international development partners in the Niger Delta. CSR has yielded to Corporate Social Investment (CSI) or Corporate Social Enterprise (CSE). CSE/CSI represents a market based model that seeks to provide a fair and balance market environment that promotes entrepreneurship and non-oil sector investment. It is particularly useful as it targets the poor and disadvantaged, in addition to adopting a holistic and regional approach. This helps to eliminate some of the issues with the CSR. Although a market based approach, there are strong elements of a human rights based approach such as inclusiveness/participation, transparency, gender equality and rule of law. This section traces this development; particularly looking at the manifestation of rights based methodology in the development intervention. It concludes that the latest development approach presents great opportunity for the observation of a right based approach. Yet, there are still persistent challenges which are likely inadvertent.

5.3.1 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

Much of the external development initiatives and interventions directly addressing the Niger Delta conflict have been carried out by MNOCs such as Chevron-Texaco and Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC) operating in the region. The oil companies have done this as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) which involves rewarding their host communities. MNOCs operating in Niger Delta have conducted their CSR in line with international standards and in compliance with the laws and norms set by the GON. For instance, the Nigeria Petroleum Industry Bill establishes a Fund, known as the Petroleum Host Communities Fund- “the PHC Fund” which is to be “utilised for the development of the economic and social infrastructure of the communities within the
petroleum producing area” (PIB, 2012, Section G, 116-119). Section G (118) is quite interesting:

Where an act of vandalism, sabotage or other civil unrest occurs that causes damage to any petroleum facilities within a host community, the cost of repair of such facility shall be paid from PHC fund entitlement unless it is established that no member of the community is responsible.

This provision in the reformed Petroleum Act betrays the motive of the PHC Fund as being a little more than protection for MNOCs against attacks on oil facilities, rather than a genuine concern with the development of the Niger Delta region. Similarly, PIB, Section 198-200 provides laws that guarantee environmental protection and compensation when the oil companies pollute the environment through their activities. Section 198 (2) states that “a licensee or lessee who causes damages or injury to a tree or object of commercial value or which is the object of veneration shall pay fair and adequate compensation to the persons or communities directly affected by the damage or injury.” But this is often less the case. As elucidated in the previous section, the compromised stake of the government (through its NNPC) means that the whole procedure is often mired in “corruption and inadequate compensation for damage to property; and lack of enforcement of environmental regulations. (Industry and Energy Operations Division West Central Africa Department, Vol II, 1995, p.46).

Section 260 of PIB provides further evidence that the MNOCs CSR are conducted within the state’s regulatory framework and requirements. Section 260 (a, b, & c) entails a “public service obligation” which the state can impose on the licensee for “the economic development and achievement of wider economic policy objectives, environmental protection; and health and safety”. We may therefore argue that CSR in the Niger Delta case is less about delivery of social good and most likely a risk management technique. The
evidence for such is found in the selective and strategic approach to CSR adopted by the MNOCS operating in the region which involves situating development projects only in communities where they operate. Respondent XII opines: “they do it so that they will not have problems with the communities. Because sometimes, the communities can go and seal up their business area where they are producing the oil—we call them the flow stations” (Res XII).

Another reason for this scenario is that the oil companies operating in the region find themselves in a challenging position where they grapple with the absence of the state and the undue expectation from them to fill the development vacuum left by the state. While the MNOCs carried out their CSR in a way that development interventions were perceived only as gateway to preventing attacks on their facilities, hence maximising profit, their limited development interventions still had a far reaching impact than the absence of government intervention. Nigeria’s Petroleum Act (1969) and Land Use Act (1978) help us understand the complexity of the situation. The Petroleum Act (1969) is an Act that “vests the ownership of, and all on-shore and off-shore revenue from petroleum resources derivable therefrom in the Federal Government and for all other matters incidental thereto”, while the Land Use Decree (now Act) places all lands in each state of the Federation under the governor of the state. Hence, the FG controls the Niger Delta area and inadvertently absolves the Niger Delta states of primary responsibility. Respondent XII expresses his frustration in the statement below: “They (FG) are benefiting. You say we are running a FG in Nigeria, we are actually running a unitary government. So the whole system is fraudulent” (Res XII). In essence, the development architecture and intervention by the FG towards the Niger Delta is nothing more than a cesspool.

Therefore, the oil producing communities cannot hold the government of their states accountable, and the FG which has imposed itself as the Trust manager of the region is far
away in Abuja. This is what Alao (2007) describes as a major reason for natural-resources inspired conflicts in Africa, where “citizens…do not have any control over their country’s natural resource endowment, and they cannot see a way of seeking redress through existing structures-democratic or authoritarian” (p.278). One would argue that the Niger Delta States enjoy the 13 per cent monthly derivation fund from the FG, hence should easily be able to intervene adequately and should be held accountable. Nonetheless, they are unable to because the derivation funds only yields to “decentralisation of corruption” (Watts, 2007, p.642). More so, the “state does not have authority over the oil” (Respondent XII). The resources are centralised and controlled by the FG.

The failure of the Nigerian FG to assume its role means that the responsibility transfers to the MNOCS. The MNOCs are often vested with the responsibility of providing development as they are the ones mostly visible and close to the people both in physical terms and in terms of the impact that their activities have on the livelihood of the Niger Delta people. Undeniably, the MNOCs have contributed to the development of the Niger Delta, but most of the contributions have been done as part of their obligatory license requirement. Therefore we see a sense that the MNOCs believe that the primary responsibility of development lies with the GON. It is therefore not surprising that “the oil companies will tell you that they have what they call joint venture with the FG and they are doing their part, FG are not doing their part. That’s why I say it’s government’s will. If government is there to follow up on these things, the conflict will reduce” (Res XII). Alao (2007) may therefore be right to conclude that the lack (or inefficient) of credible “administrative structures” or “governance” is responsible for the greed (and key to solving the grievance) of the actors in the oil-rich Niger Delta, rather than the mere presence of natural resources as scholars such as Collier seems to portray (p.278-279).
However, Alao’s argument, although valid, is limited. It is not just the dearth of interventions or credible structures, but more so the absence of political will to act. The Nigerian government will need “to remove clauses under existing democratic structures that, although they may be legal and constitutional, are unfair to segments of the population” (Alao 2007, p.278). In this regard, the Petroleum Act and the Land Use Act need to be changed, such that the Niger Delta people are given greater freedom over their resources. But, as widely noted in the literature and illustrated in the previous section, the state’s stake in the oil companies and its overt reliance on oil revenue are likely responsible for the absence of the political will that Respondent XII laments above (see Zalik, 2004; Frynas, 2001, 2005). Profit seems to be at the heart of the operations and interventions in the Niger Delta which undercuts the public goodwill and social good that the development intervention by both the MNOCs and the GON may have engendered. This is clearly evident in the selective development intervention pursued by the MNOCs, one that has produced some grievous consequences including inter-community and inter-ethnic rivalry and conflicts. The internal development interventions such as the Amnesty Programme also produce this negative trend, as illustrated in the previous section. But recent development initiatives and interventions by both the GON and external development partners mainly the MNOCs are beginning to show a paradigm shift from selective development designs and delivery.

5.3.2 Development Approach- A Regional Market-Based Approach (Corporate Social Enterprise/Investment, (CSE/CSI)

For instance, the NDRMP admits that past development interventions by the government failed because of “the grossly inadequate focus on the actual oil producing communities” (ibid, p.110). There is also similar awareness and change in attitude by the MNOCs:

Chevron, like others in the industry, has traditionally focused its development efforts on the communities closest to its operations. After recognizing, however, that those communities do
not exist in isolation of the broader needs and challenges in the Niger Delta, the company has learned to take a more regional approach to corporate social investment by focusing on managing social risk in a more preventive and proactive manner (NDPI, p.2).

Just as the government’s NDRMP and NDAP present an overarching regional development plan, the MNOCs and the external development partners are equally adopting a regional approach towards the nine states in the region. The adoption of a regional approach is quite useful as most of the Niger Delta conflicts are concentrated in Bayelsa, Delta and River States. As such, these states have conspicuously attracted more development attention than the other Niger Delta states. This is because of the large deposit of oil mineral resources and particularly the conflict generated by the neglect of the state and damage of its means of livelihood through the activities of MNOCs. The new approach yields two positive impacts. On the one hand, it takes cognizance of the root causes rather than the symptoms which have always been the case with past approaches. On the other, it reduces the potential rivalry and inter-ethnic and inter-community conflict that the selective development methods of the past were creating.

Another notable difference is the adoption of a multi-stakeholder approach. This is a complete departure from the past development interventions where each intervener, mostly the oil companies, fund development projects in areas where they operate, especially ones where they are likely to encounter problem from agitating youth and members of the community. These community development projects show a “noticeable lack of coordination and collaboration among the development partners in the region” (NDP1, 2010, P.6). This is succinctly captured by Respondent XII: “but you see the pace of those things will slow down at a point. But if what I have mentioned to you...if it is something that is coordinated well and they grow with it based on understanding between the communities in the oil producing states, maybe monitored by the FG, it will go a very long way in terms of the youth
restiveness. “It is therefore significant that current development thinking in the Niger Delta encourages coordination and partnership between the oil companies and other external development bodies. According to NDPI Annual report (2010), the context for partnership and coordination began in 2005 “under the Global Memoranda of Understanding (GMOU) that engaged communities through Regional Development Committees (RDC) “(ibid, p.6).

The growing partnership and cooperation among the different development agencies and MNOCs have yielded much more synthesised objectives and ideas. One idea that has gained traction and has become a common ground in the development initiatives and approaches of both the GON and external development partners including USAID, DFID, UNDP and the MNOCs is the “Market Development” approach. For instance, DFID has an initiative called the Market Development for the Niger Delta (MADE). MADE is an unconventional development intervention programme that seeks to achieve “increased, pro-poor economic growth in the non-oil sectors of the nine (Niger Delta) states (Terms of Reference, TOR, p.1). DFID has a total budget of £15 million to spend for a stipulated 5 year period (2013-2018) for stimulating the market and improving the economy and livelihood of a target of 150,000 people including 50 per cent women (TOR).

The market approach is an innovative strategy that deviates from top-down development initiatives and programmes of the past whereby the benefits of the development projects do not often reach those at the bottom, those that really need it. This programme and development method directly benefits the poor and common people who are largely involved in the often neglected non-oil sectors mainly agriculture and related trades. It is unlike the selective development intervention-largely CDPs adopted in the past. Interestingly, in past CDPs, development projects were strategically located in communities with oil wells (excluding those without oil wells) and the Niger Delta people were alienated from the development process where MNOCs cared less about the quality or impact of the CDP in the
lives of the people. The market approach therefore holds the promise of turning around the defects of the past and making sure that the development interventions have a direct impact in the lives and livelihood of the Niger Delta people.

Chevron-Texaco illustrates well the private sector or market model in its shift away from CSR to Corporate Social Enterprise (CSE) or Corporate Social Investment (CSI). CSE/CSI helps MNOCs such as Chevron create “opportunities for sustainable and equitable economic growth in the Niger Delta and to foster stability in vulnerable and conflict-impacted communities in the Niger Delta” (NDPI, in-Review, 2010-2013) at the same time attain its own business objectives. Chevron’s business objectives include:

- Improve investment climate for Chevron to conduct and grow its business in Nigeria; Reduce community dependency on Chevron to be their primary source of development assistance;
- Create a peaceful and stable environment for Chevron’s operations; Reduce community pressures on Chevron to be their primary source of employment and contracts; Distinguish Chevron as a responsible corporate citizen and partner of choice (NDPI, in-Review 2010-2013, p.6).

Significantly, the market approach gives MNOCs like Chevron and other external development partners the leeway to design and implement genuine and sustainable development interventions without undermining their own profit pursuit. To achieve this, the U.S. MNOC created its own NGO, Niger Delta Partnership Initiatives (NDPI) registered in the U.S. and another NGO locally registered in Nigeria, Partnership Initiatives for Niger Delta (PIND). Hence, we can see, in the Market model, the prospect of an improved living standard and sustainable development in the Niger Delta-one that was clearly lacking in the development intervention strategies adopted in the past. The market model has very little chance of being hijacked by community leaders, traditional leaders and other self-driven individuals and representatives as was the case with the traditional approach where funds and other financial assistance were directly given to communities, businesses and individuals.
Rather, it “focuses on improving local economies by expanding and increasing the efficiency of market systems… (With the belief that it will) enable a greater number of entrepreneurs, producers and employees to participate in higher paying economic activities” (NDPI, in-Review 2010-2013, p.9). The focus on non-oil sector is very commendable and taking root in the region.

In the focus group interview conducted with five students of the University of Portharcourt and members of ENACTUS, more evidence emerged about the change towards developing non-oil skills and investing in non-oil sector. ENACTUS is helping to create young entrepreneurs in different non-oil areas. One remarkable project carried out by the students under the ENACTUS banner is the “Choko Oven Project” that involved designing and developing environmentally friendly fish smoking equipment for the market women in Choba Market. The Choko Oven helped the market women to smoke more fish with little or no environment hazard that the traditional approach caused.

ENACTUS has made me better because I am also impacting myself. The CHOKO Oven Project has reduced the harmful impact of the smoke. If you see where they smoke the fish at this Junction market, the place is unhygienic. That is why I prefer to buy fish at Choba Market. I tell my mum buy fish here, the health hazard is not much and I showed my mum the Choko oven and I said I am so proud that I am a member of that group that made it possible (XXV).

Hence, there is an increasing awareness and shift towards entrepreneurship and non-oil skills, and groups such as Chevron’s PIND and ENACTUS are helping ordinary Niger Delta residents develop and practice such skills. However, the oil-dependent mentality, especially the community dependency on MNOCs as primary source for development assistance and employment, one that Chevron seeks to eliminate (as expressed in its business objectives) still persists.
A lot of these individuals because of this oil mentality don’t want to do anything. Most of them in school now what they want is “let me just graduate and attach myself to an oil company provided i’m from Rivers state or the Niger Delta”. Now, look at that-the oil itself is depleting right now. Its value is diminishing, but still these individuals have not really seen the need to channel that energy or channel their mentality towards other profitable businesses. Even the courses they do in school right now, they look for a way to link the course to oil. They are not looking for a way to link their courses to something else that can be beneficial. You will see someone studying Micro-Biology; the person will want to study Environmental Biology, because with that, he can work in an oil company (XXV).

From the testimony above, we glean that youths get trainings that are narrowly tailored towards oil-related jobs. However, the overt reliance on oil as the major source of revenue continues to impact negatively on the growth of the Nigerian economy, especially as the global price of oil dips. There is increased unemployment which can lead to frustration and eventually militancy and insurgency. Hence, the market development approach, particularly the focus on entrepreneurship and non-oil related skills are quite commendable.

NDPI and PIND lead in promoting the market development approach as it has an extensive and expansive network of international and internal development organisations, private businesses and community organisations/leaders and student networks as partners. Traditional development partners such as DFID, UNDP, EU, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), World Bank and several UN Offices and programmes such as International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) are cooperating and coordinating activities with NDPI and PIND. DFID, for instance, like many of the traditional development organisations already have ongoing development programmes in Nigeria and in the Niger Delta region, but they are increasingly aligning these development programmes with the development work led by the Chevron-funded NGOs.
For example, NDPI/PIND launched the Partners for Peace (P4P) network in 2012 as part of its plan to address the conflict situation in the region. P4P is a grassroots programme that engages all relevant stakeholders in the Niger Delta through a real time online tool—a web map that allows “peace builders and development implementers in the Niger Delta region to more effectively anticipate and respond to conflict” (NDPI Annual Report, 2013, p.17). The report claims that “by the end of 2013: 11, 126 incidents were uploaded on the Web Map as well as 350 peace actors, initiatives and their locations. Nine conflict bulletins were produced and shared with 2, 557 peace actors” (Annual Report, 2013, p.17). P4P is therefore “a peace building framework integrated into the market and economic model against the background that “Healthy market systems flourish in peaceful societies. Jobs created through economic development initiatives, in turn, help reinforce peace. (NDPI/PIND Annual Report, 2014, p.17). While the market development model is recently been applied in the Niger Delta with some of the programmes such as DFID’s MADE expected to run till 2018, it is difficult or perhaps too early to measure their effect. There are some positive news coming out from the intervention, but the latest round of insurgent attacks in the region calls for a cautious assessment.

For example, in its evaluation report of the first year of MADE, DFID admits some variance in the expectation from the initial six months design stage and the actual implementation. For instance, in the first year, there was intervention in seven Niger Delta states (Abia and Ondo were excluded) and just “37% of programme beneficiaries are located in the four core states (Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers), where livelihoods and job opportunities, especially for youth, are needed mostly due to a long history of militancy and criminality” (Annual Review-Summary Sheet, DFID, P.1). Hence, this market approach and the regional dimension taken have the tendency to stoke inter-state or inter-community rivalry just like the past traditional approaches. DFID’s stage-by-stage performance assessment and annual
review are therefore relevant as they recognise that “the geographic focus of the programme, and ultimately the focus of the programme with respect to economic development, poverty reduction and conflict reduction, needs further consideration” (Annual Review-Summary Sheet, DFID, P.1).

Undoubtedly, past development approaches by external development partners in the Niger Delta, especially MNOCs produced tensions among the diverse ethnic groups and oil communities in the region. The development policies pursued by the MNOCs, mainly the strategic location of development projects in communities with more oil wells reproduced tensions and conflicts among the communities. Hence, we see during the height of the insurgency, inter-ethnic rivalry between the Ijaw and Itsekeri, Ogoni, Ilajes, and other oil producing communities in the region. Also, the MNOCs financed several militias who were contracted to protect the MNOCs facilities. Hence, we see several militias of different ethnic affiliation contest for relevance. The Nigerian government amnesty programme, especially its overt focus on a particular ethnic group (the Ijaws) and gender (male) recreated tension among the ethnic groups as well as marginalised the women. It is against this background that the newer development approaches-the regional and market-based approach are considered for human rights compliance test. The next section is critical to the research argument as it reveals how the notion of human rights based approach to development is conceptualised and practiced by the Nigerian state and its external development partners.

5:4 Do the Anti-terrorism Laws and Development Policies and Programmes Conform to Human Rights Principles?

The result produces abundant evidence that shows an increasing knowledge of a human rights based approach to development both in the development initiatives and interventions by
external development partners including MNOCs as well as the GON. Interestingly, the awareness of a rights based approach is evident both in principle and practice, but there is still significant divorce between theory and praxis as would be discussed in this section. For instance, the NDRMP designed by NDDC recognises and attempts an inclusive approach right from the design stage. The NDRMP reveals the extent of consultation with and participation of the Niger Delta people as well as other relevant stakeholders in conceptualising and drafting the regional Master Plan.

This is a major departure from the development interventions and initiatives adopted in the past. As Respondent XI posits, past development interventions by the GON involved the setting up of committees who “were just adhoc...set up to come and identify the problem (and) make recommendations”. The Niger Delta people were often excluded. For instance, the Land Use Act (1978) encourages the exclusion of the Niger Delta people as the MNOCs tend to only “negotiate with the state governors over land requirements. Since riverine communities have no rights to the oil, the oil companies are not required to initiate a dialogue with the villages before beginning operations, instead they can merely inform communities of impending activities. (Hence there was) no requirement for community participation in planning and development of oil activities” (World Bank, 1995, p.45-46). It is also quite important to highlight that where the oil communities were involved, their participation suffered from lack of requisite knowledge to fully engage in the development process—a crucial element of the rights based approach (Hamm, 2001).

For example, while the oil companies usually have meetings with the communities where the latter inform them of the projects they want, the people as well as the oil companies do not pay careful attention to critical issues of transparency, monitoring, accountability and sustainability. According to Respondent XII, “even if you reduce the quality, how would the community know? Do they have knowledge that the quality had been reduced? Even the oil
companies they don’t care about, they just know a project had been done”. This defined the past approaches where oil companies invest a token in limited CDPs mainly in communities where they have their oil facilities as part of their conditional CSR. However, we have witnessed a paradigmatic shift from project based development interventions to market based models based on CSI and CSE. This new approach demonstrates a principal awareness and need to genuinely address the poverty and underdevelopment that characterise not just the oil producing communities but the whole region through strategic market intervention.

The development interveners including international development partners, MNOCs and the GON somewhat realise that only by addressing the root causes and pursuing an equitable distribution of development resources can there be sustainable peace and development in the region. The incessant attacks on oil activities by Niger Delta militants indicate that the old way of intervention is not sustainable as it did not only reduce the profitability of oil business in the region, but furthermore inflamed tension leading to inter-ethnic and inter-community rivalry and conflict. In the assessment of its regional approach to development intervention in the Niger Delta, Chevron, one of the major MNOCs in the region, argues that “thinking this way has helped Chevron to look more deeply at the root causes of risk in the region-poverty and conflict. These factors create a vicious cycle where relative poverty breeds conflict and conflict prevents the investment and growth needed to lift people out of poverty” (NDPI, In Review 2010-2013, p.2).

NDPI and PIND lead and coordinate the private sector and external development organisations’ regional market development approach. They are the face of the market-led and regional development approach in the Niger Delta. They have forged a wide and expansive network of local and international partners from all walks and disciplines including local business leaders, traditional leaders, community heads, students and traditional development partners such as DFID. For instance, its first P4P Peace Camp in Rivers State
recorded “more than 110 university students, community and religious leaders, civil society organisations and representatives from women and youth groups from across the Niger Delta” (NDPI, Annual Report, 2013, p.7). This is in addition to the yearly Niger Delta Development Forum (NDDF) that it started in 2011.

In the same light, DFID, and PIND are part of “a member of developing market approaches to the Niger Delta (DEMAND) forum” (NDPI, Annual Report, 2013, p.7) including traditional development partners such as WB, EU, USAID, International Fertilizer Corporation (IFDC) and UN International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). These collaborative efforts and integrated approach to development intervention in the Niger Delta, especially the market based model are useful towards reducing the potential of engendering inter-ethnic and intercommunity conflicts (which were all too frequent with the past development interventions and initiatives). The forums such as NDDF provide a critical platform for participation, which seems to be broad and inclusive, particularly including ordinary Niger Delta people in dialogue and planning about the development of the region. The regional approach guarantees the equitable distribution of development resources.

Particularly laudable is DFID’s goal of ensuring gender parity by making sure that 52 percent of the beneficiaries of MADE are women. It is important to reiterate that there is massive gender imbalance in terms of development resource distribution in the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta women do not benefit as much as their men.

If we consider for instance the Niger Delta Amnesty programme, just about 700 out of the 30,000 beneficiaries are women. “Some of them were wives to the former agitators. Some of them their husbands have been killed. Some of them their communities were badly affected. Some of them their children were part of this agitation” (Respondent XI). While the inclusion of the women in the Amnesty programme is laudable, the small number of women reveals the gender bias against women in the region. Niger Delta women through women lobbyists and
campaign groups have played crucial roles in the Niger Delta struggle. Hence, it is unfair to justify their inclusion only on the grounds highlighted by Respondent XI. The Niger Delta women’s contribution to the Niger Delta struggle merits its own recognition. This has not been the case. Hence, we see that the development interventions in the Niger Delta such as the Amnesty Programme do not adequately recognise the role Niger Delta women played in the struggle. For instance, in July 2002, hundreds of Niger Delta women staged a 10-day occupation of one of Chevron-Texaco’s facility, grinding oil production facilities (HRW, 2002).

It seems that achieving equitable distribution of development resources between the men and women of Niger Delta, through direct empowerment of women (an obvious agenda pursued by DFID in MADE) is a challenge that would have to receive increased attention. For instance, MADE fell short of its 52 per cent target for female empowerment in its first year. It achieved just 28 percent. It was also not able to achieve an equitable distribution of development resources. For instance, just 37 percent of the programme beneficiaries are located in the four core Niger Delta states (Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers). The implication of this distribution is that, by its own admission, people and places are excluded and these are locations “where livelihoods and job opportunities especially for youth, are needed most due to a long history of militancy and criminality”. Additionally, there was no recipient from two (Abia and Ondo) of the Niger Delta states. MADE therefore presents a real risk of alienating and excluding some people and region.

Despite the good intentions of the market model, like past development interventions such as the CSR model, it presents a real risk of generating disaffection among some sections of the Niger Delta people. Definitely, there is need for more targeted and specific development strategy rather than the current blanket statement about regional development. As acknowledged in its first year performance assessment, “the geographic focus of the
programme with respect to economic development, poverty reduction and conflict reduction needs further consideration" (Annual Review, DFID, p.1). There is the need also to further improve on mechanisms for measuring impact that will involve developing “an effective monitoring and evaluation system, to assess programme results and help improve intervention focus on women and the poor" (Annual Review, DFID,). Here, one could glimpse some form of parallel with the Nigerian government’s development intervention.

However, in the case of the Nigerian government, particularly the Amnesty Programme, its more specific target on a particular ethnic group (Ijaw) have produced tension among the different ethnic groups, mainly between the Ijaws and the Itsekeris. The government’s DDR programme seems to benefit largely the Ijaw militants without considering the broader participation of other groups in the Niger Delta struggle and militancy or the other sublevel interethnic conflicts that the development strategy of the oil companies and the government produced. According to Respondent XI:

> When the Niger Delta youths took up arms against the Nigerian state, the action was led primarily by a particular group in the Niger Delta...so if you relate that to justice, if you are to favour the persons, or if you are to pick people that took part, are you not going to pick youths from that region that really or actually agitated?. Amnesty programme is not about sharing slots to any group. It's about a category of persons that actually took part in agitation (Res XI).

The Amnesty programme therefore reproduces the grievance and violent conflict that have characterised the Niger Delta region. Ultimately, there is need to attain balance in the consideration given to both broad and specific factors while developing and implementing development initiatives and interventions. Ironically, Respondent XI supports this argument in his latter admission: “we have identified that if we leave out persons who did not take part in the agitation, you are just building the blocks for another fresh agitation in the future”. It remains debatable if the other groups are deliberately excluded in a way to stoke future
conflicts that will justify development intervention—where such interventions are used as conduit for self-enrichment and compensation to cronies.

If we accept the argument that Amnesty is specifically about a particular group that agitated, we cannot be less critical of the NDRMP and NDAP sponsored by NDDC and MNDA respectively. These programmes are specifically created for the direct development of the region. Although the two different development agencies have shown significant steps towards adopting a rights based approach in how they conceptualise and plan development interventions, they have failed to show same level of commitment in the implementation of the development initiatives. For instance, there is evidence of “weak stakeholders' engagement, lack of synergy and poor collaboration” (NDDC Qtr. Report, 2016, p.ii) in the implementation of the Master Plan.

Effective development intervention in the Niger Delta requires a conscious effort at balancing broad and specific factors, regional and state peculiarities and state and communities' needs. In other words, as both internal and external development interveners shift towards addressing root causes, largely poverty and underdevelopment, that plague the entire region, it would be wrong to underestimate the peculiar characteristics and requirements of each state and even each community. Hence, as laudable as the regional approach is, it can lend itself to violation of rights or exclusion of particular groups which can generate further conflict.

5:5 Addressing the Question of Compatibility between Human Rights Principle and the Nigerian Socio-Cultural Reality.

Undoubtedly, Nigeria presents its own peculiarities and socio-economic, cultural and political realities. The Niger Delta region reflects most of the characteristics that define Nigeria as a nation including the multiple ethnicities and how such diversity and
differentiation affect relations and the distribution of resources. For instance, the agitation of the Niger Delta people has seen specific FG interventions mainly in terms of establishment of development commissions and special funds. One such special fund is the derivation funds, currently at 13 percent, having passed through different cuts and increases (from 50 percent in 1963). Some scholars have called for an increase in the derivation percentage (Aaron, 2010), while others see such an increase as insignificant to the development of the region (Watt, 2007).

There is however unanimity regarding the special development requirement of the Niger Delta. The Willink Report identified it in 1958 and many assessment reports and independent reports and documents confirm it. The terrain of the Niger Delta requires more resources. Respondent XII argues that the amount needed to build 2 kilometres of roads in the Niger Delta can build 10 kilometres in other region of the country.

Development interventions in the Niger Delta have been ineffective (characterised by “a lack of coordination, ill-informed development actors and inefficient use of scarce resources" (NDPI, In Review, 2013, p.6) because of the failure to consider the special development requirements. To be able to construct a development intervention that is compatible and suitable to the region's need, there will be need to address the paucity of data and analysis. Hence, NDPI and PIND Foundation are in the right course as “they have been collecting data, facilitating multi-stakeholder analysis and sharing the results as a public good...to promote better development strategies based on a more thorough understanding of the region's needs" (NDPI, In Review, 2013, p.6).

As we have seen, development interventions in the Niger Delta, whether at the regional, state or community level, have the tendency to generate tensions and produce conflicts between and among the communities and ethnicities. It is therefore important that in addition to a
regional mapping and drawing of developmental plans, the internal and external interveners take more specific targeted approach towards each state and/or community. But, by and large, the participation of the people in the development process is important. We have seen an increasing number of participation of the Niger Delta people in the identification and planning stages of development interventions for example, in the GON NDRMP and NDAP and external interveners' market model. But we do not see much of their involvement in the monitoring and evaluation process.

An effective development intervention in the Niger Delta region will require validation from the Niger Delta people themselves. The result framework and performance assessment by the interveners must recognise this important fact. As a veteran community development project coordinator in the Niger Delta, Respondent XII’s view should be given serious weight. According to him, “Delta communities can get hold of their youths who are unruly, those who go out of their way. When you are developing my community and we have a Community Development Committee in place, we have the chief, the primary ruler, and then you have the youth president and youth groups, and if that is coordinated, it will be very difficult for anybody to go out of his way. The youths will hold him and the community will come together”. This recalls the importance of informal traditional structures (Oshita, 2007).

Ultimately, for sustainable development, such an approach will be needed. It would be useful as a tool of conflict prevention and resolution because of its democratic nature-one that requires input and participation from different social groups.

Community engagement appears to be vital. Why this is already incorporated in the recent development intervention models and approaches adopted by the GON and its external development partners including the oil companies, there is perhaps the need to expand the engagement to all facets of the development architecture. And this would normally start from identification to conceptualisation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The Niger
Delta people would be required to own the development and feel that it is their right. But beyond rights, the Niger Delta people can show a sense of responsibility by protecting and safeguarding the development as Respondent XII argues. There is an existing structure—a communal approach that includes the interests of several groups. This structure can be useful towards obtaining sustainable development in the region, especially in terms of monitoring and evaluation.

In the past, the government and oil companies in the region have bribed or paid militants to protect development projects and oil facilities and that has multiplied the number of militant groups who fight each other for such positions. However, much more would be achieved if the communal architecture was utilised.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to show the trajectory of development intervention in the Niger Delta and the issues that have arisen concerning their effectiveness. Patently, the Niger Delta region has experienced several development mutations, but one constant theme is the uncontested argument that the region requires special development attention and intervention. There is a sense that past development interventions cared less about producing lasting solutions in the region, but offered token development interventions that sought only to contain or manage the conflict that the poverty and underdevelopment of the region engendered. This has only helped in increasing the conflict and turning a non-violent protest and struggle into a full blown insurgency and militancy.

However, since the return to democratic rule in 1999 after a long spell of military rule, there have been several efforts to develop more sustainable development approaches. We have seen in the creation of NDDC’s NDRMP, MNDA’s NDAP and the Amnesty Programme a
paradigm shift from development interventions of the past. Similarly, external development interveners largely the MNOC such as Chevron have shifted from the traditional CSR development models to market based models such as CSE and CSI. These new approaches show strong potential for direct impact on the lives and livelihood of ordinary Niger Delta citizens. They appear to be more participatory, broad, and transparent and open than past development initiatives. However, they are still fraught with challenges some of which are unintended consequences such as exclusion or unequitable distribution of resources. But these challenges are not insurmountable. The interveners both local and external identify these challenges in their reviews. Interestingly, some of these strategies are fairly recent and any conclusion drawn now will be incomplete and perhaps biased. However, there are indicators, positive and negative, that point to a clear roadmap towards sustainable development in the region or a relapse into familiar consequences of past development approaches.

In terms of evidence of a right based approach, particularly whether the internal and external development interveners conformed to human rights principles of participation, transparency, accountability and equality, there are significant improvements. These are evident in the increasing participation of Niger Delta citizens in the development architecture and the adoption of a regional development intervention. The regional approach means broader coverage, a shift away from targeted development interventions in only communities with oil well. The attempt to close gender disparity is noted in DFID’s MADE. Yet, there remains the high risk of exclusion of women, as illustrated by the gendered distribution of the amnesty programme. Also, the Niger Delta amnesty benefitted a particular ethnic group (the Ijaw) in a way that tend to reproduce inter-ethnic rivalry and tension.

Obviously, there are still challenges, but these challenges do not obfuscate the significant steps that the Nigerian government and its external development partners, including the
MNOCs have taken to improve development intervention in the region. The continuous investment in studying the peculiar dynamics of the Niger Delta and its transformation as evidenced in further data gathering and analysis show the understanding of the relevance of the sociocultural dimension and in the design of any development intervention.
Chapter Six: Boko Haram: Results and Discussion

6.0 Introduction

The Boko Haram insurgency continues to provoke, predominantly, a military strategy. This reality challenges the notion that contemporary actors, especially non-states, seek political rather than military victory (Kaldor, 1999; Rapoport, 2002; Kilcullen, 2006). However, in the Boko Haram context, such hard power approach not only escalated the conflict, it contributed in no little way to its transformation from being a social movement into the terrorist group that it is today. However, there seems to be an increasing shift from the military approach, or at the most, an increasing application of a development approach side-by-side the predominant military methodology. This is in line with the growing recognition of the need to address push factors including poverty, injustice, inequality and underdevelopment, as contained in the counterterrorism documents and policies of many states and multinational organisations such as the US, UK, and the UN. This chapter considers how this shift occurred, especially how the development interventions and policies of the internal and external development agencies have been developed. In the same stroke, it looks at the issues they engender, including the critical role they play towards the effectiveness of the development strategies employed. The chapter begins with a critique of the military strategy, for example, looking at how it lends itself to human rights violation, on one hand, on the other, this chapter discusses the development approaches, particularly investigating if the development interventions and policies of both the internal and external agencies conform to human rights principles. For instance, do the interveners (local and external alike) conform to the human rights principle of participation, accountability, transparency and equality/equity? Considering the on-going tension between the need for local ownership of development interventions and the reservation towards a universal human rights framework, it considers if
there is a chance of a human rights based approach compatible with Nigeria’s socio-cultural reality.

The chapter concludes that there is an increasing awareness of a human rights based approach to development intervention by both the internal and external development agencies. Yet, such interventions are not free of securitization or pursuit of strategic interest. On the external side, there is a definite pursuit of narrow interest such as the need to guarantee the security and prosperity of their own citizens first. In addition, there is a genuine concern with building local capacity with the hope that the state with its civil structures (CSOs) will bear the full responsibility in the future. As many of the respondents argue, the Nigerian state and, at most, the regional governments should lead the counterterrorism effort against Boko Haram. However, some of the approaches adopted by the external development partners, especially its funding policy inadvertently adversely affect sustainable development. On the internal side of things, there is a proclivity towards corruption and transference of development responsibility to external agencies as there is a genuine lack of capacity to address some of the underlying issues sustaining the Boko Haram conflict. The arguments in this chapter benefit from a combination of opinions obtained from interviews with a number of respondents and analysis of relevant documents.

6.1 Assessing Nigeria’s Development Initiatives and Interventions

This section is guided by the key question: how have Nigeria’s development initiatives and interventions been developed in the Boko Haram conflicts and what are the issues that have arisen concerning their effectiveness?
6.1.1 The Military Dimension

The Nigerian government with its CSOs and international development partners are currently applying a “soft approach” to the Boko Haram conflict. The soft approach is synonymous with the concept of a development strategy—a non-kinetic methodology to countering insurgency, adopted in this study. However, the military methodology is central to the Nigerian state’s counterterrorism effort. There seems to be unanimity in the views of the interview respondents and the growing Boko Haram literature that the Nigerian State, especially its military, is responsible for the transformation of Boko Haram from a social movement into a terrorist group (Cook, 2011; Johnson, 2011; Forest, 2012; Anonymous, 2012; Higazi, 2013). According to Respondent VIII, a Permanent Secretary of the FG and executive member of the high profile committee on dialogue on Boko Haram:

It was actually the Nigerian state that was responsible for radicalising the Boko Haram people, in the manner they misunderstood them, in the manner they were attacking, in the manner they fought them, in the manner they killed Mohammed Yusuf, and in the manner they subsequently handled the post-Mohammed Yusuf… (Respondent VIII)

Although Boko Haram had shown early signs of extremism, it was not until after the extra-judicial killing of its charismatic founder in 2009 that it turned into a full blown insurgency. Respondent VIII is therefore right in his assessment. Essentially, the Boko Haram conflict has attracted largely a military approach which is likely due to its fundamentalist and religious nature. In this regard, Boko Haram falls under the category of contemporary conflict, that has been described as a “Religious Wave” (Rapoport, 2002, p.2), asymmetrical—hence difficult to defeat, aimed at achieving strategic outcome by changing the minds of decision makers and has a network structure unlike the hierarchical and command structure of old warfare (Lesser, 1999; Hoffman, 1999; Arquilla, Ronfeldt & Zanini, 1999; Hammes, 2005; Metz, 2007). Even more important is the fact that Boko Haram, like many other contemporary conflicts, is considered irrational in its objectives and use of violence.
terrorism is used as an end rather than as a means to an end) (Hoffman, 1999). All of these assumptions likely guided the overtly military approach towards the Boko Haram insurgency.

Respectively, the hard power approach to the Boko Haram conflict has attracted mixed responses. For instance, Respondent VIII speaks favourably of the Nigerian military’s campaign against Boko Haram:

> It has been successful. Substantially, they have broken the backbone of the insurgency. I think Shekau is dead. They have succeeded in killing Shekau. They’ve succeeded substantially in disrupting its command and control. They’ve succeeded in disrupting or destroying its coordinating capacities. They have killed thousands of Boko Haram members and arrested more. They have cleaned up communities that were totally intimidated by Boko Haram and given them back some confidence. And life is gradually returning to normal. Substantially, the military option has been fairly successful. It’s just that they left it very late. But it was successful. (Res VIII).

The view above may be exaggerated and perhaps premature as Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram is still alive (as at the time of this writing) (Shekau has released videos that prove that he is still alive), as millions of the Northeast residents are displaced, and those living there live somewhat in perpetual fear. But it is understandable as it was expressed in January 2014 and captures the successful military campaign carried out by the defunct JTF between 2011 and 2013, culminating in an 18 month (May 2013-November 2014) State of Emergency in three Northeast states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. The JTF curtailed the geographic spread of Boko Haram at that time and pushed it to the outskirt of the Northeast state of Borno mainly. Between 2011 and 2012, Boko Haram “insurgents had almost defeated the Nigerian state in about more than half of Borno state” (Respondent VIII), as well as spreading beyond the Northeast (its main theatre of action) to Northwest and Central states such as Kogi, Kaduna and even the capital, Abuja. Respondent III, a top British diplomat with the British High Commission in Nigeria, confirms Boko Haram’s initial gains over the Nigerian state, “two-third if not more of Borno state was under Boko Haram control, you
had essentially a secession of sort”. It was therefore a considerably huge success for the military, enough for them to declare a State of Emergency.

The JTF was able to contain the spread of Boko Haram. According to Respondent IX, an Assistant Commissioner of Police and a JTF senior commandant in the defunct JTF:

There was containment, but no abatement. They could not spread further. You will realise that at a point they moved as far as Abuja. So, you will discover the fact that no more attacks happened in Abuja or in Kogi, Okene axis. No more attacks happened in Bauchi. No more attacks, for some time, happened in Kano...means they pushed them back to the northeast (Res IX).

The Nigerian government declared a State of Emergency in a bid to consolidate its military victory against Boko Haram-in the words of Respondent IX, “in the hope of quickly wiping them out”. Nevertheless, Boko Haram terror continues till today, because in the words of Respondent II, a popular cleric and executive member of several government’s committee on conflict resolution in Nigeria, “Boko Haram, as the evidence clearly suggests, should be seen more as an idea than as a human being to be attacked [as] the more people you kill, the more new soldiers emerge” (Respondent II). Several respondents share similar sentiment: “straightaway we can conclude that military approach alone will not solve it, since it is faith-based, you can kill me and I will be happy dying. And more people are happy to be killed, because by virtue of their religion they are assured a place in heaven” (Respondent IX). While speaking glowingly of the military success, Respondent VIII equally admits that “it would be a long time before Boko Haram as a threat is finished entirely because they just don’t die because you’ve killed a few people” (Respondent VIII). Yet, unlike Respondent II, Respondent VIII bases his prognosis on the loose and cell-like structure of Boko Haram- “(a) deep classic guerrilla warfare structure”, in his words. Ultimately, the military approach to the Boko Haram insurgency is not enough to end it, as it may even be the sustaining force for the insurgency. Therefore, alternative approaches have been required and applied.
While other alternative (particularly non-military) approaches, as discussed in subsequent sections, have and are being applied to the Boko Haram conflict, Nigeria’s counter-terrorism strategy continues to be guided by an overt military strategy. For instance, the new President, upon taking office in May 2015 instructed the military to defeat Boko Haram within three months (deadline December 2015) at the same time showing willingness to negotiate with the group, especially for the release of the nearly 300 kidnapped boarding school girls. Boko Haram kidnapped up to 276 school girls in Chibok area of Borno state on 14 April 2014, in a brazen attack that brought worldwide condemnation for the group and attracted external support for Nigeria’s anti-terrorism war. The military campaign has helped curtail Boko Haram’s advances and reduced what was a near-daily attack, but the Boko Haram terror is far from finished. The number of Boko Haram hostages freed by the Nigerian military and the assisting neighbouring forces (the MNJTF) show how enormous the task of defeating Boko Haram will be as well as a pointer to the strength of the insurgent group. Respondent I, the national Chairman of PAVE, a coalition of NGOs and CSOs in Nigeria provide an insight into the underappreciated strength of Boko Haram:

Every week, the Nigerian military and the Multinational Joint Task Force announces the flushing out of Boko Haram suspects from one hide-out or the other. Every week, an average of 50 insurgents are killed. Every week an average of about 300 captives are freed. That should tell you the scale of the challenge that you face. That should probably also tell you the scale and scope of the organisation called Boko Haram itself (Res 1).

However, the military campaign by the Nigerian forces has brought heavy backlash. As some of the respondents aver and as substantiated in the literature, the overt military approach is responsible for escalating the Boko Haram terror. The Nigerian force has often been criticized for grave violation of human rights in its fight against Boko Haram starting from the extra-judicial killing of its charismatic leader, Mohammed Yusuf (AI, 2014). Another
point relating to the military campaign that is less explored in the literature on Boko Haram is the overt concentration of counterterrorism power in the hands of the military, following the disbandment of the JTF in 2013 (Nwankpa 2016) and the inter-rivalry amongst various security forces in the JTF shortly before the disbandment. At one point during the lifeline of the JTF, relations and cooperation among the security agencies (army, navy, air force, police, secret service, custom and immigration) were fraught with “rivalry and competition.

According to Respondent I, the relationship among the cooperating security units deteriorated because the political leadership was convinced or had convinced itself that this was a conspiracy and therefore it was dealing with it as a conspiracy, you know. Because of that, it could not give leadership to the military, to the security sector”. Respondent VIII, as discussed in subsequent section in this chapter, equally highlights the issue of poor leadership from the Nigerian state (the Federal Government, FG) and its denial of the insurgency.

After all, there was a brief moment of successful coordinated effort by the JTF (although this was after the initial damage done by Boko Haram between 2010 and 2012) before the inter-agency relationship deteriorated and extensive power was given to the military, who was solely responsible for executing the State of Emergency between May 2013 and November 2014. According to Respondent IX:

There was synergy...there was synergy each of the services exist and carry out their normal functions. The JTF consists of the attachment from each of the services who are removed from the day-to-day operations of their services and focused on the joint operations. So it was a beautiful arrangement. It was seamless and it was effective. It was so effective that the SSS, for example, was intercepting phone conversations of the insurgents, their plans, intended targets, where weapons are being expected from, date operations are to be carried out, they were intercepting it and they were relaying it to JTF and to the other services. And actions were taken in conjunction. You will discover that between that 2011 and until the State of Emergency was declared there was containment, but there was no abatement (Res IX).
Arguably, a point that has been overlooked is that the declaration of State of Emergency (which by the way was unnecessary and arguably inflamed the Boko Haram conflict) with the extensive and sole power given to the military most likely accounted for the inter-agency rivalry and competition rather than the lack of leadership from the government, as some respondents argue. Although there is increasing coordination now, Respondent I suggests that:

The dominant strategy even when it was decided to have a coordinated approach to combating the insurgency is a military strategy, that of a military defeat. So because of that the focus has been on getting the military to act properly, more efficiently. So the other non-military but also armed security sector forces, institutions are not as integrated into that coordination mechanism as the military. And you see that gap clearly in the fact that the capacity of the military is been built, the capacity of the police and the civil defence is not been built for counterinsurgency (Res I).

One area where this overt military approach is having adverse effect is in consolidating the gains made by the military in re-claiming the territories that were seized by Boko Haram and protecting returning citizens. The military has been unable to protect the Northeast citizens from further attacks from Boko Haram and Boko Haram still controls certain territories as well as shows ambition to seize more. This is perhaps because lasting solution is that of the civil or law and order structure, most especially the police. In the words of Respondent IV, a former military officer and the arch-bishop of the Anglican church in Nigeria“ the only cure is to have a police that is able to police, to prosecute, to prevent, to protect and to give itself the image of being a force of law”. Unfortunately, “as it is now, we are partially militarised and the military their code of operation is different, completely different” (Respondent IV). But the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) “are not prepared for that” Respondent I contested. For instance, “no police station is configured to withstand Boko Haram attack, in terms of
building structure and in terms of personnel and in terms of equipment (Respondent IX).”

Even the international development partners consider for “a much longer term really offering our training to the Nigerian military” (Respondent III). However, the success of a military or law enforcement or even economic approach to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency depends on the stage of the conflict, an understanding of the motivation driving each cycle and the strength or weakness of the conflict group (Crenshaw, 2007; Kilcullen, 2006). For a group like Boko Haram, there is need for the government to continuously assess their response and adapt it to the evolutionary character of the group.

One way to mitigate the adverse impact of the overly military approach of the Nigerian state is by adopting the International Relations approach (Pressman, 2007). An international relations approach is a coalition of efforts by states in a multilateral arrangement. A multilateral approach can help a state fighting terrorism gain legitimacy. Nigeria is currently in a multinational joint task force (MNJTF). Conversely, there is the growing belief that “security cannot be achieved within a single country. Intelligence, police and military efforts need to be coordinated and information exchanged in a secure and timely way” (Omand, 2005, p.10 as quoted by EU, 2007, see also the UN CT document, and the UNSC). The coordinating efforts among the Nigerian forces and the militaries of Chad, Cameroon, Chad and Benin have been rewarding in terms of curbing Boko Haram’s territorial reach and incessant attacks. Nonetheless, the armies of the coordinating forces have experienced difficulties that range from distrust, suspicion, human rights violation, and promotion of selfish national interest over the general purpose. For example, there are notable political and cultural differences between the countries as there are historical tensions such as the border dispute (over Bakassi Peninsula) between Nigeria and Cameroon. For Respondent III “it (the regional military cooperation between the Lake Chad countries) is also going slowly because
the region, the countries have not really committed much as they should do to the whole thing because they kept their domestic priorities” (Res III). Despite this, there is increasingly a shift away, or at most, a combination of military strategies (which appear dominant still) with non-military approaches.

According to Respondent XIV, “to a large extent, we have strengthened our civil-military relations platform” (Res XIV). One area where the military and the civil structures are collaborating is the induction of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) into the counterterrorism framework against the Boko Haram. The joint counterterrorism operations between the CJTF and the military have yielded great success in most cases. The CJTF, consists of Northeast youths who have played a pivotal role in the military campaign by virtue of their indigenous knowledge of the difficult Northeast terrain, the language, and their ability to clearly identify Boko Haram members or would-be members (Respondent XXII:Yobe Focus Group). In fact, the CJTF is a child of necessity borne out of the need to protect the hapless Northeast civilian populations against the Boko Haram attacks, on the one hand, and, on the other, to protect them (the Northeast civilian population) from the military’s arbitrary and collective punishment for their perceived role in supporting and shielding the insurgents. “And it was really communities trying to protect themselves both from the military and from the insurgents. So they needed a third force, which was their own force.

And that’s how the militia initially arose” (Res I). Crucially, the Boko Haram group is identified with a particular ethnic group-the Kanuri who make up a large percentage of the NE citizens living in the main theatre of Boko Haram’s activities-Borno and Yobe, and about 4 percent of Nigeria’s population. Interestingly, according to Respondent VIII:

Eighty per cent of the key people in Boko Haram, who started it, who command it, are Kanuri. So, the Kanuri community in Borno and Yobe largely saw this as an internal problem and tolerated it beyond a certain degree. By the time it became a real problem, the community
had become hostage of Boko Haram and so they eventually became both victims of Boko Haram and victims of the FG agency that were there to fight Boko Haram (ResVIII).

There is an obvious lack of trust in the Nigerian state with its security agencies. People find it difficult to trust the police and military with information as “a lot of times you see leakages of sensitive information, you see leakages about sensitive operations…you know there are insiders” (Respondent IX). The often reactive nature of the Nigerian security forces including “outright intimidation makes people to hate even the presence of the security. …The arbitrariness of the state instrument also makes people to be sceptical about their genuineness and the level of corruption” (Respondent XV). It is this issue of distrust for the security agencies that “gave birth to the CJTF, because it started when people will go and voluntarily give information and those who give such information will turn up dead a couple of days [after]” (Res XIV).

But as Boko Haram’s terrorist activities dwindle, the need for a non-military approach becomes imminent. There is need to reinstate traditional authorities and law enforcement structures which have been displaced as a result of the insurgency. Respondent I believes that “there is really a power and authority vacuum in the communities which the CJTF has just filled and so they are increasingly playing the roles of dispensing community governance” (Respondent I). But the CJTF should not be playing that role. It is essentially the duty of the government to provide security and governance. The civil structure has some form of responsibility, “because a lot of the times we advocate for human rights, but we don’t even talk about human responsibility. It is actually supposed to be complementary” (Res XIV). But the responsibility of the civil structure should not involve taking up arms, as is the case with the CJTF. For Respondent I it is important “to start thinking of how they are armed. So how do we disarm them too? How do we reintegrate them into the society (Res I)?
As noted by Respondent VI, a top British expat with DFID in Nigeria: “if the CJTF are not dealt with you know constructively…their role and attitude are not harnessed either by the local communities or the administration, then that could be potentially another driver indirectly of radicalization” (Res VI). Ultimately, there is a strong case for alternative approaches to the predominant military approach. It is against this background that the argument for a development approach becomes necessary. The following sections will discuss how the non-military approaches are developed and how they mitigate against some of the challenges raised by the military methodology as well as some of the issues that they throw up.

6.1.2 Presidential Committees

From late 2013 and even before, the Nigerian government’s approach to countering the Boko Haram insurgency began to change from a predominant militarised strategy to an increasingly non-kinetic approach. This new attitude signals the government’s willingness to understand the grievance and motivation for Boko Haram with the intention of dialoguing and possibly negotiating with the group. It was clear that the Nigerian government did not understand the magnitude of the threat that it was dealing with. It dismissed Boko Haram “as a problem of local politics in Borno and to a lesser extent in Yobe state [and having] suffered very badly as a result of the post 2011 election violence was unwilling to get too deeply involved in trying to understand the root causes, the nature and the dimensions of Boko Haram” (Res VIII).

The Boko Haram crisis has a long historical root-one rooted and steeped in the particular recurring reformist movements in northern Nigeria (Loimeier, 2012; Last, 2012). Respondent VIII argues that “every once in a while, you get a leader or a group of people who rise up in the effort to purify Islam, to reject impurities in Islam, to expand its scope and take it to those areas where it does not exist” (Res VIII). Although, the bleak political and socio-economic
environment in Nigeria is similar, one that appears bleaker is in northern Nigeria (more so in the Northeast). For instance, Respondent III, a top British diplomat with the British High Commission in Nigeria posits that

Northern Nigeria is one of the poorest places in the world. It’s got the highest proportion of children out of school of any country in the entire world. It has high infant mortality. It has high maternal mortality in giving birth. It scores very low on human development indicators. If you cut off Nigeria to both Abuja and draw a line east and west, you would have only probably the 15 poorest countries in the world-so worthy of assistance (Res III).

Citing information from the global campaign *Education for All*, Respondent I states that out of the “10.5 million Nigerian children that were out of school, 7 million of these were from the north, about 4 million of these from the NE” (Res I). He argues further that “the NE has the worst of the indices in terms of the poverty rate. Average poverty rate- it is closer to 80% in the NE, whereas the national average is about 66” (ibid). Unsurprisingly, out of the £220 million a year budgeted for UK development assistance in Nigeria about “60% of that is solely focused on the north of Nigeria” (Res III). What becomes evident therefore is, besides the precipitating impact of Nigeria’s excessive military action in escalating Boko Haram, a growing consensus that the “lack of justice in the system” (Res XXI), the fact that “people don’t have jobs” (Res XIV), the fact that “kids are not in school” (Res XXIV), the fact that people are “very poor” (Res XVII), “inequality” (Res IV), “massive poverty, massive alienation” (Res VIII) and the lack of “good governance” (Res XIX) play a major role in sustaining the conflict. These views are supported by the FG commissioned Committees, the *Presidential Committee on the Security Challenges in the North-East Zone* (29 July 2011) also known as the Galtimari Committee (named after the head of the Committee, Ambassador Usman Galtimari) and *Presidential Committee for Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North* (24 April 2013).
Presidential commissioning of Committees or panel of distinguished citizens on fact-finding missions is one of the alternative approaches adopted by the Nigerian government towards the Boko Haram insurgency. Most of the facts gathered and recommendations made support largely a political and development approach. This includes economic empowerment of the teeming unemployed youths in the region, prosecuting security agents and politicians that have committed grave violation of human rights including the extra-judicial killing of the founder of Boko Haram, Muhammad Yusuf, compensate victims, create an environment and platform for dialogue between different stakeholders, and provide infrastructure. Sadly, but not uncharacteristic of the Nigerian government, the recommendations of the White Paper reports were largely ignored.

Respondent VIII, a member of the 2013 Committee, claims that “80 percent of the solutions to insecurity and even to some of the recurrent issues-corruption are there” and alludes to poor leadership, especially of President Jonathan as responsible for non-implementation. “The government of the day seem to be not very proactive in dealing with emergent issues, and then people are seeing government laxity or the way things are going on, that’s the way they look at it, it became difficult to mitigate the issues” (Res XV). Therefore, the lack of political will hampered (and still continues to hamper) the effective implementation of the laudable recommendations in the Reports. Interestingly, the Galtimari Report raised similar concern about government’s failure to implement previous Committee Reports: “Most importantly, the Committee was inundated with a series of complaints that the increasing level of insecurity in the country was amongst other reasons due to the failure of governments to implement reports of various committees that were constituted and had submitted useful recommendations in the past” (Galtimari Report 2011). Clearly, there is a potential conflict of trust between the government and the people.
Undeniably, the Nigerian government is “facing a severe crisis of legitimacy” (Res II).

According to Respondent XIX, the Programme Director for United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, and Nigeria, there is a palpable “lack of good governance, basically having resources appropriated illegally by elected and appointed public officials by excluding rural areas from social amenities” (Res XIX). The critical question remains whether the failure resides in providing governance or acting upon the recommendations of the Committee Reports. In other words, is it simply due to weak leadership as Respondent VIII avers or that “the government is not genuinely interested in resolving dispute because they want to prolong the insurgency and the more they prolong, the more money comes to their pockets?” according to Respondent XXI, Chairman of PAVE, Kogi State. A similar view is expressed by Respondent VIII: “there was so much money fighting Boko Haram that it became easier to sustain the fight than to bring it to an end” (Res VIII). There is however no evidence to suggest that the Nigerian government is deliberately undermining its counterterrorism efforts in a way to prolong the conflict.

“Since 2009, Nigeria has seen a ten-fold increase in defense budget allocations, from NGR ₦100 billion (about USD $625 million) in 2010 to NGR ₦1 trillion (~USD6.25 billion) in 2014” (Nwankpa 2015a; see also International Crisis Group, ICG 2014). To an extent, the availability of counterterrorism funds and, especially the absence of transparent and accountable structures of disbursement of the funds including procurement of military arms inspired corrupt practices among some government officials and top military personnel, leading to the court-martial of some Generals. But this does not suggest that there is a deliberate government agenda to undermine the fight against Boko Haram and prolong the conflict.
Although Nigeria is a rich country, rich in natural resources, it does not have the full capacity to provide governance for its citizens, and would therefore qualify for some concessions (albeit temporary) that include a less critical stance on its shortcomings and even development assistance from the international community (Hausermann, 1998). Evidence for the Nigerian state’s incapacity to provide social welfare can be traced to the oil boom of the late 1970s (and Nigeria’s membership of OPEC) and the economic recession of the early 1980s (as well as successive military rule). These events have substantial impact on the Nigerian state’s capacity and even attitude towards providing governance and social welfare to its citizens. At the peak of the oil boom, the Nigerian government embarked on large scale industrial projects (“White Elephant” projects) and social welfare scheme, which subsided by the early 1980s, replaced by neo-liberal principles (of privatization,) facilitated by the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) set by IFIs such as the IMF and World Bank as loan conditions to the Nigerian military government. Whether the imposed neo-liberal policies of IMF or Nigeria’s irresponsible management of the gains of the oil boom is to blame for Nigeria’s degraded capacity to provide governance and social welfare to its citizens remains contentious (Watt, 1992).

A critical factor that is often overlooked or undercut in the analysis of the Boko Haram crisis according to Respondent XV, (the Head of CEPID, and a key CSO based in Jos and across Northern Nigeria) is the fact that “there is no social scheme. This increases the vulnerability of a person who is unemployed. There is no state care. So, part of what accelerates the pain of unemployment and the poverty level is lack of social scheme” (Res XV). Therefore, he suggests it is necessary to focus attention on “eliminating the factors that facilitate escalation…it is not just issues for insurgents; it is issue for the entire area’s development” (Res XV). These factors are the ones mentioned by Respondent II above which are largely
socio-economic issues. However, the critical question to ask is: does Nigeria have the capacity to provide governance to its citizens?

Not many believe that the Nigerian state lacks the requisite capacity to provide governance and social welfare for its citizens. Both in terms of financial and military capabilities, Respondent III believes that “Nigeria has the means, has the resources, and has the expertise to lead its own forces—whether against the Delta militants, whether against the Middle Belt or whether against Boko Haram” (Res III). We may therefore argue that the Nigerian government perhaps aims to gain from the underdevelopment, by and large the socio-economic problems of the region, as removing such conditions would de-legitimise the insurgents as it would deny them a critical justification for taking up arms, ultimately undermining Nigeria’s increasing security budget and access to external support towards its counterterrorism efforts.

However, one consistent argument put forward by most of the respondents and supported overwhelmingly in the literature (see Forest, 2012; Isa, 2010) is the need to understand and address underlying causes. Some of the underlying drivers of the Boko Haram conflict identified range from poverty, to unemployment, social injustice, and exclusion, excessive use of power by states’ security agencies, inequality, and corruption. Essentially these relate to root causes that set the preconditions as well as the precipitants that escalate conflict (Crenshaw, 1981; Schmid, 2005). This is very significant considering that Boko Haram is often seen as an Islamic fundamentalist group with extreme ideological motivation that is not easily appeased by socio-economic interventions (Cook, 2014; Alao, 2013).

Therefore, the Boko Haram conflict presents a good case for studying the contending arguments in the literature between supporters of the new war/new terrorism and old war and between relative deprivation and religiously-motivated conflict. For instance, Boko Haram is
often seen as an Islamic fundamentalist group especially that its stated goal is to Islamize the secular Nigerian state and that it seeks validation from Islamic religious creeds and texts, as well as its affiliation with other transnational Islamic terrorist groups such as ISIS. For instance, Respondent IX argues that “Boko Haram exists as a religious extremist group interested in nothing else” (Res IX). This kind of reasoning underscores the first stream of the recent government’s non-military responses to the Boko Haram conflict or what the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) terms the “Soft Approach”. This represents a milestone in the domestic approach to counterterrorism and reflects the acceptance of the limitations of an overt military approach.

6.1.3 The Soft Approach

Nigeria’s Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) (2011) provided the legal support for dealing with the new kind of threat that Boko Haram presents. This Act was amended two years later. The Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act (TPA) 2013 provided the legislation that secured the “extra-territorial application of the Act and strengthens terrorist finances offences” (TPA, 2013, p.1). It also empowered the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) as the central coordinator of the country’s counterterrorism efforts. Section 1A of the TPA (2013) mandates ONSA as the national CT coordinator to:

ensure the effective formulation and implementation of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy for Nigeria; build capacity for the effective discharge of the functions of all relevant security, intelligence, law enforcement and military services under this Act or any other law on terrorism in Nigeria; and do such other acts or things that are necessary for the effective performance of the functions of the relevant security. (ibid, p.4).

The soft approach shows Nigeria’s first ever effort to design a comprehensive and coordinated national approach to countering terrorism- National Counter-terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) in 2014. NACTEST is designed and managed by ONSA but with input from several stakeholders including external agencies. One of the signature programmes of
NACTEST is the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme. The CVE programme represents Nigeria’s soft approach to countering terrorism, and it has four basic components/streams, as stated by Colonel Mohammed Sambo Dasuki, the former National Security Adviser (NSA) who unveiled the programme:

The first stream is the de-radicalisation of convicted terrorists, suspects awaiting trials, and those who might be released through court orders or such order government arising from the ongoing engagement and dialogue with repentant terrorists. The second will move from government to society approach on counter terrorism thinking. The third will be building capacity through strategic communication for the military and law enforcement agencies. The fourth stream, based on our understanding of the economic root causes of terrorism and global best practice in addressing them will be working with the governors of the six North-Eastern states to design an economic revitalisation programme targeted at the states most impacted by terrorism (Premium Times 2014)

The first phase is explicit enough. Centre for Peace Initiative Development (CEPID) and other CSOs are contributing to government’s legislative effort to regulate the Islamic religion in the north. For instance, CEPID has partnered with the Assembly of Muslims in Nigeria (AMIN) to advise and work on legislature that will regulate religious preaching and teachings, set up guidelines, and vet religious preachers. Also in fulfilment of the CVE mandate of de-radicalisation and counter-narrative, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) plays a part in the process of censoring and regulating religious teachings (that will most likely involve licensing religious preachers) (Res XV, Res XIV).

The second phase includes a communal approach that envisions cooperation among families, community members and faith-based institutions with the aim of reinforcing values that will build resilience and aversion towards violent extremism. This phase is quite important and perhaps accounts for the great reception that the government’s soft approach has received both locally and internationally. A communal approach to conflict resolution is considered indigenous to Africa and largely used in pre-colonial period. Scholars such as Oshita (2007)
have been demanding a return to this approach. However, the likelihood of success for this phase hinges greatly on the government’s transparency and political will. To win asymmetrical warfare like the one embarked upon by Boko Haram; there is need for cooperation between the government and the community. Not only does economic marginalisation of the masses and elite greed and corruption sever the government from the people, the blatant violation of human rights, impunity and inequality before the law will frustrate any form of cooperation. It is therefore important that counterterrorism is conducted with great regard for rule of law. The third phase seeks to produce a communication output with the aim of fostering bipartisan agreement on counterterrorism measures. The last phase seeks to build an economic revitalisation programme in the NE states. The FG soft approach however presents challenges.

The first phase of the FG soft approach is not entirely new. The government has employed a counter-narrative strategy in the past where it employed the services of moderate Islamic clerics to de-radicalise arrested suspects in prison as well as the vulnerable members of the affected society through special radio programmes (Sampson, 2013). This approach brought heavy backlash as prominent Muslim clerics who condemned the group were assassinated by Boko Haram. The vicious assassinations by the sect extend to members that leave the group or engage the government in dialogue as was the case with Babakura Fuga, the brother-in-law of Mohammed Yusuf (the slain founder of Boko Haram) who was assassinated by the sect on 17 September 2011 for attending peace talks with former President Olusegun Obasanjo. It is unclear how past counter-narrative strategies used by the Nigerian Government differ from the de-radicalisation programme highlighted in the NSA’s soft approach to the Boko Haram crisis.

There is the possibility of re-offending or ‘recidivism’ (Horgan & Altier, 2012). It remains uncertain how the Nigerian Government hopes to distinguish between ‘de-radicalised’
(change in ideological orientation) and ‘disengaged’ (change in attitude) terrorists. More so, a successful de-radicalisation programme recognises individual’s radicalisation process and hence, a ‘person-specific and not doctrine-specific process’ will most likely be effective (Horgan & Altier, 2012, p. 84). It remains doubtful that such an approach is considered by the NSA and even more doubtful if it is an available resource to reduce the risk of terrorist reoffending. In fact, both the Nigerian government and local CSOs are giving serious attention to addressing the extremist motive in the Boko Haram agenda, especially in their collaborative effort to counter the extremist narrative as well as produce legislation to regulate the Islamic religion in Northern Nigeria.

In the CVE aspects of de-radicalisation and counter-narrative, the government unit, Society against Violent Extremism (SAVE) - a sub-unit under ONSA’s CVE architecture collaborated with Partnership against Violent Extremism (PAVE) – a coalition of local NGOs in terrorist hotspots across the northern and central states in Nigeria. The CVE programme terminated with the advent of a new administration (the government of President Buhari) in May 2015. However, “CVE in Nigeria is relatively new and there are not too many actors particularly working around it, except for those who are doing some kind of activities either related to it but as a stand-alone project” (Res XIV). For instance, Respondent XVII confirms that it is only recently that Renaissance Lifeline Foundation (RELIEF) and other selected NGOs in the PAVE network are beginning to “build in the issue of CVE into the various projects we are already running in our various communities” (Res XVII).

CISLAC, the Abuja-based Secretariat of PAVE network in the North Central was able to incorporate the mandate of the CVE into its existing portfolio-its peace and security programme. Working within the framework of the CVE, CISLAC established the Peace and Security Forum (PSF)-a forum that encourages periodic dialogue between CSOs and the
government (especially security agencies). Respondent XIV maintains that “to a large extent, we have strengthened our civil-military relations platform” (Res XIV). There are still though shortcomings which may be as a result of a historical vacuum and an uncharted ground in CVE.

There is more to why the CVE programme failed. For instance, there was a fundamental error from the conceptual and particularly design stage as it excluded the CSOs, who were only considered afterwards when the government realized that “what they were doing was majorly a civil society work” (Res XXI). The partnership between the government (through SAVE) and the CSOs (through PAVE) did not materialize simply due to the government’s realization that they were doing what is largely a CSO job. It was mainly because the government could not gain access to the communities they were looking to help because they are not trusted. The lack of trust leads to self-help as evident in the rise of Boko Haram and even the CJTF. The prominent role played by non-state actors in the fight against Boko Haram is somehow evidence of the failure of governance and rejection of the government. The government with some of its development agencies is “rejected because they are seen as part of the problem” (Res XVIII).

Unsurprisingly “the people are willing to talk to the civil society” (Res XXI). According to Respondent XV “you need NGOs to provide that environment for acceptance of intervention” (Respondent XV). Governance failure, in addition to government’s role as “mobilisers of violence and sponsors of violence” (Res I) and the illicit gains made from such ventures create a massive chasm of trust between the duty bearer (the Nigerian Government) and the right holders (the Nigerian citizens). This greatly impedes the cooperation between the government and the people, one considered crucial to winning the fight against Boko
Haram. The lack of trust between the government (state) and the citizens badly affects the government’s counterterrorism efforts as the people are “skeptical about their [government] genuineness and their level of corruption” (Res XV). Therefore, to bridge the gap between the state and the citizens, the state is encouraged to partner with local CSOs and CBOs and even international NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) who already enjoy some level of support and acceptance at the grassroots. Such partnership is considered essential especially for gaining acceptance by the people and access into the community.

The interaction between CSOs and the government has greatly improved, although the relationship remains fraught with mutual suspicion and distrust between them. For instance, the thorny relationship between SAVE and PAVE reveals the government’s failure to see “the civil society component of this aspect as very important and so for that, they decided to create their own structure which has collapsed” (Res XXI). For example, CSOs (constituting the PAVE network) were not consulted and hence not involved in designing the CVE programme. More so, the SAVE programme went about setting up its own structures rather than utilising the existing structures and infrastructures provided by the partnering CSOs.

Despite the improved relationship between the civil society and the Nigerian state, the state continues to be more important especially that it has elective power and constitutional mandate to protect its citizens and provide governance (Thomas, 2001). This position is recognized in Hausermann’s description of human rights as “a global vision backed by state obligations” (Hausermann, 1998, p.25). Yet, we cannot disregard the gains made by CSOs, CBOs and NGOs set up by international development agencies such as DFID’s JFA and NSRP.
These non-government bodies are influencing government’s CT policies and strategies through the use of advocacy, media, mediation and research, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict resolution through dialogue (especially fostering inter-agency and civil-military forums and dialogues), capacity building and awareness/enlightenment programmes, economic empowerment and skill acquisition programmes. These alternative approaches are proving more popular and effective than the coercive human rights legislation—one that the state is expected to administer (Sano, 2000; Sen, 2004; Uvin, 2007).

For instance, CEPID, headquartered in Jos, the capital city of Plateau state, has developed an early warning programme that aims at improving the capacity of local youth, community leaders, religious leaders, government agencies and security forces, particularly providing the bridge through which a concerted effort to security can be achieved at the neighbourhood level. The main objective is to be “able to anticipate, to understand the triggers—what they are pointing to“ (Res XV).

CISLAC is helping in the harmonization of the communication infrastructure, which is in fulfilment of the Third Stream of ONSA’s CVE programme under the aegis of the soft approach. Specifically, CISLAC canvassed for the creation of an emergency line (112) that will aid the fight against terrorism, especially quick dispersal of information from the public to relevant security agency. CISLAC also advocated for enhancing National Identity, which extends to immigration services, particularly problematic issue of border control. CISLAC’s advocacy in this area led to the establishment of the Border Patrol Corp (Respondent XIV).

In terms of bridging the gap between the state and the citizens, CISLAC is setting up a grievance mechanism in the NE which allows for dialogue between victims of social injustice and the duty providers. Underlying this intervention is the objective of offsetting the “we versus them” mentality that characterizes the relationship between the citizens and the
Nigerian state such that the citizens can be able to develop a sense of human responsibility as much as the state improves on its responsibility as the primary duty bearer (Res XIV).

The crucial role of CSOs and CBOs are increasingly being appreciated as their activities are mainstreamed into government’s intervention. For instance, CEPID has developed a robust partnership with government-run research centre, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR). Together, they have developed a partnership that emphasizes the research component of the development approach leading to a fieldwork research in three core NE states-Borno, Yobe and Bauchi and two other Middle Belt states, Kaduna and Plateau. This research has the financial support of UNDP. It focuses on three dimensions of transformation of Boko Haram including the radicalisation process, militarisation and the insurgency. Essentially, it seeks to explore how people are radicalized, how they mobilise the locals, how they gain popular support (assuming they have) and what should be the correct response for de-radicalisation and prevention of radicalization (Res XV).

This initial research effort informs the annual Experts and Eminent Group Meetings (EEGM) that is been managed by the National Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) starting from 2013. The reports from the EEGM have become a useful influence on government’s CT policy (Res XV). Like CEPID, CISLAC forged a partnership with IPCR in order to allow the benefits gain “greater entry point and allow for security agencies and government institutions to own it up and be very comfortable to being part of it” (Res XIV). This has helped the CSOs make great stride at the strategy and policy levels leading to the establishment of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and NACTEST.

Evidently, for CT to be effective in Nigeria there must be greater cooperation between government institutions and CSOs or CBOs. While we are beginning to witness such collaboration, the relationship is still hamstrung by the historical tension between the
Nigerian state and the civil society. The long years of mostly oppressive military regimes in Nigeria produced a crop of antagonistic CSOs (see Akinrinmade, 2006). As Respondent XXI maintained, “part of the problem we have in Nigeria is about the fact that because of the history of the emergence of human rights struggle in Nigeria came majorly during the military, so there is that antagonistic tendencies. There is that belief that we are trouble makers” (Res XXI). Although CSOs in the Fourth Republic are divided between pro-government (mostly) and anti-government (see Res XIV, Tar, 2008), the notion that CSOs are “traditionally critical of government” (Res I) still survives. CSOs are seen to be “traditionally hostile to security forces and particularly the intelligence services” (Res I).

Nonetheless, the collaboration between the government and the CSOs (evident in the relationship between SAVE and PAVE) has failed to mitigate the trust issues between the state and non-state agencies.

The non-state agency remains constrained by the knowledge that “we are volunteers… we have limitations-we cannot impose, we cannot enforce” (Res XXI). The state still remains the umpire with the elective mandate (Hausermann, 1998; Thomas, 2001). More so, the CSOs are at the mercy of the State and foreign development donors and agencies for funding. For example, Respondent XVI posits that “civil society organisations, especially the ones dominant in Nigeria here, we are donor-driven. So donors tend to lead you to a direction where they want you to go. They all have their objective and interest”. In terms of the relationship between SAVE and PAVE, Respondent XVII states that “there was really no money from the office of ONSA. All the funds, I think it was sponsored by the European Union”. Respondent I confirm this in his assessment of how this kind of arrangement affected PAVE when SAVE was scrapped by the new administration:

As at that time, the relationship of PAVE with the EU was through SAVE and through ONSA and so funding the activities of PAVE was channelled through the SAVE project. So that was
the nature of the agreement. So, and for that agreement to be changed, this cycle of funding has to end. So we can’t re-negotiate a new agreement until after June. So that affected what we can call the national activities of PAVE, even though the component continued to do their own activity, because in any case, what we were simply doing was integrating CVE into what we were already doing in our own places (Res I).

Lack of direct funds to CSOs and CBOs greatly undermines their capacity and ultimately affects the sustainability of the development projects. One of the consequences of not devolving funding (that is, not directly funding the CSOs) in the case of the CVE programme is that it leads to misappropriation of funds and corruption. For instance,

Where the government cannot talk nor do certain things, the civil societies are in a better position to do that. But unfortunately the government themselves made a mistake from the designing stage. For instance, ‘kobo’ was not given to us, but they spent not less than N5 million per state where they claim they are working- to rent offices, to equip their offices and carry out programmes. But we the partners, who are independent, who are volunteers, who already have existing offices were not given anything. And now when DASUKI GATE\(^1\) came up, the first casualty was SAVE because they are baby of the ONSA (Res XXI).

Respondent XXI, a foremost Nigerian human rights activist and Kogi State Chairman of the Partnership against Violent Extremism, categorically accuses the government (and criticizes the funding arrangement) of creating new structures (rather than use the existing structures provided by the CSOs) “for the purpose of corruption and embezzlement”. This somewhat justifies the funding approach adopted by most foreign development agencies such as DFID and USAID in Nigeria. Respondent III professes that “what DFID does is...it doesn’t give money to the government, but it partners with state governments and federal government to deliver them”. A similar view is expressed by Respondent V, “We do not partner with state agency from this part of Nigeria. We do in some other parts of Nigeria. But we don’t work with the government directly in Nigeria on principle because of the issue of corruption”.

There is of course every reason to be wary of Nigeria. For instance, Nigeria scores 28/100 (in a scale of 0-100 representing highly corrupt to clean) and ranks 136/176 in Corruption
Perception Index (Transparency International, TI, 2016). This pragmatic approach will however have a detrimental effect on the sustainability of development interventions as well as risk producing consequences of securitized development, as it has the tendency of alienating credible local partners, therefore risking the problem of local ownership. More details are given in the next section.

However, the more socio-economic or governance consideration in the soft approach adopted by the Nigerian government is evident in the last phase of the four stream intervention framework. The last phase appreciates the economic root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency. Under the Presidential Initiatives for the North East (PINE), the FG and the governors of the six NE states as well as international partners such as DFID have developed a regional economic or development plan. The objective of this plan, which includes programmes such as the Victim Support Fund (VSF), is to revitalise the damaged economy of the region as well as bring about infrastructural and human development. This can also been seen as response to the demand of NE governors and law makers for a North East Development Commission (NEDC). PINE is a national economic initiative primarily focused on providing emergency assistance (especially to victims of the Boko Haram insurgency) as well as mobilising resources for a longer term economic development of the region. PINE seeks to provide the strategic leadership and guidance for the economic turn-around and long-term prosperity of the NE, hence its effort at collaboration with different stakeholders including relevant FG ministries, the government of the affected states, international partners and other relevant local actors. Some of the projects designed under PINE include: strengthening early warning systems, targeted cash transfer schemes, and mobile hospital for providing quick medical support. The activities of PINE are now coordinated under the Presidential Committee on Northeast Initiative (PCNI)-chaired by General Theophilous Danjuma (rdt). PCNI was set up by President Muhammadu Buhari in
attempt to centralise and harmonise all the presidential initiatives (such as PINE, VSF, and the Safe School Initiative-SSI) towards the humanitarian development of the NE. Nigeria, under its Ministry of Finance, established the **Safe School Fund (SSF)**, in response to the UN-led SSI. The government made an initial contribution of US $10 Million with a further US $10 Million pledge from the private sector (UNDP 2017)).

Evidently, the Nigerian government is making serious efforts at synchronizing its counterterrorism strategies and approaches under ONSA. However, there are still notable gaps. One of the gaps is that the government’s development initiatives including PINE, VSF, SSI and CVE are far from integrated. There appears to be a lack of an overarching sense of guidance and leadership from the coordinating CT body, ONSA. Respondent I argues that “you don’t see a sense of a strategy of an overarching something, you know, because the responsibility to protect is actually that of the state. Everybody can just support. So you don’t see a sense of the state understanding that responsibility” (Res I). As Respondent VI argues, there is confusion regarding who actually leads the counter-terrorism effort, “whether it is the Vice President Office or whether T.Y Danjuma’s PCNI is”. One clear illustration is ONSA’s foray into implementing its own CVE programme-one that every indicator, including ONSA’s initial study show that CSOs are more suited to implementing. UNDP and DFID and other international agencies such as USAID are assisting the Nigerian government coordinate and synchronise its counterterrorism policies and programmes. But, there is still that notion among international partners that the Nigerian government should lead the counterterrorism effort.

Arguably, it is more a lack of understanding of its role as the primary duty bearer (as Res I posits) than a deliberate attempt as Respondent III avers that constrains the Nigerian states counter-terrorism efforts. Respondent III states that “Nigeria, at one point wanted outsiders to...
deal with Boko Haram for them”. One cannot rule out the fact that Nigeria hopes to benefit from the GWOT mantra where countering terrorism is considered a global effort, but this does not necessarily amounts to transference of responsibility to external agencies. Nigeria does genuinely lack experience in fighting terrorism, as it was not until 2011 that it established the anti-terrorism legislation to deal with the threat of Boko Haram.

It is therefore not surprising that the Nigerian government does not seem to have a comprehensive and elaborate soft approach that goes beyond mere rhetorical statements. This much is reflected in the National Security Strategy document. “The gap is simply because even the government has no clear strategy on the soft approach. So, it appears to be scattered and ad hoc. It’s difficult for donors to also understand therefore what the country’s strategy on soft approach is” (Res I). For example, there is no clarity regarding roles and agencies responsible for leading and implementing the functions. One can see a lot of overlap of programmes and interventions that amount to duplicity. The poor coordination is exemplified by the safe school component of the CVE programme that intersects with the SSI. ONSA through the SAVE programme was adopting schools to pilot its CVE, whereas this component could have been integrated with the Safe School Project such that “all the Safe Schools project will now be implementing CVE programme. And then you have wider reach and greater impact” (Respondent I).

Akin to that is the obvious disconnect between PCNI/PINE and the communities it is meant to serve. While the government is taking considerable steps to improve its development intervention by synchronizing all its development initiatives towards the Boko Haram crisis, its efforts are fraught with fundamental errors. One, PCNI/PINE does not fully engage with the victims of Boko Haram and the affected communities that it is meant to serve. For instance, while PCNI involved CSOs and CBOs in the initial consultation and dialogue, there
has been no follow-up meeting with these critical components to truly assess the needs of victims and affected societies. The VSF has not been fully directed to meeting the needs of victims of Boko Haram. Rather, the leadership of PCNI/PINE sits in Abuja, away from the theatre of action in the NE fussing more about administrative issues such as renting office spaces and furnishing (Res XXI).

There is also the concern that intervention should be driven at the state, or at most, the regional levels, rather than at the Federal level that PINE represents. The government of the six affected states should come up with a comprehensive response to the crisis and only solicit assistance from the FG. “What they should have simply done is the fact that Adamawa or the NE independently ought to have had a conference on the crisis and conflict in their states in respect of this insurgency and how to address it, because these are peculiarities” (Res XXI). While the contribution (financial) of the FG is important, especially considering the centralized nature of the Nigerian state, the government of the six NE states should be leading the responses, particularly the design of the intervention. However, this is to be differentiated from the politically-motivated demand for NEDC. The argument for NEDC has been pushed at the legislative level, but the whole debate is flawed as it is based on the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)-one that was set up in 2001 to control the agitation and violent struggle of the Niger Delta militants. Interestingly, external agencies such as DFID and USAID are leading the NE regional development framework.

6.2 Assessing External Development Initiatives and Interventions

The key question to answer here is: how have external development initiatives and interventions been developed in the Boko Haram conflicts and what are the issues that have arisen concerning their effectiveness? Significantly, external perception and intervention in the Boko Haram conflict follow a similar trajectory to that of the Nigerian state.
Akin to the domestic response, external intervention in the Boko Haram conflict was minimal, progressing from non-interference to some military assistance and more recently some humanitarian and development assistance. Boko Haram was not considered a priority. For instance, it was only at the request of the Nigerian government that the UK proscribed the Boko Haram group in July 2013. The U.S. blacklisted the group in November 2013. Significantly, the U.S., especially the then-Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, has often been criticized for failing to proscribe Boko Haram in 2011 following its attack on the United Nation’s building in Abuja (the first ever Boko Haram attack on a foreign symbol). The U.S only managed in 2011 to blacklist three key Boko Haram leaders, Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar Adam Kambar, and Khalid al-Barbaai- as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT), that is “foreign terrorists that support or otherwise associate with foreign terrorists” ( Poling, 2013, p.77; Nwankpa, 2015a). In the words of Respondent III, “Lake Chad is a long way from the UK”. Boko Haram did not feature in the rank of more seriously threatening transnational terrorist groups such as AQIM, Al-Shabab, and al-Qaeda.

There is the notion that “Boko Haram insurgency has not been able to internationalise itself. It doesn’t appeal to people outside its region. So, there’s a lot of Nigerians, Chadians, Cameroonian and Nigeriens, maybe some Ghanaians, Senegalese...but it’s not in the same scale...it is not drawing people in from across the world” (Res III). Hence, we can understand low level external intervention. But this view is not entirely correct. While it clearly describes Boko Haram’s international clout at the initial stages of the insurgency, the same cannot be said of Boko Haram’s international influence since 2014 following the Chibok kidnap, and increasingly more since 2015 when it publicly swore allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). However, while the impact of the connection between Boko Haram and IS may be less visible on the surface, it would be wrong to deny the ideological, tactical and strategic resemblance. Not surprising, external intervention has become more direct and intensified.
The U.K., alongside the US, China, France, and Israel offered aerial surveillance, drones, intelligence and information sharing, law enforcement, hostage-negotiation experts, development assistance, and Special Troop’s assistance. Emphasis has shifted to the security, rather than the development of Nigeria.

Apparently, security threats such as terrorism and the emerging nuances of poverty, underdevelopment and inequality are becoming globalized as are the responses to them. In this regard, the Boko Haram conflict has attracted a great deal of attention from the international community including the UN, African Union (AU), several governments with their development departments such as the UK (DFID), U.S. (USAID) and other international non-governmental development and human rights organisations. In terms of the driving force behind external intervention in the Boko Haram crisis, Respondent III identifies multiple reasons why the UK, for instance, is intervening in the Nigerian conflict:

Firstly, Nigeria and the UK are old friends from the colonial times and even pre-colonial times and then early independence all the way through. So there is something about standing with an ally that needs some assistance… Nigeria has brought stability within West Africa and could be on a continental scale in the future. While fighting internal insurgency but its struggling to contain, it will not play a positive role in West Africa…Then there is the humanitarian argument. For sure, that’s a really important point, and the UK does spend money on humanitarian concerns around the world and does increasingly in Nigeria as well. Just as a human being, to have 2.2 million people been displaced of whom probably 1 million are in Maiduguri, are in poor conditions, unacceptable (sic!). So we should try to assist there as well (Res III).

In the specific case of the UK, we can identify a special relationship based on colonial history. However, there is mixed feelings in the literature regarding the relevance of ex-colony in external intervention. While some find it important (Rothchild et al, 1970), others find it irrelevant towards solving the conflict (Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000).
historical relationship between Britain and Nigeria may have inspired assistance from the UK, but that history was not particularly a pleasant one especially that the indigenous political elite inherited an absolutist state structure-a political system that encourages violence through the politicization of ethnic and primordial identities (Ake, 1996; Jega, 2000; Falola, 2009; Preston, 1999). More so, it “intensified the expectation of help from the outside” (Oshita, 2007 p.35). There is however growing concern about Africa’s and by extension, Nigeria’s continued dependence on external support (Cooper 1994; Herbst, 2000, 2014; Zartman, 2000). Even the internally driven development policies launched by the Nigerian government since the return to democratic rule in 1999 is dismissed as a calculated attempt to secure outside support leading to debt relief and foreign aid (Paden, 2005). Nigeria, like many African countries, is advised to look inwards to more local and micro-approaches to solving the persisting development and conflict challenges (Paden, 2005; Herbst, 2014).

6.2.1 European Union (EU)

The other non-securitised motive identified by Respondent III-humanitarian consideration is also not free of securitization. While the displacement of over 2 million in the NE shocks our human conscience, it is significant to query if assistance is considered only for the sake of alleviating the suffering of the NE people or if it is for other strategic interests such as curtailing migration flow. One can only imagine the refugee crisis that millions of displaced people from the most populous black nation can create to Europe. For instance, the political dialogue and cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Nigeria set out common areas of concern such as climate change, immigration, peace and security, democracy and rule of law, development and human rights and regional cooperation and integration. These are expressed in a number of political and declaratory documents such as the Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward, 2008 and the Cotonou Agreement, revised edition, 2000/Partnership

Nigeria’s strategic role in promoting regional peace and security (especially through the ECOWAS framework) justifies external help. Failure to contain the Boko Haram and Niger Delta insurgencies means that Nigeria “will not play a positive role in West Africa. I’m thinking of what they did in Liberia and Sierra Leone… If it is turning inwards because it cannot handle these things, then it is one, not fulfilling its potential on an international scale. So that’s in everyone’s interest” (Res III). The EU recognizes Nigeria as a major contributor to peace and security in the Sahel region and provides support and training for Nigerian peacekeeping troops.

The EU intervention in Nigeria operates within the framework of the Sahel Strategy adopted by the European Council (EC) in 2011. The Sahel Strategy draws a useful link between development and security and supports a Regional Action Plan (RAP) that focuses on four crucial areas: preventing and countering radicalisation; creating appropriate conditions for youth; migration and mobility; and, border management, fighting against illicit trafficking and transnational organised crime (*EU Sahel Strategy*, 2015, p.5). The EU coordinates its activities including funding of projects with key partners including the UN, African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Lake Chad Basin Commission and World Bank, as well as civil societies.

While the EU with other foreign governments such as the U.S. and international agencies such as the UN has been partnering and supporting ECOWAS towards maintaining peace and security in the West African region, the Boko Haram crisis with other emergent insurgent activities in the Sahel region throws up a new challenge. In direct response to the Boko
Haram crisis, the EU funded ONSA’s CVE programme with around €8 Million. It is set to release €50 Million to the AU-backed MNJTF and Lake Chad Basin Commission (Respondent III). It is also a part of the high profile Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPBA) of the NE conducted together with the World Bank (WB), UN, and the GON. And it supports other regional responses such as the arms control carried out by ECOWAS and implemented by UNDP. EU’s commitment to the development of the ACP countries and to Nigeria in this instance fails to conceal a strategic interest however. One of such visible area of strategic consideration is in the area of migration. For example, Article 13 (4) of the Cotonou Agreement (2010) states that “the parties consider that strategic aim of reducing poverty, improving living and working conditions, creating employment and development training contribute in the long term to normalising migration flow” (Cotonou Agreement, 2010, p.27). This is further substantiated in Article 13(5c):

Each of the ACP States shall accept the return of and readmission of any of its nationals who are illegally present on the territory of a member state of the European Union, at that member state’s request and without further formalities (ibid, p.i)

Although same applies to EU nationals in ACP countries, one needs to consider the negligible or better still, disproportionate number of EU citizens in the poorer ACP countries. There is the notion among external interveners that solution to the Boko Haram crisis lays in a regional approach. The West African region, especially the countries bordering Nigeria has been encouraged to step up to the plate. In this regard, the MNJTF, comprising the armies of Niger, Cameroon, Chad and Benin, was formed in 2014 after a high profile summit hosted in Paris by the French President, Hollande. This meeting was set up following the Chibok girls kidnapping. While the world supports the fight against the Boko Haram insurgents, external interveners are clear in their belief that “the region should lead” (Res III).
ECOWAS’ long-standing success as a framework of peacekeeping and conflict prevention in the sub-Saharan region naturally seems useful for such regional intervention, but ECOWAS has little or no experience in fighting terrorism, especially non-state terrorist groups such as Boko Haram. “The issue of violent extremism, terrorism is new to them; they do not have enough experience to be at the commanding height of programmatic initiating across borders” (Res XIX). Beyond experience, the effective role of ECOWAS as a regional framework may be fraught by the variation in cultural and political orientation among its member states. For instance, Chad and Cameroon, both crucial members of the MNJTF, are not part of the ECOWAS bloc. They belong to the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The Sahel strategy is therefore undermined by the absence of a single economic bloc. Essentially, according to Respondent XXIV, who is the Head of the Arms unit, ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja that leaves “a huge space where you don’t have one regional economic community being responsible for it. There’s an overlap between ECOWAS and the Maghreb areas” (Res XXIV). Despite the relative success of the MNJTF in the military campaign against Boko Haram, there is high level of distrust among the collaborating armies. On the other hand, there is also growing acknowledgment that a non-military strategy may be needed for a lasting solution in the fight against Boko Haram. As such, the MNJTF encompasses a development methodology (although this is still in principle and not in practice) in its mandate.

6.2.2 United Kingdom (UK)

The 14 April 2014 Boko Haram suicide bomb attack in Abuja and the kidnap of nearly 300 boarding school girls in Chibok area of Borno present the cardinal point for direct and enlarged external intervention in the Boko Haram crisis. For instance, the UK government, despite claims of special colonial history and humanitarian considerations, did not intervene
directly in the Boko Haram conflict until the 14 April 2014 incidents. It was after these incidents that we began to see a deeper involvement of the UK government in direct assistance towards the fight against Boko Haram. “What happened on April 14th… made it clear that the government hadn’t quite got everything under control in classic counterterrorism law. So, that affected the way that the UK saw its own security. So, that was a real wake-up call that the Boko Haram campaign was spreading out from the Northeast and possibly here to stay” (Res III). Evidently, UK’s security and how the Boko Haram conflict affects its interests in Nigeria remain paramount.

The UK, through its development agency, DFID and as part of its bilateral agreement with Nigeria, a former colony, has been offering development assistance to Nigeria. DFID spends about £220 Million a year on development intervention in Nigeria. Interestingly, sixty percent of that money is focused largely in the north of Nigeria. Whereas before, DFID’s activities in Nigeria did not have a direct bearing on the Boko Haram crisis, it is now directly involved in intervention in the NE. DFID’s involvement in the intervention is to be understood within the UK national security strategy that combines development, defence and diplomacy into a single coherent policy for what would seem to be a more coordinated and efficient way of achieving security. The UK offered two strands of assistance to the GON. The first is more of military assistance and is offered within the UN Security Council framework.

However, the UK believes that “its priorities were best on acts through development (sic!)” (Res III). Hence, it established a new fund called the Conflict Stability and Security Fund Framework (CSSF) which has a budget of about £1 billion for conflict and security efforts. About £7-8million of that fund was used in support of the fight on Boko Haram in 2016 (Respondent III). The CSSF fund is in addition to the programmes been run by DFID and it is shared between Defence, Foreign Office and Development and anyone of them can bid for it
(Respondent III)-a confirmation that development, defence and diplomacy are combined together as a single policy. DFID runs four different development programmes in Nigeria, but only two of these are direct response to the Boko Haram crisis. They are **Justice for All (JFA)** and **Nigeria Stability Reconciliation Programme (NSRP)**. DFID, like many international development agencies working in Nigeria sets up its own organisations or programmes such as JFA and NSRC and partners with international NGOs or organisations. For instance, NSRP is a consortium of three big international NGOs: International Alert, Social Development Direct and British Council working with local NGOs on conflict reduction, women empowerment and research, media and advocacy, while JFA works in the security and justice sector, with the aim of improving policing and access to justice.

NSRP promotes non-violent approach to conflict reduction by facilitating constructive dialogue as a mediator between relevant stakeholders including victims of violence, perpetrators of violence and duty providers such as the government and security forces with the objective of addressing structural drivers of violence. They support advocacy work by CSOs (such as CISLAC and others as identified in previous sections) that identifies and advices on good initiatives as well as conflict prevention and early warning systems. NSRP’s intervention also involves improving gender relations, particularly enhancing women and female child participation and reducing violence against them. NSRP was instrumental in helping the GON develop and implement its National Action Plan in fulfilment of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325. As such, it partnered and supported the Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development. Its research, media and advocacy intervention provides evidence-based results that help government make better policies as well as create awareness and conflict sensitiveness in media reporting. In this regard, it partnered and supported the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) in developing security policy recommendations. NSRP operates in 8 conflict affected states across Nigeria.
including the NE states of Borno and Yobe, Kaduna and Kano in the North West zone, Plateau in the North Central, and Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta in the South South (NSRP 2017)).

On the other hand, JFA works to improve the capability, accountability and responsiveness of responsible officials of the security and justice sector as well as enhance the capacity of the CSOs to provide better oversight. It works at the three levels of government and focuses attention on improving human rights and facilitating access to justice particularly to the poor and vulnerable members of the society. This includes women and children and is done through its Law and Mediation centres and Multi-Door Courthouses (advancing alternative dispute resolution). It also trains the government Economic Fraud unit, Economic Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), especially to build their investigative and policing skills. It also provides support to the government’s Special Control Unit against Money Laundering (SCUML). Like NSRP, it works with a consortium of partners and selected local NGOs in Nigeria such as the British Council, ATOS Consulting, and Nigerian partners such as the Centre for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria, known as CLEEN Foundation. JFA’s programme supports and encourages community policing in furtherance of the community-oriented policy approach launched by former President Olusegun Obasanjo on 24 April 2004 into selected pilot divisions (JFA 2017).

Evidently, NSRP and JFA work with local CSOs such as CISLAC and CLEEN Foundation, but NSRP and JFA are established by the British Commission and DFID in Nigeria. As Respondent XXI asserts “what the foreign donors do now is to come to your country, come to your state and establish their own NGOs and employ Nigerian citizens, go to some of these big NGOs like Action Aid and take their staff to implement these programmes along with other NGOs, rather than give fund directly to you to do the job”. As stated before, the reason
for such an intervention approach, which is clearly admitted by both the external interveners and the collaborating CSOs, relates to the issue of trust.

Therefore, “you may not blame them because they don’t trust us” (Respondent XXI). The constraint of corruption is important nonetheless it portends serious implications for the success of the intervention. The obvious implication is that it runs the risk of external development agencies and donors such as DFID pursuing their own narrow interests by imposing certain conditions that may not be conducive to the local environment. Obviously, “whoever funds you will dictate to you how you want to use those funds” (Respondent XVI).

Similar view is expressed by Respondent XVIII, “everybody who gives out his money wants to see result and he has a particular interest at heart”. As such, the external development interventions are likely to be unsustainable as there may be no “institutional support for the mobilising organisation. And I think to me that is a setback. One, the result is there is no sustainability. Two, it reduces the level of commitment of the participants” (Respondent XXI). Similar sentiment is shared below

And the government should not leave it entirely to NGO themselves. One is that if you ask NGOs to source funds, the mandates of the foreign institutions also shapes what is happening. Two, for something that requires 18 months or 36 months to be effective to even commence a life of its own, they give you 6 months’ support. And sometimes, what you have just done will worsen the situation for the people rather than helping them, because of the required resources minimally required to take off (Res XV).

6.2.3 United States (U.S.)

A similar policy is carried out by the U.S. with its development agency-United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The U.S supports regional and other multilateral efforts towards fighting Boko Haram as well as encourages a development approach. But, the U.S., prior to the rise of Boko Haram, already provides some form of antiterrorism assistance
to Nigeria as part of the GWOT pursued by the administration of President G.W Bush under
the framework of 9/11. President Bush established the United States’ Africa Command
(AFRICOM) under the Department of Defence (DoD). AFRICOM was set up to mitigate
security threats posed by fragile African states. AFRICOM, through the African Coastal and
Border Security Program and the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP),
provides military training and border and maritime security in Africa. The U.S. Department
of State (DoS) established a U.S.-Nigeria Bi-national Commission in 2010, aimed at
improving good governance and transparency, promoting regional cooperation and
development, energy reform and investment, and food security and agricultural investment.
Nigeria benefits from a DoS Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) programme that provides
funding, equipment, and training to countries fighting terrorism.

In terms of direct assistance (largely military) towards the Boko Haram, through the ATA
programme, the U.S trains the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) in the detection and handling of
Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs). Also, through the Global Security Contingency Fund
Counter-Boko Haram Program, the NPF and other relevant security agencies such as
immigration officers and custom officials are given inter-agency border patrol training
towards addressing rural border security challenges (DOS 2016 Country Reports on
Terrorism 2015). The Nigerian government also enjoys the benefits of the DoS
Counterterrorist Finance Project, which helps to fight terrorist financing and curtails the flow
of funds to terrorist groups.

The U.S. CT assistance has however taken a new dynamics or better still a much more
integrated approach which followed from the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of
2010. The NSS draws a significant parallel between the (in) securities and (under)
development of other countries and the implication to U.S. security and prosperity. Hence,
U.S. intervention is guided by its boldly expressed strategic interests that include Security
(“The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners”), Prosperity (“A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity”), Values (“Respect for universal values at home and around the world”) and International Order (“An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges”) (NSS, P.17).

The guiding principle is summarised in the statement below:

Where governments are incapable of meeting their citizens’ basic needs and fulfilling their responsibilities to provide security within their borders, the consequences are often global and may directly threaten the American people. To advance our common security, we must address the underlying political and economic deficits that foster instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and ultimately undermine the ability of governments to manage threats within their borders and to be our partners in addressing common challenges” (NSS, P.26).

It is in line with this vision that the U.S. promotes a development response as part of its “A Whole of Government Approach” including other strategies such as defence, diplomacy, economics, intelligence, strategic communications and partnership with the private sectors (including NGOS, foundations and CBOs).

Development is seen by the U.S. as a “strategic, economic, and moral imperative” (NSS, p.23). Therefore, it applies development as a form of assistance to developing countries to help them manage security threats, helping them develop accountable and democratic institutions and advancing democracy and human rights among many other approaches.

USAID drives the U.S. development policy as contained in its policy document: The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency (2011). U.S. development response has become even more integrated by the Department of State and USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism (May 2016) and other relevant documents such
as the *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (2010, 2015). USAID and the DoS carry out their development mandate largely by supporting multilateral development and humanitarian programmes and efforts with funding, including other direct development engagements that essentially aim to build local capacity and guarantee sustainability.

Hence, USAID has contributed to several pools of funds such as the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF)-a fund that encourages beneficiary countries to develop localized CVE response that involves all relevant stakeholders including the government, CSOs and the private sector. GCERF has conducted two “Needs Assessment” in Nigeria. One was conducted in 2015, followed by another in 2016. The U.S. also supports the regional counterterrorism joint task force-MNJTF and has contributed $5 Million as part of its Lake Chad Basin response. The Lake Chad Basin response to the Boko Haram crisis in the Financial Years (FY) 2015 and FY 2016, by USAID/FFP (U.S Office of Food for Peace), amounts to more than $77.6 Million (USAID, 2015, p.1). USAID supported humanitarian programmes such as “in-kind food assistance, …capacity building assistance, cash transfers, local and regional procurement of food and food vouchers in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria” (USAID, 2015, p.1). USAID’s activities in Nigeria alone amount to $33,800,000 out of the $195,017, 502 in FY 2015-FY 2016. The capacity building assistance is given particularly to the FG National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) with its state counterpart, State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA). The food assistance is part of the contribution to UN World Food Programme (WFP) targeted at meeting the critical food and nutrition needs of the Boko Haram-affected areas.

USAID also funds research that generates reports and informs policy and strategic intervention. One of such USAID-funded research is the Famine and Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET). USAID partners with other international organisations such as the
UN and its relevant subsets such as UNICEF, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Save the Children (SC), and International Organisation for Migration (IOM), OCHA, and UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO).

Patently, the U.S. just like the UK and most Western nations is syncing its defence and diplomatic engagements with its development department and agenda such that international development has become securitized. Development aids are mostly diverted to “fragile” states such as Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan and Nigeria and used to counter terrorism. Fragile states are seen less as places with populations in dire need and more as states that pose potential and substantial security risks or threats firstly to American people (and other Western nation citizens),- the “insured citizens” of the world (Duffield 2007). The development response in this regard is securitised. Hence, the positive impact of some of the development programmes and projects supported by external development partners such as DFID and USAID is undermined by the securitization underpinning the development assistance. The U.S also does not directly fund local CSOs and the Nigerian government. For instance, USAID will only provide direct funding assistance to NGOs it sets up-American NGOS operating in Nigeria such as National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI). “And that is the key problem that we face because people sit down in Washington and design programmes for Lokoja and it doesn’t have impact” (Res XXI). This policy, despite its good intention, creates a lack of commitment from the local partners (the CSOs and CBOs) who often feel alienated from the whole process of identifying the needs and designing the intervention. Inevitably, many of the international development partners project outcomes that are unfeasible within the set timeframe. Hence, the projects often fail the test of sustainability.
6.2.4 United Nations (UN)

One key external agency that has been active towards the Boko Haram conflict is the United Nations (UN). The UN leads counterterrorism efforts globally and has a relative advantage over other external agency in the area of counterterrorism. Respondent XIX posits that “for UNDP, we are fortunate because we are a global network in over 100 countries, some of which have experienced the issue of terrorism in the past and we’ve been able to leverage on lessons learned in those climes and territories to enrich our own interventions”. By-and-large, the UN’s counterterrorism activities (carried out by its various offices such as UNDP and UNICEF) are guided by the UN General Assembly (GA) Resolution 60/288. On 8 September 2006, the General Assembly (GA) of the UN adopted a resolution, Resolution 60/288 that sets out a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) (2006). GCTS is “guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations” especially its mandate in guaranteeing international peace and security (ibid, p.1). It consolidates all previous GA resolutions and efforts at eliminating international terrorism.

GCTS particularly follows the 2005 World Summit Outcome of world leaders mandating the GA to develop a counter-terrorism strategy “with a view to adopting and implementing a strategy to promote comprehensive, coordinated and consistent responses, at the national, regional and international levels, to counter terrorism, which also takes into account the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism “(ibid, p.2). The Resolution crucially recognizes that “development, peace and security, and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing” (p.2). In line with this thinking, the UN sets out measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, to prevent and combat terrorism, to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism, and to ensure that respect for human rights for all and the rule of law form the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism. GCTS
forms the pivot and guidance for all of the activities of the various offices of the UN intervening in the Boko Haram conflict.

For instance, the UN Special Envoy for Global Education, former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Gordon Brown and the Government of Nigeria as well as Nigeria Global Business Coalition for Education and the private sector launched the **Safe School Initiative (SSI)** in 2014. SSI Nigeria was launched at the World Economic Forum Africa in Abuja in May 2014. It is a response to Boko Haram’s attacks on schools and school children and teachers as part of its repudiation of “Western education”. SSI was more a direct response to the Chibok girls kidnapping. The UN with other international traditional partners such as USAID and DFID supports the Nigerian government **Safe School Fund (SSF)** by pooling together what it terms the **Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF)** (UNDP 2016). However, SSI responds to what appears to be a much more widespread problem in Nigeria particularly in the Boko Haram ravaged NE—that is, the shocking number of children out-of-school, (up to 10.5 million). 60 per cent (6.3 million) are largely girls and are located in the north of Nigeria. SSI targets the three most affected NE states-Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. SSI is divided into three components- school-based interventions, community intervention to protect schools; and special measures for at-risk population. In specific terms, this involves transferring affected secondary school students to other states, supporting education in IDP camps, and piloting safe school models including community mobilization. The outcome of the intervention is to build resilience and encourage vigilance and awareness of threat (UNDP 2016).

The UN continues to play other pivotal roles in the fight against Boko Haram, mainly in helping Nigeria integrate its various counterterrorism interventions and programmes (soft approaches) that appear to be “scattered and ad hoc” (Res I). It was apparent that the Nigerian government lacked an overarching knowledge of the conflict and a clear sense of direction.
For instance, as discussed in the previous section, ONSA disregarded the local structures provided by CSOs who were more suitable in implementing the CVE programme. ONSA overstepped its boundary as a policy setting agency by directly implementing the CVE programme. The CVE programme has terminated by the new Nigerian administration that started in May 2015. But “it’s not bad that it stopped work and they (ONSA) are looking at policy setting. So, there are positives there as well” (Res V). DFID is supporting Nigeria-ONSA in this regard, especially towards the design of a comprehensive counterterrorism policy, NACTEST, an “overarching Counterterrorism strategy which CVE would come up as a sub-part” (Res V). External support from agencies such as UN and DFID towards Nigeria’s NACTEST unfortunately brings up the issue of transference of development responsibility.

For the government to take full advantage of the donors’ commitment, it has to reorganise itself. So based on discussions, the government was persuaded to mainstream and consolidate its own structure for dealing with the NE. So before now you had the presidential Initiative for the NE, you have the Victim Support Funds, you have the Back-to-School initiative and the Presidential Initiative for the NE. Now, all the four mechanisms have been merged together into the Presidential Council for the NE, even though everybody is still doing their work, but there is now better coordination (Res XIX).

We can therefore ask the salient question: is the government’s decision due to the promise of external support? Arguably, the Nigerian government may be deliberately transferring development responsibility to external agencies, considering the GWOT rhetoric and the U.S. position that, “Where governments are incapable of meeting their citizens’ basic needs and fulfilling their responsibilities to provide security within their borders, the consequences are often global and may directly threaten the American people” (NSS, 2010, P.26) (see also Paden, 2005; Omeje, 2007). For instance, Respondent III argues that “Nigeria, at one point wanted outsiders to deal with Boko Haram for them”, hinting that this may have affected the
UK’s slow response to the Boko Haram conflict. Respondent III argues further that “you will only spend your own money if you think no one else will spend it for you (sic)”. Respondent III implies that that there is a tendency for countries fighting terrorism and other types of conflict to rely on the security assistance provided by external interveners, while refusing to bear the direct security or defence burden or contribute to it. This kind of reasoning is illustrated recently by the U.S., under President Trump, who has also accused other NATO members of not contributing their required quota to the cost of defending Europe especially.

However, Nigeria contributes financially and strategically to virtually all of the counterterrorism efforts towards Boko Haram. For instance, as part of its contribution to the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) sub-regional MNJTF “the Nigerian government gave $21 million and is about to release $79 million” (Res III). Respondent III alludes to the change in government and the responsiveness of the new President, President Buhari. “The old government didn’t do that. It is President Buhari’s decision to do this. And he is doing that as a show of intent. And I think regional leadership as well. So, he is aware that Nigeria is the biggest country” (Res III). This confirms Respondent VIII claim that what Nigeria needs is “a new leadership that is stronger, firmer, willing to go deep into the root of the issue and who have the moral authority to take on the Boko Haram”.

As such, why Nigeria may have partly aimed at transferring its responsibility to external agencies, it is possible, and perhaps more tenable that a genuine lack of capacity (including the right leadership) is at the heart of the failure of domestic counterterrorism in Nigeria. This much is admitted by Respondent III, “there is a genuine risk of what we call general problem of low absorptive capacity… so that applies to a CSO, it can apply to a government as well”. For instance, the UK government made an independent contribution of £5 million towards the MNJTF in 2015, but a year after “that hasn’t been spent yet” (Res III). At the domestic front, we see that poor coordination and lack of capacity, rather than availability of resources
are hindering the effective fight against Boko Haram. “In the case of NE, the government has
the money. The victim support-whatever intervention that T.Y Danjuma is chairing, they
have billions of naira and not knowing what to do with it (Respondent XV). This is proof that
internal development intervention towards the Boko Haram conflict is undercut by lack of
capacity and coordination, rather than the need to transfer intervention responsibility to
external partners. Perhaps, what Nigeria needs is help with putting up structures that will help
resource management so that development interventions are better channeled to meet the
desired end.

If for now, you go to the audit account, you would have seen from the money released to
them what has been spent for personnel, administrative, office furnishing and what have you
has taken chunk of that money. But yet the victims of Boko Haram that are scattered across
the NE and Federal capital territory, FCT in the IDP camps are not benefitting as expected
from the funds (Res XXI)

We can conclude therefore that the Nigerian government and local CSOs genuinely need help
with capacity building, as the unanimous views of both local and external respondents show.
Respondent XIV rightly notes of CSOs that “one thing you will find missing in the NE is the
issue of capacity”. Other respondents share similar view, “Funding, in my opinion, is always
secondary, second challenge. The major challenge has always been the capacity” (Res XVI).
A more damming view is given by Respondent V in his assessment that CSOs and even
government’s capacity in the NE is “non-existent”. On the government side, we see a very
problematic political structure and federal system that do not support good and efficient
federal-state cooperation, and inter-agency cooperation. This badly affects the government’s
soft approach towards the Boko Haram. Hence, the assistance offered by external agencies
such as the Norwegian government, DFID, USAID and the UN is justified. According to
Respondent XIX “that is why we are having this type of Recovery and Peacebuilding
Assessment (RPBA) to be able to generate baselines on which some of our small interventions can be rolled out on a more ambitious scale”.

In February 2016, the UN, EU, and WB, under the auspices of the 2008 Joint EU-UN-WBG Declaration on crisis assessment and recovery planning, jointly carried out a high-level development needs assessment (field research) of the NE states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe, at the request of the Government of Nigeria (GON). RPBA offers a holistic assessment of the physical (under Infrastructure and Social Services), social, psychological (under Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion component) and economic (under Economic Recovery component) impacts of the Boko Haram crisis in the NE. The objective was to inform strategic and focused actions towards rehabilitation and reconstruction of the region. RPBA seeks to identify and provide a coordinated and coherent response and unified efforts by the GON and its international humanitarian and development partners specifically in prioritizing of immediate and medium-term peacebuilding intervention and humanitarian assistance to the affected communities in the NE. The assessment hinges on the recognition of the need to address the structural and underlying drivers of violent conflict in order to achieve lasting resolution of the conflict in the NE (European External Action Service, EEAS, 2016).

The report, released in April 2016, estimates about USD $9 Billion for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the damaged infrastructures of the six NE states, with over $6 Billion, approximately $6.4 Billion needed for immediate recovery and short term stabilization of the region. The report recommended a two-phase strategic plan of two years for the stabilisation of the region and a further two years recovery phase that will set the region on the path to long term prosperity and development. Both phases are recommended to run concurrently.

The Recovery and Peace Building Strategy (RPBS) is also recommended to run
concurrently with the **Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP)** that was prepared by the UN. HRP identifies 14.8 Million affected people in four focus NE states-Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe, with 7.0 Million in needs, targeting 3.9 Million, requiring USD $248 Million and with 62 humanitarian partners (HRP, 2016). Some of the partners include UNICEF, Action Aid, Food Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Save the Children and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). HRP focuses on humanitarian intervention addressing emergency needs such as food security, protection, health, water, sanitation and hygiene, nutrition, education and IDPs camp coordination and management. Hence, by combining RPBS/RPBA with HRP, interveners are able to target both short term and long term development.

**6.2.5 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**

One department of the UN that is taking lead role in the development approach to the Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNDP plays a very central role in the development interventions in the NE. In most cases, it leads its own direct intervention, and in some other cases, it is the implementing agency for development interventions designed and funded by other donor agencies. For example, UNDP is the implementing agency in the fully EU-funded ECOWAS Peace, Security and Stability mandate (EU-ECOWAS PSS)-a three-year project (2015-2017) that seeks to curb the flow of small arms and light weapons (SALW) across the region by bolstering the capacity of the selected ECOWAS states towards addressing instability and developing a proactive methodology to peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution in West Africa. EU-ECOWAS PSS projects four outcomes corresponding to four phases of the intervention: Sensitisation and advocacy programmes elaborated and implemented (aimed at creating awareness for the pilot project), Capacity of relevant stakeholders-armed and security Forces, National Commissions and CSOs of the selected countries in the Mano River Union (MRU)
and Sahel regions enhanced (including improving operational capacities of security forces and building capacities of CSOs), Weapons collection, record keeping and destruction of SALW collected, and Implementation of community-based micro projects in exchange for arms collection conducted and key projects provided (UNDP, 2016 [SALW Annual Report, 2015]).

UNDP is also the implementing partner for the Early Recovery Programme for the North East- an intervention funded by the government of Norway with a budget of USD $1.7Million. In conjunction with Nigeria’s NEMA and SEMA, UNDP seeks to expedite the recovery of the three major NE states (Borno, Adamawa and Yobe) badly affected by the Boko Haram crisis with the aim of establishing a safe and conducive environment for the displaced persons. The intervention, which began in 2015, includes building social cohesion and peace and reconciliation infrastructures, building resilience that includes capacity training of communities to prevent conflict and other skill acquisition or socio-economic empowerment projects, especially for women and youth, to facilitate their reintegration into the society.

The specific projects include the creation of an ICT-based early warning and early response system in the three core affected NE states identified, and the provision of agro-processing equipment and farm inputs to the most vulnerable households. Under this programme, UNDP carries out waste debris management in the NE, based on its January 2015 Debris and Waste Assessment-in response to the infrastructural destruction of the region (some of which pose health and safety risks to returning IDPs). This takes four stages which includes clearing the area of landmines, managing solid waste through collection, recycling and reusing waste debris, giving skills training, providing emergency employment (as the people are trained and employed to carry out some of these tasks identified) and provide safe access to buildings.
Other partners in this project include: Disaster Waste Recovery (DWR), Oxfam International and Action against Hunger (Respondent XIX; UNDP 2015).

6.2.6 United Nations Children Education Fund (UNICEF)

UNICEF is another important arm of the UN playing a significant role in the development approach to the Boko Haram, especially as it relates to children affected. UNICEF plays an integral role in the humanitarian and development response to the Boko Haram conflicts. It is an active participant in the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and the Inter-Sector Working Group (ISWG). HCT, under the leadership of the UN Resident Coordinator, provides strategic guidance, policy development and engagement with the FG, while ISWG encourages sectorial responses and coordination. UNICEF leads in the development intervention in education, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), Nutrition as well as Child Protection sub-sector (UNICEF, 2016-Humanitarian situation report).

UNICEF works to protect and prevent the violation of the rights of children in the conflict-affected NE. This is achieved through its Child Protection Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. The Group monitors and reports on grave violations of children’s rights in two core NE states of Borno and Adamawa. UNICEF also works with other intervening partners to address the food and nutrition crisis engendered by the Boko Haram conflict in the NE, especially as it relates to children. Hence, it advocates for the treatment of children suffering from moderate acute malnutrition and other health and nutrition interventions within its Integrated Primary Health Care (PHC) services. Psychosocial support is provided to identified high risk children (mainly former Boko Haram-child soldiers, and children born out of sexual violence including their mothers) in order to facilitate reintegration into the society. UNICEF is a critical part of the Education in Emergency (EiE) Working Group and Safe School Initiative (SSI). SSI and EiE work together to ensure and monitor the quality of education delivered by UNICEF trained teachers and school attendance by enrolled IDP
school children in Borno. In terms of the SSI, UNICEF had carried out an assessment through a small scale research involving a survey and interviews with potential educational providers such as head of schools and teachers and head of households, particularly women. The survey is expected to provide information on the number of children out of school within each IDP camps as well as to know the number of schools in the same area as the IDP camps and their capacity to absorb the children, amongst many other needs. UNICEF has thus developed what it calls the Double Shift Schooling System—one that allows children from IDP camps to use the school structures and facilities used by regular attendees during out-of-regular school hours. This is to ensure that the limited facilities accommodate all of the children out-of-school. UNICEF also incorporates the safety condition of the SSI—hence it considers the child protection and health and special needs of the children surveyed. It is important to emphasise that UNICEF contributes to the training of locals as part of its effort to increase national capacity.

6.2.7 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)

UNESCO is also part of the EiE. It plays a crucial role in promoting education as a measure of emergency response leading to long-term recovery. The education response is therefore seen as a fundamental tool for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). UNESCO supports the SSI in Nigeria as it promotes education and dialogue as tools of preventing conflict and countering terrorism in Nigeria. Hence, UNESCO programmes in Nigeria support peace education and strengthen development and social inclusion of vulnerable communities, as well as promote inter-religious and inter-ethnic dialogue and other economic empowerment programmes that seek to curb the tendency towards extremism and violence.
6.2.8 World Bank (WB)

The WB is a key player leading in development and humanitarian interventions in the NE. It is one of the major partners that conducted the Recovery and Peace Building Assessment of the NE. It has made financial pledge (an initial amount of $800 Million) towards the stabilisation and recovery of the NE based on the needs assessment, one that it adjudges to align well with WB’s vision of “ending poverty and boosting shared prosperity” (WB document, 2016). WB has developed a framework that guides its engagement in Northern Nigeria. WB has developed, together with the GON, the Northeast Emergency Transition and Stabilisation Programme (NETSP) targeting the six NE states. It also supports the Northern Nigeria Regional Development Framework (NRDF).

Under NETSP, WB designs programmes and activities that address service delivery gaps, livelihood deficits and social cohesion challenges produced by the protracted conflict with an estimated budget of USD $775 million. The activities under NETSP include a series of additional financing (AF), and a multi-sector Emergency Crisis Recovery Project (ECRP). This intervention is to be complemented by the activities under the RPBA. The findings of the RPBA inform the AF interventions’ (under NETSP) focus in four critical areas—agriculture, health, education and social protection.

Evidently, we see, since the 14 April 2014 Boko Haram incidents, a paradigmatic shift in the perception and increasing intervention by external interveners. For instance, “the north east has become the new bride of the humanitarian community. Everybody who wants to retain the significance of their brand globally is struggling to set up in the NE, absolutely without coordination” (Res I). Many of the interveners often come with a predetermined idea of needs and areas to focus intervention on. This leads to duplicity of programmes as well as abandonment of other critical areas needing intervention. For example, GCERF conducted a needs assessment in 2015 but failed to act in the Middle Belt where all the indicators pointed
to. Rather, according to Respondent V, a top British expat with DFID, the “GCERF Board decided to work in the Northeast”. GCERF has now carried out a second assessment in March 2016 - a move that is somewhat untimely considering that a joint UN-EU-WB needs assessment of the NE was underway at the time. Hence, it is true to some extent that there is still issue of poor coordination among external interveners, despite the growing efforts to coordinate and integrate development initiatives and programmes as demonstrated by the MDTF managed by UNDP amongst many other combined efforts.

Interestingly, the failure of external donors and interveners to achieve effective coordination in their interventions may be partly due to the Nigerian government’s inability to play its role as the primary duty bearer. Respondent I noted this earlier. A similar view is expressed by Respondent VI, another top British expat with DFID: “you get the feeling that the government itself, like part of the international communities, is putting everything on hold, waiting for the assessment to come out. That’s the basis for which they will take the next step. But who leads on that and how the delivery is still really unclear to all of us”. Therefore we see a persisting contention between sovereign states as primary duty bearers and the extension of the duty to external interveners.

The debate about who leads the intervention in the NE reflects the tension in the literature regarding external intervention as a moral right versus intervention as a legal right, within the framework of the Right to Development. Such evidence proves that the rights based approach that views external intervention as a legal obligation within existing human rights framework and instruments is inadequate (Hausermann, 1998; Hamm, 2001). The sense of duty expressed by external interveners in the Boko Haram case is unfortunately not one guided by a legal binding framework. Rather, it is steered by the interveners’ need to guarantee its own security and protect its own values (see Duffield, 2007). One of such values that it promotes is human right. For example, while the EU’s development agenda is prominently highlighted
in the Sahel Strategy, it conceals a more subtle security objective as evidenced by its preconditions of human rights, rule of law, and governance, and its concerns with issues of migration and energy. It would seem that the EU’s development policies in Africa have become politicized and securitized to produce “unsettling effects on the objectives of EC (European Community) development policies” (Hadfield, 2007)

The conditionality of human rights placed on development aid recipients such as Nigeria sparks reaction from Nigerians particularly on the basis that Western governments often violate its own liberal principles in its fight against terrorism for strategic advantage (Doyle, 1983; Stedman, 1993). “There’s a sense in which I feel agitated as a Nigerian when I hear the British, the Americans making all these claims, when they have the glaring evidence of their own total lack of respect for human rights in moments of tensional crises” (Respondent II).

For instance, the Leahy Vetting Process, under the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, requires that the DoS and DoD vet foreign partners for human rights compliance to determine eligibility or continuation of assistance and training of foreign security forces. Starting in 2013 when Human Rights Watch published a report on Nigeria (HRW, 2013), the U.S. has threatened to terminate its support to Nigeria, following the indictment of Nigerian security forces for gross human rights violation in the fight against Boko Haram. Another dimension is added to the West’s double standard as relating to how it defines Boko Haram as an insurgency:

for labelling them insurgents, they are intending to agree that there is a grieve to be settled and up to this minute that I am speaking, I do not know of the grief that Boko Haram have to settle with the Nigerian nation. The young men who keep killing children in American schools, would we say that is insurgency? That is criminality! It’s the same thing here. So why do label one a different one, and label the one here differently? It is terrorism (Res IV).
This raises an important issue based on the assumptions of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS). Here, we see the notion of power and agency plays out. Who defines terrorism or insurgency and the responses to it? (Burnett & Whyte, 2005; Gunning, 2007; Blakeley, 2007; McDonald, 2007). There is a sense therefore as argued by Duffield (2007) that development aid may represent a structural technology used by liberal governments to maintain the divide between them and the poorer nations of the world (see also Paris, 2004). Therefore, the intervention in the NE, especially the conditionality of human rights and other Western values placed on Nigeria is likely expressive of “the self-justifying ideologies of superiority and responsibility” (Preston, 1999, p.142; see Uvin, 2007). However, the capacity building aspect of the intervention presents a counterargument that seeks to achieve a double effect. One is to empower and equip the locals so that they can respond to future threats in a way that is sustainable. The activities of UNDP, DFID, USAID and a host of others towards the Boko Haram emphasize this point. Secondly, the capacity building is a subtle way of withdrawing itself from that responsibility to protect—an argument that is in line with the Western governments and international development partners’ perception of who should be leading the intervention.

More so, the development and humanitarian interventions by external development partners such as the UN and the WB face some critical risks and challenges in the implementation and this is generally conditioned by the volatile nature of the NE—one where the transition from conflict to peace is still evolving. Hence, it becomes difficult to plan and monitor the outcomes of development intervention in such a dynamic and fragile security environment. Similarly, the crisis has eroded local traditional authority structures which heavily impacts on citizen-state relationship. In many of the NE states, the CJTF has assumed the role of the state. In this regard, WB NETSP (unlike the uncertainty with DFID’s contribution) hopes to embed improved governance and better service delivery in its programme as part of a long-
term development. However, it still has to operate within the security framework provided by the GON and the Nigerian military. More so, policies and strategies are still incoherent (although several assessments such as the RPBA are targeted towards attaining a coordinated and coherent policy and strategic response). One of the challenges that NETSP faces and which the RPBA seeks to overcome is one of prioritizing needs to focus on, especially given limited resources available to the government. NETSP hopes to assist the government in creating a hierarchy of needs, for instance, the social groups in more need of assistance. For example, NETSP assesses the differing stabilization and recovery needs of the six affected NE states and decided to allocate higher funds to Borno, Adamawa and Yobe based on the extent of the damage and needs. Yet, there is still the challenge of “variation in absorptive capacity and disbursement rates (WB Doc, 2016)”

The WB NETSP faces another challenge in its attempt at bringing together different stakeholders including non-conventional ones. The different interests and priorities of the stakeholders may impede effective coordination. However, it proposes to mitigate the challenge by using “regular information sharing processes among stakeholders, including counselling and awareness” (WB doc, 2016).

6:3 Do the Nigerian Antiterrorism Laws and Development Policies and Programmes Conform to Human Rights Principles?

There is evidence of a good knowledge of human rights principles in ONSA’s soft approach. The intervention has focused on building capacity of relevant government institutions and agencies “on global best practices and human rights compliant approaches of responding to, preventing and dealing with individuals/groups involved with extremism and radicalization that leads to terrorism” (Dasuki, 2014). Furthermore, the intervention involves “engaging and partnering with states, local governments, civil society and communities to counter
radicalization, build community engagement tools and capabilities while entrenching the culture of resilience” (p.2). It also includes working “with Federal and State agencies involved in economic development, job creation and poverty alleviation to explore their roles in effecting a robust PREVENT programme” (Dasuki, 2014, p.4).

ONSA seems to have taken an approach that seems to be as participatory and inclusive as possible in the process of codifying its terrorism prevention strategy. However, while this is evident in principle, it is often just a little above rhetorical statements. “There’s no elaboration that has been done for the citizen approach beyond statements—we will work with civil societies. We will work with communities. But that needs to happen, so that everybody is clear“(Respondent I). In practice, ONSA as evident in its management of the CVE programme did not apply the principle of participation and inclusion. For instance, it did not include local CSOs and CBOs in the design of the CVE programme. Even when it partnered with PAVE, it was a strategic move to leverage on the grassroots support that the local CSOs and CBOs already enjoy. But beyond using the CSOs and CBOs to gain access into the communities, ONSA carried out the majority of the work using its own structure SAVE, rather than using the existing infrastructures that civil societies within the PAVE network offered.

Most likely, ONSA’s decision to create new structures (through SAVE) rather than use existing infrastructure provided by the local CSOs is “for the purpose of corruption and embezzlement” (Respondent XXI). Ultimately, “from the SAVE side, they are still running it as if it is the normal government business. Unlike the way he has explained to you whereby we have to involve the community members from the grassroots, what SAVE does is that they have already packaged what they want. They just come, submit information to the community members”. (Respondent XVII). Hence, we see a massive lack of participation and community engagement.
We see the same evidence in PINE/PCNI or VSF- there is an apparent disengagement from the civil society and especially from the community, including victims of the Boko Haram insurgency for whom such aid is established. Sadly, despite the emergency humanitarian situation in the NE, the leadership of PCNI does not show any sense of urgency in engaging directly with those in needs and/or the civil societies representing them. Rather, more attention and resources are spent on administrative purposes as Respondent XXI states in the previous section. It is not the lack of funds. Rather, it is poor management and misappropriation of fund that stem from failure to “cooperate with NGOs-community based organisations…and state in developing the democratic institutions or infrastructure of the state as well as trust building, enabling the required mechanism to be put in place” (Res XIV).

In terms of the legal framework guiding Nigeria’s counterterrorism effort-TPA, there is no evidence to show that it targets any particular ethnic or religious group. “Certainly we cannot say the law itself favours or disfavours any group. The law was passed by the national Assembly which has members from both religions” (Res VII). Notably, Nigerians are divided nearly equally into Christian and Muslim religions. Despite the Islamic character of Boko Haram (especially that it is often mostly defined as a religiously motivated insurgency), “if you look at the way terrorism is going on in the country, at the moment, it is doing a lot of havoc even in the Muslim areas” (Res VII). Having established this however, the application of the Act in terms of prosecution shows a lack of transparency, partiality and selective justice in addition to the lack of an effective inter-agency cooperation. There have been very few successful cases of insurgents or terrorists that have been prosecuted. Some of the notable prosecutions include the life-sentencing of Kabiru Sokoto, a Boko Haram commandant responsible for the 2010 Christmas day bombing at St. Theresa’s Church in
Sokoto, and the arrest of Aminu Ogwuche, the alleged planner of the 14 April 2014 Nyanya motor park bombing, who was arrested in Sudan and extradited to Nigeria. Many of the cases are pending including the case against Abdullahi Mustapha Berende and Saidi Adewumi, charged under Section 5(1) 8 of the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2013 with terrorist recruitment.

Unfortunately, Nigeria’s TPA is restricted to the federal level as terrorism and associated acts are considered federal offenses. Hence, all terrorism related offenses committed at the states are tried at the federal court. This means that, in “most cases, those that were caught in actual behaviours were transferred to Abuja. We never hear anything about it again. At the point, some of us here felt that the leadership in Abuja, particularly in the police command was in favour of one side than the other, because anytime such facts and figures were found and certainly clear for prosecution, they will say bring them to Abuja, we will investigate. That will be the end you will hear of it” (Res VII). Some examples are the prominent cases against Senator Ali Ndume and the former Governor of Borno, Ali Modu Sheriff, suspected sponsors of Boko Haram. These cases have been stalled for years, a move that has created a feeling amongst the people that the law is partial.

6.4 Do External Antiterrorism Laws and Development Policies and Programmes Conform to Human Rights Principles?

The supporting funds from the MDTF follow a strict set of guidelines that seek to achieve effectiveness and transparency. One of the processes involves a centralized fund administrator, a function performed by UNDP. UNDP manages all the funds contributed by the donors in line with international best practices that include making the programmatic and
financial information publicly available. This is accessible through its online platform, the MPTF Office Gateway [http://mptf.undp.org/](http://mptf.undp.org/) - a purported accountable, transparent, result-oriented and cost-effective tool that allows access to real-time information on all the financial and programmatic facts and figures relating to the SSI. The online portal is thus a Result Based Management (RBM) system that allows one to measure result at both the outcome and output levels. It helps the Steering Committee (SC) to know how to better manage the funds as well as provide funders with information on how their money is being spent.

Only participating United Nations organisations (PUNOs) are eligible for direct funds from UNDP. This relates to external interveners’ perception that the local structure including government and non-government is corrupt. Therefore, local NGOs, CSOs, and CBOs can only have access to funds through a PUNO. UNDP sets up a Steering Committee that oversees the funds administration including allocation, setting fund requirement and priorities and measuring fund’s impact and achievement of outcomes. In order to synchronise its activities with that of the National Safe School Funds (SSF), managed by the FG Ministry of Finance, and avoid duplication, the MDTF adopts the same Steering Committee (SC) as the SSF. The SC is supported by a Technical Secretariat (TS) that is mandated to provide technical, administrative and programmatic support to the SC.

Noticeably, there is an increasing knowledge and application of a rights-based approach in the development interventions carried out by external interveners towards the Boko Haram conflict. The MDTF illustrates this well both in its policies and implementation. The MDTF projects an outlook of a conscious dedication to participation, transparency and accountability. This is demonstrated in UNDP’s effort to consolidate the MDTF with the Nigerian government’s SSF by adopting the steering Committee (SC) of the SSF. In this way, the Safe School Initiative is unified both in terms of objectives and strategies. Unlike PINE and most development initiatives by the Nigerian government, MDTF establishes a platform
through its online gateway-http://mptf.undp.org/ where all of its activities, including programmatic details and financial information (amount donated, amount used and amount remaining) are published in real-time. The information is publicly available and helpful towards measuring outcomes and output as well.

Still within the SSI framework, UNICEF uses a data gathering approach in its small survey to collect relevant information from key stakeholders including NE community members especially women, teachers and heads of schools, and those in the IDP camps. By interviewing those for whom the intervention is developed, UNICEF shows an awareness that an effective intervention will be the one where the needs are identified by the people themselves. This approach is also evident in the recently concluded RPBA. RPBA and similar needs assessment going on in the NE demonstrate a paradigm shift in the thinking and approach of those intervening in the Boko Haram conflict. The fieldwork helps to gather useful information directly from the affected communities and their representatives-information that is helping to shape a more efficient and coordinated response.

The WB NETSP projects the outlook of a development policy that reflects a rights-based approach particularly one that promotes equity, participation and inclusion and accountability. For instance, NETSP provides guidance on how the government can prioritize those in need of government support scheme by drawing a hierarchy of beneficiary groups (from a group of women and girls, elderly, youth including child soldiers, victims of war, IDPs and so on) from which selection can be made. This also extends to achieving equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance such as cash transfer, emergency housing and financial support to beneficiary groups such that no one feels marginalized. The WB assistance also purports to help the government formulate policies and strategies that address the specific needs of displaced people (such as internally displaced and externally displaced
or returning displaced persons) under the theme of displacement management. NETSP equally aims at participation and inclusion by involving many non-conventional stakeholders. The RPBA has hugely reinforced the strategy of the WB programs-AF and NETSP especially its re-assessment of its approach. It now adopts a more flexible, quick and adaptive response that recognizes that no one approach is enough to address the development crises engendered by the Boko Haram crisis. For instance, it shows evidence of a rights-based approach in its reliance on existing institutional capacities at the state and LG levels and works with CSOs, CBOs and faith-based organisations. In furtherance of its broad inclusion and participatory approach, NETSP adopts a “demand-driven” rather than supply-driven approach. Hence, it empowers and engages locals at the community level both in its programme design and implementation by setting up School-Based Management Committees (SBMC) in the education sector, Primary Health Care Development Agencies (SPHCDAS) in the health sector, as well as private farmers, farmers’ groups and cooperatives in the agriculture sector.

However, the establishment and use of own NGOs by international development partners to implement their development projects in Nigeria may inadvertently violate the core principles of human rights such as participation and inclusion. While such an approach is understandable within the Nigerian context where corruption is rife (one admitted to by both the external interveners and the local CSOs and CBOs respondents), it does exclude the locals from the critical stages in the development process. Examples of such own NGOs are National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI)-both set up to receive direct funds and implement development programmes by USAID. JFA and NSRP are also examples of foreign-controlled programmes set up and managed by DFID.

However, while many of the staff working in these foreign-owned NGOs may be Nigerians “it is still them (DFID and USAID) controlling it … But that has also affected the delivery.
The impact of these things compared to the money they spend is not commensurate “(Respondent XXI). What manifests at the end of the day is that the developmental outcomes are mostly not achieved in a sustainable way and it is also not cost-effective.

Clearly, the approach does not only alienate local CSOs and CBOs from the crucial initial stages of the development process including identifying the needs and designing the intervention, but also it does not support sustainable development and perhaps more expensive.

6:5 How could a Human Rights Approach to Development that is Compatible with the Nigerian Socio-Cultural Reality be Developed?

One thing that is becoming abundantly clear and proving impactful is the use of advocacy, dialogue and forums (mediation) and media awareness including radio programmes using local languages. USAID, DFID, UNDP and some other foreign development partners are collaborating with local CSOs such as CISLAC in this area. The non-legalistic human rights measures are proving to be more effective than coercive human rights legislation as suggested in the literature (see Sano, 2000; Sen, 2004; Uvin, 2007). Educative approach or simply education is seen to be the key to a long-term sustainable solution to the problem of Boko Haram insurgency. In the words of Respondent XVI: “Our communities are poor not because they lack resources, but because they lack knowledge “. The kind of education that is described here is one that has a local flavour, largely civil or moral education.

Interestingly, the advocacy, mediation and awareness programmes carried out by JFA and NSRP as well as by other development agencies such as UNDP and USAID in collaboration with local CSOs and CBOs are producing greater impact especially in how they influence policy (if not much in terms of implementation). Although Nigeria has a national human rights commission (NHRC), as mandated by the United Nation General Assembly, the reach of such normative structures (in terms of human rights impact) are less compared to the non-
normative structures. By its own admission, “Human rights campaign cannot be achieved solely through the development of protective laws or establishment of mechanisms to implement those laws” (NHRC 2017)).

It would seem that a pragmatic rights-based approach that targets disadvantaged peoples and communities and creates awareness or education about human rights, participation and accountability is more suitable to the Nigerian context (see Nelson & Dorsey, 2003; Sano, 2000; Hamm, 2001). Such an approach will help resolve the seeming irreconcilable difference in ideals of the normative human rights framework-one often seen from the subaltem perspective as largely Western-oriented. Imposing human rights and other liberal principles as conditions of development aid without consideration of local context may undercut the effectiveness of such development intervention.

For instance, Part II (6) of the NHRC (Amendment) Act gives the Commission the power to—

conduct its investigations and inquiries in such a manner as it considers appropriate; institute any civil action on any matter it deems fit in relation to the exercise of its functions under this Act; appoint any person, whether or not such person is in the public service, to act as an interpreter in any matter brought before it and to translate any such book, paper or writing produced to it; visit persons, police cells and other places of detention in order to ascertain the conditions thereof and make recommendations to the appropriate authorities; make determination as to the damages or compensation payable in relation to any violation of human rights where it deems this necessary in the circumstances of the case; (NHRC, 2010, p.5).

It is therefore not surprising that the Commission, even with the enforceable power that the NHRC (Amendment) Act 2010 confers on it, now embraces and engages in more pragmatic approaches including education and enlightenment programmes and media advocacy just as other NGOs with no enforceable authority.

Education is considered a key factor of the pragmatic approach, but such education goes beyond the formal, largely Western-oriented education. In the view of one of the respondents,
the ills in our society are there because “the moral values that you hold in education have been removed a long time ago”(Res XXIV). He argues further that “The local context is very important. So gone are the days when communities are so important. The sense of community is gone. It is gone completely. People set up schools for profit and once it is profitable the kernel of it is lost”. This view is corroborated by a vivid illustration given by Respondent XVI of a community, Garanja Village in Kogi State where 12 years after Initiatives for Grassroots Advancement (INGRA) campaigned on its behalf for the abolition of girl-child hawking (a huge concern at the time for the community due to the high spate of rape and associated crimes) and for the establishment of schools, there remains a limited number of schools (perhaps just one primary school) largely private-owned.

A direct correlation between increasing privatization of public services, which is usually neo-liberal principles and conditions of development assistance, and growing alienation, and consequently conflict, including the Boko Haram conflict can be established. In the case of the Boko Haram, its purported rejection of Western education can be seen as a reaction to what Western education is seen to represent-an entrenchment of individualism and contrariwise, subversion of the sense of community, which is, in its own case, the Islamic religion. Hence, the idea of SSI and other educational interventions in the NE will perhaps be more effective if they consider such dynamics. It is within this perspective that one can fully appreciate the reform of the Alma Jiri school system by the Goodluck Jonathan’s administration. President Jonathan’s administration sought to integrate the popular Islamic learning system (the traditional Tsangaya/Qur’anic school) in northern Nigeria with the formal education system which is largely Western oriented. This initiative offers the opportunity to integrate Western conflict resolution mechanisms with traditional approaches as the literature recommends (Zartman, 2000; Paden, 2005).
Another aspect of a localized approach evident in the result is the use of informal conflict resolution mechanism reflective of the pre-colonial age-grade or social grouping restorative approach (Oshita, 2007). UNDP is leading intervention in this regard in the NE, particularly with its ongoing meetings with women peacebuilding groups at the community level in the region. But the remit of these informal structures does not go beyond peacebuilding, conflict mediation and reconciliation. The engagement of UNDP in this regard is “constrained because informal institutions are not recognised or provide justice in Nigeria even though some of them do “(Respondent XIX). RELIEF provides an example of such informal peace and conflict resolution architecture in Okene Central Senatorial District, but as Respondent XIX points out, the traditional approaches are only limited to non-criminal issues (largely civil issues). But by-and-large, non-legalistic strategies such as public discussion, enlightenment, media advocacy and mediation are becoming increasingly important as alternative and effective approaches. And even more striking is the fact that these approaches are no longer exclusive to NGOs and CSOs and CBOs. Government institutions and frameworks such as NHRC also use them.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the extent of development intervention as a CT strategy to the Boko Haram conflict. Although the Nigerian military and the MNJTF continue their military campaign against the group, which despite degraded in terms of attacking capabilities, remain dangerous, yet more CT strategies are gearing towards non-military approaches. The CT policies and strategies of both external and internal interveners reflect the new thinking that development response presents a viable solution to the Boko Haram conflict. Generally, there seems to be, in principle, a much more developed understanding of the relationship between development and security than in practice. The UN leads in promoting comprehensive, coordinated and consistent international, regional and national efforts that
seek a development path to global security, principally within the discourse of CT. In its Global CT Strategy, the UN recognizes that “development, peace and security, and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing” (Global Counterterrorism Strategy, 2006, p.2). Similar views are found in the CT strategy documents of the U.S. for instance. Nigeria, like many sovereign nations, has developed its own national CT strategy (NACTEST) and (NSS). These strategies are focusing more on prevention including addressing the structural conditions conducive for terrorism such as poverty, inequality, exclusion and social injustice or lack of access to justice among many other factors.

External intervention in the Boko Haram conflict shows evidence of this. The UK, U.S. Canada, Norway and global organisations such as UN and WB and regional bodies such as the EU, and ECOWAS and international NGOs, development and humanitarian agencies are coordinating development efforts towards the Boko Haram conflict. However, from the external development partners’ angle, their development interventions are largely based on the need to guarantee their own security, prosperity and values, as demonstrated by the integration of their development departments and agendas with their defense and diplomatic engagements. More so, their funding approach in Nigeria and their largely focused attention on short-term intervention in the NE undermines the notion of sustainable development that underpins the Post-MDG development agenda, the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

On the other hand, the national government’s development interventions still appear to be one that “transfers development responsibility to outsiders (particularly the West), and ultimately sets itself up for imposition of Western “model of social transformation” (Ake, 2001, p.9). Additionally, development programmes become a tool of corruption and
embezzlement. But this is also not entirely true as the result shows. Some of the internal development initiatives by the Nigerian government are ineffective because of lack of capacity and misplacement of development priorities. The Nigerian government provides counterpart funds and most times makes the initial financial contribution to many of the joint development interventions carried out with its international development partners. So, we see some sense of responsibility by the Nigerian state, although not fully developed as there is still confusion surrounding who leads the intervention in the NE.

The lack of capacity argument is therefore more tenable if we consider the international development partners’ investment in capacity building of the local civil society infrastructures and the state institutions. For instance, UNDP is training police officers in the area of human rights especially in conducting CT operations in the NE. It is also supporting immigration services such as National Agency on Prevention of Trafficking Persons (NAPTIP) “to be able to profile cases of cross-border terrorist, you know-apprehension, identification, apprehension and arrest and proper profiling through ICT system”(Respondent XIX). DFID’s JFA and NSRP also contribute to boosting capacity in the police and judicial sectors. These interventions confirm the direction and belief of external development partners that long term and sustainable development can only be achieved through the direct intervention by the internal authorities including state and non-state actors within the state. The results further prove that a more localised and contextualised strategy present a viable and long term solution against the insurgency.

This chapter offers some form of clarity to the motive of external interveners in the Boko Haram crisis. On one hand, it supports the argument in the literature that external development assistance is driven by the interveners’ strategic interest, which in this case,
involves the attempt to protect their own security, prosperity and values. On the other, the funding approach and implementation strategy adopted by the international development partners in the Boko Haram case undermines sustainable development and violates the core principles of human rights that include participation and inclusion. The effect of sacrificing sustainable development far outweighs the question of corruption and incapacity of the Nigerian government and local NGOs. But this does not seem to be a deliberate policy, at least on the surface. It may therefore be a question of finding a fine balance between these two conflicting elements. Perhaps the capacity building aspect of the intervention will help resolve the conflict. But the impact of this is still negligible. The growing preference for a development approach and the human rights principles of inclusion, participation, transparency and accountability adopted in some of the development initiatives such as the MDTF projects a positive outlook. This thesis therefore presents a huge opportunity for moving these debates forward with a view to tightening some of the loose knots.
Chapter Seven: A Comparative Analysis of Niger Delta and Boko Haram Conflicts

7.0 Introduction

The Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies present useful materials that make for a rich comparative study. The last two chapters produced evidence to show that there has been a deliberate shift from past approaches, largely military and top-down development strategies, towards more participatory, bottom-up development and non-kinetic approaches to countering insurgency and terrorism. However, whilst the military response is not yet obsolete, there is at the very least, an integrated approach that combines defence or security with development strategies. This is reflected in the national security strategies and foreign development policies of most Western governments and external interveners. The argument for a development approach becomes even more persuasive in a developing country like Nigeria with abundant evidence of the contemporary global security threats such as poverty, underdevelopment, inequality and, insurgency. In both insurgencies, the Nigerian State is increasingly applying a development approach; yet, a military response remains predominant especially in the Boko Haram conflict. The military strategy has produced some relatively positive impacts in the Boko Haram conflict, while it has produced almost a nil effect in curbing the Niger Delta insurgency. A more common ground is established in the negative impact of the military strategy on the transformation of the insurgencies from social movements to insurgency (for Niger Delta) and terrorism (Boko Haram). The military response is responsible for escalating and sustaining the conflicts.

Ultimately, there seems to be a growing preference for development responses to both conflict groups. Both conflicts are identified with similar structural preconditions including poverty, underdevelopment and inequality. Significantly, as the threats are globalised so are
the responses. Hence, the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies attract both local and foreign development interventions. However, there are still contentions regarding who leads the intervention, especially in the case of Boko Haram. We see evidence of the old argument regarding the tendency of transferring development responsibilities to external (largely Western) interveners. More so, the development interventions by both the Nigerian government and external development partners demonstrate proclivity towards securitisation. Development intervention becomes, deliberately or inadvertently, a tool of control (Duffield, 2010) or manipulation (Ake, 1996) such that it is used to manage rather than resolve conflicts with strong tendency of stoking further conflict and maintaining the global status quo. While there is still manifestation of this in the responses to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts, we are beginning to see a new awareness of a rights based approach that seeks to eliminate the inclination towards securitisation in the development approaches of the internal and external interveners. There is also a new attitude towards development responsibility. This chapter will show how all of these manifest by comparing the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies.

7.1 Similarities and Differences in the Nature and Characteristics of the Niger Delta and Boko Haram Insurgencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Niger Delta</th>
<th>Boko Haram</th>
<th>Niger Delta</th>
<th>Boko Haram</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theatre of Operation</strong></td>
<td>Carries out its insurgent and militant activities in Nigeria and on the Gulf Coast of Guinea that include pirate attacks on foreign vessels, bombing of MNOCs’ facilities and kidnapping of foreigners.</td>
<td>Carries out terrorist acts in Nigeria and outside Nigeria that include foreign targets including the use of kidnapping and suicide bombing</td>
<td>Operates mainly in the South-South states of Nigeria: Rivers, Delta, Bayelsa and Akwa Ibom and the remaining five states constituting the Niger Delta region, and across the Gulf Coast of Guinea</td>
<td>Operates mainly in the North-East of Nigeria, across the other northern states, Middle Belt states and across the Lake Chad Basin Countries including the Republics of Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Motivation</strong></td>
<td>At a deeper level, there is common grievances such as social injustice, poverty, underdevelopment, elite corruption and manipulation. Ken Sarowiwa was executed by the government</td>
<td>Shared socio-economic grievances Mohammed Yusuf was murdered extra judicially by the Nigerian police force</td>
<td>Struggle for self-determination, resource control, equitable resource distribution, political inclusion and greater environmental protection</td>
<td>A jihadist movement driven by a radical and extremist ideology seeking to overthrow the Nigerian secular state and enshrine a strict sharia system of governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mass Support</strong></td>
<td>There is strong mass support</td>
<td>There was a significant level of mass support especially at the early stages, before the adoption of suicide bombing and other mass punishment inflicting strategies</td>
<td>Popular mass support remains steadfast as the causes and theme of the struggle remain constant</td>
<td>No popular support. At best, the tacit support is coerced or best interpreted as indifference</td>
</tr>
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### Modules

**Operandi**
- Use of guerrilla tactics including ambush, kidnapping and hostage taking and armed assault
- Similar trend in the use of guerrilla strategies
- There has been no deliberate attack on civilian population. Kidnapping and hostage-taking tilt more towards criminality as a money-making venture. Most hostages are released when ransom is paid. Use of terrorist tools largely suicide bombing and deliberate attack on civilian populations. Kidnapping and hostage-taking serve more purposes other than as a source of terrorist funding. Hostages are used as human bombs, human shields, sex slaves, terrorist recruits among many others.

### Membership Strength

**Tens of thousands, up to 50,000.**
- Composed of different factions which managed to unite under MEND. The majority of the militants are Ijaw (making about eighty percent of), but there are also militants and factions from other ethnic groups such as the Itsekiri and Ogoni.
- Tens of thousands. Factionalised with up to three to six factions. The majority of its members, especially its executive members or leaders are from a particular ethnic group, Kanuri. Its members are varied including Hausas and Fulanis.
- Active fighters could have been up to 50,000 including 30,000 documented ex-insurgents that received the government amnesty in 2009. There is no evidence of forced conscript. Less clandestine in nature.
- There is no known figure. There are different accounts. But the figure has been put between 5000 and 15,000. But this is a conservative figure considering the group’s use of forced conscripts and paid-to-fight membership. More clandestine.
| External Impact | Its insurgent activities affect international economy. Nigeria is rich in oil and natural gas | Its insurgent and terrorist activities affects international security. Boko Haram is a part of the global and transnational terrorist network. It has affiliations with ISIS/IS, al-Qaeda, AQIM and other terrorist groups in the continent. |
7:2 Similarities and Differences in the Responses to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram Insurgencies

7.2.1 Military Responses

Unarguably, the Nigerian state’s approach to conflict resolution is predominantly reactionary and military in nature. The choice of military response to civil and internal conflict is not unrelated to Nigeria’s peculiar political history—one characterised by long years of military rule. The long years of military rule has badly damaged democratic values and created a psyche of violence (Akinrinade, 2006). In this regard, the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts have attracted excessive use of force by the Nigerian state with its security apparatus, especially its police and military.
While there are similarities in the consequences engendered by the overly military response in both conflicts, the differences between the Niger Delta and Boko Haram manifest only in the pattern and dynamics of the responses including the state and insurgent responses. In the case of the Niger Delta, a development response predates the military response, while military response predates development response (and continues to be the main approach) in the Boko Haram case. Despite the differences, both conflicts have attracted disproportionate use of military force by the Nigerian state. For the oil-related Niger Delta conflict, there is “no simple or linear evolution in the pattern and dynamics. It has mutated and hybridized in complex ways” (Joab-Peterside, Porter & Watts, 2012, p.6). However, the prevalent approach remains development strategies. The pre-Independence Report prepared by Sir Henry Willink-Her Majesty’s representative in Nigeria identified the Niger Delta region as a “Special Area” requiring special development intervention. It is therefore not surprising that “over the years, there have been several commissions and boards set up because of the peculiar nature of that region” (Res XI). However, the face of the Niger Delta struggle (which was largely non-violent) has changed since 1995 following the execution of its protagonist, Ken Saro-Wiwa with other eight Ogoni leaders by the junta government of General Sani Abacha.

More military responses against the Ijaw group from 1998 to 2003 only led to the proliferation of militant groups in the region and produced hardened and resilient insurgents. Hence, from 2004 until 2009 when the government offered amnesty to militants who surrendered their arms, the Nigerian state endured a systematic attack on its major source of revenue-oil. The military response to the Niger Delta crisis including the creation of a joint task force (JTF) in May 2009 had very little impact in hurting the capacity and capabilities of the Niger Delta militants. Unlike the Niger Delta, the military approach has produced some positive results in the Boko Haram conflict. The JTF, established in 2011, curbed the
ambitious spread of Boko Haram between 2011 and 2013. Between these periods, Boko Haram attacked targets outside its North-East epicentre including the federal capital territory (FCT), North-West states such as Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto and North Central states such as Kogi and Plateau. Likewise, the MNJTF has played a vital role in defeating Boko Haram’s more ambitious agenda-territorial control. Between 2014 and 2015, Boko Haram seized and controlled a substantial land mass in NE Nigeria. This could be seen as a pointer to its effort to re-establish the defunct Kanem-Borno Empire-a direct challenge to the traditional and religious authority of the leaders of the Sokoto Caliphate. However, the popular view is that Boko Haram’s territorial pursuit is incidental, one that is inspired by ISIS’ similar goal in the Middle East. What is more important here is that the regional force, constituting armies of Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger and Benue helped the Nigerian force re-claim the lands under Boko Haram’s control as well as rebuild its image. There is no doubt that multilateral cooperation provides some real legitimacy to the cooperating armies rather than unilateral CT (Pressman, 2007).

Evidently, the military response to terrorism remains important. Yet, its effectiveness seems to be guaranteed within the framework of multilateral (for example, MNJTF) or inter-agency (JTF) cooperation. A war approach, especially one pursued unilaterally, presents a huge risk of escalating and protracting violent conflict (Crenshaw, 2000; Schmid, 2005; Kiras, 2007). Undoubtedly, states fighting terrorism are required to “maintain the moral high-ground in the struggle with terrorists by defending and strengthening the rule of law, good governance, democracy and social justice” (Schmid, 2005, p.144). There seems to be a high chance of achieving this in a multilateral or inter-agency CT alliance than a unilateral arrangement. This perhaps partly explains why the military failed in countering the Niger Delta insurgency.

In the first instance, the military response to the largely non-violent Niger Delta struggle was inappropriate. The military, in this instance, was used as an instrument of the state and as a
force of occupation with a self-serving interest: to protect the profitable venture controlled by the state in alliance with the MNOCs. The heavy-handed approach used by the military and the militarisation of the Niger Delta region were encouraged by the state and the MNOCs. In essence, the political economy is higher in the Niger Delta than in the Boko Haram conflict. The military in Nigeria remains almost solely responsible for CI and CT. However, there was a brief moment of successful inter-agency cooperation in the defunct JTF (2011-2013) against Boko Haram’s initial advancement.

It was seamless and it was effective. It was so effective that the SSS, for example, was intercepting phone conversations of the insurgents, their plans, intended targets, where weapons are being expected from, date operations are to be carried out, they were intercepting it and they were relaying it to JTF and to the other services. And actions were taken in conjunction (Res IX).

This was before the government declared a State of Emergency in 2013. That JTF was disbanded and CT power was given exclusively to the Nigerian military, leading to grave human rights violation-one not uncommon in a unilateral arrangement. Respondent I presents a contrary description of the defunct JTF-one where “rather than coordination, there was rivalry and competition amongst the security forces”. Although, the cooperation between the security agencies in the JTF did not remain beautiful and seamless for long as described by Respondent IX, the JTF recorded some considerable level of success against the Boko Haram group. However, the Nigerian state continues to seek ways to coordinate and synchronise its CT strategy. This effort is led by ONSA

But there is still gap between that cluster and the police for instance and between that cluster with the police on the peripheral of it and the other security agencies like civil defence, like immigration, like customs…I mean there is just simply the absence… Again it’s also because of the dominant strategy even when it was decided to have a coordinated approach to combating the insurgency; it is a military strategy, that of a military defeat (Res I).
Hence, we see that the response towards insurgency in Nigeria is overtly military in orientation. One way to reduce the negative effect of military approach is through enhanced civil-military cooperation (Kiras, 2007; Kaldor, 2005; Schmid, 2005). This is becoming quite commonplace in the Boko Haram case than in the Niger Delta. For the latter, the government has reverted to non-military strategies following the granting of amnesty to the Niger Delta militants in 2009, although the military has been deployed in some instances. Coincidentally, the Boko Haram conflict turned violent in 2009, the same year that the Niger Delta militants accepted the government’s amnesty. More so, there are other internal conflicts across the six geopolitical zones that stretch the capacity of the Nigerian security agencies and account for the yearly increase in the budget for defence and security. Nigeria seems to be “spending at least a third of its budgeted resources around fighting insecurity” (Respondent VIII). Ultimately, the overt military approach to insurgency in Nigeria is becoming expensive both in financial and humanitarian sense.

On a positive note, there seems to be a growing cooperation between the Nigerian military and CSOs including pro-State armed group (CJTF). The civilian-military relationship, especially the one between the military and the CJTF is proving very useful—one that will be discussed under the civilian structure response heading. In this section, what is clearly important is the need to adopt a multilateral, often international relations approach to CT. For instance, the UNSC resolutions of 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), 2161 (2014), 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014) and 2253 (2015) aim to disrupt the transnational nature of terrorism. To elucidate, paragraph 4 of Resolution 2178 (2014):

*Calls upon* all Member States, in accordance with their obligations under international law, to cooperate in efforts to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including by preventing the radicalization to terrorism and recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters, including children, preventing foreign terrorist fighters from crossing their borders, disrupting and preventing financial support to foreign terrorist fighters, and developing and
implementing prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fighters;

Resolution 2199 (2015) is quite specific in its mandate. In terms of oil trade (amongst other specific such as arms and banking), paragraph 14:

*Calls upon* Member States to improve international, regional, and sub-regional cooperation, including through increased sharing of information for the purpose of identifying smuggling routes used by ISIL and ANF, and for Member States to consider provision of technical assistance and capacity building to assist other Member States to counter smuggling of oil and oil products, and modular refineries and related material, by ISIL, ANF and any other individual, group, undertaking or entity associated with Al-Qaida;

In the fight against Niger Delta, the U.S, and other key international players have supported Nigeria’s military effort against the militant activities of the Niger Delta insurgents. The Nigerian military/navy has received training, and Nigeria has received military naval ships and other military resources to deal with the surge of piracy and oil theft in the region.

Although the Nigerian government has received military assistance towards the fight against Boko Haram, it is valid to state that, compared to the Niger Delta, the military assistance is negligible. For instance, it was only in 2014 following the 14 April kidnap of the Chibok school girls and the Nyanya bomb attack in Abuja that we began to see direct military assistance. Prior to the 14 April 2014 terrorist incidences, “there was no appetite for that” (Res III). However, “few months later, we had British military guys in uniform on the ground assisting, meeting on a daily basis in Abuja with Nigerian colleagues, working with the French and Americans” (Res III). The reluctance of the international community to render military assistance to the Nigerian government’s CT effort towards Boko Haram, in comparison to the military assistance to the Niger Delta, is perhaps because the Boko Haram conflict presented little economic incentive.

The change in attitude is not unrelated to Boko Haram’s affiliation with other deadly global terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. Such transition and growing capacity to
threaten the security and prosperity of Western nations account for the increasing military assistance to the Nigerian government in its fight against Boko Haram. For instance, the 14 April 2014 Boko Haram’s attack “affected the way that the UK saw its own security” (Res III). This somehow justifies Duffield’s (2007, 2010) view that external intervention is driven by the need for Western nations to protect the values and lifestyles of the “insured” citizens of the world against the “uninsured”. Essentially, the concept of human security appears vague. A less critical explanation of why most Western governments refused to provide military assistance to Nigeria in its fight against Boko Haram is because of the issue of gross human rights violation. Since the State of Emergency, the Nigerian military has been accused of gross violation of human rights (AI, 2014, 2015; HRW, 2013, 2014). The U.S., particularly, refused to sell arms to Nigeria based on the Leahy Vetting Process. The Leahy Vetting Process is based on U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that requires the DoS and DoD to vet foreign partners for human rights compliance to determine eligibility or continuation of military assistance and training of foreign security forces.

Although the Nigerian military did indeed commit grave acts of human rights violation, refusing to provide military support on such ground becomes questionable when the external interveners who are largely Western nations struggle to show a high moral ground. Since 9/11 and with growing terrorist attacks in Western nations, leaders of liberal democracies in the West have been forced to adopt illiberal practices that include restricting human rights and freedoms (freedom of speech and of religious affiliation, for example). There seems to be some form of meta-dialogue in the actions of terrorists and reactions by Western governments (Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005). Hence, beyond having strategic interest in their intervention, external interveners (in this instance, Western governments) show willingness to compromise their liberal principles for strategic gain (Doyle, 1983; Stedman,
In this regard, one can relate with the frustration expressed by Respondent II: “there’s a sense in which I feel agitated as a Nigerian when I hear the British, the Americans making all these claims, when they have the glaring evidence of their own total lack of respect for human rights in moments of tensional crises” (Res II). Although there are accounts of the use of torture and suspension of some citizens’ rights by some Western governments battling terrorism in recent times, there is no evidence of a “total lack of respect for human rights” as expressed by Respondent II.

The decision not to intervene militarily in the Boko Haram conflict is likely a result of fatigue and the undesirable consequences emerging from Western interventions in Iraq and Libya. “The UK (and Western allies) had just been involved in two very long, costly and sad wars in Libya and Iraq” (Res III). Although a valid argument, it is interesting to compare the Boko Haram situation to the West’s reluctance in intervening in Darfur (a conflict considered to be well-deserving of humanitarian intervention) (Williams & Bellamy, 2005) and the West’s supposed partiality in the Israel/Palestine crisis (Ayoob, 2004) for instance. While not eliminating the important factor of strategic interest and selective intervention in external support, what becomes more pertinent is the declining attraction for military intervention. Yet, military response remains necessary, as the UK considers “a much longer term really offering our training to the Nigerian military” (Respondent III). However, for military approach to be effective, it has to be coordinated with the soft approach. This perhaps accounts for the integration of defence, development and diplomacy as a single policy by the UK government and other Western governments including the U.S. This effort however presents a real risk of development securitisation. But, it does offer some benefits to civil-military relations.
7.2.2 Community/Civilian/Non-State Responses

The emergence of the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies correspond to the turn of the Millennium and Nigeria’s return to liberal democracy in 1999. Nigeria endured military rule consecutively for 16 years (1983-1999). As mentioned in the previous section, the long years of military rule produced a psyche of violent reaction exhibited, sadly, by both the civilian and security structures (Akinrinna, 2006). CSOs played a very important role in brokering the return to civilian government through their vibrant activism against successive military regimes. Significantly, this history of antagonism continues to impede the relation between the state and the civil society, although “to a large extent, we have strengthened our civil-military relations platform” (Res XIV). Returning to the wake of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (1999 till date), we witness a resurgence of ethnic based organisations such as the IYC, OPC, Bakassi Boys, MOSOP and several vigilante groups in the north, known as Hishba police (Sharia police). These non-state actors, mostly CSOs took on the responsibility of law and order. They were also funded and supported by the state (Oyeniyi, 2010).

The long years of military rule greatly damaged the capacity of the police—the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) was hugely underfunded and incapacitated. The NPF was ill-prepared to deal with the growing insecurities and inter-ethnic conflicts that emerged following the return to civilian rule. Hence, law and order became the responsibility of the military and ethnic based vigilante groups. In the Niger Delta, MOSOP and IYC stand out among 100s of CSOs. The Ogoni Bill of Rights (1990) by MOSOP and Kaiama Declaration (1998) by IYC helped to shape the Niger Delta struggle. However, these civil society organisations appear limited by their ethnic colouration-MOSOP (Ogoni ethnic group) and IYC (Ijaw ethnic group). Arguably, they fail to represent the interest of all the ethnic groups in the Niger Delta region.
Unsurprisingly, the Niger Delta region is rife with inter-ethnic rivalry, competition and conflict (Ijaw versus Itsekeri, Bomadi versus Ororoama).

While the CSOs pursued mostly ethnic or regional agendas, these limited drives somehow resonated with the national struggle. For instance, ethnic, religious and other primordial identities became easy outlet for the economic hardship produced by SAP (Jega, 2000). One of such ethnic-based CSOs is the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), formed on 15 May 1994. Significantly, the membership of NADECO is Yoruba; based in the South-West (Osaghae, 1998, p.294). NADECO was mainly established to protest General Ibrahim Babaginda’s (Head of State, 1985-1993) annulment of the 12 June 1993 Presidential election won by Moshood Kashimawo Abiola (MKO)-a Yoruba. However, NADECO soon became the face of mass resistance against military rule, now led by General Sani Abacha, President Babaginda’s successor (Khadiagala, 2001, p.30).

The posture of mass struggle against the oppressive regime of General Abacha justified NADECO’s militant activities (including series of bombings of military targets), but failed to mask its ethnic composition and agenda. As such, ethnic/regional agendas more often than not overlap with national struggles in a way that ethnic identities and other primordial identities are de-emphasised. Hence, Tar (2008) is not wrong in casting the relationship between the Nigerian state and the CSOs in terms of class war. It is therefore fascinating that the Niger Delta has been able to unite in their armed struggle against the State/MNOCs alliance, despite the distinct ethnic composition of Niger Delta groups such as MOSOP and IYC. The Niger Delta was able to rise above ethnic jingoism and then couch their struggle in a much wider sense that identified with the struggle expressed by other ethnicities.
We express our solidarity with all peoples, organisations and ethnic nationalities in Nigeria and elsewhere who are struggling for self-determination and justice. In particular we note the struggle of the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (Mosop), Egi Women’s Movement etc. (Resolution 6, \textit{Kaiama Declaration} 1998, p.3).

While political dialogue, activism and non-violent peaceful demonstrations were applied before, from 2004 to 2009, the Niger Delta struggle turned violent. This coincided with the emergent of armed groups such as NDVPF, NDV and MEND. MEND, in particular, provided the overarching guidance and leadership in the armed struggle against the Nigerian state and the MNOCs. It is important to appreciate and further study how MEND was able to secure the loyalties and coordinate the insurgent activities of over 100 smaller militant groups. There are other CSOs in the Niger Delta including research-based CSOs and CBOs that are contributing to improving the lot of the Niger Delta people by beaming light on the Niger Delta struggle as well as the responses to them.

In the case of Boko Haram, unlike the Niger Delta, there is a profound lack of CSO influence. Although there is a growing number of CSOs and CBOs working in the NE and towards the Boko Haram insurgency, in terms of capacity, Respondent V states that “it’s non-existent”. The insurgency has displaced traditional authority, religious authority and the civil society structure. Hence, the insecurity that that creates makes it difficult for interveners to “know exactly what is happening” (Res V). However, “besides the insecurity, (there) is the lack of people or organisations to partner with” (Respondent VI). Most CSOs working towards the Boko Haram insurgency operate outside the epicenter of the insurgency, largely in capital cities such as Abuja. We see therefore a huge vacuum in the NE filled with individual as well as collective community response. “Some of the most significant and the most obvious community collective responses, which actually arose as individual response, is the Civilian JTF which the community then owned” (Res I).
The NE communities responded to Boko Haram's aggression and the government forces’ oppression by setting up vigilante groups, the most prominent being the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). CJTF multiplied across several NE communities and became “the first line of defense and protection for the communities” (Res I). CJTF has shown resilience against the insurgents and produced impressive counterinsurgency capability that has hurt the advances of Boko Haram. The success of CJTF is based on its knowledge of the local terrain, language and other cultural and context-based identifiers (Res XXII). Abubakar Shekau’s war declaration against the CJTF and the co-option of CJTF into a formal CT alliance with the Nigerian military are testaments to their effectiveness.

CJTF has worked alongside the Nigerian army and has been instrumental in the counterterrorism progress against Boko Haram. However, CJTF now poses a huge threat as many fear what the militarisation of civilians, youths portends for the long term stability of the NE. Respondent XIV expresses his fear in the following statements: “And one other issue that needs to be looked at very critically as a time-bomb is the CJTF situation in that region. Because people are just seeing them as...but the next five, ten years the CJTF will become a group that will also begin to make demands because of their large numbers and the size they have come to” (Res XIV). Respondent I expresses similar stance when he says that: “we are going to have challenge with the CJTF. It’s already there “. The uncertainty of the future of the NE especially in relation to the CJTF as it relates to the end of the funding cycle for DFID’s flagship programme, Justice for All is expressed by Respondent VI “So we don’t exactly what we will do on that security and justice in the future when Justice for All is finishing in December. But if there were so many level of continuation of our engagement with security and justice one way or another, we might also be looking at CJTF aspect either at policy level or centrally or more practical committee level on the ground” (Res VI).
Therefore, we see that while civil-military cooperation is crucial to CT/CI, it becomes important to differentiate between non-armed CSOs such as CISLAC and CEPI, and armed non-state groups like CJTF. Civil-military CT/CI cooperation is useful as it can confer legitimacy on the military and help it gain the support of the population (by isolating the insurgents) (Kaldor, 2005; Kiras, 2007). The cooperation between the CJTF and the Nigerian military clearly confirms the benefit of such cooperation. However, while CJTF appears to be pro-State by taking up arms mainly against Boko Haram insurgents, it is important to analyse how it is different from the Boko Haram group and the implication their armed struggle has on the dynamics of the insurgency. CJTF therefore falls under the label counterinsurgency group-representing a “quasi-privatisation of state’s monopoly of violence” (Arjonas & Kalyvas, 2008, p.4). Hence, in the NE, the absence or decline of formal institutions of authority (such as the traditional rulers, religious leaders and state agencies such as the police) accounts for the rise of CJTF. Yet, as the military, with help from the CJTF, scores an important victory against the insurgents, there will be need to consider the new role of CJTF as they are already militarised.

Should the Nigerian government deal with the CJTF as it dealt with the leaders of Niger Delta? Interestingly, the leaders of the Niger Delta militant groups received big money contracts that included securing oil infrastructures in exchange for preventing insurgency in the region, as part of the amnesty deal. In essence, material reward and non-material incentives may be useful to give to the CJTF as the insurgency winds down. Arjona and Kalyvas (2008) find grievance to be constant for both rebel groups and counterinsurgent groups, but significantly find counterinsurgent groups to be more attracted to greed-both material and non-material inducement. If there is anything to learn from the Niger Delta
amnesty, whilst promise of material reward may have helped the Niger Delta insurgents surrender their arm, the absence of development or failure to address the underlying development issues continues to provide the incentive for the rise of insurgency in the region. Militancy and insurgency are resurging in the Niger Delta region. Therefore, it is prudent to learn from the mistake of the Niger Delta and deal with the preconditions that led to the Boko Haram insurgency. As noted by Respondent I “it is also the same dynamic that gave birth to the Civilian JTF”. The Nigerian government has applied several measures to address the insurgencies, including effort at a Niger Delta-styled amnesty.

7.2.3 Presidential Amnesty

The Niger Delta amnesty has been lauded as one of the most successful non-military approach to the Niger Delta insurgency and has been cited as a model and inspiration for a proposed Boko Haram amnesty. Such proposal and even the Niger Delta amnesty have generated mixed feelings in the literature. Some scholars see it as gateway to a long term development plan (see Onuoha, 2011; Yusuf, 2014). These scholars often base their arguments on the maxim: there cannot be development without security (and there cannot be security without development). While this is true, the good intentions of the development interveners are often defeated owing to a wrong approach.

Despite the obvious benefits of the government amnesty, the Niger Delta amnesty continues to be criticised and seen as a bad model for Boko Haram proposed amnesty (Sampson, 2013). The criticism becomes even more poignant as northern elites especially northern legislators are proposing to replicate the 2001 Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in the northeast (proposed Northeast Development Commission). These attempts have often
attracted criticisms but perhaps they just show that the Boko Haram insurgency and the Niger Delta insurgency share more in common as much as there are differences.

However, the success of the Niger Delta amnesty programme seems to be overshadowed by the fact that it is little just more than pay-out to militants, hence a reward to insurgency and disregard to the plight of the victims (Sampson, 2013). According to Respondent XIII, a Nigerian military captain and intelligence officer involved in counterterrorism operations against Boko Haram, the stipend (NGR N65, 000) given to the militants was based on the number and type of weapons possessed by the different Niger Delta militant camps. For instance, “for each automatic rifles, it gives them three slots and each slot is N65,000 per month (while) for a very heavy machine gun, a branded machine gun, .50MM, you are entitled to ten slots” (Res XIII). Hence, the leaders of the camp enriched themselves by appropriating the money for the whole group. This led to a second agitation (which was successful) and an unsuccessful third phase bid which continues to resurface as evident by the rise of militancy and militant groups in the Niger Delta.

The Nigerian government, under the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan pursued several dialogues with the Boko Haram insurgents with the objective of offering them a Niger delta-styled amnesty. None was successful. Unlike the Niger Delta, the leadership of Boko Haram has been vocal in its condemnation of any dialogue or negotiation with the Nigerian government. Not until recently, the Nigerian government would have therefore been dialoguing with Boko Haram impostors or at the very least, with less influential Boko Haram factions. Perhaps, the reason why Boko Haram amnesty failed to materialise was because Boko Haram could not present a united front like MEND (in the case of Niger Delta) that could accommodate all the interests of its fractured groups. To be clear, Niger Delta insurgents were fragmented into several groups numbering up to 100, but they managed to coalesce in their struggle. Therefore, it is perhaps more rewarding to ask if the absence of a
unified front rather than difficult, incoherent and impossible demands present a more plausible explanation for why a Boko Haram’s amnesty has failed to find traction. This is more tenable for a clandestine group such as Boko Haram. Even for an economically driven insurgent group such as Niger Delta, the amnesty has generated no little criticism.

Hence, we can understand the opposition to the proposed Boko Haram amnesty, especially one modelled on the Niger Delta. While the Niger Delta insurgency presents an identifiable cause that makes amnesty tenable, the lack of a clear or better still the absence of a popular cause makes amnesty to Boko Haram unattractive. More so, the terrorist dimension in Boko Haram's activities seems to foreclose any chance of amnesty. According to Respondent XIII:

> The amnesty here (proposed Boko Haram amnesty); I don’t think it will work. Many people won’t support it. Compared to the Niger Delta, it has a cause, and if you check the way they were attacking, it was mainly sabotage. They had no cause to attack the military. Only cause to attack the military is when the military is defending those infrastructures. You know they didn’t go around ravaging communities, attacking women and children...Here, what is their cause? They want to turn the state into a sharia state (Res XIII).

Hence, those who canvass for amnesty for Boko Haram and for the establishment of the North East Development Commission (NEDC) may be acting within the remit of the principle of consociation. This is to be differentiated from a human rights based approach to development that requires equal or equitable development interventions.

### 7.2.4 Development Approach

Undeniably, the transformation of the Niger Delta struggle from a simple and non-violent agitation into a violent armed insurgency is due to the undue use of military force starting from around 1995 into early 2000. Yet, in comparison to the Boko Haram conflict, the Niger Delta region has attracted a much more development response. It is only recently that development strategies towards the Boko Haram conflict seems to be appreciated. The
resilience of the Boko Haram insurgents to the Nigerian military’s CT effort, including the combined military efforts of the regional forces; MNJTF and the support from the UNSC make the development approach expedient. The Nigerian government, despite the military support from the UNSC in terms of reconnaissance, surveillance and technical assistance, was only able, in 2017, to secure the negotiated release of a total of 103 out of the 276 schoolgirls kidnapped by Boko Haram in 2014. The girls were released in two batches of 21 and 82 each several months apart after the negotiated settlement with Boko Haram for the release of some detained Boko Haram commanders. This clearly indicates the failure or mildly speaking, limitation of military approach. Simply, “it didn’t work. We couldn’t find the girls” (Res III).

Unsurprisingly, “the UK decided that its priorities were best on acts through development” (Res III). The focus on development approach has gained much attention since the 14 April 2014 incidence, such that the UK, which before then considered Boko Haram a low priority, has managed to find more money (£7-£8 million). Unfortunately, this fund under the Conflict Stability and Security Framework (CSSF) is shared between its Defence, Foreign Office (diplomatic) and Development units—an action that tends towards development securitisation.

Internally, it was also in 2014 that the Nigerian government, through ONSA, outlined its Soft Approach to CT. The soft approach features under NACTEST- Nigeria’s national counterterrorism framework. The soft approach as we see in Chapter Six highlights four streams of intervention that include a de-radicalisation programme, community-based approach, strategic communication to improve capacity of law enforcement, and an economic revitalisation phase. Nigeria’s development intervention falls under the last phase-economic revitalisation. It is still developing, but its focus is more on humanitarian than actual economic development. PINE, VSF, SSF, and PCNI are new development initiatives by the Nigerian government towards Boko Haram. These programmes appear to be disjointed and
disconnected. PCNI represents the attempt to synchronise the programmes. Yet, they are still “scattered and ad hoc” (Res I). The programmes do not impact the lives of the NE citizens. This is not surprising as the Boko Haram victims, mostly the NE citizens are excluded from the planning and implementation of the development programmes.

For example, there is a huge amount of development funds available to PCNI, but we have seen very little impact in the lives of the victims of Boko Haram, including those in IDP camps. According to Respondent XV, PCNI “have billions of naira and not knowing what to do with it” (Res XV). He argues further that “such funds can be better managed when they cooperate with NGOs-community based organisations. And then work with the state in developing the democratic institutions on infrastructure of the state as well as trust building, enabling the required mechanism to be put in place” (Res XV). This justifies the need for a rights based approach to development-one that can help prevent misappropriation of development funds and corruption. We cannot also underestimate the genuine lack of capacity. For instance, “the UK made an independent donation to the MNJTF of £5million. We made that through the African Union. And I don’t think the money has been spent yet. We made that almost a year ago” (Res III). Hence, as discussed previously, the shocking resilience of the Boko Haram insurgency to the CT efforts by the Nigerian military and its external partners and the humanitarian challenge the conflict raises (over 2 million people are displaced) makes it expedient for the international community to support Nigeria’s CT effort.

These supports are now turning towards humanitarian and development strategies, and less on military supports. For instance, “the UK has probably...support in helping sponsor and develop what, they (Nigeria) call NACTEST (Res V). The development intervention is not fully developed. It is still skeletal, dependent on the outcome of several Needs Assessment carried out jointly by the GON and its international partners. There are still huge challenges
ahead including largely whose responsibility it is to lead the development intervention-the
international community or the Nigerian state?

Ultimately, responses to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts have required both
internal and external efforts. The inability of states such as Nigeria to provide governance and
security for its citizens, “things that less endowed nations take for granted” (Respondent II)
justifies the position taken by the U.S National Security Strategy regarding the need to
intervene in such weak or failed states. Such a laudable effort or intention however lends
itself to two discernible negative interpretations. One is the issue of securitisation, and the
other is the risk of internal governments transferring development responsibility to external
governments. On the first, there is very little attempt by external interveners to conceal the
underlying motive for intervening in conflict-ridden states-the need to secure the lives and
interests of its citizens first and those of its allies (U.S NSS and EU The Cotonou
Agreement).

Similarly, in the Niger Delta, past development interventions by MNOCs such as SPDC and
CHEVRON have largely operated within the framework of CSR. Interestingly, such CSR
seems to be part of the legal requirements for obtaining licence and operating in the region.
Hence, such development interventions were not only limited, they ended up escalating the
conflict by pitting communities against one another. The MNOCs, the most obvious external
interveners in the Niger Delta, neither cared about the impact of their minimal interventions
on the material essence of the Niger Delta people nor on how they fuel further conflict. It
appeared that the MNOCs cared mostly about their profit. However, we are beginning to see
a change in approach and attitude with the shift from CSR to CSE/CSI. Chevron Nigeria
leads this approach without the necessary burden of legal requirement. CSE/CSI involves a
wider approach that seeks to reduce inter-communal conflict and genuinely improve the
material condition of a wide variety of Niger Delta citizens without necessarily concentrating
development projects only in communities with oil wells. Hence it seems that external development interveners in the Niger Delta have found a way of securing their interests at the same time guaranteeing the true development of the region. Perhaps, more important is the fact that whilst Chevron and ilk such as DFID have adopted a market approach to the development of the region, they do recognise the need of involving the Niger Delta people in the different stages of the development intervention.

Participation is one of the key elements of a human rights based approach to development. Chevron, through NDPI and PINP, has reshaped the face of development intervention in the region by its multi-stakeholder approach. Ordinary Niger Delta citizens not only have the chance to benefit directly from the interventions from NDPI and PINP, they equally have the opportunity to be involved in different stages of the development process such as the P4P and the annual dialogue. While a wide range of domestic organisations including government and NGOs and CBOs in the Niger Delta are involved in this process, Chevron still drives the intervention. External interveners such as Chevron, as is the case with DFID and USAID in the case of Boko Haram, set up and use their own structures to implement their development policies and programmes.

This reflects a general lack of trust in the capacity and character of the Nigerian government and the domestic NGOs. While there is a genuine cause of concern about incapacity and the need to reduce unintended consequences of external intervention, there is also the tendency to view the external development agencies' intervention policy (not giving money directly to the Nigerian government) as eliciting a moral superiority (Preston, 1999). This is more difficult to prove. But what is clear, especially in the case of Boko Haram is that the policy isolates the local agencies, failing to gain their trust and commitment, essential ingredients for sustainable development. Such a reaction is less evident in the Niger Delta. Chevron's lead does not seem to be eliciting issue of local ownership.
Evidently, there are mixed feelings in the literature regarding the motive for intervention. Scholars are divided on when and, especially why external agencies should intervene in internal conflicts. Even a human rights based approach to development intervention is not free of such contentions. Proponents of the human rights based approach to development deal with some of the thorny issues noticeable in the nexus between human rights and development—such as the often expressed reservation to the legal status of the human rights framework (Sen, 2004, 2010; Hausermaan, 1998; Nussbaum, 1977). On one hand, external interveners, often Western nations (especially former colonial powers) express reservation to the notion of and claim to development “right” imbued in the human rights narrative. In essence, external development intervention is still befuddled with the question of intervention as an act of charity or as a legal requirement (Preston, 1999; Sen, 2010). There seems to be no resolution to this debate in the literature. However, some scholars recognise the benefit of a non-legalistic approach (such as advocacy, open discussion) to a rights based approach to development intervention. External responses to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflict present evidence that support this argument as much as they show quite significantly an increasing normalisation of the combination of internal and external intervention. The pertinent question that remains is not about Nigeria's or Africa's reliance on external intervention (see Cooper, 1994; Herbst, 2000, 2014) but who leads the intervention—Nigeria or its external development partners?

As gleaned from the views of Respondents I, III and V the Nigerian government seems not to understand its position as the primary duty giver. The argument by Respondent III that the Nigerian government sought, at one time to transfer responsibility to the international community however does not hold much ground when we consider Nigeria's financial contribution to most of the interventions in the NE and towards Boko Haram. Nigeria contributes to nearly every single development intervention towards the Boko Haram. For
instance, it provides $USD10 million to the Safe School Initiative. It also contributes to the
MNJTF. The Nigerian government also has flagship development policies and programmes
such as NACTEST and VSF. It would therefore be unfair to argue that the Nigerian
government is transferring development responsibility to the West. However, maybe what
Respondents I, III, and V and a host of others are saying is that far more than making
financial commitment, the Nigerian government is equally expected to provide strategic
leadership.

In this regard, the Nigerian government has made more strides in the Niger Delta. Although
not without flaws, the NDDC’s NDRMP and the Ministry of Niger Delta's NDAP set the tone
and provide the strategic guidance for the noticeable change in the attitude and development
strategies adopted by external agents in the Niger Delta. This is in addition to the more
general and national development policies such as NEEDS, Vision 20:20:20 and
Transformation Agenda. What sets NDRMP and NNDAP especially NDAP apart from past
domestic development interventions is that whilst they are locally driven, the local agencies
adopt a multi-stakeholder approach involving external development partners. Similar
situation is noticeable in the Boko Haram case-as traditional development partners such as
the WB, UNDP, DFID, EU and a host of others combine effort with the Nigerian government
and other local non-governmental organisations in intervening in the NE. But unlike the
Niger Delta, there are very few or no existing regional development policies in the NE. The
development policies been developed are fairly recent and are jointly done by both the
Nigerian government and its external partners. This does not necessarily amount to
transference of development responsibility; rather what is in contention is who leads in this
intervention.

Evidently, there remains the contention regarding the notion of states having the primary
responsibility to protect. This obviously is not reassuring to the contemporary idea that
human security prevails over state security. Rather, it reinforces the predominance of state security. This is particularly evident in the reluctance of ECOWAS state governments to intervene in the internal affairs of member states. The fear of attracting undue interference in their own domestic issues also inhibited many African states from recognising the Biafran state or at least strongly condemning the Nigerian side. External interveners, particularly Western nations and Western oriented organisations are still likely constrained by the Right to Development framework. Hence, the extension of R2P to the international community and other stakeholders, as advocated by the proponents of the human rights approach to development seem to be little well received in practice. While this is apparent, the interventions in the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts reveal an increasing collaboration and normalisation of development partnership between the internal and external development agencies.

The joint collaborations in the Safe School project, CVE programme, NE Recovery and Peace building Assessment (RPBA) among several cooperation between the external and internal agencies towards the Boko Haram conflict show more of partnership than a calculated attempt to secure foreign aid and other form of external assistance as some scholars argue (Paden, 2005; Omeje, 2007). It seems contrary to views expressed by scholars such as Paris (2004), Buzan (2004) and Duffield (2007, 2010) that there is a genuine global concern with poverty, underdevelopment which necessitates a global response. These scholars are right to question the motive of the West in intervening in these places. However, there is not much veiled motive as Western interveners clearly prioritise their own security and prosperity as major motivations for intervention (US NSS).

However, the Market Development approach pursued in the Niger Delta shows how a macro development approach can be integrated with a micro approach. More so, it shows how external development interveners can genuinely intervene without hurting their profit agenda.
at the same time guaranteeing that the principles of a rights based approach (such as participation, equitable distribution of development/equality, transparency and accountability) are adhered. It seems therefore more profitable and pragmatic to accept that external intervention cannot be done without consideration of strategic interests. But ultimately this should not be the sole reason or even the major reason for intervention. As gleaned from Respondent III, there can be multiple reasons for external intervention. However, human security of all (and not just of the intervener) should prevail.

7.3 Mapping Parallels and Ramifications for Future Conflicts and the Nigerian State

Capacity to Cope

Palpably, Nigeria is conflict-ridden. Presently, we “have more varied form of insecurity, more pronounced, more endemic, in some areas more localised. And so the Nigerian state is facing a very serious problem of multiple and varied sources of threats to its security. ” (Res VIII). Ostensibly, t Boko Haram presents the most security challenge. The Boko Haram insurgency trumps every other conflict in the country in terms of the degree of violence, the number of casualty and the seeming intractableness of the insurgency.

**Number of Violent Deaths per year (2006-2014)**


Boko Haram insurgency account for the spike in the number of violent death per year starting from 2009. Before 2009, the greatest threat to Nigeria’s security was the Niger Delta insurgency. The general elections of 2007 and 2011, inter-communal/inter-religious crisis in Plateau, and the activities of the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB-a secessionist movement fighting for the resurgence of the defunct Biafra Republic) also contributed to the number of violent deaths within this period. But, without doubt, the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies remain Nigeria’s most serious conflicts (if we exclude the Biafra-Nigeria civil war) in terms of their scope of violence and international visibility. The response of the Nigerian state to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts provides lessons that can be useful to how it responds to other recurrent conflicts across the geopolitics.
7.3.1 Defining the Place of Religion

Interestingly, the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies present distinct as well as common characteristics that reflect the kind of responses they have attracted. For instance, As Respondent I notes, the Boko Haram conflict is distinguished by the “religious mix and religious contestation” (Res I). Poignantly, many Boko Haram scholars and the media often fail to differentiate between the different Islamic sects in Northern Nigeria and how such ideological differences narrow (or expand) Boko Haram’s scope. In other words, we are only presented with a limited view when we describe Boko Haram as an Islamic fundamentalist group that seeks to change the Nigerian secular state into an Islamic state ruled by Sharia state. It is important to recognise similar objectives pursued by groups in the north such as IMN and Yan Izala and the different shades of opinions and strategies they adopt. It is my contention that Boko Haram shares similar ideological stance with the aforementioned groups, but only differs in the choice of terrorism as a means to reach the same end (see Nwankpa, 2015b). There are some scholars who deny that any kind of connection exists between Boko Haram and the other groups in the north (Isa, 2010), why others present varying levels of connection (largely ideological but not operational) (Anonymous, 2012; Higazi, 2013; Hill, 2013). However, some of these groups have also shown capacity to use violence, although they are less enthusiastic than Boko Haram about using violent means.

Hence, the legislative attempt by the northern political and religious elites to regulate the Islamic religion suffers from a reductionist tendency. Local CSOs such as CISLAC and CEPID are collaborating with AMIN to support government’s effort to regulate religion in the north. The Kaduna state, a northern state with roughly an equal number of Christians and Muslims, is foremost in pursuing legislation to see how to achieve, in the words of Respondent XIV “a separation between the state and religion [and] how clergy men can also begin to see the possibility of censoring their texts, religious texts“ (Res XIV). One can
understand the leading role that the Kaduna State government plays in this matter, as Kaduna is, as a result of its significant number of Christians and Muslims, often embroiled in inter-religious crises. It is however right to question the wisdom of having the State drive this fundamental change. Perhaps, an NGO is more suited to pursuing this kind of intervention (Res XXVI). The sponsors of such a bill and proposal may inadvertently flout a basic Constitutional right that guarantees every individual right to practice whatever religion she wishes.

For example, Chapter IV, 38 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution (1999) states that “every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance”. It remains therefore unclear how the government will achieve such outcome without infringing on the constitutional right of the people. However, it is clear that we cannot disregard the religious dimension in the Boko Haram conflict. As such, the response to the Boko Haram conflict merits its own investigation. However, there is the need to critically look at the role of religion, especially the Islamic religion in mobilising violence. Although MOSOP demanded “the right to religious freedom” (Ogoni Bill of Right 1990, 20(f)), religion plays an almost negligible role in the Niger Delta conflict, and significantly, in conflicts across the south of Nigeria. Of course, there is a significant number of Muslims in the South-West, yet other socio-cultural identities override the religious identity in importance (Kukah & Falola, 1996).

The Nigerian government has since Independence been confronted with the challenge of defining the place of religion in Nigerian politics. Yet, the Islamic religion remains a mobilising force for the northern geopolitical zone, available to the conservative authorities (politicians and religious leaders) as well as its radicals (example Boko Haram). Quite
importantly, this manifests at key junctures in Nigeria’s political history. It became an issue in 1978 during Nigeria’s transition from a military government to its first ever elected civilian government—the Sharia debate. At this period, the issue of sharia was constitutionally debated. The issue of sharia arose again in 2000, a year after the transition from long years of military rule to a democratically elected civilian government. Paradoxically, President Olusegun Obasanjo (a Yoruba man from the South-West), the winner of the 1999 election was the then military Head of State in 1978. The twelve states in the north adopted Sharia as a criminal penal code— an action that seriously challenged the Constitutional superiority of the Common Law.

Remarkably, Boko Haram emerged from the political context of the 1999/2000 sharia conflict, one that President Obasanjo describes as “political sharia” or “shariacracy” (Mazrui, 2005, p.63). Although, the actions by the northern political elites imploded, the failure was not due to any serious constitutional challenge by the FG or the protests by the Northern Christians, but the unmasking of the political motive behind the move and the “underlying struggle for monopoly over Islamic structures” (Nwankpa, 2015b, p.13). The northern elites used the introduction of criminal sharia as a tool to negotiate the continued relevance of the Northern geopolitical zone in the highly centralised Nigerian political structure. The Northern elite felt their position threatened by the control of the centre by someone from the South-West and more specifically by some of the perceived anti-north policies (for example, the compulsory retirement of senior military personnel from the North) pursued by the administration of President Obasanjo.

Unfortunately, the leadership of Boko Haram, especially its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, who was part of this process believed it to be genuine. Before then, the Northern youths were disenchanted with the political system that supported corruption and created an unfair
distribution of wealth. Religion became an outlet to vent their frustration, but essentially

Boko Haram did not start off attacking the state. It started with

A group of young men who believe their parents, their own biological parents have illegally acquired material of the state to the detriment of the state and that the parents needed to refund those back-their motivation being religion. That the fathers and mothers who are the Permanent Secretaries have the largest chunk of the state resources in their hands which are acquired illegally, while the people live in abject poverty, and to their standard, that is condemnable. And that the system that enabled their parents to accumulate this needed to change (Res XV).

Hence, we see from the statement above that religion is only a tool of resistance against the northern socio-economic and political environment (characterised by inequality, lack of opportunity and social mobility). There is no doubt; Boko Haram is part of a rich culture of Islamic reformism starting from the Nineteenth Century jihad of Sheikh Uthman Dan Fodio (Last, 2012; Loimeier, 2012; Brigaglia, 2012; Hill, 2013; Higazi, 2013). “Dan Fodio’s jihad provides a rallying point of political and religious legitimation for many Islamic activist groups in northern Nigeria, including both conservative (traditional Sufi Brotherhood) and insurgent groups (Boko Haram)” as they both use it as a common reference (Nwankpa, 2015b, p.8). But as Loimeier (2012) avers, Boko Haram is “deeply rooted in northern Nigeria’s specific economic, religious and political development” (p.137). By implication, we cannot deal with Boko Haram insurgency and other religiously-inspired conflicts in Nigeria by focusing only on the religious aspect. Hence, while intervention programmes such as de-radicalisation, counter-narrative, inter-religious dialogue and religious regulation can be useful towards achieving peace and security in the north, a more sustainable development and security will consider the economic and political dimensions. Religious identity “is just one out of many identities” (Res II).
7.3.2 Addressing Nigeria’s Complex Federalism: Macro versus Micro Approaches to Conflict Resolution

The responses and reactions to the responses to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts have great ramification for Nigeria’s federalism. For instance, the Niger Delta amnesty programme, for all its touted success, produced a condition of inequality that is permissive to further conflict. We can glean such outcome from the tension between the Niger Delta ethnic groups, the Ijaws and the Itsekeris and emergent militant groups in the region. The amnesty largely favoured the Ijaws, hence creating disaffection among other marginalised Niger Delta ethnic groups, notably, the Itsekiris.

Although “Ijaw politics figured centrally in the new post-1995 landscape of militancy, many ethnic minorities were drawn into the militant struggle for oil rents on the one side and illicit activities on the other” (Joab-Peterside, Porter & Watts, 2012, p.8). Evidently, primordial identities such as ethnicity and religion represent draw backs to the balance of power between the different parts that make up the Nigerian federation. This has played out in the relationship between the civil society and the Nigerian state. Importantly, most CSOs in Nigeria are oriented towards one particular ethnicity or another. OPC is mainly Yoruba (South-West), MASSOB, Bakassi Boys and Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) largely Igbos (South-East), MOSOP (Ogoni), IYC (Ijaw). However, at some strategic junctures in Nigeria’s nation building, ethnic CSOs have played useful roles towards national cohesion, one that have produced national benefits to other groups within the federation (Osaghae, 2006). NADECO, MOSOP and IYC are examples of such ethnic-based CSOs with such ramification. Nevertheless, there is an urgent need for the Nigerian civil society structure to rise above ethnic bias and unite in a class struggle against the political class. Tar (2008) focuses on the complicated class struggle between Nigeria’s political class and the civil society, while Jega (2000) emphasises the ethnic and other primordial identities. However,
there is a robust interplay between ethnicity and class as mobilising forces of action against state oppression.

More so, there is a growing drive and shift towards citizenship, what is generally known as the National Question (cut-crossing identifiers that unite the disparate identities in Nigeria). Respondent II notes that “we are Nigerians and we must be working towards our common citizenship” (Res II). Yet, the centrifugal forces including regional forces and primordial identities (ethnicity and religion mostly) continue to contend with centripetal forces such as citizenship. Patently, “any examination of Nigeria’s identity diversity would have to be inclusive of all identities – civil and primordial – and the ways in which they are intricately linked” (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005, p.7). All of these manifests in the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts as evident in the contentious issues surrounding giving the Boko Haram insurgents a Niger Delta styled amnesty and creating a NEDC based on NDDC. The Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts therefore present implications for how the Nigerian state responds to other conflicts in the country. There is no doubt that Nigeria’s federal structure is imperfect and inhibitive to an effective CT/CI. This is reflected in the opinions of many of the respondents. For instance, Respondent IV notes the jurisdictional challenge between the state and the FG in the implementation of the Anti-Terrorism law. Respondent XXI questions FG overriding control of intervention in the NE. In his opinion, it should be the governors and leaders of the six affected states that should be leading the intervention. Hence, we see evidence of a top-down development response in FG’s involvement in most of the local development interventions. The CVE programme and the fraught relationship between SAVE and PAVE emphasise this point. The pertinent question to ask remains: “who leads the intervention?” (Res V).

The underlining creed that informs the support for a Boko Haram amnesty and a NEDC reflects the consociation policies (that is, constitutional arrangements and political
engineering) used in plural societies such as Nigeria to balance power among elites from its diverse social, ethnic, religious and political blocs (Jinadu, 1995; Jega, 2000; Ekeh, 1975). Those who demand a Boko Haram amnesty and a NEDC based on the Niger Delta amnesty and NDDC miss the point about achieving equal and equitable development across the different regions. Respondent I’s critique is quite useful here: “Now, one would expect that if you want this to work more effectively as a federation, you are talking about a regional challenge, so rather than have a federal government establish a regional intervention commission, the state governments in the region should establish it collectively. And then they can negotiate support from the FG” (Res IV).

The FG (through ONSA) forays into implementing the CVE programme reflects this kind of misplacement of priorities. ONSA should have been setting the policies, not implementing them. Yet, there is a sense in which a FG intervention becomes necessary. For instance, in the case of the Niger Delta, “it is very difficult to develop such a place, unless the FG is totally, directly involved in the development of that place, it would be very difficult to stop all these (insurgency) “(Res XII). The peculiar topographical nature of the Niger Delta region means that more resources are required, far more than is needed for the development of other zones. For instance, “the cost of building a one kilometre road in the Niger Delta can build ten, twenty kilometre road in the upland area in the north, because of the type of terrain” (Respondent XII). It is therefore morally and pragmatically wrong to expect the same level of resource allocation to the Niger Delta and Northeast zones.

Even the 13 percent revenue derivation (in addition to the normal budgetary allocation) to each of the Niger Delta states is adjudged not to be enough. Yet, such perceived unfair and inequitable distribution of development continues to inspire conflicts elsewhere. The Niger Delta region with its militants is seen to be given a special treatment because their activities directly hurt the Nigerian mono-economy rather than the peculiarities of the region that
requires special development intervention as recommended in the Willink’s Report. This is perhaps why Boko Haram has tried to increase its economic incentives in its unsuccessful attempt to spread its attacks southwards towards the economic nerve centres. However, Boko Haram has remained isolated from other Nigerian conflicts such as the Niger Delta insurgency because of its religious colouration.

Ultimately, the problem lies with the nature of Nigeria's federalism, one where resources are centralised, which unfortunately yields conflict between the central and the state governments. Interestingly, the move towards centralisation of power, which consolidated during the military regime of General Olusegun Obasanjo (1976-1979), started during the military regime of General Gowon (1967-1975). General Gowon divided the Southeast region into several states and eventually carved out a Fourth region (of smaller minority ethnic groups including the core Niger Delta states) in an attempt to undercut the ambition of the Southeast region towards self-governance. This move helped the Nigerian side to defeat the Biafran side. Since then, the Federal government has established national development plans, carried out in contemporary times by its National Planning Commission (NPC). While this is important, it becomes clear from growing regional approaches to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts that each conflict and by extension, each geopolitical region requires its own peculiar response.

But the pertinent question to ask is: should Nigeria adopt a national or federal approach to regional and state crises or each region and state be allowed to adopt an approach that addresses their peculiarity? Nigeria has adopted broad development policies that specifically aimed at reducing conflict such as the First (1962-1967) and Second (1970-1975) National Development Plans (Kirk-Greene, 1971; Stremlau, 1975). Particularly, the Second National Development Plan by the military regime of General Gowon considered a broad development intervention that aimed at an equitable and fair distribution of development intervention...
simultaneously in war-torn defunct Biafra states and other states in the federation. This was done within the framework of consociationalism to reduce the tension and possible conflict that an overt development intervention in the most affected Biafran states will generate.

In contemporary times which significantly coincides with the start of the Millenial, successive Nigerian governments in the current running democratic season (1999 till date) have established national development agendas and policies (some have been replicated at the state and local government levels) such as NEEDS, Vision 20:20:20, and Transformation Agenda. These internal development policies reflect the popular view among Nigerian leaders and by extension African leaders that addressing the development needs (including poverty, underdevelopment and inequality) is paramount to the prevention or reduction of conflict including insurgency and terrorism (see also Forest & Giroux, 2011). But some scholars undercut such internal development interventions as a calculated attempt to secure external assistance (see Paden, 2005, Omeje, 2007).

As Respondent IV notes, if not for its religious trait, Boko Haram would have had a wider national traction. In essence, Boko Haram and the Niger Delta insurgencies, despite their geopolitical differentiations, represent popular mass uprising. The Islamic religious ideology in the Boko Haram case is only a mobilising force; the underlying issues are common to the Niger Delta and other conflicts in the country. There are two ways to view this. On one hand, we can argue that a one-size-fit-all CT/CI approach can be applied to both insurgencies. We would be right to assume such position especially when we cast the conflicts in the light of a class war-that is, the rise of the general mass against the elites (see Tar, 2008) and in repudiation of the ethnic explanation (see Jega, 2000).

Respondent II sums up the situation. According to him, “what you are witnessing in Nigeria now, whether you call it Boko Haram today or EKPESU Boys or MEND or whatever is
evidence of a state that is facing a severe crisis of legitimacy” (Res II). On this ground, we can posit that every geopolitical zone and conflict in Nigeria face the same development challenges. Respondent XVI captures this clearly in his statement: “basically we all have the same problem of bread and butter problem of infrastructure, of ...just basically the rudimentary things of day-to-day activities in the communities like roads, healthcare, water. So basically every community has the same problem” (Res XVI). But do the regions and the conflicts necessarily require similar development interventions?

The findings show that while it is useful to have broad development policies that are cut-crossing, each conflict must be given its own special consideration. Ironically, Respondent II recognises, in the same statement, the peculiarity of each conflict when he states that: “every conflict situation is different, because the causes are never always the same” (Res II). It is therefore not much contradiction in Respondent II's position as he himself admits that in principle, both the Niger Delta and Boko Haram and other conflict groups in Nigeria have as common denominator the perception that the Nigerian state has failed the citizens. Perhaps the solution lies in Respondent XVI’s argument: “But prioritising those problems are now the trick in knowing which problems you have to start to work on first” (Res XVI). In essence, while Boko Haram and Niger Delta insurgencies share similar socio-economic and even political problems, the approach should not necessarily be the same.

**Poverty Prevalence by Sectors and Zones**
Respondent XV provides statements that further support the argument against adopting a one-size-fit-all approach. In his view:

Depending on, if you take a simple approach to it, you will discover that in a community we may have the same situation, there is no violence. So those are kind of multiple-layered

Source: (adapted) UNDP (2016). Human Security and Human Development in Nigeria P.21
questions left you can come into in terms of ...a factor may not have a simple linear relationship. You say ok poverty leads to violence or leads to insurgency...so there are other accelerating factors (Res XV).

From the graph above, we see that while 61.3 per cent of the total population are considered poor in 2010, the prevalence of poverty is spread unevenly across the geopolitical zones and between the rural and urban population. In both years considered, the NE zone has the highest poverty rate. This corresponds to the views expressed by many of the respondents. Having established this point, we cannot however disagree with Respondent II's view that a legitimate state is one that is able to “secure and protect [its] citizens” (Res II). In this regard, the Niger Delta and Boko Haram share a common element. It is this notion of a failed state or failing state, one that cannot provide governance or secure and protect its citizens, that informs the intervention by external agencies such as foreign governments and traditional external development interveners.

However, the need to classify states as weak/strong and failed/successful based on several indicators including protracted conflicts (Soares de Oliveria, 2007) may blind us to the credible efforts and achievements the Nigerian state has made in conflict management and nation building. There is a genuine risk of underappreciating Nigeria’s effort and achievement towards nation building and conflict management. Some of the notable achievements made by the Nigerian state include the ability to establish “a durable and expanded federal system, a multi-party partial democratisation and important forms of institutional building (increasing separation of powers, more autonomy of the judiciary, a gradual improvement in electoral processes and a proliferation of civil society organisations)” (Joab-Peterside, Porter & Watts, 2012, p.4).

Essentially, “in conflict-affected settings, threats of violence and the ability to manipulate the outcomes of social contests through violent acts are often part of the ways in which societies
transition to more enduring political settlements and more capable, peaceful and legitimate institutional arrangements to maintain security and justice” (Joab-Peterside, Porter & Watts, 2012, p.4). Obviously, the overt military approach taken by the Nigerian government seems to place the Nigerian state at a disadvantage, as it generates more grievances, isolating the state and reproducing more violent conflicts. Equally, the development interventions, by both the Nigerian state (including its civil society) and its external development partners show similar proclivities. The statement below captures the core of my argument and my exploration of a human rights based approach to development:

Naturally, there is much less clarity among development practitioners and researchers on how programmes may address these concerns in practice, and most particularly how development might avoid exacerbating injustice and insecurity, and help build capacity for mitigating them (Joab-Peterside, Porter & Watts, 2012, p.4).

**7.3.3 Adapting Human Rights Based Approach to Development**

Obviously, the Nigerian Government and its external development partners seem to be showing a conscious awareness of applying an ethical approach to CT/CI. There is evidence of this in the current development and even military orientations. The language; human rights approach to development does not appear strange. For instance, the CVE programme, for all its many flaws, recognised the importance of CSOs in the development interventions towards the insurgencies. As Respondent XIV notes, civil-military relations have improved. External development partners such as the DFID (through its programmes, NSRP and JFA) and UNDP are providing human rights training to members of the NPF and the Nigerian military involved in CT/CI.

The prospect of a highly professional and human rights-conscious Nigerian military seems promising. Although there is still some level of resistance from the military, there is notable
improvement in civilian oversight of military CI activities. CSOs such as CEPID have played an important role in bringing about transparency in the procurement of military hardware, following the sabotage and undercutting of the CT effort against Boko Haram by senior military officers who diverted the CT funds for private use and/or purchase of inadequate and substandard weapons. The Nigerian military’s legitimacy has also been bolstered by its collaboration with the regional force, MNJTF. Such cooperation removes the incentive for unilateral actions which are often heavy-handed and overreaching as it creates room for sharing of information and providing oversights among the cooperating armies. It is therefore not surprising that the military approach has been, to some degree, effective towards the Boko Haram conflict. However, there seems to be a shift towards more participatory, inclusive and ethical development strategies, although military intervention remains significant.

For instance, the Nigerian government has established a number of development programmes towards the Boko Haram insurgency, including the VSF, PINE, PCNI, and SSF. There is increasingly good cooperation between Nigeria and its external development partners, as they collaborate and synchronise their efforts at different levels. External development partners such as the WB, EU, UN and foreign governments such as the UK, U.S., Norway, Canada, Japan and a host of others are helping Nigeria’s development efforts towards the Boko Haram insurgency. Such collaborations can be seen in the drafting of NACTEST-Nigeria’s national counterterrorism framework, SSI, and a number of Needs Assessments (prominent among is the RPBA) of the NE.

Yet, there is still a huge divorce between the principle and practice of human rights approach to development. If we take for example, the funding policy of most Western interveners, the decision not to directly fund local CSOs and the Nigerian government may yield to the kind of conclusions reached by Duffield (2007, 2010) and Preston (1999). It is important that in
guarding against propping up corruption, which is one unintended consequences of external intervention (or foreign aid to be specific), we do not sacrifice sustainability. Joab-Peterside, Porter and Watts, (2012) are right in saying that “the existence of widespread corruption should not be antithetical to the recognition that the state has been informalised for particular purposes, vested with certain state capabilities and made ‘functional’ (networks, pacts, coalitions) in particular ways” (p.4). The Nigerian state with its CSOs should be given more credit for its efforts, though they still appear disjointed, “scattered and ad hoc” (Res I).

The challenge seems to be that of incapacity. There is a genuine lack of capacity to deal effectively with the insurgencies. Nigeria does not enjoy the experience that the UN, UK and other external development bodies have in dealing with insurgency and terrorism in their countries and across the globe. This hugely impedes its ability to lead the counterinsurgency. But ultimately, the views of external development partners and those of local respondents confirm that the state still remains the primary duty bearer. The Nigerian state needs to provide the strategic guidance and lead. The ability of the Nigerian state to lead and provide the needed guidance are hampered by its long history of violence and oppression against its citizens which include the excessive use of force by its security agents as well as its failure to provide governance. In this regard, the Nigerian state lacks legitimacy. The prospect of the Nigerian government gaining the trust of its citizens appears high especially against the backdrop of increasing cooperation between the Nigerian military and the regional coalition CT forces, human rights and CT training of Nigerian security forces by external governments, improved civil-military relations, and growing development partnership between the Nigerian government and its external development partners, Ultimately, there is a strong need for healthy cooperation between the state, civil society, and even the market.

In terms of the relevance of the market in the mix, MADE is one development programme that is having a meaningful impact on CI in the Niger Delta. MADE seeks to provide a
market environment that is competitive and fair to all, more importantly to the disadvantaged in the Niger Delta. External interveners such as Chevron, DFID and a host of other international development agencies lead the market development approach. However, the government’s macro development policies (NEEDS, SEEDS, LEEDS, Vision 20, 20:20 and Transformation Agenda) and regional development programme (NDRMP and NDAP) provide the economic and political groundwork crucial to the success of the market development approach. The absence of such groundwork has been deemed responsible for the ineffectiveness of past development interventions in the Niger Delta.

Unquestionably, the Nigerian state has made progress in its ability to deal with the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies. These insurgencies are by no means over. More so, there are newer threats, some which are resurfacing old conflicts. Some of these are IPOB and the seemingly perennial Fulani herdsmen versus farmers’ conflict largely in the central states but spreading across all the geopolitical zones. A rights based approach present a huge potential for addressing these conflicts which are largely development including marginalisation or injustice, (un) even distribution of scarce resources and the issue of indigene versus settler status, especially in the Central state of Plateau. Participation, equality/equitable distribution of development intervention, transparency, accountability and rule of law should define the terms of development interventions in these crises. And interestingly, the international community still has a role to play, although Nigeria retains the primary responsibility. One example that foregrounds the important role of the international community is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The Red Cross, including the Nigerian Red Cross (NRC) and the ICRC enjoy great level of community acceptance that can provide the bridge for the government and other external development bodies.
7.4 Conclusion

The comparison of the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts reveals information that are useful to exploring how the Nigerian government and its external development partners’ development interventions have been developed and the issues that have arisen concerning their effectiveness. The comparative analysis of both conflicts produces great ramification for a Nigerian general approach to conflict management and resolution. In this regard, the chapter makes three major propositions: defining the place of religion; addressing Nigeria’s complex federalism; and adopting a human rights approach to development. The chapter notes the great stride that Nigeria has made towards reducing and managing its conflicts—one that is significantly shifting from a predominantly military approach to development responses. We see, particularly, since the return to democratic rule in 1999 that successive Nigerian governments have attempted several development policies including economic policies and political reforms that aim to achieve short, medium and long-term development goals. However, these internal development efforts have been criticised and seen as a calculated attempt to secure external assistance. While not completely untrue, there is growing evidence that shows more engaged development interventions by the Nigerian government and other local stakeholders.

This chapter shows how a new sense of commitment to development intervention especially towards the Boko Haram and Niger Delta insurgencies is emerging. Although there is still confusion surrounding who leads the intervention (that is, whether the foreign interveners or the Nigerian government should be doing more in terms of providing strategic leadership) particularly in the case of the Boko Haram, there is more evidence of practical collaboration between the external development interveners and the Nigerian government. The Nigerian government is increasingly playing an important role in the designing, structuring, planning and financing of development intervention, hence making issues of local ownership and
securitisation less problematic. Also, at the external level, there is now more transparency (and acceptance) by external development interveners about the strategic interests that underline their interventions. This however portends a serious implication for sustainability of the development interventions as locals are alienated.

This is more visible in the case of Boko Haram. Whilst external development interveners in both cases, as evident in Chevron’s NPDI and PIND, and several DFID and USAID’s programmes, set up their own local structures (often with the aim to mitigate against corruption), the situation in the Boko Haram seems to be more precarious than the Niger Delta as it undermines the influence of the local organisations and their willingness to buy-in into the projects. Significantly, the Boko Haram and Niger Delta conflicts present huge similarities and differences that justify general as well as specific development approaches. While the result of my findings show that a specific development intervention approach (cognizant of the peculiarities of each conflict) is useful, it also reveals common ground especially similar underlining development challenges.

Both conflicts show that addressing underlining factors that are conducive to the spread of terrorism would be hugely rewarding. The findings support this view.

Yet, despite the obvious differences in the orientation of the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies, there are strong common denominators.
Chapter 8 Conclusion

This research sets out to study the nexus between development, security and human rights. It is based on the finding that there has been a shift in the response to CT/CI such that development (non-kinetic strategies/soft power) strategies are now replacing traditional military response, or at most, development strategies are combined with military strategies. Underlining such a shift is the notion that contemporary conflicts are different from conflicts of the past which were mostly inter-state wars. Most contemporary conflicts are seen to be confined within a state (intra-state), often between a state and at least one non-state armed group. Additionally, these states are usually developing, fragile, failing or weak, and are marked frequently by poverty, inequality, protracted conflict, and underdevelopment-conditions that are conducive to terrorism. There is also the assumption that the threats and outcomes from these crises-torn states produce consequences that extend beyond their state borders. Hence the threats are globalised as are the responses. As such, external development partners such as WB and UN and foreign governments such as the U.S. and UK are syncing their development aid with security/defence.

In essence, development interventions are more likely to be strategically directed to places that present security threats such as terrorism, rather than places with dire development needs but not necessarily presenting terrorist threats. Hence, there is tendency towards development securitisation. Equally, there is growing international collaboration evident in several multilateral arrangements (NATO, MNJTF) and bilateral agreements towards countering terrorism, insurgency as well as other globalised security threats such as drug trafficking. In the light of globalised security and especially since the construct of the GWOT, the notion of human security is theoretically considered more important than state security. External interveners often discard the argument of sovereignty when they intervene to protect the
security of humans from an oppressive state or from non-state actors in states where formal authority has been undermined. The interventions in Libya, Syria and a host of other civil war-ravaged countries reflect the contentious issue between sovereignty and R2P. Usually, states themselves are vested with the primary responsibility to protect.

When states fail to live up to this responsibility, it passes on to the international community (Annan, 2005, p.69). However, in practice, such reality is far from simple. The international community, especially developed countries are quite sceptical of taking on such responsibilities as it somewhat gives the recipient country the opportunity to transfer development responsibility to external agencies. This is often perceived within the construct of right to development. External interveners are against assuming legal responsibility. In the Nigerian case studies, external interveners are still hamstrung by the perceived “right” that recipient nations, in this case Nigeria, appear to have in terms of external development intervention.

The state continues to play a central role even when R2P is expanded. It becomes important to explore how the Nigerian state responds to its duty as the primary duty bearer. Does incapacity absolve the Nigerian state of its responsibility towards its citizens? There is a chance that a state may be genuinely incapable of meeting its primary duty. In that instance, external assistance is justified. However, the Nigerian state has responded to its insurgency crises, especially since the Millennium, which incidentally corresponds to its return to liberal democratic civilian government (one that has remained consistent since 1999), by applying a mixture of military and development interventions. The military responses have often been criticised for escalating violence and provoking the rise of armed insurgency. Nonetheless, the development interventions are also instrumental to the rise of violent conflicts as they become manipulative tool in the hands of the political elites.
This thesis therefore offers a practical evaluation of a variety of theoretical issues through the empirical study of the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts. The thesis makes both empirical and theoretical contributions to the literature. Empirically, the thesis used multiple case studies, specifically the Niger Delta and Boko Haram cases. The peculiarities and characteristics of each conflict group were observed, compared and then discussed in light of the complex relationship between human development, human security and human rights. The empirical tools consisting of interviews, focus groups, observation and document data from Nigeria were brought to bear on the theoretical debates particularly the thorny relationship between the triad, development, security and human rights. Theoretically, the study stressed the idea of securitised development and the challenge of R2P.

For instance, the case studies raised the theoretical issues of securitised development, contention with R2P, particularly looking at any evidence that the Nigerian government seeks to transfer development responsibility to external interveners. Also within the context of R2P, the thesis adds to the commentary on the relationship between the State and CSOs. Also, the relationship between a legalistic human rights framework and alternative frameworks play out in the thesis. Finally, the study looked at the conceptual understanding and practice of a human rights based approach to development intervention by both the internal and external development agencies.

There are key findings that emerge from this study. One of the findings is the fact that while a military response to security threats still prevails generally, there is a growing recognition of a development approach towards CT/CI in Nigeria. There is very little disagreement that the Nigerian state has often preferred the use of force, excessive force in countering security threats. In both case studies, the Nigerian state stands accused of transforming social movements into insurgency. However, the Niger Delta conflict, unlike the Boko Haram conflict, has attracted more development response. The notion that the Niger Delta crisis
requires a development strategy has remained uncontested. Yet, the development responses to the Niger Delta have produced no much difference from the military strategy as a site of contest and conflict. On the Boko Haram conflict, the shift towards soft approaches has only occurred in recent times, particularly since the 14 April 2014 terrorist incidents. Yet, a military strategy remains predominant.

The military response has produced some positive results in the Boko Haram conflict and little to negligible effect in countering the Niger Delta insurgency. However, the idea that a development strategy is appropriate for a long term solution is emerging for both cases. Yet, this understanding appears only successful at best in paper and muddied in practice, at worst. For instance, Nigeria has developed a national counter-terrorism strategy, NACTEST. Yet, the soft strategy appears to be little more than rhetoric with no clear sense of structure and agency. This reflects on the programmes designed under Nigeria’s soft power approach towards the Boko Haram insurgency. Likewise, while there is an attempt at collaboration between the state and the CSOs, there is still a significant rift stemming from trust issues (the Nigerian state is not trusted and is considered to be part of the problem).

The lack of organisation and clarity in government’s soft approach has left room for the misappropriation of development or better put humanitarian funds towards Boko Haram. Additionally, it encourages corruption. Most of these issues seem unavoidable or irreconcilable with the current federal structure. Nigeria is a highly centralised state. Hence, development interventions for local conflicts are centrally created, often creating tension and conflict of interests between the FG and the component states. Such conflict defines the growing development interventions in the NE. Hence, the relevance of several Needs Assessments, prominent among is the RPBA.
More so, the centralised nature of development intervention creates an unhealthy competition among the six geopolitical zones and the component states. This is evident in the clamour for a Niger Delta styled amnesty for Boko Haram insurgents and the establishment of a NEDC modelled on NDDC. This reflects the principle of consociation that has aided successive Nigerian government to deal with the tensions and conflicts produced by Nigeria’s ethno-religious diversity. This includes some institutional reforms, constitutional arrangements leading to ever expanding federal system (that has been somewhat durable) and other democratic changes. There is no denying; the Nigerian state has made laudable progress in containing the tensions and conflicts generated by its peculiar ethnic and political structures. But the persistent conflicts and, especially the capacity of the current trend to reproduce conflict mean that we should be looking at an alternative approach. The human rights development approach to development presents such viable alternative and solution to Nigeria’s persistent conflicts.

This reflects another key finding showing an improvement in current development approaches towards CT/CI in Nigeria. The current development strategies show evidence of a rights based approach to development, although there is still a huge gap between principle and practice. Some practical evidence of a rights based approach is seen in the current development initiatives and interventions towards the Niger Delta conflict. The Nigerian government seems to have set the tone by laying down development groundwork through its macro development policies such as NEEDS, Vision 20:2020, and Transformation Agenda. In specific terms, the NDRMP and NDAP provide a development base from which more participatory, inclusive, equitable, transparent and accountable development programmes are established. MADE is one example that illustrates this point. It reflects the market development strategy spearheaded by Texaco-Chevron, a MNOC in the Niger Delta. On the government side, NDRMP and NDAP represent shift from past development interventions
which relied on derivation formula and a limited development intervention and produced a top-down methodology. On the side of the MNOCs, we see a giant leap from CSR to CSE/CSI.

The Niger Delta case study shows the potential of being the bedrock for managing other conflicts in Nigeria. In this regard, the Niger Delta conflict stands as a microcosm of conflicts in Nigeria-one inspired by poverty, inequality, injustice, exclusion and underdevelopment.

The shift towards development response to the Boko Haram conflict is a clear indicator that virtually every conflict group and potential conflict groups are underscored by the same variable. In terms of the RDT and BGT dynamics in the Boko Haram conflict, we see a lot of intersection between it and the Niger Delta conflict. Although religion remains central to the Boko Haram narrative, there seems to be underlying development challenges that are similar to the more obviously economically-motivated conflict, the Niger Delta.

While it is important to recognise the stated intent of a terrorist group, which in the case of Boko Haram, is to Islamise the secular Nigerian state, we need to be equally aware that conflicts transform. Terrorists, contrary to the proponents of new war/new terrorism, are rational actors capable of reviewing the utility of their methodology as well as transforming their goals. It is therefore important to address those structural conditions that terrorists can manipulate in order to justify their actions or conceal their main agenda. It is within this framework that the relative deprivation theory (RDT) or Breakdown-Grievance theory (BGT) becomes relevant to the Boko Haram conflict. Governance, or better still, the lack of it is recognized as a critical part of the underlying drivers of the Boko Haram conflict. It is therefore not surprising that Nigeria established its soft approach to countering terrorism in 2014. Within the construct of the soft approach, the Nigerian government has designed development initiatives which include PINE, SSI, VSF and PCNI. It is also carrying out
several needs assessment in conjunction with key external development partners such as the UN, WB and the EU.

But development response to the Boko Haram conflict presents both practical and theoretical challenges. For instance, while there is a growing collaboration between Nigeria (including both state and non-state components) and its external development partners in the fight against Boko Haram, there is contention about who leads. The external partners believe that Nigeria has the primary responsibility to lead its counterterrorism effort. On one hand, they believe that Nigeria has the capacity—military and financial, to deal with its security challenges; on the other, they acknowledge that Nigeria has low absorptive capacity and inexperience in dealing with insurgency and terrorism. Local CSO respondents share similar view. Therefore, another key finding of this study is that there is a huge capacity deficit by both the Nigerian state and local CSOs. Yet, the Nigerian state is still seen to have the primary responsibility.

Although the Nigerian government does get support from its external development partners and may have partly sought to gain from the GWOT mantra, this study finds little evidence to prove that it is deliberately transferring CT/CI responsibility to the international community. The Nigerian government has contributed financially to most of the development interventions in the NE. It has also made some initiatives that are supported by external governments and international development partners. In the Niger Delta for instance, the total finance for the NDAP is within the budgetary allocations of the nine Niger Delta states. Therefore, the contention about who leads the intervention in the NE or towards the Boko Haram conflict is reflective of the persistent tension about the idea of “right” or entitlement to external development intervention held by poorer and developing nations, as perceived by Western aid donor. The human rights approach to development seems to resolve this conflict as it expands duty bearers to include external bodies including governments and international
NGOs. Yet, the state remains the primary duty bearer, even under the human rights based approach.

The state does indeed have a central role to play; however, this should not be rigidly interpreted. As can be deduced, external interveners show real fear of assuming responsibility for development interventions in Nigeria. This is one of the major findings of this study. However, such perception may be slowly eroding, as evidenced in the current market development approach adopted by Chevron towards the Niger Delta conflict. Chevron’s NDPI and PIND lead the market development approach in the Niger Delta. Other international development agencies such as DFID, EU, WB and local CSOs and the Nigerian government follow Chevron’s lead. The market development approach or CSE/CSI allows Chevron and ilk to intervene in such a way that development benefit reaches a majority of the Niger Delta citizens that need it most, the poor and the ordinary. More so, CSE or CSI is not constrained by the necessary burden of CSR: the statutory requirement of development intervention imposed on MNOCs as part of their oil license.

However, NDPI and PIND are NGO structures set up by Chevron, an external agency. This seems to be the general trend among external development partners who adopt a funding policy that creates unhelpful consequences largely unsustainable development. For instance, DFID sets up its own local NGO such as NSRP and JFA, and USAID works with National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI), that it sets up. In the same vein, most external development partners do not fund local CSOs or the Nigerian government directly. They are usually funded through the local structures directly established by the external agencies. The development programmes are also designed and developed by the external funders most times. These external development policies tend towards securitisation with serious implication for sustainable development.
Although, these policies are considered necessary to curb the unhelpful consequence of corruption that external assistance can produce, they show a great proclivity towards securitised development. It is possible that the funders’ interest is prioritised over the needs of the recipient communities. Hence, there is the tendency of discarding existing local structures. Funders often come with a pre-set knowledge or bias and most external development interveners in the NE are only committed to short-term development, largely humanitarian.

This assumption may be based on the conventional wisdom that development cannot be achieved without security. Whilst true, it is a fallacy of liberal intervention that often relegates development to the bottom in the priority list of interventions. It seems that development is narrowly constructed here in economic terms. But development intervention can include economic as well as other non-kinetic strategies. VSF, PINE and PCNI and most of the humanitarian intervention in the NE aim for short term goals.

Perhaps, external development interveners do not aim to resolve the conflict, but are only involved to contain the consequences that the conflicts produce-such as mass migration, disruption to international economy (Niger Delta) and expansion of transnational terror networks (Boko Haram). Therefore, we see little attempt to conceal consideration of strategic interests in development intervention which leads to securitisation. For instance, the UK and by extension the UNSC only directly intervened in the Boko Haram conflict after the 14 April 2014. The 14 April 2014 terrorist incidences “affected the way that the UK saw its own security “(Res III). Also, the U.S. considers development intervention a “strategic, economic, and moral imperative” (NSS, P.23). The strategic consideration involves the need to protect “the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners“. The economic imperative encompasses guaranteeing “a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity“(NSS, p.17).
Duffield (2007) seems to be right that human security present the smokescreen for external interveners (especially developed Western nations) to intervene in developing countries with the aim of safeguarding the values and lifestyles of the “insured” citizens against the negative consequences of the “un-insured” citizens of the world.

Evidently, external interventions in the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts illustrate the point made by Duffield above (see also Buzan, 2004; Paris, 2004). Arguably, external interveners may not be driven by the need to resolve the conflicts but to curtail its impact on the security and prosperity of developed Western world. The need to establish own NGOs and the decision not to directly fund local CSOs adversely affect the idea of local ownership and sustainable development. Hence, by discarding existing local structures (also exemplified by the Nigerian government through the relationship between SAVE and PAVE), external interveners may inadvertently be promoting the idea of moral superiority (Preston, 1999). Such Universalist attitude has the potential of engendering global inequality and disaffection.

While scholars such as Duffield, Buzan, Paris, Preston and a host of others identify this tendency in the motive of external interveners, this study goes further in its assessment that the external interveners do not make any attempt to conceal the strategic and economic interests that inform their intervention. At best, the pursuit of strategic interest is mitigated by including other interests such as humanitarian. Hence, the integration of defence, diplomacy and development into a single policy by most Western nations such as the U.S. and the UK is more than an attempt at organisation. It tends naturally to securitisation.
However, the need to build the capacity of the internal agency provides a counterweight to the notion of securitised development. To some extent, this can be understood within the R2P narrative. External interveners believe that the state, Nigeria in this case should be responsible for its own development and security. The Nigerian military, police and other security agencies, as well as local CSOs and CBOs and government ministries and agencies are benefitting from relevant trainings from external agencies. Nigeria is responding to this need. In the Niger Delta, for instance, the major finance for the NDAP is covered within the region’s budgetary allocation. The external development partners provide additional funding (but this is outside the required funding) and other kinds of technical support. Hence, there is little contest over ownership of development programmes. The government’s macro-development policies also provide the environment for more sustainable, specific and targeted local development interventions.

This thesis has provided an empirical assessment of the theoretical debates surrounding the thorny relationship between human development and human security. The Nigerian case studies- the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies provide the litmus for testing the notion of securitised development. The case studies also lend themselves to the contentious debates surrounding R2P, that is, the issue of duty bearers. The study reveals the need to acknowledge local structures including traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and community-led education structures (that inculcates Nigerian moral values). This thesis concludes that there is a growing awareness of a rights based approach to development intervention by the internal agencies, yet there is still a huge gap between principle and practice. The newer development strategies are still subjected to the weaknesses of past development policies and programmes. More so, there is a much better cooperation and collaboration between Nigeria and external development partners. The RPBA, NDAP,
NACTEST, CVE and a host of other development programmes are jointly developed by Nigeria and its external development partners. There is a growing shift from the largely vertical relationship that defines past partnership to a horizontal relationship. The Safe School project is one out of many programmes that reflect this shift.

Internally, the historical antagonistic relationship between the Nigerian state and its civil society is gradually simmering down. The civil-military relationship is improving as there are more civilian over sights on military CI activities. Government’s CI policies now rely on research outputs and recommendations from CSOs and other research organisations (both state-owned and non-state). The growing dialogue and cooperation between the Nigerian state and its civil society, including international NGOs such as ICRC, in addition to its collaboration with the regional armies (MNJTF), is helping to bolster the image of the Nigerian army, and the Nigerian state as a whole. Human rights training offered by DFID’s JFA and NSRP and other external development partners to the Nigerian security forces is proving useful to a long-lasting peace and security. However, the CT/CI assistance that the Nigerian security forces receive is focused largely on its military and less on its law enforcement, the Nigerian police force (NPF). This perhaps accounts for the little reward yielded so far, because NPF with other law enforcement agencies will be crucial to the long term peace and stability of the crises-torn regions.

Evidently, CSOs are major players in the intervention in the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts, as their activism, dialogue and research are helping to shape government’s CI response. However, there is still a massive capacity deficit, both in terms of funding and personnel capabilities. Their almost total dependence on external donors and the government for funding can compromise their required independence and ability to effectively carry out their oversight roles. More so, CSOs in Nigeria are themselves not immune from the different
primordial identities that are setting Nigeria back. Many CSOs and NGOs in Nigeria reflect particular ethnic or religious identity. This continues to impinge on their ability to form a unified class struggle against the political elites, who continue to manipulate these primordial differences for their own agenda. But, this is gradually changing as CSOs are forming formidable networks, such as PAVE, that will allow them have a greater influence in Nigeria’s development.

In answering the main research question, this thesis concludes that, at the internal level, development is still conceived as a consociational tool of managing Nigeria’s diverse and plural identities rather than as a human rights. Hence, the transition towards a rights based approach to development intervention becomes hamstrung by a structural problem involving a centralised and top-down development strategy that not only fails to deliver development gains to the people but more so, lends itself to corrupt abuses and politicisation of development. At the external level, development intervention is conceived as a tool of security-securitisation, although a new consciousness exist that is far more complex than Duffield’s (2007) view of development as biopolitical technology or Preston’s (1999) view of development as a moral responsibility. Yet, there remains tension as external interveners seek to balance their strategic political and economic interests including security (couched in the vague concept of “human security”) with the new awareness of a rights based approach.

Evidently, while the idea of a rights based approach has and continues to gain wider currency, the gains remain mostly in theory. The delivery and application of a rights based development strategy remain a far cry from its knowledge. Perhaps it is time to re-evaluate the notion of human rights, particularly what is seen as the normative idea of human rights. The Nigerian case study offers evidence that supports looking at human rights from an
African lens—“Africanisation” of human rights. In this sense, Preston’s (1999) prognosis remains true: what will count as development should be locally determined (p.24). In essence, the concept of the “human” in human development, human security and human rights will need to be reviewed and reconstructed to accommodate the Nigerian and by extension, African notion of the human as both an individual and a collective.

This thesis challenges the perception of a universal frame of human rights that often allows for the politicisation of human rights evident in the conditionality of human rights and other economic and political conditions often placed on aid recipient countries such as Nigeria. Furthermore, regarding the conceptual problem in the distinction (or lack of it) between terrorism and insurgency, this thesis argues that terrorism is only a strategy of insurgency (or at most, terrorism and insurgency are both strategies of war/conflict) and concludes that it can be used by both non-state and state actors. Essentially, labelling a group as an insurgent or terrorist organisation serve political purposes which include, amongst other things, a justification of the use of excessive military force.
Notes

Chapter Six

1. Colonel Sambo Dasuki, the former head of ONSA was arrested by President Buhari’s administration on corruption charges-accused of diverting and misappropriating the funds set aside for fighting Boko Haram.

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