DOCTORAL THESIS

Lost Luggage
Cartographies of Self and Other in Performance

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Lost Luggage: Cartographies of Self and Other in Performance.
by
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Abstract

The thesis examines contexts of belonging as they operate relatively between Self and Other. It theorises around a body of practice in ‘auto-performance’ that has developed over the span of a decade in response to a powerful shift in my sense of identity and place following a key discovery in 2000. This autobiographical context is placed relatively against contemporary political shifts in notions of place and belonging in the wake of key events such as 9/11, the Balkan conflict and the fall of the Soviet Union that preceded it. The manner in which ancestry and culture inform displacement is considered and applied to a consideration of belonging that argues a multiplicity transcending the boundaries of nation. The thesis is, in gesture, an attempt to map the Self through a discourse of performance and is far more concerned with connections in this act of mapping than it is in ends, as such. The works discussed are structured by the discourse rather than by chronology and the thesis unfolds through subsequent discussions of depiction and inscription, cartography and landscape, nomadism and settlement and speech and silence. These discussions shift back and forth in what I have described as a ‘telescopic’ mode between the near and the far, the subjective and the objective, the body and the mind both from the perspective of the audience participant and the performer. This is constantly relative to the consideration of Self and Other and the shift in frames and form of the works. The thesis finally returns Self, through practice as research and personal experience, to a final recognition of Other as an assignation of identity, proposing that difference is crucial to a conference of belonging.
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_I would like to dedicate this thesis to the memory of my father, Francis Fallon, my Great Aunt Veronika Ogorodnik (née Piasecka) and my good friend and supporter, Linda Ludwin, all of whom I have lost during this study._
Introduction

i. Catalysts

This discourse started somewhat before its realisation as a thesis for PhD, in a watershed moment for both my practice as an artist and for my sense of personal identity. The catalyst for the study, whilst spurred by huge shifts in the global political dimension, was primarily founded in the personal discovery of a family lost for sixty years and that profoundly affected (and illuminated) the fabric of my own identity. These days I find it a dishonesty to write such a singular term as ‘my identity’ but at the point of that discovery I certainly imagined myself as inwardly little changed since childhood and should emphasise too that I had the closest of upbringings with the family on my mother’s side. But the discovery of that lost family in Ukraine was also index to my childhood acceptance of an ‘iron curtain’ and my adolescent fear of a nuclear conflict that was so manifest that I was an active member of CND by the age of twelve. Equally, the revelation that my paternal grandfather was Polish (although I later discovered that he was Ukrainian of Polish ethnicity) was fairly synchronous with the fall of communism at the end of the eighties, as if two veils were simultaneously drawn back revealing something of a threshold rather than a barrier.

This study in that respect has 1989 at its root, but I am also unable to relinquish the poetics of personal experience as they run beside something more academically pursued. The moment, as it were, that a personal artistic discourse knowingly emerged around a consideration of identity was perhaps apt, when I
found myself performing as an invited artist at the Third International Festival of Experimental Art in St Petersburg, Russia, 2000.

The exhibition took place in the *Imperial Manege* of Tsar Nicholas II, a vast hall wherein he would review his cavalry. As artists we arrived to find that our visa invitations had been falsified and we were required to submit our passports, but free to continue with the exhibition. Moreover, all of the funds for our equipment and requirements had been stolen and the accommodation that we had been promised did not materialise. Whilst staying in the studios of Russian artists, a good many of us were placed into a situation of producing work from scratch, as it were. I produced five new pieces there and in retrospect all of these durational actions and interventions discussed contexts of the *Other*¹. Then something seismic shifted the trajectory of my work and of my life for good.

I performed a work in collaboration with Glyn Davies Marshall, an artist from Yorkshire that I met in Russia, titled *Underground at the Winter Palace*. We worked for three hours beneath the brass traps that the Tsar’s horses’ manure would be washed away into – a dark and blackened environment beneath the hall itself. We worked for different reasons that explored mystery around the

²In an untitled action I cleaned my teeth whilst watching the viewers watching me for three hours, until my mouth was full with bloody foam. In *La Revolution Francais* I ate a two kilogram bag of flour, whilst covered in honey until, gagging and clogged, another performer dropped wine into my mouth from theirs, clearing my passages. In a work we called *Exchange Rate* Howard Matthew, Shelley Good, Glyn Davies Marshall and I placed our belongings in small brown paper bags and offered these anonymous objects in blind exchange for something with strangers on the street; we made a museum of their offers, a sort of visual scale of trust.
death of our grandfathers – his in a mine attempting a rescue after a fourteen hour shift, mine as a Polish-Ukrainian pilot who having escaped the Nazi invasion on foot through Europe had joined the RAF. I performed this through the frustration of an unyielding search for relatives of my grandfather, which I had undertaken for some thirteen years. We scrubbed away the blackness with small brushes and lit the space with thin candles. We sang and passed sketches up through the grill to the audience. We counted away notional decades. A Russian artist called Vladimir Yabotchuk watched the performance and offered me assistance in searching for this lost family. He rang two weeks after my return to the UK to announce that he had found them; his mother knew my grandfather’s sister Veronika who was still alive in Lviv, Ukraine. He gave me her number and everything changed.

Performing Underground at the Winter Palace, St Petersburg, 2000

That I found myself performing these works in Russia by the year 2000, at all, left me in wonder. The 1990s had begun during the fall of the Soviet Union
after the *Cold War*, which had informed my sense of the world and the *Other* throughout my childhood. With the fall of the Wall I had my first encounter with someone from beyond the *Iron Curtain* in 1990 – a young East German that I found beaten up and bloody, his hundred marks of *Begrüßungsgeld*² taken along with his ‘trainers’³, and with broken ribs in the subway of a West German station. We shared a close encounter as I attempted, with few means at my disposal to help (I simply implored him to take another 100DM from me and go home. Station officials called for medical attention.). He embraced me finally and I could not forget this encounter throughout the nineties: it resonated often in my practice I think. As the Wall fell and an era of objective otherness came to an end, the first fires were lit in the Balkans. In truth the Balkan problem was age old but as a collective state of control disappeared so an internal difference as old as the Ottoman Empire re-emerged and a brutal and complex war took hold. The Balkan conflict literally shifted our notion of the *Other* as separated by an ideological and physical border to that of being amongst us, to be rooted out, to be sent away, to be exterminated and thus the term *ethnic cleansing* came into common use. This is also at the heart of Mestrovic’s pessimistic analysis of the failure of post-modernism, wherein he predicts a *Balkanisation* of the West (Mestrovic, 1994).

The Balkan conflict of the 1990s presented quite a different *Gordian Knot* to the more objective age of the *Cold War*. Whilst Western support, such as it was, in the Balkan conflict increasingly supported the Muslim population, the

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² As they came to the West, each East German was given 100DM of *Begrüßungsgeld* (Greeting Money), since the East German mark became worthless.

³ He attackers told him that trainers were for westerners.
war was having a binary effect on a Western fear of otherness as we watched sectarian divisions lead to outright extermination from within. This is why Mestrovic writes that the conflict ‘Balkanised’ perceptions in the West. *Balkanised:* the word sounds like a hardening of substance by fire. The region becomes a verb to do, a cold and hardened resolve that also infers terrible internalisation of fear reminiscent of a witch-hunt. The correlation of this notion to the desired erasure of internal difference seen in the Balkan conflict, and considered in Mestrovic’s pre-9/11 analysis, is becoming more visually manifest in contemporary social, media and state contexts in Western Europe and the USA. In a neo-conservative age, western states are reinforcing the border territory in an effort to prevent attacks from within. Goulish reflects that the definition of Nation depended upon the context of the outsider and as the former shrinks, so the importance of the latter eclipses it (Goulish, 2000).

ii. ‘Mystory’

As the 1990s ended, therefore, I found a synchronicity between the circumstance of my identity and this notion of a shift in social perceptions of the *Other.* During the final stages of writing this thesis, and thanks to Mike Pearson’s *In Come’s I* (2006), I discovered Ulmer’s notion of *Mystory* (1994)

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4 The shooting in the head of De Menezes on the London Underground in July 2005 (in the wake of the July 7th bombings) is certainly testament to a new complexity in acts driven by a notion of social protection in the face of an attack from within. ‘Passenger Mark Whitby said the man was being pursued by three plainclothes officers who ran on just a few feet behind him … "They pushed him onto the floor and unloaded five shots into him. He's dead," A spokesman for the Muslim Council of Britain said Muslims he had spoken to this morning were "jumpy and nervous." He said in the current atmosphere Muslims “were very afraid and other people were looking at them in a very suspicious manner” (Oliver & Sturke, 2005).
and recognised a great similarity to the chemistry of methodology that I aspired to in this study. Pearson described this most economically as:

A combination of three kinds of discourse: personal, popular and expert.

Mystory blurs the boundary between critical and creative writing, autobiography and cultural history, one text and the next: the author is located within an intertextual network of cultural references (2006, p.9).

I should emphasise from the outset that the study intends to construct itself from a maplike obsession with connections. It is the nature of connections that fascinates me more than the ends that they might reach, for in the nature and direction of connections lies the mechanism of understanding; understanding of belonging and identity in relation to space and temporality. In this I will not regard the edges of a discipline as constraining the direction of discussion and the study will take reference from philosophy, ethnography, law, language, theology, geography and cultural study.

This study is concerned primarily with a mapping of the contexts of Self and Other that are apparent in modes of performance, but as they particularly deal with contexts of belonging, identity and mobility. In this respect, the shape of the thesis navigates an argument that shifts from the internal body to the external world and back again, attempting by this route to consider the complex relationship between what is physically experienced, what is cognitively understood, and what is culturally or ideologically given. Throughout that consideration flow questions of freedom, identity, license and otherness. This is
a dialogic space in many respects, reflecting the Bakhtinian idea that Self is essentially relational, revealing, as Hegel did, the impossibility of solipsism in the face of a need to be recognised in return by the (human) objects of our consciousness. As such, the research vehicle of performance practice as it sits in that dialogic space suits this discourse very well.

Whilst reflexively locating the discussion with other theory and praxis, the thesis is primarily constructed as a research discussion around the body of my practice and as such is a study in auto-performance, through a charting, navigation and revealing of some of the works of the past decade. Its ‘modus operandi’ has been in the decentring of Self as a motif of this body of work – the attempt to other ‘I’. This attempt raises the recurrent issue of subjective states and locates my practice in this regard. I choose not to discuss these works as chronology, since they stand as aspects of a discourse that visits, evaluates and revisits key concerns and also because the works are relative to one and other in different ways, either by form or theme. Arising out of that I realised that there were cornerstone discussions and these became the chapters.

I cannot separate the chapters easily, since there is so much interrelation and fluidity between notions of cartography, self, inscription, utterance and so forth, but each chapter is intended to explore the shift in perspective that has driven the practice and its own shift in forms. An essential quality of the thesis for the reader is that it will shift between formal modes of theorised exploration to personal account and performance writing (the chorographic mode of ‘mystory’). This traverse of a more autobiographical voice to the academic
reflects a core shift between ideas and embodiment, between subjective and objective modes of considering Self and Other and of the discussion and extrapolation of constructs of identity. The thesis shifts between a direct discussion of the works of my practice and the critical contexts that they operate within, constructing out of this a discussion that is intended in itself to be a map, with far more interest in the nature of connections than the closure of destinations. From the perspective of examination, the written aspect of the thesis is to be considered alongside an exhibition that documents the body of practice discussed.

iii. Being

The efficacy of memory essentially concerns personal safety. It is a constantly edited facility that informs taste, personal geography, action and behaviour by storing and connecting a posteriori experience to a priori cognition. Wherever possible human decisions are based on the experience of memory, and this is of course true of other sentient creatures. In human terms this is also a formative facility in the construction of Self. I know who I am and yet I know that this is as a veil, masking the emptiness of pure phenomenal being. I am generating oneness and yet, as Deleuze and Guattari declare in the introduction of A Thousand Plateaus, I am already ‘quite a crowd’ (2004, p.3).

I tend to consider my identity is a solid and static phenomenon, but know that this is nonsense. It is something that is dressed, redressed and adjusted every day, throughout the day and is also complexly re-considered in the contexts of space, place and through a need to negotiate with people. Even in a biological
sense there is no constancy of self whatsoever; being is in a constant state of change. There is an instinctive avoidance, of listening to one’s physical self in operation (rather like the discomfort of hearing one’s own heartbeat when the head is on the pillow). This basic fear centres on a mortal wish for health, wellbeing and security, which are in turn directly index to matters of social and familial belonging, societal visibility, license and identity as they map across the territories of landscape, belief, ideology, culture and nationhood. The dualistic dichotomy of this state is that we vigorously construct oneness whilst simultaneously seeking the symbiotic sanctuary of belonging.

This notion is at the core of Buddhist theologies, but is also considered in depth by Sartre in Being and Nothingness (1969), as he considers the stricture between being in-itself (unconscious being, en-soi), as most sentient creatures are, and the more reflexively human state of being for-itself (conscious, pour-soi). For Sartre:

identity is the limiting concept of unification: it is not true that the in-itself has any need of a synthetic unification of its being; at its own extreme limit unity disappears and passes into identity. Identity is the ideal of “one”, and “one” comes into the world by human reality (Sartre, 1969, p74).

It is also this grasping ideal of “one” that places us in the permanent regenerative state of being for-itself. This might also be quantified by the taxonomies of being and doing - or substance and semblance (Lawler, 2008,
There is a social desire for authenticity (to be oneself; *being*), but also a widespread understanding of acting a role (performing the self; *doing*). Drawing upon this distinction, Lawler then re-closes the gap because ‘it is taken … that semblance and substance ought to coincide. If semblance does not match substance, that is because of some dissembling – some attempt to deceive others …’ (2008, p.101). In respect of the idea of Performance (as event), this is the root of a personal disaffection with my early professional forays into acting and pedagogic delivery of ‘actor training’. It seems to me that actors are in a constant and difficult negotiation with that dissembled gap betwixt self and other, constructing short-circuits at best, with great skill, but still short circuits.

Performance art practices, such as *auto-performance*, close that gap at every opportunity, choosing instead to negotiate efficacy in the space between Sartre’s *en soi* and *pour-soi*. These are more naked spaces, more revealing and more immediate and which often strive for subjectivity, in regard of their audience, as opposed to objectivity. The process of constructing an acted role, then, begins with the gulf between self and other but aims to close that gap during the process, by complexly convincing self of its relation to the other before then disguising it as other. But, this remains a fictionally contrived and therefore extremely dissembled state. Performance Art practices certainly involve travesty (and often magnifications of constructed dysfunction or even deliberations of deviance⁵), but these are regarded as the necessary vehicle to

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⁵ ‘People are frequently undecided whether a particular episode is truly deviant or what true deviance is: their judgement depends on context, biography and purpose.’ (Downes & Rock, 2007, p.3)
reveal, rather than obfuscate, self and furthermore to attach/detach/attach self to socio-ideological frameworks, extrapolating their functions, debating their efficacy, revealing that *nothingness*.

**iv. Constructing Territories of Belonging**

Perhaps part of my fascination with this territory of performance is because validity of identity is as much concerned with exclusion as belonging. There are primary, secondary and tertiary frames at play, across which an individual sense of *Self* navigates in a constant state of readjustment. A primary context such as immediate family may be offset by education, religion, belief or culture. Tertiary contexts might reflect the 'placeness' of localised geography or the broader ideology of nationhood. It is not necessarily the case that such aspects are framed either as discreetly as this or even in this order. An individual may feel far more patriotically influenced or constructed by nationhood than by family, by religious conviction than by localised culture. The validity of belonging is also variably based upon rights gained from all of the above – family, nation, education, culture, belief, placeness. The respective weight of these ingredients against one another is, however, a matter of constructive choice and license.

Bauman asserts that the issue of (national) identity is a recent, rather than ancient, discourse that arose only since the possibility of human movement en masse, following the transport revolution and conflicts of the modern epoch. He discusses the Polish national census that occurred just prior to the Second World War. Up to a million people were bemused by the question of their
national identity, insisting that they belonged to a local place, a small community, beyond which they felt and understood no relevant sense of allegiance (Bauman, 2004). As such the assertion of self in any given community only becomes visible as an issue when the self is removed from an indigenous state of belonging, thus becoming other. Indigeny and the construct of identity are closely engaged if not quite the same – the former is asserted at a genetic level and where this is a physically visible feature, the acceptance as belonging or social rejection as ‘other’ is more explicitly enforced in relation to territory.

This study discusses dispossession by mobile, static and enforced containment, illustrating this phenomenologically through a series of works of performance that deal with placeness, identity and belonging, and constituting the research praxis of the author. This engagement will intend that form follows practice, rather than the more traditional mode of practice following form; in this regard then the projects unfold across a number of performative modes that include durational installation, public intervention, performance writing, action, theatre and lens media.

v. An Outline of the Thesis

The structure of the study as a written expression has developed organically and over a number of years. The chapter headings therefore reflect a discussion that unfolds but that is subsequent in respect of themes rather than of the works discussed.
Chapter One begins with a consideration of the relationship of depiction to the viewer and with the idea of the expression of art as a document, considering inscription, the artefact and the trace as assignations of embodiment, identity and presence. These of course are made phenomenally in the moment of an event but then pass into the evidential, as fragmentary documents that can be strategised in the presentation of that event after the fact.

The chapter is also about depiction and the distance and difference of perspectives between artist, viewer and participant. It introduces a telescopic shift in this relationship through the body of practice and considers how the inscribed document asserts notions of authenticity in the present as it conveys the events of the past. Through these perspectives the discussion sets up a key issue of the thesis in the relationship of the embodied to the represented as they exist as socio-political and cultural corollaries of belonging, identity and inheritance.

Chapter Two develops the notion of the subjective and objective position adjacent to Self and Other by considering a cultural distrust of mobility besides the settled. In this respect it begins with the idea of being as an act of occupation at which I is a centre and observer of a world that is subject to I. In ethnographic terms the chapter then discusses the shift to strategies that attempt a multiplicity of perspectives and a decentring of Self in the attempt to understand Other. This requires a greater mobility and this tension corresponds in the argument to the qualities of philosophy beside fact, thinking and doing, settlement and nomadism.
The discussion unfolds through an examination of my own practice and others, urban and natural space, politics and theology. In this chapter I introduce two key artworks to the thesis: Nightflight, an eight hour performance at night, moving a participant audience in a metaphoric flight over the Clwydian Range in North West Wales and A Wonderful Engine, a nine-hour durationally performed installation constructed out of maps. The discourse of these works then unfolds in two further works: City Dell, produced in a small urban park for Leeds Lightnight, and with Basque performers in the mountains near Bilbao in Walking With Stones.

The discussion unfolds toward one of cartography as land crossed is represented and that represented is then crossed, but is also crucially framed in temporality; liminality is considered beside the notion of leaving and arriving, but particularly in the condition of arriving on leaving, that in order to arrive something must be left, that a death of sorts will occur. This gesture to death is present throughout in consideration of diaspora and flight and of being able to move out of the past, through the present to the future. Ancestry is also introduced, following a discussion of inheritance in chapter one, and is related through these works to the crossing of landscapes and to plurality.

In Chapter Three the notion of the real and the represented, of being positioned as observer or enveloped as subject and of understanding landscape as it relates to identity combine in a discussion of cartography. The chapter sets up an examination of the relationship of maps to power and offsets the ideological
claim to territory with the map of the disenfranchised. The chapter also engages with alternative perspectives in art practice to notions of the map and its relationship to exploring space and place, with an emphasis on the ‘no man’s land’ of the Surrealist Derive, of the trenches, of the Situationists and in contemporary practice. Through all of this a core consideration of the embodied and idealised constructs of identity is placed within Bauman’s notion of a liquid state of constant change (2000). The chapter works toward an extrapolation of five of Wood’s cartographic coda (1992) – the iconic, linguistic, tectonic, temporal and presentational – as they exist in my practice as an examination of Self and Other in relation to landscape and belonging. The chapter returns to the body as a metaphor for landscape and as a map as it arrives the at assertion of the map by a reader or cartographer in the claiming of territories of belonging. The chapter finally examines an act of palmistry as an interpretive giving of voice in that assertion of identity, through an act of mapping.

In the wake of a discussion of the diasporic crossing of territory and the assertion need in respect to belonging, Chapter Four considers the act of speech in respect of language, rights and visibility. It frames utterance beside need as the driving illocutionary force (Austin, 1976; Searle, 1995) but considers the caveat of a license to speak in a given social context. The discussion is political in theme, working through a number of artworks in my practice, Rich Tea Conversations, Fizz Bomb and Twice Rendered, as they explore territories of speech as a right, as a sermon and as a projection of Self or indeed a silencing of Other. The notion of silence as enforced or chosen is examined through personal practice, others’ practice, fiction and theology. The discussion works
toward a consideration of language as a resistant act and considers the power of this resistance relative to the territory of its enactment, arriving once more with the body as the glottic originator of parole. There is a discussion here of ecstatic glossolalia, of understanding and interlocution arriving finally at the Artaudian scream that manifests voice as a purely embodied act of will.

As the final chapter, Chapter Five returns the study to its context as a cartography of Self by a consideration of the autobiographic. It considers the term initially as tripartite, separating the idea of Self, its constructs, from issues of phenomenal embodiment in the present, but also as the body becomes a palimpsest of the past, which is depicted as a strategy of assertion, of saying and documenting something. The three contexts form the geological, biological and ideological strata of the study. But this final discussion returns Self, through practice as research and personal experience, to a final recognition of Other as an assignation of identity, proposing that difference is crucial to a conference of belonging. The discussion considers plasticity in the adjustment of identity to circumstance, of the framing and reframing of ancestry in that regard, of the shift in uses of language and the redefinition of spaces. Self and Other meet in a ‘Venn’ space that is constructed out the overlapping terms of reference of their opposition – they approach one another from opposite positions of the same historical story, but have that story in common. They represent the essential aspect of multiplicity and the infinity of maps as embodied narratives of

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6 I first heard auto/bio/graphic verbally dissected in this way by my colleague Steve Purcell in 2001, who was an inspiration and a catalyst to my thinking. We co-authored a degree called Performance Works and placed, in the second year, a module called Performing Selves (Auto/bio/graphical works).

7 As in a Venn Diagram that illustrates the area of commonality between subjects.
connectivity as the past is asserted in face of present need in an attempt to navigate the future.
Chapter 1 – Graphic

To be graphic is to describe with detail, to illustrate, to form a picture. In this chapter the issue of something graphic is seen as a beginning and, from a Bakhtinian perspective, as dialogic\(^8\) inasmuch as there is an interpretation or response to be made by a reader or viewer; a discussion to be had. From an autobiographic perspective, this is the beginning of an analysis of the contexts of auto-performance in my work spanning a decade. The *graph* in that context is more of a process of charting, of navigating and of revealing the efficacy and tensions of research that inhabits these works. This chapter introduces a telescopic mode that resurfaces throughout the thesis as it discusses notions of audience and performer, near and far, inside and outside, self and other. It intends, through discussion of example and argument, to relate objective and subjective frames, to discuss empirical and rational modes, to expand and contract temporal aspects. To be graphic then, is to create the interspective context for the viewer but it is also a reflective act introspectively for the artist.

The exploration of the nature of the relation between the event of performance and the audience has been a vital aspect of experimentation throughout the late twentieth century into the twenty-first, but is further driven by post-structural ideas of decentring a static viewpoint from which traditional modes of viewing are singular in perspective and distanced by the shift in paradigms of liveness in a global digital environment, by the subsequent growth in notions of the

\(^8\) Holquist refers the term ‘dialogism’ to Bakhtin as a collective adjective terming of his theories (1997).
interactive and, as such, by the recognition that we are all socio-politically complicit in what we view – viewing *is* participation:

Spectator and actor are parts played by … mind and body. The division between the former two as roles is the split between the latter two as a social organization … The state, a source of social control, is a state of mind … The body is the appropriate source of action precisely because the control of the mind makes it a site of resistance … [T]he body, as a site of resistance, exists only in performance (Martin, 1990, p.2).

Martin’s statement is a powerful description of the implication of both mind and body but points towards a binary reading that suits traditional conventions of that singular perspective more than the physically participatory, sited or interventionist practices considered here. In these works there exists a correspondence founded more complexly between audience and performer that is often strategised as interchangeable, wherein the position, perspective or action of the viewer is a crucial gesture to the subject (since they take a role).

The graphology of performance is therefore a crucial and political dialogue with both self and other, between physical experiences and societal constructs and in spaces of belonging and non-belonging. The performer and audience are united in grappling with truths as physically experienced and cognitively derived and in this respect practitioners since the *fin de siècle* have attempted to agitate the space between the performer and the audience in order to develop the notions of a viewer’s sense of complicity in what they view by
concentrating more on the qualities of subjective experience than objective separation in order then to create an immersion rather than a spectacle. The advent of film and particularly the perspectival shot achieved this very early on with examples such as the Lumière Brothers *L'Arrivée d'un Train en Gare* (1895), in which the ‘camera is perhaps nearer to the edge of the platform than in similar films, and the approaching locomotive leans towards it, as if it might topple and crush the cinematographer’ (Keiller, 2007, p.72) and whilst there is no real evidence to the popular legend that audience members ran in alarm, it certainly had an ‘unsettling’ impact⁹.

The intimacy of experimental cabarets such as Voltaire denied any theatrical fourth wall and had a far more participatory relationship between audience and performer much like that of a contemporary stand-up show, although in respect of complicity there existed far more membership amongst the audience. The first *derives* of the Dadaists and then the Surrealists, Brecht’s interest in the boxing match, Artaud’s manifesto wish to surround the audience and expose them to cacophony are all examples at attempting a complicity with the audience, wherein the connections are not just presented like the two-dimensional map before us but rather imply us and contain us in an actual landscape. There was also an implicit conversation in many early modern practitioners and institutions concerning the spectrum of forms of performance between the efficacy of ritual and its opposite in entertainment, underpinned by

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⁹ Film also enjoyed a particularly close approach with dance from the outset, which suited the commitment of the early pioneers of modern dance to subject rather than object, to actual time and metre.
an interest in *Primitivism* and psychoanalysis\(^\text{10}\), insofar as ritual trance states are concerned\(^\text{11}\). This is evident in the collaboration of Laban’s rationalism with Wigman’s expressionist primitivism, in addition to Laban’s interest in the interventionist approach to audience of the Dadaist cabaret mentioned above\(^\text{12}\) (Piasecki, 2007a). Stanislavski’s systemised ritualisation of role preparation is also indicative of an attempt at this fusion, if not in its relationship to the audience who remained in the dark void of the auditorium; \(^\text{13}\). These Modernist projects are therefore somewhat:

characterised by the merging of audience and action, by a rejection of language or verbal logic as a primary means of communication; and where the aim is to induce trance states these are active and tend toward convulsion (Innes, 1981, p.7).

\(^{10}\) Consideration of efficacy and entertainment as forming a spectrum was a core consideration of Schlemmer’s Bauhaus Theatre programme (Schlemmer, 1960), but evident in the work of many modernist practitioners from Laban with Wigman to Artaud and Barrault. It became core to the emergent practices of Performance Art, to the studio ensemble and training practices of figures such as Grotowski, Hijikata and Barba, to the development of trans-cultural form in the theatre of Brook. It has also been widely discussed by Performance Studies theorists and historians but perhaps most significantly by Barba and Savarese (1991), Innes (1981 & 1993), Schechner (2002). It is not a subject for expansive discussion in this thesis however.

\(^{11}\) The study will variously touch on this issue, particularly in consideration of the disembodied voice (Chapter 4 – Linguagraphic).

\(^{12}\) ‘Laban’s experiments with space had been largely intellectual; he had seen the human body as standing theoretically in the centre of a many sided geometric figure[.]
Wigman developed this emotionally – … her movement was conceived in the inner processes of her individual psychology.’ (Martin cited in Foster, 1977, p.22)

\(^{13}\) ‘However rational [Stanislavski’s] system, it remains romantically driven by something of tradition, something less than Modern, the manifestation of which is always in the meta-world of his chapter headings in *An Actor Prepares: When Acting is an Art, Imagination, Emotion Memory, Communion, Faith and a Sense of Truth* (Stanislavski 1988 edition)’ (Piasecki, 2007a, p.158). The recognition of the audience as present in real time was also a key factor in Meyerhold’s split with Stanislavski.
Returning to the intentions of the thesis, subjectivity is a recurring theme and this chapter will extrapolate this as a distinct discourse in graphic depiction, whether as inscribed, multi-perspectival or as a trace.

### 1.1 The Document.

The graphic context also raises the issue of the document since a performance work, as an event, is an object record in itself, albeit that the live phenomenon differs from what remains after the fact. Documentation is an uneasy bedfellow of performance practice for three ontological reasons:

1. Performance is synonymous with phenomenal experience, liveness,nowness and by definition cannot exist beyond the fact of its event (other than in a different form);
2. Any documentary strategy is driven by representational objectives that are concerned with mythological status, memory, reconstruction, publishing, archiving and marketing;
3. Documentation can be subversive and is perspectival – it depicts the perspective of the viewer and as an act of deliberation by its author, leaves important aspects (physical, atmospheric and temporal) beyond the selected frame.

Phelan is unequivocal in this regard:

Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of
representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance. To that degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology (1993, p.146).

But documentation is also where discussion occurs, where opinion is formed and tested, and reaction and reflexivity remain after the fact of the event. It is where discourse connects through a series of works and therefore presents plurality rather than closed singular events. As a graphological exercise questions then remain about the position the document takes either after the fact of the work or indeed as a direct causal product of the work as a trace or imprint of phenomenal action.

Heathfield presents a discussion on the nature and value of documentation as editor of *Shattered Anatomies*, (1997). This limited edition box contains artefacts, traces and writings concerning the body in performance, but is presented as an eclectic collection of documents: for example, a small jewellery box contains the ‘Sharp Kiss’ by Bobby Baker (from a performance in which she smashed a jar of jam, spooned the contents into her mouth and then placed kisses onto squares of card). A postcard accompanies this artefact, with instructions for repeating the action. Station House Opera have supplied a small parcel of wooden bricks with illustrations of how they might be architecturally stacked to recreate some of their performance installations. *Shattered Anatomies* contains cards, acetates, diagrams, dolls and even plastic glasses. These objects and traces are appended by a collection of critical writing, presented in an unusual but pertinent layout as a small bound book, delicate
paper document or large foldout landscape. ‘Bound pages and textual expressions would not suffice,’ here was ‘…a commitment to undermine the dominant orders of the text’ (Heathfield, 1997a, np).

In this way Heathfield critiques not only the valorisation of the event, but also the value of the performance document to an artist, for whom it might bring a new or broader audience, cultural authority or indeed the possibility of commercial payment that the event itself eschewed by nature of its rejection of art as commodity. Heathfield is extremely aware of the contradictions at work here, but also of the shared profit of the academy itself in the ‘intellectual commoditisation and reproduction of elusive events.’ (1997a, np)

The multiple approaches to the document evident in Shattered Anatomies deals with a number of artists and works, but the implication is also for the reconstructive possibility of multiple documents or perspectives of a single work – images, traces, artefacts, recordings. These layers can be thought of as horizontal, rhizomatic and connective, but are often also modally evident within a work as a palimpsest manifestation of the durational performance art action. I like this as a taxonomy because the image of the palimpsest directly infers a more temporal frame in which something manifests and metamorphoses over a duration. This also brings us closer to the relationship of the cartographic to the consideration of identity as a posteriori construction of self and also reveals the complicit role of active interpretation by other. Barthes analogised layers of interpreted meaning in a work as ‘weaves’ constructed by the reader and dependent on a ‘stereographic plurality’ of its signifiers (1977, p.159), the
complexity of which might be read synchronously rather than as chronology. This is rather like an old school desk, revealing its history simultaneously as stains, carvings, scribblings, wear and patina, but requiring a certain accumulative duration. A good deal of task-based performance art involves a detailed and paced metamorphoses of both performer and space - a state of becoming - and in respect of performance art I would prefer to consider an archaeology of fragments as opposed to the fluency implied by Barthes’ weave. That is to say that weaving suggests a completion of text that is not always possible or even desirable. From a more archaeological perspective, it is the gaps between what is present that are the active devices for the interpretation of the reader (viewer). The reader then imagines a linkage that is subject to their own experience of the world; they try to make sense out of the inexplicable and only partially succeed.

Certainly in respect of performance art practices, the line between the phenomenal event and its document has become blurred through notions of inscription and trace that have occurred precisely within the event itself and are therefore authentic index to the live moment; they are artefactual testaments, graphic evidence, like the bullet and shrapnel holes in the buildings of post-war cities. These traces become testament to a presence that is absent after the fact, to an event, to temporality and as evidence that a past, our past, the past before our past existed. This empirical evidence is crucial to the license of our identity in the present and our need to touch the past as a fact. But if performativity continues in any live sense then it is, as Phelan asserts, in forms of viewer testament. She considers Sophie Calle’s collection of audience memories of...
absent paintings both in the form of sketches and descriptions and the display of these in the place of those missing works:

The descriptions remind us of how loss acquires meaning and generates recovery – not only of and for the object, but for the one who remembers. The disappearance of the object is fundamental to performance;… Calle demonstrates the performative quality of all seeing. (1993, p.147).

In 2006 I supervised the graduation project of a student, whom I will refer to as Laura, which was particularly focussed upon the tensions between the object, the event, memory and intrinsic value. We discussed at length where value resided in the fabric of an object considering souvenirs, memento mori, heirlooms, authenticity and evidence. Laura felt increasingly that the object was the interlocutor of that event recovery, that the value was intrinsically dependent upon the liminal import of an event, but was sometimes also further compromised by a material value (the object is worth a fortune but the owner would never part with it). The student constructed a performance intervention, titled *Artefactual Freedom: Cleansing Your Connections*, which forced the object into a competition of value with its index (representational significance). She had a formal contract of exchange drawn up at a solicitors that required the owner of a personally valued object to sign full ownership over to her in exchange for a careful documentation of its significance and history; she promised that in return for the permanent exchange, they would receive a number of documents of the object and history as a unique artwork. Audience members were then written to and invited to bring a treasured object to an
appointment wherein it would be legally exchanged in this manner. The viewer sat in a formal interview with Laura, whilst the terms of the contract were legally read and signed by both parties, with careful emphasis that this was a permanent exchange. The viewer was then invited to carefully relate the history and significance of this object, and this was sound recorded. The artist then took a careful photograph of the object and presented the contract, recording and photograph to the viewer. Finally the viewer was asked to follow the artist to another space where they were sat down and asked to put on safety goggles. The space was full of power tools and, as the now previous owner of the object watched, the artist destroyed the object with any means necessary – hammering, sawing, chopping, or burning. Finally, the viewer received a fragment before being shown out.

The project caused a deal of disturbance and yet the legal contract had been carefully drawn up and carefully explained. Perhaps as an art action, some viewers still resisted the implications of an exchange of ownership for a document and were horrified as witnesses to the destruction of an object of great personal significance – and yet the significance had been surgically removed through the act of documentation as an event that now signified the original event, in place of the object itself.

I participated in the piece myself and exchanged an original Leninist banner that I had bought back from Russia, on the trip that led directly to the discovery of my family after sixty years of war, flight and disruption. It was a painful exchange that left me with a photograph, a contract and a shard of material. I felt in some respects that I had just betrayed my own memory and rejected the empirical evidence. The object index was now contained within a triadic document and its representational index was now fragmentary and plural rather than singular. The material value was divorced from the intrinsic value. The perspective – my perspective – was also fettered by the authorship of the document being that of the artist, my student. I felt curiously invaded and recognised that my ego had also been intrinsically present in a trophy of sorts; a proof of my first hand experience of a ripple in some significant history of the world. A primary object had become a secondary source and the landscape of the story had been replaced with a map of it. In some respects, my discovery of family at that moment in Russia now has a part association with the artwork made by this undergraduate and the document has a duration for that precedes the artistic event, and yet it is produced by it.
For the first decade of my own practice I did not really consider a documentary strategy as being inherent in the practice, although I had a tendency to retain an object from each piece for some personal display. I had always had an interest and training in photography, but as a performer tended to rely upon prints from friends or perhaps published images, poor quality videos and posters. During this early phase there were a good deal of lost opportunities. During a 2001 residency in Ypres, discussed later, I formed a friendship with a photographer called Peter Morton that has remained as a crucial relationship, but I now also recognise the intrinsic production of documentation as inherent to both the process of making and performing work and as such it is often produced within the mechanisms at play within the practice.

1.2 Mendel’s Garden.

Since my work is primarily concerned with belonging, I will now move on to explore how these graphic contexts are often connected gesturally to notions of the hereditary self, constructs of identity, and the traces/tracing of ancestry within some of my practice. A perfect example would be in a collaborative work that I made and toured with Walt Shaw. 

Mendel's Garden was first commissioned by the Theatres of Science conference at the University of Glamorgan (2004). I had worked collaboratively with Shaw throughout the previous decade and we had often had conversations regarding science and its relation to creativity, in part due to Shaw’s training as a biologist. I had become interested in the figure of Gregor Mendel having listened to a broadcast of his biography and was interested in the relationship of belief and creativity to science in his endeavour. Shaw
discussed Mendel’s ‘laws’ of inheritance with me and we found ourselves pouring over gamete generation structures that led eventually to a strategy for this work. As a work it teased its audience to make decisions regarding the efficacy of data retrieval when related to a creative act and based spurious performance action upon the science of inheritance, considering then the relationship of the objective and subjective domains in art and science. It was viewed and discussed by scientists and artists alike, because the subjective creative act was carefully tied up in the domain of a recognisable laboratory with objectively collated data. This antagonism of subject and object was very much present as the work attempted a pointlessly doomed collation of data in measuring the trajectory and distance of falling ‘generations’ of peas, which we entered with date, time and generation onto large charts at the edge of the space, seeking to explore an analogy with Mendel’s experiments to elaborate the basic rules of inheritance.
This spectrum between the subjective and the objective, between experience and logic, or *a posteriori* and *a priori* knowledge, is naturally adjacent to the interiority of the body and its externalised or constructed social manifestation in the world. Artaud recognised and struggled with the extrapolation of the physical body from the constructed or social body, suspecting that only his bones could remain loyal to his Self (Barber, 1993). In this he wished for and depicted an eviscerated body for ‘there is nothing more useless than an organ’ (Artaud, 1976, p.571). The point though, in regard of this discussion, is that the interiority of the organ for Artaud was index to the distrust he felt for the social organs of an exterior world. I find this useful, for in any discussion of the graphology of identity there exists slippage between corporeal affect and political effect. Butler neatly frames this by considering how the state that we are in is affected by the State we are in (2007).

Considering the era that Artaud grew up in, I am reminded too of the modernist debate between Universalists and Individualists, typified in the earlier Viennese lectures of Franz Brentano (Watson, 2000) at the beginning of the last century. The debate is best illustrated by its mirror states of the agricultural versus the industrial, of god versus science, of the *a posteriori* versus the *a priori*, and in this sense is directly rooted to Kant’s attempt to create a workable fusion at the end of the Enlightenment. This is later reflected in Derrida’s comparisons of

14 Whilst it is difficult to extrapolate the literal distrust Artaud felt for his own body from its metaphoric contexts beyond the self, Deleuze and Guattari achieve this by broadly considering the Body without Organs (BwO) as an extension of potentials. Cruelty, and indeed performance, remains in their writing as they describe sado-masochistic treatments that contain interiority (sewing up of the urethera, anus, nipples) and emphasise desire and therefore the unobtainable.
Freud and Artaud because it is also concerns the separation of self-determination from Divine control (1978, p.243). Self-determination in the 19th century had been fuelled by Darwin’s theory, by Nietzsche’s Übermensch, by a move to the cities, by the growing Women’s movement, for whom it was a key political goal, by Marx and Engels and for artists by the death of patronage as the determinant of subject and discourse. Brentano held that because ‘mankind has a universal, natural longing for answers’ religion was ‘as universal a phenomenon in the history of peoples as the formation of government’ (Brentano, 1987, p.10). As such he attempted to prove the presence of the Divine through the scientific.

Brentano attempted to construct an argument out of an empirical and ontological standpoint that would make the ‘proposition that God exists … an analytic proposition and, as such, evident a priori ‘ (Krantz, 1987, p.2). This is an important point since an a priori truth in itself is formed from a rational logic and in this way Brentano applies a perspective and a mechanism of the opposition against itself. In a letter to an agnostic Brentano observes that ‘all those who have been bewildered by the proofs of God’s existence … have not made sufficient use of what reason allows us,’ and he goes on to add that Philosophy loses its superiority and value as a ‘theoretical science … if the existence of God and everything connected to this as a consequence, is banned from the domain of philosophical knowledge’ (Brentano, 1987, p.9)\(^{15}\).

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\(^{15}\) Brentano’s lectures were attended by Husserl (1859-1938) and Von Ehrenfels (1859-1932), who established Phenomenology and Gestalt Theory respectively.
The most powerful modernist project in the secular control of life itself has been the mapping of the genome, ironic because it began with the dedicated horticultural study of a dedicated Augustinian monk, Gregor Mendel. Here the rooted origins, the proclivities and to some extent the future of the individual are mapped. Whilst this understanding of self informs and perhaps affects the development and emergence of personality and the socio-political, it also infers debate regarding the ethics of bio-design and economic demand that again is rooted in what Foucault referred to as the Bio-Power that formed ‘an indispensable element in the development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production …’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 263). This observation by Foucault is another causal indicator in the struggle of Individualists for self-determination following the Industrial Revolution.

Today, the phenomenon of genetic manipulation places a legislative pressure on the State again to define its relationship to the Church, to the market and to the individual body and since the market is governed somewhat beyond the power of any individual state (Butler & Spivak, 2007, p.79), commercial interpretations of genetic manipulation are more a question of time than the politics of governance. Foucault always regarded the application of bio-power as having its ‘firstness’ in economic processes that reinforced socio-economic

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16 In respect of human cloning, the US Patents office has received a huge variety of related applications since the successful cloning of Dolly the sheep in 1996. Many of these are repeat applications and, according to Patent Watch, some were granted as early as 2002, such as that for Human Reproductive Cloning owned by the University of Missouri, but with a financial interest shared by Biotransplant Inc. of Massachusetts. (http://www.gene.ch/gentech/2002/May/msg00181.html retrieved on 13/01/2009)
hierarchies of power and subjugation. What differs in the new bio-political of today is the issue of sex. Foucault observes that the politics of sex in the early modernist era were so important precisely because of the ‘the stamp of individuality’:

[it became] the theme of political operations, economic interventions (through incitements to or curbs on procreation), and ideological campaigns for raising standards of morality and responsibility: … this technology of sex was a whole series of different tactics that combined in various proportions the objective of disciplining the body and regulating populations (1991, p.268).

The concerns of the Individualists were caught between the inescapable certainties of a universal subjugation to the Divine or being equally diminished by the bio-power of a capitalist economy of production. Mendel’s experiments essentially rationalise hereditary qualities of sex and family into a theory of production that Brentano would argue could only originate in Divine intention or what today is called Intelligent Design. Again in his letter to the agnostic he wrote of William Thompson as a young scientist taking a walk with Leibig through a field of flowers in England:

Thompson asked him whether he really believed that one such blossom could be conceived to exist without an intelligent cause; … ‘No, surely no more than I believe that without an intelligent cause there could be a book describing the whole amazing structure of such a blossom’ (1987, p.7).
The use of science to prove God was always finally going to fail, following Mendel since the greatest irony is that his experiments with peas would lead mankind to the ability to exert a defining power over the essential creation of life, the main driver being the very economics of bio-power that fuelled the Individualist debate, the main resistor being theist ideologies. Foucault regarded the emergent bio-power of the state since the Enlightenment as a polarity of the body seen as ‘a machine; its disciplining, the optimisation of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces’ and the body ‘serving’ as a mechanism in ‘biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, … health, … longevity’, and these poles became the foci of a growing number of ‘regulatory controls [in] a bio-politics of the population’ (Foucault, 1991, pp.261-2). My assertion that current genetic manipulations are more a question of time than ethics is in part borne, albeit cynically, out of the observation that bio-politics and bio-power are original mechanisms of the capitalist State.

Having said this, ethics plays a more institutional and governmental role than it did even a century previous, but that cynical view might assert that the state of the ethical is only relative to its terms of reference. That is to say that the viewpoint that something constitutes an ethical action is weighed not against absolute values but rather on the efficacy of the product of that action – does the end ethically justify the means? That end is also imbricated with collective socio-political fear and belonging. Whilst there remain parameters to this notion, they shift by degrees dependent upon a slow public process of acclimatisation to the issues: the ethical can be ideologically shifted by long and strategic campaigns and reinforced by a focus on key events. For example, some social acceptance of the existence of torture, or the shift in that which
constitutes it (is ‘water-boarding’ torture?), in American foreign policy can be seen to have been catalysed by 9/11, desensitised by the wars (and their media depictions) that followed and normalised in a wealth of mainstream dramatisations of the same on stage, on film, in novel and on television.

As a durational performance installation, then, Mendel’s Garden attempted to consider qualitative and quantitative strictures in genetic cartography. On a six metre square black surface, with a sound-garden of raised speaker cones vibrating and releasing thousands of peas, we worked for three days ‘cross-pollinating’ the cones measuring the fall distance of peas, noting unusual events, working in cycles or generations and marking our activity at the time of its moment with white ink on the black surface. In this way the work attempted to form a map as a palimpsest layering of ‘generations’; an objective depiction of rootedness that is gradually belied by its subjectively over-inscribed surface.

The physical manifestation of marks upon this blackboard ground, gradually required a closer viewing in order to disentangle discreet and observable information. But it is also the quality of this tangled weave that reveals Deleuze’s arborescent mode, naturalising the objective data and prioritising the rhizomatic ‘narratives of origin’ (Auslander, 2008, p.58), and therefore eschewing any notion that we are phenomenally (biologically, genetically, naturally) one thing or socially (educationally, politically, nationally) another. I want to triangulate Foucault’s polarities of bio-power here, with the third contingent aspect of Self:

**1. PROMOTION:**
Individualised Self

**2. PRODUCTION:**
Healthy Body

**3. REPRODUCTION:**
Genetic control

Of course, the promotion of self as an individual is the antagonist to the clear controls of bio-power over the body as a means of [capitalist] production or reproduction and the subjective is necessarily drawn into conflict with the objective in a manner not dissimilar to the difficulty of reconciling self and role.
Mendel worked painstakingly over years, collecting data from crosses of pea plants that displayed varying characteristics but it was a more subjective imaginative leap for Mendel that derived patterns from the mass of seemingly meaningless, almost chaotic information. The potential of subjective truth is then an equal to observable fact and *Mendel’s Garden* invited its audience to consider where the home of ‘truth’ was, whether in the personal report or the unfettered record. The work attempted an extrapolation of the rational from the empirical and yet, like Kant, affirming that the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive by deliberately failing in the attempt to make a purely rational sense of information – time and experience were an important factor. The work critically asserted that whilst data reveals the truth of understanding, it does not necessarily reveal an understanding of truth. In this respect our identity and understanding is as much predicated on the provenance of experience and memory, as it is on evidential fact. The spilling of the peas from vibrating speakers over the four-day period provided us with the vehicle to cartographically inscribe the history of our own movements, thoughts and actions and the trace of that movement, more than an interpretation of its data, emphasised the critical aspect of temporality and change. What our data then meant in mathematical terms was quite different to what it meant as a working log of our presence and industry.

1.3 Inscription.
At the heart of *Mendel’s Garden* were my concerns about authenticity and self, about extrapolating aspects of identity that are predominantly constructed from those that are inherent. There is also a relative space in the work between what is internally and externally the case, between the physical visceral truth of one’s
body and the emotional and cognitive truths of one’s life. It was evident that an interlocutor of these domains was the physical act and particularly that which inscribed or made a mark; such a mark seemed index to the personal process and attitudes that themselves formed the evolving territory of Self. The Garden became a richly inscribed map of reactions, of interpretations and calculations that attempted to triangulate an understanding of their perpetrator as much of the subject matter at hand. Many of the great discoveries of Science certainly reveal the attitudes and priorities of their authors and are catalysed by a creative as well as a purely rational moment - perhaps the best examples are those wherein the scientist took a creative leap of inspiration from the accidental moment: Fleming’s recognition of bacterial resistant cultures in 1928, Perkin’s discovery in 1865 of the first synthetic dye, Mauve, whilst seeking an artificial quinine, or Fahlberg’s discovery of Saccharin in 1879 after eating bread with unwashed hands that had experimented with coal tar. The analogue notations of these authors are also paramount in our fascination with getting beneath the surface of their discoveries; we wish to know something of their internal means and feel that there is no more authentic an index than the personal mark of notebooks, letters, diagrams or napkin scribbles – such things exist in museums around the world\(^1\).

\(^{17}\) Following an invitation from the Fine Art Department of Leeds University, I displayed my notebooks in a locked cabinet of the Old Mining Building for one month in November, 2008 in order to consider a self-imposed historicisation of process and documentation. The efficacy of the exhibition, however, was as an example of documented process for students. Whilst in some respects a digression from the main thesis, the generative mythology of this display fascinated me – there was something of death and memorial here too, of not being able to contact, of the glass partition and the scrutiny of ink on paper.
As a young art student, I was obsessively fascinated by the self-portraits of Rembrandt, but more specifically by the small 1657 portrait that hangs in Edinburgh. This is a work rendered during a penultimate period of despair for the artist and the direct gaze is quite haunted. The self-portraits, of which I believe there are some sixty, employ a much heavier, almost abstract, brush mark than the commissions. The mark is heavy enough at close scrutiny for the observer to infer speed, weight and direction and, considering the absence of several centuries, to invoke the physical presence and action of the artist, at least in an imagined space. It is not just the figurative image, but the haptic weight of the surface that achieves this, and yet it also seems like a signatory act. There is weight in the substance, inasmuch as that the paint is so thickly applied, but also in the audacity and economy of mark making, both of which testify to authorship, to experience, to suffering life, to plain speaking as it were – a high-lit curl of hair is achieved by a single lick of paint. This is then reinforced by the figurative testament of a somewhat tired and reconciled expression in the absence of finery or decorative embellishment. Standing as a young man before this portrait, my interpretation of the direction and speed of a stroke raised my heartbeat as it seemed so actually to collapse time and distance in my proximity to its author; I felt as if I had enjoyed a private letter.

I am drawn here to mention the dancer Trisha Brown. Brown has always produced drawings both as depiction and trace of her practice, but I was struck how, with Drawing/Performance (2008), there appeared to be a signature taking place that involved the phenomenal inscription of the whole body: ‘Deeply sensual and usually abstract, her drawings are full-body productions (she sometimes uses her feet, for example), snapshots of a mind in motion’ (La
Rocco, 2009, np.). Brown used paint and point-media held by and against various features of her body to inscribe a surface in an action that was danced. Pressure, the direction of marks, the sustaining or sudden impact of time, the use of flexible and direct space were reminiscent of the elements of Laban’s *Principles of Movement* (Laban, 1968). But this was also readable as a conventional production of large scale drawing that is very similar for the viewer to films made of artists such as Picasso and Pollock at work, particularly since the latter worked on the floor. Their practices extended through the gestural inclusion of the entire body, which as a transition of the mark upon a surface implies the action of the body in the process of its rendering as a visual quality of the final drawn object. In this manner the document implies and extends the value of the physically performed action as an equal subject in representation.

Again, these are to me explosions of the signatory act and the works they produced are simultaneously artworks as static visual objects and, graphologically, documentary traces of phenomenal action that are directly index therefore to the identity of their author. When Brown rolls a thick stick of charcoal beneath her foot it leaves a trace like the ghosted tracks of a truck that skidded from the lane of the highway – we are left with a trajectory, the evidence of weight, direction and action that refers to a specific event, a specific body, a unique inscription. Considering my earlier discussion of the durational document, I am also reminded here of Abramovic & Ulays’ *Relation*

18 This differs to a product of figurative drawing in which the process or action of mark-making, if not the quality, is less relevant and often obfuscated by notions of virtuosic draughtsmanship.
in Movement (1977) piece at the Paris Biennale, in which Abramovic sat in a truck whilst Ulay drove it in a circle for 16 hours. The work is documented by time-lapsed photographs but also by static staged ones; I find the latter much more interesting as a circle of dark rubber tread slowly manifests upon the ground (Abramovic, 1998, pp.162-7)\(^1\), and yet I am also frustrated by the intervention of the vehicle between the mark and its author in this instance – it seems that there can be no subtlety of transferred weight, that even the presence of suspension is disturbance to an act that might otherwise have felt signatory or directly interlocuted as a mark from the presence of the body. Having said so, the intrinsic value of the durational action is very much inferred in the resulting drawing and I am struck with the beauty of the mark as a trace of a presence and event now absent and finished; these marks are evidence of presence and event, of being there, of being in sensorial and phenomenal range of a person, of liveness. To stand in a place and view something of an aftermath is haunting; there is a concrete residue that disturbs a sense of now with the fact that something happened here, not long before, and one cannot touch it other than in a space of temporal removal. As I connect the idea to death, this becomes a source of genuine frustration that causes me to imagine strategies for a performed expression. Here is one:

As I stand at the grave of the grandfather that I never knew, I feel the urge to push one thousand pencils into the grass and lay atop the points, to receive a letter directly to my body. Like Kafka's machine in ‘In The Penal Colony’ (Kafka, 2011), this bed of nails would transmit

\(^{1}\) After 2,226 circles, the artists had a number three tattooed on the third finger of their left hands.
the corporeal weight of my grandfather’s mark to be received and read by my body; a phantasmic communication denying the intercedence of time. But also then a direct autograph – a personal mark that connects physical presence to ego and identity.

I feel utter frustration that I cannot stand before him and experience a communion through the interpretation of a physical mark – I wish for his footprint, for a scratch he made on an object, for a crease he placed in a pocketed document. My proximity to Rembrandt’s brush stroke collapsed three hundred years insofar as I could read that action and experience presence that was corporeal in significance, that might have happened yesterday and therefore primary experience from my perspective, and yet with my Grandfather I cannot collapse sixty. This is the significance of the signature – a deliberate tautology of description because the signature is crucially concerned with the significance of presence, an index from the physical fact of being to the metaphysical essentiality of individual identity; the mark leans this way or that, has speed or stasis, is sweeping and broad or simple and contained.

The development of the personal mark, or signature, is a crucial and performative act in the forging of one’s social and political identity. As a child reaches the stage of requiring respect they repeatedly inscribe their given name in a deliberate formation of the signature. This young signature remains affected and unedited, but is index to the child’s social aspiration. In adulthood this aspiration is still an evident quality of any given signature and will be found by the cryptographer in the tiniest embellishment, leaning, legibility and density of the mark. The signature, as it develops from the point of those initial
childhood versions, takes upon itself the constructs of personality including attitude, education, power, prejudice and again aspiration. In short, it is not simply the given name, but one’s subsequent dressing of that name with the experience of social interaction.

This is of course the latent quality of the signature as it travels from the cognisant intention of making a document authentic, through the psychomotor movement of the elbow, wrist and the finer pressures exerted by the index finger and thumb, finally resulting in the uniquely individual mark. The fiction author Margaret Atwood recently developed a ‘long pen’ in order to conduct book signings from a remote distance, wherein the physical movement and pressure particular to the individual are transmitted and remotely received (CBC. 2009.n.p.). This has since been developed as a commercial global solution and is accepted as a legally binding method of signing documents remotely:

LongPen Signature Solutions™ provide legally binding methods to sign documents remotely. With LongPen™ hardware and software - including the unique RealWET™ pen-on-paper signature and the Transactional Masterfile™ for all-in storage and extra non-repudiation - the distance between signing parties becomes irrelevant. LongPen™ transmits an original signature via a secure network – instantly (Unochit Inc., 2008).

If accurate in transmission this might be argued to be vastly preferable to the ink-stamped signature employed by some and certainly more pleasing than the
pre-signed labels applied to the fly-pages of others. This is because there is still an indirect inscribing of the object by its author, albeit as a synchronously and remotely reproduced action. Were there any time difference of significance, the control of authorship would shift and this would no longer feel acceptable as a ‘genuine’ and ‘original’ signature. Therefore, the signature is the lasting trace of a necessarily performative act and an interpersonal index to the uniquely intrapersonal associations of identity. In itself it links corporeal presence to concepts of identity and intention, which is why the act still remains crucial in legally binding agreements. This is what I am able to touch in respect of Rembrandt’s 1657 self portrait, and yet not in respect of my own grandfather, because the weight of being as a verb to do can only be testified to by the evidential weight of a being in the mark that they leave.

1.4 In Deed
I changed my name following the discovery of a lost family in the Ukraine at the close of 2000 and as a precursor to a second marriage.

This personal intervention was conducted in the legal environment of a solicitor’s office and witnessed by my mother who held the duel role of also being the legal assistant in this particular firm. The document had been drawn up at my behest and subsequently placed before me for a signature at several places, before being legally archived – a Dickensian moment. There is an interesting temporality to the document and an obvious flaw: whilst I began the process with one construct of identity it would end with another and thus the requirement of a ‘new’ signature. This is of course no different to the experience of women who choose to adopt their husband’s name. As a legally
binding document of great longevity, the flaw is that a ‘young’ signature is subject to a relatively swift process of change that would render it ‘comfortable’ or commensurate with the sense of oneself; it is likely that the signature borne by the document would quickly change in the period following the legal action.

The experience of signing the new name came as a surprise in the event of sanctifying the deed and I remember well the sense of panic and insecurity as I placed pen to important document in order to sign that mark of which I had no psychomotor experience. For that moment I felt truly without identity, as if I had thrown a birth-given name to the wind, and stood facing a foreign and unwieldy name with twice the syllables of the last and none of the indigenous stability. I also stood before my mother, who bore me and was now witnessing this adoption of her son by the sons of Poland. I struggled to assess the authenticity of my actions and, whilst I knew that the name I took was a psycho-geographical blood-right, the name that I left had more relation to the geography of my physical life.

This vertiginous moment is evident when one scrutinises the trace on the subsequent document. I still shudder at its sight. Following the unsurety of this legal ritual, I set myself to the problem of performing my new signature much like learning to drive. This is a process that begins heavily in the cognitive and affective domains, as one struggles to force a negotiation of the unfamiliar to the embodied. With practice and familiarity the cognitive is equalled and perhaps then dominated by the psychomotor of physical repetition. The dancer equally requires the transport of a learned phrase to embodied knowledge, since
the movement necessarily needs to become a physical knowledge, which can be hampered by an overt cognisant recognition of itself: there is a stage of performative development that requires subjective immersion rather than objective correction.

In respect of a signature, the most effective illustration of this necessity would be that occasional moment, perhaps at the cashier, when the ‘flow’ of one’s mark is interrupted; it is hugely difficult to re-find the physical act from a point midway through signing and one experiences the basic need to assert authenticity. It is interesting to note that in this respect at least, the pin number is rapidly replacing the signature in an attempt to prevent identity fraud. That the complexity of my signature is less authentic than my knowledge of four digits is troubling. I would imagine that the observable performance of someone attempting my signature, however well they manage it, is far more revealing than their ability to type four falsely attained numbers. The issue would seem to be one of observable nuance rather than skill with a pen (This also begins to reveal how my State identity is rather a separate issue than what I might regard as my personal inasmuch as the signature, the personally inscribed surface, is an index to the corporeal fact of my presence in the world at a given moment and the unique quality of my character, as opposed to another’s. Historically a signature (and therefore an identity) was a bourgeois right of social standing, whilst the poor had a mark, usually a characterless ‘X’. The exploitation of the characterless ‘X’ as a legally binding mark always struck me, therefore, as audacity, as a con-trick played out against its author, considering the absence of a more definitive sign.).
In respect of finding a new signature, I practiced repetitions of signing and resolved that I needed a trick in order to convince my body of the authenticity of the new act. I then returned to a contemplation of the ‘shapes’ involved in my previous signature, both inscribed and in the action of doing. I took the action apart, stage-by-stage and attempted to retain its basic psychomotor qualities in the new signature; I closed my eyes and felt how my arm and hand wished to move. I then took a four syllable Polish name and painstakingly performed it as a two syllable English name. This is not to say that I still wrote the latter, it simply felt like a similar act, a mimesis, of the former.

The resulting signature is clearly different but at a glance or from a distance would be recognised as the same person. On occasion, and after a decade, I still accidentally sign the previous name, but the discrepancy has never been questioned under closer scrutiny. My body swiftly retained this mimesis and I experienced a comfort, deep in the construct of self, with a new identity. I had forced the unfamiliar into a symbiotic relationship with the familiar and narrowly avoided the profound compromise that created the panic experienced in the solicitor’s office.

This is no different to the experience of women who choose to relinquish their maiden name through marriage, particularly when the name similarly implies a vast shift in cultural or ideological belonging. Some years hence and there are two more children who have the Polish surname, have always had it and whom I imagine will never question its authenticity as it relates to their personal sense of identity.
One should not ignore the placeness implied in that shift either. Deleuze and Guattari discuss the signature as the ‘chancy formation of a domain’ rather than as directly constituting a person: ‘one puts one’s signature on something just as one plants one’s flag on a piece of land’ (2008, p.394). This is a provocation, but also usefully connects the essence of geography, or more crucially territory, to one’s mark. I find this relativity between a trace or inscription and a territory of significant interest, particularly considering the ramifications of power at work in the notion of planting the flag. These cartographic contexts will be examined in the Chapter 3.

In reverting my name and re-establishing that line in respect of my children, I also relate them by right as inheritors of that name’s connotations and denotations in Poland and Ukraine. Does a signature in this sense differ in any crucial way then from the graffiti culture of tagging? In that phenomenon we witness the audacity of territorial claims by individuals in sweeping physical gestures that mark public and private properties. A claim is staked but only has currency and licence within the margins of it’s circle of cultural belonging, the signatory gaining status through the audacity and repetition and therefore territory of their mark.

As a teenager, a friend from Hong Kong taught me how to write a version of my name in Chinese characters. I practiced this and developed my mark. As I opened a deposit account with the Midland Bank I attempted to lodge this as my signature and was, to my genuine and young surprise, refused, being instructed that it had to be in English – herein was a rather extraordinary expectation that my personal mark would reflect my perceived cultural territory. Even in relative maturity I ponder this when I view the illegible scrawls that constitute signatures. As a personal irony Midlands bank were eventually taken over by the HSBC, a Hong Kong and Singapore financial leviathan.
1.5 Lost and Found.

With strictures of the viewed and the viewer, self and other, in performance practice there follows a close consideration of space, place and site, the most proximate being that of the artist’s body itself.

I have for some time artistically considered that my home is the repository of lost luggage and that I am a case amongst cases. I am considering the manifest sign of this in respect of my body and realise that the repository is in some respects the mortuary. It is a museal collection of objects that cannot be re-owned, they are literally on the shelf as the significant artefacts of ownership. They are index to the personal and might only be claimed by the person.

My body lies in there, prostrate, and the flat thick skin of my soles and toes present the humorous, labelled and clichéd profile that obliterates the foreshortened territory of my body. I imagine Da Vinci’s illustrations of public dissections. I am contented to wait. I imagine an act of inscribing the soles of my feet; two tattooed words that flow from the heel to the toe of my right foot and from the toe to the heel of my left, respectively. They can be read as one … lost and found: left luggage, lost property, the ‘Lost and Found’. The words face the direction of the past and the future. I might walk backwards or I might walk forwards but the truth of this action in every moment of my life is to travel toward an experience of belonging – I leave the past in order to realise the future. I walk to food, money, love, knowledge, sex, partnership, children and home. I walk to assert the transience of the desired and the primacy of the requisite, the needed. And yet, I now deeply desire to become lost. I wish to
discover a manner in which I might truly assert the protection and love of family, but reject other constructs of self, such as nationhood. I wish to say to my family that I do not live anywhere, but this will not change my proximity to our territory. Inversely, it informs my love for them with a terrible beauty because I recognise that it is founded on the death and suffering that resulted from tumultuous political acts, on ethnic conflicts, on flight, on dreadful separation. I wish the tattooed words to perform the Other in my Self and the permanency of a moment, the significance of which is an exquisite torture. But I cannot bear to have my feet touched.
Chapter 2 – Ethnomadic

The relationship between the self-reflexive auto-performance of an artistic study and the de-centred and post-structural mode necessitated by writing others is dichotomous at best. It is an intention of the thesis to harness this as a quality of the argument rather than a problem of the thesis. As such, this chapter intends to explore the *telescopic* as a trope that conveys an idea of scale and distance, rather than adopting a more divisive approach that polarises perspectives. In this manner, the dichotomised space, particularly between subjective and objective perspectives, is transformed from a polarity to a spectrum that can be travelled, or then perhaps it becomes a more complex junction of intersections, the routes of which remain visible in convergence as another is explored. The chapter will consider a number of works that have this quality of the telescopic in common and through which I explored qualities of proximity, subjectivity, scale and the tension between actual and represented space. The works, and discussion, consider the nature of *being* as an act of occupation, both visible and invisible, both with and without license.

From a Bakhtinian perspective, we might consider this notion of occupation to extend from the unique position of *I* at the centre of being and indeed language, since *I* is without referent object ‘in the way “tree”, for instance, nominates a class of flora’ (Holquist, pp.22-23). *I*, then, or *Self*, is always the occupant position and the impossible task of the thesis is its attempt throughout the discussed practice to *other* my Self.
The artistic enquiry requires the presence of ego, since it is an intense and intrapersonal discourse that produces the work. In this specific study, the work requires an emergence of self as other, but this, in its very nature would seem to be contradictory. Certainly, given a history of ‘outsider’ art, artistic output commonly attempts a segregated social perspective but this can result in a brutal and often frank objectivity. In his coining of the term outsider art in 1972, Cardinal was concerned with a study of twenty-nine artists in particular who were ‘outside culture’ (1972, p.7) and often sufferers of poor mental health. This line of definition has continued to be explored by academics with similarly titled books by Macaglan (2009) Rhodes (2000) and Ferrier (1998) and there is also an emphasis on the artist as untrained. But the context of being outside a context of social belonging is not particular to this definition of the artist or indeed of the late twentieth century. Artists such as Rembrandt, whom I discussed in the previous chapter, suffered greatly at the hands of the patron as a result of their frank portrayal of the subject.

Whilst this objective removal could be considered otherness, it does not de-centre the ego – it does, after all, require a strong positioning of the self in order to offer a specific standpoint with a significant resolve. Some artists have defined themselves, for example, as being outside the commercial art establishment because of a rejection of that value – a particular quality of Performance Art - or outside of social acceptance because of the interpretation of their frank portrayal of a political or taboo subject. For example, during the 1998 Sensation show at the Royal Academy there was a media and public furore around Marcus Harvey’s work Myra (1995), which appeared to portray
the child murderer as formed out of children’s hand-prints\textsuperscript{21} (Adams et al, 1998). The difficulty here depends upon a perception of permission for such commentary and the perceived value of an artist doing so. As an artistic remark, \textit{Myra} is perceived as brutal by the media and a section of the public, because of its frank objectivity to the subject – as if it extends Hindley’s cruelty through an exploitation of children. But the production of the work is as subjectively part of artistic discourse as any other. This perception of cool objectivity is both a rather literal misreading of the tools of production and an attempt to \textit{other} the artist and also the object of their production. The resistance of the emotive ring fencing of taboo events or subjects by artists is certainly necessary in order to make any form of close investigation a possibility and this is a quality of ethnographic research.

Ethnographers locate themselves within the contextual community of their subjects, attempting a journalistic proximity, rather than a datative examination. This experiential study is most commonly conducted over long duree, and involves the forming of relationships, notwithstanding subsequent responsibilities, as opposed to removal and impartiality. What benefits such a study is a progressively reduced situatedness for the researcher and this accords to a post-structural emphasis on the de-centring of the researcher, the imperative being that the results of such a study will be less fettered by objectively removed judgements and hopefully multi-perspectival. Mitchell sees this also as the ‘practical challenges of mobility to a discipline classically

\textsuperscript{21} The perception was that the children had been coached in forming the painting, whereas in fact it was made using hand-casts.
premised on stasis’ (Melhuus et al, 2010, p.1). He builds upon the aspiration of Marcus who has:

in mind a shift away from the ethnography that is so centrally placed and local-world determined toward an ethnography that emphasizes a link up with the more pluralistically sensitive systems perspectives (1998, p.34).

Mitchell approves of this and notes Marcus’ recognition that whilst there may be some loss of the depth of more traditionally and singularly embedded approaches to ethnography, what emerges from the more multi-sited and short sampled approached is a better ‘‘translation’ of meaning from one culture to another’ (Melhuus et al, 2010, p.8).

In order to write or study otherness, then, perhaps as an ethnography, a post-structural method is desirable; one that consistently de-centres and resists the objectivity of the mono-viewpoint. Structural ethnographies, particularly of the late Victorian age, regarded our ‘contemporary ancestors’ from the imperialist standpoint of the morally superior. Buzard and Childer cite Stocking’s critique of Tylor’s *Primitive Cultures* (1871), emphasising Tylor’s use of the term ‘culture’ in the singular, suggesting that:

[c]ulture is a single domain shared by all the world's peoples, and the ways and institutions of each human group may be compared and assessed using a single developmental scheme. It is not until around
1900 that writers finally began adding an "s" to the end of Tylor's term, subsuming the developmental ideas associated with it (*Bildung*, evolution) in a new conception of object-like, mappable, and incommensurable social totalities (Buzard & Childers, 1998, intro.).

Many of the pre-*fin de siècle* studies were the product of imperial travel and even fictional, if accidental, ethnographies such as Swift’s ‘Gulliver’ emphasised the context of the observer. The two items that the Lilliputians fail to discover about Gulliver’s person are his telescope and glasses, ocular devices that promote an *etic* perspective of removal and place glass between the viewer and the subject (Ritchie, 2011, p.23). In imperial terms then, this seems to emphasise Gulliver’s wish to remain in control as observer and commentator and his discomfort with becoming observed (I will examine this dynamic more closely through an extrapolation of contexts for the performance installation *A Wonderful Engine*).

Whilst a body of discussion now exists on questions of belonging and identity, particularly in the post-war period led by academics and social philosophers such as Bauman with his development of a theories of *liquidity* in the modern (2000), in notions of identity (2004) and then also in respect of the causality and quality of human fear (2006). The fascination of belonging is core to Bauman’s thinking and if this is reduced to a question of the human desire for security, then his consideration of the mechanism of fear is of particular relevance, with the ‘dread of death’ (2006, p.22) a causal and constant factor. Death as a literal and metaphoric aspect runs as a stratum throughout this
thesis: death of the past and our ability to leave, death of ancestors, fear of our own death and that of those close by us. Insofar as death is also a point at which there is no longer an I, we finally pass into a state of being othered. This question of the relationship of the Other to the Self remains at a core of the study of identity and is considered in that post-war period with explorations of being such as that by Heidegger (2002\textsuperscript{22}), ideology and the subject from the Marxist perspective of Althusser (2008\textsuperscript{23}) and the post-colonial critique of national belonging by Bhabha (2003). All of these approaches infer the predominant concern in the post-war period around huge shifts in the make-up of nation and culture in the west to increasingly plural states, as a result of diasporas and post-colonial rights of migration. To be even more reductive, the common agitator to all these concerns of nation, ideology, being and questions of self is the factor of movement as it relates, then, to territory, security and cultural belonging.

Diaspora is primarily rooted in ideological intolerance; an identifiable social element is rejected by a dominant power or threatened to the extent that it takes to the road in order to survive. Therefore at the core of the phenomenon is the physical act of travel and if that is then further extrapolated, we might say that it concerns leaving, arriving, past and future, liminality, memory and testament. All of these things suggest movement either in the physical, experiential or metaphorical sense. There is also arguably an inference that the power of the disenfranchised remains in their ability to voice, to express, to make testament

\textsuperscript{22} Published from two lectures that Heidegger gave in 1957.

\textsuperscript{23} This title is a collection of Althussar’s writing on the subject between the late 1960s until the mid 1970s.
to the past in the present. It follows then that this requires social license in order to be effective and that social license is critically dependent upon a successful demand to be heard and to be socially founded. I am reminded here of Spivak and Butler’s consideration that a demonstration is in effect an expression of the very same licence that is being demanded (Butler & Spivak, 2007).

The loss of social license at one or all levels provides the impetus for flight. I have largely explored this context through the medium of performance, exploring possibilities of durative mobility so far as the audience were concerned with works that travelled over landscape, the largest of which was the Nightflight Project, an eight kilometre meta-flight through the night, across the Clwydian range of hills with performance, sound and 26 installations. But I have also worked with qualities of durative stasis so far as the performer is concerned. In A Wonderful Engine, a nine-hour performed installation during which the performer is restrained to the floor. This form is reminiscent of that notion of death too, as the state of stillness in meditation, restraint or collapse described by Howell in his Analysis of Performance Art (2000). Whilst death was not my immediate consideration as a state in the work, which will be discussed later, I could reflect in retrospect that it was certainly particularly present as a concept, manifest in all of Howell’s described states, as I lay in enforced stillness beneath the suspended angel of a pilot in miniature. Between these durative approaches though, of mobility and stasis between audience and performer – although I wish to exercise these terms advisedly since the audience certainly perform something – there is a crucial tension in the

Howell dedicates a chapter to stillness, considering its implications for the performer as a form of methodology but also as an aesthetic quality in work.
examination of movement and stasis, of leaving and staying, of the nomadic and the settled, all within the frame of temporality.

2.1 Nomadism versus Settlement

A tension in the definition of civilisation has long existed between the human modes of nomadism and settlement and is allegorically characterised in the Old Testament parable of Cain’s murder of his brother Abel according to Careri (Careri, 2005, pp.29-36). Cain was a sedentary character, living by the product of his physical toil in the direct territory of his habitat. His was a knowledge born of *a posteriori* contexts, of a causal link between work and production. His brother, on the other hand, was a shepherd, a nomad. Abel represents not just movement, but also the knowledge of philosophy, of cognitive meditation as opposed to somatic contact. That Cain is condemned to a life of wandering following his murder of Abel is no arbitrary punishment; nomadism is the antithesis of Cain, but was at the core of his brother. In this sense the space and freedom of a flâneur (Benjamin, 1999, pp.416-455) correlates with the right to freethinking or philosophy. This political tension between spaces is described by Deleuze and Guattari as between ‘smooth’ and ‘striated’, but they also point out that the two, whilst in opposition, are not mutually exclusive, but relying in need upon the other (2008, p.524). Cain’s space, then is more that of the pragmatist – bounded and fenced within known and proven experience.

Further to this is the function of class discrimination, since the philosophy of the nomad is a dangerous and bourgeois tendency to those that value the security of known spaces and unquestioned roles. The former favours change,
which is movement in itself, whilst the latter resists it, which is stasis. At the heart of these political positions, then, lies the tension of identity because it is an issue borne of movement (leaving and arriving), requiring stasis (belonging); identity needs and rejects the other in a simultaneous grasping for recognition (status and license). This Hegelian phenomenon defines a state of belonging (security) by exclusion of those that do not (Hegel, 1998). Identity, then, only becomes a question, or indeed a subject, in the presence of otherness (and of difference), and stasis is trustworthy whilst movement is suspicious. As with most concepts employed in this chapter, this is perceived as scalar, because it is operable at the level of two people, a family, a clan (or race, or religion), a village, a town, a region, a country, or perhaps a continent. The assertion of belonging or identity is therefore dependent on circumstance, stakeholders and to what the other is not a member of. Cresswell writes about the threat of mobility as ‘one of the principle ways of thinking about mobility in the modern Western world’ and comments upon a preoccupation to control and discipline ‘the drifter, the shiftless, the refugee and the asylum seeker [who] have been inscribed with immoral intent’ (2006, p.26). We are returned also to the notion of the outsider here, whom, whilst not necessarily an artist, is distrusted because they cannot be pinned as a static point. Cresswell’s book examines this flow of contemporary mobility because ironically ‘in contemporary social thought, words associated with mobility are unremittingly positive’ (2006, p.25).

25 Hegel considered this at length in his study of ‘Lordship and Bondage’ and his broader discussion of ‘self’ and ‘other’ in Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel, 1998). The Phenomenology of Spirit was first published in 1807.
I have said that movement is crucial to the question of belonging and this is more because of arrival in territory than the leaving of home. Those that arrive threaten native interests in terms of belief and production simply by virtue of their presence. They will also import cultural signifiers from the home that they left in order to try to maintain some stability around the idea of themselves. The space between leaving and arriving, especially in the context of flight from conflict, stands for the suspension of stability, of culture, of past and future and has interested my practice in this study greatly.

In 2004 I met a theatre practitioner called Teddy Keindl. Keindl was an American who was also a Special Forces veteran of the Vietnam War and had lived for an extended period among the Montagnard tribes. At the point at which I met Keindl, he was studying the syncretic ritual cultures of Haiti and I sensed a good deal of common ground in our discussions. We began our conversation by walking for six hours over the Clwydian range in North Wales, along the ancient Offa’s Dyke route that extends from the actual Dyke, out across these peaks and over to the coast just west of Chester. The most significant aspect of this walk was the thick fog that swallowed and removed us from any view or perspective of the landscape; everything unfolded in immediacy and I became aware that our conversation had become concerned with flight, which, as Keindl put it, often involved crossing mountains at night. I realised two things during the walk: many constructs of social identity were removed or objectively distanced when one stands at the hilltop and that I could identify very clearly the significant hilltops of my life. I realised that I had always had a quiet relationship to these high spaces, returning to them
sporadically, and that in, or indeed on, these hills I had experienced a meditative state of reflection and something approaching relief.

A performance extract written for and performed in Timepoints (2004) offers an illustration of the point:

Places 1 – High on a Hilltop

*The first most significant hilltop was shown to me by my French teacher. But I experienced it in the particular company of a German girl called Frederika. The wind, the rain, the small circle of Cotswold stones and my earache made me fall in love without any question of will. At that point I fell in love with her (or at least the idea of her), with life, with landscape, and with a past I had yet to find. I stole a kiss from her [that] she freely gave. But the kiss was really stolen from that place; it was what I wished to leave there. Frederika quickly disappeared but the damage had been done. I would conduct my life as an unreasonable and unrealistic quest and I would steal kisses from hilltops in return for a view, for a little bit of clarity ... After years of secretly stolen kisses, standing central and gazing hard upon the bewilderment of my life, I brought my true love here and kissed her instead. Not eighteen anymore, but thirty-one. Each visit stood by, measured the intervening years to say, “You have come from there to here, from here to there and this is what has changed.”*
Student days and married nights, divorced dazed and still bewildered. As I sank into despair I climbed this hill to cry blankly. As my children were born, this is where I came to fill that gap between heaven and earth and say thank you to life. As finally I found that most significant other half, this is where we stood at dawn and hugged in desperate love. As I discovered a family, lost on South Barrule and in the cavernous secrecy of a cold Russian war, this is where I came to marvel at the landscapes of our lives. Thank you to that Teacher of French – you were often drunk and you confiscated my first digital watch, but thank you anyway\textsuperscript{26}.

Whilst a good number of genuine flights have occurred at night and across mountainous terrain, the conditions also suit a personal dialogue of belonging for those of us that enjoy lives of relative security and freedom. It is a luxury to walk in such spaces for enjoyment and always a thoughtful pleasure that is infinitely distant from the anguish and trauma of a real flight during real conflict, and yet the Clwydian range was the site of such conflict at several times in its history. In peaceful weekend walks, hilltops are active beacons in life – points at which we might measure and observe the impact of our past on the trajectory of our future. We sit up high, clutching a flask and looking down on the complexity of our lives. In high spaces we are put in mind of memory and assert our relationship to it. In high spaces we are exposed and unobtainable by choice, returning, with a sense of weary refreshment, to complex and busy lives. But at night, there is another sort of phenomenological

\textsuperscript{26} For complete text see Appendix 1
absence – the darkness places us in a precarious void and the hills seem
leviathan as we pick a way along a dragon’s back. The high darkness is
somehow defined as negative space between these electric territories – a black
pocket turned out to the night. It is where we might consider the spaces
between belonging, the fiduciary nature of Nationhood, the mountain streams
of identity that quietly flow from multiple sources and across multiple borders.
It is where we might consider that in truth we assert belonging and have the
freedom to redefine its edges.

Following our first fog-riven hike and a discussion that seemed to be unfolding
in a number of directions, Keindl and I embarked on our first night walk across
the Clwydian range on a moonless and stormy autumn night. From the outset
we agreed not to talk much en route, not to use torchlight and to keep moving
other than for one rest break. I remember that the first night walk was moonless
and muddy. We left a fifty feet gap between us, only coming together as we
attempted to navigate in more ambiguous areas and we slipped and fell on
muddy slopes often. We walked like this for hour upon hour, finally taking
shelter for tea behind the ruined walls of the Moel Famau tower at the highest
point of the Clwyds. I arrived back at the University in Chester at 8.30 am,
without sleep but quietly buzzing with the adventure. Our collaboration was
formed out of these parameters and so was the subsequent work of performance
that we collaborated on. We referred to the form as a theatre of constant
change, but as we continued our night walking our work unfolded in its intent
as The Nightflight Project.
2.2 *The Nightflight Project*

Already, beneath him, the shadowed hills had dug their furrows in the golden evening and the plains grown luminous with long enduring light. … The night would be beautiful yet spoiled, and he felt ill at ease at the thought of entering this shadow that was ripe to rottenness.

(Antoine De Saint-Exupery, 1976, p.109-110)

The pilot work constituted a four-hour audience experience over the northernmost stretch of the Clwydian range in northwest Wales. Along the Offa’s Dyke trail one can see the huge orange lakes of light across the Cheshire plain in Chester, the Wirral, Runcorn and Liverpool, whilst on the other side are the smaller pools of Ruthin, Denbigh and the Prestatyn coastline.

*Nightflight* was never going to approximate the suffering or exertion of a real flight into exile, but was always intended as a discussion of that flight in the spaces between belonging. One enduring tension between us and within the project would be how to navigate between acting and actually doing. Keindl’s work had been very much in the vein of the former whilst mine was very much the latter; I felt strongly that pretence of flight would be a crass undertaking at best, but Keindl had experienced conflict. We carefully agreed that answers lay in the more surreal experience of sleep deprived tiredness – that space that one

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The project began in 2004. Producer Jess Tyrell joined us later, with the work subsequently being realised through her production house, *Germination*. It was production managed by Johnny Goodwin (*Moti Roti, Walk the Plank*).
might reach in the depth of night – and out of this came a decision to keep a caravan of people moving, to use this notion of progressing into the night, into the landscape and into exhaustion (partially at least).

Keindl and I then walked repeatedly for a two-year period, mostly throughout the night, considering paths, routes, venues and experiences. We began to plot positions and consider the logistics of performers and their routes around and beyond the audience. Jess Tyrell worked on funding and partnership, founding some £35k for the work, with which we would also win the collaboration and support of the Heather and Hillforts Trust, Mountain Rescue and local authorities.

In addition to developing several versions of the project route, we wrote commissions in performance, sound and visual art/installation for which we interviewed in London. Scanner (Robin Rimbaud) took up the sonic commission but we failed to fill the visual one as three artists in succession declined the work once they had attempted a nightwalk in pitch darkness. At this juncture we also began to develop very clear and tight parameters for the inclusion, and indeed exclusion, of audience-participants. It also meant that I took on the development and production of scenographic contexts and installations, some twenty-six of which would be included in the final work across eight kilometres. What began as a conversation during a walk became a huge undertaking.
Keindl and I had always walked without torchlight. If ever we viewed a map in difficult weather, he insisted that we cover one eye at least to retain some night vision. We would not allow torchlight on the event either, providing our audiences instead with a stick to prod their way and a fear of unknown pitfalls. Naturally we defined the route for ourselves impeccably, having walked it in most conditions in all the seasons. In Nightflight the audience had to rely upon their scotopic vision, where the iris is dilated for maximum reception on the retina – Miller II and Tredici suggest that it takes around 30-45 minutes to obtain 80% of the potential night vision in the human eye and hours, perhaps days for the remaining 20% (Miller II & Tredici, 1992). Scotopic vision carries with it a number of qualities different to day vision. Whilst the eye is structured from rods and cones, night vision relies on the rods. Since there are no rods at the centre of the retina, nothing can be seen directly in front of the eye, and the viewer has to learn instead to look to one side of the distant object (a star will always seem brightest in periphery). Red is required to view what is directly ahead in any detail. Whilst movement is discernible at night with static vision, ironically the viewer has to move her eyes to discern a static image. Colour distinction is also reduced and objects are affected by auto-kinesis, which has the effect of making the static appear to move when it isn’t; a phenomenon that could be the cause of a number of air crashes (Miller II & Tredici, 1992).
All of these material, biological and anatomical phenomena of night vision shape the spectatorship in a moving night performance because of their ability to disorientate, but the use of pyrotechnic light then also becomes a careful choice, with recovery time a necessary logistic. LED lights are useful, especially the blue green and red, although intense red can create visual fatigue fairly swiftly. Whilst it is tempting to flood for silhouette, white light needs to be carefully managed, diffuse and low in intensity. Mostly as a fact of economy, the lighting designer and project manager, Johnny Goodwin discovered the contemporary potential of obsolete and throw-away technology: the beauty of paraffin storm-lanterns, the ghostly shimmer of the disposable LED key-fob, the austere bureaucratic air of the car inspection florescent.
Following the differences of experience and perspective between Keindl and myself, the work operated in component forms as territories of output – installations, logistical movement, light, sound, performance and text – that presented a spectrum between that which is done and that which is acted, between the narrative and the abstract, the contrived and the arbitrary. These tensions were indicative of the complex stylistic question of form within the work: the audience were at once subjectively immersed and yet often objectively distanced. Whilst in some respects the work followed a narrative tradition reminiscent of theatre, a teleological development toward an end that suited the linearity of the route, it also clearly presented itself as a work of Live Art, an installation, a durational and interactively sensual experience; a walk. While the latter frames demanded less of a literal narrative, they attempted to weave a discourse of belonging through variation and repetition of theme: clothing, memento-mori, homesteads, bedsteads, bags, bodies and tombs.

The rejection of promenade ‘hot spots’ in favour of constant movement created an additional challenge in regard of dynamic; maintaining a pace suited to the slowest walker and unfolding imagery as a dynamic in itself, orchestrating scale, narrative and proximity in relationship to landscape and duration. The initial cement of the work was the sequence of installations, the order of which was adjusted to the emergence of performance, sound and landscape features right up until the day of the initial showing. The installations were divided between border camps, shrines, dwelling images, road signs, boxes and baggage. Most of the installations progressed as sequential sub-narratives in
themselves: shrines worked from the small and possibly unintended to clear votive structures, dwellings evolved from the illusion of security to its opposite, from presence to absence, from interior to exterior and back again and finally to a 'smokestack' furnace to the lost at the ruined tower of Moel Famau.

Baggage and clothes were primarily referred to in a sequence of washing lines, used by performers and adjacent to images of dwelling. Whilst performers themselves carried old luggage cases for the duration of the walk, the images were complexly joined with variations on the theme of bodies and clothing in the forest; feet protruding from an ammunition box long barrow, pyjamas in an
excavated locker, suit-bags hanging deep in the trees, an old-fashioned living room in a small case, four moonlit body bags at a forest crossroads.

The audience were taking a flight of sorts, in the absence of conflict but with a set pace and in the presence of physical unknowns so far as they were concerned, both in respect of landscape features and stamina – they were required to climb onto the back of darkness, to relinquish the warmth of what they had left and to accept the unknown ahead. Naturally this is a question of trust and also not unlike that moment of entry to the ghost train, a spider tickling the head, a door banging open with the wail of the siren. Whilst a Mountain Rescue briefing was a necessity of safe conduct, it also served the opposite goal of emphasising the threat, if natural, of a night-time walk across challenging terrain. The briefing raised the stakes of a meta-flight, without the crass pretence of some pursuit, but with the exclusion of any participant whose clothing or equipment fell short of a required inventory. It began with a gruelling climb of 25 minutes, at the top of which a further decision was made concerning any audience member who had encountered serious difficulty. Whilst this attrition was an important executive right of mountain rescue, it also served the aesthetic of loss with some efficacy; seven audience members of almost seventy were unfortunately gone before even the first moment on top of the hills.

An audience at night, on steep terrain is somewhat of a concertina; there are those that eagerly march and push at the front of the line and there are those that pause at the rear to carefully view or regain a breath. The group tends
therefore to be long and thin and this in itself presents complex caveats for the viewing of significant objects or events en route. It is useful to present visual moments ahead whilst the group is on a slight descent because this rakes the audience, but on the other hand this is also the time when an audience naturally gazes at its feet.

The imperative of flight is urgent movement and, whilst Nightflight would resist what I had considered a crass urge to fake danger, we decided upon our theatre of constant change with only one rest-point across the eight kilometres. This created an additional challenge in regard of dynamic; maintaining a pace suited to the slowest walker and unfolding imagery as a dynamic in itself, orchestrating scale, narrative and proximity in relationship to landscape and duration.

Since the earliest walks we had agreed that we would drop the walkers down finally into forest. There was a significant contrast in light, acoustic and emersion in the density of forest; it takes a different sort of courage to enter unlit at night that is informed by something altogether more superstitious. Entering the dark forest is an act of submission and disappearance. It also heightens the sense of vulnerability since the very trunks themselves feel like so many eyes upon the back. So far as I was concerned the forest became a metaphoric death in our journey and therefore a threshold that had to be crossed before we could arrive. In entering the interior we were to let go of what had passed before and allow ourselves to be swallowed by a deep and labyrinthine territory that stood for no return.
I first tested the aesthetic of this dropping into death by running a pilot project with undergraduates from the University of Chester on and around the first great hillfort of the Clwydians, Pennycloodia. This became a performance event called *Memento Mori*. We worked for five weeks in the spring of 2005, devising material around issues of identity and placing the work in different
sites on the hill. We took our audience in twilight and circumnavigated the hillfort with a number of experimental research performances en route to discover logistics of movement and the realities of sound and light. I had decided to drop them down through the forest with performers standing at distance with dim, gentle lights illuminating photographs of ancestors. Each audience member was also accompanied, hand in hand, or held around the shoulders by a ghostly figure who would whisper memories gently to them as they descended through the forest. This was a technique of leading that I would employ later with Basque performers in Bilbao. I remembered spending some weeks working with Augusto Boal in London during the 1990s when he had spoken to us regarding his coaching of the Royal Shakespeare Company in their rehearsals for Hamlet. He doubted very much that a father haunting his son would do this in a frightening manner, believing rather that the spirit would guide his offspring with a loving and protective hand.
In the final professional work, *Nightflight*, the dark forest also provided an acoustic that contrasted hugely with the open and weathered hillsides. Here was more bass resonance and reflection; footsteps, breathing, leaves, whispers became of phenomenal significance and from an audience-participator’s perspective, attention shifted more sharply to a position of self-awareness. In this personal and telescopic frame, the forest became a liminal exit to the work, a penultimate antechamber, without much need for artistic intervention. The party finally emerged, tired, through something of a border-zone, in which we held them to check and stamp papers given at the outset, before finally allowing them through for hot coffee and bacon sandwiches.

At its completion *Nightflight* was a massive achievement for us all, having employed a company of thirty people in addition to Mountain rescue and rangers of the Heather and Hillforts Trust, stretching across eight kilometres with 26 installations, some of which were large in scale. But I came away finally exhausted and confused by the achievement insofar as I had never intended that scale of production. I finally felt that those differences between Keindl and myself, particularly in respect of performative style, had re-emerged and that for us, if not the audience, the project was fractured between performances that were acted and, for me, quite Brechtian and performed installations or sonic works that were simply done. With the commercial interests of a very effective producer and theatre director, I felt swept along with the inflation of the project, and, whilst excited by the prospect, realised afterward that I still wished to work more intimately with a smaller audience (the final work had nearly 70 audience-participators). I certainly wished for
performers to actualise ‘venues’ and installations, but felt that the emphasis of performance needed to fall on the frame in which the audience reconsidered themselves within the experience because of the notion of a subjective occupation of self, of I within this and in the here and now rather than the more theatrically realised there and then. If we were able to enter some pretence of narrative then I could not see how people would not remove themselves from its direct implication as something personally embodied; exhaustion, ground underfoot, darkness, weather and constant movement were the work.

Some three years later I would have another chance with performers in the Basque country near Bilbao.

2.3 Walking With Stones

During 2009 I was invited to direct and devise a piece of work with Basque performers who were past graduates of the Bilbao Antzerki Ikastegia (BAI – Bilbao Drama School), as part of a partnership with Leeds Metropolitan University. Two years after the completion of Nightflight, I had been considering a new work upon the Yorkshire Pennines, but as I initially researched a project brief for Bilbao, I realised the crucial relativity of mountainous landscape to Basque history and culture and recognised the potential importance of a sited work there to my own discourse.

In reading Basque history and culture to try to find a way in to modelling the project, I quickly found myself in relative historical discussions of belonging and identity. As a trans-border ‘nation’ within two sovereign states, mobility
and landscape have always formed a fundamental aspect of Basque identity and I found myself fascinated by a culture that has asserted a separate status since Roman occupation, its language being the oldest pre-Indo European tongue in Europe\textsuperscript{28}. It is impossible not to consider some comparison to the Welsh, at least in respect of the oppression of language and the manner in which a people are culturally, industrially and economically defined by a particular mountainous landscape. That landscape, difficult agriculture and geographical positioning have always meant that the value of the Basque country was primarily as a route. The Romans, recognising that the Vascones (Basques) were unmanageable, chose instead to maintain their autonomy, asking ‘for little more … than free passage between southern Gaul and the lands beyond the Ebro’ (Kurlansky, 2000, p.31). Having said as much, as with Britain, Roman culture was largely adopted by Basques with roads that connected towns and markets, and also with architectural, artistic and agricultural influences. But, in their language and as a people, they remained distinctly rooted for some particular cultural reasons:

A central concept in Basque identity is belonging, not only to the Basque people but also to a house, known in the Basque language as etxea. Etxea or echea is one of the most common routes of Basque surnames. … A house stands for a clan …. The Basques have preserved this notion because the Basques preserve almost everything. … Even

\textsuperscript{28} For Kurlansky the question of Basqueness is not predicated on a birthright but rather on language – one can become Basque if one speaks Basque and indeed there is no word in that language for a Basque, but rather they refer to themselves as ‘Euskaldun’ literally meaning Basque speaker. I will briefly explore the context of language in respect of Basques in chapter four.
today some Basques recall their origins by introducing themselves … not by their family name but by the name of their house, a building which may have vanished centuries ago (Kurlansky, 2000, pp. 6,7).

I began my work with the performers by agreeing that the space between our understanding, between language, would be the space of our work; instead of suffering the frustration of misunderstanding, we would build on it. We moved to interviewing one another, finding narratives, texts and themes from our lives. These we translated, through a technique of Butoh Fu poetry from Hijikata, into images scored for the body, and began to site; a woman washing the clothes of her suitcase in a town fountain and walking away, the water trailing her footsteps; a woman cleaning out the black mud of a drain to allow a man to drop a single flower into it; a man grazing on grass and being carried like a suitcase.

Bilbao Walking With Stones project exploration, 2009.
We worked for an intensive two weeks exploring the spaces between our understanding of one another’s language, considering landscape and belonging in modes of movement, speech and duration. We made derives through the industrial centre of Barracaldo and worked on the old steps of Casco Viejo, in Bilbao. We considered our histories, using the personal as an index to the national and further to something that might be culturally shared and, after finding the mechanism and technique of making that suited us, we walked together in the heat of the mountains, looking down over Biscay.

Preparatory walk of Penas Negras, 2009.
On that day we took a six-hour hike, but my intention was to find a route for a performance work, which I found on the Penas Negras mountain overlooking the coast near Barracaldo, a town that forms an industrial hub on the estuary leading to the city. I selected the space because, whilst extremely local, it was a revelation to the performers, most having never visited. Whilst this was the case, it was also a landscape that epitomised so much of what was worn on the cultural sleeve of even young Basques – strongly independent, a landscape of their songs, of redundant iron mines, of verdant greenness, of wild horses, apples and a beacon to the sea off Biscay. These contexts came up again and again as I was introduced to places, food, people or read of history: cider making, steel and iron forging, ship building, fishing and the retreat to mountain hideouts by rebels and partisans.

Penas Negras is not of agricultural use but, other than being the original site of a mine, is rather strategic. It is like a basket of eggs; full of craters, hillocks, escarpments, dells and scattered with rock and copses of trees. It is inhabited by herds of wild horses, a much larger and more powerful breed than those seen in England’s New Forest. The way down toward the Mining Centre’s car park also drops through woods, which returned my thinking to that notion of the metaphoric death of something before any true arrival is possible. I had explored this with the idea of memento-mori in my research with undergraduates prior to Nightflight and again in that work. In this site I found the opportunity to re-approach that notion from a different cultural perspective.
and for an audience for whom the Spanish Civil and Second World wars had intrinsically characterised the landscape with flight, death and memory.

I had worked for some days in studios at the Bizkaiko Antzerki Ikastegia partners and hosts of the project, developing approaches and techniques, finding a rhythm for our practice together. Once we had established this working process, I suggested a day outing to the mountains to consider the notion of their use as a site for the work. As we walked we imagined possible routes of the work, looking for features that spoke to us – performers claimed areas as inspirations for narratives of culture, history and identity. We began using our process to develop physical and active occupations for these spaces, whilst I worked to make sense of an unfolding narrative for an audience to perform in terms of travel; how would these events link as a process of leaving, travelling and arriving? Could such a process manifest genuine contexts of belonging for a Basque audience with my direction or was I projecting something extraneous? I often worry about romanticising or simplifying serious and political themes in producing artworks, but found with these collaborators, at least, a comfortable relativity between political contexts and the narratives, myths and images of the past – storytelling was always a quietly resistant act in the years under Franko, since the Spanish Civil War and it remains popular amongst younger generations.

Armstrong discusses the efficacy of storytelling in respect of cultural nationalism, with the ‘effect of the myth recital [arousing] an intense awareness among the group members of their ‘common fate’ … by stressing individuals’
solidarity against an alien force, that is, by enhancing the salience of boundary perceptions’ (Armstrong, 1994, p.145). This is of particular pertinence to the Basque situation throughout the twentieth century, but also at many times in its history. I was lucky enough to count a well-established storyteller amongst my cast. Doroteo was well known and celebrated in the region near Guernika for his storytelling and led weekly sessions with children of the region. He was also a master of the key traditional instruments of the Basque culture – the conch, the Alboka (twin horned pipe), the Trikitixa (accordion) and the Txalaparta (a wooden glockenspiel style instrument that uses planks of various dense woods across two trestles, padded with sheepskin). I knew that, as a Basque storyteller of some decades experience, ‘Doro’ was my measure for the material if not for my less than traditional processes. A week of extraordinarily poor weather hampered our progress at every turn but the performers determined still to produce the work on the mountain. As with Nightflight I was aware of the thin line between success and absolute disaster in a landscape such as this, but after a full final day, the weather held into the evening and as twilight approached an audience of around 25 people arrived. The event unfolded through the following structure but, unlike Nightflight, I chose to pause at the sited works; this was not a flight, but rather a journey through the temporal frame of occupation:

1. *The Stuckness of Leaving* –

   Working across a plateau, distant figures converge whilst a conch sounds from an escarpment. They finally signal for the walkers to follow;
2. *Broken Houses* –

the walkers arrive at a ruined cottage where a ghostly woman enacts a folk tale of an eagle that attacks a homestead. Two performers striking the Txalaparta accompany her;

3. *Washing and Drinking* –

The walkers arrive at a glade where figures appear to be washing clothes. Two figures sit by drinking and eating apples, spitting the contents into buckets in which clothes from travelling cases are dipped. But they are rubbing the clothes into the dark earth – it is the reverse of washing - before hanging them across our path. ;

4. *Digging in Holes* –

As the walkers continue through a high trail a woman stands in solitude atop a huge boulder whilst a reed horn plays a lament – she seems to be temporally out of shift with the present, as if lost in a time and space other than this; the boulder holds her presence in a stasis that might last an eternity. The walkers arrive around the lip of a huge bowl cut into the earth. Down below figures dig out a hole and plant a woman, up to her ankles, finishing her lags with a pile of rocks. She raises her open mouth in a silent scream as we hear the approach of a couple singing in the forest;
5. **Apple Break** –

After an hour of walking the participants pause near a crag and are given apples to eat from buckets;

6. **Sleeping** –

The group drops down, as darkness swallows us in to a thickening wood. We find a row of figures kneeling. Whilst a Txalaparta is played with animal bones, they kiss and lay themselves down to perform the text for *Sleeping*. This is a text that I had written earlier,

7. **The Stuckness of Arriving** –

Ghosts accompany the walkers, holding them gently, hands clasped and whispering the poetry of memory as they walk down and out of the forest. We hear a loud report and a herd of wild horses thunders by in the moonlight.\(^{29}\)

I conducted one other significant walk amongst Basque friends, as I was invited to join the Confederation Nacionale del Trabajo (National Confederation of Labour or CNT) – an anarchist syndicate established one hundred years previous in 1910 - as they marched alongside other syndicates on the traditional May Day workers demonstrations in Bilbao. This was a massive mobilisation of workers across a number of syndicates or unions. Tens of thousands converged on the centre of Bilbao where speeches were given, received

\(^{29}\) For a fuller description of the performance of *Walking With Stones* please refer to Appendix 2.
applause and flags were waved. Syndicate members then either retired to their headquarters for wine and talk or into the old quarter of Casca Viejo where glasses of martini rosso awaited with pintxos\textsuperscript{30}. The walk, the verbalised beliefs and the social agreement are a powerful concoction of belonging and determinacy, again by occupation (in both the sense of space and of industry).

### 2.4 Walking, Peril, Death

Movement in the political context then physically conveys the sense of objective and direction, of manifesto perhaps, whilst in the works of performance over the hills, the journey is a meditation, clearly not determined. The liminality of movement, of the journey, has long been associated with philosophical exploration and this is no more true than in religious texts that present the notion of \textit{becoming} in respect of their iconic protagonist: the lives of Christ, Muhammad and Buddha all involve the journey as a crucial vehicle to revelation, dissemination and conflict\textsuperscript{31}. The penultimate component of \textit{The

\textsuperscript{30} The Pintxo is a Basque form of Tapas.

\textsuperscript{31} Other than the initial movements with his parents, which include flight to escape Herod’s massacre of infants, Jesus’ formative life is one of stasis, learning his father’s trade. His life after baptism becomes characterised by continual travel, beginning with his solitary temptation in the desert and continuing throughout the three years or so of his ministry until his crucifixion (Crossan, 1995). Prince Siddhattha’s formative life is also one of relative stasis, until he necessarily leaves his Palace by night at the age of twenty-nine, in order to undertake a journey to enlightenment as the Buddha and indeed his post-enlightenment life is one of nomadic and seasonal drift. The final chapter of his life is also retold as a walk along a road with a number of stages, including drinking, bathing, the crossing of a river and the arrival at the shala grove where he would achieve his \textit{parinirvana}. Throughout the story of the Buddha there are encounters with wandering ascetics and in the final moments of his life, it is one such ascetic, Subhadra, that receives his final blessing (Kohn, 1994). Muhammad’s young life was full of travel as he worked with the caravan of his uncle, but he also enacted a leaving for solitude before receiving divine revelations. His subsequent life involved the establishment of a the first Muslim community in Medina, an attempt at settlement, but was also
Passion is a journey under great duress, up to the place of crucifixion and is often played out within promenade performances of The Stations of the Cross, wherein the movement of the audience is as of an embodied realisation of the meanings of the Passion. Peterson’s guide to this, combines maps and architectural description of the stations with spiritual meditation and prayer; presented as a walk, it shifts back and forth from religious instruction, meditation and prayer to factual description of the locations, closing the gap between a physical and metaphysical tour of the Passion (Peterson, 1998)\(^{32}\).

Religious biographies are not alone as ideologically founding narratives of travel; the Norse saga is typified by the journey as ordeal and Crossley-Holland acknowledges this in his introduction to his translations of the myths:

> Conditions on the road were frequently demanding, taking the traveller over fells, round a glacier, or across a wilderness – journeys made all the more hazardous by the chance of prolonged violent snowstorms in the mountains and dust storms in the desert; for half a year, moreover, 

characterised by missions and travel in the spiritual unification of tribes in the teaching of Islam (Armstrong, 2004), but a particularly fascinating conjunction of this notion of travel and enlightenment can be found in his Night Journey. This was a journey on a winged mule to Jerusalem in one night, whereupon he met other prophets, angels and also ascended to the ‘seven heavens’ to speak with God. The story operates as affirmation of his status as prophet and is also an instruction in the daily amount of prayer since the journey itself is enacted across the gap between the place of utterance of that prayer and the place of its reception in Paradise (Colby, 2008).

\(^{32}\) The Stations of the Cross were a matter of some formative discussion between Keindl and myself in our early walks of the Clwydian range and in our consideration of the shape or purpose of the work from the perspective of the viewer – we considered a similar meditative unravelling between the peaks of the hills, but later rejected this notion for a form that would emphasise constant movement rather than travel from one venue to the next.
the light only lasted for a few hours each day (Crossley-Holland, 1982, p.xviii).

The hardship of lives and travel was valorised through Nordic storytelling, often involving the figures of Asgard, and in this manner it was possible for man to be lifted toward the status of a god. We might consider other examples of this in other cultural systems, such as the Greek for example, with both positive and negative outcomes, particularly involving the fall of man. The primary vehicle in the realisation of Oedipus’ prophesised plight is certainly founded in the journey, beginning with his parents’ removal of him to the wilderness to die. He is subsequently saved by a shepherd and brought up in another region. He returns to Thebes to escape the very prophecy that he travels toward and brutally kills his own father, King Laius, on the road (Sophocles, Fagles & Knox, 1984). Examples of this fatedness are numerous: for example all of Jason’s journeys with the Argonauts lead to his eventual destitution as he dies under the collapsed and rotting hulk of his ship, the Argo (Euripedes & Vellacott, 1963).

To travel has long been associated with taking risk then, and the origin of the word experience is etymologically contained in the original word *Per* which

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33 In his book examining risk, Dan Gardner relates an anecdote about having his wallet stolen whilst travelling on assignment in Nigeria – he is unable to stop himself pursuing the thief into the most dangerous slums, really for the sake of a family photograph contained in the wallet. He travels into danger by weighing up the potential reward with the potentially mortal risk and is later horrified at how imbalanced this decision was. He mentions the physiological affects on his body of this fear and yet it is probably the adrenalin that skewed his judgement (Gardner, 2009). Bernstein regards risk more in the context of gambling and probability but his core theme that risk is a calculation of the future based upon
synonymously meant to cross a space. Careri illustrates this with words such as ‘peril’. This can also be found in ‘experiment’ for example and as such the notion of crossing unknown space is woven with that of the efficacy of taking risk. Inherent in the term is action, something done whilst something is risked and so we might arrive again at the idea of something ‘performed’. In this sense there is also a natural link to terms that confer a state of knowledge such as well travelled (Careri, 2005, p.41). If you have travelled then you have encountered risk – Lupton considers the connection of this fear to the body (see footnote above) relative to its endangerment by Others, both as an attack or a contamination by fluids and contact (1999). Crossing space then, or travelling through, also concerns the exposing of self to risk out of which there is the reward of a more meaningful empirical understanding of ourselves and therein is the inference of the wise in the well-travelled and an absolute essential link between the mind, the body and identity.

the knowledge of the past may explain something of Gardner’s resolve to get his wallet back, pushing to the point at which he felt he was without experience and then stopping (Bernstein, 1998). Lupton considers that a good deal of fear, both in past and now, relates to the possibility of danger to the body and connects this physical fear to the observation that ‘notions of Otherness remain central to ways of thinking and acting about risk’ (Lupton, 1999, p.126). The link here is not just the physical risk of injury by the Other but also contamination. Gardner mentions his fear of having his throat cut in the incident with his wallet as he entered deeper into the slum and two things are striking in this; that he should choose to fear such an old fashioned and viscerally engaged attack such as throat cutting, in which a great deal of blood is released from the body and secondly that the form of fear coincides with the dirt and contamination of the slum. This relationship of the body to the Other is confirmed by Lupton who writes extensively about a connection between Others, fear and bodily fluid. Bauman has also examined the corporeal disgust of Other’s evident, for example, in the Nazi’s stripping of Jewish humanity to replace it with something more on the level of vermin ‘in the service of extermination’ (1991, p.48).
Multiple crossings of space have been an important context for a number of works that form the practice of this study – *Mendel’s Garden, Entropic, Memento Mori, Nightflight, City Dell, Harriekin Ibitzen (Walking with Stones)* and *A Wonderful Engine* – but the context of taking a risk is also present, albeit in varying forms, both real and implied. The three works across landscape certainly took a real risk, if carefully managed, inasmuch as they were at night and in difficult terrain. Whilst this managed risk was relatively small, it operated upon the body of the audience to stimulate a literal anxiety that would close the gap between their actual activity and its metaphoric flight from one place to another.

Careri is interested in the etymology of the terms for the routes of travel. Whilst paths and roads infer being *en route* to somewhere, streets derive from the paved avenues of settlement. He argues that movement is the origin of architecture, not stasis, pointing out that the original solid forms such as the Menhir stand between settlements and were erected by multiple communities coming together in the *meanspace*[^34]. Whilst undoubtedly important spiritual places, these stones also stood as waysigns. But Careri’s study is very much bounded from a sculpturo-architectural standpoint, predicated on structures such as menhirs because of their scale and static weight. I should add then that it is the cairn pile of stones and the shrine that are the true monuments of travel and drift, created with the urgent economy of found materials, and more realised *entropically* so far as the composition is formed out of multiple

[^34]: I have adopted the term *meanspace* following its use by the Italian collective, *Stalker ON*. It is intended to infer a territory between boundaries, between belonging, a no-man’s land. I discuss *Stalker On* in Chapter 5.
fragments – they are in this sense not only testament to movement across space but also through time and; they are redolent with movement rather than the monolithic stasis of the standing stones, which, whilst speaking of age also deny the constancy of change. I reminded then of Beuys’ 1982 work *7000 Eichen* (*7000 Oaks*), wherein Oak trees are each resisted by a solitary rock (Cooke & Kelly, 1994). But then of course it is only the presence of the rock that reveals the relative growth of the tree:

In Kassel … basalt stones stand as markers for the 7000 oaks planted as Beuys’ greatest living artwork, a perfect synthesis of his love of nature, history, the paradoxes of time transition and time eternal … The trees grow taller and wider. The stone remains constant, and in the fullness of time only the stone will remain (Tisdall, 1995, p.126)

But cairns, or wayside shrines, are temporal and plastic structures that also do not reject the participation of subsequent travellers, whose addition quietly asserts that *I have passed* or that *I have lived*. Climbing up to impossibly high monasteries in the Himalayan kingdom of Ladakh, I often passed little towers of balanced stones, the mark of a traveller but also the mark of a considered or meditative action that speaks of *taking time* or perhaps *having time*. As I added my own, I was aware that its success was subject to selection and painstaking balance that would require a pulling back of attention from this enormous landscape to a microcosm of its material entropy. Five or six small stones, delicately balanced one above the other, variations of shape and colour, size and weight. These small acts of architecture precariously recognise, in contrast
to the menhir, their temporality. They are here, but they will be gone … no
matter. Beside the Indus, as it winds through this high desert of peaks, are other
interventions – walking along a shore of boulders, an occasional rock has been
carved in Sanskrit with mantras. As the water laps at these, so the prayers are
carried away, just like the wind-blown prayer flags. What struck me was their
indifference to being discovered – these objects are efficacious tools, returning
slowly to the landscape without need for witness. The painstaking beauty of
their carving, like a sand mandala that is destroyed in water, recognises the
emptiness of materiality in the face of temporal drift, rather than the joy of the
beholder.

The cairn or roadside shrine, however, also speaks of the element of *per* or risk inherent in the journey, often memorialising a specific event or fatality en route, or perhaps acting as a temporary altar, a place to pray for safe passage. Shrines or cairns of this sort primarily remind us that we are taking a risk, that we are mortal, but whilst they represent warning by playing testament perhaps to an event, in extreme landscapes they might even close the gap betwixt that which is represented and the object of representation.

Since its original ascent by Mallory, Tensing and Hillary, Everest has become scattered with the corpses of climbers whose removal would be deemed to place too many other lives at risk. The enduring presence of many of these bodies, in particular those that lie near the most popular expedition routes such as the north-east ridge, transforms their status in an extraordinary fashion. Whilst a corpse, they are simultaneously objectified as *repressamenten* (Pierce, 1974, p.285) of their own demise, as a memorial to themselves and a warning of the danger to come. Further still, some become waypoints of the route, temporal markers of progress. This mutability is best illustrated by *Green Boots*, whose body has lain just beneath an overhang since 1996 and fairly often has to be stepped over by climbing parties taking the northeast ridge. This is the body of an Indian climber called Tsewang Paljor who died of exposure in the storm that took eight lives on Everest in May of 1996:

Twelve climbers died that spring – eight of them on a single day – fixing the mountain in the public imagination as a place where rich, inexperienced clients tried to buy their way to the summit. Two
Japanese climbers had noticed Paljor’s plight, but they had trudged past to reach the summit, leaving him to become a macabre landmark now known simply as Green Boots (Douglas, 2007).

Whilst his name is known, he is now only referred to as ‘Green Boots’, due to the prominence of his fluorescent plastic green mountain boots as he lies, semi-foetal on his side, with his feet toward the passage of climbers only a foot or so away.

Forward parties radio back to camp announcing that they have reached *Green Boots*. When Dave Bunting who led a 2006 expedition to the west ridge first related this to me, I struggled to try to understand it ethically. Most climbers on Everest, irrespective of mountaineering experience, understand the very great risks to life, which extend beyond weather and landscape – this is intrinsic to the pull and to an extent one begins to face that mortality in the stages of preparation: my last act before leaving for the Himalaya was to draw up a full will and lodge it with a solicitor.

As I fell ill with altitude sickness and the beginnings of a cerebral oedema in Ladakh, my fear was also offset by a phenomenon I struggle to explain – something instinctively calm in a high, extreme landscape, perhaps submissive. Whilst I am sure that there is a transformed attitude to the danger of death in these experiences, I remain less convinced about its objectification on Everest. “We are at Green Boots.” Why not “we are with Green Boots”, or even that “we are with Tsewang Paljor?” Firstly the use of *at* rather than *with* confirms
that the body of this climber has taken on the significance of its own memorial cairn. The most significant feature seems to be the boots and in this regard I am tempted here to refer to the boot soles I found whilst working in the battlefields of Ypres, or to the thousands of shoes that remain in the Nazi deathcamp of Madjanek. But in both of those experiences, which will be discussed in the following chapter, the presence of the footwear served to heighten a sense of the absence of the foot, ergo the body. In both of those examples, it is absence that is at the core of human tragedy.

On Everest the presence of the body draws the mythic status of the highest peak on earth into a challenging reality. Jalpor is serially denied singular identity because he has passed into the folklore of the northeast ridge, even as the mummies of the Andean peaks. Freeze dried, Green Boots has become immortal, whilst Jalpor’s identity would expose too much of a proximity to fragile individuality, or perhaps more explicitly to having to recognise personality, a person, a character, someone and not something.

I feel the inverse might be argued for the body of George Mallory, who was discovered recently and whose identity was, after all, the point of a longstanding search. He lies, face down and half buried in scree, ropes still lying diagonally across his back. No plastic, no bright colours – referring more to something ancient and mummified, but somehow less than the status of his supreme physical presence in expedition and camp photographs. The mountain consumes him: his face buried in its slope, his hands embracing its sides. He cannot take on the status of a memorial cairn perhaps – he is Mallory at least in
the sense of becoming denotative icon, specifically significant of a key event – but he is representative of firstness, both in ascent and death and therefore speaks to climbers of the actuality of their mortality in multiple crossings. He is the first death, the original, the archetype.

In 2007, after ten years of Green Boots laying in the lee of a small overhang, David Sharpe, a British climber dying slowly of frostbite and a cerebral oedema, joined Tsewang Jalpor. To the nearly forty climbers who passed him, some of whom attempted to make him a little more comfortable, some of whom filmed his dying moments, his fate was an inevitability – that he was lying across Green Boots probably made it more so. His body now also lies only a foot or so from the ascent route.

The remains of far more ancient explorers at least predicate the fact of our need to investigate and conquer territory with more evolutionary efficacy than simply way-marking a route. The Independent newspaper ran a front cover report on 9th September 2009 regarding the discovery of skulls and bones from early Hominin humans in Georgia, that disproves previous theories of the African cradle of humanity, at least so far as dates are confirmed (Connor, 2009). The discovery illustrates that Hominins migrated to Georgia out of Africa some 750,000 years earlier than Homo Erectus as previously thought. The point for this study emerges when the development of the legs and arms are placed against that of the Hominins’ brains. The brain was on average forty percent smaller than Erectus and the arms were not yet developed, moving differently to ours, whilst the leg bones were large, strong and athletic. It would
seem that evolutionary primacy favoured the ability to travel and move large distances over cognitive intelligence in the early development of man. Brains developed later as a result of humans becoming carnivores.

Out of this then emerges the prime function of nomadism and the respective notion that settlement is somehow more equal to civilisation, ergo intelligence, which is a fallacy. This is a point emphasised by Careri (2005), who begins his radical book *Walkscapes* by establishing a binary of spatial occupation that he traces back beyond the Old Testament to the pre-historic. Whilst this notion, as I described earlier, is allegorically present in the story of Cain and Abel, people, suggests Careri, have always been divided between settlers and nomads, or architects and *anti*-architects. (2005).
Western culture certainly has a general disregard for nomadism, perhaps also because it has developed ideologies that fail in governance of it (Cresswell, 2006). Antagonism toward Romany Gypsies, Navvies, travellers, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers all emerge through the distrust of the nomadic other whose only objective is deemed to take social advantage like a locust before moving on. Bauman discusses the reduction of Others to the rank of vermin as a constructive argument for eradication (1991) (see footnote 33).

There is something here also concerning the investment of and in places of settlement with cultures of participation. The western forces currently struggling to control Afghanistan are realising that a secondary war of investment in communities is the only way in which they might wrest support from the Taliban and that that investment is more than economic – it is participatory. We are returned once more to Cain and Abel, to architects and anti-architects. Perhaps the truth is that in the twenty-first century we need to re-approach architecture as a mutable phenomenon of space, to embrace migration as a prime vehicle of human development. This was a familiar idea to the Lettrists, clearly manifest in the young Ivan Chtcheglov’s\textsuperscript{35} 1953 essay, \textit{Formulaire Pour Une Urbanisme Nouveau} (Formulary for a New Urbanism); writing of the future city he hailed:

\begin{quote}
\textquote{\textbf{[t]he main activity of the inhabitants [as the] CONTINUOUS DRIFTING. The changing of landscapes from one hour to the next will result in total disorientation}} (Gilles, 2006, p.7).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{35} Chtcheglov wrote under the pseudonym of Ivin Gilles.
A further definition needs to be sought between the routed, deliberate journeys of flight or nomadism, and erratic drift. Like Cresswell (2006), Clifford considers that ‘travels and contexts are crucial sites for an unfinished modernity’ (1997, p.2) and uses a language that is constantly replete with that plurality of perspectives considered earlier in Marcus’ vision of a contemporary ethnography (Marcus, 1998). Whilst this plurality is not necessarily erratic, the latter is certainly more exploratory in nature than deliberate journeys, deriving from hunter gathering in *spaces* rather than places, considering Rogoff’s use of the terms (2000). The distinction is an important one in socio-evolutionary terms, since nomadism refers more to a seasonal migration to and from defined *places*, but also in terms of defining the performance of space and place, particularly since the Dadaists first *deambulations* attempted ‘the achievement of a state of hypnosis by walking, a disorientating loss of control’. This was deployed as a ‘medium through which to enter into contact with the unconscious part of the territory’ (Careri, 2006, p.82).

This notion of engagement with an unconscious element of territory effectively defines the role of darkness in my three works across landscape at night. Whilst these routes are closed, at least so far as my control of them is concerned, they take on the uncertainty of drift so far as the participants are concerned and this is where the aspect of risk becomes active as an actual experience for the participants rather than something narrated. Narratives unfold, but a linear route is obfuscated by the dynamics of high landscape at night – we walk up, down, around, through, we climb, we circle and we encounter constant change, constant uncertainty and, for the participant in the darkness, constant risk.
Conversely the Dadaists wished to visit banality, and did so with their first outing to a neglected church garden in Paris in April 1921 (Careri, 2006). This was taken on as a staple of the Surrealists and was a core ideal of Breton’s first manifesto relationship between the dreamed and the real, an ideal later criticised by the Lettrists who viewed this somnambulant insistence as a bourgeois imposition on real urban spaces that offered their own material richly; it was a lost opportunity. The Lettrists were more interested in the potential of banality that the Dadaists first recognised but certainly didn’t realise. The Lettrist’s aesthetic would be in the construction of temporary situations to be experienced in non-places, but still with the emphasis on the *derive*. This type of drift remains explicitly urban in their work and relates well to my own experiments with the performance students in Bilbao. We had physicalised our Butoh Fu style poems that were then architecturally framed as temporary interventions within the public spaces of Barracaldo, an outlying industrial town, and Casca Viejo, Bilbao’s rambling and maze-like old quarter.
The Lettrists, and later the Situationists remained urban, and in that sense modernist. Whilst their political antagonism of architectural conurbation was driven by a reassertion of drift, movement and freedom, it was still rooted in the context of the city and of the urban, with a deliberate and explicit disregard for non-urban natural landscapes. This project of *deambulation* or derive (drift), has been more rooted narratively in the city throughout the latter part of the twentieth century as well, with non-urban projects tending toward a sculptural aesthetic of object traces rather than socio-architectonic texts that unfold via perambulation. To illustrate I might refer to the work of Richard Long and Robert Smithson. Long’s *A Line (Made By) Walking* (1967), is, as it suggests, a line that results from the careful treading of a line in across a field.

Careri observes that:

> the image of the treaded grass contains the presence of absence: absence of the action, absence of the body, absence of the object. But it also unmistakably the result of the act-ion of a body, and it is an object, a something that is situated between sculpture, a performance and an architecture of the landscape (2005,p.144).

But the action as such is defined by its trace in the object and as such lends a primacy to the sculpture as semiotic index of a performance that we do not witness. This is no different in a way to the boot sole that I pulled in horror from the trenches of Ypres whilst working as an artist in residence with Glyn Davies Marshall, or the mass of shoes that I saw and smelt, also with horror, in
the Majdanek deathcamp near Lublin. I might go as far to suggest that this is also the function of Tsewang Jalpor’s renaming as Green Boots – a contradictory space has opened between Jalpor’s action in climbing to this point and the object of his remains as an index to that moment. Green boots is a present trace of Jalpor’s absent action. Since Long’s line is indeed a line, it is not action – it certainly is a document as art and this is true of much of his work, which, like Rebecca Horn’s wearable objects, stand before us in the absence of their action. There is also a borrowed mythology about this absence, not unlike the power of the disembodied voice that I shall deal with in chapter four. This ‘power’ lends an epic scale to what we infer is absent – the soldier of the trenches, the climber of Everest, the victim of the Holocaust, the tribal ancestor – and it multiplies this metonymically, since the one will stand for all. These object traces operate as invocations then, which are also testament to per (the risk of the journey), but are not cartographic as such or indeed performances in and of themselves.

Robert Smithson’s artistic interest in the transformation of sites related to that of Tony Smith, who took his students at night for a walk along the unfinished turnpike – a space not yet mapped or finished (Wagstaff Jr., 1966, pp.14-19). Smithson began by exhibiting the debris of earth-works, rocks and rubble in gallery works before progressing to large-scale interventions in landscape such as his Spiral Jetty (1970). In consideration of Smith’s reflections on this experience, Smithson recognised that the artist could modify the way that an observer – or shall I say an audience – viewed a given territory, re-presenting it in a fresh light.
This reflection engaged in actual territory and feels relative to my use of guided night-walks across landscapes that, whilst they may seem familiar by the relative perspectives of day (with visible landmarks, tracks and other features), are utterly transformed by night and further by the cycles of weather and the moon. But, certainly as the huge process of realising Nightflight was under way, I also found myself fascinated by the representations of landscape and territory and, following a visit to a superbly detailed model village in Wimborne, Dorset, realised that I wanted to make giants of an audience. I had worked with miniaturisation in my collaborations with Glyn Davies-Marshall between 2000 and 2002, at one point constructing a bridge for ‘others’ over a river in the Stafford festival (a work in which we spent a full day in the water and populated our world with small cars).

Davies-Marshall and I had an interest in the miniature in common, but for different reasons: whilst he was genuinely interested in the detail and relative reproductive accuracy of the model, I was engaged with issues of scale and representation as they related interpretations of reality to the phenomenal fact itself. I was returned to this notion of the miniature somehow because of our insignificance in the actual landscape of mountains, but also realised that it was with the map that we objectively removed ourselves, stood at a simultaneous distance from our occupation and asserted control. It was not long before I took a copy of Gulliver’s Travels from the bookshelf and this avenue of research

36 Whenever Davies-Marshall and myself collaborated, I found that we were working on a different but parallel discourse and was fascinated by this synchronicity and the fact that we could make this operate so effectively.
culminated in a nine-hour durational performance installation work called *A Wonderful Engine*.

### 2.5 A Wonderful Engine.

If *Nightflight* swallowed its audience into the black pocket of the night, the opposite was sought with the durational studio installation performance of *A Wonderful Engine*, wherein they became the giants stepping across border-zones, scrutinising cultural difference. But a growing phenomenon of the post-millennial (and post-9/11) decade is where the form of disenfranchisement concerns containment of one form or another; both containment as political siege (Palestine) and containment as control (detention centres, extraordinary rendition, house arrest, tagging and so forth). I was drawn to consider exactly why Swift ‘contained’ the giant Gulliver in the second chapter by an act of restraint.

This containment by restraint might suit the efficacies of information gathering as intelligence, crime prevention, illegal immigration, political currency and, perversely, human rights if it is argued that the subject is being kept from harm. But it has also become a constraint employed by artists, and often those who are in some personal respect invested in migration or diaspora – this is particularly true of performance and live art, the economy of which employs the body in the absence of other materials or formal environments and can be a useful form for works that concern disenfranchisement.
In *An Analysis of Performance Art*, Howell considers states of stillness as death or collapse, as meditation and as arrest or restraint (2000). The latter state concerns an enforced physical restraint that also implies a loss of freedom, implying that something is executed by one party upon the person of another and in the absence of consent. Whilst physical, then, this is also knowingly psychological in nature since, as I said, it removes freedom involuntarily and perhaps with an element of real or threatened violence. Spivak and Butler also consider the extent to which the ‘State I’m in’ affects the ‘state I’m in’. They assert that the idea of Nation and State are not necessarily synchronous; there are ideas such as the security state that don’t necessarily flow with the idea of the national; “…the State is meant to serve the matrix for the obligations and prerogatives of citizenship” (2007, p.3). They go on to consider that the State can signify the source of 'unbelonging' and even enforce that in a semi-permanent state of dispossession (the duree of which has been openly flaunted by the US government in regard of international law and is subject to repeated testing in Britain by recent governments, such as for example with the 42 Day Detention Bill that was rejected by the House of Lords in October 200837).

Swift wrote an itinerary of the contents of Gulliver’s pockets that is often abridged from editions, I assume because it stands as a stylistic ‘carbuncle’ on the fluidity of a fictional narrative; it has something of the ‘Modern’ about it (indeed, considering its ephemerality, I might go so far as suggesting it has something of the post-modern about it). Having said as much, it is this passage

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37 The 42 day Detention bill was passed in the House of Commons in July 2008 but later rejected by the House of Lords in October 2008. Liberty made a film concerning the subject as part of its Charge or Release campaign against the bill (*Liberty Human Rights, 2008*)
alone that attracted critical praise of Samuel Johnson, an open critic of Swift, since, in Gravil’s words, ‘it combines pleasure and surprise with the important effect of establishing the foreignness of Gulliver,’ and ‘introduces … the constant theme of surveillance’ (Gravil, 2001, pp.15,79) The Lilliputian Emperor demands that the itinerary is drawn up so that they might assess the risk factor of this insurgent giant in their midst and decide his fate as a result. The security officers assigned the task are ironically assisted by Gulliver who places them in turn in each of his pockets. The problem with this, or any, customs procedure is that their interpretation of the object-texts is culturally derived from the position of their own social constructs, the humour for Swift being that safe objects are accorded threat status and dangerous ones the opposite.

Objects in travel are normally constituted by the collective noun ‘luggage’ and in such a manner belongings are referred as a singular object of responsibility to the traveller. This singularity is signified by or literally and metaphorically contained in the ‘case’. But the carrying of luggage is not merely necessitated by the changing of clothes or by the transference of one identity to another, it is also of a matriarchal anima – the security that lends the traveller the context of the safe inside whilst they are outside. As an object the case is a leathery vertebrate, presenting our defensive strengths and covering our defenceless inner; it is a presenting of the back and a protection of the belly. We lock it, armour it, knock, scrape and personalise it. Luggage is not merely packed at an origin and unpacked at a destination; it is carried and meditated upon throughout the process of a journey.
In potential texts for performance I have written that my home was the *Repository of Lost Luggage* and that I was a *case* amongst cases. In that playful statement there is interplay between luggage, corporeality and psychology that operates in the liminality of the journey, of leaving, of becoming lost and of *being* something that is unresolved. Rogoff dedicates a chapter of her book *Terra Infirma* to the notion of luggage (2000). She tends to view the metaphor of the case as being synonymous with origins or destinations, whilst I suggest that there is a growing community that resides in the meta-space of non-belonging. Certainly the case is the vessel of objects that symbolically tether us in respect of both place and time – the photograph, a memento, a book, a gift we were given. These contents are indexed as clues to ourselves and read as a text by those that might view our luggage. Yet as a vessel it is also an object for and *in* motion that confers the status of nomad on its owner, albeit perhaps temporarily. With that status, as I have discussed, comes suspicion, Otherness, fear of the courier of contamination and risk.

In *A Wonderful Engine* these objects of luggage are no longer in a case, or indeed a pocket, but are returned, trailing from a restrained and prostrate body, to their origins in miniature communities as plural rather than singular indexes to the Self. As an installation the audience enter a space covered in maps, punctuated by miniature cities, also of maps, and inhabited for the most part by a single performer (myself), tied to the floor. At two-hour intervals this figure is joined by a second who performs acupuncture upon the left arm and hand.
The work presents the artefactual world as woven and connected to placeness, requiring an act of investigation from an audience of proto-flâneurs. The objects are connected by a web of cords emanating from the floor-bound figure of the performer and off across cartographic territories where they sit, minutely labelled, within illuminated termite-mound cities – the literal attachment of the protagonist to the object world remains vulnerable to scrutiny, such as that carried out by Swift’s Lilliputian Emperor or of passing ones luggage through a contemporary customs procedure, but here that scrutiny conditionally requires a recognition of a multiplicity of origins.
A Wonderful Engine was in many respects a work of ethnographic constraints, exploring its relationship to placeness through the opposite stricture of micro and macro approaches; the work makes giants of the audience whilst supplying them all with magnifying glasses for a more haptic scrutiny. Some of the closest scrutiny occurred when the body, my body, underwent the periods of acupuncture. The needles were treated as waypoints to another form of personal map and each, after being professionally administered, was labelled with a minute luggage label and text. One particular needle, on the inside of the
forearm just below the elbow, visibly ticked with the beat of my heart. This direct index to inner, active life was of the most remarkable interest to audience members who drew as close as they might in what appeared an instinctive, intimate and human scrutiny of the body as a wonderful engine.

Ethnographic study deals broadly in a continuum between the emic and the etic modes\textsuperscript{38} and this was very much at the heart of the relationship between this performance and Nightflight; that is to say that there is a constant telescopic shifting between the subjective domain of things viewed from within as it were and then the objective advantage of distance. As a default position Nightflight engaged with the etic context of viewing something that is from within

\textsuperscript{38} The emic refers to material or perspectives that are derived from within, and has a subjective position often being the account of the participant, whilst the etic refers to the position of external or distanced observation and therefore is the account of an observer in separation from the subject (Fetterman, 1998).
inasmuch as its attempt to disorientate and swallow its audience in a subjectively dark space and undefined space might be concerned. From time to time it granted distance to view installations and performance, but these remained fragmentary and appeared to gesture to a larger whole or other events that we could never grasp. *A Wonderful Engine*, on the other hand placed its participants in a far more *etic* context because it presented representation (maps) and a reduced scale that made their default position that of the observer. They were still immersed in a world of sorts but the edges were defined and the details illustrated in such a way that the mechanisms were revealed – herein was the engine referred to by the title, a term that also quotes Swift’s text as the Lilliputians’ description of Gulliver’s pocket watch: ‘“Out of the right fob hung a great silver chain, with a wonderful kind of engine at the bottom”’ (1991, p.39).

Whilst this *etic* position of observation is dominant for participants in *A Wonderful Engine*, and the *emic* then for *Nightflight*, the modality of both these performances shifts between something experienced via the senses and something rationally reached in interpretation of those experiences, triangulated or related in order to personally map. The *emic* perspective of subjectivity ‘…compels the recognition and acceptance of multiple realities’ whilst the *etic* is more datative, ‘materialist and positivistic’ (Fetterman, 1998, p.20). In some respects artistic discourse is caught in the continuum between the two – the artistic trope of commentator or outsider is a well-founded concept, whereas their interpretation of a subject itself is often of an extremely subjective and
positioned perspective. But the most important thing is the attempt to make sense of experience and this process seems crucially cartographic to me.

2.6 City Dell

Sometime before reading Careri, but after both of my own performances of Nightflight and A Wonderful Engine, I explored a synchronisation of those participant modalities in an outdoor commission for Leeds Light Night (2008). City Dell was a directorial collaboration with Stephen Burke in which we aimed to place multiple cities in a small park, in a city, unfolding durationally over a five-hour period. The paper buildings of A Wonderful Engine heavily influenced it, but these were realised in actual landscape and in a larger, less fragile scale. The site was Queen Square – a small park surrounded by railings in a square of Georgian houses.

The work took a good deal of inspiration from Calvino’s Invisible Cities (1997) but further considered change and movement as a constant and opposite phenomenon to the notion of settlement; our settlers were neon-suited dancers that were tethered by bungee cord to various points around the small square park. They worked with a ‘kit’ of internally lit model buildings, working their way into the centre, stretching the chords, to build cities, to take down cities, to reconfigure environments. The performers were all undergraduates of my programme at Leeds Metropolitan University and in the devising process we looked at the evolution of well-known cities, their shape, their logic, their provenance and their (sometimes imagined) demise. These settlers were offset

39 This was made as a launch event for the Art, Event, Performance Degree that I had taken up post to run at Leeds Metropolitan University.
with a constantly shifting group of nomads, who, shepherd-like, used certain rules to navigate and re-navigate the space. The clothing of this group also became tents, again internally lit, so that from time to time an encampment would materialise. A further group – *the Venetians* (Calvino’s book appears to consider multiple cities whilst it actually describes perspectives of Venice) – attempted to move water over a duration, using a *Heath Robinson* supply of guttering, baths, vessels, string, bottles and so forth: an irrigation in the absence of solid architecture.

![City Dell during Leeds Light Night, 2008](image)

In this work, as a further development of the telescopic oppositions of *Nightflight* and *A Wonderful Engine*, I wanted to place the audience both within and without, to objectify and subjectify synchronously placing my map of a city within a park within the actual city that loomed, lit for *LightNight*, all around:
the outside inside the outside. Herein too was a further marriage of representational model to the real. In *Nightflight* I had included a moving ‘pedlars’ cart that was the platform for a model village; a performer trundled this across a high path past the walking participants, as smoke blew from its buildings chimneys. I was fascinated with this antagonism of the stability of buildings, of communities. In *A Wonderful Engine* the buildings were presented as translucent in their fragility, made as they were from paper.

In *City Dell* the towering buildings of a real city overlooked the performance space, whilst the performers moved and arranged a virtual city in a constant state of transition. We additionally placed camouflaged bird-hides, with headphone soundtracks, from which viewers might achieve another state of
removal. The work could be viewed from without or within the park but was then contained in a world away from the world by the extraordinary enclosure of the Georgian buildings (extraordinary because Queen Square is so centrally located to Leeds and yet so quietly separate). Here was the ‘dell’, the city and the citadel inferred by the word play of the work’s title. Its separation was also one of relative darkness - the square’s park only being peripherally lit by old fashioned gaslamps - that we could intervene with using our internally lit buildings and tents.

City Dell, Leeds Lightnight, 2008.

The works discussed in this chapter employed travel as a meditation upon occupation and belonging, deploying the practice to navigate the sensibilities of emic and etic positions, telescoping scales, alternating between the representational and the actual rather like the choices we now face on Google
Maps between the photographic and the cartographic. All of the works discussed have the latter in common, either as a necessary logistical tool in the planning and execution of large-scale walks or as an aesthetic ground for discussing distance.

Between the exploration of an outsider status, multi-perspectival ethnography driven by mobility, ideology concerned with stasis and the architectonics of waypoints, of memorialised objects, of embodiment, the works discussed throughout this chapter certainly contain a crisis of representation between the subjective and objective modes of production and discourse that gestures to the inability to both visualise my Self (I will refer to this Bakhtinian problem again in chapter 5) or indeed to realise my Self as Other. If these perspectives are concerned with representation, they also concern the relative space between the physical and the meta-physical that requires an act of representational translation that we call mapping. In the following chapter I aim, therefore, to develop these cartographic concerns but with a continuing antagonism of the notion of something static, sedentary or fixed; maps, after all, are outdated from the moment they are produced as a result of natural or cultural change.
What we call places are stable locations with unstable converging forces that cannot be delineated either by fences on the ground or by boundaries in the imagination – or by the perimeter of a map. Something is always coming from elsewhere, whether it’s wind, water, immigrants, trade goods, or ideas (Solnit, 2010, p.vii).
In the previous chapters I discussed a dialectical and telescopic relation between real and represented landscapes in my work, it follows that I should more extensively discuss the relationship of mapping to a definition and claiming (or, in the case of some artists, *declaiming*) of territory. I intend certainly the term ‘mapping’ to convey formal notions of cartography, but also in a broader sense to refer to a process that is intrinsic to self-location and recognition; that we socially position ourselves in relative terms that are spatial but also attitudinal, social and political – this is a process of mapping. As such, I will frame the chapter through the discussion of a number of performance works of my own and of others (also revisiting works previously discussed but from a cartographic context). Running through this is the dialectical relationship between the organic in a process of constant change (ecological, biological, climate, mutation, growth, decay…) and the problem of static cartographic representations. There is also something, then, within all of this that will consider the crucial aspect of temporality in the face of our insistence upon stasis as a component emblem of civilisation.

The first of the works to be examined was a collaboration that I was invited to participate in by Walt Shaw. Shaw is a qualified biologist and much of the themes of his paintings, sculptures and sonic art of the past thirty years reflect his engagement with science. I have created many works together with Shaw over the past fifteen years and as members of the north midlands based artists’ collective known as BET4. The work discussed in this chapter was a toured performance installation called *Entropic*, performed by five members of the collective in addition to the dance practitioner, Sophia Lycouris and the free
jazz improviser, Lol Coxhill. The work was initiated by Shaw and preceded by a yearlong process of gathering material according to the coordinates of concentric circles drawn over a map of Derbyshire. In consideration of the cross-disciplinarity and interest in decay evident in Shaw’s collaboration, I am drawn to consider another collective called Stalker ON (Osservatorio Nomade) whose work in many respects owes something of an inheritance to the Situationist politic of non-places. For Stalker ON these are *meanspaces*, or by definition (non-) places that occupy an intermediate space between others, that are defined by what exists beyond or around them, and often places that have become disused and abandoned. These *meanspaces* are then palimpsests of multiple crossings and whilst Shaw and Stalker’s work both reveal something of the mutability of architectural space as ultimately unsustainable (Nature), I intend to shift focus back to its illusion of stasis in cartographic representations of power (Man). I’m interested in the biological contexts of these practices as embodied, certainly in the politics of human movement, but also in respect of the body itself as a site of constant change, as subject to power, as the primary territory of the Self.

*Nightflight* and *A Wonderful Engine (AWE)*, as discussed in the previous chapter, respectively generated subjective and objectively driven environments, reflecting embedded and distanced states and those *emic* and *etic* states derived from the social sciences. Having said this, *Nightflight* dealt with linearity as a stricture to that subjective envelopment, whilst *AWE* attempted to construct a gestalt and web-like environment but one that was cartographically objectified, the experience of which might be non-sequentially constructed by the viewer.
Both works also draw their audience into the respective contexts of landscape and its representation in cartographic forms. *AWE* is an environment completely constructed out of NATO flight maps, many representing areas of recent conflict such as Bosnia Herzegovina, whilst *Nightflight* deals in the interpretation of a cartographic representation in darkness. *Nightflight* plunged its participants into a blackness that was to some extent dependent upon the weather, removing from them the physical and visual reality of location and replacing it with the representational construct of mapping. As an undertaking, the production of a map in itself has a colonial energy because it attempts through representation to understand, to translate and to gain some control of space as a property through that translation.

An important aspect of the ‘Empire’ is that the commissioning and drawing up of the map is, in fact, a drawing up of the deed. The power-language of the map is a Western tradition of symbology that syntagmatically relates the represented territory to the ownership of those that will represent it. In *The Power of Maps*, Wood argues that a primary purpose of a map is the alleviation of the possibility of becoming lost (1992). This alleviation in itself is a shifting of power and control into the hands of the map holder. On our second night walk together, Keindl and I encountered horizontal rain and virtually no visibility. By careful study and translation of map symbols he managed to locate us in what seemed to me an impossible blackness. Many fictional adventures represent this shift of power as a map is seized and then re-seized in a desperate race between good and evil to reach an ideal (and therefore an ultimate power).
In the realms of popular fiction and film, *Treasure Island*, *Indiana Jones* and *His Dark Materials* are all examples of this narrative.

### 3.1 Entropic

Cartography is epistemic so far as its truths might be regarded. Maps don’t just represent ‘placeness’ but also manifest human politic as demographic, territorial, colonial and economic taxonomies. Maps themselves become quickly and progressively inaccurate from the moment of their initial drawing. Whilst inaccuracies emerge more often as a consequence of human events than natural, there may be a representational symmetry to their inevitable entropy if considered temporally, as with, for example, nuclear half-lives\(^40\); any chronographic series of maps will depict the organisation and dissipation of social territories.

Whilst representing geography according to the ideology and politic of its moment in time, a map is also always in the process of a degenerative loss of accuracy. Whilst not causal, this degeneration also reveals the vulnerability of such an ideology as nothing more or less than being of *that* moment. Territories change as a result of human intervention or occupation in both the physical and representative modes; they are named and renamed, with border

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\(^{40}\) I don’t intend to explore in depth any relationship between entropy and symmetry, but rather specifically refer to the difficulty of time in respect of cartographic representations of space. In this respect my comments regarding symmetry have no scalar bearing on actual physical material or space but rather rates by which it might representationally change/decay/mutate as born out by the map editions which then operate as snap shots. Having said so the correlation of entropic processes with symmetry have long been the subject of scientific theory since ‘nature has a stubborn tendency to remain as symmetrical as possible …’ (Lin, 1996, p.374).
zones shifting and also affected by settlement, mining, war and industry. All of these factors are more cyclic than we might infer from the map, which is regarded as the static endorsement of social geography.

In 2005 I was invited with four other artists to collaborate with Walt Shaw on a performance installation called Entropic, touring four studio venues over a six-month period. In this work though I was not a collaborative artist in the same context as some of my other engagements with Shaw (Mendel’s Garden 2004) and Timepoints 2007) in which we were equal creative authors. In Entropic I was a commissioned performer, joining Shaw and other performers for a final rehearsal and development period and the actual performances. This is a useful and slightly different position from other collaborations discussed in this thesis, since I am able to consider the work as an observer of the process and participant in the outcome. As a piece, it has fascinated me because of its application of maps and travel in a stage of preparation that constitutes a whole separate and solitary process for Shaw, and one that took many months. I remember finding the scale of his preparation impressive and perplexing for a work that would run with a duration of around one hour – each performance necessitated fresh material that had been gathered, bagged and placed in boxes representing sixty-four different locations.

With Entropic, Shaw was interested in the manner in which the debris of manufactured and used objects inevitably re-met the natural. He drew three concentric circles on a map of Derbyshire, with his home at the epicentre. He then defined the sixty-four points along those circles and over a six month
period travelled to each of these points to collect whatever material lay on the ground. The resulting debris was carefully logged, labelled and bagged to be drawn together in a large white box. Each box carried with it a map with its point of collection clearly shown. The boxes then formed part of a large cube in a performance installation, during which all were dismantled allowing the audience to explore the bagged material before it was frenetically ‘reduced’ with saws, wood mulchers, hammers and vacuum cleaners with the resulting ‘grey’ material only to be returned to the rebuilt cube. This cycle was repeated throughout four performances, and we reloaded the boxes with fresh material for each.

41 The discarded material took on a fetishised quality once bagged, causing audiences to engage in a close and curious manner reminiscent of a car boot sale – Shaw’s preparation had manufactured museal expectations of value, despite bags containing, for example, discarded cigarette cartons.
This was a work of two processes, quite differently undertaken. The first process of retrieval considered the way material is collected in a body. The context of the circles emanating from the notion of ‘home’ considers our wish for the certainty of something static and this is expressed in the drawing of these disparate materials back within something central. Home and the body are corporeal spaces that are in a state of constant change, despite human efforts to establish them as secure or even static. This is evident whenever I consider the guided tour through a stately residence, the contents of which seem often locked in a struggle of the contemporary with the endurance of agelessness. That agelessness refers to the continuation of power, the wish to eschew change and of course it still infers ownership and collection. Adorno considers that ‘the german word museal (museum-like) has unpleasant overtones. It describes objects to which the observer no longer has any vital relationship and which are in the process of dying’, and in linking the word to its etymological origins with mausoleum, he goes on to liken museums to ‘family sepulchres’ wherein treasures are hoarded on the basis of value rather than pleasure (1983, p.175). So this sense of stability and security in the heimlich is intrinsic to notions of capital value and wealth.

Shaw’s focus on debris and waste antagonises this notion of wealth as fiduciary and recognises the centre of power in the home, as the body of family. As a biologist he refers this as a stricture to the process of entropy that seems to suffuse all aspects of the work, not just the gestural. The map of the area is
revealed as inconsistent and changeable by his repeat visits, or at least not revealing the micro-shifts in its represented surfaces. The material collected has already, for the large part, been subject to entropic processes – stones are worn remnants, glass is broken, cans are crushed and faded, micro-chip boards are broken and muddied, cigarette packets are softened by a dampness that is then contained by the cellophane around their base. For the most part these articles are also incomplete, discarded, considered beyond use. Having said so, and whilst a good deal of the material was man-made in origin, Shaw did not differentiate some of the natural substances found, whether they be charcoal or stone, which also shared the context of being in the process of dissipation.

There was an attempt in the work to reverse that entropy by drawing these materials back to a centre, to a body, that is referred to through the analogy of a house. The relevance of my reference to the stately home is clarified by Shaw’s careful labelling and archiving of the material, which is protected and stored in some respects as a means to ensure its continuity and perhaps then the ideology of the body as something that wishes to retain power.

His subsequent reversal of this in the second stage of the work, the performance installation, has Marxist undertones as this ‘power’ is broken down and redistributed. The materials are contained in the sixty-four boxes that form a large white cube that is tethered to rocks around the space. Figures emerge from the centre of the cube and the boxes are slowly distributed among the audience who are also supplied with torches with which to explore the contents. The debris consequently emerges through a shared process into the space, at which
point it is aggressively reduced to something even less and yet returned to the cubes. This subsequent return, however, was now more like the boxes of death, of something that is returned to a meanstate, prior to its re-emergence as formal matter in the world. It is to this rational context of biology and the idea of entropy as an inevitable process that the work primarily speaks.

By forensically bagging and packaging material, Shaw gestures toward productivity and consumption whilst also playfully suggesting that an audience look much closer because what appears to merge at distance, is still quite distinct in the macro view of the microscope. In this sense distance itself can be the catalyst of a visual entropy wherein the loss (mergence) of one type of information forms the fabric of another, rather like a painting by Seurat. In identifying with the whole scene, then, we are blind to its substantive reality. In that moment before we destroy the evidence – or rather reduce it for a stronger lens – Shaw’s audience are investigators, curators, readers, and auditors. As in my installation *A Wonderful Engine*, here again is a telescopic relational aspect between the viewer and the object, the objectivity of distance and the subjectivity of the immediate, wherein the viewer is made complicit in a close investigation and in so doing owns discovery and loses the neutral status of observer. Through this intimate proximity they construct a relation *to* and therefore a responsibility *for* the object or text of discovery. This is reminiscent of Duchamp’s *readymade* inasmuch as a repositioning or framing of the pre-
existing and often banal article leads to its status as art through its reconsideration by the viewer.\footnote{Zepke compares Baudrillard’s rejection of this on the basis of its ‘banality’, to Deleuze and Guattari’s view of it as ‘ushering in a new immanence of art and life’ (2008, p.33) because the readymade is a mechanism in the transformation of aesthetics, rather than the destroyer of them. See also Baudrillard’s The System of Objects (2005 edition) and Art and Artefact (1997).}

Notwithstanding that this was a sculptural work of installation performance, with Entropic I am reminded of Chekhov’s depiction of the struggle to resist change, in plays such as The Cherry Orchard. Here too is something that relates the ‘natural truth’ of entropy to the man-made as well as the natural, of the transience of power and the fiduciary truth of land ownership. All this then returns us to the issue of the home as a centre of belonging, which represents a corporeal security that is ultimately illusory. This can be extended to the intended efficacy of a map, if we consider it not only as a representational record of where things are but also of where we are, of what we occupy, what we do and do not belong within, what we own, where our edges are, what we culturally agree on. A single place may therefore infer an infinite number of maps from an infinite number of perspectives, and each of these become redundant as a result of the temporal ecology of place and culture, since ‘…a static map cannot describe change, and every place is in constant change …; another map is required; and another; and yet another…’ (Solnit, 2010, p.2).

Within Shaw’s work there is also a clear context for this state of becoming, but the process is reductive, devolved and entropic in quality as material travels toward indivisibility corresponding ‘to indistinguishability (total loss of
information), to perfect symmetry … and to the highest simplicity’ (Lin, 1996, p.367). In Shaw’s material though there is less aspiration than Lin’s inference by virtue of its reclamation of and emphasis on waste. Shaw’s found material suggests that these locations are all subject not to stasis, but to mutation. There is, then, the physical and biological truth of this material process, but also the inferred history of its arrival; a used and discarded condom is an object to draw a grimace of disgust, partly because the latex will preserve the content, but may also be index to a desperate and necessarily human moment of love, never forgotten in the mind of its participants. A shard of a hubcap will draw a more neutral response, but its arrival may have been a result of no less charged a moment of human existence. Shaw’s locations emphasise the human aspect of a mutability that is also finally inseparable from natural entropy – the locations are static but subject to travel both in the temporal and physical sense because time and objects shift.

3.2 Mutability and Stalker.

There is therefore an axis that sits between the mutability of space as a static temporal effect and the transitional aspect of space as something travelled. In chapter two I referred to Careri (2005) to posit that the transitional space is in many respects regarded less civil than the settlement. Whilst a fallacy, this is was also a colonial tool in both a distrust of nomadic cultures and the transformation, or designed settlement, of ‘primitive’ territories. When Bauman writes on identity, it is clear that he perceives human movement as a huge phenomena of the post-industrial, post-war and post-modern era, running in the face of which is a renewed State objective in the United Kingdom and other
countries of the West, to restrict borders in the decade following the 11th September attacks in New York and the 7th July attack in London. In the mid nineteen-nineties Marc Auge wrote extensively on the subject of Super-Modernity (1995), at the heart of which was the non-place – a space of transition that exists without an anthro-historical link often because its existence facilitates contemporary travel (airports, terminals, motorways, cyberspace even). In some respects the politic of the text remains largely within capitalist terms because Auge’s non-spaces concern economy, and by definition are by and large not spaces that infer a sense of belonging – they are operable and exist in that economy of need or demand as necessary, as useful, as being on the way to there rather than actually being there. If such spaces attempt to root themselves culturally, it is as a promotion of product – Christmas, souvenir, food, tourism – or of place – sign-posts, advertising billboards - and therefore carries within it a Baudrillardian quality of the hypereal. But post-9/11 this phenomenon has been antagonised by new levels of inspection and reduced rights of carriage. The final souvenir my five-year old daughter, Greta, bought in New York in the summer of 2011 was a snow globe that was taken from her at the security check because of the suspicion and threat regarding fluids in post-millennial travel. To a backdrop of tears and upset, I appealed to security who graciously escorted me back into the pre-check shopping centre whereupon I borrowed a screwdriver from a mobile phone shop and emptied the glittering water into a drinking fountain. Following such endorsed suspicious behaviour I was allowed through the check with a rather less magical and dry globe.
The space beyond the airport security check affords a new sense of license, of acceptance and yet if one changes flight enroute then any post-check liquids bought at JFK might well be lost as one returns to pre-accepted status. As one of the final excursions of this study, I have visited my family once more in Ukraine (I will discuss this in the final chapter). Returning, I took a bus across the border between Ukraine and Poland – essentially still the border of Europe and ‘the West’; this experience seems to necessitate at least two and a half hours of sitting still under bright lights in a huge covered transit area. Cases are unloaded, passports are taken, but the most important aspect simply appears to be a *holding* of the traveller and this is done twice; once by the Ukrainian border authority and once by the Polish. Auge’s spaces, as opposed to places as such, are in that transitional category of being passed through and constant change in this respect is result of constant human movement. City spaces are also transitory but occupation is repeated over a much longer and more familiar duree – people dwell in, work in and visit these places as more historically, culturally and architecturally defined, ancient with modern, than the new anthropology required by Auge’s non-places. Yet cities do have non-places in abundance.

Barber considers dichotomies of European cities in an extended essay that is a difficult blend of observation and poetry; difficult because the poetic expression has a tendency to obfuscate a repetition of the same basic issue of tension in the denial of the past by the present, stasis and transformation. However, amongst that predominantly subjective and dense text, Barber reveals how each of these cities ‘is ground into the ruins and detritus of the former’ and therefore in its
transformation still ‘carries the implication of its own flattening into shards of memory …’ (1995, p.23). On occasion this ruin is preserved and Barber considers the charred bombsites at the heart of Dresden, whilst I am put in mind of their relationship to ancient Rome – to what are these ruins a testament then in respect of a contemporary city? These spaces are frozen, no longer used (excepting Trajan’s market) and yet evidently visited, viewed, and considered as a testament to the past, whether as warning or example to the present as it forms the future, or then perhaps their event impact is of such intrinsic value that they become consecrated as emblems of themselves, metonyms of something momentous, index to proof of the fact that this really happened.

That places are subject to change is no revelation, but our identification of and with them as mapped environment, as iconic architectural environments and as metonyms of events or political attitude (Waterloo, Dresden, Palestine…), generates a perception of stasis or permanence as desirable. Since the Modernist project activists and artists have numerously agitated around issues of exclusivity and visibility in urban design in order to reveal the public

43 Dresden is a contemporary place but the name also stands with immediacy for the devastation of the thousand bomber raids that brought Germany to its knees and killed innocents with impunity. My Grandfather flew those raids.

44 To take Manifesta 3, a European biennial that I visited a year before the events of September 11, as an example, the artist Marjetica Potrc explored the illegal additions to architecture in poor urban areas where residents have attempted to increase their accommodation and considered many of these innovations as ‘insurgent citizenship’ in her resulting gallery sculptural dwellings (Zabel, 2000, pp.137-141). Gruppo A12 worked on a derelicted but historical bar in Ljubljana called SUMI – the space was shortly to make way for a new building, but for the moment would have its doors and windows removed and the inside cleansed with limemilk, in order that something negative becomes positive in its last reflective moment, inviting investigation freely (2000, pp.26-28). Roland Boden created Urban Shelter Units, pods for protection and personal expression, for public solitude and sanctuary (2000,
solitude of non-places and the unintended city; positively transformed spaces create negative spaces in adjacency, and in poorer economies workers occupy peripheral wastelands without address or right to basic utility. During the late 1970’s and throughout the 1980’s a workers’ organisation called Unnayan (meaning development in Bengali) in Kolkata (Calcutta) began to create maps of these marginal settlements around the city, with the political objective of providing formal visibility through the creation of addresses and assisting in the planning of water pumps and such basic services for these communities. The project expanded to include those living along railroads, major roads and drainage canals but was not completed, many of the maps being destroyed by flooding or stolen. But the Unintended City Project had a substantial social impact in establishing the issues of visibility and rights of unintended populations (who’s work, as Rickshaw drivers for example, was crucial to the mechanism of the city). Jai Sen, a member of Unnayan, reflects upon the power of maps in this regard and the critical importance of the dwelling or community within them:

Our home is [where] we establish … most of our social and economic relations. It is the place from which we claim two of our most basic political rights and freedoms: … to build community and so to exercise governance over our individual and collective lives; and our right as citizens to vote (and thereby participate in institutional governance) (Sen, 2008, p.23).

pp.46,47). Many other works considered the transformative urban environment and the invisibility of its less privileged occupants.
Sen continues then to expand this notion to both capitalist and socialist societies, since ‘those who do not have a specific place to live are grossly disprivileged and discriminated against; their ability to build power-to is greatly eroded; and they are made vulnerable to all exercise of power-over’ (2008, pp.23-24). Whilst the politic of power and license is clear, this is also of certain impact upon constructs of social identity and connects even to longevity because of the impact of stress caused by powerlessness. Without visibility or license to basic rights, a person is without a crucial recognition that is, as Hegel sees it, fundamental to a whole concept of Self both to slave or indeed master (Hegel, 2005). Kain observes that this is because even the self conscious being-for-itself ‘overlooks … that it needs the other to recognize in it the fact that it does not at all need the other’ (Kain, 2005, p.46).

Since cities are now so definitive in the way in which we globally demarcate politically, culturally and economically the work of artists, collectives and activists in considering issues of belonging, visibility and social licence in these environments is as crucial as ever, but also serves to illustrate their transitional nature. The artists of *Wrights and Sites* facilitate guided walks that reveal alternative perspectives on urban (and non-urban) places through the use of *Mythogeography*. In these projects what is not known about a space is elevated to an extent above the ‘official story’ for ‘resistant walkers, drifting groups and disrupted pedestrians’ (Smith, 2010, back cover). There is an intended

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45 Sir Michael Marmot’s research led directly to a reversal of the notion that stress related heart disease correlated with high powered positions and proved that it was low powered and underprivileged jobs and communities that suffered the highest mortality rate (*The Life Scientific*, 2011).

46 Stephen Hodge, Simon Persighetti, Phil Smith, Cathy Turner, Tony Weaver.
disruption of any experience that has been pre-designed in the planning or architecture of the environment and in this regard stasis as a given or didactic quality is resisted, whilst unplanned perspectives are revealed; this may be as small an issue as not following a street sign. The guides (such as *An Exeter Mis-Guide*, 2003 and *Mis-Guides to Anywhere*, 2006) suggested a series of instructional but liberally flexible parameters for re-looking at the city\(^{47}\), an approach that was extended by *The Lonely Planet Guide to Experimental Travel* in 2005. The approach is playful but gesturally of political and social significance in the manner in which it considers relational perceptions and temporality of places, using ‘the ‘drift’ to map and transgress the unmarked boundaries, slipping through them to find out about other people, other rhythms, other ways of being in the world’ (Hodge et al, 2006, p.61 fold-out).

*Wrights and Sites* offer constraints to reframe the manner in which places are experienced or the perspective by which they are commonly viewed, generating a reflective consideration of our normative relation to a given environment and an evaluation of the extent to which our experience is pre-designed, subject to assumption, influenced by *a posteriori* contexts. Mis-guides attempt in this way, to establish something more phenomenally in the present and that concerns the reality of occupying space rather than considering planned outcomes or published histories.

\(^{47}\) ‘At any point in this book, please interpret:

- ‘City’ as metropolis, town, village, hamlet, house, room, body, world, field, beach, etc. as appropriate to your location or ambition.
- ‘walk’ as journey, hop, skip, jump, negotiate on wheels, etc. as appropriate to your circumstances or mood.

our instructions and our use of the imperative as freely/rigidly as you wish – ‘drift’ from one page to another and beyond as you see fit’ (Hodge et al, 2006, p.61).
The mode of the ‘guide’ in this work considers that we all have our stories that are credibly sewn to locations, a myriad and infinite map of narratives that largely remain invisible beside the official tour. There are cartographic attempts to consider a multiplicity of lenses in the experience of a city space and a recent example, drawing its inspiration from Calvino’s *Invisible Cities*, is Rebecca Solnit’s complex atlas of San Francisco, *Infinite City* (2010). The title itself is testament to the endless perspectives of a place as it is personally mapped in the lives of its occupants and visitors and therein reflects a license of governance that hands territory to the inhabitants rather than to the single hand of local or national authority. Solnit is struck that ‘no two people live in the same city. Your current surroundings exist in relation to your other places …’ (2010, p.5). This is clear too in the breadth of maps within the atlas, many of which are dual in perspective: *Butterfly Habitats and Queer Public Spaces* (p.45), politically discursive: *Truth To Justice: Race and Justice in the City’s Heart* (p.36), empirically philosophical: *Who Am I Where?: A Map of Contingent Identities and Circumstantial Memories* (p.105), ecological: *Once and Future Waters: Nineteenth-Century Bodies of Water, Twenty-Second Century Shorelines* (p.150), socio-historic: *Four Hundred Years and Five Hundred Evictions*, or combinations of the above. These cartographies and their accompanying texts represent the primacy of perspective for their authors who ‘select, and a map is a selection of relevant data that arises from relevant desires and questions’ (p.9). A core principle of the book is the recognition by Solnit that all people contain maps in abundance and that places have an unwritten density that is written in the lives of those that arrive, stay and leave; that contained in these
passages are also the remnants of other places – ‘undocumented immigrants
who seem to trail behind them the paths they took from their homelands …’
(p.5).

Solnit’s trail is possibly most evident as cultural ephemera but is reminiscent of
the fragmentary material collected by Shaw, for *Entropic*, from the sixty-four
places derived from circles drawn with string and a pin on a cartographic
representation of the region surrounding his home. This was also an attempt to
find multiple perspectives, to seek new versions or maps of a place that he had
lived in for decades. These destinations, whilst selected according to the
parameters of these circles, retained the chance aspect of a *derive* inasmuch as
they dislocated the control of the author. For Shaw the locations, whilst
possibly actively inhabited, busy, abandoned or still, urban or non-urban, were
destinations for something portable and transient. There may have been a causal
link between the material and the location or the former may simply evidence a
passing archaeology of the history of the latter.

The Surrealist *deambulations*, originating with a Dadaist visit to a disused
Parisian church garden in April 1921 (that was referred to earlier), intended to
‘enter into contact with the unconscious part of the territory’ (Careri, 2005,
p.82) in accordance with Breton’s manifesto intention to connect the dreamed
with the real. For Shaw the issue of consciousness is relative to how closely one
looks beyond the identifying features of the place and so the material is more
representative of a brutal reality of that place in a state of flux than of any meta-
physical aspect. Shaw’s rejection of the romantic, like the Lettrist critique of
the Surrealist *deambulation*, is also present in the relinquishment of desire in a
destination; to *want* to go somewhere is also on some level connected to leisure,
to mythology and to imagined realities - the bourgeois qualities that Guy
Debord criticised in the Surrealist imposition of the dream upon the working,
problematised, dirty reality of an actual place: ‘Decrepit surrealism …
boredom is what they have got in common. The Situationists will execute the
judgement that contemporary leisure is pronouncing against itself’ (Debord

Whilst Shaw concentrates on the forensic, there has been a long established
Italian collective who concentrate on the mutability of space and place. *Stalker ON (Osservatorio Nomade)* was founded by a group of architecture students in
Rome in 1990. Despite this beginning, the collective operates loosely and has
involved members as diverse as dentists and physicists. It operates as a
collective focusing on the ‘meanspace’, that is to say a space that is marginal, at
the edge and between borders that might be national, regional, local or
translocational as between the urban and non-urban. These spaces might be
abandoned or in a state of transformation and vary from the context of urban
borders to national.

Stalker is interested in reinvesting these spaces:

to confront at once the apparently unsolvable contradictions of
salvaging through abandonment, of representation through sensorial
perception, of intervening within the unstable and mutable conditions of these areas (Stalker, 2002\textsuperscript{48}).

Here is quite a large influence from the Situationist International ideas (and therefore formerly the Lettrists) led by Guy Debord, particularly in the self-defeating contexts of mapping that which is unmappable (although the lack of Situationist critique literally on the subject of cartography surprises me, but then there is a level of tension between the static model provided by a map and the active mobility of the situation and this distance is only narrowed by a broader consideration of the process of cartography as embodied, and, as Solnit intends, as individually empowering, dense and multiple in perspective. This shift in intended power then seems more in tune with the Marxist root of Situationism that rejected the design of experience in capitalist urbanity). Having said so, the notion of the map is something that is dealt with quite unconventionally by the Stalker collective, which carefully avoids any prevention of a space’s process of becoming and therefore treats its record as a continuum. The work deals then with inhabiting the threshold state, or the negative space that through its lack or emptiness lends form to that which it borders.

There is something here of Rogoff’s notion of the point at which a space becomes a place, due to its cartographic recognition as territory, but Stalker recognizes, like Shaw, that places also decline and return to undefined spaces, wherein human detritus transmutes with the decay and growth of nature. Shaw

\textsuperscript{48} Website – no page: see references.
is acutely aware of the revolutionary politic at work here but regards the material from the perspective of a biologist, emphasizing the aspect of inevitability at the heart of what he views as an unavoidable process. Whilst this perspective might seem nihilistic in outlook, the Stalker collective also declares that it is this entropic return to something wild that reinvigorates social stagnation.

Stalker considers that the state of becoming inherent in spaces wherein ‘the metabolization of humanity's discarded scrap, or nature's detritus, produces a new horizon of unexplored territores, mutant and by default virgin’ is what makes them ‘actual’, meaning that this in some sense establishes an important and untouched authenticity that contains the quality of firstness (Stalker, 2002). This is linked by Stalker back to Foucault’s notion of the other that becomes other, and is at the core of Stalker’s interest in these locations as important sites for intervention.

The discarded quality of theses spaces, disconnected from the present, generates an apprehension that is dichotomized by natural fear of encounter and yet an adventurous will for discovery. Stalker ON considers that in this way there is a natural heightening of the senses in the phenomenal experience of place and that this enhanced state provides the conditions for viewing the mutation of these meanspaces. There is also an anarchic quality because the spaces have eschewed governance and in some cases, cartographic record. Mark Rappolt describes one of Stalker’s initial spaces in Rome being an abandoned parachute factory from the Second World War. Originally the space
could not be recorded on a map for reasons of defensive intelligence, but following the war its status as a non-place was never reversed. Developers sought to take advantage of this because of its legal distance from standard regulations of practice and began to build a shopping centre on the site. However, whilst building they struck an underground river that flooded the site and created a new lake that has since caused the return of wild-foul unseen in the area for many years (Rappolt, 2001). In Steven King’s recent novel, *11.22.63*, the protagonist, Jake, gets out of his car in the shopping area of a town called *Derry*, for which he feels an immediate dislike and distrust, and narrates that:

> I realized that the canal I’d seen must run directly beneath this peculiar sunken downtown, and I was standing on top of it. I could feel hidden water in my feet, thrumming the sidewalk. It was a vaguely unpleasant feeling, as if this little piece of the world had gone soft’ (2011, p.122).

In both the real and the interestingly similar fictional example there is a distrust in water; King’s character even considers its subterranean presence to have ‘softened’ that which clearly should be concrete and settled\(^{49}\) – motion contests stability, an image that I explored with the pulling of the model village on the Peddler’s cart in *Nightflight*, and again with the resetting of cities in *City Dell* whilst ‘Venetians’ nearby attempted to move water (see last chapter). I am again reminded of the intervention of fluid in my daughter’s snow globe at the JFK airport as a material beyond the control of the secure, the static, the stable,

\(^{49}\) King goes on to site a history of murders near stagnant, subterranean and sewer-ridden water in the town, until it is half destroyed by a flood some decades later (2011).
and the settled.

3.3 The Authenticity of Multiple Crossings

At the heart of Stalker’s consideration is something of transience – there is recognition that static constitutional ownership of territory or place cannot ultimately disturb the continuum that that space occupies. This is reflected in the notion of crossing territory (remember the per of ‘perform’ in chapter two), perhaps many times, in order to better understand not its physical characteristic as a cartographic constant, but more its mutability as being in the process of constant change. This is also seen as a positive aspect, certainly of cities, that through this process of mutability reclaim something inherently wild.

In respect of multiple crossings, the public walk (performance) of Nightflight, in October 2006, only constituted a single audience experience of territory that I had walked at night for the preceding two and a half years. Keindl and I had indeed walked that territory, in the most binary of circumstances, from t-shirt warmth to well below freezing, from full and bright moon to complete clouded blackness, from dry, hard ground to saturated mud. Each of these versions rendered the space and its constituent features differently and would have promoted a singular reading had I only experienced one of them – rain, mud, blackness, wind, wet grass, bent pine or breaking ice, blue-white snow, crunching, glittering rock, stillness, moonlit shadows. These differences extend to the manner in which the traveler might perceive the glow of a distant town or farmhouse, to the ‘flavour’ of the landscape, whether mythological, threatening, romantic, inviting, bleak or fertile. The final work occurred with a ‘hunters’
moon occasionally obscured by white cloud and a little wind. The ground was dry and visual distance clear. For most concerned this was a blessing, but I am less convinced.

My many crossings of that landscape and its routes, both by day and night, lay across one-another like tracings each recognisable only by Plato’s archetype that seems to cast their shadow and sit somewhere beyond their reality. But, as with Stalker, it is the multiple crossings that construct an understanding of the mutability rather than any single experience. That does not invalidate the public experience of Nightflight to any other extent though; the work considered the meanspace as something crossed, certainly, but crucially as a single and unreturnable departure and arrival, within which birth follows death rather than the reverse. Whilst there was a single crossing for this audience, the intensification of perception referred to by Stalker, was heightened by night, the absence of torchlight and, for the audience, the unknown. Like Stalker also, here was an attempt to stimulate something of transcendence through continuous movement, through a theatre of constant change, perceiving atemporal fragments throughout that vibrate agglomerated significance, memory and, as Stalker would assert, something of testimony. In Stalker’s manifesto words:

‘to intervene on a territory is not merely an act of planning but an act of creation, an attempt to assemble contradictions and transform them into poetic relationships: ultimately one is more attentive to modifying how space is perceived than the way space itself exists’ (Stalker, 2002).
During 2001 Glyn Davies-Marshall and I undertook a four-day residency in the preserved First World War trenches of Sanctuary Wood, Ypres with our collaboration being documented by photographer Peter Morton. Davies-Marshall and I had begun collaborating in Russia during 2000, and had become fascinated in the intertextual possibilities of our parallel concerns (I referred to this quality in our collaboration in chapter two).

For Davies-Marshall the trenches were, quite literally the space in which his great grandfather the sapper had suffered the awful fact of the Great War. For him there was also something to be understood about the Yorkshire mining community from this. He expressed to me a need to understand, through his practice, a crucial symbolic order that would unravel his relationship to his grandfather\(^50\). From my perspective the space began certainly as more representative of a meanspace – a borderzone that had changed hands and then back again, as territory will in war. I was also keenly aware of its resonances through my own heightened state; I wanted to receive something authentic and respond genuinely. But the term preservation is a key agitator to any notion of the genuine. This was a space that had been ‘kept’ the same since 1918 through the wish of the landowner that the territory returned to. As a result of this maintenance, the sapper tunnels were now concreted internally and we variously saw trenches being re-dug and sided. Meanwhile the trees had

\(^{50}\) I took from this that Davies-Marshall was referring to Lacan’s theory of Symbolic Order, particularly in his 1966 essay The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason Since Freud in Écrits: a Selection (2001) that considers, using an application of Freud’s Oedipus Complex, how a symbolic father, is a crucial mediator in the development and perspective of a child.
returned to break the sunshine with their shade, and only a few blasted dead trunks bore testament to the fact that this place had not been a wood at all during the height of the Somme, but rather a wasted, blast-ridden field of mud and turmoil. The only authenticity to our experience was in the present reality of the space and in some respects the attempt to maintain it had created a version less honest than geophysical shadows of trenches evident across the agricultural landscape of Belgium, now grassy and vague.

Sanctuary Wood, 2001

Sanctuary Wood certainly occupies the same space as it did, but as a place it is somewhat alike the old broom that has had six new heads and five new shafts. On our penultimate day we were driven as guests to a new archeological dig, in a field that was shortly to be developed. Our arrival was something of a disappointment, in an unremarkable, flat field close by industry. The field had been recently farmed and was certainly thick with heavy red clay-mud. We
were shown where mud had been excavated to reveal trench floors and the train tracks of a trench munitions wagon. I remember a growing unease that we might be about to encounter the remains of a soldier and I looked to my feet as a preparatory act of avoidance perhaps and entered that micro aspect of perception that I later intended to engender in the spectator within *A Wonderful Engine*:

Notebook entry, 27/06/01

*As I gazed at my boots, now caked in heavy clay-mud, fragments of this inferred presence grew distinct; bottle-glass, mess tins, bullet shells. Peter exclaimed in disgust and shock and held up some relic pinched between forefinger and thumb. Glyn and I nervously asked what this was; “the sole of a boot.” Silence – the three of us looked absurdly from one to another. ... No trace of discernable identity, a body blasted and fragmented. Struggling around this field of mud, Peter and I began to find more and more boot soles, hobnails attached. Footwear ... is the most personal of clothing. In a shoe is left the clearest imprint of the person, more telling than the fingerprint. From it we find statistics of height and weight, the physical traits of movement, and perhaps even some essence of personality. With a body one may say he is here, he is found – the wearers of these boots were present only in their absence. A lost sole for a lost soul.*
Everything that we had performed in the preserved trenches now seemed to fall into question in respect of that authenticity of response. We found many of bits of debris in that field, even an unexploded shell that our host Jacques joked we might take as a memento. I did take a boot sole, perhaps because of the impossibility of leaving it. On our return we almost missed the ferry, a fact that weighed much heavier on us than it should have. I slept with difficulty for a week and realised one morning that at the root of this disturbance was a sense of guilt, perhaps of taking the boot sole and with it a responsibility of sorts, or perhaps of standing in that space eighty years later. Standing in a place where others lay. Standing in trenches that are graves. I wonder also that my later work across hills is not in some sense a turning out of those trenches, still in the
presence of death, but an attempt to ascend at least above their entropy to a point of clarity wherefrom the fragments of past might be reconfigured in the choosing of a path. As we dropped then into that metaphoric death in the forests of Biscay and Clwyd so I might reflect this was my symbolic return, by foot, standing with guilt, to the graves of Sanctuary Wood.

Stalker ON refer to multiple crossings that form through their collision a maplike testament of experience that retains mutability. I realised that perhaps authenticity is marred by preservation in this testament, or perhaps that preservation by its nature attempts a stasis that will ultimately fail in the face of entropy. But then preservation of the sites of great atrocities or disasters serve as a social tool in understanding those events. I was much more convinced by the intactness of the Majdanek deathcamp near Lublin in Poland than by Sanctuary Wood. The site is in many respects as I expected, and a difficult experience, but it is often the unexpected that has the most impact:

Notebook entry, 01/08/2004

I came across a barracks [with shuttered windows] that clearly had no light in it other than that from the door. I entered and walked into the darkness. One thing that was difficult was the stifling heat in the barracks – I hadn’t drunk for an hour but could not imagine the conditions for prisoners. As my eyes adapted I became ware of a stifling, leathery and bad smell. I walked down what felt like a corridor and as I turned to look back at the door, I realized that the whole barrack was full of shoes, in ceiling-high cages along its length and
waist-high cages along the sides. I followed them into the pitch dark and, when I could see no more, put my fingers through the wide metal wire mesh, feeling leather. I couldn’t do this again. The smell became over-bearing, nauseating, and it was only at this point that I realised what the bad part was – feet. I walked very quickly out, but couldn’t shake the smell. I could smell it twenty minutes later in the wind across the field. In that heat, after sixty years you can still smell the feet of those dear people.

Shoes again. But this time also the corporeal fact of a human smell beside the massive absence left by their shoes and not so much a preservation as the fact
that a trace is left intact as a direct index to the testament of place, and its crossings. This is the cartography of the dispossessed and of the lost and exists as a gestalt of those multiple crossings rather than a map in representational format. Formally produced maps during wartime are either strategically concerned with territory and power, or propagandist tools: Newspaper’s of the two world wars often illustrated suggested gains with fragments of maps and bold, sweeping arrows assuring the reader of a positive momentum.

3.4 Maps and Power

Maps produce power, law and property and they also define who holds the privilege of rights and who does not. An early example of this is the Mappa Mundi, which was a 13th Century attempt to dispossess the pagan. Like Stalker ON or Debord, Umberto Eco considers the inadequacy and dishonesty of the map as a representation of something constant in his essay titled ‘The Impossibility of Drawing a Map of the Empire on a Scale of 1:1’, which appears to be a practical reflection upon Borges’ short parable On Exactitude of Science (2000)51, fictionally credited to Suarez Miranda in 1658 and concerns a cartographer’s art reaching a perfection of detail, with the ultimate power goal of representing the Empire on a scale of one to one. Eco considers the complicated paradoxes of such an achievement, such as the fact that it would need to record its own folded point of storage (which would be a vast plateau) but that if it depicted itself as folded this would be a misrepresentation of itself at the time of reading. In Borges’ parable the map is stored in a desert where, disused, it fragments and stray pieces are occupied by creatures and vagrants.

51 Eco sits on the International Scientific Committee of the J L Borges Centre.
Eco also points out that when unfolded it would shield the territory represented both from sunlight and from precipitation, thus altering the balance of ecology and once more rendering the map as unfaithful. Eco concludes three corollaries:

1. Every 1:1 map always reproduces the territory unfaithfully.

2. At the moment the map is realized, the Empire becomes irreproducible.

3. Every 1:1 map of the Empire decrees the end of the Empire as such and therefore is a map of the territory that is not an Empire’ (1998, p.93).

The scale of Eco’s imagined map is travesty but his point has more to do with extrapolating the inadequacy of a map in respect an actual representation, because ultimately that may not be its primary goal at all. Eco is more concerned with the map as a deed of territory, as an inventory of that which is owned, and so we are returned to Wood’s consideration of maps and power. Wood suggests that we read a map through at least ten cartographic coda. Five of these operate *intrasignificantly*, that is to say within the map as language (as opposed to extrasignificantly, outside the map, at ‘the level of myth’). (1992, p.111). I will discuss these throughout the following five subsections of the chapter.
3.4.1 Maps and Power: Iconography and Gender

Firstly ‘the iconic: ‘things’, ‘events’ with whose location the map is ‘enrapt’: places, data, systems – a code of invention’ (Rogoff, 2000, p.75). As an example my work, *Nightflight*, began at Moel y Arthur, crossed many tumuli and had at its crescendo the ruined tower of Moel Famau. Then there is the fact that the range constitutes a historio-political border in its own right. All these symbols and contexts merged with a contemporary relevance for the participant and their relationship to the map; these multiple texts of ancestry were crucial. At the iconic level, travelling along the Clwydian range might have illustrated its mythic resemblance to the backbone of a sleeping dragon, or indeed been a physico-historic realisation of a difficult border under Saxon management in post-Romano Britain.

Adversely, *A Wonderful Engine* replaced the linear routed hilltops with the occurrence of cities and a network of objects as index to human relationship to space, place, time, memory and travel. Herein, the code of invention was more arbitrarily subject to the culturo-political derivation of a viewer’s interpretation, as with Swift’s original text. In this too, though, and between the works, was a consideration of what might controversially be regarded as masculine and feminine modes of reading cartographic significance – A to B routing or network connectivity. It is rather a worn cliché to suggest that women are less able to read maps than their counterparts and certainly the undertone of gender superiority in this regard is completely rejected by any serious study. A more accurate statement is that women consider and decipher the representation of
space on a map in a different manner to their male counterparts and so the issue of reading becomes more a question of purpose. If a map is deployed, for example, in respect of the most direct journey from point A to point B, then this directional objective suits a cognitive approach that is associated with the male. But maps in themselves, as holistic structures of interconnection, are arguably more feminine in context and it is this awareness of breadth, connection and possibility that perhaps works against the notion of any single route. It might be argued that whilst the ‘point A to point B’ deployment, associated with the male, is singular, then the holistic quality and possibility of the map itself, as female, is plural. In her paper *A Map of Her Own*, Virginia Nazarea suggests that:

socialization embedded in a multidimensional space brings about an interpenetration of multiple factors that shape and structure the political ecology of cognition. Women, particularly those belonging to marginalized ethnic and socioeconomic groups, possess cognitive frameworks that combine greater attention to detail with a more holistic appreciation of interconnections than their counterparts. Sense of place is complex and persistent, a product of negotiation of history, power, memory, and identity in the perception of landscape.

(Nazarea, 1996\(^{52}\))

The point might be that women’s investment in the notion of a map is more enspaced than the linearity of simply navigating a route, and in this respect it is

\(^{52}\) Website – no page: see references.
simply a broadening of the definition of ‘reading’ that is required to dispel the myth that women can less well translate its representation to that which it represents. But this also further reveals the role of the map in producing place rather than just space, inasmuch as the connections between places define our claim to occupy them and these ‘connections’ were historically just as powerful in symbolic cartographic terms as physical, as any map of an empire would show. Maps intend to reveal themselves as networks of power and relativity, utilising gendered lenses to reveal intended contexts.

3.4.2 Maps and Power: Representation and Expectation

The second level of Wood’s reading is the ‘linguistic code – a code of names, of classifications, of ownership, of naming and assigning’ (Rogoff, 2000, p.65). Again this pulsates on our Ordnance Survey map of the Clwydian range, betwixt the history of the Anglo and the Welsh: the context of ancestral ownership is readily in the air. Therein lies the issue of border that *A Wonderful Engine* both transgresses and denies – it is rather difficult for the prostrate figure of a giant to avoid lying across territories and, so far as the Wigs’ government, were concerned, Swift’s giant was at this juncture an antagonist to Nationhood; the generational border crossings of ancestry saturate the notion of nationality with a more rhizomatic truth, and infer a multiplicity, therefore, that is not simply caught up in the dichotomic patterns of something resembling a family tree, or of the subject/object relationship of otherness, but is rather more complexly woven across multiple sources. Deleuze & Guattari borrow this term ‘rhizome’ from the plant world in order to illustrate a complex multiplicity in the description of a book, without any set beginning or end, unlike the root,
which runs in complex interconnection beneath the surface of the object. This also antagonises the metaphor of the tree and its roots because it denies singularity to the object, preferring something like the potato plant that is a multiplicity at its core (2004).

Thirdly there is the ‘Tectonic – the relation of things in space, scalar (number) or topological such as relational or three-dimensional’ (Rogoff, 2000, p.65). In respect of the map the Clwydian range is carefully delineated by the relative concentricity of lines. How steep is this landscape and how do we translate this by torchlight into an expectation for the body? The tectonic is the level at which we translate symbology as a physical expectation, as something that prepares the psychomotor. This is semiotic language as power-base at its best, for it is a preparation that to the uninitiated would appear as nothing less than divination - compasses are applied, numbers calculated. Physical expectations are concretised as a result. *A Wonderful Engine* on the other hand requires that we get down and close to establish any psychophysical state of proximity that translates cartographic representations back to human experience of what they might indicate. Intrinsically contained therein is the debate between forms of knowledge as empirical or rational; does our reading of the map require the transliteration of physical experience over the surface of its lines and symbols?

### 3.4.3 Maps and Power: *The Knowledge of Whitby Steps*

In 2009 I made a piece of work with long-time collaborator and co-writer, Robert Wilsmore; in *A Knowledge of Whitby Steps* I drag Wilsmore down all one hundred and ninety-nine steps from Whitby Abbey to the fish market on a
stormy morning, at the end of which the suit that he wears is ragged and worn through to the skin of his back. The work took inspiration from Raphael’s *The School at Athens*, which centrally depicts Plato and Aristotle, standing upon steps. Both hold books, whilst Plato gestures to the sky for the truth of knowledge (rational) and Aristotle to the ground for the truth of experience (empirical). We also had the opening page of *Winnie-the-Pooh* in mind, a scene in which Pooh is being dragged down the stairs by Christopher Robin and:

‘it is, as far as he knows, the only way of coming downstairs, but sometimes he feels that there really is another way, if only he could stop bumping for a moment and think of it’ (Milne, 1926, p.1)

The Knowledge of Whitby Steps was produced as a film, also with the insertion of still photographs and the photographer and filmmaker are visible in their work throughout. There is a gesture here toward the necessity of empirical knowledge in the viewer in order to translate and construct an embodied empathy with the physical experience of Wilsmore. This construction is haptic; we know the texture of sandstone, can feel the cold wetness of puddles, the bite of wind, the discomfort of hard stone as it impacts on bone in a seemingly endless endurance. The film is also subversive with the truth since the viewer watches an edited reconstruction of three different versions (one full pull from top to bottom, one half pull and a number of insert shots for detail; the audio track is laid across the whole for experiential fluidity and to promote continuity) – the question then is whether this ever happened as an entire
experience in actuality, or if our mediated reconstruction (mapping) of the work is a rational wolf in an empirical sheep’s clothing.

As a durational piece, *A Knowledge of Whitby Steps* may also be regarded from the perspective of the durative resistance of its layers of key material – flesh, fabric, stone and the document. Each of these resists time and space differently and, like *rock, paper, scissors*, any hierarchy of resistance is illusory; the steps are worn from the footfalls of the body and yet stone will break, cut and bruise the softness of flesh. Within those contexts exists the document – the worn steps, the scarred body or the photographs and films that we make in order to represent the event as a past for an unknown duration of the future. There is the possibility too that the map redresses these physical truths with something of an economy dependent upon its purpose. Like that illusory hierarchy of resistance, the dominance of materials is distorted by any given point of view.

![Stills from A Knowledge of Whitby Steps, 2009](image)
3.4.4 Maps and Power: Distortion

That the Mercator projection of the world as a map produces a disproportionate view has long being accepted, although its origins in 1569 intended to be an aid to navigators who needed to discern true compass directions, rather than one that primarily diminished the Southern Hemisphere in the assertion of power. Arno Peters produced a new ‘non-racist’ projection in 1973, which represented a fairer representation of relative space, depicting the proportional size of the third world more realistically. It certainly achieves this – in the Mercator, Greenland is relatively as large as Africa whereas in truth the latter has fourteen times more landmass. This was eloquently illustrated in an episode of the NBC television drama The West Wing (Someone’s Going to Emergency, Someone’s Going to Jail, 2003), wherein the White House is lobbied to legislate for a use of the Peters projection in geography education by the Organization of Cartographers for Social Equality. When asked why the distortion of the Mercator was a problem, the cartographers in this episode neatly answer that because in the West size has long been equated with power.

The Peters lobby has certainly been a powerful voice since the 1970’s and its chief cartographer, Hardaker, wrote that other projections are ‘the equivalent of peering at Europe and North America through a magnifying glass and then surveying the rest of the world through the wrong end of a telescope’ (Hardaker cited in Hall, 1992, pp.380,381). But both Mercator and Peters projections are rectangular projections and in this respect problematic – by correcting one
distortion another is inevitably created and thus projections are developed usually to suit an objective purpose or agenda (as with the Mercator's original intention for navigational accuracy in straight lines). In respect of cartography it is a mistake to confuse accuracy of representation with efficacy of use. The most well known criticism of Arno Peter’s projection came from Arthur Robinson whom referred to it as ‘wet, ragged, long winter underwear, hung out to dry’ (1985, pp. 103-111). Wood vilifies Robinson’s criticism for its aesthetic lent, but remarks that the Peters projection is also driven by politics rather than science. (1992, p.60). Meanwhile, whilst the UN backed the Peters projection, Robinson’s own projection, somewhat of an aesthetically driven compromise of distortions, was adopted by the National Geographic.

There is quite clearly then a crucial confrontation of efficacy and politics in the creation of the map, the accuracy of which is simply dependent upon its intended use; a map may provide an excellent navigational aid, whilst at the same time disproportionately inflating the size of Europe and America. As a symbolic representation, this matters because it is our sense of space that is affected. When I travelled by train from Delhi to Rishikesh, it took some ten hours, and from Rishikesh to Dharamsala by bus some fourteen hours. But if I view the distance comparatively on the Atlas with Britain, this makes no sense at all. I realise that my sense of space in India was certainly preconceived by my view of it on the Mercator and this is a good example – whilst reduced, Africa still seems a large continent, but on the Mercator India is really quite small when placed alongside the countries of Europe. Whatever its original
purpose, it is clear that Mercator’s projection was a great propagandist tool itself in the building and control of empire, because perception is so powerful.

3.4.5 Maps and Power: Time and Presentation

The fourth of Wood’s codes is the *temporal*. Whilst maps lose relevance as a matter of course, Wood observes that cartographers tend not to include aspects that will alter before the map can reach its audience, rendering it obsolete. But maps do not escape temporality, although they may seem to resist it by use of a macroscopic mode; like a time-lapse photograph, only the still objects are in focus. The map encodes time as well as space, invoking ‘a temporal code that empowers it to signify in the temporal dimension’. According to Wood the ‘map employs a code of *tense*, concerning its temporal *topology*, and a code of *duration*, which concerns its temporal scale’ (1992, p.126). In this context the tense refers to where the map indicatively points, whether past (a map of the Roman Empire in 120AD for example), present or even future if it deals in contexts of forecast.

In contemporary maps this notion of tense is not without topological anachronism, at the level of evolving politics or even where the new meets with and attempts to sit beside the old. Tense is certainly interpretive, both for the cartographer and the reader. Anachronism is a significant agitator when I attempt to use maps as a tool to reconcile my ancestry with my present in respect of a psychogeographic understanding of formative identity. I look for example at the 1895 edition of The Times Atlas, viewing several versions of Europe – the ethnographic map against the geographic – and find a surprisingly
contradictory set of representation. The Atlas was commissioned from a German cartographic company and the city of Lviv, presently in Ukraine, carries the Austro-Hungarian title of *Lemberg*. At that point it formed part of Galicia and was ethnically demarcated as Ruthene, which is to say Ukrainian. But Lviv had been subject to partition from Poland and was populated dominantly by Polish aristocracy, which is certainly the derivation of my name.

Prior to the twentieth century I discover a surprisingly complex and subjective cartographic identity than that which followed the subsequent carving up of Europe; Galician, Austria-Hungarian, Polish and Ruthene ethnicity all cross each other as a Venn diagram and the atlas is a powerful testament to Europe as a set of principalities and kingdoms in the absence of what we term as a country. Bauman’s assertion that people’s perception of an identity in Europe was not formed out of a particular sense of the national border resonates when one views the first edition of The Times Atlas. As for other continents, they are variously and colourfully portrayed from the European perspective of ‘possessions’, wherein nation is far more evident – British, Portuguese, French.

Returning to temporal coda, the *durative* aspect concerns something more scalar, wherein distance and time coincide rather like the charts at the back of a road map. Wood’s initial attempt to place the time of production against the time represented is problematic, but he follows this up with an interesting

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53 The sense of rooted difference in one city surprised me upon my final trip to Ukraine for this study – I travelled for the first time with a good but recent friend from there, Konstantin Medovnikov, whose background and education was particularly Russian in culture. Whilst there we celebrated his birthday and I met a good many of his friends from German, Jewish and Russian backgrounds, and with Vodka flowing, this was not without moments of discomfort for me around the Polish character of my name which was clearly debated in respect of their consideration of my ‘root’ in Lviv, despite my knowledge of my own family history!
exploration of the impact of personal experience on cartographic understanding through use of the term ‘closed traverse’ (1992, p.129). The closed traverse requires that the traveller return to a point of departure in order that they might reach that revelation of knowing where they are (and therefore indicatively where they have been). This was certainly part of the mechanism of Nightflight, insofar as the point of departure was also that of arrival. The audience were first transported on a bus journey, through darkness and seemingly endless lanes to their stepping off point, confounding their reference. After several hours of walking they then passed down through a dense forest to arrive at their original arrival place, but from a different perspective. The realisation was clearly a celebratory moment as people re-found themselves and I was aware that the constraint of time against distance and physical exhaustion were key factors in their experience of this landscape. From this point any map of the route would be informed by a physical memory.

I am struck that Stalker emphasises the importance of multiple crossings in forming the ‘map’ of testament, but does not regard the aspect of a closed traverse, perhaps because of an insistence on the mutable continuum of space. But this closure is a necessary aspect of understanding our own relativity, and narrowing the contradictory gap between the map, our reading and our experience of that which it represents. A key difficulty in map making has always been the time taken in its production is naturally relative to a loss of accuracy. Digitisation has revolutionised this aspect because of the constancy of updates and the ease with which alterations can occur. But it has also closed the distance between the represented and the real, with satellite images overlain
with cartographic coda, names, borders and suchlike. The in-car GPS also replaces our role as interpretant by supplying us not only with a temporally shifting version but also a vocal instructor. The perspective of the representation can be shifted to a virtual three dimensional environment in which the ‘correct’ route is boldly coloured and chosen by our instruction to prioritise time or distance against one another. We are then shown in parallel the remaining distance against speed and our present time against our estimated arrival time. It is tempting to enter into a competition with the device to close the gap, to beat its estimation, to know better. Having the GPS device is not just about finding the best route, but essentially about crossing space in the shortest time.

I am returned to the Mercator projection here because its temporal aspect is clear as a navigational device, but as I previously mentioned, I could only reconcile a cognitive appreciation of its distortion to physical reality through my experience of the train journey from Delhi to Rishikesh and a bus journey up to Dharamsala. I was aware of a constant rate of movement relative to journeys I have made in Britain, but also that each journey took well in excess of ten hours, a fact that was not commensurate with the distance as apparently represented by the map. The physical realisation was a shock that caused me to completely redress the timescale of my itinerary. I was also caused to refer far more closely to regional, rather than international cartography. I had resisted this simply because of the unfolded size and density of these beautiful documents.
Maps reflect time in respect of their specific purpose and the era of their production but, as wide and static representations, they also resist the quality of time as an unfolding chronology and its dominant representation is, unsurprisingly, linear. Grafton and Rosenberg elaborate:

‘addressing the problem of [visual] chronology …. means going back to the line, to understand its ubiquity, flexibility and force. In representations of time lines appear everywhere, in texts and images and devices’ (2010, p.13).

The line, then, as a linear representation of chronology, does have its own cartographic form in the timeline; this crucially concerns facts as opposed to the stories of history (2010, p.11) and follows order rather than theme. So far as constructions of identity are concerned the Curriculum Vitae is most often presented as a chronological timeline that heads into the past – dates tend to lend weight to achievement as they extend and punctuate the representational line of personal experience. The Curriculum Vitae is a cartographic, formal proposal of license to become validated by claims of relevant experience that are bonded by a chronology of dates. This attempt to convince, or perhaps less cynically to celebrate achievement has it’s parallel in historical documents, or artworks, such as the Bayeux Tapestry which publish a version of the ‘truth’ through the depiction of unfolding circumstance that we then take as fact since to disagree with any episode would fracture our ability to read beyond that point; the narrative is a syntagm with each moment proving the previous.
Another cartographic tool in the proposition of authenticity through time is the family tree. These timelines trace provenance back to its sturdy arboreal roots.

The last of the five of Wood’s coda is the Presentational and, like notions of form, this is more difficult to pin down as a closed perspective with edges. Presentation contains within it all of the aspects of iconography, representation and inferred temporality mentioned above, but as they are conceptually contained for a target audience or subject. Woods considers that ‘good’ maps position themselves to the left of oppositions in ‘discursive tone’ such as ‘soft/loud, even/dynamic, complacent/agitated, polite/aggressive, soothing/abrasive’ (1992, p.131), and I might certainly map these positions in relation to the performance works of this thesis and their intended relationship to an audience as an act of presentation; The Knowledge of Whitby Steps feels quite different in those terms to Nightflight, but both of these differ significantly to the proximities and form of the more linguistic works discussed in the next chapter.

The Presentational code, however is also subject to temporality as a durative document because the concepts and intentions at work concern or operate around a particular period or event, or at least are authored from the perspective of a particular position in time and space. The practice also orders, determines or represents time and duration differently for both participant/viewer and the performer. Nightflight had a clear and set timeframe for leaving, travelling and arriving of around four hours, but the day of the actual event saw me on those hills for eighteen hours without stop. Nevertheless, whilst the performance
worked in and out of some surreal and dreamlike imagery, the timeframe was here and now, not there and then; works of theatre often compress the representation of weeks, months or even years into two hours.

*A Wonderful Engine* gifted the aspect of duration to its viewer as a provocation of sorts since they were free to leave as quickly as they might, much as any gallery visitor could, but might also spend time voluntarily to investigate levels of detail at closer ranges – to move from observation to a more *emic* occupation. As a performer my experience was of nine hours and I find in such durations that the meditation on time alters the experience of it. *A Wonderful Engine* also playfully involved its audience in a crossing of continents in seconds, as they traversed representations of landscape in steps of several hundred scaled miles. *The Knowledge of Whitby Steps* reconstructs time in the film to the same length as that actually needed to pull Wilsmore down the steps, approximately twenty-five minutes, but this is gestural only. The film of the event might easily have been two minutes, whilst its filming took two days. The *Knowledge of Whitby Steps* reordered shots and action that had happened over those two days into an edited economy that seemed to run from start to finish. Sometimes the film inserts earlier shots or moments of action but these are made less visible as problems of continuity because the landscape of the action repeats itself anyway and the result appears to be (and only appears to be) a complete story that begins, takes twenty-five minutes and ends. *A Wonderful Engine*, also re-orders time but gives the freedom of its interpretation to the viewer. Objects that emanate on lines from the performers body lie within provinces of the space and each of these might refer to events within one’s
history, but this narrative is not constructed as a single journey, but rather that multiplicity or plurality of being that is more rhizomatically like the quality of the book described by Deleuze & Guattari (2004).

_Nightflight_ ordered time sequentially and as a reality of walking the route as a linear stretch of hills, and whilst, in darkness, this linearity was still framed by the sky and lights in towns and villages to either side. I now see the conflict between a dominant, possibly masculine, human tendency for the singularly linear as it resists the plurality of the enspaced. Returning to Grafton and Rosenbergs’ observation that the depiction of time is characterised by lines that appear everywhere (2010, p.13) and then considering the embodied emblem of age and experience being the line – lines in the face, scars, wrinkles of the skin, I am drawn back to the notion of the reader of this map and its concern with the future that is played out, as with the Curriculum Vitae, through a presentation or reading of the past. I was naturally drawn then, in practice, to consider the performance of palmistry.

### 3.5 My Daughter is Older Than Me.

Whilst this chapter has considered the crossing of territory beside memory and testament, it has also found, particularly through the examples of the Stalker collective’s manifesto, my discussion of Shaw’s _Entropic_ and _The Knowledge of Whitby Steps_ against a subsequent consideration of cartographic codes, that there is a necessary tension between what Wood describes as the synchronic aspect of a map, which belies its diachronic content. But the most temporal maps have to be those that we find ourselves engaged in making as we
relatively triangulate our lives and our spaces with our experienced events. These maps take stock of the past to assert our present in some way to attempt to secure a forecast of our future. In this sense we might suggest that quasi-occult ‘readings’ such as Tarot, astrology or palmistry, with their consideration of time, place and event and their rich employment of interpretive symbolism, are intimately cartographic.

As possibly the last of the Lessons in Language series of works that deal in containment, language and identity, My Daughter is Older Than Me re-enacts a significant conversation with my eldest daughter Freja. In some casual context of friendship my daughter learned palmistry with surprising detail and confidence because of an old book of general knowledge. At this point she gave me a reading that has fascinated me since and that I was keen to film for a gallery setting. She turns my hand palm upward and I am on some level already moved by the care taken – whilst loving, it is also infused with the emerging responsibility of a teenage child at the verge of young adulthood. This is a curious binary from the point of view of the father; a novel territory that I have to negotiate, somewhat against my own will, but the care that underpins her scrutiny of my hand also fills me with warmth and the pleasure of paternal love.

She begins with a tour around the different features and their use or reference in palmistry. Many of her initial statements are hardly remarkable; statements of the facts that we both know. But then she makes an observation is surprising for both of us; she announces that she is a good deal older than me. I suppose that she is joking initially but then she turns her own hand over and shows me the myriad criss-crossing of the pad beneath her thumb – she has many more than
me and explains that these represent the journey of past lives. I am impressed
by the confidence of her resolve.

When I took my father back to the Ukraine for the first time we stood in tears in
the childhood garden of his father. I felt that I was both father and son as I held
him. It is a little like this with my daughter as she confidently asserts that she is
the elder in respect of multiple lives.

We laugh at the irony, but she is careful to add that my hand is wise, the wisest
she has seen. I don’t miss the compensation of her words, her careful re-
establishment of our present relationship, even if the statement is doubtful.

She looks to my lifeline and says that it is long – she does after all have a
vested interest. She knowingly acknowledges that I have had two loves in life
and I am pleased with her acceptance that her mother was not my life partner.
She turns my hand to look at the small creases that run down the edge of the
hand at the base of the little finger; I will have four children. But again, she
already knows this. She is stating the known, rather than the foretold, but this is
a close performance of reading. Her observations are skilled inasmuch as they
establish the goalposts of our relationship as wrote on the hand of her father.

She is performing the dot to dot that defines the space which contains her and
my hand is the patrolled and maintained fence of a territory, of her territory.
But the image is not that of a territory of conflict, rather this is the boundary of
an agricultural landscape that is patrolled, assessed and reinforced when
damaged. Yet it is also unobtainable because whilst I would not presume to contradict the importance of such security, and aspire to create it, I am aware that my relationship to her as father, and hers to me as daughter are only one of those many versions of interdependent self that we both produce as voice, as status, as license, as performance.

But the cartography of this relationship is also resonant here – the notion of territory as a physical space is in reality secondary to the territory of human relationships. This is also a question of the physical presence and is therefore phenomenological in nature as opposed to purely psycho-historical; it uses narratives of memory but is far more concerned with the connective tissue of present relationships and a wish to ensure the future. The history of the landscape is not in question here, but its maintenance and relativity as a meta-space of belonging are.

Nazarea also reflects upon the importance of remembering…

... that sense of place which on the surface may be constraining (as in to be put in one’s place) is actually a major source of strength for the dominated or the marginalized. As Hubert Benoit (1955:66) remarked, “In refusing to accept limitations, man deprives himself of the impression of liberty which he feels when he is within accepted constraints” (Nazarea, 1996).

She then concludes that in investigating senses of place, we would do well to
examine the shifting boundaries of spatial cognition and ascertaining to what extent the shared is actually not shared, not only among our informants but also between our informants and ourselves.

Again, in this regard I find myself dichotomized by the attraction and benefit of belonging against its mirror state of exclusion. I am also drawn back once more to Bauman’s reflection that even prior to the second world war a census showed that many Polish villagers had little sense of themselves within a nation as such – their sense of belonging crucially concerned agriculture and local community (Bauman, 2004). In *Flight to Arras* Saint-Exupery bitterly laments the futility of French defense against the German invasion, reflecting that his country was one of agricultural concerns, not industry (De Saint-Exupery, 1942). In this too there is the inference that sensed space is local rather than national as such, and I might go as far to link the perceptual conflict of these versions of space to that of the universalists and the individualists at the core of the early modernist debate. Returning to gendered spaces once more though, there are also fascinating human psychologies in operation that concern thresholds of the interior and exterior, holistic spaces, spaces that are produced, spaces that emanate, that contain and expel. Our treatment and occupation of space is naturally formed as a relation of the corporeal fact of our bodies in relationship to other bodies, and its thresholds repeat our physical concerns for security, expulsion, containment, comfort, sex and inter-relation. But the thresholds are also temporal since we assign these relationships to event, epochs of territorial power and multiple crossings, by ourselves and by others. This psychophysical mirror is explicit in the discourse of artists such as Artaud, whose relationship
and distrust of his own body was rooted in deep suspicion of the ‘organs’ of social or ideological bodies such as Church and State.\(^{54}\)

Earlier I discussed Wood’s final intrasignificant code, ‘the presentational – the representation system for these codes, their embodiment in signs’ (Rogoff, 2000, p.65). In any map or system of representation through sign or symbol, the reader needs a key. In the real darkness of the Clwydians, this required a concentration that was in itself exhausting, but constituted the only way we might really understand a view from our space in between, as it were. To an extent this knowledge offended the mystery of the void that *Nightflight* ultimately offered its participant – a Zen realisation of emptiness and being that we rarely taste; a chance to lose oneself as a meditation on locating identity. In the constructed darkness of *A Wonderful Engine*, the audience were placed in the opposite position of trying to construct a real experience of place from representation. Perhaps though, both works operate at different points in the same cyclic translation of *a posteriori* knowledge to *a priori* representation and back again.

The crucial and colonial power of the cartographer is contained in the assertion of domain by representation and observation. By constraining Gulliver as a giant, Swift removes his ability to be colonial observer but refers to this prerogative by preventing the discovery of both his spectacles and spyglass. Instead the scrutiny passes to the hands of his observers. For them there is less evidence in what he might say than in what he might possess – like any court or

\(^{54}\) A further consideration of the body in its relationship to bodies of ideology will be discussed in chapter 4 in its discussion of acts of speech.
customs procedure, the forensic interpretation will be an indicative factor in assessing the validity of his statement.

At a point of struggle a group of archers release a flight of arrows into Gulliver’s left hand, an image fairly literally interpreted through my use of acupuncture. Retrospectively though there was a connection, that I earlier made, between these pin points in the myriad streams of the body, signposts, maps and the link between the physical and meta-physical planes of identity.

The left hand is also traditionally the hand employed in an act of palm reading and this introduces the human notion of a fated future or personal destiny. We are again drawn between the continuum of the rational and the empirical but not always in the manner that might be expected – modernist rationalism dictates that we are the masters of our own future and the notion of fate, whilst of some moral use, is without foundation in reality. But of course the Human Genome project of the last decade has reintroduced a level of fate as reality, in consideration genetic proclivities to disease, obesity, fertility or indeed giftedness. We can now have our genetic palms read.

Artaud also exemplifies concerns of the interiority of the body as they are transmitted, or indeed expelled into the social ether; for him this was a glottic link between the power of words and the waste of the body. He is also genetically resigned to what he considers to be an inevitable betrayal of his own body and organs. My daughter, Freja’s reading of the marks upon my hand is also a translation of the genetically defined detail of physical presence into
verbal narrative; I am manifested as part of her language, she is present as part of mine. She gives voice to shore up our relationship that, on the basic level of genes, is already assured.

The following chapter will broadly explore notions of giving voice, in performance, politics and social contexts of identity to consider the communication of the body in the projection of identity, connections between belonging, placeness and the license to speak and be heard.
Chapter 4 – Linguagraphic

In the previous chapter I considered a work of palmistry as my daughter attempted to consider me as a text and perhaps even as a location or meta-territory. This chapter follows by dealing primarily in acts of speech but also the role or politic of these acts in rights to social license\textsuperscript{55} and social visibility. In voicing I am aware that I produce my space aurally and additionally position myself accordingly, dependent on the content of that parole and my socially recognised right to utter it. I will also consider acts of silence, whether forced or chosen and the manner in which these perform or deny basic rights to speech. Throughout this discussion there will be an exploration of further performance works made by others and myself but which have an engagement with speech acts as fundamentally connective between matters of the body (physical being) and socio-political constructions of identity (ideological being).

Other than the immediate familial context, the language of human relationships is also diversely operable within the actual territory of its enactment, forming demi-territories with dialect, accent and local vocabulary (between family, cultural, regional and national belonging). Whilst extra-familial tribal distinctions such as these achieve (or are subject to) unity through singular governance (and in the past religion), the new plural and post-diasporic societies of our age face complex challenges of cultural interpretation that defy the naive assumption of any single linguistic reception. That is to say that what is uttered in the contemporary cultural politics of the developed world is more

\textsuperscript{55} By ‘license’ I refer to who can speak in any given context of communication.
subject to misinterpretation now than at any time in living memory and is also
more hybrid in respect of language, culture and representational community.
There are degrees by which such a sweeping statement might be true of course,
between the intercultural urbanity of a western city to the barriers of contested
communities such as in Israel and Palestine or even Belfast and the ideological
differences of States such as Iran and the United Kingdom.

4.1 Needing to Say

In a plural society the potential noise between the transmission and reception of
utterance is culturo-political and agendised; a gap in understanding opens with
a gulf relative to that gap between psycho-geographic loyalties (the spiritual
home perhaps) and the actual geographic or physical home, region or nation.
The overwhelming truth of utterance is that it contains what we want, what we
dee we need – need is the original truth of language and therein lies a
wealth of disagreement between the sayer and the listener, the applicant and the
respondent, the possessor and the dispossessed. But the use of the term need
here is inadequate and its causal relationship to utterance needs expanding,

\[56\] Rousseau disagrees with this to the extent that he see’s need as separating
people in the pursuit of livelihood. He considers that it is passion – whether in
love or disagreement – that is the core of the origin of language. But then
passion surely reflects need to the extent that something is asserted communally
or morally founded. I am surprised too that Rousseau’s 18th century essay does
not discuss law in respect of original social need (Herder & Rousseau, 1966).
The derivation of language is a need to communicate in order to benefit from
collaborative understanding that agrees upon strategies, procreation and basic
moral principles. Adversely it provides a non-violent platform for
disagreement, leadership and appeal, although for Gans, language is preceded
by communal violence that becomes a more sanctified or sacred repetition of
murder in sacrifice, to reach the peaceful aftermath (Gans, 1981). Morality
arrives through agreements in forms of security that best suit individual well-
being within a community and at the root of language therefore is a survival in
numbers rather than in isolation.
since it is really the sum of modes of lingual representation, illocutionary force, intentionality and satisfaction and is rarely opaquely represented in the direct parole of a speech act.

I have emphasized *illocutionary force* rather than *locutionary statement* following Austin’s definition that the former was an act *in* saying something rather than *of* saying something (1976). Whilst I agree with the definition, Austin’s approach is too polarised to suit this study – in respect of the *need* ‘beneath’ utterance, illocutionary force must exist along a spectrum of intentionality since things are rarely said in the absence of at least some purpose. To this degree, I will disregard locutionary acts and concentrate on the illocutionary element, however slight, of any live exchange. When a person speaks, so far as when they employ dialogic language, there is a primary objective for their communication to be received and this is never in the absence of need, at least in the context of an intention, since the act of speech itself projects perspective. Certainly the language used might obfuscate those needs as a result of a social politic leaving the receiver to decode what lies in the subtext. We tend to be less successful with the obfuscation of our paralanguage\(^57\) (Johnstone, 1985) and the physical or proximal self often discloses contradictions in utterance.

\(^{57}\) Para-language refers to the pitch, pace and tone of acts of speech – in a book that I loved as an undergraduate, Jonstone considers the scripted line ‘it’s cold in here’ and the myriad paralingual approaches that, dependent upon interpretation in both utterance and reception, shift the true intention of the phrase far from a literal definition of its wording; it might, for example, mean ‘it’s hot’ if uttered in irony (Johnstone, 1985).
For Searle, the basis of intention is contained within language as an *illocutionary act*, a term that he reformulates from Austin. Searle considers what intentionality is to language, but importantly here, he establishes that ‘language is derived from Intentionality and not conversely’ (1999, p.5). At this stage we should separate the issue of *illocutionary force* from a *propositional content* (1999, p.6), but perhaps for different reasons to Searle. The separation here is to clarify that when I refer need to language, I am specifically interested in the causal need to speak, to utter, rather than necessarily in the composition of a sentence because the content of a sentence is rather a different matter to one’s need to pronounce it. I might read the said sentence and it may have a propositional content, but that is in the absence of a dialogic frame between myself and it’s author; I am much more concerned in this study with the liveness of speech acts than language texts per se.

What both Austin and Searle don’t appear to achieve – a point picked up by Schechner (2002) – is a clarity between the uttered and the utterer in respect of illocutionary force between the fictional and the real. Certainly Searle discusses the suspension of satisfaction in the fictional, but there is no caveat of liveness. This is an important observation when considering auto-performance or interventionist artworks of my own such as *Rich Tea Conversations* (2008-10) as opposed to the theatricality of the obfuscated monologue in my work to camera, *Fizz Bomb* (2009) because whilst the former, a set of live conversations, intends to both handicap and encourage the pursuit of agreement in meaning, of seeing eye-to-eye as it were, the latter removes that right from the viewer who is not invested as participant, who is not present at the live
event, having its content mediated through a film, through a mask to the face, through a deliberate obfuscation of verbal language and through a chanted sermon of sorts.

Again, I return to the dialogic frame and the fast paced tennis match of illocutionary force so finely woven into a conversation. Searle breaks down intention further using the frame of a direction of fit, dependent on whether the speech act is assertive, directive or commissive (statements, orders or pledges respectively), because the former are intended to match the world whereas the latter two classes intend to bring about changes in the world to match the intention of the utterance (Searle, 1999). In this way, Searle considers the intentional state of what is uttered and the subsequent conditions of satisfaction. Whilst the primary frame of a dialogue is not necessarily competitive, insofar as there is a wish to explain, to or elicit agreement from, or draw information from a respondent, there is a corresponding scale of success or failure, which forms simultaneous adjustments throughout live communication and is dependent on that which the sayer wishes to represent.

Searle then further extrapolates the intentionality of actual language (words), which whilst interpretable form a whole object from the intentionality of the sayer, as an expressed state (1999). Again from a performative perspective, and particularly in respect of modes of Performance Art, the derivation of meaning in terms of these distinctions and in fact the gap between them is what leads fluidly to Barthes’ destination of meaning resting with an audience, rather than an author (Barthes, 1977). That is to say that if words imply something
intentional, and the act of speech implies an intentional state subject to conditions of satisfaction, then meaning as such is to be found in an interpretive consideration of the space between these two states of intentionality – literally and figuratively reading between the lines. In *Silence and Freedom*, Seidman considers that illocutionary intentionality forms the basis of human rights in respect of the confession since it is what defines the difference between information as voluntarily offered or information as extracted through extraneous forces such as torture (Seidman, 2007). There is no essential motivation for ‘truth’ in information offered because of a basic need to end pain since the victim may be primarily aiming to satisfy with words what the perpetrator wishes to hear. Without illocutionary authenticity the intentionality of actual words remains meaningless because it is forcibly severed from the conditions of satisfaction. The conditions in respect of torture purely seek a cessation of suffering and as such there is no meaning to be found in the gap between that which is said and that which is intended; there is a complete fracture between the content of what is said and what is needed from the subject’s perspective.

Under duress of torture or otherwise the sayer may experience failure to achieve an intended end with an act of speech – something that Austin refers to as ‘infelicities’ (1976, p.14), or perhaps even that the act is differently heard (interpreted); usual acts of speech often contain unintended euphemisms that are recognised by the sayer in the moment of utterance, followed swiftly by a sense of panic and a scramble to redress. The failure, or infelicity, here is that a particular act of parole has bypassed our own personal censor that screens...
language as appropriate to circumstance and company. We often silence our thoughts or bind them up in a language that skirts the discreet edges of our real intention or position, hoping to achieve our end with a minimum of conflict. In this regard we operate self-constraint.

Whilst Gulliver, in Swift’s second chapter, is not gagged there is an inextricable link between mind, body and speech in the context of constraint by others (to constrain is to remove license and therefore voice, as an emblem of self-representation). In a diasporic context, voice is vital in counteracting estrangement, in arrival to new circumstance, in the promotion of acceptance and in any negotiated continuance of culture that follows. To utter is to take license. When we produce sound meaningfully, as parole, we project ourselves into frontal space and request to be heard. One of the social imperatives of belonging is that the volume of what is said is relative in power to the number of people saying it, until such point as one is elevated to a symbolic or metonymic (or indeed synecdochal) level of representational power. Migration as a group is not so much safety in numbers as safety in collective voice, it is the export of collective cultural representation.

4.2 Elinguation.

You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney present during questioning. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed for you. Do you understand these rights? (Smith, 2007, p.12)\textsuperscript{58}

The Miranda warning, emerging from the Supreme Courts decision regarding Miranda versus Arizona in 1966, asserts that speech is an act of personal will that is unassailable in the context of that which constitutes the self. In this regard, having the right to remain silent is a legislated argument against the use of torture to bend that will, reinforced by the rights of the Fifth amendment in the United States because of its concentration on metaphysical freedoms (Dershowitz, 2008).

In his cultural history of ventriloquism, Connor writes that the act of speech overridingly says that ‘this voice is voice, or voicing itself. Listen, says a voice: some being is giving voice’ (2000, p.4). For Connor, voice is the projected license of Self inasmuch as the phenomenon depends upon external recognition. Beyond the direct inference of words, giving voice asserts a power of presence and confirms that our existence is not intrinsic but rather interdependent, an idea recurring in the Buddhist tradition. Therefore, the removal of voice is inversely significant as a way of manifesting invisibility and as such the removal of the tongue - elinguation, or glossectomy - has been a recurrent tool of assertive ideological containment from ancient times up until the present\textsuperscript{59}. In one of the earliest known legal constitutions, Hammurabi, the

\textsuperscript{58} There are many variations of the \textit{Miranda Warning}, approximating to this construction.

\textsuperscript{59} Mugabe attempted the silencing of his opposition, using violent personal attacks as a semiotic metonym to threaten opposition as a whole; the body of a key anti-Mugabe campaigner, Tonderai Ndira, was found in May 2008, two
Babylonian King of 1750bc, includes the cutting out of tongues for verbal crimes, such as defamation, and therefore urges that the populace takes great care with utterance:

If a son of a palace warder, or of a vowed woman, to the father that brought him up, and the mother that brought him up, has said ‘thou art not my father, thou art not my mother,’ one shall cut out his tongue (Hammurabi, 1903, loc.376\textsuperscript{60}).

Biblical translations variously translate Proverbs 10:31\textsuperscript{61}, the Standard English Version of which is ‘The mouth of the righteous brings forth wisdom, but the perverse tongue will be cut out’ (Metzger et al, 2006, p.625). There are various shifts through different Bible interpretations, from the literal promise of cutting it out to the rather more ambiguously dark threat of being ‘silenced’, in the Contemporary English version (American Bible Society, 1995, loc.22903\textsuperscript{60}). The inference of ‘wrong-speaking’ also shifts through the Standard, Contemporary, Wycliffe, American and King James versions from perverse, twisted and deceitful to fraudulent. A version that commonly appears includes the term ‘froward’ in place of perverse, the definition of which is obstinate, contrary or disobedient. This shifts the inference of the proverb away from deviant language to power, because it is explicitly suggestive of the patriarchal

\textsuperscript{60} The Kindle edition uses ‘location’ rather than page number.
\textsuperscript{61} Proverbs 10 constitute Solomon’s Wise Sayings.
requirement to obey or be thus punished; it no longer implies *aberro lingua* (abhorrent language) so much as disobedience.

The border-artist and performer Guillermo Gomez-Peña illustrates the relationship between ideologically deviant behaviour and the implication of punishment in a performance called *Trimming One’s Identity* wherein he slowly works his ears, nose and tongue between the blades of industrial steel scissors, opening and squeezing shut the blades around the flesh, leaving us to wince at the threshold of a self mutilation – by compacting both the crime with the punishment he holds a mirror to both, implicating them as complicit sides of a coin (*Trimming One’s Identity*, 2004).

In 675 AD, St Leger (or Leodegarius), the Bishop of Autun, had his eyes poked out, his lips cut off and his tongue cut out at the root, following a history of political difference to Ebroin, Mayor of Neustria. King Theoderic III had him executed four years later in 679, again on Ebroin’s orders. In the period following his torture, Leger, would have become as dependent as others had previously been on him. His mutilation was the physical means of the removal of all social license and power to both observe and to utter upon that which he observed.

In truth, elinguation has consistently occurred throughout history and is always applied as symbolically powerful as it is physically disabling. *IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Networks)*, part of the *UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*, has reported as part of an Iraq diary on one Muhanned
Sulaiman who had his tongue cut off by insurgents when he told them he did not want to work for them anymore.

Three strong men held me down and another opened my mouth and pulled out my tongue and in seconds they had cut it off ... I woke up hours later to find my wife beside me crying and then I realised that I couldn’t speak any more. (Irin, 2007, n.p)

Irving dichotomises the politic of silence through his self-mutilated Ellen Jamesians in *The World According To Garp* (Irving, 1998). These women, who self-commit glossectomies as a symbolic solidarity with the elinguated rape victim Ellen, attempt by their act to be heard:

“You mean this Ellen James Society goes around not talking,” Garp said, “as if they didn’t have any tongues?” “No, I mean they don’t have any tongues,” Jenny said. “People in the Ellen James Society have their tongues cut off. To protest what happened to Ellen James.” “Oh boy”, Garp said, looking at the large woman with renewed dislike. (1998, p.196)

But Irving’s portrayal of this group is hugely problematised by grotesquery and fundamentalism, leaving them and their cause ultimately socially ineffectual – their symbolic act epitomised the opposite of their legitimate claim to be heard, but the literality of their silence was unfortunately not overcome by its symbolism. For Seidman in his book *Silence & Freedom*, this is because
‘silence often connotes alienation,’ being ‘…always defined by what is lacking’ (2007, p.1). That silence only becomes meaningful when it is framed by the act of speech or indeed forms the spaces between acts of speech or individual words (2007, p.2). Without those spaces we have babble. Silence is a connective fabric.

Returning to the Contemporary English Bible translation of Proverbs 10:31, it is interesting to find that the subject is ‘silenced’ rather than the tongue cut out. This is the promise of a total loss of licence, rather than a mutilation and might be interpreted to reflect the civility of the modern age (no irony intended). Ideologically then, this takes far more account of the politics of social license, of having a say and is reflected in the strategies of post 9-11 Western governments in acts of rendition, internment and social segregation that, instead of removing body parts, remove the whole offending body into a space outside of the law. In this space the right to remain silent becomes meaningless (unheard).

4.3 Twice Rendered

In 2007 I sent a letter out to a group of people requesting that they form a Coalition Against Myself for a work that I would call Twice Rendered, with the objective of, at some time in the future, my complete removal for a period of time set by them. The intended the coalition to comprise of a number of artist collaborators whom I trusted to understand my intentions, having knowledge of my practice, but whom I also felt would be able to deal with an ethical waiver

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62 The letter to The Coalition is reproduced in appendix 3.
on my part (whilst I did not intend self-harm in the slightest I realised that I what I was asking of them would be physically and philosophically demanding).63

Twice Rendered as a work attempts to interiorise by containment in a first ‘rendition’ (or taking) as the body is involuntarily moved and held by the ‘audience’ coalition. There follows a subsequent attempt to exteriorise as the performer attempts a voluntary coalescent performance (or giving) with an objective of physical release.

In the first instance this was a work driven mostly by the politic of rendition at the time and in this respect intended to refer more to the question of will than to that of silence. But since silencing is the corollary of the removal of freedom I would discover its presence in the work as ultimately more crucial than the aspect of will. I was also struck by Agamen's ‘state of exception’, considering the law outside the law, as it were, in regard of human rights and the incidence of governments breaching laws that they themselves set, for some sort of urgency of the greater good. He refers to an ancient maxim often applied to justify this ‘in which necessitas legem non habet [necessity has no law]’ (Agamen, 2005, p.1). Agamen also begins his book with a short latin inscription, which refers to the morality of a choice to remain silent:

63 I initially wrote to five people, Robert Wilsmore, Walt Shaw, Peter Morton, Catherine Cullinane and Richard Molony, but the final coalition involved only two of these and a number of other people whom I had never met before, including Gemma Aldred and Nathan Walker.
**Quare siletis juristae in munare vestro?**

[Why are you jurists silent about that which concerns you?]

(2005, np.).

But I was interested too in the new US *Patriot Act* that essentially led to rendition and was seemingly also facilitated on occasion by the UK. According to Agamben, ‘Bush’s order … radically erases any legal status of the individual, thus producing a legally un-nameable and unclassifiable being’ (2005, p.3). The *Patriot Act* then supersedes not only international law such as the Geneva Convention, but also American laws in respect of the rights and status of those charged with a crime (2005, p.3). This is an uncanny realisation of themes that only twenty years previous had been examined as science fiction. In Philip K Dick’s *Flow My Tears, the Policeman Said*, first published in 1974, a figure of some celebrity wakes up in a hotel room to find himself stripped of these vestiges:

> I can’t live two hours without my ID, he said to himself. I don’t even dare walk out of the lobby of this rundown hotel and onto the public sidewalk. They’ll assume I’m a student or teacher escaped from one of the campuses. I’ll spend the rest of my life as a slave doing heavy manual labour [in a forced labour camp]. I am what they call an *unperson* (Dick, 2001, p.25).

As the character attempts to elicit underground help, he is consistently under surveillance. This theme of either the *unperson* or a distrust that we in anyway
control our lives is a constant in Dick’s repertoire (and reminds me of Artaud’s similar distrust). Butler extrapolates the political relativity portrayed in this example between the body and ideological control as she considers the affect of a governing State upon the physical state (2007).

Butler discusses Helen Arendt’s book *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1994) asserting that one weakness of Arendt’s arguments regarding the stateless, is that they are solely predicated on the statelessness of the exile or the refugee, both of which imply physical removal (2007, p.17). But there is a growing context of dispossession by state removal of the rights to belong, as feared in Dick’s vision of the near future back in the 1970s, which does not necessitate movement across a physical border. This exclusion is also an act of polity, of nation defining itself by collective requirements to be met in plurality. Exclusion defines inclusion and visa versa. *Lessons in Language*, as a series of interventionist works attempted to break the personal sense of plurality, to lever open gaps in this self-assured belonging. To dig around in contexts of any individual might in some sense dispossess them of who they consider that they are, revealing seed aspects of self that might be chosen for magnification, chosen as vehicles to travel away from *Stateness*. This journey is mainly on the level of the constructed self, notwithstanding the presence of the body of participant and performer.

To extrapolate in retrospect the contexts existing in my series of performances that are mostly clearly inferred in Butler’s main critique of Arendt (2007, p.17), the works by turn magnified and diminished corporeal placement in landscape.
They presented both rhizomatic and teleological narratives, perpetuating the premise of the physical terrain between or along borders, a no-man’s land, a space to be crossed and then again refuting its status as an ideological border. They attempted to export by movement, to illustrate a psycho-geographic gap, to create a space to be heard, to be told, to be patrolled, to be silenced and to remove by containment.

*Twice Rendered* then, tries to articulate the crucial link between the state of the body and the State, freedom and control, the interior and the exterior. As a work this is reminiscent of Blast Theory’s staged kidnappings in 1998, in a work called *Kidnap*, but in reality is quite a differently driven and realised piece. Blast Theory offered public kidnapping in a lottery disseminated through a nationwide cinema ‘blipvert’ in which people could apply to be taken. The application asked people to describe their fantasy abduction, whilst in reality they would be kept in a safe-house room for forty-eight hours. The work was one of the early attempts to explore webcam streams, with viewers able to watch and control the video cameras from centres in Manchester’s *Greenroom* and London’s *ICA*. Including surveillance and wanted posters, *Kidnap* was gamelike and explored the fantasy of being taken or being placed under surveillance. Prior to kidnappings the applicants were encouraged to try and spot the surveillance and given tips on how to do this. As with a good deal of Blast Theory’s this was participant-based and operated with strategies reminiscent of gameplay. I am struck by the qualities of *Kidnap* that place it so firmly prior to the 9/11 attacks, its positive framing of the fantasy of being
taken, of being surveilled, and wonder how differently it would be perceived and connotate as a proposal to participants in the public domain now.

*Twice Rendered* involves removal but attempts on the one hand to eschew the term kidnapping, in an exceptional effort (Agamben, 2005) to ideologically justify the efficacy/legality of its first rendition, whilst at the same time intending to give its subject (me) little choice in the carrying out of the second rendition. In the work there are no *safe words* and, beyond my initial set outline to a *Coalition Against Myself*, no control as the object of the rendition (as a work its object is not the viewer as participant or the taking of others, but rather myself since it attempts to interrogate the power and the role of others). The research and surveillance frame is over two years in length, long enough for any surveillance to become invisible to the point of my doubting its existence as a proposed work. The nature of that surveillance is also less immediate than it may have seemed in the 1990s, when we consider the amount of information available online in addition to mobile technology.

The work examines two versions of rendition: first, the recently politicised use of the term to justify the taking and flying subjects out of their own national jurisdiction to an unknown destination. The first reports of this type of abduction raised all sorts of questions regarding the abeyance of one sovereign territory to another, or rather the extent to which one might exist in pockets within another.\(^{64}\)

\(^{64}\) West Berlin constituted an unusually large example of a sovereign territory within another before the collapse of the Wall, reached via the corridor of a scrutinized autobahn. Embassies also operate as pockets of sovereign territory
Extraordinary Renditions by the US through British territory are preceded by an operation to abduct the subject, which extracts them from the sovereign rights of their own national territory. Whilst there is no example of a person been taken from British soil as such, rendition flights have been shown to land and refuel on British territory and renditions have involved British subjects. Sadie Gray reported for The Guardian newspaper on the case of Binyam Mohamed, the ‘… last British resident left in Guantánamo Bay [who] is suing the UK government for refusing to produce evidence that he was a victim of extraordinary rendition and torture’ (Gray, 2008).

The rendering here is done unto the subject, and the term is preceded by the validation of ‘extraordinary’ as if under any normal circumstances of course such an abduction would be illegal and out of the question, but tough times require tougher measures and so forth. Secondly, and once removed, the subject is required to perform another rendition in order to achieve safe return. This rendition follows the more traditionally performative connotations of the word, since it is executed to the satisfaction of its audience or, in this case, captors and might involve techniques as semantically removed from torture only as

and there are numerous incidents in the last sixty years of embassy sieges. Popular programmes such as HBO’s 24 attempt to discuss this with questions concerning the point at which it is justified to violently break that sovereign agreement, considering the consequences that ensue. Agamben’s state (2005) is never far from the narrative as both the fictional agency strategises outside of its own governments knowledge and the fictional anti-terrorism agent Jack Bauer justifies his own exceptions to the laws of the agency: these acts are always presented as exceptions for the greater good as it were.
‘rendition’ is from ‘abduction’; the subject is *encouraged* to admit, confess, inform, comply and, if they wish for liberty, convince. We are returned then, to those relative issues of speech or testament and need that I discussed earlier (Seidman, 2007).

The clear delineations between Blast Theory’s invitation and my own would seem to be those of consent, objective, action and visibility. Naturally my invitation is explicitly consensual insofar as it forms a coalition to carry out the rendition, but after this my only consent is to lose my consent. I form the terms of reference for my own state of exception. There is no safe word, no question of release until such time as *The Coalition* are satisfied that I have met the conditions that they have set for my rendition. Herein, they are not involved in a game of waiting for a third party to capitulate (ransom) but rather for the *rendee* to, transforming the abduction into that second active rendition by an act of need (which turns out to be a speech act). Finally, none of this is primarily visible to an audience beyond *The Coalition* – it is documented by the Coalition who then re-present it according to their own agenda. The only documents here are subversive, selective and mythologised – but then perhaps that is the case with all performance. It is their word against mine.

Beyond my control, the work took more than two years to unfold, as the Coalition shaped itself and planned its action, with two cancelled attempts after a year or so, and during this time my interest in its questions of removal developed with far more consideration of the notion of utterance or the right to speech. I was finally taken in May 2009, by which time I had really forgotten
my request, or at least decided that the Coalition had never managed to organise itself: it was a term of the initial letter that they would have no further contact with me. As a result the first two hours of the experience were truly frightening, a period during which I was instructed, with a bag on my head, to say nothing unless told to do so. I lay with my wrists strapped, on the floor of a van for nearly two hours, the adrenalin causing a curious narcolepsy that in itself led me to quite a surreal threshold state. I was aware in my silence of my captors’ silence – as least as parole. I began to read the language of proximity in their movement, of road surfaces, of materials such as rustling plastic. At one point I envisioned a knife being sharpened since one of them was, as it turned out, rolling their thumb over the cog of a lighter. I was delivered to a dark boarded up building with no electricity. I spent two days, a good part of which was alone, in absolute disconnection and a silence of my own. I heard my body, my coughing and generally if I spoke to myself it was as a whisper. For this reason the bulk of the documentation of this work exists as audio recordings, in which the pauses and listening are palpably index to my condition.

After my initial taking I was left in a room for some hours, still cuffed and hooded. A stranger to me removed the hood eventually, and I was given a digital recorder being told to record any thoughts or messages. In one of the early recordings I become fearful of a loud and repetitive banging, the imagined violence of which is offset by birdsong outside. I voice my concern and fear to myself, using my words as instructions to self in the process of maintaining

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65 See appendix 6 CD for sample recordings.
calm. Many of these early recordings are instructions to self\textsuperscript{66}. The recordings are placed into further context by a Cognitive Memory interview by Richard Etches, a behavioural psychologist, who measured the impact of the event on the form and function of my memory\textsuperscript{67}. The interview was not an intended document on my behalf but was commissioned by The Coalition. Some time after my release I was simply instructed to arrive at a given venue at a given time, where the interview was conducted. I am surprised in retrospect at the extent to which this has become an audio and linguistic project and this shift away from the visual in the primacy of memory codification is commented on by Etches who observes that it is:

\begin{quote}
‘reinforced by Simon’s comments that “Sound throughout the whole experience was heightened”. In combination with the emotion of the event, this seems to have led to a rich, vivid memory, lacking in visual information’ (Appendix 4, 2010, p.6).
\end{quote}

The shift in mode of utterance for my own voice occurs when I am interviewed during the experience for the first time. Having spent a long time in a windowless and clearly semi-derelict room, the door was abruptly opened and a woman entered whom I had not met before. She sat opposite me at a small table and with a severe neutrality introduced the fact that I was only to answer and not to ask any questions. I felt some difficulty in positioning need in this respect, but also discomfort at the forced intimacy of being confronted by a confident stranger.

\textsuperscript{66} See appendix 5, audio track 3
\textsuperscript{67} See appendix 4.
Etches’ analysis suggests that I have experienced trauma in this work, but then therein is the necessity to have created a state of exception for myself in which I consider the trauma as an essential vehicle to a certain reality in my short experience of being an unperson. I was terrified for the relatively short period of the primary rendition, an experience that also transported my physical and cognitive state to a different space. Etches ends his report by asking rhetorically why anyone would have this done to themselves, but I believe that the traumatic aspect reconstructs itself as a rich and empirically rewarding outcome and I am very thankful that my Coalition accepted my request to a state of ethical exception. I was certainly affected deeply, but the difference is that ultimately I also controlled the frame and recognised my own project after the initial five hours – as such I would reject Etches’ suggestion that this could prove to have a lifelong impact; despite the short period of genuine disturbance. I am the author and solicitor and remain comfortable with this work. I was on the road at Lockerbie when the plane hit; that has a lifelong impact.

This notion of controlled aesthetic trauma or suffering is not unusual in performance and I might suggest that it is even present in the choice to do a parachute jump, without any intention to undermine the power of the work on me which was certainly huge and extremely informative. But trauma that is chosen with known parameters differs wholly from that which is unbidden, since rights that are taken with permission are not really taken. I experienced something genuinely frightening in the taking, but was able to reflect upon this later in the context of a work that I had completely intended, without needing to
struggle to resolve an idea that in being taken, something had been taken from me.

4.4 Language, Ideology and Resistance

Twice Rendered realised itself an act of containment, which also set conditions around the terms by which I might communicate. But Language is itself a containment by ideological control of the means by which we interact, and its forms have, at least until recently, reflected geographical territories. It is also a key index to social belonging. As I discussed in the previous chapter, I have been recently fortunate to work in some depth with performers of the Basque Country, Euskal Herria that spans the border between France and Spain with its seven provinces. The Basques have long recognised that the definition of their ‘meta-nation’ is dependent upon language and theirs is the only pre-indoeuropean language still in operation on mainland Europe.

The Basque history of struggle for autonomy has numerous times been an engagement with laws that banned the public use of their language. Franco had ordered them to ‘speak Christian’ and it is only the post-Franco generation (from the mid-1980’s more accurately) that have enjoyed an open use and opportunity to learn their language. Up until that point young Basque Nationalists would whistle folk songs openly in front of the Spanish Guardia Civil, daring to think in Basque (Euskera), but not to utter it. But there is an important definition to be made here that separates Basque Nationalism from the sort of right wing politics that might be inferred in other western political movements engaged in a notion of nationhood.
The origin of Basque Nationalism under the difficult leadership of Sabino Arana Goiri (1865-1903), considered racial purity, as was the fashion of the late Victorian age, but its second incarnation did not. The Nationalists were carefully separated from the likes of ETA, but it was this separatist movement that redefined the notion of Basqueness without racism, concerning an *Euskaldun*. That is to say that racial stock became a non-issue beside the real definition of Basqueness: the ability to speak Basque, to be *Euskaldun* – a Basque speaker. This workable definition operated in the face of Franco’s attempt to populate the Basque Country with people originating from other parts of Spain. But it also redefines, through speech and against the silencing of a culture, the age-old Basque belief that Nation is not defined by the political borders, but by the cultural. In *The Basque History of the World*, Kurlansky writes about the new European notion of nations that maintain:

culture and identity while being economically linked and politically loyal to a larger state. Some 1,800 years ago the Basques told the Roman Empire that this was what they wanted. Four centuries ago, they told it to Ferdinand of Aragon. They have told it to Francois Mitterand and Felipe Gonzalez and King Juan Carlos (2000, p.351). 68

68 Mitterand renaged on promises to devolve central powers ‘consciously avoiding the development of separate regional political identities in a recognition of regional identities’ (Watson, 2003, p.397). Felipe Gonzales was the longest serving Prime Minister for Spain, between 1982 and 1996. Juan Carlos is the ruling King of Spain and was a supporter of Franko’s regime as a younger Prince. In all these contexts, Kurlansky’s use of the term ‘told’ certainly concerns both passive and aggressive acts of political resistance directed at the office of these key figures.
In the Basque Country today, at least in the Bilbao province of my experience, the use of Basque is healthily present once more, notwithstanding a whole generation of middle-aged Basques who do not speak it. I am reminded of the similar tensions of language in Wales; as I constructed *Nightflight* I would often drive past road signs that had been sprayed out and replaced with a the Welsh equivalent in language. In my visits to western Ukraine the tension between the speech of Polish, Russian and Ukrainian are clear, but there is a widespread dislike that Russian is the default language of commerce and therefore remains dominant. On my recent visit with Konstantin Medovnikov, he told me that my cousin Oleg speaks really Ukrainian. I was trying to tease out of him what he meant – was it an accent? The implication was that whilst speaking Ukrainian, the form and conjunction of words and sentences that he used also positioned him firmly as pro-Ukrainian politically; he used the language perhaps as a closed object of cultural derivation.

As a student I worked in Guernsey every summer and my Grandfather on my mother’s side had been from Jersey. He often dropped patois sayings into his jokes and sentences. This always fascinated me about the Channel Islands, British governed and yet culturally as in-between as they are geographically. More accurately perhaps that’s unfair since they are clearly closer to France in geography and closer to Britain in culture, however hybridity is culture in food, lifestyle and in language. In 1870 George Pulman writing under the colourful pseudonym of ‘John Trotendot’. 

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69 Writing under the colourful pseudonym of ‘John Trotendot’.
during the 1980s. He refers to the markets and therefore gesturally to a meeting place of culture and language:

The butchers dissect their French beef and English mutton in their own Jersey fashion… The Babel of tongues goes on. Here French - there English – copiously commingled with Jersey patois and with unmistakable Zummerset and Darset. And this is the scene a-mornings, but more particularly on Saturdays (Trotendot, 1870, pp.237-238).

The Channel Islanders enjoy a distinction of governance under their respective ‘bailiwick’ that is not unlike what the Basques request. The Basques have traditionally done this by having the King, or Spanish Heads of State, swear to respect their ‘foral law’ under the sacred Tree of Guernica (an Oak that stands outside the Basque Meeting House on the hillside of Guernica)\(^\text{70}\). In this request they recognise their own existence within a larger State, since ‘foral’ or the Spanish ‘fuero’ is of the same etymological root as ‘feudal’, but claim independence of culture and their right to exercise their own law as a region. In past centuries this was granted because of the strategic, geographical and economic importance of the Basques.

Returning to the issue of language, however, I am interested in the presence of patois in the Channel Islands because it is not something that can be easily outlawed; it is not a language of edges and rules. Mary Horlock’s character, the

\(^{70}\) A useful and concise description of the history and application of this ‘foral’ agreement can be found in Kurlansky’s *The Basque history of the World* (2000).
fifteen-year old Catherine Rozier, reflects humorously upon this in the novel *Book of Lies*:

> Only ye old people (and Dad) can speak Guernsey patois. It was spoken a lot during the German Occupation because *most* Germans couldn’t understand it ... It sounds a lot like someone speaking French badly without their front teeth (2011, p.27).

This is the use of language to obfuscate meaning then. At school I learnt a sort of ‘pig latin’, locally referred to as *Manchester Butcher’s Slang*, that we employed to hide meaning in our comments from teachers and peers. I will discuss my recent application of this in practice later, but for the moment wish to emphasise its use to exclude understanding in the resistance of power.

Using the standard constraints and parole of a language draws the user within the parameters of particular ideology (consider the inference of history and power present in Russian spoken in Ukraine). Artists have variously attempted to dislocate this control through a deployment of glossolalia, invoking social accusations of insanity and the enforced containment that follows. The clearest example is Artaud, who spent a decade in Parisian asylums, during the first half of which his glossalic chants were treated (punished?) with electric shock treatments that he grew to fear with all his being. I will return to this context in a number of the subsequent sections.

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71 I am given to understand that its derivation of use was similar to that of butchers who might discuss costs or otherwise without prying ears, but evidence is anecdotal.
I am drawn here to refer to the Chinese performance artist, Yang Zhichao. Yang’s work has broadly responded to the extent to which the body may be owned by the State or the broader society. He has considered himself in terms of unitary consumerism, branding himself with his identity number and had plants and objects surgically (im)planted on his back and body. Whilst those works consider the extent to which the body today might be farmed, modified or extended, the dichotomic space between State and society remains unresolved:

Historically, a body was a personal thing; when there was something wrong with a person’s heart or lung, we could only watch him becoming weaker and die. Today the nature of the body has changed completely and every part of the body can be replaced and rebuilt. It can now be connected to all productive system of society [sic] and therefore I am no longer the master of my own body, it actually belongs to the whole society (Yang, 2005, p.130).

Ethnically Chinese, but with his home province of Gansu in the Tibet autonomous region, Yang was struck by the contrasts between the super-urban modernity of life in cities such as Peking and the rural isolation of his background, seeing in this also the contrasts socio-economic, ethnographic and physical struggle. These themes of a location of his body with the social, the ideological, the technological and the agricultural have remained across a
diverse and extreme series of actions. In *Iron* (2000), the work in which he had himself branded:

‘by having the number of his passport burned into his back, Yang is presenting in visual form the confrontation of the public and the private, of industrial modernity and rural tradition. The pain suffered in facing this challenge or threat to one’s personal identity is here made openly visible’ (Münter, 2007).

I find myself most interested in the context of this discussion in his self imposed month locked up in mental hospital in the Gansu Province of China, entitled *Jaiyu Pass* (1999-2000), perhaps because of the additional contexts of constraint and silence. Yang wished to exploit the frightening ease with which a person could have another incarcerated whilst also connecting himself to social outcasts, therefore again illustrating contemporary socio-ideological complicities; all that was necessary was a relative’s statement and payment for the duration. Yang had himself admitted with the help of his sister and Berghuis describes him having immediately been ‘taken to a side room and given more than half an hour of electric shock therapy, followed by doses of sedatives leading the artist himself to believe that he was mentally unhinged’ (Berghuis, 2006,p.182). During the following month of incarceration he kept a diary and was secretly photographed during visits by his brother in law. But what is actually occurring here – does the work really operate as a social exposure, displaying something of taboo, or is there more of a collaborative masochism in Yang’s self imposition that meditatively connects the artist to a state akin to the
declaration of pain in other works. Certainly the duration is indicative, but so too is the containment and removal of a license to free expression. I might attempt to compare this to my performance of *Twice Rendered* but for Yang the institutional actors are unaware of the status of an artwork and as such there was nothing ‘collaborative’ in their treatment of him. *Twice Rendered* was a cold, uncomfortable experience in a semi derelict compound and in constant company of a very active rat. But its parameters were set and interpreted from my initial letter to the *Coalition Against Myself* who were always aware of the status of an artwork in our actions. Yang’s statement of concern for his own mental state during the experience relates to my initial panic and terror during my abrupt taking, but nevertheless leaves me to ponder as to whether there is any residue of trauma after the fact that lays beyond the control of intention for the artist in Yang’s work, since his experience was at the hands of the uninitiated.\(^72\)

The stricture of expulsion and containment is not unconnected though to the context of verbal utterance and language found in my own performances of this study and both articulate the crucial link between the body and the State, freedom and control, the interior and the exterior. For Artaud the conventional use of parole was directly indexed to social control and meta-physico-ideological constraint. The threshold locations of utterance such as mouth and

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\(^{72}\) The risk apparent in Yang’s work in its difficult relationship to ethics is evident in a body of Chinese Performance Art practice since the 1980s, but the practice that is perhaps the most difficult is that which Berghuis refers to as *Flesh Art* (2006, p.122), in which a number of artists deploy human flesh, body parts, limbs and foetus in various works. In *Honey (2\textsuperscript{nd} Edition)* Sun Yuan lay a foetus on the head of a man in a bed of ice (2006, p.123), but perhaps the most provocative and repulsive is the work entitled *Eating People* (2000) in which Zhu Yen appears to eat a fried, stillborn foetus (2006, pp.162-163).
anus were inextricable to Artaud since they both conveyed the inner to the outer and Artaud was quite capable of viewing language as defecation. Weiss illustrates this eloquently in his consideration of Artaud’s final recording of To Have Done with the Judgement of God, (1995, p.21-22), by considering the scatological themes of the work as they relate to the glottic use of ‘k’s particularly in Artaud’s glossalalia. A glottic iteration is drawn from a clutching of rectal muscles deep within the body and expelled as a forceful and basic verbal cry. An equal pressure is applied rectally for excretion. The link between the physical material waste of the body and a verbal utterance is clear, but so too is that between an interior and exterior existence, characterised in Artaud’s case by oppression and mirrored by his social dispossession, incarceration and the ‘treatment’ applied to his body.

What I find fascinating about glossolalia is that it depicts that noise, earlier mentioned, between what is transmitted and what is received. Paralanguage (pitch, pace and tone) is perhaps evident and passionate intent also; certain shapes and vocalic qualities also appear in the air like fragments of archeology that infer the whole, but we remain as listeners in dislocation. This is most clearly evident in Kurt Schwitters’ sound poem Ursonate (1922-32), the score for which covers some thirty pages and was developed from an early version over ten years. Schwitters was consistently concerned in this work with separating issues of parole from sounds that were universally applicable and therefore subject to a more primal recognition. This crucially separates the issue of paralanguage from specific language (English, French…) or dialect, because pitch, pace, tone and intonation are more transcendent (although not universally
so). In his consideration of the grain of the voice, Barthes separates the issues of language and paralanguage respectively as the *pheno-song* and the *geno-song* (terms borrowed from Julia Kristeva). The *geno-song* ‘is that apex (or that depth) of production where the melody really works at the language – not at what it says, but the voluptuousness of its sound-signifiers’ (1977, p.182).

4.5 Rich Tea Conversations.

My performance of a work called *Rich Tea Conversations* involves the digestion and vomiting of language, but also crucially creates a noise between the transmission and reception of it. *Rich Tea Conversations* undertakes a series of one to one interviews with voluntary audience participants. It is perhaps the clearest example in the praxis of a more traditionally ethnographic mode, since the conversations follow a prescribed trail of questions designed to reveal attitudes regarding migration, border crossings, identity and belonging. During
the conversation the audience follow the same rule as myself: that they may only speak with their mouth full of biscuit. Some is spat verbally, like the smoke that reveals a beam of light, to become the debris of consumption across the table. Still more is taken into the body to emerge as waste later, a memory of social interaction, not unlike Manzoni’s *Artist’s Shit* (1961), but immediately lost. Toward the end of the durational work (which is between 4 and 6 hours depending upon constraints of the venue), I have felt the urge to vomit into my galvanised bucket, whilst my conversee enthusiastically unfolds their identity. My duration is of course somewhat different to theirs – most of the conversations last around twenty-five minutes – and as such the wish to reach agreement and understanding in conversations slides in a scale according to my duration and sense of wellbeing. This can even depend upon the brand of Rich Tea biscuits, some of which have a much more noticeable residue of salt and some which cut the gums after repeated eating. After several hours the motivation to smile, to communicate and be interested in the respondents’ answers is more challenged by these things in addition to my tiredness as opposed to their enthusiastic energy. This is another form of ‘noise’ that is to be worked through then, as our embodied sense of comfort interrupts or engages a sense of fulfilment in conversation.

*Rich Tea Conversations* concerns the crumbs of cultural memory that gather around given constructs of communication. It follows the Artaudian thread by illustrating that such constructs veil our ability to genuinely locate self and other in any given dialogue. We project the identity of nation, of politic, of sexuality, of placeness in the very code of our dress, our physicality and
situatedness of any given communication. Artaud observed that who I am is barely revealed by the many versions of my public self; it takes an extraordinary circumstance for the constructed others of self to dissipate, a circumstance driven by pain, terror, displacement or amnesia. During the 1930’s Artaud wrote that a plague would impel ‘us to see ourselves as we are, making the masks fall and divulging our world’s lies, aimlessness, meanness, and even two-facedness, urging us to take a ‘more heroic stand in the face of destiny’ than we would otherwise have done (1995, p.22).

Ordinarily, however, behavioural protocols of social acceptance always apply; agreements by which we urbanely secure ourselves. The socially contrived ritual of taking tea asserts a respect for the conversee on one level, ensuring that certain taboo’s are not breached, whilst the act of speaking with a full mouth and of spraying our words at the other is both an assault and a deliberate breaching of the walls of social niceties. We spit with consent and this allows a quicker and warmer intimacy that short-circuits the need for polite acquaintance; the spitting, rather than offensive, is more of a food fight, a rebellious joy and solidarity. This space of immediate solidarity, like sex, employs the body in the establishment of a more intimate trust. It is an abject exchange both in respect of the fact that we shower one another with interiority but also therefore that we agree upon a revealing of Self in the absence of shame. This is still conversation and, from the perspective of my setting the parameters for the interaction, an interview. Fetterman considers the interview as the most crucial vehicle in the collecting of ethnographic data, reflecting that the experienced interviewer begins with:
… nontargeting questions deeply embedded in conversation before posing highly personal and potentially threatening questions and to develop a healthy rapport before introducing sensitive topics. Sensitivity to timing and to the participants tone is critical in interviewing – informal or otherwise (1998, p.39).

In many respects the immediate and emblematic breaking of social distance in this work, in addition to the pre-agreed context of a personal intervention, remove the need for a non-threatening gradual emersion into a state of trust. Whilst the work also gives as much space to the interviewee as possible in respect of personal narratives, it also reciprocates where there is an opportunity
of solidarity or even opposition; it is playfully and genuinely interested in its subject’s story. Whilst the work provides what has proved an effective shortcut to quite intimate and detailed discussions, it has also observed some ethnographic patterns in the type of questions employed from ‘grand tour’ (Fetterman, 1998, p.40) to specific, open and close-ended. The forty conversations have certainly shifted through intimate and dark contexts, but have always remained a thrillingly close space between strangers that have left me, without exception, so impressed by the rich, complexities of individual identities and yet also by their many contradictions. 

I am also struck by the vast majority of interviewees with border crossings in the last two generations, the majority of whom also have split psycho-geographical allegiances that importantly express the positioning of a personal perception of identity, either evolving, once removed or ancestrally cemented: a young man from Hull who, despite never having visited Ireland, powerfully asserts his description of self as Irish; the woman who is the daughter of a north African Muslim; an Irish Catholic Nun who resists nationality as perceives her ‘home’ as crucially mobile; and the Woman from Paris who unerringly describes herself as a ‘Londoner’. The conversations varied in live dissemination from venue to venue and as such were performed in various degrees of live mediation or amplification that shifted the aspect for viewer or listener. In all the performances, the participants were aware that our conversations, whilst intimately staged across a small table – in the centre of a

A good proportion of interviews from Rich Tea Conversation were recorded and two excerpts are included with permission and anonymity - see appendix 6 CD tracks 1 and 2 for sample.
gallery, in the corner of a jazz bar, as a conference exhibit, in an anechoic chamber within a club, in a business centre foyer – were publicly witnessed and subject to visual and aural documentation.

**4.6 Fizz Bomb**

Whilst we throw our language as verbal signifiers to the other, we also swallow our words and consume ourselves in the act of an intrapersonal communion: this is my body and this is my blood, and this is my spit and this is my shit. But memory is like this; we utter it in order that we might digest, define and redefine ourselves, locating identity, indexing belonging. It occurred to me that this speech to the self, this verbal confirmation for the self, might provide an excellent performative tool in the investigation of my notion of the home[land] and its difficult relation to the notional heart[land]. I wonder that even in the video statements of suicide-bombers there is a noticeable gap between the language employed (as in contemporary English) and the kind of grammatical structures in play (which can approach something ‘biblical’ in shape) and this ‘gap’ of itself is a key signifier of the dispossession of heart (psycho-geographic) from home (geographic) and the unfulfilled desire that grows in this interstice. It seems indicative that these speeches take the recognisable shape of a sermon that is more a testament to a religious rather than a political conviction; here is something of fire and brimstone. For Connor ‘the bad voice is … the self become other: the good voice is … the other become self’ (2000, p.32). How much more shocking it would be if such final proclamations were utterances of truly everyday unremarkable language, leaving the audience without religious signifiers in grammar or vocabulary, without sermon.
This raises the other useful social accusation, associated with glossolalia, which is of heretical possession or disembodiment. Connor discusses at length the origins and form of the Oracle at Delphi, but also interestingly raises the debate that hinged on whether a voice was produced through the body as possessed glottic medium or whether this interlocutor took license to translate and thus interpret what they heard. Typified in the Roman poems of Virgil and Lucan (later propagandised by the Christians), this is an important distinction if an ideology wants to control or indeed remove that person and practice; it is the difference between the actual voice of a god (or indeed a demon) through ecstatic, atavistic union (Connor, 2000, p.64) or the voice of human interpretation (or indeed heresy).

Heretical dispossession and the qualities of the sermon were certainly part of my exploration with a performance to camera, entitled *Fizz Bomb*. *Fizz Bomb* also manufactures that noise between transmission and reception and is adjacent as a work to *Rich Tea Conversations*, but if the latter attempted to find agreement through the warmth of a negotiated conversation, *Fizz Bomb* is more didactic, more one-sided, more fervently delivered and, as a film, without the possibility of a real-time interactive response.
Fizz Bomb depicts the image of a suicide bomber strapped and wired with sweets, chanting something apparently indecipherable. The camera wheels around the image, cutting in close detail of the figure. The sweets are labeled with explosive names – Fizzers, Wham, Blitz – and signify their acidity besides sugar. I am interested in the work in the metamorphosis of sugar to acid, as a metaphor for the journey from a position of childlike innocence to one of political and religious fundamentalism. I am also interested again in that Kantian relationship between the logic of the mind and the experience of the body that was a key driver of A Knowledge of Whitby Steps. But in this piece
there is an attempt, through the speech, to shift a dominant internal driver from mind to body. I wear a colourful balaclava and the eyes are the only signifier of imminence in action. The explosives are part poppers – this is an act of clowning. The speech, which begins as said and ends as screamed, is actually not glossolalic at all, despite its appearance – the work is in English and uses grammar correctly. What it applies to that speech is repetition and what in the school playground, I learnt as Manchester Butchers’ Slang (I referred to this earlier). This is also often referred to as ‘back-slang’ and emerged as a manner of covert conversation in bartering. The common form approximately reverses the spelling of words, but the form used in *Fizz Bomb* creates a repetition or extension of vowels.

Whilst not an overt aspect for my audience, I was interested in the local dialectic of this technique for obfuscating words and its relationship to an act of butchery, at least in name. This seems to me to comment neatly on the essential quality of insurgence as internal, as originating from within and in the performance it therefore negotiated territory both with the Artaudian wish for corporeal evisceration (Barber, 1993) and the act of speech. The speech also intended to combine qualities of the ‘brimstone’ absolutist Sermon that forges a resolve to act along with the repetitive objective of the chanted mantra to clear away doubt and displace self. An irony perhaps of these contexts is that the relinquishment of self is replaced by ideological interdependence – that is a connecting of the self to the broader ideal - and yet, as with Artaud, it is also a

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74 Deleuze and Guattari also discuss the notion of Artaud’s ‘body without organs’ in *A Thousand Plateaus*, considering multiplicity in the regeneration of desire in Artaud’s idea as dangerously similar to the consumptive proliferation of ‘money, army, police and State desire…’ (2004, p.183).
rejection of that same thing. Artaud also yearned for an evisceration of his organs, which is also the denial of significance or meaning.

The glossolalic link to the body is broadly explored by Weiss, and particularly in connection with Artaud’s scatological linking of the mouth to the sphincter, of speech to excrement, but perhaps more relevantly here of the deeper physical origins of something screamed to something said. *Fizz Bomb* essentially attempts to make this journey too; speech begins as a simmering repetition and steadily builds to something yelled. At the same time there is a lowering of the vocal source from the mouth to the body, as more oxygen and force is necessitated.

*Rich Tea Conversations* then is less didactic, creating noise between understanding and then attempting to negotiate that gap with agreement. This performance concerns the crumbs of cultural memory that gather around given constructs of communication. We project the identity of nation, of politic, of sexuality, of placeness in the very code of our dress, our physicality and situatedness of any given communication. My aim with this work was to verbally chase my respondent, revealing the genealogical gaps in their sense of rootedness and the contradictions of their personal geography.

But the cartography of this relationship is also resonant here – the notion of territory as a physical space is in reality secondary to the territory of human relationships. As my grandmother lay dying last summer I was called to her bedside, a journey of two hours, but missed her passing. As I came into the
hospital room it took but a second to realise that lateness. The room was full of
us – a family with its matriarch – and none had words to speak. I looked to her
but there is something unrecognisable in death, something crucial in our
reading of a person that has gone. I held her hand a while and kissed her
already cool cheek. But it was not her – there was too much weight here, and
she would not speak. And what was this silence composed of? We all stood
present as a product of her body. Our voices followed hers. We had been
caressed, advised, fed and scolded by her. She was always the instigator. What
was there now to say when she had been silenced? Our voices were damp
matches beside a fire that was out. The silence was only broken by the speech
of practicality – when would they take her body, who would do what? Little
moments, answered shortly with little voices. None of us had ever lived without
her voice, not even really my grandfather whose company she had closely
shared for seventy years.

4.7 Scream

Speech is first an act of desire, formed out of the unconscious, a wish to
consume. Barthes wrote that speech was essentially sexualised, either creating
attraction or repulsion, but what we most fear, he argues, is the neutral voice,
the white noise of which presents ‘a frozen voice, where desire is dead.’ Is this
why the style of my writing in a short one-act play, Camping, for example,
affects the dead-pan neutrality so removed from the scream of it’s death-camp
subject75. Whilst this may be true in retrospective consideration I had intended

75 For Camping script please refer to Appendix 5.
the style to draw an audience into a space like a trap that might only be sprung
days later, in a moment of reflection, or perhaps not at all.

In *Camping*, the mystery of a group of people waiting is only illustrated further
through a series of seemingly banal and pointless actions – counting, reading,
tying, caring, not-caring, queuing. The work intends to provide clues and
questions but could never presume to explain or literally narrate. All action,
seemingly so abstract, is transformed into a clear naturalism once a viewer
recognises the subject, but this might never occur; it is purely dependent upon
viewer interpretation. The work points in one respect at Beckett but intends that
he is viewed not as absurd, but as naturalist working at the extremes of
suffering. Works such as *Waiting for Godot* (1955), *Endgame* (1958) or
*Footfalls* (1976)\(^{76}\) contain the pacing, repetitious, haunted vacuum of
dispossession and infer that direct link between interiority and exteriority in
respect of space, body and politic, freedom and incarceration. They inflect the
same disease that so assailed Artaud but with the neutral frozen voice of terror
that is more objectively given – Beckett’s understanding of this is not indicative
that he subjectively lived his subject quite like Artaud, who was the
embodiment of his thesis, but certainly there is a shared cognition. Beckett’s
success is also Artaud’s failure in the respect of a recognition of the potentiality
of pretence – that my work *Camping* adopts a minimal neutrality of action is
also to minimalise the falsity of action as ‘acting’. In acting there can be no real
exhaustion, no real ‘bone, pure will, [and] scream’ (Barber, 1993, p.3). As
Artaud might have it, performers recognise their dishonesty and lift that lie to

\(^{76}\) Versions consulted in Beckett’s *Complete Dramatic Works* (1990).
the level of an intricately illustrated sham. Beckett knew this and played with it, creating travesty in some works (Endgame) and pure action in others (Quad).

There is a schism between the scream of Artaud’s theatrics and his genuine scream, which to an extent is ironically product of his own compartmentalised perception of forms, whether as enunciated, theatrical, written or visually depicted. Derrida considers this at length, remaining though still within the hegemony of a notion of ‘theatre’:

Speech and its notation – phonetic speech, an element of classical theatre – speech and its writing will be erased on the stage of cruelty only to the extent to which they were allegedly dictation: at once citations or recitations and orders (1978, p.239).

This returns to the earlier discussion of illocutionary force and Searle’s direction of fit in directive or commissive statements (1999), and is indicative of a distrust of words placed in the mouth by an author other than the sayer. Having said this, he recognises that through an analysis of forms that could not be included in Artaud’s manifesto for theatre, fidelity to these ideas in a contemporary sense is impossible anyway:

There is no theatre in the world today which fulfils Artaud’s desire. And there would be no exception to be made for the attempts made by Artaud himself. … The grammar of the theatre of cruelty… will always remain the inaccessible limit of a representation which is not
representation, of a re-presentation which is full presence … which does not repeat itself…a nonpresent (1978, pp.247-248)

But, as I observed, Derrida does appear to stay within the conventions of a staged work of theatre and I have witnessed many forms of presence, of testament, in performance art beyond those conventions that approach these aspirations more viscerally. Perhaps we need to step beyond something definitively theatrical, either as event, space or action, in order to realise something truly of Artaud’s scream.

Weiss observes that Artaud abandons in many respects the glossalalia of speech in his final work for radio and that the screams are somewhat less than screams and more the theatrical representation of them (1995). Artaud still ultimately failed to place the truth of himself before the audience because of the construct of a theatrical space that inferred, or interlocuted, something poetically acted rather than done. Whereas Beckett chose acting, perhaps Artaud would have been better to choose doing, although naturally the birth of performance art as a phenomenal category of work would require his death in its own forging, notwithstanding previous works that might be included by retrospect under such a heading. Herein, though, lies a great struggle of interiority in Artaud’s production of work; he invokes fragmentation through incantatory rites of repetition but is consistently returned to narrative devices in order that such ideals are communicated. I doubt that any of the performers recruited for such works as The Cenci would or could have understood the true nature of Artaud’s performative demands, returning always to the paradigms of acting and the
stage and therefore continuing to dislocate Artaud’s desire for something of original and *genuine* identity.
Chapter 5: Auto/Bio/Graphic

The previous chapter’s concluding consideration of Artaud returns the thesis to its origin in the need for a discourse of practice that extrapolates, examines and expresses a feeling of essential isolation that is relative; this is a study of auto-performance primarily, but one based in the belief that such practice has something useful to say in a broader social and contemporary context. In my introduction, I referred to Bakhtin using Holquist’s reading (Holquist, 1997) to expose the problems of I as an active pronoun that is never observable in the same manner as other. Bakhtin reinforces Hegel’s examination of the need for recognition, because in recognition of Self by the other, I find an observable mirror to my presence, confirm my visibility and enter the dialogic space (1997). Whilst the thesis returns at this point to Self, this is not an examination of the performance of solipsism but rather of the relative space of the I that only exists because of the other and, returning to per, of the crossing (performing) of space that is essentially dialogic, to be experienced and to be observed. This chapter arrives, then, at the crucial context of the autobiographic wherein the themes of the study are resolved as constructed (written) in the home (body) of the Self.

5.1 The First Person, the Person First

According to Hegel’s Idealism, the key to the avoidance of solipsism regarding the Self is to be found in the notion of the Other. There is a dependency, even for the dictator, upon the other for recognition and ‘I am only a self consciousness for another’, and therefore without the other I don’t exist since
‘the other is part of my essence.’ (Kain, 2005, p.44). Having said so, self-consciousness takes itself to be the object of significance and in considering Hegel, Kain also begins with the assertion that everything is perceptually the object of that self-consciousness, categorising this either as the inanimate object or other human beings. A basic conflict of interest then arises out of the fact that others, as an object for any self-consciousness, might only claim to be self-conscious themselves. Yet, as I have said, there is conversely a need to be recognised by others in order to assert their object relationship to a consciousness of the Self and in so doing the Other has also to be recognised. Therefore there is a conflict between any claim of consciousness as discreet, autonomous or independent, so how can heteronomy be denied? Kain suggests that we have to deny that consciousness is to be understood as individual since ‘… this then forces the view that self-consciousness is contained within a broader spiritual or cultural unity’ (2005, p.44), or a unified consciousness.

In his reading of Hegel with Kant, Kain discusses this issue of recognition of the Other in respect of power. In order to confirm the subject status of others, the quickest approach would appear to lie in tactics that make them irrelevant or inessential (master/slave), but because of our dependency for recognition this negates our own essence. Therefore, in depending upon recognition for our own sense of authenticity, recognition of others is prerequisite and in particular those with power or importance. This dangerously implicates the social politics of otherness both in the recognition of power and its subordination of those without license. But I am also reminded of Allen Moore’s excellent article dealing with questions of the authentic in respect of popular music. After an
investigation that discusses authenticity as something ascribed to its subject either because they represent original experience (First person: Blues player from the Mississippi Delta), or because they have ‘earned’ the right (Third person: Eric Clapton), Moore concludes that this assignation is also a positioning of the self for recognition by others (Second person), requesting and hoping for assignation through a positioning of self beside material tastes and interests (Moore, 2002). I co-authored a chapter concerning this with Wilsmore, whom I had pulled down the steps at Whitby (The Knowledge of Whitby Steps, 2009):

Moore (2002) considers that there is a version of authenticity that exists despite any qualitative aural experience ascribed by the listener to the musician. He begins and ends his article with a consideration of who is being authenticated; he arrives at this idea of a second person authenticity that asserts the truth of experience for the listener, that no matter what their maturity and no matter what the apparent depths (or lack) of accomplishment in the music, theirs is a real experience (Piasecki & Wilsmore, 2011).

In the conversation that forms our chapter, I was interested in the correlation of my emerging tastes as a young teenager with the advent of my first independent travel (at least in the absence of my parents) and the need for recognition by others (peers and my brother). It is an easy economy to suggest that I began to assert something unexpected in my sense of identity during the school exchanges of childhood. From age twelve I persevered annually with an
exchange system to Germany and felt a growing loyalty or belonging to something qualitatively ‘European’. I described myself as a European with little personal tension and hoped for an assignation as such, especially whilst in Germany. This was certainly connected to a wish to escape the claustrophobia of a small midlands town in recession, but also to gain an unquestionable aspect of authenticity in respect of my elder brother who had not travelled. I desired in that combat what Kain interprets as a Hegelian negation of the other by itself. That is to say that through my unquestionable and original experience of the school exchange, my brother (in this case the Other) submits to a recognition of me and denies himself – hence the impossibility of my own negation is circumvented by his negation of himself as excluded from the experience. This victory raises my importance in the family, with him, with our peers with the hope that these others desire to be recognised by me (Kain, 2005, p.50). That was the plan, at least.

Since that example returns myself, in this discussion of Moore’s Second Person authenticity also to travel and the condition of brothers, I am drawn back once again to Carreri’s discussion of Cain and Able (2005) as a Hegelian dialectic between movement and stasis, between Subjective Idealism (Master) and Objective Idealism (Slave) and, in slightly Marxist terms, between the use or display of objects and the application or luxury of ideas. Certainly, the (positive) relationship between my brother and I has always been one of conflicting regard for the physical and philosophical dimensions of work, of being pour-soi (Sartre, 1969), and of regard for geographies of home and abroad (therefore indeed also of the Other). But a suggestion that an element of
my psyche recognised the other in my-Self is too easily sentimental or romantic. I am certainly prone to sentimentality regarding an understanding of my own identity, not least because the pivotal figure of my grandfather – the refugee airman – died following an air-crash on a hillside, in the mythology of a past before my past. This sentimentality is certainly instantiated by the fact of his death before my birth although I could not claim that this results from a mythology grown out of family retellings. In fact detail of the death was never known to anyone but my paternal grandmother who did not relate it in her lifetime; the detail was discovered first through a military history given to me by another veteran, Stainslaw Piasecki (no relation) and later in Ministry of Defence documents.

I also discovered a narrative of the air crash in David Earl’s rather sensationally titled *Hell on High Ground Volume 2* (Earl, 1999, p.120), but the most interesting description concerns the aftermath and is in the Manx Aviation and Military Museum. This is the account of a small boy living on the Isle of Man in the 1940’s, who explored the flight deck of the wreck as it waited in Douglas, while the work detail took lunch after the recovery. He found my grandfather’s cap badge under the pilot’s seat and years later he gave his treasure to the museum, who still have it in a small display. A student of mine from the island then photographed the exhibit for me. The story gave me a narratival context of the aftermath that certainly valorises my sense of something that in truth was a pointless accident after two full tours of duty in thousand bomber raids over Europe. The story sounds filmic and makes it very difficult to access anything of the reality. I understand the actions of child of
course but must remind myself that this was no more romantic than a fatal car wreck.

My work on the hills in Nightflight (2006) and in the studio for A Wonderful Engine (2005) have most certainly served in some ways as a personal extrapolation of what that death on the mountain meant. In the context of an event I suppose it meant nothing; it simply happened. Meaning and event have no correlation in terms of nature, but that we philosophically question and infer is both causal in our suffering and an aspect of our claimed difference to other animals. Having murdered Abel, Cain was dichotomised in the narrative by a punishment of nomadism and therefore of philosophically pondering his actions. Once he had physically extinguished his brother, he could no longer be able to negate him and through this daily recognition of that Other shifted away from solipsism rather than toward it. In this manner the tensions between Hegel’s Subjective and Objective Idealisms of the self-conscious are activated (or perhaps even unified in the state of becoming), by movement and landscape.

5.2 Auto

There is no I without Other then and in death the former crosses into the latter. In respect of its origins the term ‘auto’ derives from ‘self’ or ‘same’ and in Greek can be used as a prefix to refer to the person themselves (Skeat, 2005): ‘Autosimon’ – ‘Simon himself’. The opposite of this prefix is to be found in ‘allo’, which directly refers to the Other: an ‘allograph’ is writing by another. I am particularly interested in the reference to the ‘same’ in the etymological definition of ‘auto’ though. The same as what? If one is to be found as the same
as oneself – *the one and the same* – then this appears to be a form of repetition that Derrida asserts as repulsive to Artaud (1978). Following Hegel’s examination of recognition and Bakhtin’s impossibility of an *I* without an *Other*, then *one and the same* can indeed only describe the *auto* as relative to the presence of the *allo*. Artaud’s aspiration was for authenticity, a word beginning with the same prefix and predicated phenomenally on firstness. But, considering the complexities of experience that inform identity, what is then authentic? I explore this mechanistically through Moore (above), but could now add that authenticity seems bound to the notion of origin, or originality and as such to the notion of a *beginning*. A thesis or works of performance may claim originality in their construction and insight (I intend no facetiousness here) but in substance they necessarily depend on something that has gone before, those complexities of experience and evidence that are both secondary and primary.

My interest in Performance Art certainly connects to a feeling that it dissembles less through *doing*, which is at least one re-presentation short of *acting*. But this does not necessarily draw us closer to authenticity in *beginning* than the level of pretence. As I pulled Wilsmore down the steps at Whitby (*The Knowledge of Whitby Steps*, 2009), we were aware that we would obfuscate the authentic action through a mediated version – a re-construction via video and stills. Films are generally filmed for located economy rather than order; the narratival beginning is not in fact the beginning. In our reality we certainly *did* rather than *pretended* to do - Wilsmore’s badly damaged suit is some testament to that - and yet we possibly deliberately lie about beginnings and wholeness; we depict one complete pull from the Abbey down to the fish market, but our reality was
at least three pulls over two days of shooting - one full, two halves and then numerous sections for close-up and insert shots. In exhibition we place our suits beside the film, as further documents that seem to phenomenally present the body by its absence and by the clear damage to the one suit. The viewer triangulates experience of cold hard stone with the film and with the artefact to reconstruct a sense of authenticity that is actually really allëotic\textsuperscript{77} in quality. But an audience reading is authentic in and of itself and to an extent arguably complicit – it occurs from the position of the Self in sympathy with the Other through an idea (political), or in empathy with the Other in some projected recognition of embodied experience (‘that must hurt’).

5.3 Bio

Considered initially, the issue of embodiment seems phenomenally in the present but as the vessel of experience I find the aspect of the body difficult to consider without temporal coda of duration and of history, particularly as the thesis shifts throughout between contexts of identity as it shifts between mind and body. This takes me back to my teaching of Stanislavskian theory some fifteen years ago and in particular to his notion of a psycho-technique that filters physical behaviour with contexts of history. His approach, whilst locked into the acting of the proscenium stage, interests me with its emphasis on causality (Stansilavsky, 1964). I spent a week working with Deborah Hay who also passes the physical through a filter but attempts to disconnect the body

\textsuperscript{77} Allëotic – alternative, other, but nowadays more commonly used as ‘alterative’ in medicine meaning to bring about change in constitution. I use the word a little provocatively, having wanted to construct my own term in allëtic, but also as more closely linked to the ancient Greek. My definition is taken from \textit{The Complete Oxford English Dictionary} (Simpson & Weiner, 1993).
from its known repertory of movement. The filter, or net is not event based but rather more of a particular quality: She asks me to perform some vocabulary of movement that I am struggling with, through the net of a ‘dog’. Surprised, I add this idea as a visual concept and allow it to pass to my body and as a whole the work becomes more ‘scratchy’ but not recognisable as a dog, or indeed as ‘me’. However, the known or the past is still acting on the present embodied since I needed some level experience of a dog in order to approximate such a quality. But one set of experience that is qualitatively accessed outside of the body is interfering now with another that already lives in that ‘house’. Hay remarks that this disconnect improves my performance and at the end of the week writes in my book ‘keep up your dog!’

On the level of gaining a physical freedom or break from some sort of pattern of embodiment, Hay’s technique was effective and no doubt healthy, but I felt disturbed by a distance from my own rhythm of embodiment and actually quite ‘othered’ – some authenticity or ‘truth’ of my own experience was being tampered with and the result was an emptiness that reminds me again of the meaninglessness of events, beyond constructed interpretations.

On the question of ‘truth’ and in respect of human experience, events and landscape, I am reminded of the essential difference between a record and a report. The record of any particular day of the Battle of the Somme will state casualties, weather, ordnance used, territory gained or lost, times and so forth but has little to say of consequence when placed besides a poem of Sassoon or

78 Hay describes her approaches in diary form in My Body the Buddhist (2000).
Owen that might consider a single moment of a single place. The lasting significance of those spaces is such that many are permanently preserved, such as Hill 62 or Sanctuary Wood in Ypres. The four days that I spent there in residence as an artist with Davies-Marshall in 2001 crystallised the wish to extrapolate placeness through my practice. In these subterranean trenches and tunnels I also realised the ulterior significance of hilltops as another type of meanspace – one on which we are exposed and objectively neutralised as identities. Hilltops are undervalued places. They are active as beacons of life – points at which me might measure and observe the impact of our past on the trajectory of our future. The following is a performance extract that attempted a consideration of the mountainous landscape that was the site of my grandfather’s death in a Wellington Bomber in 1944.

Performance Extract written for and performed in Timepoints (2004):

A place I have, as yet, not visited. It exists in every moment of my every day and yet, I haven’t visited. South Barrule is part of the bleak and powerful landscape of the Isle of Man. It shrouds its past in silent fog and remains, tight-lipped as the constant giant who sees all and says nothing. Each year, at 4.00pm precisely and on the 22nd of December, I am born on the slopes of South Barrule at 1020ft. I am born in a moment that is followed each and every year by forty-five years of silence. I am born as a great bird breaks its back and four young bodies lie in that silence breathing the last of their hot and vital breath into the freezing stillness.
They gaze finally into the low and gentle cloud that they have spent so much time wrapped within and that the steam of their breath now joins, and they are at once in heaven and yet on earth. They die quietly and so very bravely whilst wishing, as we all do, for their mothers. The constant giant cradles them gently, terribly and says nothing. At least one of them is a father and at that moment his wife cradles their baby son, also gently. As a breeze, a dying father mentally hugs and kisses them both. As a breeze, life is changed and the trajectory of my future is decided by a past before my past. I really must visit South Barrule.

Looking back at the passage now I am struck by its romance, but also by the presence of and wish for the body on behalf of us all, the mental and physical pleasure of contact. I had reflected in chapter three on a performance idea in which I would insert thousands of pencils into my grandfather’s grave and lay atop them as if to take his inscription upon myself. I am aware too of attempts to close the gap between an idea and an embodiment in much of my practice – Rich Tea Conversations attempts this as we consume and spit our conversation in an act of ‘communion’, Fizz Bomb attempts to transfer the idea of the mind to the scream of the body, The Knowledge of Whitby Steps mediates a duration on the body as it reconstructs in the mind of the viewer, A Wonderful Engine locates the body across boundaries of representation as it considers a state within a State (Butler & Spivak, 2007), Twice Rendered removes the body from rights of visibility and social intercourse. The body exists through the centre of practice, as a site of historical impact and as the presence of the I that it inscribes and that it is documented by. These are attempts to wear the idea of
the mind in the sense of the body and as such to provoke the temporal order between the empirical and the phenomenal – if I view the historical digging of *Rich Tea Conversations* and its attempt to make sense of the past in the embodied presence of participants, or *Whitby Steps* reordering of time as a representation, the collapsing of time as compared to territory in *A Wonderful Engine* or the constancy of realtime movement in *Nightflight* as the installations unfolded fragments of reference to multiple stories, I realise that I have wished impossibly in the discourse for a temporal reordering that would allow me into those events that preceded even my life. This is possible, of course, in the onieric\(^79\) space of performance.

5. 4 Graphic

The context of the graphic has to be placed adjacent to a notion of assertion, to the ‘need’ that I discussed in respect of language in chapter 4. I might counter this by suggesting that a trace that remains after an event as an artefact is a graphic document produced by the event, but it only becomes this through a assertion of its status as that said document, as evidential. In the graphic then is something of ego in the production of documents, in the mapping of connections and in the need to bring meaning to the emptiness of an event. Whether record or report this publishes a version of the past as it recedes but only with the tone of that need in the present that allows us to remain identifiably ‘comfortable in our shoes’ because we like to see things this or that

\(^{79}\) Onieric is the Greek term meaning ‘of or belonging to dreams’ and is taken from Augusto Boal’s *Rainbow of Desire* (1995, p.19). I worked with Boal for two weeks in the 1990s and was touched daily by his reference to memory and ancestry. His practice had a political dimension at its centre but was full of this sense of potential in the imagined worlds of performance as they might affect reality.
way. Agendas of particular perspective like this create a friction between the
timeline that I discussed in Chapter 3, through Grafton & Rosenberg’s history
of timelines (2010) - the patriarchal quality of seeing a journey of time and
event in forms of the line that we might also then apply to one in space and
place - as opposed to the possibly infinite multiplicity when considering the
perspectives of many lives as they shift across and impact upon any space
(Solnit, 2010). What I experienced, following twenty formative years in
ignorance of my grandfather’s name, origin or story, was quite a seismic shift
in the sense of my own identity.

Considering that absence, my grandfather’s name, Jozef Tadeusz Piasecki, was
curious in my mouth initially. I recognised that the ‘J’ was a ‘Y’ and the ‘F’
that replaced the ‘PH’ reminded me of my childhood exchanges to Germany,
but the relationship of this phonetic to my own very English background was
already a novelty that my identity rather relished. I understood my father’s
teenage decision to change his name however; his birth name had been
Zbigniew Piasecki, which he changed to John Steven Maxted and then just
Steve Maxted. In our first visit to Ukraine together in 2000, I was fascinated to
observe how he would discuss and navigate his original name (as if it were
someone else that he had a right to), having discovered that Zbigniew had also
been the name of his paternal uncle.

Travelling to Ukraine and Poland a number of times since 2000 has also been a
struggle between objective and subjective discovery. It is impossible not to own
an unfolding experience from the personal perspective and I find myself
rejecting romantic interpretations without success. I am returned to Wood’s (1992) iconic, linguistic and tectonic layers (discussed in Chapter 3) inasmuch as my experience of both Poland and Ukraine is one of reconciling the reality of being there, with cliché, historical iconography both of the pre-Soviet and Soviet periods, with languages that are completely differently rooted to my own and with both natural and architectural landscapes. This is true also of my grandfather’s name on my tongue, those hilltops of personal significance and images collected from veterans in Britain and family in the Ukraine. This adds up to an experience that is reminiscent of a magical-realism80, wherein the magical aspect reflects that romantic interpretation that is present for example in my performance extract above, but is knowingly adjacent to a harsher contemporary realisation and frustration.

Pre-war Lviv81. Copyright owned.

80 I use the term ‘magical-realism’ carefully and without capitalisation since I am aware of its ramifications to a particular body of writing – the relativity that I suggest is deliberate but intended only loosely.
81 The writer Bruno Schultz frequented the M L Atlas coffee shop in the image.
I felt my experience identifiably mirrored by Safran-Foer in his autobiographical novel *Everything is Illuminated* (2002), in which the text alternates between memory, mythology, a search for a long disappeared Ukrainian village (and in this respect for identity), and harsh economic facts. Its most effective quality is found in the relative perspectives and desires of an American grandson searching for a past truth and a Ukrainian youth with aspirations toward western consumer freedoms; both antagonists have and reject what the other seeks. The Ukrainian youth and his grandfather act as hapless tour-guides to the American without any sense of pride in what they reveal – they represent dysfunction and disconnection in a world that has offered them little.

The American is invested in an archaeology of their past that they have little appetite for and this is also true of my own experience with family in the Ukraine. It is difficult to avoid the bourgeois air of Baudelaire’s flâneurs setting up house ‘in the midst of the fugitive and the infinite. To be away from home and yet to feel oneself everywhere at home… and yet to feel oneself hidden from the world’ (1968, p.8). This returns me also to Swift’s giant in Gulliver (1991) and his hidden ocular devices, because there is a level at which I can never become that which I am observing; I step away from that which I am but never authentically arrive at that which I wish to become. I may have ‘othered’ myself (or would ‘distanced’ be a better term?) in this respect, but enter a space wherein I am already ‘othered’ (and distanced) by circumstance of territory, ideology, culture and language none of which are indigenously known to me. Kwon puts this neatly:
Our very sense of self-worth seems predicated more and more on our suffering through the inconveniences and psychic destabilizations of undergrounded transience, of not being at home (or not having a home), of always travelling through elsewheres. … The distinction between “right” and “wrong” places seems less and less relevant in the constitution of the self (2004, p.156, 157).

Whilst Kwon’s ‘suffering’ infers instability for the transient, suffering, and indeed death, runs through the core of this thesis. I don’t intend this as necessarily a dark morbidity but rather something richer, perhaps more in common with Watson’s idea of a terrible beauty (2000). That is to say that as Bauman (2004) asserted identity as a conscious notion to be a recent phenomenon, so its catalyst is suffering that results from invasion and flight. The suffering in itself can serve to distil the ideal of belonging and mythologise those that suffer as an example to those that wish to (or are schooled to) belong.

A good deal of my work concentrates on destabilisation that is the result of suffering a displacement of identity, but my recent research in the Basque country offered a more binary example of destabilisation that flows through stasis.

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82 The term ‘a terrible beauty’ is also the title of Watson’s book. The book explores the rich ideas and discourses that formed the twentieth century in the midst of and sometimes despite war, discrimination and genocide. I first read this encyclopaedic study in 2000 and it has remained an inspirational source since, particularly in terms of its structural emphasis on connective discourse: Watson’s writing is cartographic in quality as he maps one event, person or idea to another.
I have been struck in my experience of the Euskaldun (Basque) people, and of the landscape around Bilbo (Bilbao), Viscaya (Biscay) and Gernika (Guernica), by the importance of movement as a resistant device in the survival of cultural clarity. The Basques are more interested it seems in managing movement than borders as such; that the land sits across the border of France and Spain is less of an issue for Basques than maintaining their language. Since the Romans, interest in control of the Basque Country has had more to do with its status as conduit than as occupied territory: for the Romans it was a gateway, for the Spanish it was a coastline famed for its ship builders. The Basque’s strength in resistance has always had a good deal to do with their mountainous landscape, using guerrilla strategies to fall on the Romans, the Spanish and the Fascists as they attempted to move through the valleys.

Kurlansky describes the Basques ‘love of border stories’ (2000, p.347). In the Spanish Civil war and the Second World War Basque knowledge of the landscape would also be applied in the smuggling of people, equipment and goods, with particular pride taken in compromising the French/Spanish border. Resistance as (freedom to) travel is a core aspect of Basque identity ironically rooted in the notion of home and politically it is a phenomenon as slippery as an eel. Guernica was attacked on its market day by the Nazi Condor

83 In a twentieth-century story, a man crossed the Behobie Bridge over the Bidasoa from Irún, Spain, to Hendaye, France, every day. He would ride his bicycle over the bridge past the Guardia Civil and the gendarmes and would disappear into Hendaye. Later in the day, he would bicycle back with a sack of flour. The Guardia Civil stopped him every day and made him open the sack so they could carefully sift through the flour. But they never found any contraband in it. And they never noticed that he always biked into Hendaye on an old bicycle and rode back to Irún on a new one’ (Kurlansky, 2000, p.347). Similar examples run through Boling’s documentary novel Guernica, which acknowledges Kurlansky (Boling, 2008).
Legion and at the time was certainly predominated by a transient population; around three thousand refugees thronged the small town, in addition to many Basques that would come down from the hills and fishing villages to buy and sell their goods. Added to this was a key station for travel to and from Bilbao, with a huge queue of people and an estuary close to the ocean. As a representation in the painting by Picasso, we are tempted to assume the massacre as inflicted on an indigenous population, whereas it was timed for greatest impact on the use of this place as a conduit: it was an attack on the seat of Basque identity and at the heart of resistant movement. The Fascists claimed that it was a mistake caused by poor visibility, the real target being a stone bridge that remained unscathed. In truth, the town itself was the bridge and the Basque culture had a long tradition of ‘bridging’. I am also topographically struck by the contexts of mountain and valley in that understanding of what constitutes home and, from the perspective of the Condor Legion, what constitutes an easy target. Guernica was as easy to bomb as throwing rocks in a bucket. Again, I feel that Hegelian dialectic resonating in a cultural identity that places huge linguistic import on the word for home (Etxea) defining that notion often in the alterity or shadow of movement.

A central concept in Basque identity is belonging … to a house, known in Basque language as etxea. Etxea or echea is one of the most common roots of Basque surnames. … A house stands for a clan [and even though] the family name might disappear, … the name of the house endures. … And this contradiction – preserving the house whilst
pursuing the world – may ensure their survival long after France and Spain have faded (Kurlansky, 2000, p.7).

But then there was the point concerning suffering too and this, certainly, when it is formed out of cultural oppression, produces a far more distilled sense of belonging. As I have said, the events of oppression can stand as a mythologised emblem of authenticity, the assignation of which often comes from the descendents of the oppressor in public or state acts of contrition. If I now return to Kwon’s point about self-worth being predicated on the suffering of transience, I realise that her point regards the travelling ‘through elsewheres’, whilst the Basques have a long history of suffering and indeed surviving through an insistence on the value of travel through the territories of their Etxeoa. So far as assertion is concerned, the documentation of the events of oppression solicit the assignation and their dissemination as testaments protect the interest of the present. A map must be constructed.

5.5 Heartlands

These qualities also arise in what I might call the heartland – loyalty to the spiritual home that is elsewhere. One might think of the Zionist example but there are others, some of which are meta-landscapes wherein a fantasy desire is cast as a net over observable reality. There are those that make a pilgrimage to Glastonbury in order to reach the threshold of something Pagan, but based upon the fame of an Arthurian claim by 12th century monks following a fire and potential poverty at their monastery trying to raise the profile of a place and therefore their alms income. In 1190, following a tip-off by the King’s
Soothsayer, they claimed to have found the remains of Arthur and Guinevere beneath the Abbey – a brilliant act of self marketing that has lasted for over eight hundred years. Abbeys of the period were crucially ranked by their relics, which naturally became a focal point of pilgrimage and therefore income. It is not by accident that the monastic discovery followed the hugely successful publication of Geoffrey of Monmouth’s *History of the Kings of Britain* in 1139 (Monmouth, 1969), although that did not mention Glastonbury in respect of Arthur. The discovery also helpfully put a nail in the coffin of the Welsh wish for a return of Arthur in defence against the Norman Conquest and:

‘it seems reasonable to suppose that these new-found relics were no more than one aspect of the complex capital fund drive needed to support the monks’ rebuilding efforts (Crick, 1991, p.220).

The commercial small-town centre of Glastonbury is now a stew of spiritual ‘offers’ reminiscent of the reliquary trade of the middle ages – dragons, candles, crystals, Native American chants, Peruvian pipes, Buddha’s and witches – and its efficacy in generating a local income is certainly the motivating factor, with the largest ‘pilgrimage’ now being the huge music festival. But in a more clearly political and less commercially driven sense, similar palimpsest narratives (some of which are also Arthurian) can be found endlessly woven across the Clwydian Range of *The Nightflight Project*, both evident in the naming of hills, hill forts, Offa’s Dyke path and in the significance of various local legends, often of knights and giants.
The duality of place in respect of its geographic and psycho-geographic existence has been the subject of many works of fiction since the Millennium, that play in alternately imagined realities, aimed at both the child and adult – *His Dark Materials, Harry Potter, Pans Labyrinth*, a renewed interest in Tolkien and C.S Lewis to name but a few - and these works are saturated with contemporary politic and the neurosis of escape, of a place that is here and at once an alternative there. We are in the same place and yet we travel, we see things differently; another dimension of viewing opens, magic becomes possible.

As a teenager I was very much involved in the first evolution of role playing games (*Dungeons and Dragons, Traveller, Runequest* et al) as a participant in an after school club led by our geography teacher. We would generate ever more complex characters with a full understanding of their traits, strengths, qualifications, spiritual leanings, intelligence and constitution. With these we would enter campaigns that only existed in the roll of percentile dice, the description of the ‘Dungeon Master’ (usually the geography teacher) and the decisions we made. All of these campaigns were conducted around school tables in a fluorescently lit classroom and yet our subsequent recollections were surprisingly and convincingly empirical even for ourselves – we created memories that *felt* as if they had occurred and often marvelled at our conviction, finding this obvious falsity collectively fascinating and funny. We also flirted across sexes with our characters in gameplay, whilst having very platonic friendships outside of that. These are all qualities of avatar-based
gameplay in online ‘worlds’ such as *Second Life* or *World of Warcraft*\(^8^4\), and yet I feel a certain aversion: in retrospect of those very enjoyable teenage forays, I consider the notion of a false a posteriori empirical knowledge worrying. I cannot trust experience that I thought I had, things that I thought I saw or people that I thought I knew because in so doing I also falsely construct around issues of my own identity, virtually being my wish rather than wishing to be; if the former is achieved virtually then it removes the aspiration of the latter in reality.

Perhaps a clear and present danger in a place that is here and yet there is the mythology of belief that gains loyalty relative to the feeling of present dispossession or alienation. I am disappointed with the perceptual form of avatars in online ‘worlds’ such as *Second Life* and uncomfortable with profiles as bodies of social perception on network sites such as *Facebook*\(^8^5\). I suspect

\(^8^4\) *World of Warcraft* uses the term ‘persistent online personae’ to describe the constant development of a character through online presence (Blizzard Entertainment, inc., 2012).

\(^8^5\) There are contexts of study in otherness that this thesis does not pursue and perhaps the most significant of these for the emerging era is that of digital and online presence, in the perceptual form of avatars or even profiles as bodies of social perception. I might ascribe this deliberate absence to the disciplinary boundaries of soft and hardware, but the main reason is that my corresponding practice has not manifested in virtual online domains. I might be tempted to close the statement there, accept that I also know that I suffer a psychology of resistance to Facebook, a disappointment in Second Life, an oppression of email and so on it goes. I feel a new pressure to connect that is dichotomised by a corporeal need to retain an analogue life – to feel the ground, to feel physical contact, to speak aloud. Yet, I cannot operate without my mobile, my laptop, and my wireless connectivity, whilst Skype has increasingly had a significant role to play in actually connecting me to my Ukrainian relatives, or back to my wife, mother and children whilst I am thousands of miles removed. But, I find myself struggling with a general sense that we are, after all, losing our grip on here and now as we spend more time immersed in that techno-connection; this is an obvious and perhaps clichéd observation but its point can only really be made in the day to day realisation of its truth and I wonder whether we are
the potential of a self-fulfilling prophecy in these possible versions of Self; representing my identity in accordance with an alternative domain as I become less content with licence in an actual one. But this place might also be my mythologised landscape that actually exists abroad and thereby returns me to notions of Nationhood.

Nationhood presupposes a recognised and cultural way of being, a set of qualities necessitated by social, educational, linguistic and financial license; it requires a personal investment in particular ideological values and it is, of course a powerful cultural export. None of this locates myself so much as it either entertains or rejects my sense of belonging – there are choices to be made and I make them. I reject the ideal of Nationhood politically and yet have played an ‘Englishness’ abroad. In this lies an identity schism that could be particularly prevalent in contemporary plurality: it becomes difficult to purely and perhaps proudly, assert one context of belonging when therein is a dichotomous disloyalty to another. Such a friction produces doubt and uncertainty until I return to Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of multiplicity as rhizomatic rather than purely arboreal or dichotomous (2004).

This is not a case of split loyalty but rather of multiple woven strands wherein the argument of Self was never concerned with a single objective and closed

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reaching social crises as a by-product – the 2011 riots were exacerbated by the ability to send encoded and instant messages via Blackberry phones. The core of that concern may emerge in how much of an identity lives in the virtual and social network – do I live to Twitter, or do I Twitter to live? Is this the truth, then, of Hegel’s need for recognition that is simultaneously a self-slavery of sorts – re-attesting social existence on a daily basis; I think that is the nub of my unrest.
certainty but rather the opposite uncertainty of a less resolute multiplicity. In this way I can begin to accept Self as a multi-contradictory being, with infinite digressions attached page-like to a pivotal spine, which whilst book-like, are not read as teleological lines that dichotomously split or chronologically unfold. Identity is asserted with flexibility relative to one’s situation – it is adjusted according to our need and in this manner we genuinely dissemble. That may seem a contradiction in terms but I refer more to the fact that even a curriculum vitae, as a time-line or map examined in Chapter 3, is retuned to need and circumstance. This is not a dishonesty so much as a will to positively employ the past as we proceed into the future and this malleability allows the Self to navigate these crossings of time in space.

5.6 Plasticity

I certainly don’t feel any great degree of removed geographic or cultural loyalty, but when I was in Poland and Ukraine I certainly felt my nationality slipping in small ways; perhaps as I also willed it to slip in an effort to feel more ‘Ukrainian’, also an artifice at best. Indeed, in England I have caught myself on occasion attempting to magnify the European or even Polish/Ukrainian contexts of my identity, albeit again in small ways. This is also mythology and in reality I know very little of these cultures, but my twice-removed provenance and my name still provide access\textsuperscript{86}; making certain

\textsuperscript{86} In America this provenance is a mainstream and acceptable device in the celebration of itself as a migrant-derived nation – Irish, Italian, African, Polish, Swedish, Jewish, Latino and Dutch cultures, among others, remain present as combined assertions that form a sense of American ‘authenticity’. These are
contexts of rootedness visible creates a right of cultural inference and therefore raises the question of self-determination. Bauman describes this as an emerging and universal issue for ‘liquid modern times’ in which ‘most of us have trouble with resolving …the issue of la memete (the consistency and continuity of your identity over time) … and with the issue of l’ipseite (coherence of whatever distinguishes us as persons’) (Bauman, 2004, p.13).

Many of the forty discussions in my work Rich Tea Conversations illustrated the fact that constructs of identity are chosen and based on those mythologised ancestral allegiances of one or several generations’ removal and that often are the significant ripples of migration or diaspora. This cultural lack, loss or mythology of original placeness is evident in the children and grandchildren of migrants, but matters of foreign policy and the defence of religious belief that magnify cultural isolation, containment or segregation might also reconstruct and magnify this quality of identity, as a matter of choice. Such a re-emergence is replete with problems of authenticity, often romanticised to the extent of removal from the place of one’s forefathers, both temporally and geographically.

also locatable and inflected in accent and vocabulary, perhaps one of the most interesting examples being Swedish of the Mid West (notably Wisconsin and Minnesota), where even jokes of the ‘old country’ survive in good health alongside locally relevant products and Scandinavian names.
It is only in my adult life, then, that I have consciously chosen to build a fragile architecture around an Ukrainian aspect. Where does this live – is it in my name, my blood or in my acquired knowledge? Is my identity purely an academic act of appropriated knowledge after all, that I choose to perform and so therefore become? If I chose to be a Muslim would this also then alter my psycho-geographic allegiance and if this were the case what would provide the catalyst? Two aspects I think, the first being a sense of pride that emerges out of belonging and the second being a sense of distance, of ‘otherness’ that I choose because of a gap that has opened between myself and my proximal socio-political environment; I decide at some point that my true home is elsewhere. One of the questions asked of the subject in *Rich Tea Conversations* concerns a description of their preferred landscape and their favourite place (not always synonymous). Preferred landscapes, whilst perhaps influenced by the landscape that a person grew up in or lives in currently, are not necessarily coherent with it. They contain something of the poetic wish, some projection of the way in which a person would like to be perceived and then an element of escape.

### 5.7 Fiduciary Values

Any Polish or Ukrainian aspect of myself is deferred and reduced by two generations but I *could* choose to pick it up and claim that I have a cultural right, if not a passport. Accordingly with Bauman (2004), I *could* reject ‘Englishness’ theoretically (the greater part of my background) if I feel that it no longer represents me and the gap increases. At the same time I might wish to increase my currency by actively supporting Ukrainian contexts and many of
these might be served purely through my psycho-geographic heartland rather than an engagement with the ‘real-politic’. During the worst atrocities of the IRA, financial fundraising in the United States played upon romantic visions of distant struggles in a homeland never visited and never forgotten for some. Money given bought that currency of engagement, shored up an aspect of identity that, whilst historically genuine, was nevertheless expressed by choice.

A heredity bloodline is not necessary either – a Buddhist might locate their spiritual landscape in North East India, their active support of related contexts in the Free Tibet movement. Whilst it’s sincerely difficult to disagree with a forced occupation of any sort, it seems a fair comment to suggest that such a movement can also cause unwitting damage purely because of the gap between a perceived Shangri-La and the ‘real-politic’ of an actual place. Patrick French comments that ‘the demand for a greater Tibet is rooted in the politics of displacement’ rather than in something that was previously manifest, since the government in exile ‘developed the idea of a giant, theoretical Tibet’ (French, 2003, p.14). People who had previously identified themselves in regional contexts became conscientiously Tibetan and a regimental banner designed by a travelling Japanese man in the 1920’s now became the national flag. This was a necessary taxonomy of representing the issue of occupation to a world stage, but French also describes how ‘Tibet – the export version, the mind’s Tibet – went from being obscure, to cult fashionable, to mainstream in under a decade’ (2003, p.29).
But misconception reigns when human aspiration is driven by a combination of consumer demand and a romantic psycho-geographic ideal somewhat removed from contemporary reality. French describes this gap in a critical reflection of his earlier activism within the Free Tibet movement. Our desire is earnest, but we are misguided by the unobtainable. In this way I might propose that the IRA supporters of the 1970s have something in common with the Free Tibet movement and yet the statement also dismays me. But my dismay is geographically founded too – I grew up in such close proximity to bombings, I was twice in bombings. But when it comes to the occupation of lands the truth of its success is well founded in the context of time, since it is only a question of generational distance. Culture, belief and practice create plural social truths, but the grandchildren of migrants are at home, if not in the psycho-geographic context.

For the children of the dispossessed the ‘motherland’ is psycho-geographically removed from the homeland, mythologised either positively or negatively, and their access to it is through their parents, their relatives, or their communities perhaps. What happens at the point of the next generation? The Chinese have only to sit tight as it were and this is exactly what their government has done, paying little heed to the Western ‘cult of Tibet’ and refusing to recognise the status of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. However, the emergence of the Dalai Lama as exile has immensely engaged the international community that was so very complicit in its denial of original support. This engagement, formed out

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87 The legacy of Western complicities, particularly British, is one of multiple emergent contexts during the post-war period that have led to contemporary political crises in Pakistan (partition of British India 1947), in Palestine (ending
of needful canvassing perhaps, has given him the ear of the West in particular, but this ear is far more interested in his spiritual advice than in his real struggle to return. He fascinates and we look upon him as index to that distant and mythical Shangri-La, a living embodiment of the spiritual identity we socially lack, a dislocated shaman that we hope will guide us to that heartland - Moses, Mohammed, Buddha incarnate, Christ on the cross.

A sense of contemporary identity, whilst liquid (Bauman, 2004), expands and contracts according to a concentricity of encounters - familial, local, national, global - and in crossing, these circles form a further ‘Venn’ relationship to belonging dependent upon ethnicity, religion and culture. Commonality depends upon the number of circles that cross – if I consider my recent but good friendship with Konstantin, a Ukrainian who is married to a British woman and who live in our small town, we have five circles of belonging that entirely cross, two more that don’t and create a little tension that I cannot control, particularly when we were in Ukraine together:

of British Mandate in 1947), in Iraq (occupation and restoration of Hashemite monarchy between 1941-47), and Zimbabwe (independence declared by Britain 1965).
In Britain our Ukrainian ancestry in the city of Lviv ties us very closely, and yet in Ukraine the same was a division of background and culture, his ethnically Russian and mine Polish, and as we moved amongst his friends and my family this troubled me a little. Konstantin had fairly warned me of this tension and I had suspected it an exaggeration until I experienced it. But Konstantin seemed proud to stand for me and I very much appreciated that fact. Perhaps I felt troubled because again, considering Kwon’s statement about ‘psychic destabilization’ that I discussed earlier (2004, p.156,157), I sometimes felt further from a home instead of closer to it.

I dislike conflict on a very basic level that is fundamental to both my psychological and physical wellbeing, and yet it is behaviour that hurts me far
more effectively than physical damage, perhaps due to a life-long social over-
sensitivity. I feel the break of an elbow as I fall on stone, the cut of broken glass
and I have lived with recurrent pain from a neck fractured in performance for
fifteen years, but my body experiences something that feels deeper and more
damaging when faced with unjustified conflict. It feels invasively offensive,
mortally threatening even – as if the idea of it might kill me as mental
preoccupation is passed down to affect chemistry within the body. I see this
quality in my children too: my youngest son is very tall for his age of nine,
ever fosters any conflict or unkindness but plays a very hard and direct game
of Rugby, tackling effectively and scoring try after try. Enjoying this struggle
of territory, he returns cut and bruised every week, concussed once, but is only
ever really upset when another player has said something unkind or un sporting.
We introduced him to Rugby in some ways to build his sense of himself as a
physical presence in the world, to help him see his own weight and the
responsibility of that in collaboration. This realisation of the body, I hope, will
shore up a realisation of confidence in the mind and the interrelation of both
inform a sense of Self.

At the point of his birthday, a month after our visit to Ukraine, Kostantin
invited me to see an old band, Marillion, with him. I was amazed because this
was a group that I had seen in my teenage years. Konstantin had also listened to
them then, but on tapes recorded from illegally received broadcasts out of
Poland. I realised that now I could internally map that distance and that border
that we had crossed on foot together with our sons, a border still starkly
reminiscent of a different era. But we stood together, drinks in hand, and
watched Marillion in Manchester’s Academy, and I marvelled at the moment that found us together like this when I considered the mystery of the Soviet Union for me then and of the West for him then. We agreed that they sounded much as we remembered back then, he in Lviv and I in Birmingham. I realised that the importance of our difference was in the fuller view that it gave as separate perspectives of a larger story, that we had experiences that made sense of something that we had in common and yet that made us different. I can reflect now that the spaces of commonality in that Venn diagram are the venues for meeting in contexts of belonging whilst we discuss difference.

The best definition of difference is found in the space of conference.

My western self wishes to consume my Other – it wishes to assert its observation of these discovered territories in the cartographic context of ownership and then to reproduce them in the imagined form of art product. For example I wished strongly to overlook the institutional corruption in Ukraine, or blame it on Russia, because Ukraine needed, for me, to remain pre-modern in some respect. I needed cobbles, wood, orthodox choirs, Cossacks. I needed also to view the Soviet era as an attempted strangulation of this – an imaginary image much helped by the typical architectural strategy of the period, which certainly is an encirclement (the Bloc). I imagine and realise these moments in performance, in film, in poem, in still image, in novel – Chekhov, Dostoyevsky, Pasternak, Safran-Foer, Tolstoy, Tarkovsky, Stanislavski, Meyerhold. I want to say that I have a right by blood; I belong. I looked into the blue eyes of my great aunt and tried to locate myself as she described the brutality of the
Gestapo officers that put a gun to her head, the terror of the returning NKVD who peeled the skin from the hands of partisans and crucified the priest on the door of the church. As a Russian speaker, Konstantin researched the history of my great uncle Zbigniew Piasecki and told me that as a partisan he had shot a Hero of the Soviet Union as he took the Red Flag up the town hall of Lviv. He was wounded himself and then hunted by the NKVD, escaping to Poland (allegedly being murdered by the KGB some thirty years later). How do I resist a romantic view of that in respect of my Self? Perhaps in a consideration of the body in that moment, rather than the story, of a red hot bullet, fired in defence of belonging, piercing flesh, shattering bone, breaking will and producing scream.

5.8 The Tango

I wanted my great aunt to tell me about herself, but in so doing wished to hear about myself. I felt myself in the act of assignation of authenticity toward her, and as such to find some myself – this was an act of consumption for me. Here is a recognition and a distance that will simultaneously magnify my sense of otherness in both my geographic and psycho-geographic home; and so I am returned to the ‘repository of lost luggage’, to the meanspace wherein I remain a case amongst cases.

In that final trip to Lviv, Ukraine in the two months before the completion of this thesis, it was fascinating to see how my youngest son constructed a relationship to the city of Lviv, by a small sense of right, sitting at the table of his relatives and trying a first taste of traditional food, making pretend ‘vodka
toasts’ with apple juice; I watched as he tried on a traditional Ukrainian embroidered shirt in the old market, purchased for him by my older cousin, Oleg. He spent pocket money on a Soviet era military winter hat and Oleg bought a Ukrainian badge to replace the communist symbol, which he accepted with enthusiasm since he is, at nine, unerringly in the present and finds it difficult to perceive the weight of this particular aspect of the past.

But on that visit, I also found my great aunt Veronika literally on her deathbed. On the Tuesday of that week she received the last rights from her Orthodox priest and was on the verge of being incommunicable (that slow and steady slide down to extinction). I held her hand and kissed her, whispering my presence. She seemed so much smaller than on my first visit in 2000. My love was genuine, but I also felt the frustration of losing an atlas whose multiplicity of maps I had only very briefly glimpsed. I needed her as a book. She grasped
my hand, clearly knew I was there and began to climb back up the stairs to consciousness. Within forty-eight hours Veronica sat up, a hollow little shell of a person, and greeted Felix and I. She sipped tea, grasped photographs of my other children to her heart and looked at the flowers that we had bought. Together we looked at her photograph of my grandfather and she was able to express her love to us.

Fully aware of her own physical state, the last thing that Veronika asked me, with the fragile chuckle of ninety years, was whether I would like to Tango or Foxtrot. The question wasn’t only humour in the present, but based in a memory of her happiest time as a young student dancing at the University in Lviv; she had loved to dance. We returned to England and Veronika returned to that gentle slide down and out of life, dying within a fortnight. I sensed it was a decision. Since that moment and at the end of this study two months hence, the question won’t leave me. It is after all a question concerning performance, crossing space, negotiating something collaboratively and posed by someone that I searched for throughout my adult life and found, sixty years after the flight of her brother (my grandfather), through an act of performance.

The Foxtrot seems to me to be a dance without adversity, the couple standing poised and in harmony: forward, forward, side side, slow, slow, quick, quick. I find myself looking at notation of the footwork in a beginner’s guide

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88 I finally located family in Lviv after performing a durational work called Underground at the Winter Palace in St Petersburg, 2000 – the work, which was driven by an the frustration of failure in my search for family, was viewed by the artist Vladimir Yabotchuk whose parents consequently reunited me with my Great Aunt Veronika, the sister of my grandfather.
(Horwood, 2005); maps that cross space. The Foxtrot is smooth and gliding, assured even; I am impressed by its sophistication and dislike its lack of disruption.

I once had the pleasure of learning some basic Argentine Tango from an elderly American lady that had danced it with her husband everyday for forty years. When I subsequently watched a professional Argentine company dance it, I was struck by the depictions of conflict and tragedy that were always adjacent to passion and love. Christine Denniston has conducted a study of Tango through a number of works and writes that ‘Tango was created by the kinds of people who generally leave no mark on history except by dying in wars - the poor, the underprivileged’ and was bought to Buenos Aires by immigrants (Denniston, 2003). It is a dance of difference and not always of agreement being a live discussion of control, of a permission to lead only granted by consent, that is often deferred through kicks of the legs and weaving consideration of that request. It seems to me that the map constructed across the space of a couple engaged in Tango is far less set than in the Foxtrot, it is a map of their bodies that relates to a conversation of will. Sally Potter explores this in her film The Tango Lesson (1997), in which she narrates the complex exchanges of control in a relationship to an Argentinian dancer, Pablo Verón, that she gives a film role to as an exchange for lessons in Tango. As they lead each other in each respective context, the resulting and intimately emotional conflict threatens their relationship and their dance.

89 Additionally see The Meaning of Tango (2007).
In the Tango is the gesture of danger, threat and that risk involved in performance, in *per*, in the crossing of space. In the Tango, though, is the assertion that in the midst of this peril there might be something crucial to be shared and gained from the *Other* but we need to negotiate a space together, appraise one another and define our difference in conference. I wish that I might have been able to dance with Veronika, but our lives barely crossed, albeit that when they did it resolved something of family tragedy and put my Other in touch with my Self.

I would choose the Tango.
Appendices
Appendix 1 – Performance Text for *Timepoints, 2004*

**PLACES 1 – High on a Hilltop**

Hilltops are undervalued places. They are active as beacons of life – points at which one might measure and observe the impact of our past on the trajectory of our future. The first most significant hilltop was shown to me by my French teacher. But I experienced it in the particular company of a German girl called Frederika. The wind, the rain, the small circle of Cotswold stones and my earache made me fall in love without any question of will. At that point I fell in love with her (or at least the idea of her), with life, with landscape, and with a past I had yet to find. I stole a kiss from her which she freely gave. But the kiss was really stolen from that place; it was what I wished to leave there. Frederika quickly disappeared but the damage had been done. I would conduct my life as an unreasonable and unrealistic quest and I would steal kisses from hilltops in return for a view, for a little bit of clarity. Here are the hilltops of significance; they are the giants, the players, that mosslike sleep over chessgamed lives.

Little Rollright

Mudridden and tamed by the small stone hut, the kings men craggily lean, bound hard by a witches curse. A circle of twisted stone, not far from the halls of Christchurch, a spit from Shakespeare’s mouth and a vision of his mind. Soilrich in Cotswold gold and coven tight with rooks, tourists of the bard stop by to wander (wonder?) and muddy-up decent theatre-leathered soles. After years of secretly stolen kisses, standing central and gazing hard upon the bewilderment of my life, I brought my true love here and kissed her instead. Not eighteen anymore, but thirty-one. Each visit stood by, measured the intervening years to say “You have come from there to here, from here to there and this is what has changed.”

Student days and married nights, divorced dazed and still bewildered. As I sank into despair I climbed this hill to cry blankly. As my children were born, this is where I came to fill that gap between heaven and earth and say thank you to life. As finally I found that most significant other half, this is where we stood at dawn and hugged in desperate love. As I discovered a family, lost on South Barrule and in the cavernous secrecy of a cold Russian war, this is where I
came to marvel at the landscapes of our lives. Thank you to that Teacher of French – you were often drunk and you confiscated my first digital watch, but thank you anyway.

South Barrule
A place I have, as yet, not visited. It exists in every moment of my every day and yet, I haven’t visited. South Barrule is part of the bleak and powerful landscape of the Isle of Man. It shrouds its past in silent fog and remains, tight-lipped as the constant giant who sees all and says nothing. Each year, at 4.00pm precisely and on the 22nd of December, I am born on the slopes of South Barrule at 1020ft. I am born in a moment that is followed each and every year by forty-five years of silence. I am born as a great bird breaks its back and four young bodies lie in that silence breathing the last of their hot and vital breath into the freezing stillness. They gaze finally into the low and gentle cloud that they have spent so much time wrapped within and that the steam of their breath now joins, and they are at once in heaven and yet on earth. They die quietly and so very bravely whilst wishing, as we all do, for their mothers. The constant giant cradles them gently, terribly and says nothing. At least one of them is a father and at that moment his wife cradles their baby son, also gently. As a breeze, a dying father mentally hugs and kisses them both. As a breeze, life is changed and the trajectory of my future is decided by a past before my past. I really must visit South Barrule.

West Kennet Long Barrow
Not far from Marlborough and opposite a great pregnancy of earth known as Silbury, rises the splendid pasture of the Southern Down. We park in the lay-by and double-knot our boots. The children sparkle with energy and the dog pulls, gasping at its leash as we navigate the style and begin our climb to a splendid grave. I am with my wife and a Maori guest from New Zealand. Cattled, muddy, brookbabbled and nettleshy, we tramp to the base of our ascendance. The dog is off the leash and the children shout to call her back from the depths of yellow rapeseed. I sneeze, she laughs, they play.

A small hawthorn is bound with coloured rags and Rangimoana asks me for its significance. I tell him how I had goggled at the pagan shops of Glastonbury, askew with the eclectic debris of a world without substance – here a crystalgobbed dragon, there a fat and laughing Buddha, here
a stone of healing, there a native American dream catcher, here an African fertility god, there an
Indian milk drinking elephant, here a semi-naked amazon warrior candle, there a wizard goblet,
rune carved and mead-thirsty, and all infused with the incense of Tibet and the sound of the
Andes.

I cannot help my cynicism and suggest to him that the tree has been bound by people who have
really lost any real sense of their past. They wish for it so badly but are terribly befuddled by
the colonialism of a christian-age, the romantic fiction of a middle-age and the baseless
paraphernalia of a post-modern age. We are quiet and I feel a little guilty.

I notice that the children never take the straight route up but spend their time in little
transgressions over fence and through hedge – they must double the distance and do so with
grand pleasure. They steam, coal-shovelled full of life. How I love them.

At the top we stand transfixed by the enormous flat entrance stones of a tomb. We enter into
cool black stillness. There are alcoves to the left and to the right and as we creep down into the
heart of the barrow we emerge into its central womblike bowl. Funny to consider the place of
death as a womblike.

The children are impressed but never for a moment still. I feel at first the need to quieten them,
perhaps embarrassed by the serious presence of this fascinating Maori. I know he is deeply
moved. But I realise that their vigorous little lives frame this place with a splendid resonance.
My little boy has gone outside and now stands above us. He jumps up and down and asks
through the muffled earth,
“Can you hear me?”
Thump, thump, thump, thump. I want to cry.
I spend sometime outside the barrow, lying on top with my wife and my children. We eat
apples and stare up at the blue heavens, the vapour trails of high planes, the windblown arcs of
gulls. We can hear Rangimoana gently singing a Maori chant to himself below. I see him near
the entrance and notice the quivering hand gestures with which he accompanies his song. He
later tells me that the quiver of the hand refers to the vibrations of life; the rustle of leaves, the wings of the butterfly, the heart of a baby.

I make a return trip to the long barrow at West Kennet, but this time with the other most important woman in my life, my mother. The children come too and once more they jump upon the roof, whilst the other listens below.

As we sit atop and eat our picnic, I tell my mother that I feel often regarded as having my head in the clouds. “This is probably true,” she frankly returns, “but your feet are soundly on the ground. And that’s how it is here. We sit somewhere between heaven and earth and things are thrown into splendid clarity. I look to my mother and children and think suddenly of the young dead airman lying between the heaven and earth of South Barrule. He flew across borders and like a stork dropped a baby, my father, in a foreign land. He was much like the Saxon Farmers that had lain in the barrow beneath. We eat, we play, we laugh and we return, past the ragged tree and back to time.

Vysokyi Zamok (The High Castle)

In Western Ukraine is the beautiful and ravaged city of Lviv. It is surrounded by six hills of which Vysokyi Zamok is the highest and is approximately the same height as South Barrule. It is at the crossing of East and Western Europe and at the divide of the great rivers of the Baltic and Black Sea basins. Below me huge Russian trains sidle into warehouses or snake out toward the Steppe. I turn and to the other side can see the white tower of the town hall. Some five decades previous a young Ukrainian partisan had shot at a Bolshevik at the gates of the town hall. He was called Zbigniev and would be murdered by the KGB in 1976. They would take him in a car and hurl him under the wheels of an oncoming truck. He would die in hospital some days later.

I can see the streets leading to the Ivan Franko park, where a young girl called Veronika, the sister of Zbigniev, was brutally raped by a piece of wood forced into her by Bolshevik troops. I adjust my focus to the more distant Gymnasium school where a young man called Jozef, the
brother of Zpigniev and Veronika had studied in radio and transmission. Jozef loved to collect insect life around the woods and hills of the city to pin and label. And then there is me. I look at them down in the city that runs with blood and compromise.

I am surrounded by the excited children of a school visit and they bubble with life. The weather is good and I look up to the flag of a recently founded republic and beyond to the blue sky, broken by clouds, the vapour trails of high planes and the sweeping arcs of gulls. I think of my mother. I lower my gaze to my excited father who is now asking for the Ukrainian translator to take a photograph with the vista of Lviv in the background. The terrible vista of Lviv cradled by six constant giants who say nothing. My father is like a child. No, he is a child – he is the small baby of an airman lying dead at 4.00pm precisely on 22\textsuperscript{nd} December on the slopes of South Barrule and he is meeting his father for the first time. And I am meeting my father for the first time.

To stand on this hill, as sunlight glints from the roofs, spires and domes of a city bathed in its own blood, is miraculous. It is a momentous victory of simple people caught in the history of ideologies, of military powers, of bloody murderous hate and the extremes of human suffering. And no one knows that it has happened. It is the moment that a little boy jumps up and down on top of a grave, yelling “Can you hear me?” ….. and is answered.

Can you hear me grandfather? I know that you can.
Appendix 2 – Complete description for Walking With Stones, 2009

1. The Stuckness of Leaving:
As we approached the four rocks that marked our Oentrance’ you could see blue clad figures standing at distance across the landscape. Then there was the sound of a conch been blown and as you looked up high to the right a figure was etched against the sky, about half a km away on a precipice. He blew the conch throughout the first section, which I called ‘The Stuckness of Leaving’. The performers slowly approached with a strange physical style across the plateau, alternating pace and calling the lines of a poem:

Blown from the trees,
We’re black dust on the Stone Sky,
Our voices buckled iron,
Our wings charred paper.
We soar, wind harried,
Over gates and guarded borders.
We’re specks but we’re eternal.
We’re ash, we fall everywhere.

Its sounds lovely to me in Spanish:

Golpeado por el viento desde los arboles,
Somos polvo negro en el petreo cielo,
Nuestras roces hierro doblado,
Nuestras alas papel carbonizado.
Volamos alto, apresurados puerl viento,
Sobre puertas y fronteras vigiladas.
Somos motas diminutas, pero somos eternos.
Somos ceniza, cameos en todas lados.

As they spoke they were accompanied by dusk birdsong, distant bells of cattle and horses and the conch blowing. Yum.

Then they suddenly broke and headed off to the hills.

2. Broken Houses:
I told the audience ‘vamos’ and we began to walk toward the second space this was a little climb to a ruined stone cottage in the lee of a hill, overlooking a huge valley. Three women stand on the broken walls and perform a butoh fu poem about clutching stones, whilst my conch blowing musician, an
amazing storyteller called Doroteo played on the Txalaparta with a young woman called Madalen. It’s percussive wooden sounds ricocheted around the valley beyond a real Basque moment. He began to sing a tale about an eagle swooping down to attack the livestock of a cottage it’s a little more complex than this and finally the woman there flings a rock at it, which was the final action of our performers here. Vamos!

3. Washing and Drinking.
Back on the initial plateau and near the road there was a natural spring which they have constructed an old stone wall out of which the water trickles, like a tap really. Near this is a sort of rustic bench made from one piece of wood and two stones. Three performers sat side by side eating apples and drinking from glasses, spitting the drink into three buckets. The buckets were taken by three more performers to the wall where there was an open case of folded clothes. They were joined by yet three more who came down a small slope from a washing line, tied between two trees that crossed a path upwards. These six then took the clothes and soaked them in the buckets and spring then came fast across the ground, sometimes at the feet of or through the audience to scrub the clothes in muddy holes. Following this they beat the clothes furiously against rocks, on the ground and at the foot of the audience the sound was great and we were sprayed with the water. Finally some of the clothes were hung on the line whilst the three sitting drinkers, who had also spoken a verbal poem, were dressed in what remained. We then took the audience through the flapping clothes on the line and upward through wild horses toward the inner landscape of this semi-forested mountain. Shortly we passed by the lone figure of a woman performing a butoh dance on a huge rock, accompanied by a twin reeded Basque horn (not unlike a bagpipe chanter).

4. Digging in Holes.
The performers had to skip past us fast as lightning in order to crawl through the entry cave of the gorge. We came to the edge. The light was becoming that luminous blue of dusk. Looking down into the gorge, in front of the two spiked rocks, two women began to dig holes with iron shovels. A third stood still at some distance and looked up, beyond the gorge. A man and a woman approached us through the woodlands and began to sing they would circle and approach the gorge at its highest cliff throughout. The digging built tempo until it was a furious task that bought them to collapse the space. One dropped a flower into the hole whilst the other some seeds
(well beans). The third had a blood red case which she filled with the earth excavated from one hole after the last two had departed. She then struggled away with it. Two male performers approached from behind the rocks, their mouths open and eyes heaven-ward. With a shout they bought their heads down into the holes and we heard their voices disappear, along with their head and shoulders. Only one of them rose and walked to the original still figure. She was looking up to the singers who were singing our texts in a Basque style Ocantheon’. He embraced her and left. She then walked to a hole and stood in it. The diggers stood at a distance eating apples but now came and buried her feet, building up rocks around her ankles like a tree. She looked upward and opened her mouth wide like a silent shout whilst the singers finished their cantheon. It looked beautiful down in their and all around you could hear the evening birdsong. Because I had requested audience silence, the landscape intervened all the while. Vamos!

5. Apple break.
After a gentle climb of about 10 minutes, through an area strewn with boulders, old trees and natural gorges I walked the audience around the side of what seems to be a huge dolmen or burial mound. Darkness was descending and from here they got to look down on the myriad lights of civilization from the sea, along the valley towards Barracaldo and Bilbao a beautiful twinkling sight. We asked them to eat an apple with us out of a bucket (under the surface of the work was always the context of cider and I have a thing for apples in performance for some reason). They liked that, but the real reason was logistic to give the performers time to crawl out of the gorge and run with the instruments and equipment to the forest. When I knew they had past, we again set off.

After a short walk across high open ground we came to a wood (forest makes it sound to thick) in which we could see the light of a single candle lantern. It was becoming quite dark now but you could still discern features. In the woods the performers were kneeling up facing each other in two lines. They began by kissing each other full on the lips and then with a gasp, fell to lying like railway sleepers, head, feet, head, feet. This is a short play I had written sometime ago and it was their gift to me to do it here and in Spanish it is a sort of magical-realism not unlike Lorca in as much as we’re not sure what is real and what is a dream. They whisper about sleeping, roll and count one Mississippi, two MississippiS...in order to try and achieve sleep. When one becomes frustrated and tries to rise, breaking
the tempo, another tells them that they can’t Owe sleep together under stars’. It’s playful and not without humour, but under the surface perhaps people recognise a mass grave of lost people with lost identities. OI don’t know you!’ says one, Owe might be related’ whispers another. They are lit by a single apple eating witness with the lamp.

7. The Stuckness of Arriving.

As the sleepers finally arose they returned to the original poem, whilst Doroteo began to play the Txalaparta, this time with two bones he had found in the gorge (!) it sounded lovely. The performers each gentle took an audience member closely, like their mother or a loved one, and whispered to them as they walked them away and through the trees & back down to some old stone steps and a small hillside slope to the cars. As we arrived we heard the calls of a shepherd disturbing wild horses in the forest. Then he cracked two stones together and an entire herd stampeded past us incredible!!
Appendix 3 – Letter to the Coalition Against Myself, Twice Rendered, 2007-2009

Lessons in Language: Twice Rendered.

October 26th, 2007

My Dear Friends,

I need a favour from you and I need your answer, yes or no – following this we will talk no more of the matter.

I need to be kidnapped. Seriously. And I’m sorry for the inconvenience it will cause you.

I ask because I know that you are ingenious enough to do it; you will be the magicians and I the assistant. You will come together as a team, as a coalition against me, excluding me from any hint of your correspondence.

I owe you a rationale, a motivation and then I will lay out my terms.

I now need to make a work of personal dispossession that enforces qualities of non-belonging for an uncertain duration. I am interested in the interstice between belonging, the gap or the mean space. I have been reading for sometime wonderful books about place and space, about territory, about the ‘State’ I am in and the ‘state’ I am in. I need to create work that creates that interstice, and you might see its relevance to the discussion of my recent works. However, this will need to be a work that could be repeated by anyone following a set of precise instructions. As part of the Lessons in Language series it deals in provocation, didactic instruction and playful analogy. It will finally operate as a published and illustrated example to others, a users guide to rendition.

These are my terms:

1. There will be two extraordinary renditions; yours and mine. Yours will be the organisation and execution of kidnap (the first rendition) and the setting of parameters for the second rendition. Mine will be the performance of a required task of compliance (eg. the second rendition), set by you and that must be completed before I can achieve reintegration. What will it be? I am sure that your combined ingenuity will discover the perfect task for my compliant rendition. It should last at least 48 hours and should at least be possible. This is our collaborative work of art so I only ask that you consider how it conceptually and contextually relates to the problem at hand – simple and beautiful in its cruelty.

2. My taking should not disturb the peace in a manner that might be unfortunately misconstrued by any authority – this is a personal intervention rather than a public one and I’d rather no one was arrested. Choose your moment with care and make as many of those present complicit as possible (basic information, a public interventionist statement of your authority but with the reason of my taking left unexplained as it were?). As a child I had a recurring nightmare of hiding from a world of complicit hunters, seeking me out in hoods – capture was as certain as the next following day, but I would awake before it happened.

3. You will attempt to dispossess me in the most basic and thorough of terms – restrict my senses in the first rendition to an unknown destination, restrict my freedoms in the second. That destination should at least appear to be distant, an
outpost with the diplomatic rights of your self-determined state. Suffice it to say that it should not be one of your houses but should not cost you a financial outlay either. Use your networks. You should choose a uniform or collective feature for yourselves in the first rendition (Outfit? Gloves? Hat? ) and should determine every item of my clothing in the second – I am to be denied my own clothes, watch or other adornments. Naturally there will be some cost incurred in this respect and that of food. One of you has full control of my finances. You will collectively agree that my rendition is complete before I am released. Naturally your collective presence is not necessary – use any form of communication.

4. Please plan this as a serious conspiracy of creative thought – I don’t wish that it dominates your time and would prefer that you involve yourselves at a level of communication that is not oppressive; email discussion in the main, perhaps a meeting or two later as necessary. But plan this as a serious conspiracy of creative thought. You will need to conspire with some of the institutions of my life and gain some information too in order to remove me. One of you will have to use my phone, replacing the answer message and an ‘out of office’ message will need to be set up on my email. For these you will need my passwords but it is up to your ingenuity as to how these are gained from me; they will not be offered. Likewise you will need to finally ascertain my movements with some accuracy in order to execute the first rendition.

5. Everything you plan or do will require its document – one of you will be an archivist of this action. Emails, photographs, video, conversation, trace materials and correspondence will enter the archive and the two renditions will need to be documented on video of some form (one of you will film the events). This is important because this material will subsequently form and illustrate a ‘how to’ chapter of the intended published artefact.

6. If you agree to do it then I want the work to be completed. If you don’t agree to take part I will completely understand.

If you agree to join this coalition then simply reply ‘yes’. I will collate the group and place you in email contact with one another. From that point your next correspondence and all further organisation will be with you; I will know nothing until the moment of extrication arrives.

God’s speed as they say.

Your friend in love and respect,

Simon.
Appendix 4 – Cognitive Memory Interview, Richard Edges.

Memories of a Hostage: A Cognitive Interview with Simon Piasecki

Richard B Etches, Institute of Psychological Sciences, University of Leeds

Introduction: The science of memory

Tulving (1985) demonstrated that memory is split into three different systems:

The first system is semantic – knowledge of one’s world

The second is episodic – remembering events experienced

The third is procedural – knowledge of how to complete procedures.

It is episodic memory which makes it possible for humans to remember past events, be they trivial, fleeting experiences, eyewitness memories of interest to police or events that can fundamentally affect who we are and our sense of self, often referred to as self-defining memories. However, human memory is not a video recording of events storing everything a person experiences, not every experience will be encoded and stored in memory (Milne & Shaw, 1999).

Every sensory experience, everything a person hears, sees, feels, tastes or smells, has the potential to be encoded. Unfortunately, the brain cannot possibly store all the information at an event, so alternatively selects information believed to be of greatest importance. This selectivity can lead to potentially large differences between individuals.

Fruzzetti et al. (1992) stated if a group of people all saw the same event, each would recall a different version of what had occurred. Individuals can only focus their attention on a limited amount of information at any one time, may utilize different strategies to remember, and may have different interpretations of what happened.

As with many brain processes however, memory can be markedly affected by emotion. The sensory information encoded, the reliability/level of recall, and even the likelihood of intrusive recollection can vary greatly according to emotion at the time of encoding. This is particularly true for traumatic experiences, which can lead to unusually vivid and detailed recollection termed “flashbulb memories”. Commonly studied examples of these are hearing the news that Princess Diana had died, or the terrorist attacks of September 11th. These vivid memories usually encode high levels of sensory detail, but also large amounts of contextual information, such as what the person was doing at the time, what other people were present, etc.

Brown & Kulik (1982) suggested that there is a special neural mechanism triggered by high levels of emotion, surprise and consequentiality that causes the whole scene to be “printed” on the memory. Other researchers, such as Neisser (1982) argue that these flashbulb memories are a product of
frequent rehearsal and retelling after the event, rather than a special neural process. If there were a special neural mechanism activated when encoding such emotional events, you would expect flashbulb memories to be accurate and stable. Whereas if they arose as a result of rehearsal and retelling, there would likely be more inaccuracy and confabulation during recollection.

This brief introduction to episodic memory leads to some pertinent questions regarding Simon’s memory of his kidnapping. Firstly, what kind of information does the memory mainly comprise of? Is it mainly sensory in nature, if so, what modality; visual, auditory, tactile? Secondly, are there large amounts of contextual information? In addition to examining Simon’s memory form the kidnapping, an emotionally neutral memory from around the time of the event will be obtained for comparison. Thirdly, how accurate is his memory, and what can this tell us about flashbulb memories? Are his perceptions of time accurate? Furthermore, through quantitative measure, and his recollection, we can look at how traumatic/impactful the experience was for him.

The Interview

The Enhanced Cognitive Interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992) was a procedure originally designed for use in police interviews that involve witnesses and victims. Its goal is to enable more complete and more accurate information to be recalled, through the application of psychological research to the procedure.

The interview has four main principles used in its instructions.

1) Reinstall Context

Why?

Memory does not occur in a vacuum, the event was lived through by the witness. Asking for the recall of a specific part may not produce detailed recall. Memory record is heavily influenced by internal thoughts than external environment. Hence asking the individual to reinstall the physical and personal context that existed, the context of the event and to think about their physical surroundings and psychological state can lead to more complete and accurate recall.

2) Report every detail

Why?

People often edit their recall and summarise what they feel are the relevant points. However such a subjective component can lead to large amounts of potentially important detail being omitted. Hence the interview asks for every detail to be reported, no matter how fragmentary or seemingly inconsequential.

3) Report the event in different temporal orders

Why?
Bartlett (1932) explained how memory may be altered using preconceived ideas about the world stored in semantic memory, which he called schema. In certain situations these schema can be very useful in helping a person know how to behave. For example, when in a restaurant it is known that typically a person sits down, reads the menu and then orders a drink, a starter, a meal, etc.

Bower et al (1979) demonstrated that additional memories could be recalled due to a person unconsciously using their schema. He showed that after a participant had read about someone entering a restaurant they were more likely to add additional and possible erroneous, information into the account, such as the person eating. Bower believed that this showed people were likely to create aspects of their memory which were not explicitly shown, based on previously known scripts of how an event should occur. This research highlights, that when a person encodes an event they may 'see' what they believe should be present, based on cultural norms and past experiences.

By requiring out-of-sequence recall, the individual is discouraged from ‘filling in the gaps’ with memory from schema, and instead produces detail from the actual event.

4) Recall from a different perspective

Why?

Asking an individual to describe the event from different points of view or perspectives (e.g. from first person and third person) serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it can help to de-traumatize the event, as traumatic memories have been shown to often have distortions of perspective. Secondly by asking a person to describe an event from another physical location can enable recall of more detail. Memory is complex, and there can often be several triggers to recall. The more perspectives a person uses, the more cues and pathways to memory become available.

In addition to these four key principles, the Enhanced Cognitive Interview has instructions for the interviewer to help reduce anxiety in the interviewee, encourage disclosure, and prevent leading questions.

The Kidnapping

The following is the summary of Simon’s recollection of the kidnapping, restructured into chronological order.

Before being taken:

"I started talking to a student...I’m chatting to him and all of a sudden, someone walked up to me who I didn’t recognize...He walked up to me and he said, “this is what’s going to happen” I knew at that point, that he was in a calm but nervous state...you could see it in his eyes, he was agitated."
He said: “This is what’s gonna happen, you’re gonna kneel down and I’m gonna put this bag on your head”

I said “I’m not going anywhere until you let that go”...the next thing I knew, this voice said “shut the fuck up and move” and I did, I just did.

There was a period of time in the street, and I could hear students jostling.”

**Once taken:**

“I was put in a van...he said “don’t speak unless I was spoken to”. There was a lot of stopping and starting, I knew we were going through a series of traffic lights. After about 15 minutes a torch was shone into the hood I was wearing. I was trying at that point to read any sound or smell anything that I could.

I became aware the turning stopped...I could hear the person in the back with me shifting...eating a bag of crisps at once point...They got quite close to me at one point, which felt quite threatening.

I became very stressed in the van...There was a point at which I was having to control my breathing, I was beginning to wheeze...I felt like I was heading towards hyperventilation

Occasionally they’d take photographs.

I decided I would stay really still, it wasn’t a cognitive decision...it was just a complete decision.

After about half the journey I was slipping in and out of a kind of semi sleeping state. I was in a really strange state...I didn’t feel ill, I just felt that my sense of reality had been completely twisted around...I didn’t want to sleep, I just couldn’t help myself, I was just going in and out...Every time I kind of sank, something ill defined, kind of almost nightmarish would shock me awake.

Oh gosh. At one point I thought he was sharpening a knife...that led to me thinking there may have been an attack at the other end...Noises were all I could read.

In the van I’d become, what I can only describe as narcoleptic...stress was making me slip in and out of half sleep. I could feel my heart pumping

The journey seemed at least two hours...more than one, less than three”

**Upon arriving at Boathouse:**

“Darkness became light...I heard the grinding of the van door. I was thinking about possibilities of escape...hands tied...hooded...then door closed. That was really disappointing. I was removed from van, standing on a rough gravel surface that became a grassy area, disorientated, pushed/shoved
around...convinced I was being pushed off a precipice...The sound quality around me told me that it was an open space...Sound throughout the whole experience was heightened.

I became aware that I was approaching something. I was brought into a place; my picture of it was that it was it was a wooden outhouse or building...something to do with the way the door slid, it sounded like there was lots of stuff there.

I felt like I was in a space that was about 5m by 5m. In like a shed like structure.

I sat for a long time with the hood on, it must have been another couple of hours. While I was hooded there was this massive hammering, a bashing, to me someone was right outside the window with a metal bar, smashing it against the wall. I’d hear these little rustles, so I thought there was someone still there. During that time, I think I’m aware someone came back once and asked me if I wanted, in their words...sorry I’m confused....they asked me if I wanted a piss.”

*After a couple of hours:*

“The hood was removed...When the hood came off, I wasn’t frightened, I was convinced it was my project by this point...but there was still a really odd state of mind. It left me in a really odd place, I wanted to sleep...I got the shakes.

I was thrown a really nasty old blanket, and a sleeping bag...no I was thrown a coat...a cross between a hoodie and a coat.

At one point I was taken to the toilet. Then I became aware I was in a really frightening place, at that point, very dark, full of piles of things.

After some time, darkness had fallen, I felt cold at this point and very stagnant.

They told me “you’re coming to have something to eat now”. I’m not sure, I feel like I was told I was going to meet rob and Pete, but I don’t know if that’s a real memory...there was a sense of release”

*When asked to describe the attacker:*

“He was bearded, but only a very short beard, like a stubbly beard...short hair, quite spiky. I had him at about 28...he had very distinctive eyes...clear eyes, they felt slightly wider than they should be”

“I thought he was wearing like an army green jacket...he was casual, not formally dressed. I think he was wearing jeans, but that could just be a default assumption. I can’t say what his top was, but I felt like he was wearing some sort of jumper, and it was dark. I feel like I’m making a lot of that up, but that’s how I feel, which is different than remembering exactly.”
“His voice was always very quiet...it was decisive, slow and measured and calm, and that didn’t have a calming effect. It was someone I felt you couldn’t negotiate with. No accent. Male, low, kind of, very clear, quite bass” 

Analysis of Simon’s Memory

Composition of the memory:

Simon’s recollection has many of the characteristics of a flashbulb memory. Throughout the interview much contextual information was provided, and when questioned about the morning prior to the event Simon was able to describe in detail about an argument with his wife, the journey to work, and a meeting he had earlier that day. Through the interview Simon frequently describes what he was thinking and feeling at the time; “I thought there was someone still there” and “I decided I would stay really still, it wasn’t a cognitive decision...it was just a complete decision”. This large amount of detail regarding one’s own thought processes at the time of encoding, is absent from the neutral memory Simon provided during the interview. This memory was regarding a meeting Simon had in York St John. Simon showed high levels of episodic detail in the memory, describing the layout of the room; “there was a long table...it was a long room, there was a window set back...I was sat in front of the projector” and describing that one of the attendees of the meeting was wearing “a really high pair of Doc Martin boots”. However there was an absence of any description of thoughts or feelings, and when questioned, could provide little contextual information about the morning prior to the meeting.

As for the sensorial composition of the memory, this is quite a unique situation. Episodic memory usually has a large visual component. Indeed on one of the criteria for episodic memory, which makes it unique to humans, is the ability to mentally time-travel back to the event (Tulving, 2002). When recollecting the event, much of this is done visually, however in Simons case he was hooded for large periods of the kidnapping. As mentioned earlier the brain cannot possibly store all the information at an event, so alternatively selects information believed to be of greatest importance. If hooded, there will have undoubtedly been a shift to encoding other more pertinent information. This is reinforced by Simons comments that “Sound throughout the whole experience was heightened”. In combination with the emotion of the event, this seems to have led to a rich, vivid memory, lacking in visual information.

Accuracy of the memory:

Having looked at the composition of Simon’s memory, and compared with a neutral memory, what can we say about the accuracy of the memory? In order to examine the veracity of the memory the “Coalition” was asked to provide memories regarding the certain aspects of the kidnapping.
In a forensic setting the description of the suspect is often the most crucial information, and as the kidnapper was seen clearly by Simon before being hooded, this is one of the few areas where Simon should show intact visual memory. For ease of comparison the table below shows Simons descriptions along with the kidnappers own description.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Simon’s Description</th>
<th>Kidnapper’s description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“He was bearded, but only a very short beard... short hair, quite spiky””</td>
<td>“scruffy short darkish hair and beard”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I felt like he was wearing some sort of jumper, and it was dark”</td>
<td>“a black Berghaus fleece jumper zipped right up”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“He was wearing like an army green jacket”</td>
<td>“a black Berghaus waterproof jacket”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I think he was wearing jeans”</td>
<td>“wearing grey corduroy trousers”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from the above table Simons memory of the attacker is quite accurate. What is also interesting is that in their descriptions both Simon and Nathan comment on a moment of eye contact prior to the first instruction being given.

Simon perceptions of time also seem to be accurate, albeit possibly slightly inflated. Estimating the journey time to the boathouse to be at “least two hours...more than one, less than three” and the time in the boathouse before his hood was removed to be “a couple of hours”, this compares to the times of “nearer two hours” and “about an hour and a half” respectively provided by Peter, one of the Coalition.

*Impact of the event:*

During the interview Simon completed The Impact of Event Scale (IES; Horowitz et al., 1979) is a short set of 15 questions that measure the impact that one experiences following a traumatic event. Studies show the IES valuable in spotting both trauma and less intense forms of stress and in some is useful in detecting the most severe impact events, which can lead to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). A copy of the IES can be found in Appendix II. Simon scored a total of 45 on the IES, scoring 31 on the intrusion subscale and 14 on the avoidance subscale, which fits in the scoring category of a Severe Impact Event. This shows that Simon has had occurrences where he has had intrusive memories of the event, and has strong feelings regarding the event.

In addition to this, throughout Simon’s interview he provides almost textbook descriptions of dissociation. Dissociation is a mental state or process which can interrupt an individual’s thoughts,
memories, feelings, actions, or sense of identity. Dissociation is a commonly observed response to trauma. This can be protective, by allowing the mind to distance itself from experiences that are too traumatic. However it can also interrupt processing and encoding of information, leading to inaccurate distorted memories, which can problematic. Examples of dissociation from Simon include; “there was still a really odd state of mind. It left me in a really odd place” and he showed evidence of depersonalisation on several occasions throughout the interview “I was in a really strange state...I didn’t feel ill, I just felt that my sense of reality had been completely twisted around”.

In addition to the psychological effects of stress, Simon commented on several somatic symptoms of stress; “I felt like I was heading towards hyperventilation...In the van I’d become, what I can only describe as narcoleptic...stress was making me slip in and out of half sleep...I could feel my heart pumping”.

The scores from the IES and the descriptions of some of the acute psychological and physiological effects of stress demonstrate that this was clearly a traumatic experience for Simon, which would understandably lead to shifts in memory encoding and cognitive processing.

Final conclusions

Simon has provided a rich and vivid description of his kidnapping experience, consistent with the recollections of significant life events, such as the World Trade Centre attacks. Whilst there is the unusual situation of having relatively little visual information, the accuracy of time perceptions, the rich contextual information and the memory for his own thought processes (metacognition) all would suggest this is a flashbulb memory. In years to come Simon may reflect on this as a self-defining memory, one that has shaped his sense of self. This would not be surprising, given the clear and significant impact this trauma had on him at the time, and in the immediate aftermath.

It was a pleasure to talk to Simon about his experiences, although the question still begs...Why would someone have themselves kidnapped?
Appendix 5 – Script for *Camping*, 1999

*Camping* - S Piasecki-Maxted

Stye, Wort, Hat and Rot are sitting at varying proximity and facing various directions.

Stye, Wort and Rot adjust, tie and fasten themselves, whilst Hat stares blankly frontward.

They wait.

Hat coughs and Wort momentarily raises their left arm.

Rot looks to Hat, rises and approaches. Rot embraces Hat who faintly smiles, still staring frontward and sitting.

Rot straightens, considers, looks to the others who are inwardly focussed and returns to sit.

Hat coughs and Wort momentarily raises their left arm.

Stye quietly and gently laughs in amusement.

They wait.

They tremble momentarily and glance sideward to one another, followed by leaning forward and glancing offstage on both sides.

They wait.

As an amount of time passes a resolve arises in Hat who suddenly races offstage right. However Hat is captured by Wort and Rot and is pinned down in a rough and desperate struggle. Stye watches dispassionately as they drag Hat back to their original space. The three are breathing heavily.

Stye: "While they're cooling, what happens next?" (called offstage right but with no response.)

They wait for ten seconds.

All four suddenly race downstage left and form a queue - Hat at the rear, then Rot, Wort and Stye at the front and with roughly a single person space between each of them.

After a moment Hat attempts to jump the queue in the following manner:- pushes Rot aside, crawls under Worts legs then turns back to back with Stye, places arms around Stye's waist and turns 180 degrees so that Stye is now facing an astonished Wort. Hat now releases grip on Stye and is at the front of the queue. Hat looks offstage in eager expectation and begins wringing hands. Hat begins counting with say two seconds between each count.
Wort turns 180 degrees to face Rot, who then also turns so that Hat is now at the rear of the queue again (but continues to count, wring hands and face offstage in expectation - not noticing that the others have turned away).

Rot, Wort and Stye wander back into the space in silent resignation and perform the following simultaneously:-

Rot removes a book from an unexpected place in their clothing and begins to read out loud. The book is Robinson Crusoe.

Wort precisely puts on an overcoat, fastens it and then removes it without unfastening. Wort lays the coat silently on the floor with the arms bent as if the coat were still occupied.

Stye quietly removes shoes, reties the laces and carefully lays them where they had previously sat. Stye then considers the shoes as if they were an exhibit.

Hat reaches 99, still wringing hands and is interrupted by an apple being flung onstage, which they catch.

Hat stops, looks at the apple in bemusement and turns towards the others with the apple placed on outstretched palms. The others stop and view Hat intently. Hat slowly returns to their original position, sits and precisely eats the apple after thoroughly polishing. Hat thoroughly chews every bite and breathes audibly through the nose. The others watch intently - Wort is lying on the coat, Rot sits holding the book and Stye is standing near the shoes.

When Hat finishes, the core is thrown carelessly a few feet downstage right. Stye, Rot and Worts' gazes all follow the core. After a moment they look back to hat who performs a double take between them and the core.

They sit and wait with increasing frowns, sighs and double-takes. Action subsides and becomes stillness.

Hat (after a moment & wiping mouth with arm): "Home then!"

Rot and Wort look to Hat in shock and amazement. Stye smiles thinly and quietly laughs.

After a moment, Rot rises and approaches Hat. Rot embraces Hat who smiles thinly and continues facing frontward. Rot straightens, considers, looks to Wort who looks sympathetically back, and returns to seat.

They wait.

Wort, recumbent on back, coughs and Stye momentarily raises left arm.

End.
Appendix 6 – Audio Samples.

CD track listing:

Track 1 – Rich Tea Sample 1 – *Family*
Track 2 – Rich Tea Sample 2 – *Ireland*
Track 3 – Twice Rendered Recording – *loud banging*
Track 4 – Twice Rendered Interview – *Introduction*
Track 5 – Twice Rendered Interview – *Fear*
Track 6 – Twice Rendered Interview – *Not the Coalition?*
Appendix 7 – Chronology of Relevant Practice

1999 - *Camping* – part of a trilogy of one act plays.

2000 - *La Revolution Francais*, – St Petersburg, performed with Shelley Good.


2002 - *Demobbed*, – 48 hour live research action with Glynn Davies Marshall

2002 - *The Blackpool Front*, – performed drawing with Glyn Davies Marshall


2005 - *Memento Mori*, – director of devised ensemble work on Pennycloddia Hillfort, with undergraduates.


2008 - *Fizz Bomb* (work to camera)

2008 - *Walking With Stones*, ensemble direction – nightwalk performance, Bilbao

2009 - *The Knowledge of Whitby Steps* (work to camera)

2009 - *Proverbs 10:31* (work to camera)

2011 – *My daughter is Older Than Me* (work to camera)

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