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Apologiai, supplication and moral characterisation in Plutarch's Lives

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James Day

***Apologiai*, supplication and moral characterisation in Plutarch's Lives**

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MPhil

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Abstract

The thesis is a study of Plutarch's selective use of *apologia* and supplication in the *Eumenes*, *Cato the Younger*, *Themistocles* and *Coriolanus*. The main aim of this dissertation is to establish Plutarch's authorial intentions in the protagonists' *apologiai*. I argue that Plutarch's main intention in all four *apologiai* was an inquiry into whether statesmen should be motivated by self-interest or by moral justice and community interests. The issue of supplication is integral because the protagonist's misfortune, i.e. defeat or exile marks a moment where these motivations conflict. Plutarch's judgement of the protagonist's speech and action is connected to his representation of their emotional state, specifically whether anger dominates the spirited part of their soul. Plutarch uses these *apologiai* and the supplication scenes which they belong to, as part of a dialectical and sceptical strategy. I demonstrate that this was Plutarch's main intention by conducting a textual analysis of each *apologia*, comparing Plutarch's characterisation approach with surviving sources' accounts of the protagonist's defence speeches. The protagonists deliver their *apologia* at a moment of great political and moral crisis. In chapters one and two, Eumenes and Cato deliver their *apologia* in the situation of defeat where they face the difficult choice of supplicating their antagonists or committing suicide. In chapters three and four, Themistocles and Coriolanus use their *apologia* to reconcile with their enemies after suffering exile. The problem with Themistocles and Coriolanus' *apologiai* concerns how they use their enemies since Coriolanus acts from a selfish motivation to satisfy his vengeance and he does not care for the interests of his enemy Tullus and the Volscians. Themistocles though he similarly speaks from self-interest, instead supplicates to calm the passion of anger in his enemy the Persian king's soul. His supplication has a positive and *philanthropic* effect on the king and his court.

Contents

Abstract: 2

Acknowledgements: 5

Introduction: 6-26

Literature Review: 12-24

Παιδεία: 12-17

Educational models within the biographies: 17-21

Φιλανθρωπία in civil society and friendship: 21-23

Apologia, supplication and moral characterisation: 23-24

Chapter 1: Eumenes' *apologia*: 27-54

Introduction: 27-33

Eumenes' *apologia*: a commentary: 34-44

Parallelism and juxtaposition with the *Sertorius*: 44-48

The significance of the *apologia* within the *Eumenes*: 49-52

Conclusions: 52-54

Chapter 2: The *apologia* of Cato the Younger: 55-85

Introduction: 55-58

Cato the Younger's *apologia*: a commentary: 58-72

Parallelism and juxtaposition with the *Phocion*: 73-76

The significance of the *apologia* within the *Cato the Younger*: 76-82

Conclusions: 82-85

Chapter 3: The *apologia* of Themistocles: 86-110

Introduction: 86-90

Themistocles' *apologia*: a commentary: 90-100

Parallelism and juxtaposition with the *Camillus*: 100-104

The significance of the *apologia* within the *Themistocles*: 104-107

Conclusions: 107-110

Chapter 4: The *apologia* of Coriolanus: 111-143

Introduction: 111-115

Coriolanus' *apologia*: a commentary: 115-134

The parallelism of the veiling with Plutarch's representation of Alcibiades
πολύτροπος: 122-128

The use of supplication by the protagonist: the themes of enmity and
friendship: 128-134

Juxtaposition and parallelism with the *Alcibiades*: 134-138

The significance of the *apologia* within *Coriolanus*: 138-142

Conclusions: 142-143

Conclusions: 144-148

Bibliography: 149-164

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Introduction

This dissertation examines the use of the *apologiai* speeches as a vehicle of moral characterisation of the eponymous protagonists of the *Lives*. Plutarch's main focus in these scenes is the moral and political choices which the protagonist, his antagonist and other secondary characters make. The *Lives* which are the subject of study are the *Eumenes*, *Cato the Younger*, *Themistocles* and *Coriolanus*. These biographies are important because only in these cases does Plutarch decide to provide an *apologia* in direct speech by and for protagonists in crises, such as exile or military defeat. Plutarch's use of the communicative discourse of the *apologia* is significant because of the importance that speech plays in the evaluation and defence of the protagonist's moral characterisation, particularly concerning the death scene which it precedes. The choice of inclusion of *apologiai* needs to be explained because the biographer elsewhere states that a speaker delivered an *apologia* but only provides a short one or two sentence description of the content.¹ Plutarch also on several occasions demonstrates that the protagonist intended to deliver an *apologia* or had begun to speak but circumstances prevent the event occurring. The fact that Plutarch uses the noun ἀπολογία rarely but particularly in situations where it was undelivered, suggests that the author is deliberately drawing the reader's attention in contexts where such a speech would be expected.² Plutarch uses the *apologia* verb with the meaning to defend, but there are several instances where the biographer refers to an *apologia* that a secondary character delivered, but he gives no details of the content of these speeches.³ Despite the great significance of *apologiai* in Plutarch's *Lives*; these speeches within supplication scenes have largely escaped scholarly inquiry. Scholars have not yet examined in detail the inclusion of protagonists' *apologiai* in the *Lives* as a literary tool within the author's characterisation technique. This study of the *apologia* will improve understanding and contribute a novel way to approaching characterisation in Plutarch's corpus as well as reveal his complex approach to supplication and submission. The study aims to answer these two questions: 1) can we ascertain Plutarch's authorial intentions in his writing of *apologiai*? And 2) can we determine

¹ Plut. *Sul.* 24.2.

² Plut. *Cor.* 39.3, *Pomp.* 79.2, *Alc.* 19.3.

³ Plut. *Cic.* 16.3, *Dion* 34.3, *Mul. Vir.* 19. 256D In reference to Aretaphila's defence of criminal accusations, her speech is described by Plutarch as an *apologia*. *Cor.* 17.2, 18.2, 18.3, 20.1.

the significance of supplication, both as a theme and a practice within his characterisation technique?

An *apologia* can be defined as a self-defence speech; its main aim and focus are to defend and uphold the character of the speaker.⁴ In biography, character is interpreted in connection with the self-representation of deeds and moral choices. Plutarch does not define these *apologiai* explicitly but the following evidence suggests that these speeches can be classed in this genre. In the *Lives*, Plutarch attributes the verb ἀπολογέομαι as an action and speech of the protagonists, or as a term which features as a defence by others on behalf of the protagonist.⁵ This distinction between “the softness and hardness of the discourse” is an important feature in Plutarch’s recognition of different speech types and has been taken into account within this study’s definition of *apologia*.

Plutarch’s main concern in these *apologiai* is the interpretation of whether a protagonist’s character and life are examples of moral virtue. The main focus of this dissertation is to examine how Plutarch uses the theme and practice of supplication in the *apologiai* within his representation of the protagonist’s character. Plutarch considered that it was ‘both character and speech, or character by means of speech’, as an instrument of virtue which persuaded the audience.⁶ In all four *apologiai*, through their argument and intentions towards their audiences, the protagonists reject or excuse themselves from the humiliating charge of the love of life (φιλοψυχία). All four protagonists include death as a possible choice for their *supplicandus*. Φιλοψυχία is a quality exhibited in a man who supplicates shamelessly for asylum and yields to their passions instead of controlling them by the use of reason. The traditional purpose of supplication was for asylum, which Plutarch regarded as having great religious and political significance. The protagonists do not reject supplication for sanctuary, the issue is more with how they act and are portrayed in their relationship to their antagonists since in these scenes they possess inferior political authority, which is the result of military defeat or exile. The circumstances of these interactions, of the supplications or potential events between the protagonists and their enemies are problematised by the honour and status which they value. Ambition and love of victory are problematic because

⁴ LSJ s.v. ἀπολογέομαι. They define the term to mean to speak in defence and to speak in defence of a fact. There are several legalistic meanings of the verb such as to defend oneself against a charge and to speak against the death sentence. They define the noun ἀπολογία in the same way.

⁵ Plut. *Caes.* 6.4, 8.3, *Luc* 14.3, *Dem.* 37.1, *Cic.* 29.2, *Dion* 14.5, 34.3, *Sull.* 23.2, 24.4, *Cor.* 20.1. As a defence of the protagonists’ conduct by others: Plut. *Pomp.* 47.5. *Cat. Min.* 15.4. *Them.* 23.3, *Fab.* 9.1. *Dem.* 25.5, *Cim.* 14.3. *Flam.* 13.3, *Agis* 19.3. These examples were possible opportunities for Plutarch to write an *apologia* in direct speech.

⁶ Plut. *Quomodo adul.* 33F apud Hunter & Russell 2011: 190.

these qualities are responsible for the events which lead to the protagonists' crises. For this reason, a speaker's use of honour in their self-praise of their deeds complicate the interpretation of the character. The *apologiai* take two forms: the first without supplication involves the accusation and denigration of enemies; the second features the practice and aims to reconcile enemies.⁷

In the case of Plutarch's *Lives*, unlike defence speeches in legal courts, wrongdoing was not the main issue: what matters was how one lived one's life. Because of this, the character models served as important examples of literary mimesis for Plutarch's audience to apply in their lives. This was part of the purpose of these *apologiai* as moral exempla: which are extended or brief models or examples, used to illustrate a philosophical and political problem. The model or example provides alternative solutions to the problem through particular and complex human choices and actions. Plutarch's moral perspective aids the hypothetical inquiry into the rightness or wrongness of the characterisation depicted. There is a great deal of evidence that Plutarch envisages these defence speeches with juridical contexts. Alessio Sacco in his commentary on the *On Praising Oneself Inoffensively* makes a similar observation about Plutarch's concentrated use of legal vocabulary in speech.⁸

Plutarch's characterisation of the protagonist in his *apologia* is consistent concerning the previous biographical narrative, and their behaviour in death. Each *apologia* is unique because of the choice of methodology which he uses to persuade his opponents, and because of the specific issue or issues upon which he focuses. The protagonist's defence depends upon how he perceives his opponents' attack on his character. The nature of the apologist's opponents also differs in each case. For instance, Themistocles spoke through an interpreter to the Persian King.⁹

Plutarch's highlighting of speeches as *apologiai* emphasises the speaker as a professional orator.¹⁰ In several examples, Plutarch's usage conveys a negative perspective of orators who use speech to persuade an audience, because of the manipulation of the truth.¹¹ What is important to recognise is the nature of the focus, for example in another scene of supplication, the Roman general Sulla's defeated antagonist, Mithridates spurns custom by his silence, since it was expected that the defeated speak first.

⁷ A great number of examples in Plutarch feature *apologia* (ἀπολογία) as a response to accusation (κατηγορία).

⁸ Sacco 2017: 18.

⁹ Plut. *Them.* 28.1.

¹⁰ Plut. *Quaest. Conv.* 9.14.

¹¹ Plut. *Sull.* 24.2. A negative quality is seen in the meaning of *apologia* in *Pomp.* 78.3.

Moreover, Plutarch's use of this terminology connects with characterisations of figures in trials and conspiracies. Speakers defend themselves in relation to how their audience perceives them as enemies or traitors of a community, particularly due to suspicion or ill feeling (ὕποψία). Human beings make moral choices in crises, which interests Plutarch.¹² Mike Edwards noticed that indirect *apologiai* serve a role in the representation of the empowerment or passivity of the speaker.¹³ Simon Verdegem, commenting on the passage where Alcibiades makes an *apologia* to explain his conduct, states that the episode is significant as part of the story that the protagonist caused his downfall.¹⁴ It is important that in this indirect *apologia*, Alcibiades' rhetorical skills fail him. Verdegem examines how Plutarch adapted Thucydides' account in this scene in order to emphasise the characterisation of Alcibiades as a general and his relationship with his men.¹⁵

The speakers of *apologiai* in the *Lives*, face like other ancient defendants a real possibility of death or captivity by their antagonists; however, their treatment is not a result of a jury's decision and their speech is not the result of a formal accusation. Instead, the conditions and forces acting upon the protagonists are different and foreign to a Greek or Roman legal court. For example, Cato the Younger's situation involves a domestic conflict, where he questions the power and legitimacy of his son over his free will, Eumenes' the justice of his soldiers' surrender of him, and Coriolanus and Themistocles both seek aid in different ways from their enemies in foreign lands.¹⁶ As will be examined in the chapters, the protagonists' aims in their *apologiai* differ due to their circumstances, but also due to Plutarch's method of characterisation.

The majority of the *apologiai* take place within a supplication. The *Eumenes* is set up as if this will be the case; however, the narrator rejects the view that the speaker uses the *apologia* to supplicate. In my analysis, I follow Fred Naiden's definition of supplication as a 'quasilegal' practice.¹⁷ Naiden's quasilegal conception is beneficial for my research because in his use of *apologiai* Plutarch indicates that he interpreted the suppliant as a defendant. The evidence he uses to defend himself is an account of his past deeds. In the analysis, the majority of the speeches represent Naiden's third stage: the supplication speech, which orients itself differently as an *apologia*. The speeches in the *Cato the Younger* and Tullus' brief response to Coriolanus represent the fourth stage: the speeches of the *supplicandus* Cato

¹² Edwards 1991: 134.

¹³ Edwards 1991:45.

¹⁴ Plut. *Alc.* 19.4.

¹⁵ Plut. *Alc.* 10.3-4, 13.1-2, 14.3-5, 17.2, 18.3 apud Verdegem 2010: 245 s.79.

¹⁶ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 68-70, *Eum.* 17-18, *Cor.* 22-23, *Them.* 28.

¹⁷ Naiden 2006: 6.

to his son and companions who supplicated him.¹⁸ The cases do not contain the *supplicandus*' speeches, but they do feature a response and treatment of the suppliant. Plutarch imitates and was influenced by legal and political speeches including *apologiai* which were a part of his rhetorical education.¹⁹ For this reason, it is important to understand the role of Plutarch's writing of the *apologiai* as a rhetorical tool, and to examine how other scholars have examined the biographer's methods of apology or criticism of protagonists' character in the *Lives*.

Plutarch's use of apologetic features, including tone or perspective, in the *Lives* have been briefly examined.²⁰ Also, Rebecca Frank argues that Plutarch wrote his *Alexander* as an *apologia* to stand against his criticism of the characterisation of Julius Caesar. She finds that the main difference between the two *Lives* is the nature of legitimacy behind the empires and leadership of both men. Plutarch condemned Caesar because of how he perceived the ambition driving the Roman leader like a tyrant to greater and unlawful power.²¹ This study will also examine the nature of ambition and legitimacy as integral forces behind Plutarch's interpretation of moral character in the four *apologiai*.

Plutarch's intentions in relation to the characterisation of his protagonists or key characters dictated his methodology and interpretation of historical accounts. For example, Christopher Pelling, examining how Plutarch manipulates the story of the revolution and fall of Catiline in different *Lives*, concludes that the biographer's approach differs according to the nature of the protagonist's characterisation. Andrew Lintott comments upon Plutarch's narrative technique here, saying that Plutarch reversed the speeches of Catiline from Sallust's account and uses features that were implicit in Cicero's speech.²² Pelling argues that Plutarch would have known of Caesar's *apologia* but did not need to use it in the *Cicero*.²³ Pelling's study raises questions about Plutarch's intentions and his use of sources in his writing of *apologia*.

The work of Lee Ware and Will Linkugel in their study of the genre of *apologia* is useful in understanding and defining these speeches. Both scholars, experts in speech communication define the *apologiai* as a genre 'characterised by the situation of attack and defence'. Their examination focuses upon modern *apologia* speeches, particularly legal and

¹⁸ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 68.4-5, 69.1-3, *Cor.*23.5.

¹⁹ Sacco 2017: 72-89 surveys the literature, including the previous *apologiai* which influenced Plutarch's thought in *On Praising Oneself Inoffensively* and its theory on self-praise.

²⁰ Moles 2017: 25, 82, 135, 148.

²¹ Frank 2017: 210-225.

²² Cic. *Cat.* 1.8 apud Lintott 2013: 155.

²³ Plut. *Caes.* 8.5 apud Pelling 1985: 321-326.

political examples, but they are also aware of the ancient *apologiai*.²⁴ Their study is useful because they demonstrate that *apologia* as a genre depends upon forensic aspects for success. The four Plutarchan *apologiai* fit into the vindication subgenre named by the two scholars because this speech attempts to preserve the apologist's reputation but also emphasises his worth as a human being by depicting the immorality or mistakes of their enemies. Vindication is a helpful label in understanding the case studies because Plutarch's protagonists attempt to prove that their speeches are fair representations of their character and virtue, and they achieve a practical objective if their speech is successful. Sharon Downey, a rhetorical scholar, classes these *apologiai* of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE as representative of vindication.²⁵ The focus of *apologia* scholarship beyond Classics lies in examinations of modern corporations, institutions or political leaders' use of *apologia* in crises.²⁶ This approach to *apologia* in the modern world reflects a difference from the ancient one. Aristotle's focus for example was on rhetoric and the speaker. In the 20th-21st centuries, the interest shifted to consider the audience's perspective. These practical aims are related to how Plutarch uses his protagonists in the biographical narrative.

Plutarch's main purpose in his writing of protagonists' *apologiai* in the *Lives* was to explore the nature of personal and collective justice and political pragmatism as part of his didactic and philosophical inquiry into the roles of the philosopher and statesman in society. The *apologiai* are a didactic instrument Plutarch uses to visualise and discuss the protagonist's response to existential crises and moral conflicts. Plutarch uses the *apologiai* to explore how a statesman can fail or succeed in acting humanely (*φιλανθρωπία*), particularly in how the emotions of anger and contention can lead a man to mistake the identities of friends and enemies. Their responses reflect their flawed and difficult experience of *παιδεία* as youths. The protagonist's speech reflects an image that Plutarch has developed of his character throughout the biography. Plutarch's adaptation of *apologiai* from historical sources such as Duris of Samos' and Dionysius of Halicarnassus' accounts, which presented the scenes as traditional supplications (Eumenes, Coriolanus), presents in my view a different picture of each protagonist using the *apologia* speech to reject or diminish the alternative political and moral choice of supplication and submission to his enemy, because this would

²⁴ Ware & Linkugel 1973: 275 s. 14 cites Plato's *Apology for Socrates*, Isocrates' *Antidosis*, Demosthenes' *On the Crown*.

²⁵ Downey 1993: 47-48.

²⁶ Several studies are sociological: Tavuchis 1991, Lazare 2004. A small number of biblical scholars and a scholar of the Ancient Near East have cited Ware & Linkugel 1973: Blaney & Benoit 1997, Sullivan 1999, Knapp 2015.

undermine his self-praise. In the majority of the biographies, Plutarch undermines the protagonists' self-presentation in their character in the *apologiai* in relation to supplication.

Literature Review

In the following survey, I will sketch the broad scholarship trends on Plutarch's writing of moral biography, focusing on his conceptions of παιδεία and φιλανθρωπία. In the second section, I will discuss relevant scholarship on Plutarch and other important writers, such as Plato's use of *apologia* as a genre and the theme of supplication for characterisation. The significance of Plutarch's decision to write biography meant that he placed the individual at the central part of his framework.

Παιδεία

Plutarch's moral philosophical programme cannot be separated from his conception of παιδεία. As a Middle Platonist philosopher, influenced by and responding to the rival philosophical schools of Stoicism and Epicureanism, Plutarch's philosophy is an added ingredient to his παιδεία. What is significant about his philosophy is that it provides an interpretative framework for learning and progress in virtue. Παιδεία, an extremely complex and fundamental term in the ancient world, has a number of different meanings: such as education, transmission of knowledge, reason and culture in a diverse number of areas, for instance, gymnastics, music and rhetoric and all literature genres.²⁷ Unlike the English word 'education', the meaning of παιδεία in antiquity did not just encompass a period of education for the young, but was an experience and phenomenon within the entire life of the individual, which was also pivotal to the male elite's perception of their self within society.²⁸ It is important to stress the political aspects of παιδεία, as well as the moral and cultural. Plutarch taught citizens not just how to live, but how to act as political organisms. Joaquim Pinheiro underlines that παιδεία was important as a learning process for humans in understanding and developing their intelligence and reason.²⁹

All four speeches operate as examples of philosophical παιδεία and as part of a discussion on the complex moral-political problem of whether a statesman should act for his

²⁷ For studies on παιδεία see Cribiore 2001, Connolly 2001, Connolly 2003, Borg 2008, Gibson 2014.

²⁸ The education of the male elite as youths occurred in three stages from the ages of seven years to eighteen, see Cribiore 2001: 1.

²⁹ Pinheiro 2013: 117.

self-interest or for his community. Each *apologia* takes place in, or as part of, a civic conflict between the protagonist, his allies and his enemy: Eumenes speaks to his army who betray him to his enemies; Cato the Younger to his family who protects him and Themistocles speaks to his enemy the Persian King in exile as does Coriolanus.³⁰ Plutarch's decision to write four *apologiai* in the *Lives* may reflect his decision in the second half of the *Parallel Lives* series to write biographies for himself, i.e. as a Platonic philosopher. The *Themistocles* may have been written and published around the same time of the *Aemilius Paulus*, in which Plutarch marks the change in his approach, and explains the fundamental role of philosophical παιδεία in the *apologiai*.³¹

The protagonist uses the *apologia* as a self-representation of his character through his deeds, which specifically concern his relationship with his allies and enemies and his attitude to supplication and death. Plutarch utilises the speech to educate his audience on justice and φιλανθρωπία concerning the situation like a court case. As examples of παιδεία, each speech is problematic but useful for the lessons it teaches because Plutarch demonstrates earlier on in the biography that the protagonist struggles with his education due to his character. This affects his choices and deeds whether he acts for his self-interest, in terms of ambition, love of war, etc or for the community and justice. The flaws of the protagonists' mindset seen in their *apologiai* reflect their passionate nature, which is due to the spirit which dominates the reasoning part of their soul. The role of anger as a passion found in the spirit explains its significance in all of the *apologiai* scenes. The absence of Platonic παιδεία particularly in their youth explains why the protagonists fail to endure or make the right choices in defeat or exile, which represent the two pairs of *apologiai* of Eumenes and Cato the Younger and Themistocles and Coriolanus respectively. Though problematic, they teach important lessons about justice and φιλανθρωπία in terms of the relationships between the army and its general, the family and the paterfamilias, and enemies and allies. The *apologiai* fit into a similar inquiry into the education of statesmen and soldiers seen in Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.

One thread of research has tended to focus on the significance of the elite's use of παιδεία in expressing their social and political roles during the Roman Empire.³² Simon Swain's (1990) 'Hellenic Culture and the Roman Heroes of Plutarch' was one of the first

³⁰ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 68-70, *Eum.* 17-18, *Them.* 28, *Cor.* 22-23.

³¹ Plut. *Aem.* 1 apud. Nikolaidis 2005: 297 s.48 on Plutarch's relationship with his friends arguing against Geiger that Nepos' *Lives* influenced the order of Plutarch's *Lives* cf. Geiger 1981. For Nikolaidis' discussion of the place of the *Themistocles*, see 291.

³² Anderson 1989, Anderson 1993, Bowie 1991, Gleason 1995.

scholars to demonstrate how Plutarch's text could be read to reveal an understanding and debate upon the relationship between παιδεία and the political and cultural identity of the author. In Swain's monograph (1996) *Hellenism and Empire*, he argues from a postcolonial perspective that Plutarch's focus on the role of παιδεία in the *Parallel Lives* was to display the superiority of the Hellenic culture and the Romans' inferiority. Swain argues that there was a tension between the philosopher's support of the Roman Empire and his sadness for the loss of Hellenic independence.³³ He views the conflict as the reason why Plutarch desired civic concord in all communities because he wished to reduce Roman interventions and promote Hellenic παιδεία. Swain claims that many Roman protagonists fail in their biographies due to a lack of παιδεία, especially an education that prioritises military training over philosophical studies.

Christopher Pelling's work on Plutarch's παιδεία also examines the subject in terms of society and politics at the same time as Swain.³⁴ Christopher Pelling's (2000) 'Rhetoric, *Paideia*, and Psychology in Plutarch's *Lives*' acknowledged the contribution of Swain's article to scholarship.³⁵ Pelling concludes that Plutarch's choices in the *Lives* suggest that he attributed great importance to παιδεία and teachers, in the development of the protagonists' speech and reason. This is significant because the *apologiai* in terms of language and themes reflect different literary influences, which fit the protagonist's character.

The nature of παιδεία concerning character changes is more complicated than Swain's study indicates as a conflict between Greek and Roman models of education. Tim Whitmarsh's (2001) *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire* examines the mechanics of the construction of 'literary experience' and how classical literature was used in the creation of Greek identity in the Second Sophistic. Whitmarsh and other scholars such as Thomas Schmidt view παιδεία as a political and social value, particularly within the cultural and literary phenomenon of the Second Sophistic, of which Plutarch himself should be seen as part.³⁶ This study also considers the parallels between Plutarch's approach in the *apologiai* and other orators and philosophers of the Second Sophistic. Whitmarsh argues that Plutarch's concept of universal Hellenic παιδεία exists in opposition to his perception of different cultures. He maintains that this Hellenic παιδεία manifests predominately in connection with non-Greeks, particularly in the Roman *Lives*. Whitmarsh downplays an analysis of these texts

³³ Swain 1996:183.

³⁴ Pelling 1988a, 1989.

³⁵ Pelling 2000: 331-339. See also Wardman 1974: 222-234 on the relationship of rhetoric and a subject's nature.

³⁶ Schmidt 1999.

as products of literary resistance or subjection to the Roman hegemony. Whitmarsh's examination of exile in his third chapter establishes an important foundation concerning the *apologiai* texts. He demonstrates that exile, and by extension other experiences of misfortune, were important experiences within texts to educate a reader in Platonic philosophy, and in applying the moral lessons about character and action in their everyday lives.³⁷

A separate strand in scholarship has examined the philosophical dimensions of Plutarch's παιδεία. Scholars such as Francesco Becchi and Daniel Babut focused on Plutarch's *Moralia* to understand the development and influences of other philosophical schools and writers upon Plutarch and his moral theory.³⁸ This study also focuses on the philosophical influences to understand Plutarch's purpose in the *apologiai* because of their ethical content. More recently, scholars such as Mark Shiffman have concentrated on the philosophical dimension to counter Swain and other postcolonial interpretations of scholars who view Plutarch primarily as a political writer. The approach of this dissertation follows a similar line of interpretation to Shiffman in his article (2008) 'Plutarch among the Postcolonialists'.³⁹ He argues that issues such as the place of Hellenic or Roman republican freedom against the principate's status quo should not be read as contradictions, or as evidence for subversion and resistance in Plutarch's writing. This is not to say that these issues are not important, but they should be read in connection with Plutarch's self-identification as a Platonic sceptic and dialectical philosopher before his elite status.⁴⁰ Shiffman argues that like Plato and Aristotle, Plutarch believed that the best role for the philosopher was as an advisor to statesmen because the political life was the greatest source of corruption on moral character.⁴¹ Shiffman makes several insightful advances, arguing that Plutarch viewed patriotism and the extreme love of freedom not as positive qualities but as passions deriving from the spirited part of the soul, and that true freedom for Plutarch was only possible in the soul of people whose reason ruled the spirit. This led the study to investigate further and examine why Plutarch entertains different judgements on protagonists' attitudes towards supplication. It is supplication as an act in connection with the protagonist's

³⁷ Whitmarsh 2001: 133-180.

³⁸ Babut 1969a, 1969b, 1996. Becchi 1990.

³⁹ Duff 1999: Duff's work focuses on Plutarch's moralism and moral attitudes within the *Parallel Lives*, Preston 2001.

⁴⁰ Shiffman 2008:224.

⁴¹ The main purpose of Plutarch's essay *On the fact that the philosopher ought most of all to converse with leaders*.

emotional experience within the soul that provides a pathway to understanding Plutarch's authorial intentions.⁴²

Sven-Tage Teodorsson (2008) in her chapter 'The education of rulers in theory (*Mor.*) and practice (*Vitae*)' also disagrees with Swain's interpretation. She examines the idealism of educational models in Plutarch's character portraits.⁴³ Teodorsson demonstrates why παιδεία was so important for Plutarch in putting his ethical systems and ideals into practice. She states that Plutarch understood that his ideal παιδεία was unrealistic, and only a few of the protagonists experience the full and well-rounded education which he envisaged. It is important to be aware, as Teodorsson states, that Plutarch's writings in the *Lives* reflect his perception of contemporary leaders who did not live up to his ideal. Teodorsson examining three essays from the *Moralia* and the *Lives* argues that the inconsistent treatment of nature and character meant that Plutarch did not view παιδεία and its impact on the subject as a more important theme.⁴⁴ She concludes that Plutarch cut down on discussions of the role of education in childhood because he was disappointed by how protagonists applied their learning in adulthood.⁴⁵ Teodorsson demonstrates in her discussion the practical purpose of Plutarch's Platonic philosophy, in teaching the importance of justice, honour, and community values to his audience and the mistake that men make in pursuing a political career due to self-interest. It is this philosophical inquiry which is Plutarch's main intention in his writing of the *apologiai*.

More recently, Lieve Van Hoof (2010) has concentrated on how Plutarch through his philosophical essays attempted to mould his elite audience's ethics and social attitudes. Van Hoof argues that the essays which she examines are important responses to a fundamental issue of Plutarch and his audience, of social responsibility and honour.⁴⁶ The *apologiai* also focus on the same themes and treat the ethical problem in different ways. Van Hoof argues that Plutarch as a philosopher should be placed more within the social-political context of the Second Sophistic and to understand that he uses his moral teachings to promote his role within society. She states that this affects how we interpret his self-representation as a humane and kind philosopher and his conception of a philanthropic society, which is a critical issue in the *apologiai*.⁴⁷

⁴² Shiffman 2008: 226.

⁴³ Teodorsson 2008: 339-350.

⁴⁴ Teodorsson 2008: 347.

⁴⁵ Teodorsson 2008: 349.

⁴⁶ Van Hoof 2010: 12, 31.

⁴⁷ Van Hoof 2010: 79-80.

Sophia Xenophontos (2016) takes a similar approach to Shiffman, focusing on Plutarch's conception of moral education as a type of 'ethical apprenticeship and long-lasting moral training', considering that, though important, Swain and other scholars' approaches diminish the philosophical significance of Plutarch's work.⁴⁸ Plutarch perceives social and cultural institutions, for example, the Roman military through a pedagogical lens, and perceives hierarchies and roles as a teacher-student relationship. Her study demonstrates that in biography in contrast with philosophy, a person's character can change due to events within one's life or education. The literary idea of the correction and revision (ἐπανόρθωσις) of texts is highly significant because Plutarch applies it also to the development of peoples' moral character and virtue.⁴⁹ This is an important observation of the relationship in Plutarch's mind behind literature, philosophical education and interpretation, which can be detected in the philosopher's manipulation of the sources because of his interest in character. In Xenophontos' discussion of the philosopher's place in politics, through her reading of Plutarch's essay *Political Precepts*, she makes the important point that Plutarch adapts his moralism to the harsh Roman political climate and makes his readers understand that the political pursuits of the past, as exhibited in the statesmen and generals of the *Parallel Lives*, should be abandoned.⁵⁰ Instead, these examples should be the main tools of the moralism which the philosopher uses to advise Roman statesmen and to control the people.⁵¹ The *apologiai* are beneficial examples of the same moralism because they demonstrate both the mistakes of leaders pursuing personal glory and self-interest and the importance of φιλανθρωπία within the army, family and cities.

Educational models within the biographies

Few scholars have examined the role of educational models in Plutarch's characterisation of his protagonists. Tim Duff in his article (2008) 'Models of education in Plutarch' investigates how Plutarch writes about education and childhood in the *Lives*. Duff's work was influenced by the approaches of Christopher Gill and Christopher Pelling who argued that Plutarch's *Lives* contain generally the static model of character development.⁵² In this model, the protagonist's educational experience shapes his behaviour as an adult. The developmental model focuses on how character can be shaped by environmental factors and education after

⁴⁸ Xenophontos 2016: 13 for quote see page 29.

⁴⁹ Xenophontos 2016: 89.

⁵⁰ Plutarch achieves this by showing how as a philosopher and statesman he succeeds within society.

⁵¹ Xenophontos 2016: 148-149.

⁵² Duff 2008: 1. s.1 see Gill 1983, Pelling 1988a.

childhood. The two models of the ‘illustrative’ and ‘developmental’ are only found in particular types of discourse, the anecdotal and analytical passages, and the latter seen in Plato.⁵³ Duff recognises that there is a connection between Plutarch’s use of anecdotes in his narratives of several protagonists’ childhoods and the use of the same material in law-court speeches which contain a static depiction of their character.⁵⁴ He does not expand further on the importance of this model within the rhetorical tradition and Plutarch’s writing. I examine in each chapter how Plutarch uses the *apologia* within the biographical narrative, which shows evidence of the static character model.

Plutarch’s conception of philosophical παιδεία has been argued for in the *Lives*. One important aspect which scholars have debated is the role of literary-ethical imitation (μίμησις).⁵⁵ Hugo Francisco Bauzá (2002) examining the *Lives* argues that they have a ‘didactic-moralising’ purpose and that the biographies served as examples of imitation to their audiences.⁵⁶ He explains that, for Plutarch, character was defined in accounts of deeds, in contrast with descriptions of παιδεία or the nature of one’s temperament. Bauzá is right to emphasise the role of the ‘dramatic’ writing form as a tool, and he underlines the role of the Socratic *apologia* in this regard, alongside other examples of Greek and Latin literature as influences behind Plutarch’s project and method. Bauzá detects a relationship between the privileging of certain virtues such as justice, courage and loyalty concerning several positive examples of παιδεία and protagonists’ character.⁵⁷ Ricardo Isidro Piñero Moral (2002) writing in the same volume *Plutarco Educador da Europa*, examines Plutarch’s use of the literary aesthetic as an educational tool, in particular poetic narratives because the vividness of this style and form encourages further study and moral inquiry.⁵⁸

Aurelio Pérez Jiménez (2002) ‘Exemplum: the paradigmatic education of the ruler in the *Lives*’ analyses the theoretical and practical uses of the biographies as works of imitation.⁵⁹ The mimesis theory plays a fundamental role in Plutarch’s political teachings. He argues that the placement of the imitation episode within the structure of the biography informs the reader about the protagonist’s future success or failure as a political leader.⁶⁰ His examination of the role of imitation and education in the *Lives* indicates that the *apologiai*

⁵³ Pl. *Rep.* 8.547B-C for example. See Duff 2008: 21-22.

⁵⁴ Duff 2008: 19.

⁵⁵ Teodorsson 2005: 662 explains that the *Lives* were conceived for this purpose.

⁵⁶ Bauzá 2002: 181-194.

⁵⁷ Bauzá 2002:193.

⁵⁸ Piñero Moral 2002: 221-231.

⁵⁹ Pérez Jiménez 2002: 105.

⁶⁰ Pérez Jiménez 2002: 107-108.

should also be examined as a fundamental part of Plutarch's philosophical education of his readers in virtue.

Geert Roskam (2002) in a chapter entitled 'A Paideia for the Ruler. Plutarch's Dream of Collaboration between Philosopher and Ruler' examines Plutarch's perspective of the role of the philosopher as an active political figure within the landscape of Roman hegemony, focusing his attention on the essay *Precepts of Statecraft*. It was Plutarch's view that the philosopher had to be politically engaged within society, and that he would use the mild method of persuasion and slowly educate the people in virtue. Plutarch understood politics as a moral education of the citizens. Secondly, the philosopher had a role in educating the rulers of the community. Roskam notes the importance for Plutarch of speech in contrast with accounts of deeds, and also the style of discourse in his educational programme.⁶¹ Roskam finds that Plutarch was particularly interested in establishing friendships and that there needed to be a balanced relationship between those in power and his supporters and associates. This is significant because the same theme of friendship and social order of leaders as politicians and generals is highlighted in the context of the *Lives* containing *apologiai*. The *apologiai* provide complex, and problematic teachings on the nature of leadership.

The treatise which has received the most scholarly attention as to the conception and application of παιδεία by Plutarch is undoubtedly his essay *How to Study Poetry*. Suzanne Saïd (2005) analyses the text and considers the nature of poetry and the Platonic tradition on Plutarch. Poetry, she finds, has a special nature as an art and faculty of mimesis for the philosopher. Plutarch, using the same analysis as Plato on poetry, comes to different conclusions for its use and interpretation. Saïd concludes that Plutarch in contrast with Plato's negative interpretation considered that poetry had a positive ethical benefit for readers. Saïd also highlights that poetry functioned as an important educational medium for young students in preparation for philosophical learning.⁶² In the same collected volume, Manfred Kraus (2005) identifies the treatise's importance as a source for Plutarch's pedagogy and examines the influence of Platonic and Aristotelian traditions. He finds that Plato's influence and place in the work are infrequent and indirect, but present as a point of reference in Plutarch's response. Kraus also recognises the strong use of metaphorical language in the treatise particularly the use of medicinal language; this has important implications for understanding

⁶¹ Plut. *Ad principem inerud.* 779F-780B apud Roskam 2002: 180.

⁶² Saïd 2005:147–176.

the image of the teacher as a philosopher for Plutarch.⁶³ In terms of ethical content and sources, the Platonic and Peripatetic tradition influenced Plutarch in the majority of the *apologiai*, and is detectable in allusions and themes. The medical image of a physician curing a patient's soul is particularly significant in Themistocles' *apologia* to the Persian King.

Plutarch considered that an individual, who had experienced a one-sided παιδεία, consisting of a purely physical or military training or philosophical education, would fail to master their passions. The *apologiai* serve as important models of education and human behaviour, for example, Cato the Younger's argument is right that a man should use his judgement; however, his violent actions and desire for suicide undermine it, and Themistocles educates the King that it is better to control passions, particularly anger and reconcile with his enemies.⁶⁴ There has been a great amount of scholarly investigation of emotions in the ancient world and in Plutarch, but this review will focus on the most significant literature which has discussed the most important passions which appear as themes in the *apologiai*: shame and honour, anger, ambition and love of war, and their relation to παιδεία.

One significant part of Pelling's edited volume (2002) *Plutarch and History : Eighteen Studies*, his own chapter 'Rhetoric, Paideia, And Psychology in Plutarch's Lives', addresses the impact of the lack of παιδεία on the lives of some protagonists who possess a similar character trait of contentiousness (φιλονεικία). Pelling finds that contentiousness has both positive and negative effects, these protagonists are successful in battle; however, they fail in their personal and political affairs. This reflects the two meanings of the word as the love of victory or rivalry.⁶⁵ More recently, Kristine Trego (2013) in her chapter 'Competition in Context: philonikia in Agesilaus-Pompey' has argued that Plutarch's experience as a diplomat on Roman embassies shaped his view of politics in the biographies. Internal rivalries were still a critical issue in the Greek cities under Roman rule.⁶⁶ The trait is important in connection with the *apologiai* because in all the speeches the protagonist defends his character in terms of his reputation. The protagonists, however, do not attack their main antagonists, instead blaming their community who had acted against them. The *apologiai* are a critical part of the moral frameworks of the biographies, they are complex dialogues because of how the protagonist responds in the opposite way to that expected by their friends and enemies. The evidence of the *apologiai* in connection with contentiousness

⁶³ Kraus 2005: 333–341.

⁶⁴ Plut. *Cat. Min* 68.4-5, 69.1-3, *Them.* 28.2.

⁶⁵ Pelling 2002:339-348 s.24 on the evidence of Plutarch's use of the term and in previous literature.

⁶⁶ Trego 2013: 66-68.

and other similar passions, which is the opposite of φιλανθρωπία, indicates that the protagonist could have taken different choices in life, reconciling with his enemies and ensuring civil concord in different states. Philip Stadter (2015) also considers the importance of contentiousness in the *Agesilaus-Pompey* in his chapter ‘Competition and its Costs’ making several similar observations as Pelling. Stadter observes while discussing the *Agesilaus*, that contentiousness becomes a destructive value for Agesilaus’ and Sparta’s fortunes when he changes from a diplomatic policy of befriending his enemies to punishing them through war. This reflects a view of Plutarch that there needed to be competitiveness in politics; however, he recognised the dangers of civil discord if rivalries became extreme. Stadter makes an important conclusion that the passion was only desirable for Greeks fighting to preserve their freedom and destructive in other contexts.⁶⁷ Stadter concludes that Plutarch’s differing political judgements of his protagonists acting due to or without contentiousness are representative of his view of political pragmatism.⁶⁸

Φιλανθρωπία in civil society and friendship

It was Plutarch’s view that a good leader must safeguard at all costs the government of his city, and keep order. This is achieved by acts of φιλανθρωπία, of human kindness and generosity between different members of society. The problem is that societies such as the Macedonian successor kingdoms, the Roman state at the time of Cato the Younger, and the Republic in Coriolanus were not peaceful examples of civil concord. Φιλανθρωπία is the main virtue produced as a result of Greek παιδεία, and it appears as a product associated with civilisation in contrast with barbarian, non-Roman cultures. Hubert Martin Jr. (1961) surveyed Plutarch’s use of the term in the biographies and came to this conclusion of the civilising role of φιλανθρωπία. In his discussion, he recognised that the term had a different meaning in cases of grace and gratitude involving conquerors concerning suppliants. Martin Jr. did not follow up the results of his survey further, since it is how Plutarch speaks about φιλανθρωπία and human interactions about the issues of moral justice and advantage which are critical. Martin Jr. cited the Sulla passage as an example of courtesy but Plutarch’s interpretation in the *Comparison* is more significant.⁶⁹ Plutarch praises the Roman conqueror for not acting with courtesy until he received the surrender of Asia and other objects of

⁶⁷ Stadter 2015: 270-285.

⁶⁸ Stadter 2015: 284-285.

⁶⁹ Plut. *Sull.* 24 apud Martin Jr. 1961: 169.

exchange.⁷⁰ Plutarch judges that if Sulla had acted philanthropically before these concessions, he would have acted for his advantage instead of in the interests of the Roman community.

The collected volume (2008) *Ética e Paideia em Plutarco* was an important contribution to the study of Plutarch's ethical and educational teaching in the *Lives*. José Ribeiro Ferreira in three chapters of the same volume, analyses how Plutarch's ideal protagonist of the *Lives* possesses many values and is also a friend of the people. Ribeiro Ferreira argues that the significance of φιλανθρωπία can be seen in how Plutarch applies different political identities to protagonists, for example, Coriolanus as an example of the oligarch. Ferreira demonstrates in the chapter entitled 'Os Valores de Plutarco e sua Actualidade' how it is the display of certain moral virtues which reflect and explain a protagonist's character and indicates his intelligence. This is a crucial element that will be uncovered in this study. Ferreira concludes his work by drawing attention to the great significance of civil concord and φιλανθρωπία, in association with the theme of friendship in Plutarch's philosophy.⁷¹ This is a key area to focus on within the *apologiai* scenes because reconciliation or enmity are the key choices posed in the majority of the *apologiai*.

The symbolic role of παιδεία in relation to Hellenic values such as φιλανθρωπία and friendship in the community has been raised by some scholars. Roberto Augusto Míouez (2005) addresses the influence of classical traditions on Plutarch's conception of friendship. Friendship was an important issue because it was considered as the intended outcome of politics and for the generation of justice in society.⁷² Francesco Becchi (2009) argues in his chapter that Plutarch was concerned with a loss of friendship and φιλανθρωπία in his lifetime. Plutarch considers that the cause of this loss was due to a material corruption and moral inability of his aristocratic class to control their passions and that humankind's nature had degenerated due to its vices into an unnatural state. Becchi's focus is on Plutarch, but he does acknowledge the existence of this trope in other authors by his references to the Galen's writings and his discussion of Lucian's *On Friendship*.⁷³ He notes that Plutarch criticises Cato the Elder's treatment of his slaves as unphilanthropic because he only cares for their utility as physical tools. Utility is an issue of significance in the *Coriolanus* and *Eumenes*. Becchi briefly examines the influence of Aristotle's and the Peripatetics' conception of

⁷⁰ Plut. *Comp. Lys. Sull.* 5.2.

⁷¹ Ferreira 2008: 99-122.

⁷² Augusto Míouez 2005: 185-90.

⁷³ Becchi 2009: 264-267.

φιλανθρωπία on Plutarch, which is underlined by the biographer's use of language and sources in the *Cato the Younger*, *Themistocles* and potentially the *Eumenes*.⁷⁴

Plutarch's φιλανθρωπία as a concept of human kindness is coloured by his bias towards barbarian races. Gennaro D'Ippolito (2005) in a chapter 'Filantropia, ellenocentrismo e polietnismo in Plutarco' examines this aspect of his φιλανθρωπία. D'Ippolito's main argument concerns Plutarch's conception of φιλανθρωπία reveals his Greek and Roman bias towards barbarian, uncivilised races, influenced as he was by older authors such as Plato and Isocrates.⁷⁵ It was only in recent times, since the late 1980s, that scholars reevaluated Plutarch's differing outlook upon uncivilised or Hellenic races. The role of φιλανθρωπία and Hellenism are products of a culture which can be attained by the Romans and the Greeks. D'Ippolito makes an important argument that Plutarch criticises the tendency for both races to engage in civil conflicts instead of conquering barbarian nations because they possess shared values.⁷⁶ D'Ippolito concludes with an important insight, that Plutarch's interpretation of the role of Alexander the Great as a philanthropic and Hellenised leader bringing different nations together prefigured the Roman empire's role in the world. It is remarkable, that only in *Themistocles' apologia* we find a Greek leader able to bridge the gap and make a foreign king learn through Greek παιδεία the value of φιλανθρωπία.

Apologia, supplication and moral characterisation

Plutarch, in his use of a saying of the Cynic philosopher Diogenes, reveals that the best way a man can defend himself from his enemies is by displaying his moral virtue or character.⁷⁷ The problem, however, is that men interpreted virtue in different ways and it was difficult for a leader or general who possessed virtue and honour to supplicate another. In all four Plutarchan speeches, the critical issue is the protagonist's attitude, specifically his rejection of supplication, and whether he shows consistency on this point. Scholars for a long time have distinguished Plutarch's writing of biography from other genres and examples of literature such as the encomium and *apologia*. George Harrison, in his examination of some literary innovations in Plutarch's corpus states that the philosopher 'forged the recounting of men's lives into a tool for illustrating ethical biography, saving it from the excesses of encomium and *apologia*.' However, this rather neglects the role and significance of these literary

⁷⁴ Becchi 2009: 263-272.

⁷⁵ D' Ippolito 2005: 179-194.

⁷⁶ Plut. *Pomp.* 70 apud D' Ippolito 2005: 185 s.23.

⁷⁷ Plut. *De cap. ex inim.* 88B.

strategies which are present in miniature form in contrast with the length of Plato's and Xenophon's Socratic *apologiai*.⁷⁸

Apologia as a genre influenced Plutarch in his writing of the biographies. This is important because Plutarch was influenced by and extremely familiar with these speeches, which underpinned his view that a speaker had to be careful in their use of self-praise. Scholars have for a long period discussed the issue of the use of appeals for pity, which includes supplication within *apologiai* and forensic speeches. Sonja Tanner (2017) in her analysis of Plato's characterisation of Socrates in his *apologia* argues that he deliberately differs in his approach to the sophist Gorgias in his *Apologia of Palamedes*. Though Palamedes is innocent, he feels he must use persuasion to gain his audience's trust, and this includes his refusal to supplicate because he views his Greek jury as unjust. This act of supplication would have engendered in the jury a sense of pity for the defendant. Plato's Socrates is the opposite case: he will not use persuasion to appeal to his audience, and he considers that judgement should be based only upon his actions, not on the reception of his speech. Socrates also considers that it is his role to teach and persuade, whereas as judges the jury should not punish or gratify due to their feelings.⁷⁹ Tanner's main point of interpretation is that Plato's Socrates' impassivity to his audience is due to his characterisation as a comic hero.⁸⁰

Despite the significance of *apologiai* as didactic discourses, particularly in the four Lives and the corpus as a whole, there has not been a comprehensive analysis of Plutarch's use of them to date. This investigation will attempt to address that need. Broadly speaking this study will examine several different narrative layers and applications of the *apologiai*. It will separate the intentions and perspective of the biographical subjects within the text from Plutarch as an author communicating to an external audience. The following methodology will be employed. First, this study will conduct a full textual analysis of the speeches, with a particular focus on the use of rhetorical techniques, vocabulary, themes, and character models and intertextual references. Throughout this study, there will be an investigation into why Plutarch as a philosopher and politician made different literary decisions in his use of sources for the *apologiai* and *Lives*. In the second section, I will consider why Plutarch wrote the *apologia* in relation to the evidence of the other life. Why does Plutarch emphasise different

⁷⁸ Harrison 2000: 194.

⁷⁹ Tanner 2017: 1.

⁸⁰ Tanner 2017:12-16.

themes and character traits through the moral framework operating across the two biographies? The parallelism between the pair, most notably in the *Comparisons*, can lead to an explanation of why Plutarch made deliberate literary decisions in his writing of *apologiai*. In chapters two and three the *Comparison* does not survive with the biographies, so I focus on the evidence of the Lives to analyse Plutarch's interpretation of the protagonists' moral character. In the final section of each chapter, I examine the significance of the *apologia* by understanding its place within the narrative.

The following four case studies are the basis of individual chapters and have been chosen because they are the only examples of eponymous protagonists' *apologiai* in extended direct speech. Chapter one examines why Plutarch framed Eumenes' *apologia* to his Macedonian troops as a didactic discussion instead of his supplication. Eumenes appeals for the means to commit suicide, a noble death, opposed to the shameful fate of captivity. I argue that Plutarch deliberately undermines a positive representation of Eumenes in the *apologia* and his captivity, by his manipulation of the themes of justice, impiety and self-interest. The *apologia* is a problematic didactic discourse when compared with Plutarch's final judgement of Eumenes as a suppliant, seen in the *Comparison*.⁸¹

In chapter two, Cato's *apologia* scene presents a similar context of a leader desiring to commit suicide. He also perceives his situation as captivity, and he accuses his son in his first speech. The nature of Cato's opposite point of view to his friends and family is highlighted in his attitude to the supplication of his son. I argue that although Cato's *apologia* may present the protagonist as a rational leader and a philosopher, there is a conflict with his rational speech and his use of force. This does not mean that there is a controversy in terms of the representation of his character, but there is an issue in Cato's failed imitation of the death of Socrates, which shows that his suicide is mistaken. I argue that Plutarch through Cato's *apologia* makes a statement about the different attitudes and methods of the statesmen Phocion and Cato to supplication as a form of compromise or surrender.

Chapters three and four are also closely connected in terms of the educational message of reconciliation and the removal of anger in antagonists. However, both Themistocles and Coriolanus use their misfortunes as exempla for their antagonist's display of virtue in different ways. In chapter three, I argue that Plutarch uses Themistocles' *apologia* as a positive example of how a leader can use his philosophical παιδεία to improve the morals of a barbarian and tyrant, and for this reason the biographer does not condemn his

⁸¹ Plut. *Comp. Sert. Eum.* 2.4.

supplication. Only after Themistocles' death does the King realise the value of φιλάνθρωπία, which Themistocles attempted to instil in his soul through the *apologia*. The positive portrait of Themistocles is seen in how Plutarch judges his protagonist's death as a suicide. This act functions as a rejection of Artaxerxes' plan to use Themistocles as a general against the Athenians. Plutarch viewed this political action favourably in respect of his patriotism, and I will argue that he did not consider Themistocles to have betrayed the Persians. The purpose of Themistocles' *apologia* was the employment Greek παιδεία in a moral-political sense on the rule of the Persian King, and not in terms of military service. As a positive response to exile and mistreatment, Themistocles' *apologia* resonates with Roman and Greek speakers' concerns in Plutarch's contemporary society and in the later Second Sophistic. Additionally, as a positive example of *apologia*, using the scholarship on chronology, I will argue that the other three *apologiai* should be viewed as difficult and negative advancements on this declamation form.

Chapter four considers Coriolanus' *apologia* as an inversion of the noble Themistocles' speech, and it employs a similar methodology and authorial intention. This is revealed by Plutarch's sophisticated rewriting of the *apologia* in the *Roman Antiquities* by Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The main differences can be seen in Plutarch's depiction of Coriolanus' view of supplication as a negative theme in relation to his character and the portrayal of protagonists as tragic actors. Plutarch's Coriolanus uses the supplication and his *apologia* to ally with his enemy Tullus, because he shares the same vengeance. Coriolanus only cares about utility and self-interest; his arguments in his *apologia* concern how his vengeance and military skills will benefit the Volscians. Coriolanus' *apologia* is extremely problematic because the protagonist does not use it for reconciliation. I will also discuss how Plutarch uses the chameleon-like Alcibiades in his exile as a parallel to Coriolanus.

Chapter 1: The *apologia* of Eumenes

Introduction

The *apologia* of Eumenes presents a heroic and flawed image of the protagonist. Plutarch poses a question of whether self-interest is superior to justice. This is a complex problem because of the participants' different motivations. Eumenes' army ransoms their general for the return of their baggage. Plutarch states that Eumenes' purpose was to discuss the army's interests, while the speech indicates that self-interest motivates the general in his desire to have his sword, a symbol of his honour, restored to him. Eumenes' conclusion in his *apologia* is controversial because Eumenes condemns the Macedonians, who had committed the greatest betrayal but also judges them as just and pious if they support his suicide.

This chapter argues that Plutarch's underlying interpretation in the *apologia* is that self-interest motivated Eumenes instead of moral justice. This is seen by Plutarch's depiction of Eumenes' opponents, such as Antigonus who undermines the protagonist's self-representation as a successful general in his communications with his soldiers on the issue of interests. Interpretation of his character is problematic because Eumenes' main trait is his fidelity (πίστις) to his word and loyalty to the Argead house, the royal Macedonian house. An inconsistency between his speech and action explains Plutarch's literary method as a narrator and why he rejects the *apologia* as a supplication speech in the main narrative whereas in the final *Comparison* he judges Eumenes negatively in his death as a suppliant of his conqueror. This interpretation is the outcome of a line of reasoning that Eumenes was responsible for his defeat and death because of an emotional desire to pursue war instead of peace.

First this study considers the *apologia*'s significance as a poetical and educational dialogue vis-à-vis Plutarch's approach to reading such texts as seen in his *How to study Poetry*. After this, I will analyse the entire speech, as well as Plutarch's literary intentions by comparing his text with surviving sources. Plutarch's dissenting interpretation of Eumenes can be explained by his use of the first supplication speech in Duris of Samos' historical narrative of the mutiny and by the decision to not include the second where Eumenes yields to his anger. For the majority of his narrative, Plutarch used Hieronymus of Cardia's apologetic account; however, the biographer's underlying critical interpretation suggests Duris' influence. Our knowledge of these lost histories relies upon later accounts, such as

Diodorus of Sicily for Hieronymus. The *Epitome of Pompeius Trogus' Philippic Histories* written by Justin in the third century CE preserves traces of Duris' account.¹ Brian Bosworth argues that the *Epitome* contains a similar message to Plutarch's, which this study agrees with. Bosworth considers that the speech is a faithful depiction of Trogus' account unlike other parts of the *Epitome*.² In the analysis of the Latin text, this study follows John Yardley's research methods, by examining whether there is an influence of earlier sources, for example, the writers Livy and Cicero, who are closer in time to Trogus' original, instead of later influences such as Quintilian. In the second section, I turn to the *Sertorius* and consider how Plutarch juxtaposes both protagonists through the themes of φιλανθρωπία and παιδεία, courage and the love of war. I demonstrate how Plutarch's use of these themes shapes his interpretation of Eumenes' supplication in his death scene. In the third section, I will examine the significance of supplication as a theme in Plutarch's judgement of Eumenes in the *Comparison*.³

Eumenes (c. 362-316 BCE) was a citizen of Cardia in the Chersonese. He was of Greek ethnicity, distinguished from the Macedonians and foreign cultures that he interacted with. He was originally the private secretary of Philip II and Alexander III of Macedon, and under the latter, he served as a cavalry commander. After Alexander's death, in the wars of the Diadochi, he fought as a general in support of the royal Argead house, but his army ransomed Eumenes after the battle of Gabiene (316 BCE) to Antigonus I Monophthalmus in exchange for their lost baggage. Eumenes died in captivity. His friend and companion Hieronymus of Cardia, who was perhaps his nephew, wrote a positive and useful account of Eumenes' life while in the service of Antigonus and his son Demetrius.⁴

The content of Eumenes' *apologia* is as follows: Eumenes asks his army to consider the trophy which they are setting up by surrendering and ransoming their general, with the one that Antigonus would have imagined before the battle. He indicates that his soldiers are abandoning their victory because they value their possessions more than their weapons. Eumenes believes because he has been betrayed by his allies, and not by his enemies, he should be viewed as undefeated. The second part of his *apologia* concerns his relationship with the Macedonians. Eumenes makes the argument that if they give him back his sword or allow him to kill himself he will judge that they have always acted with justice

¹ Yardley, Wheatley, & Heckel 2011: 6-7 argue that Trogus used a second source alongside Hieronymus.

² Bosworth 1992:63-64.

³ I have used Robin Waterfield's translation of the *Eumenes*, except where stated otherwise. I have also used Waterfield's translation of Diodorus. I consulted Yardley's translation of Justin's *Epitome*.

⁴ Arr. *Ind.* 18.7 apud Anson 2004: 11 s.20. Also see Geiger 1995: 174-175, Waterfield 2016: 139.

and piety. This shows that in his desire for a noble death, Eumenes is willing to ignore his army's betrayal and the oaths that his men made to him.

In the introduction of the *Eumenes*, Plutarch sets out an interpretative framework of Eumenes' character, and it parallels with the philosopher's educational method seen in his essay *How to study Poetry*. The student should approach poetic texts as an education, and not in the same way as the rhetorician's interest in style which was for the sake of pleasure.⁵ Plutarch states that the student, whose interest is in moral character, would be drawn to three of the four cardinal virtues 'toward manliness or sobriety or uprightness' (τῶν πρὸς ἀνδρείαν ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ δικαιοσύνην).⁶ All of these virtues are of paramount importance in the *apologia* and biography. Using a short speech by Diomedes to the wise Odysseus, Plutarch indicates that the 'wise and prudent man' faced with destruction fulfilled these virtues because of his fear of dishonour instead of death.⁷ These are the two key issues in all of the *apologiai*: the protagonist's mental faculties and his conception of honour. Problems arise when men do not use their reason properly, leading to an imbalanced reaction to honour and death. This is the practical and moral benefit of reading texts, and Plutarch designed the *apologia* to be read in the same way; however, the main question is whether Eumenes' speech is consistent with his deeds:

δύο δὴ περιγίγνεται μεγάλα τοῖς τῶν ποιημάτων ἐπιμελῶς ἐθιζομένοις ἀκούειν, τὸ μὲν εἰς μετριότητα, μηδενὶ τύχην ἐπαχθῶς καὶ ἀνοήτως ὄνειδιζέειν, τὸ δ' εἰς μεγαλοφροσύνην, αὐτοῦς χρησαμένους τύχαις μὴ ταπεινοῦσθαι μηδὲ ταραττεσθαι, φέρειν δὲ πρῶως καὶ σκώμματα καὶ λοιδορίας καὶ γέλωτας,

Two great advantages accrue to those who accustom themselves carefully to peruse the works of poetry: the first is conducive to moderation, that we do not odiously and foolishly reproach anybody with his fortune; while the second is conducive to magnanimity, that when we ourselves have met with chances and changes we be not humiliated or even disturbed, but bear gently with scuffings and revilings and ridicule.

Plut. *Quomodo adul.* 35C. Trans. F.C. Babbitt.

The language of the extract emphasises the physical and mental processes involved in reading as an educational practice. Richard Hunter argues that this reading of poetry, which Plutarch advocates as an aid in the experiencing of misfortune, serves as a response to Plato's negative view of poetry.⁸ Plato considered that poetry as a medium of emulation could influence immoral and destructive human behaviour. Similarly, Eumenes' *apologia* is a

⁵ Plut. *De gen.* 575C, Phld. *Rhet.* 2.49-50.

⁶ Plut. *Quomodo adul.* 30E.

⁷ Hom. *Il.* 11.313.

⁸ Pl. *Resp.* 3.376D-398C, Pl. *Grg.* 527C6-D2 apud Hunter & Russell 2011:199.

poetic dialogue owing to the presence of high prose rhythm. This rhythm is clear in the repetition of endings in the sentences and phrases.⁹ This can be seen in the following passage, where I have underlined Plutarch's use of rhythm:

οὐκ ἄρα δεινὸν ἦν κρατοῦντας ὑμᾶς ἦτταν ἐξομολογεῖσθαι διὰ τὰς ἀποσκευάς,
ὡς ἐν τοῖς χρήμασιν,
οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις τοῦ κρατεῖν ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα πέμπετε λύτρον τῆς ἀποσκευῆς,

Plut. *Eum.* 17.3

This demonstrates Plutarch's authorial intentions because only a portion of speeches and narratives in the *Lives* use this rhythm. Orations in direct speech are relatively rare in the *Parallel Lives*. Bosworth maintains that Plutarch chose to include this declamation by Eumenes, whereas there is no comparable speech in the *Sertorius*.¹⁰ Sertorius was a capable orator due to his education.¹¹ There is a higher density of rhythm in the second pair. Bosworth explains this trend in paired books with the rhetorical practice of declamation: the second speech was meant to have a greater impact on the reader.¹² Aristotle describes this use of prose rhythm as a rhetorical technique, calling it the even balancing of the clauses (παρίσῳσις).¹³ In his essay *On Listening*, Plutarch's sole use of the term fits into his view of style as having a deceptive purpose.¹⁴ He applies it to speeches of sophists who concentrate upon their use of vocabulary to hide their thoughts from their audience and employ rhetorical techniques to bewitch their audiences. The rhetorical techniques of even balancing and antithesis (ἀντιθετικός) are close to the rhetorical device called isocolon (ἰσόκωλον). An isocolon can be defined as the equal length or structure of the sentences and phrases.¹⁵ Plutarch singles out the orator Isocrates as a focus of his criticism, arguing that his interest in techniques and isocolon is symbolic of a life misspent. Plutarch preferred the political or active life over a theoretical or inactive alternative. Plutarch used a short saying of Isocrates about his great fear of death to support his negative perspective, juxtaposing this with the orator's literary appreciation of military combat.¹⁶ This has important implications for

⁹ Hutchinson 2018: 4.

¹⁰ Plut. *Sert.* 2.2 apud Bosworth 1992: 82 s.48.

¹¹ Plut. *Sert.* 2.

¹² Hutchinson 2018: 46.

¹³ Ar. *Rhet.* 3.09.

¹⁴ Plut. *De Recta.* 41C-D.

¹⁵ LSJ s.v. ἰσόκρατος: sentence constructed of equal members.

¹⁶ Plut. *De glor. Ath.* 350 D-E citing Isoc. *Panegy.* 86. Also Plut. *Comp. Dem. Cic.* 2.1.10. Plutarch's negative view parallels other writers: Gell. *NA.* 18.9.9, Lucil. 5. De Blois & Bons 1992: 167-169, 187 argue that Plutarch knew of Isocrates' speeches and the Isocratean tradition through Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Cf. Harrison 1987: 274.

reading Eumenes' speech-acts, including his *apologia* as sophistic and problematic discourses.¹⁷

As noted by scholars discussing the lost histories of the wars of the Diadochi, there were important differences between two main sources in their handling of the conspiracy of the Silver Shields and Eumenes' death. Considering our knowledge of Hieronymus' historiographical method, it is unlikely that he wrote an *apologia* of Eumenes.¹⁸ The rejection of rhetorical and pathetic features reflected Hieronymus' concern in providing a truthful account of events, following his positive view of Eumenes.¹⁹ His positive and detailed account of Eumenes' generalship seen in Diodorus of Sicily's account would have been an important source for Plutarch.²⁰ Hieronymus' framework served as the basis of Plutarch's characterisation of Eumenes:

τὸ μὲν οὖν εὐτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς φύσει μικροὺς συνεπικουρίζει τοῖς φρονήμασιν, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τι μέγεθος περὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ ὄγκον, ἐκ πραγμάτων ὑπερεχόντων ἀποβλεπομένους· ὁ δ' ἀληθῶς μεγαλόφρων καὶ βέβαιος ἐν τοῖς σφάλμασι μᾶλλον καὶ ταῖς δυσημερίαις ἀναφέρων γίνεταί κατάδηλος, ὥσπερ Εὐμενής.

Now, even people of no real worth get puffed up with pride when they meet with good fortune, and gain a certain aura of grandeur and dignity as they gaze from the height of their success, but greatness and strength of will are revealed more by a man's conduct during setbacks and failures. Eumenes is a case in point.

Plut. *Eum.* 9.1.

This passage appears at the critical halfway point of the *Eumenes* and features Plutarch's thoughts on how the magnanimous man endures and succeeds in misfortunes. Plutarch contrasts the deceiving appearance of magnanimity in men of inferior natures with the real thing. The language supports the interpretation of his inferiority because Eumenes in the narrative displays his intelligence and success as a result of fortune, which involves power, instead of innate virtue. The use of the adverb, truly (ἀληθῶς) in connection with magnanimity reveals the biographer's critical interpretation of Hieronymus. Diodorus represents Eumenes as a man who showed intelligence in his approach to misfortunes.²¹ Diodorus stresses among the other qualities, Eumenes' fidelity attracted supporters. Plutarch

¹⁷ Plut. *Eum.*1.1. Scholars argue that Plutarch relied on Duris' narrative in the *Eumenes*: Gattinoni 1997: 119, Anson 1977: 255, Anson 2013:103, Hornblower 1981: 66. Bosworth 1992: 56 says that the rhetorical schools used Eumenes' speech as a model.

¹⁸ Sacks 1990: 99 Diodorus may have excised speeches from Timaeus and Hieronymus s.66 cites Simpson 1959: 374. Anson 2004: 11 Hieronymus' history did not contain speeches. Hieronymus' writings were not rhetorical, *POxy* 4808. Col 2.

¹⁹ Hornblower 1981: 108.

²⁰ Diod. Sic. 18.16-19.12-47.

²¹ Diod. Sic. 18.42.2.

ignores these traits in connection with a judgement upon magnanimity because he viewed them as responsible for his successes and failures as a character.

At the same time, Plutarch used a ‘tragic’ account of Eumenes, which portrayed him as a suppliant, to undercut and question Hieronymus. Plutarch shows his knowledge of Duris’ *History* at the beginning of the biography.²² Plutarch expressed his judgement of Duris’ writing, that they were more fitting for tragedy, not history or biography.²³ Duris’ view of his history and its participants was moralistic and he may have been influenced by the Peripatetics.²⁴ The evidence suggests that Duris focused upon the style of his writing and his speeches contained poetic rhythm, as scholars argue.²⁵ Others detect the influence of tragedy and epic upon Duris as a writer.²⁶ Plutarch’s use of a ‘tragic history’ fits in with trends and methods argued for in other Hellenistic *Lives*. Of course, epic influenced all Greek tragedy and historiography, as Frank Walbank argued.²⁷ Plutarch’s choice to use Duris’ history was due to his shared interest in character and mimesis.²⁸

Duris’ account from the evidence of Justin’s epitome portrayed Eumenes consistently as a flatterer, using speech to deceive and persuade. Justin states that Eumenes used supplication to gain the support of the Silver Shields. This meeting occurred while Eumenes was in flight; however, Plutarch says the Silver Shields’ commanders welcomed their new general, instead of focusing on their envy:²⁹

Itaque Eumenes blandimentis agere, suppliciter singulos adloqui, nunc conmiliones suos, nunc patronos appellans, periculorum orientalium socios, nunc refugia salutis suae et unica praesidia.

Eumenes, therefore, proceeded with flattering entreaties addressed to them individually, now hailing them as ‘comrades’ and ‘protectors’, now styling them variously his ‘partners in the dangers of the East’ and ‘the last hope for his survival and his sole protection’.

Just. *Epit.* 14.2.8.

²² Plut. *Eum.* 1.1.

²³ Plut. *Per.* 28.1-3.

²⁴ The influence of the Peripatetics on Duris’ moralism and writing of history is an area of great debate in scholarship: Kebric 1972: 19-39, Kebric 1974: 286-7 argues there is no evidence that Duris studied under the Peripatetics. Dalby 1991: 541 argues that the Peripatetics influenced Duris but he was not a student. Cf. Okin 1982, Baron 2011: 93, Pownall 2013: 43.

²⁵ Yardley, Wheatley, & Heckel 2011: 7.

²⁶ Kebric 1972: 22-27.

²⁷ Walbank 1955, Walbank 1960. Cf. Marincola 2003.

²⁸ Hornblower 1981: 70 s.172 cites De Lacey 1952.

²⁹ Plut. *Eum.* 13.

This provides important evidence for two Plutarchan interpretations of Eumenes: he rejects that the *apologia* was a supplication speech but condemns him as a suppliant in captivity in the *Comparison*.

Plutarch characterises Eumenes throughout the biography in a way that sees him providing alternative interpretations in response to Duris' account.³⁰ For instance, about the financial control of his soldiers, Plutarch reverses the flattery and supplication of his troops found in the Duris tradition and says that Eumenes received money from his Macedonian allies protecting his life, whereas it was expected that the commander would secure his authority through giving rewards and pay to his troops.³¹ This parallels Plutarch's approach in the biography: his moralising about the corruption and demagogic rule of generals over the Macedonians parallels Duris' characterisation of Eumenes as a sophistic speaker.³² Joseph Geiger argues that the Macedonians' perspectives and the satraps' may have originated in Hieronymus' account, and reflects Plutarch's knowledge of the classical Athenian political system and his dislike of demagogues.³³ This would fit in with Plutarch's criticism of the Hellenistic successors to Alexander whom he saw as tyrants instead of legitimate monarchs.³⁴

Justin's version of a previous speech to the Silver Shields contrasts with his later *apologia* to the Macedonians:

Orat ut non tam ducem se quam commilitonem recipiant unumque ex corpore suo esse uelint.

He begged them to accept him not so much as a leader but as a comrade and to enlist him as a member of their order.

Just. *Epit.* 14.2.11.

The negative suppliant portrayal of Eumenes underlines Plutarch's authorial intentions. In the narrative, Plutarch sympathises with the protagonists' case and castigates through his speech the injustice of the Silver Shields' betrayal.

³⁰ Plut. *Eum.* 1.3 in reference to Leonnatus. Other examples see *Eum.* 9, 10.1, 15.

³¹ Plut. *Eum.* 13.

³² Plut. *Eum.* 13.1.

³³ Geiger 1995: 185. Cf. Aalders 1982: 28. Hornblower 1981: 188 argues for Plutarch's use of Hieronymus.

³⁴ Rose 2015: 338 argues that *Dem.* 52.4.1 suggests the influence of Aristotle's *Politics*.

Eumenes' *apologia*: a commentary

This *apologia* is an exceptional example of a didactic discourse because only here does Plutarch define a speech in this way:

[...] οὐκ εἰς δέησιν ἢ παραίτησιν, ἀλλ' ὡς περὶ τῶν ἐκείνοις συμφερόντων διαλεξόμενος.

[...] not with a view to supplication or entreaty, but in order to set forth what was for their advantage.

Plut. *Eum.* 17.2 Trans B. Perrin.

Plutarch rejects a personal motivation for Eumenes, stating that he did not supplicate; instead, his concern was as a general acting on behalf of his army. The critical issue of the biography is reflected here, of whether self-interest or profit is superior to justice. This is a complex case, considering Eumenes' position as a betrayed general and the connected purposes of the speech as a self-representation of his reputation and as a suicide appeal. The inquiry into these motivations explains why Plutarch used Duris as a source, because his writing was concerned with didacticism through an emotional experience.³⁵

Eumenes' role in this didactic relationship is unclear because both philosophers and sophists engaged their students in dialectics. In the *Theaetetus*, Plato defines dialectics in connection with dialogue. Plato uses the verb to describe a discussion within the mind.³⁶

Plutarch's text contrasts with the Duris' tradition, where the general attempted to flee and spoke after the Macedonians' betrayal. Plutarch represents instead the Macedonians binding Eumenes, while in Justin's version Eumenes speaks with greater freedom.³⁷ This tradition likely dates back to the original history by Trogus. As Yardley finds, '*conkursus multitudinis factus esset*' is a rare phrase which only two authors close in time to the historian use.³⁸ Diodorus of Sicily in his account of the life of Agathocles the tyrant of Sicily, from a part of his history which derived from Duris, also uses the same rare phrase *συμφερόντων*

³⁵ There is a general consensus that Duris wrote a 'moralising history': Kebric 1972, Gattinoni 1997, Pédech 1989. Knoepfler 2000 alternatively argues the history had an entertainment purpose. Hau 2016: 7, 137-141 considers it is difficult due to the fragmentary form to understand Duris' moral and educational choices.

³⁶ Pl. *Th.* 189E8-190A1.

³⁷ Just. *Epit.* 14.3.

³⁸ Livy 33.48.9, Cic. *Ad. Brut.* 9 apud Yardley, Wheatley, & Heckel 2011: 47. Also Just. *Epit.* 25.4.9. The lexis appears in both Livy and Cicero but with a brief description of the group, with *multitudinis* and *conkursus* reversed.

διαλεξιόμενος in the same way.³⁹ This is important because it reveals how the tyrant used communication for deception and self-advantage. Agathocles finds the common interests that lie between him and his enemies. Agathocles exploits their sympathy and uses the opportunity to destroy them. Plutarch's decision to use this phrase is morally problematic because it is difficult to understand whether Eumenes speaks from self-interest or for his army. The phrase fits a defence which a general or leader would make in a crisis. Plutarch characterises Eumenes against the Duris' tradition, making him less powerful but also a much more deceptive figure. This affects our reading of the *apologia*, since Eumenes attempts to represent himself as acting on behalf of his army's interests instead of his survival through supplication.

Dialectics was a fundamental philosophical method for Plutarch as a Middle Platonist.⁴⁰ Plutarch's philosophy united the two opposing points of view of scepticism and dogmatism that were represented in different phrases of the Platonic academy, as Jan Opsomer argues.⁴¹ For Plutarch, all of the previous Academies were true to the original spirit of Plato's and Socrates' teachings.⁴² The role of dialectics as a form of philosophical therapy is an important area of study in the Platonic dialogues.⁴³ Cristián De Bravo Delorme, in her analysis of Socrates' dialectical strategy in Plato's dialogues, interprets the meaning of the Greek language of 'persuasion' as corresponding to that of 'counsel'. There is a relationship in this dialogue between 'to want' the motivations of the characters in the scene and their ability to listen and to obey.⁴⁴ This is important in the context of a scene involving a betrayed general speaking to his army. Eumenes fails to control the Macedonians through his deceptions, which had been the tool of his generalship. Plutarch considers that such manipulations of irrational communities were acceptable by statesmen and generals. Eumenes exploited his soldier's superstition to control them.⁴⁵ Chrysanthos Chrysanthou recognises the importance of the 'interpersonal dialectics' which underpin the ethical processes of protagonists, and the role that this plays in the audience's reading. Other

³⁹ Diod. Sic. 19.6.4.6. Roesiger 1874 hypothesised that Diodorus used Duris' work in Books 19-21. Gattinoni 1997: 133-48 argues that the Romans separated the original history into the *Macedonian Histories* and the *History of Agathocles*.

⁴⁰ See Karamanolis 2014, Burns 2015: 37, 83-85, Opsomer 2014:88-103.

⁴¹ Opsomer 1998: 162-175.

⁴² Plutarch wrote a lost work entitled *On the Unity of the Academy since Plato* (Lamprias Cat. 63). Plutarch defended the Academic skeptics against Antiochus of Ascalon. Plutarch wrote works on Stoic Logic, and Aristotle (Lamprias Cat. 152, 56, 192). See Opsomer 1998 : 169.

⁴³ Robinson 1953: 160-179, Desmond 2007.

⁴⁴ De Bravo Delorme 2019:176.

⁴⁵ Cushner 2015: 198-208 argues that Plutarch concentrates on the wisdom of leaders such as Lycurgus and Numa and that they mould the souls of their subjects through civil and religious institutions. Cf. Boulet 2005: 256.

scholars have shown in their analyses that Plutarch wrote for different audiences and that there is coherence in his contradictions.⁴⁶

Eumenes' main focus in his *apologia* is his self-representation as a victorious general. His perception of defeat and victory was connected with virtue and human behaviour. Eumenes uses a rhetorical question to make his army consider the issues of justice and advantage concerning their betrayal:

“ποῖον” εἶπεν “ὃ κάκιστοι Μακεδόνων τρόπαιον Ἀντίγονος ἐθελήσας <ἄν> ἀνέστησε καθ' ὑμῶν, οἷον ὑμεῖς καθ' αὐτῶν ἀνίστατε, τὸν στρατηγὸν αἰχμάλωτον ἐκδιδόντες;

“What trophy, O ye basest of Macedonians, could Antigonus have so much desired to set up over your defeat, as this which ye yourselves are now erecting by delivering up your general as a prisoner?”

Plut. *Eum.* 17.6.1- 17.7.1. Trans. B. Perrin.

The use of the device of the trophy as part of Plutarch's antithesis between the projections of victory and defeat are present also in Justin's evidence. Plutarch moved the narrator's view of Eumenes' surrender which occurred after the speech into the *apologia* for the same purpose of criticising the Macedonians:

Sequitur exercitus prodito imperatore suo et ipse captivus, triumphumque de se ipse ad uictoris castra ducit [...].

Followed by an army which, through the betrayal of its leader, was itself captive and was now conducting towards the victor's encampment a triumphal procession in victory over itself [...].

Just. *Epit.* 14.4.16.

Plutarch repurposes the trophy idea from Duris and uses it in connection with Antigonus' decision-making in a way that condemns the Macedonians even more because it implies that their betrayal was irrational. The theme of the speech of the 'ingratitude' of soldiers who dishonour their leaders provides an important context for these writings.⁴⁷ Plutarch does not differ from the historical traditions which criticised the Macedonian soldiers while promoting their generals. Eumenes' words in Plutarch's version do not harm his image because they focus upon the civic-military bond that his soldiers broke. Eumenes' reasoning serves his ambition and his army's honour. This line of argument concerning his ambition is problematic because, in other examples involving trophies and defeat, Plutarch

⁴⁶ Boulet 2008: 159-169 on Plutarch's different uses of mythology and philosophy, Nikolaidis 1994: 213-222.

⁴⁷ Plut. *Caes.* 37.6-7 admiration for Caesar's men. Pelling 2011: 317.

upholds as positive moral paradigms leaders who act on behalf of others, while sacrificing their reputation. For example, Nicias, after defeating his enemy was viewed by custom to have abandoned his victory by asking for the return of his dead.⁴⁸

The use of a trophy as a symbol within Eumenes and his audiences' memory of the battle means it becomes an important tool of literary mimesis. Demosthenes provides an important classical model for the use of trophies within speeches; in that case, the monument is a source of inspiration to the Athenians in their future actions.⁴⁹ The use of the trophy in the negative context of defeat serves a different but connected purpose, of understanding history through the ethical mistakes of its key participants. Plutarch shows the same positive appreciation of Greek history of the Persian Wars as Demosthenes, but considers that the trophies of the great and ambitious generals of the Peloponnesian War represent the servitude of Greece.⁵⁰ This personification of Greek history and culture explains Plutarch's pathetic perspective of Philopoemen and Eumenes in their downfalls.⁵¹

By imagining his subjection in the symbol of the trophy of victory, Plutarch's Eumenes personifies himself as the object of ransom. This idea is important, Cleopatra in her speech to the dead Antony imagined herself becoming the chief part of a trophy to celebrate her husband's defeat, and similarly, she believes that suicide will preserve her honour.⁵² Cleopatra, unlike Eumenes, emphasises her potential status as a slave with the noun captive (αἰχμάλωτος).⁵³

The trophy was a critical marker in Plutarch's characterisation of Eumenes because it plays a significant role in inciting the protagonist's speech against the Macedonians. The trophy as an object also concerns the qualities of shame and courage.⁵⁴ The victorious were associated with a superior form of courage as a virtue. In the *Pelopidas*, Plutarch provides a moral judgement of the Theban victory at Tegyra that the battle served as an educational lesson. Eumenes' argument operates through the use of antithesis: his conception of victory and defeat against his enemies' actions and motivations.

Plutarch has a rigid view that the guilty, those who deserve punishment, should be delivered as prisoners. For this reason, the treatment of people was a critical moral and

⁴⁸ Plut. *Nic.* 6.5.

⁴⁹ Dem. 15.35.

⁵⁰ Plut. *Flam.* 11.3.

⁵¹ Plut. *Phil.* 19.1.

⁵² Plut. *Ant.* 84.2-4. See also the female case of Leana in Plut. *De garr.* 8.

⁵³ Plut. *Ant.* 84.2. Pelling 1988: 317.

⁵⁴ Plut. *Luc.* 36, *Crass.* 14.4. Both examples provide evidence of how trophies condition and change human behaviour, leading to Crassus' destruction.

educational issue in social and political relationships in the *Lives*.⁵⁵ Also, there was a problem of honour in respect to how communities should treat subjects and particularly protagonists.⁵⁶ This is highlighted by Plutarch's use of the verb ἐκδίδωμι in connection with verbs of destruction, in speeches by generals who suffered defeat and lost the control of their armies and become captives.⁵⁷

Eumenes provides an important commentary on the nature of the φιλανθρωπία of good leaders and communities. Plutarch calls the earlier negotiation of Antigonos and the Silver Shields, an act of φιλανθρωπία, but this does not mean that he interpreted the act as an example of virtue. After all, it is not a true act of human kindness because the Macedonians are compared to wild animals.⁵⁸ This reflects Plutarch's negative interpretation of φιλανθρωπία in the Hellenistic period. This is supported by the evidence of φιλανθρωπία in other *Lives*. Typically leaders and communities exchange human subjects without ransom or refuse these requests.⁵⁹ Plutarch criticised protagonists and other figures who gained political benefits through the ill-treatment of people in this way.⁶⁰ For instance, in the *Comparison of Demetrius and Antony*, Plutarch judged that Demetrius treated his family well, whereas Antony surrendered his mother's brother as an exchange for Cicero's life in the proscriptions.⁶¹ In the Roman *Lives*, Roman authorities did not sympathise with the fate of prisoners of war, considering that this was due to their cowardice. This stigmatisation of the captive status contributed to Plutarch's judgement of Eumenes as a suppliant in the *Comparison*.⁶²

The ransom of a leader by its people parallels their surrender and this is reflected in Plutarch's use of military and economic language.⁶³ Eumenes uses this argument to examine the Macedonians' cause for their betrayal, the loss of their baggage. This passage is an important aspect of Plutarch's version because Justin's epitome does not contain the same argument or any reference to Eumenes' view of himself as a ransom (λύτρον). Plutarch repeats baggage (ἀποσκευάς) twice:

⁵⁵ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 51.1 in reference to Caesar.

⁵⁶ Plut. *Mar.* 37.4.

⁵⁷ Plut. *Rom.* 7.5.

⁵⁸ Plut. *Eum.* 17.

⁵⁹ Plut. *Alc.* 29.3, *Rom.* 9.3. Present in the speech of Remus as a prisoner *Rom* 3.1.

⁶⁰ Plut. *Comp. Nic. Crass.* 4.3.

⁶¹ Plut. *Comp. Dem. Ant.* 5.1.

⁶² Plut. *Fab. Max.* 7.4.

⁶³ Plut. *Dem.* 23.4.

οὐκ ἄρα δεινὸν ἦν κρατοῦντας ὑμᾶς ἦτταν ἐξομολογεῖσθαι διὰ τὰς ἀποσκευάς, ὡς ἐν τοῖς χρήμασιν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις τοῦ κρατεῖν ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα πέμπετε λύτρον τῆς ἀποσκευῆς;

I can hardly believe that you would acknowledge yourselves defeated, despite your victory, because of your baggage! It's as though you think that victory depends on possessions, not on prowess. And then you ransom your baggage by surrendering your general!

Plut. *Eum.* 17.7.-17.8.

Plutarch's language use underlines his teaching about proper human relationships and virtues through Eumenes. Eumenes employs the phrase κρατοῦντας ὑμᾶς ἦτταν ἐξομολογεῖσθαι in his attempt to make his army consider the moral implications of their actions. Plutarch's choice of the verb ἐξομολογεῖσθαι, which means to confess, is part of the dialectical discourse because the term contributes to the impact of the rhetorical question. This term is a compound of the Greek verb ὁμολογεῖν.⁶⁴ Plutarch in several examples combines ὁμολογεῖν with the word for defeat.⁶⁵ The term is usually included as, or refers to, a direct speech act. Its use by protagonists and figures in the biographies suggests an integral role of the term was in connection with relationships, particularly in judgements of injustice or justice.⁶⁶ Plutarch is consistent in his use of this rare verb ἐξομολογεῖσθαι concerning situations involving servitude and submission.⁶⁷ It features predominantly in death scenes or other defining moments in life. The Theban general and statesman Epaminondas refers to the achievement of his life in having his parents see the trophy of his battle at Leuctra.⁶⁸ In the case of Eumenes, his statement is paradoxical because his victory is a moral, not a physical victory. Leaders use the verb in their perspectives of other figures' and groups' actions. It conveys a truth about the speaker's character and their opponents. For example, Alexander faced a mutiny by the same soldiers as Eumenes, and considered retreat as a confession of defeat.⁶⁹ Plutarch's Eumenes and Alexander use the term in a sarcastic and chastising way, and the Alexander example would probably have been in the audience's minds.⁷⁰ This emphasises Eumenes' failure as a leader because in Alexander's case he considers his army's refusal to pass the Ganges as a defeat. Justin's second speech of Eumenes features the protagonist referring to the same mutinies where the Silver Shields

⁶⁴ LSJ s.v. ὁμολογέω.

⁶⁵ Plut. *Dion.* 47.

⁶⁶ Plut. *Brut.* 2.4, *Phoc.* 34.5.

⁶⁷ Plut. *Ant.* 59.5. See Pelling 1988: 263.

⁶⁸ Plut. *Non posse.* 16.

⁶⁹ Plut. *Alex.* 62.3.

⁷⁰ Just. *Epit.* 14.4.12.

opposed Alexander. Plutarch's decision to not use this part of the *apologia* while preserving a link with the mutiny episode provides further evidence that the biographer wished the reader to view Eumenes as a failed Alexander because he ended up as a captive of his enemies. This depiction of Eumenes as an inferior imitator of Alexander fits into Sulochana Asirvatham's interpretation that Plutarch in his Hellenistic *Lives* in different episodes compares these protagonists against the conduct of the idealised Macedonian King.⁷¹ She underlines that one of the ethnic lessons of the *Eumenes* is that a general needs to keep the Macedonian army loyal. It is also a highly significant point, that unlike Justin's account, and Plutarch's representation of Alexander faced by a mutiny at the Hyphasis River, there is no mention of Eumenes as displaying any emotional reaction.

In the second half of the *apologia*, Plutarch uses antithesis to contrast Eumenes' perspective of his position to introduce his main purpose in delivering the speech: his request to commit suicide. In the syntax, structure is marked by the use of μέν and δε and personal pronouns. Plutarch opposes Eumenes' view of his victory with his understanding of the army's defeat:

ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἀήττητος ἄγομαι, νικῶν τοὺς πολεμίους, ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων ἀπολλύμενος· ὑμεῖς δέ, πρὸς Διὸς στρατίου καὶ θεῶν ὀρκίων, ἐνταῦθά με δι' αὐτῶν κτείνατε. πάντως κάκεῖ κτεινόμενος ὑμέτερον ἔργον εἰμί· μέμνεται δ' οὐδὲν Ἀντίγονος· νεκροῦ γὰρ Εὐμενοῦς δεῖται καὶ οὐ ζῶντος. εἰ δὲ φείδεσθε τῶν χειρῶν, ἀρκέσει τῶν ἐμῶν ἢ ἕτερα λυθεῖσα πράξαι τὸ ἔργον.

Well, I may be in custody, but I am undefeated, since I beat my enemies. My downfall is due to my friends. As for you, I urge you, in the name of Zeus, the lord of hosts, and of the gods who protect oaths, to kill me yourselves, right here and now – not that it makes any difference if I meet death there in his camp, for it will still be your doing. Antigonus won't tell you off for killing me: he wants Eumenes dead, not alive. If you don't want to sully your hands, one of mine will be enough to do the deed, if you untie me.

Plut. *Eum.* 17.9.-17.10.

Unlike in the previous parts of the speech, Eumenes does not refer to the defeat but instead demonstrates that it lays in the injustice of the breaking of their oaths. This enabled Eumenes in his request because his victory should be seen both in a military-political sense and in connection with justice. Eumenes' appeal in Justin's *Epitome* is more pathetic and he is desperate to avoid the social disgrace of becoming a captive:

⁷¹ Asirvatham 2018: 215-218, 233.

Unum oro, si propositorum Antigoni in meo capite summa consistit, inter uos me uelitis mori. Nam neque illius interest quemadmodum aut ubi cadam, et ego fuero ignominia mortis liberatus.

This is all I ask: if what Antigonus intends above all else is my death, permit me to die amongst you. It is nothing to Antigonus how or where I die, and I shall be spared a shameful death.

Just. *Epit.* 14.4. 5-6.

Trogus' Eumenes recognises that he has lost his freedom whereas paradoxically Plutarch attempts to disguise the truth. Plutarch's Eumenes uses the imperative κτείνετε as a part of his command to the Macedonians to aid his suicide. Plutarch made this change because he wishes to detach from Eumenes' motivations and instead focus on the issue of the army's betrayal. Plutarch's purpose here is to create a legal basis for the divine punishment of the Silver Shields which he describes at the biography's end.⁷² Plutarch's representation of Eumenes' final appeal for suicide departs from the evidence of the *apologia* in the *Epitome* on the issue of justice. Eumenes uses a paradoxical argument to appeal to the Macedonians: saying that if they aided him in his suicide, he would judge that they had always acted with justice. This would not be true justice, but such behaviour would be consistent with their unjust betrayal of him, which was motivated by their self-interest:

εἰ δ' οὐ πιστεύετε μοι ξίφος, ὑπορρίψατε τοῖς θηρίοις δεδεμένον. καὶ ταῦτα πράξαντας ὑμᾶς ἀφήμι τῆς ἐπ' ἐμοὶ δίκης, ὡς ἄνδρας ὀσιωτάτους καὶ δικαιοτάτους περὶ τὸν αὐτῶν στρατηγὸν γενομένου.

But if you don't trust me with a sword, throw me, bound as I am, to be trampled by the elephants. If you do that, I absolve you of all guilt in my case, and declare that there have never been soldiers who have treated their general with greater propriety and justice.'

Plut. *Eum.* 17.11.1-2.

The argument presents the Macedonians as impious because captivity or assisted suicide would not remove the stigma of their betrayal. This appeal separates the majority of the army which is sympathetic to Eumenes' plight from the Silver Shields who bear the greatest responsibility.⁷³ The main issue of justice against profit seen through the relationship between the Macedonians and Eumenes is present in both versions; however, the emphasis upon these themes is different. Plutarch draws important attention in his use of the superlative adjectives pious and just (ὀσιωτάτους καὶ δικαιοτάτους) to where the Macedonians fail.

⁷² Plut. *Eum.* 19.

⁷³ Plut. *Eum.* 18.1.

These adjectives are close synonyms of each other, and this final statement must be read in connection with their oath making.⁷⁴ Plutarch's vocabulary likely recalls the sophist Isocrates, particularly his *Antidosis* and *Plataean Oration*. Isocrates' and other Greek writers' uses of this combination of adjectives are connected with an ideal Hellenic statesman, of the benefactor. These characteristics are associated with the act of pitying the unfortunate.⁷⁵

The Isocratean references are significant because the sophist influenced Plutarch's interpretation of Greek history. Self-interest and ambition were primary reasons why the Hellenic states and Macedonian kingdoms were in a constant state of war and civil infighting.⁷⁶ David Braund has commented upon the role of the negative quality of greed (πλεονεξία) in the biographies representative of the Hellenistic period. Plutarch considers the term as the opposite of Hellenic φιλανθρωπία.⁷⁷ Plutarch underlines the differences and parallels between Greeks such as Eumenes and the Macedonians. Further evidence is found by comparing Dionysius of Halicarnassus' similar method. Pyrrhus in a short speech to the Roman general Fabricius praises his people as sharing the same Hellenic qualities of honesty and integrity.⁷⁸ Irene Peirano discusses Dionysius' intentions in this speech: Pyrrhus makes two different points about the ethnic qualities of the Greeks and Romans; the former are expected to never surrender in battle while the latter are known for their virtue.⁷⁹ With a similar method to Dionysius but for the opposite effect, Plutarch emphasised the failures of the Macedonians as rulers of an empire, and they must be perceived as a parallel to the Romans.⁸⁰ Dionysius considered these qualities to distinguish the Romans as superior from the Greeks. Both authors have a similar lesson in their writings: the Romans will preserve their superiority if they do not abandon Hellenic παιδεία.

Plutarch's use of φιλανθρωπία emphasises an important difference between Eumenes' Greek ethnicity: the traditional role of the Hellenes as benefactors and the Macedonians as rulers. Eumenes appears, however, to be closer in culture to the Macedonians, possessing negative qualities of contention and profit, which the biographer connected particularly with the Hellenistic rulers. These values are striking because of how imperial authors applied them to cultures who ruled or came to rule the Greeks such as the Macedonians and Romans. In the

⁷⁴ Peels 2016: 9 the terms can refer to divine or human justice, or to the same things, 39 on oaths in forensic speeches.

⁷⁵ Antiph. *Tetralogia* 3, *Tetralogia* 4. 11.4.

⁷⁶ Isoc. *Plat.* 297, *Antid.* 284.

⁷⁷ Braund 1997: 115-120, 126-127.

⁷⁸ Dion. Hal. *Rom. Ant.* 20.6.1.9.

⁷⁹ Peirano 2010: 49-53.

⁸⁰ Nep. *Eum* 8.2-4 makes a connection between the insubordination of the armies and wars of the Macedonians and the Romans.

Eumenes, Plutarch demonstrated how the Macedonians in the Hellenistic period had degenerated from the ideals of hellenised and civilised leadership of Alexander the Great. Plutarch's characterisation of Eumenes in the *Comparison* highlights the dominant martial character which is seen in a few other Spartan and early Roman biographies such as Romulus; this is significant because these protagonists belonged to cultures or times where Hellenic παιδεία was absent.

The *Epitome* suggests that Duris was interested more in the issue of the oaths which bound the Macedonians to their commander.⁸¹ In the *Epitome*'s second speech, Eumenes uses the oath and the religious dimension to criticise the Macedonians. The oath is the main theme that binds both speeches in Trogus and motivates Eumenes' righteous anger in the second speech:

Cum non obtineret, preces in iram uertit.

When he failed to gain his request, he turned from entreaty to anger.

Just. *Epit.* 14.4.9.

Plutarch focused on other themes: supplication and cowardice, and he decided against representing Eumenes as possessed of anger. Plutarch viewed that anger and other passions harmed the rational part of the soul which was involved in judgement and deliberation.⁸² Instead, Plutarch switched these details about the Silver Shields' punishment, stating that this righteous action was the act of Antigonus.⁸³ Plutarch was critical of anger and considered it therapeutic for this passion to be controlled.⁸⁴ It is significant, however, that there are several episodes where Plutarch highlights the role of anger and tragic performances in his characterisation of Eumenes, whereas in later episodes such as the battle of Gabiene and the *apologia*; he mutes Eumenes' anger and courage, making him appear weaker. Eumenes' first short speech in the biography depicts a protagonist possessed by anger. He threatened Alexander owing to a conflict with Hephaestion that he would abandon his sword and become an aulos player or tragic actor.⁸⁵ Eumenes' threat undermines his later accusation against his Macedonians, who abandon their weapons.

⁸¹ Just. *Epit.* 14.4.7-20.

⁸² Plut. *De virt. Mor.* 446E-F.

⁸³ Plut. *Eum* 19.2.

⁸⁴ Asirvatham 2019: 158 on the Platonic influence on Plutarch's view that anger originates in the soul's irrational part.

⁸⁵ Plut. *Eum.* 2.1.

Plutarch's use of supplicatory language serves as part of Eumenes' rejection of anger in his strategy. In several biographies in the second half of the *Parallel Lives* series, Plutarch's writing about the political submission of leaders suggests the influence of tragedy. For example, Plutarch considered that Pompey allowed himself to be manipulated and abused by Clodius.⁸⁶ Plutarch's criticism of Aratus as a leader draws upon the suppliant image seen in the physical emphasis of the same verb to throw down or under (ὑπορρίπτειν). In the second speech of *The Fortune of Alexander*, Plutarch compares, in the cases of two foreign kings supplicating their enemies by the use of this rare verb.⁸⁷ Plutarch's use of the verb parallels a similar context found in Josephus' work the *Antiquities of the Jews*, where the author states that the Romans were impious for their practice of throwing people to beasts in the amphitheatre, including prisoners.⁸⁸ Josephus viewed the treatment of the Jewish people under the tyrant Archelaus in a similar way.⁸⁹ Though there is purpose in Eumenes' method, his words could be read in a way that condemns him as a slave and suppliant willingly submitting himself to his enemies, when judged against this context. The *apologia*, therefore, stands by itself, as a disguised supplication. Plutarch uses it as part of his critical framework, raising questions about the fidelity of Eumenes' word and choice of action.

Parallelism and juxtaposition with the Sertorius

Eumenes' parallel features as the protagonist a Roman general and politician named Quintus Sertorius (c. 123-72 BCE). Scholars generally have a negative view of the *Eumenes* because its subject is obscure and his biography is the shortest in the series. They argue that the *Eumenes* was only joined with the Roman life the *Sertorius* when it was written at a late stage, even though there is no direct evidence of this in the biography. Plutarch curiously placed the *Eumenes* as the second life after the Roman *Sertorius*, in contrast with his usual practice in the majority of the biographical pairs.⁹⁰ Plutarch wrote about these men because they were examples of successful and famous commanders who struggled and were defeated by the divine force of fortune. Sertorius did not suffer a mutiny like Eumenes, but rather his close friends and captains assassinated him. There are important differences in their

⁸⁶ Plut. *Pomp.* 46.4.

⁸⁷ See also Plut. *Comp.Cim. Luc.* 3.4.

⁸⁸ Joseph. *AJ.*15.275.

⁸⁹ Joseph. *De bel.* 2.90.

⁹⁰ Geiger 1995: esp 185 makes this interpretation due to the lateness of the Life and Plutarch's lack of apparent knowledge of Hellenistic history and Eumenes. Bosworth 1992:56.

characters, for Sertorius appears as a more complex figure than Eumenes, and his guerrilla style of warfare was more successful. Sertorius' appearance as a one-eyed general, in the proem, suggests that Plutarch intended the characterisation of Antigonos II Gonatas' to serve as a parallel; certainly as a leader he is practically more successful than Eumenes.⁹¹ It will be argued in this section that the moralism of the *Sertorius* and examination of the same themes can explain what appear at first glance to be contradictions in Eumenes' character.

Plutarch's moral framework in the *Sertorius-Eumenes* focuses upon the complex differences in the characterisations of two generals, as Luis García Moreno argues. In the basic portrait, Sertorius appears as a more virtuous example concerning his moderation, φιλανθρωπία, and control of emotions.⁹² This is what led to Sertorius' downfall because, due to his ignorance, he trusted his companions who were his friends. Sertorius' fatal decision to go to the banquet is a philanthropic response to the conspirators' supplication. The Silver Shields used the same device of a report of victory, to deceive their leader; however, Eumenes' failure to detect their flattery emphasises his defective intelligence. This can be seen in the episode where Eumenes used his reason to counter his allies' envy.⁹³

Joaquim Pinheiro argues in his analysis of the *Sertorius and Eumenes*, that Plutarch does not provide an explicit analysis of the role of παιδεία in these biographies. The force of military conflicts and misfortune shapes their *Lives* to a greater degree, and παιδεία does not protect them from dangers. He is correct that Plutarch wished to show that Eumenes' Greek heritage and παιδεία did not mean that Sertorius was a lesser figure.⁹⁴ The fundamental question is why Plutarch represented Sertorius as an equal or even a superior in terms of educational and military leadership to Eumenes.

Plutarch in both *Lives* provides two different perspectives on παιδεία in his accounts of how generals treated prisoners of war. Plutarch considers that Sertorius' greatest achievement was seen in an episode where he trains his barbarian allies into a professional military force and introduces Greek and Roman education for their childrens' benefit. This episode parallels thematically the scene of Antigonos' initial philanthropic treatment of his hostage Eumenes. Plutarch notes Sertorius' success as a teacher and leader by emphasising the support of his allies at key moments; for example, when his allies rescue him from death.⁹⁵ Plutarch establishes a contrast between the Macedonians' wild nature and how

⁹¹ Plut. *Sert.* 1.

⁹² García Moreno 2002: 134.

⁹³ Plut. *Eum.* 13.2.

⁹⁴ Pinheiro 2013: 210.

⁹⁵ Plut. *Sert.* 14.6.2, *Eum.* 16.9.3.

Sertorius civilised his barbarian soldiers.⁹⁶ Sertorius uses the gift of civilisation, παιδεία, to deceive the Spanish tribes.⁹⁷ Plutarch contrasts the different perceptions of freedom by subject people in both biographies. The case of the *Eumenes* appears harsher and more pathetic. In the *Sertorius*, Hellenic παιδεία has an illusory effect upon the young prisoners' perceptions of their situations. The *Eumenes* in contrast underlines his failure to use Hellenic παιδεία to endure his misfortune and it also emphasises where Antigonus as Sertorius' double fails in his φιλανθρωπία. In a very similar way Sertorius fails because in misfortune he punishes and kills his hostages.⁹⁸

Sertorius in his suffering and the signs of his wounds showed that he possessed bravery.⁹⁹ Jeffrey Beneker argues that Plutarch deliberately focuses upon Sertorius' virtue and how the people in the theatre recognised his successes in his discussion of one episode.¹⁰⁰ This, Beneker suggests, is part of the *Sertorius* which corresponds chronologically to the narrative of the Social War, and Plutarch's portrayal of his protagonist's warlike spirit seems different to his interpretation of him as πολεμικός, as a man who desires peace not war in Spain. Sertorius unlike Eumenes destroys a small force of slaves that threatened civil order in the city.¹⁰¹ Plutarch's engagement with the traditions of Sertorius presents his character differently at two periods in his life. During the Social War, Sertorius corresponds more closely to Eumenes' character. Beneker argues that Plutarch deliberately contrasts the two episodes of the glorification of Sertorius' martial virtue in the theatre and his later rejection of self-interest and preference for peace in later life.¹⁰² As part of the inner educational teaching of the *Lives*, Plutarch never depicts Eumenes as entertaining the idea that he could pursue different life paths instead of war.

Beneker's analysis of the *Sertorius* is significant because he shows how, although the general was represented as warlike, Plutarch presents him in his war against Roman generals in Spain as unwilling to fight. Eumenes' main motivation is his ambition; for this reason he is always on the edge of destruction, while Sertorius wages war for his self-protection against his enemies.¹⁰³ Eumenes defends his warfare as a sense of duty to the Argead house; however, Plutarch underlines how problematic this is, by viewing this conflict as a civil war.

⁹⁶ Plut. *Sert.* 14.1.

⁹⁷ Plut. *Sert.* 14.3.1-4.1 apud Mayer 1997: 98-99, 134 argues that this is part of Sertorius' Romanisation of the tribes.

⁹⁸ Plut. *Sert.* 10.3.

⁹⁹ Plut. *Sert.* 4.3-5.

¹⁰⁰ Plut. *Sert.* 4.3 and 22.7-8. See Beneker 2010: 105.

¹⁰¹ Plut. *Sert.* 5.6-7.

¹⁰² Beneker 2010: 109-112.

¹⁰³ Beneker 2010: 106.

For example, Plutarch raises the issue by paralleling the two scenes where the protagonist weeps. Sertorius laments when he hears the news that his mother has died, thus his behaviour confirms his character to Plutarch's audience.¹⁰⁴ Eumenes, on the other hand, while bemoaning Craterus' death, blames necessity and his enmity with Neoptolemus.¹⁰⁵ The outcome of this, however, has positive and negative effects upon Eumenes' life, for his reputation rose due to his victory, but he suffered because he was responsible for Craterus' death. The theme of the rise in his reputation precedes the short second introduction to the *Eumenes* on the illusions of temporary successes. Plutarch questions the intelligence and bravery of a man who fights for glory against his friends.

Sertorius' and Eumenes' speeches contrast in how they justify war with their enemies. Sertorius desired peace and an end to his exile, while Eumenes emphasised his belief in his ability and reputation.¹⁰⁶ Sertorius uses his earlier glory in the Social War to support his cause, and Beneker suggests that Sertorius rejected future glory. Since Plutarch does not directly state why Sertorius acted differently to other Roman statesmen who pursued power, Beneker infers that the biographer wished his reader to consider other motivations such as patriotism.¹⁰⁷

Plutarch's main intention in Eumenes' *apologia* and Sertorius' death scene is to consider how the protagonists respond to crises in a moral sense. García Moreno is correct that Plutarch wished to emphasise a key defining difference in both leaders, in death. Sertorius displayed a superiority of his mind over his body whereas Eumenes attempted to escape death by using his speech. Eumenes' *apologia* emphasises his arrogance and irrationality, and his argument is morally and politically defective because as a prisoner he cannot make decisions. The *Eumenes* unlike *Sertorius* is an example of a life that provides a moral lesson that the reliance upon certain attributes such as beauty and strength do not prevent destruction. Pseudo-Plutarch in *The Education of Children* argues that only by exercising one's reason can someone endure and succeed in misfortunes, particularly war.¹⁰⁸

The *Comparison*'s treatment of Eumenes is harsher than the main biography because its pair is Sertorius. Plutarch's criticism focuses upon Eumenes' intelligence and behaviour in his death. There is a difference between the physical and mental modes in Plutarch's

¹⁰⁴ Plut. *Sert.* 22.12.

¹⁰⁵ Plut. *Eum.* 7.

¹⁰⁶ Plut. *Sert.* 22.7-8.

¹⁰⁷ Beneker 2010: 106.

¹⁰⁸ Ps- Plut. *De liberis educ.* 8.

language. Plutarch uses the verb ‘to twist bodily’ (ἀναστρέφειν) in Sertorius’ death scene; the same word appears in the description of Eumenes’ binding:¹⁰⁹

ἀναστρέψαντος δὲ πρὸς τὴν πληγὴν ἐκείνου καὶ συνεξανισταμένου, περιπεσὼν εἰς τὸ στήθος κατέλαβε τὰς χεῖρας ἀμφοτέρας, ὥστε μὴδ’ ἀμυνόμενον πολλῶν παιόντων ἀποθανεῖν.

Sertorius turned at the blow and would have risen with his assailant, but Antonius fell upon his chest and seized both his hands, so that he could make no defence even, and died from the blows of many.

Plut. *Sert.* 26.11.2. Trans. B. Perrin.

The present participle of the rare compound verb συνεξανισταμένου shows Plutarch’s sympathetic view that if Sertorius had not been outnumbered he would have risen. The biographer uses the verb in Eumenes’ *apologia* to emphasise his status as an object:

καὶ τοῦ μὲν οὐ κατήσχυνε τὸν βίον ὁ θάνατος, πάσχοντος ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων ἃ τῶν πολεμίων αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐποίησεν·

Moreover, death brought no stain upon the life of Sertorius, since he suffered at the hands of confederates what none of his enemies could inflict upon him;

Plut. *Comp. Sert. Eum.* 2.4. Trans. B. Perrin.

Sertorius dies in the same way as a wild animal and Eumenes survived for a period in captivity. The focus upon the nature of the intelligence of both protagonists as leaders and their endurance in death suggests strongly that Plutarch wrote these two Lives because of his interest in the ideal of the Stoic wise man. Endurance was an important feature of the sage and the tranquility of mind. This sagehood should be viewed within the Plutarchan paradigm of Socrates’ death scene, heavily dependent on Plato’s idealisation of the philosopher’s death.¹¹⁰ It was an integral model for Plutarch because according to Plato, Socrates did not flee before his death and he rejected supplicating his enemies and the Athenian jury for acquittal.¹¹¹ In the case of Eumenes, the question of whether the general wished to escape or face battle becomes an area of debate in the biography, reflecting the alternative views of his sources. Plutarch portrayed Eumenes as a problematic figure with negative overtones because the general chose to manipulate crises and had a hand in creating them for his benefit.

¹⁰⁹ Plut. *Eum.* 17.

¹¹⁰ See Beck 2014: 470, Zadorojnyi 2007, Pelling 2005, Holland 2004, Hershbell 1988, Fialho 2010.

¹¹¹ Pl. *Ap.* 34C.

The significance of the *apologia* within the *Eumenes*

Did Eumenes supplicate, or did he not? This key issue of the *Eumenes* appears when the reader compares the neutral narrative of the biography, particularly Plutarch's statement defining the *apologia* with the biographer's judgement in the *Comparison*:

οὐδείς ἐποίησεν· ὁ δὲ φεύγειν μὲν πρὸ αἰχμαλωσίας μὴ δυνηθείς, ζῆν δὲ μετ' αἰχμαλωσίαν βουλευθείς, οὐτ' ἐφυλάξατο καλῶς τὴν τελευταίην οὐθ' ὑπέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ προσλιπαρῶν καὶ δεόμενος, τοῦ σώματος μόνου κρατεῖν δοκοῦντα τὸν πολέμιον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ κύριον ἐποίησεν.

Eumenes, however, who was unable to fly before being taken prisoner, but was willing to live after being taken prisoner, neither took good precautions against death, nor faced it well, but by supplicating and entreating the foe who was known to have power over his body only, he made him lord and master of his spirit also.

Plut. *Comp. Sert. Eum.* 2.8.1-5. Trans. B. Perrin.

Plutarch never criticises Eumenes' character in this way in the biography, and on the face of it presents the *apologia* as non-supplicatory. The relationship of the *Comparisons* with the main narrative has been an area of great debate in scholarship.¹¹² These *Comparisons* should not be viewed as failures of the narrative; instead, the apparent contradictions highlight the problematic and complex moral character themes of the pair. The parallelism and complexity of the Plutarchan book encourage multiple re-readings, as Duff argues.¹¹³ The differences in character judgements in the *Comparison*, which states that Eumenes supplicated for his life and the main narrative, derive from Plutarch's interpretation of Hieronymus' and Duris' accounts. There were two ways to read Eumenes' character. Plutarch subtly undermined Eumenes' presentation of his actions and character through his speech. Plutarch in his essay *How to profit from your enemies* argues that speech is a problematic tool because accusations against enemies could be used to condemn the speaker, if he displayed the same vices in his actions which he used in speech to accuse his enemies.¹¹⁴ In his use of an otherwise unknown Euripidean quotation, Plutarch signifies the destructive

¹¹² Erbse 1956, Pelling 1986, Swain 1992, Chrysanthou 2018: 23 considers that the *Comparisons* are 'elaborate' works and are important in the examination of character and moralism, 144-153 he states that the distance between *Comparison* and narrative could lead the audience to question Plutarch's judgement.

¹¹³ Duff 2000: 145-147 views that the *Comparisons* are more critical than the narrative reflecting the rhetorical aspect of these compositions.

¹¹⁴ Plut. *De Cap.* 4.

ethical model of a diseased physician and philosopher who attempts to cure others, with a distinctive Stoic flavour. This must be borne in mind when considering the educational message of the *apologia*: of whether Eumenes is guilty of moral failures, even if they are different to the vices of the Macedonian soldiers.

The didactic function of the *Comparison* ties in with the dialectical relationship between Eumenes and the Macedonians.¹¹⁵ Plutarch uses the same military-ethical metaphors and language as in Eumenes' *apologia*. Plutarch's approach to characterisation is similar in other biographies: protagonists undo their past courageous acts or speech by their final submission. For example, in the *Demetrius*, one of the eponymous protagonist's companions calls upon him to surrender to his enemy Seleucus. Demetrius attempted to commit suicide; however, he yields to persuasion to surrender himself.¹¹⁶ Plutarch depicts Demetrius in a short period of time in the scene detailing his flight from his enemies owing to his emotional experience changing his mind about submission.¹¹⁷ Thomas Caldwell Rose argues that there is an important parallel in Plutarch's view of the cowardice of certain leaders with Perseus of Macedon by the use of the language of shame.¹¹⁸ Perseus, like Eumenes, ended up as a captive of his conqueror; however, he engages in supplication.¹¹⁹ Plutarch judged Demetrius' death as a prisoner in the *Comparison*, as morally inferior to Antony's suicide.¹²⁰ Plutarch's interpretation focuses on analysing the relationship between a protagonist's downfall in a body and emotions metaphor paralleling the event of the treatment by their conquerors. The exclusion of the issue of supplication is telling in the *Demetrius* because the protagonist did not supplicate, since his son performed the act on his behalf. Plutarch's interest is in the effect of luxury upon Demetrius' lifestyle in his captivity; the issue of life and death as a symbol of conflict with his opponent becomes a lesser theme.¹²¹ Antony's treatment is couched in similar terms as in Eumenes' case, and it represents a reinterpretation of the events of the main narrative.¹²² This is important because Plutarch paired Antony with Demetrius. Plutarch stated that Antony died courageously, but again this perspective appears in the Roman's

¹¹⁵ Duff 2000: 161.

¹¹⁶ Plut. *Demet.* 49.5.

¹¹⁷ Plut. *Demet.* 50.4.

¹¹⁸ Plut. *Aem.* 34.3-4.

¹¹⁹ Plut. *Aem.* 26.

¹²⁰ Plut. *Comp. Dem. Ant.* 6.3.1-6.4.4.

¹²¹ Plutarch makes clear at the beginning of the *Comparison* that neither Demetrius' or Antony's deaths are good moral examples, whereas as I will discuss the Sertorius-Eumenes' judgement establishes a stark difference between both personages in terms of their character in relation to their deaths and the issue of supplication.

¹²² Murgatroyd 2012: 178- 179 argues for Plutarch's sophistication in *Ant* 76-7, in undercutting the courageous death of Antony by his interaction with slaves and women. See also Pelling 2005a:303.

speech act.¹²³ Plutarch's negative interpretation of character reflects the influence of supplication and submission. This can be seen in the way which Demetrius is domesticated. It is in this state that he becomes prey to the vices which lead to a final and complete degeneration.

The *Comparison* highlights the difficult relationship between speech and action throughout the *Eumenes* and, as Bosworth argues, Plutarch's manipulation of Eumenes' short speech before his death has an effect in overturning the arrogance and delusions of the protagonist's view of his deeds.¹²⁴ Plutarch changed the order of the conversation of Eumenes and Onomarchus, his prison guard.¹²⁵ Cornelius Nepos has a more positive view of Eumenes, and has him have the last word after his opponent.¹²⁶

Plutarch's subtle use of his sources suggests that Eumenes' self-representation in his *apologia* could be read in the same critical way when the reader revisits the biographical narrative after the *Comparison*. Plutarch uses the rare verb to supplicate persistently (προσλιπαρῶν) to describe and criticise Eumenes' behaviour as a supplication.¹²⁷ Plutarch does not refer his criticism to Eumenes' *apologia* to his army explicitly. Plutarch's use of this compound verb is important because in many occasions in the *Lives*, he employs the term within a military context, and they involve a conflict in human choices between persuasion and force.¹²⁸ The verb can be representative like all actions concerning virtue, positively and negatively. For example, Pompey supplicated his army who would not obey orders to prevent sedition and swore an oath to commit suicide.¹²⁹ Whereas Perseus of Macedon supplicated a Cretan mercenary force for the return of Alexander the Great's royal plate.¹³⁰ Plutarch's use of the verb reflects the persistence meaning of the verb seen in other uses. He demonstrates that there is an opposition between the persistence in philosophical studies, which can be equated with how one lives and sticks to moral principles, and their rejection, seen in the metaphor of military desertion or surrender.¹³¹

¹²³ Plut. *Ant.* 77.7.

¹²⁴ Plut. *Eum.* 18.7-9. Bosworth 1992: 65. Cf. Duff 2000: 143 for the influence of rhetorical tradition on Plutarch and the use of two speeches or one speech to argue two sides of an argument or topic.

¹²⁵ Plut. *Eum.* 18.4. I shall discuss further Plutarch's description of Eumenes as an enemy in chapter four pages 130-131.

¹²⁶ Nep. *Eum.* 11.3-5.

¹²⁷ A TLG morphological search shows the rarity of the compound verb in authors. After Plutarch, Flavius Josephus uses the term the most 6 times: Joseph. *AJ* 1.98.4, 12.84.6, 13.132.3, 14.475.4, *BJ* 5.119.1, 2.539.1.

¹²⁸ Plutarch uses the term more than any other author; its use is rare in Greek literature. The earliest author who appears to have used the term was Ctesias: F34a Ael. *NA.* 7.1.

¹²⁹ Plut. *Pomp.* 13.2.9.

¹³⁰ Plut. *Aem.* 23.8.1.

¹³¹ Plut. *De aud.* 47 B-C.

The themes of persistence or failure are judged in connection with the soul, the setting where virtues and passions interact: in the soul (τῆς ψυχῆς) and the verb clinging to life (γλίχεσθαι). Arda Harms demonstrates how Plutarch conceptualises the relationship between emotions and reason within the soul through the idea of military conflict.¹³² The concept of mastery is important, which Harms argues is highlighted by the verb to be stronger, mightier (κρατεῖν).¹³³ Plutarch links the metaphors of emotions as an enemy and master, which connects with his political views of an ideal form of government, represented by a monarchy. Plutarch perceived the imbalance of passions and reason in the two parts of the soul in human terms as between inferiors and superiors.¹³⁴ The domination of the higher and purer form of rationality to the inferior part reflects a military conquest. All in all, Plutarch represents Eumenes' character metaphorically as an exercise for the moral benefit of his students: on how reason controls passions.¹³⁵

Conclusions

Plutarch's main intention in Eumenes' *apologia* is to establish a dialectical discussion on the question of whether self-interest or justice is superior. This discussion operates on two connected levels: the first involves the relationship and motivations of Eumenes as a defeated general speaking to the Macedonians who betrayed him to Antigonus. Plutarch's Eumenes in his *apologia* focuses on the issue of his enemies' and allies' motivations towards him in terms of φιλανθρωπία, also condemning in the same terms the righteousness of the Silver Shields and Antigonus' exchange of their baggage for Eumenes as a ransom. The problem in Eumenes' speech is the last line where the protagonist shows that he is willing to judge his betrayers as just in all their actions if they returned his sword to him. This relates to the second level, of Plutarch's and his audience's interpretation of Eumenes and the Macedonians, and as part of the parallel structure with the companion Roman life *Sertorius*. Plutarch establishes two different interpretations of Eumenes' *apologia* in the scene itself and the *Comparison*. On the one hand, he rejects that Eumenes made the *apologia* for the purpose of supplication and entreaty. In his critical judgement, on the other hand, he considers that Eumenes supplicated his conqueror, giving his enemy mastery over his body and soul. This

¹³² Harms 2011: 309.

¹³³ Foucault 1985: 66 raised this important conceptualisation in the use of the verb in classical literature.

¹³⁴ Harms 2011: 309.

¹³⁵ Harms 2011: 316.

study has read the first statement in the main narrative defining Eumenes' intentions in delivering the *apologia* as part of how the character wished to persuade the Macedonians; it is not Plutarch's view. Plutarch adopts a dialectical and sceptical approach vis-à-vis his reader to make them come to a judgement concerning Eumenes' true moral character and virtue. In the *Comparison*, Plutarch makes a different judgement of Eumenes' *apologia* and subsequent behaviour in captivity as supplicatory, because he interprets that his speech acts were not motivated by justice but self-interest in the preservation of his life. Plutarch's judgement of Eumenes' supplication is also seen by how he judges Sertorius' death: though the Roman protagonist was unable to defend himself physically, he did not dishonour himself. Plutarch's main judgement focuses upon the differences between the protagonists' speech and deeds between the *apologia* and the main narrative for the purpose of deceiving his audience. Underlying Plutarch's interpretation of both protagonists is an inquiry into the motivations behind the military struggle for their lives. Plutarch considers that Sertorius acted with a greater sense of justice and honour, whereas the vices that drove Eumenes, his greed, his love of contention, which lurk beneath his pronouncements on friendship and his loyalty to the Argead house, are symptomatic of his self-interest. This chapter has argued that part of the reason why Plutarch has this negative interpretation of Eumenes concerning his self-interest and supplication can be explained by his representation of the protagonist's παιδεία. Eumenes' education focused too much on his physical-military development, and the sophistic and literary arts. These aspects are highlighted by the subject matter of the *apologia*: Eumenes' self-praise of his generalship and victory over his enemies and the sophistic is seen in the use of stylistic techniques. Plutarch considers that Eumenes failed to show the appropriate spirit and attitude in his captivity because he lacked a philosophical education. This is seen in Plutarch's use of a rare supplication verb (προσλιπαρέω) which he uses elsewhere in his essay *On Listening to Lectures*. This example and the *Comparison* highlight that the biographer wishes a comparison to be made between students who fail in their philosophical education and soldiers who surrender and supplicate their enemies.

As this chapter has demonstrated in its examination of the surviving sources of Diodorus of Sicily and Justin, Plutarch preserves a balance in the main narrative of the biography between the approaches of his sources: Hieronymus' and Duris' representations of Eumenes. Understanding Plutarch's authorial intentions have been crucial by examining how he responded to these two accounts which differed on the point of whether Eumenes was a just and magnanimous man in his misfortunes or a flatterer and suppliant who used his speech to manipulate the Macedonians for power. The most important adaptation of his

sources can be seen in Plutarch's decision to not write a second speech of Eumenes, where the protagonist moved from supplication to the accusation of the conduct of the Macedonians. This has been demonstrated by examining the evidence of Justin's *Epitome*, which provides a comparative account of Eumenes' speech, which derives from Duris' *Histories*. Plutarch is clear that he used Duris in writing the *Eumenes*. Plutarch uses Eumenes' criticism of his soldiers which he would have found in the second speech, as part of his commentary on the punishment of the Silver Shields at the end of the main narrative. This chapter has argued that he left out this hostile second speech because of his Platonic conception of the relationship between supplication and anger. Supplication calms and removes the passion of anger in the human soul, and this will be explored further as a key part of Plutarch's writing of the supplication-*apologiai* scenes in the following chapters. Plutarch intends to represent Eumenes as cowardly for attempting to hide his supplication and self-interest from his audience. Though as an equally negative quality, as we will see in the next chapter on Cato's *apologia*, and Coriolanus' in chapter four, anger plays an important role as a part of the protagonist's *apologia*. It is through anger that a protagonist can reject the traditional charge of supplication: the preservation of one's life.

Chapter 2: The *apologia* of Cato the Younger

Introduction

Plutarch's method and vocabulary choices parallel many of his points of criticism of Stoicism. The same issues are present in Plutarch's writing of the *Phocion-Cato Minor*; however, in these biographies the author also focuses upon how internal audiences interpret speech and actions as rational or irrational. The role of advice and decision making is the primary issue that unites both biographies and, conversely, it illustrates the protagonists' differences. Phocion employed supplication and petition to the Macedonian rulers of Greece, whereas Cato the Younger's inflexible personality prevented him from compromising.¹ Phocion's moderate political approach is of great benefit for Athens' fortunes in contrast with Cato's enmity with Julius Caesar.

The first part of this chapter will examine the literary devices which Plutarch utilised in his writing of Cato's *apologia*. Plutarch's version of Cato's *apologia* is the most complete account of all the surviving sources. I will discuss Appian's account of Cato's *apologia* and suicide in connection with Plutarch, and their shared use of Asinius Pollio. I will examine parallels between Plato's *Phaedo*, which argues against suicide, and other philosophical works for, as Pelling argues, intertextuality is an important feature of this biography.² Plutarch's criticism of Cato as a philosopher and statesman is tied with his rejection of supplication; this explains why he interlaced Platonic references throughout the *apologia*. Cato's anger towards his son as a suppliant must be read against the protagonist's resistance to perform the same act to Caesar. This argument will be further supported by the evidence of Cicero's representation of Cato, particularly from books three and five of *On the ends of good and evil*. Other important evidence from Cicero's *On Duties* and *For Lucius Murena* will be examined to demonstrate why Plutarch represented Cato as an angry and unusual Stoic.

In the second section, the examination will turn to the companion biography, the *Phocion*. Scholars interpret the *Phocion-Cato* pair as an examination of the conflict between

¹ Duff 1999 discusses Cato's inflexibility as a major negative part of Plutarch's characterisation.

² Pelling 2008: 548. I will consult Plato's *Laws, Republic*.

two virtues: justice and expediency.³ This section will focus on an aspect that has not been analysed: the roles of supplication and petition in this dynamic. The Plutarchan perspectives in these biographies suggest that the writer did not have a simple view of morality, and that judgement of virtues depends upon the representation of the story by the narrator.⁴ The context of the wise sage and Plutarch's Socratic portrayals play an important role in the character representations of Phocion and Cato, and impact the interpretation of Cato's *apologia*.⁵

In the final section, I will consider the function of the supplication theme upon Plutarch's characterisation of Cato as a *supplicandus* in the episode and the narrative structure of the biography. I will examine the significance of Plutarch's approach to Cato's education as a framework for the reader understanding why the biographer depicts the protagonist's resistance and difficulty in accepting other figures' rational arguments. Plutarch characterised Cato as a man dominated by his spirit, instead of his reason, to conflict with the main theme of the *apologia* of deliberation. A scrutiny of other episodes will show why Cato rejects supplication because of his mind's inflexibility.⁶

Cato the Younger was a statesman, orator, and a Stoic philosopher. After the Battle of Thapsus, to avoid surrendering to Julius Caesar, he committed suicide in April 46 BCE. In Plutarch's biography, after his supper with his family and friends, Cato retired to his bedroom and read Plato's *Phaedo*. The *Phaedo* was a key text for all philosophers contemplating suicide or death, because it gave an account of Socrates' last conversations with his companions before his execution. Cato after reading the majority of the book realised his sword had been removed from his room and with great violence attacked his servants and accused them of surrendering him into his enemy's hands. Cato perceived his son as the leader of a conspiracy with the slaves.⁷

The sources available to Plutarch influenced his literary choices in the biographies, as Joseph Geiger argues.⁸ Cato's death scene was a highly significant philosophical event that inspired the rhetorised accounts of many authors including Plutarch. Cato's death informed

³ Jacobs 2017, Martin Jr. 2011: 133-150, esp 144.

⁴ Duff 1999: 132-133.

⁵ Scholars have long recognised the importance of Socrates as a character model in this pair: Geiger 1999: 357-364, Edwards 2007: 155 for Cato's development of this persona.

⁶ All translations are from Christopher Pelling's *Cato*.

⁷ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 68.3. Geiger 1981:90-92, Geiger 2002.

⁸ It is the general view of scholars that the Stoic Thrasea Paetus' biography of Cato from near the end of his life (63-66 CE) influenced Plutarch's writing of the *Cato*: Means & Dickison 1974: 210, Rauh 2018:70. These interpretations are speculative because Thrasea's work was lost, and our knowledge derives from Plutarch's brief comments: Plut. *Cat. Min.* 25.1, 37.1. Paetus' biography would have been an important source for Plutarch because it provided an account of Cato's Stoic ideology by a Stoic philosopher.

the suicides of many philosophers and statesmen including the Stoics Seneca the Younger in 65 CE and Thrasea Paetus in 66 CE, as represented in Tacitus' account.⁹

Appian's account is the closest to Plutarch in its form; however, he may have used the biography as a source. For this reason, a comparison of the texts of both authors cannot tell us about their intentions.¹⁰ Appian abbreviated his account, which contains Cato's first speech. The main difference is that Appian does not portray Cato's son's appeal as a supplication but rather as an exhortation (παρακαλούντω). Cato speaks to his son before he reads the *Phaedo* and sleeps. Appian does not represent Cato as angry towards his family; the reason he says that he needs his sword is to protect himself against his enemies while he is asleep. His speech is described as trustworthy. Appian's account of Cato's first speech has a greater persuasive effect on his family, who return his sword because it is not directed against his son in the same way.

The account's vividness and the depiction of Cato as a wild beast in his suicide scene may reflect the historical writing of Asinius Pollio. Pollio wrote his *Histories*, an account of the Civil Wars, after 35 BCE, and he died in 4 or 5 CE. Pollio was a commander for Julius Caesar and Pelling argues that the wild beast image was an element both Appian and Plutarch borrow and adapt. Stanly Rauh considers that Appian used Pollio because his account of the death scene resembles the image of Cato's end in Caesar's triumph.¹¹ Plutarch does not compare Cato in his suicide with a wild beast. His focus is on the inconsistency of his speech and actions. It is the consensus of scholarship that Plutarch consulted his work, whether directly or in Greek while working on the *Cato* among the Civil War Lives *Pompey*, *Crassus*, *Caesar*, *Brutus and Antony*. Pelling argues that Plutarch's use of Pollio can be seen in the increasing knowledge in the later *Lives* and due to several parallel passages within the biographies.¹² Further interferences have been made because of the narrative parallels between Plutarch, Appian, and Suetonius among other authors.¹³ Plutarch cites Pollio in the *Caesar*. Scholars observe Pollio's influence in other episodes in Plutarch's *Lives*, for example in a scene where the historian appears himself. Pollio was known for his use of autopsy.¹⁴ It is important to recognise, as Susan Lutton discusses, that Appian and Plutarch had their own

⁹ Tac. *Ann.* 16.34-35.

¹⁰ App. *B Civ.* 2.98.14. Fehrlé 1983: 29-31, 31-2. Cf. Zadorojnyi 2007: 220.

¹¹ Rauh 2018: 51 s.1 cites Pelling 2006: 264-5. Pelling argues this is due to the repetition of the beast image in Appian's narrative, cf. Westall 2015. Also see Pelling 2004: 325-326.

¹² Pelling 1979: 76, 84-85.

¹³ For Pollio as Appian's main source: Kornemann 1896, Gabba 1956.

¹⁴ Cited at Plut. *Caes.* 46.1-3. Also see *Caes.* 32.4 for Caesar's discussion with Pollio before he crossed the Rubicon.

agendas and they used other supplementary material besides Pollio.¹⁵ Understanding Plutarch's authorial intentions must be based upon analysis of his handling of themes in the *apologia*, which will be the focus of inquiry in the next section.

In comparison with the other speeches, Cato's *apologia* has a slightly different structure. It is split into two separate speeches: the first addresses his son, whereas, in the second, Cato speaks to two philosophers who are told to give his message to the son who left in the interval. The repetition of the imprisonment imagery and Cato's view that the sage must reject supplication as a practice in both speeches mean that they can be read together. In both speeches, Cato uses accusation to attack his family and companions; however, in the first, there is a greater focus upon the potential suicide acts. Cato's response is to his son who supplicated him, and the protagonist perceives himself as his prisoner. Cato uses the themes of mistreatment and subjection to attack his opponents; however, there is a disconnect between his reasoning and his violence.

Cato the Younger's *apologia*: a commentary

Plutarch represents Cato as an uncaring *supplicandus* to his young son because this characterisation fits into, and cannot be detached from, his resistance to tyrants. Cato cannot be interpreted as acting justly because of his treatment of his family and, as I will show, Plutarch characterises the protagonist to make a parallel with the tyrant whom Cato despises.¹⁶

ένος δὲ καὶ πύξ τὸ στόμα πατάξας ἤμαξε τὴν αὐτοῦ χεῖρα, χαλεπαίνων καὶ βοῶν ἤδη μέγα παραδίδοσθαι τῷ πολεμίῳ γυμνὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ παιδὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν, ἄχρι οὗ κλαίων ὁ υἱὸς εἰσέδραμε μετὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ περιπεσὼν ὠδύρετο καὶ καθικέτευεν.

He even struck one of them in the mouth and got blood on to his own hands, angrily shouting out at the top of his voice that his son and his servants were handing him over naked to his enemy. Finally his son ran into the room in tears, accompanied by the friends, and embraced him and pleaded with him mournfully.

Plut. *Cat. Min.* 68.3-4.

Plutarch uses the supplication verb (καθικετεύειν) combined with the verb of lament (ὠδύρετο) and the gesture 'to fall before' (περιπεσὼν) to describe Cato's son's appeal. The

¹⁵ Lutton 2012: 246-247.

¹⁶ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 67.2, 68.1. See Connell 2018 for how Plato frames the personalities of the tyrant and philosopher together in their relationship with emotions.

evidence of Plutarch's corpus shows that he rarely and only in special cases used this verb. The tragic emphasis of the verb should be read concerning Plutarch's philosophical-literary perspective that characterisation can be discovered in gestures and speech. The verb is rare in general Greek literature, and in classical Greek literature. It appears in only three instances in contexts of familial conflict.¹⁷ The use of this term is seen in domestic contexts in Plutarch's corpus, for example, Aegeus fails to supplicate his son Theseus from becoming tribute for the Minotaur, and Micca in the *Virtues of Women*, desired without consent by a military captain Lucius, supplicates her father and prefers to die rather than shamefully lose her virginity.¹⁸ Mallory Monaco Caterine has shown in her discussion of the *Virtues of Women* that one of Plutarch's characterisation methods is to juxtapose the behaviour of virtuous women with the irrationality of tyrant figures.¹⁹ The opposition between the supplicant and the tyrant is seen in a fragment of Diodorus of Sicily deriving from Posidonius' *Histories*. The fragment concerns the Roman politician Lucius Appuleius Saturninus, when brought to trial by the Senate, resorted to the act of supplicating the people and appealed for their pity by changing his clothes to that of the beggar.²⁰ Toshibumi Matsubara draws attention to the close vocabulary of supplication between the Saturninus passage and the succeeding scene detailing the supplication of Metellus Pius for the honourable purpose of ending his father Metellus Numidicus' exile.²¹

Plutarch probably uses the same verb to make the reader remember a previous scene in the narrative where Cato resists his friends' and family's persuasion to change his political position. Plutarch may be making a link between the two scenes and the female and male family members and companions to recall the scene in the *Phaedo* where the family and philosopher speak to Socrates for the last time.²² It is striking that Plutarch uses the rare supplication verb twice in the *Cato* when he could have in both scenes used different vocabulary. In this earlier scene, Cato refuses to take the oath to uphold the law on land distribution which the senate in 59 BCE passed. Plutarch states that the majority of the senators took the oath because of the memory of the treatment that Marius took against

¹⁷ Hdt. 6.68, Eur. *Ores.*324, Eur. *Hel.* 1018.

¹⁸ Plut. *Thes.* 17.2, Plut. *De mul. vir.* 15.

¹⁹ Monaco Caterine 2019: 198.

²⁰ Diod. Sic. 36.15.3.1 = Pos Phil Fragmenta 208.16.

²¹ Diod. Sic. 36.16. Matsubara 1998: 88-89 argues that the closeness in the vocabulary, including the description of tears and the supplication indicates Posidonius as a source.

²² Pl. *Phd.* 116B.

Metellus Numidicus, recalling this example and perhaps Posidonius' account.²³ The female members of Cato's family and his friends supplicate for his safety:

τὸν Κάτωνα πολλὰ μὲν αἱ γυναῖκες οἴκοι δακρύνουσαι καθικέτευον εἶξαι καὶ ὁμόσαι,

For the same reason the women of Cato's family at home spent hours in tearful entreaties to him to give in and swear, and his friends and family took the same line.

Plut. *Cat. Min.* 32.7.2.

Plutarch's Cicero was successful in his use of persuasion to convince Cato to change his mind. Cicero states that Cato would be wrong to go into exile and allow Rome to be captured and if he sacrificed himself for the Republic it would be an irrational and mad act (ἀνόητον καὶ μανικόν), which connects with Cato's interpretation of how his actions were seen by others.²⁴ Plutarch states that Cato's attitude became less severe and he took the oath through the methods of arguments and supplication (λόγων καὶ δεήσεων). The situation in Utica was different since Rome was controlled by his enemies. The important question Plutarch poses is whether Cato's honour and sense of justice should be sacrificed, privileging instead the state's interests.

Plutarch's characterisation of tyrants as irrational and led by their emotional excesses paradoxically appear in the way he depicts Cato's relationship with his son and can be compared due to its similar structure, vocabulary and ethical framework with a scene from the *Timoleon*. Timoleon (c.411-337 BCE) was famous for overthrowing the Sicilian tyrants. In an earlier episode in the narrative, Timoleon and his companions supplicate with tears (περιπεσὼν ὠδύρετο καὶ καθικέτευεν) his brother Timophanes who had used his army to take control of Corinth ruling as a tyrant. Timoleon and the group advised Timophanes to listen to reason and change his mind (χρησάμενον λογισμῷ μεταβαλέσθαι).²⁵ The failure of this supplication leads to Timoleon's companions killing Timophanes. In a similar way to Cato's son, Timoleon cannot witness the violence and he cries.²⁶ The key parallel between Cato and Timophanes is the fact that supplication fails to move them to change their minds.

Timophanes and Cato share the trait of severity (χαλεπαίνοντος). The prison guard who supplies the hemlock in the *Phaedo* believes Socrates displays the same trait, in feeling anger towards the men who are responsible for his execution. Indeed, Socrates looks

²³ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 32.3.

²⁴ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 32.8.1-9.1.

²⁵ Plut. *Tim.* 4.

²⁶ There is some evidence that this use of supplication language highlights the influence of the tragic style historian Timaeus. Timaeus Hist Frag Jacoby F 3b 566F fragment 116.9. Westlake 1938: 65-74 argues that Plutarch in this biography consulted the historian, but only in several episodes.

favourably upon the guard who cries for him like his companions before his death, so the question is whether the philosopher Cato's anger is justified. Timophanes and Cato are wrong because they respond aggressively to supplicating family members.²⁷

τοῦ δὲ Τιμοφάνους πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν καταγελῶντος, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς ὀργὴν ἐκφερομένου καὶ χαλεπαίνοντος.

But Timophanes first mocked them, and then lost his temper and was violent,

Plut. *Tim.* 4.8.1-8.2 Trans. B. Perrin.

As Susan Jacobs argues, Plutarch uses the episode involving Timophanes and his brother to emphasise Timoleon's virtue in placing his city's interests before his family.²⁸ Timophanes dies because he will not yield his tyranny, whereas Cato's son attempts to prevent his father from harming himself. The problem is that Cato's attachment to his principles, which manifests in his emotional intransigence to the reconciliation of his enemies, means that he cannot resolve the civil conflict.²⁹

Cato's severity towards his son was a result of his anger, which means that he conceives that his family's self-preservation as a betrayal. Plutarch uses the verb to look at (ἐμβλέπειν) with the adjective terrible (δεινόν) to characterise Cato's speech. Plutarch's use of these terms in his corpus demonstrates a relationship between the passions and the gaze, as part of an expression that reveals evidence of a positive emotion such as love or wonder at another's action or speech.³⁰ Plato uses the verb in a similar way.³¹ In a similar but harsher way to Socrates, Cato attempts to instil the seriousness of his belief that committing suicide is the correct choice. Plutarch's use of language to describe Cato's perception parallels Pyrrhus' last moment when he glares at the Macedonian soldier who cuts off his head.³² Plutarch intends to show that Cato was wrong to construe the self-preservation of his family and friends as enemy actions. In a similar way to Pyrrhus, who does not show any tranquility, Cato's gaze emphasises his irrationality. These examples are important because there is a relation between the actions, i.e. violence and emotional experience with the protagonist's gestures and appearance.³³

²⁷ Pl. *Phd.* 116C-D.

²⁸ *Tim.* 6.2-4 apud Jacobs 2017: 308-309.

²⁹ Contrary to Plut. *Thes.* 17.2.5 where Aegeus abandons his supplication.

³⁰ Plut. *Ages.* 32.2 sees his enemy Epaminondas appear in battle, *C. Gracch.* 14.4, *Sull.* 35.4.

³¹ Pl. *Resp.* 10.608D.

³² Plut. *Pyrrh.* 34.6.3.

³³ For scholarship on this subject see: Chrysanthou 2018: 68-69, Pelling 2009.

Cato considers the issue of the legal authority of his son's intervention to prevent his suicide. Cato uses a rhetorical question to ask whether he has lost the legal freedom to take care of his affairs. Cato's language use fits into a fictional legal context seen in Roman declamations of sons taking their elderly relatives to court and convicting them of dementia or insanity.³⁴

ὁ δὲ Κάτων ἐξανασταὺς ἐνέβλεψέ τε δεινὸν καὶ 'πότε,' εἶπεν, 'ἐγὼ καὶ ποῦ λέληθα παρανοίας ἥλωκώς [...].

Cato got to his feet, gave him a fierce look and said, 'Can someone tell me when it was that I was convicted of being a half-wit [...].

Plut. *Cat. Min.* 68.4.

This highlights Cato's Stoic attachment to reason as a supreme guiding principle. Stoics considered that anyone who did not follow their philosophy and were not wise, attempting to reach the state of sagehood, was mad.³⁵ Cato's speeches imply that the protagonist wished his audience to consider the justice behind their actions. The participle ἥλωκώς in the perfect tense has the meaning of conviction instead of its traditional meaning conquering. The combination in the use of ἥλωκώς with mental derangement (παράνοια) may reflect Aeschines' influence.³⁶ Aeschines' passage features the trope of a city-state setting up a monument of their defeat. This is the theme of the irrationality of a community betraying their leader already discussed in chapter one. The nature of the speech shares other elements in common with declamations that were part of the lessons in the schools. The *apologiai* thus reflect the learning from school exercises.

The madness theme fits into Plutarch's framing of Cato against Socrates in a negative light and Plato used the noun παράνοια, distinguished from other nouns for madness in the *Laws* to examine how sons can indict their fathers on charges of insanity.³⁷ Xenophon reports that one of the accusations against Socrates was that he had taught sons to indict their fathers.³⁸ Plutarch through Cato's question to his son reinforces the question that his audience would have asked whether the protagonist acted rationally or irrationally. Plutarch does not

³⁴ The use of dementia in the accusation of a son against his father is seen in several declamation exercises: Sen. *Controv.* 2.3.6, 10.3, Calpurnius Flaccus 8, Ps-Quint. *Minor Declamation* 349 these speeches involve a different legal context, of rape. For scholarship on the subject of dementia concerning the Greek and Roman legal contexts: Kaster 2001, Parkin 2003: 230-233.

³⁵ Cic. *Pro Mur.* 61.

³⁶ Aeschin. *In Ctes.* 3.156 see also 251.3. The phrase ἀποροῦντα σωτηρίας features in Isoc. *De bigis* 9.6, Dem. *Meid.* 207.7. It is present in Aeschin *In Ctes.* 90.5 providing further evidence of the influence of this text on Eumenes' and Cato's *apologia*. Cf. Xen. *An.* 5.2.24.1, Pl. *Leg.* 699B.5, Diod. Sic. 12.9.4.4.

³⁷ Pl. *Leg.* 2.928E, 929D.

³⁸ Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.49, 3.9.7. There is some evidence that Plutarch used Xenophon's *Memorabilia* in *Cato Minor*. Trapp 1999: 491 argues that Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.58-61 influenced Plutarch at *Cat. Min.* 59.

express any criticism of Cato's choice of suicide; however, he undermines Cato's sincerity and rationality found in his *apologia* by his violence and inhumanity. Cato's mind prevents him from being persuaded and Plutarch makes clear the relationship between persuasion and reason in his essay *On Moral Virtue*.³⁹ Cato assumed that his son was taking away his freedom by preventing him from being able to exercise his reason and commit suicide. This is seen in Plutarch's repeated use of verbs of deliberation and persuasion, which are underlined in the following passage:

ὅτι διδάσκει μὲν οὐδείς οὐδείς μεταπείθει περὶ ὧν δοκῶ κακῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι, κωλύομαι δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἐμαυτοῦ λογισμοῖς καὶ παροπλίζομαι;

Given that no one is telling me or trying to persuade me that my decision is a wrong one, but I am still prevented from doing as I wish, and have my weapon taken away?

Plut. *Cat. Min.* 68.4.

Underlying Plutarch's language here is the Platonic context of the use of appropriate musical modes with the courageous soldier and the statesman.⁴⁰ Plutarch's view on music closely parallels Plato's.⁴¹ Plato considers there to be an important connection between the effect of music, as well as other arts, such as poetry, upon different souls during the educational process. According to him, the Dorian mode was compatible with the soldier who fights in battle and endures misfortune, while the Phrygian was more appropriate for a statesman, who employs gentle methods of persuasion and instruction in peacetime. Plato makes clear that this statesman would yield to persuasion and such behaviour was indicative of 'moderation and common sense'. Plato suggests that if a statesman rejected gentle methods, he would be arrogant (*ὑπερηφάνως*). Plutarch ascribes this characteristic to Cato in the judgement of his family upon the protagonist's rejection of Pompey's marriage offer. Cato conceives the act in terms of a military surrender: in the interests of Pompey's advantage but not those of the state.⁴² The connection between acts in war and peace, as involuntary and voluntary actions imitating the modes is an important theme of Cato's *apologia* in the protagonist's view of his son's supplication. Cato's cruel response to his son was wrong; this is why Plutarch represented him as angry. This is because the irrational part of the soul is controlled by the rational. It is that part that submits to persuasion, and leads to a change of opinion.⁴³

³⁹ Plut. *De virt. Mor.* 448A6–9.

⁴⁰ See Crawford 2017.

⁴¹ For Plutarch's view of music see Rocha Júnior 2008, Bowie 2004.

⁴² Plut. *Cat. Min.* 30.4. 30.6 for his judgement.

⁴³ Plut *De virt. Mor.* 7.

Plutarch's depiction of Cato can be understood by interpreting the parallels between the *apologia* and Plato's *Phaedo*, which the protagonist had recently been reading. The text did not support voluntary suicide, and Plutarch emphasises Cato's difficulty in understanding the message of the text by his multiple readings; significantly, his speech occurs before Cato reads the *Phaedo* completely.⁴⁴ Socrates in the *Phaedo* responds to his companions Cebes' and Simmias' arguments on the issue of whether it is right to want to die, escaping the service of the gods in the same way as slaves escape from their masters.⁴⁵ Socrates' following discussion that encompasses the *Phaedo* is a kind of *apologia* since the philosopher says that he will defend his thought on the issues as if he was in a law court.⁴⁶ There can be no doubt that Cato intends to make a similar *apologia* justifying his suicide. Cato's *apologia* is problematic because of his anger and Socrates considered that the passions were an obstacle to men's proper reasoning.⁴⁷ Cato conceives the opposite viewpoint of his son as force instead of persuasion. Cato does not understand that Socrates uses his *apologia* to persuade his audience.⁴⁸ By failing to consider whether it is right to commit suicide and his failure to engage in dialectics with the philosophers and to understand his son's attitude, Cato demonstrates he is too focused on suicide due to his anger. Cato's main understanding from the *Phaedo* that a man should not fear death does not justify his defence of suicide. Elsewhere, Plutarch shows that suicide could be prevented if it was made a shameful act; this explains why the biographer will criticise Cato's suicide in connection with his conception of honour.⁴⁹ The *Phaedo* demonstrates that philosophers should not fear death and it should be a tranquil experience.⁵⁰

By reading the two texts against each other, it seems that Plutarch intended his audience to reflect upon Cato's and Socrates' instructions to their companions, and the differences in their characters. This can be supported by how Plutarch and Cato describe the son as a youth (μειράκιον) as Simmias speaking for Socrates' young companions compares their lack of confidence in understanding death to the fear of a child.⁵¹ Plutarch emphasises the difference between the ages of Cato and his son, particularly where he speaks to the

⁴⁴ Cooper 1989: esp 15-19 for an important discussion of the philosophical message of the text.

⁴⁵ Pl. *Phd.* 62B.

⁴⁶ Pl. *Phd.* 63B, 63E.

⁴⁷ Pl. *Phd.* 66 B-D the emotions of the body are a form of slavery.

⁴⁸ Pl. *Phd.* 63D.

⁴⁹ Plut. *De. Mul. Vir.* 249C-D, *Apopht. Lac.* 242C. I discuss Plutarch's judgement on pages 78-82.

⁵⁰ Pl. *Phd.* 77E.6.

⁵¹ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 69.1.

philosophers as if he was an old man like Socrates.⁵² Cato was forty-eight years old and his son was twenty-seven years old.

The opposition between persuasion and force and the nature of the philosopher's relationship with a tyrant is evocative of the Platonic dialogues. Cato's relationship with his son as suppliant fits into the same Platonic context of the tyrannical figure losing control of his passion and is a feature of the moral framework seen in other *Lives*.⁵³ Cato portrays himself and his relationship differently, by depicting his son's behaviour as tyrannical.⁵⁴ This reflects Cato's extreme view of Republican freedom and justice, that he conceives his son's protection as a betrayal.

Plutarch's interest is in how the speaker's perspective of events and character is interpreted by his audience. Cato's speech should be read in light of Socrates' discussion with Cephalus on justice in Plato's *Republic*.⁵⁵ Scholars argue that Cephalus' arguments reflect traditional views on justice.⁵⁶ Cato's harsh conception of justice and friendship shares much in common with the mistaken view of Cephalus' son Polemarchus that justice is replying or acting in the same way to moral or immoral action.⁵⁷ For example, enemies deserve one's enmity instead of forgiveness.⁵⁸ Plutarch did not share this attitude and desired that there was reconciliation between enemies.⁵⁹ This is highlighted by Plutarch's choice to attach justice (δικαιοσύνη) as a key character trait for Cato.

The themes of binding and suicide combined with Cato's Stoicism suggests a similar Plutarchan interpretation in the *Cato* and the *Eumenes*. Cato in Cicero's *On Ends* ends his speech with his praise of the Stoic sage. Cicero's Cato describes the sage as a man who possesses the supremacy of the mind over the body, even if he is bound.⁶⁰ Plutarch in Cato's accusation against his son visualises being bound; however, he argues that he does not need a sword:

τί δ' οὐχὶ καὶ συνδεῖς, ὃ γένναϊε, τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἀποστρέφεις, μέχρι ἂν ἐλθῶν

⁵² Geiger 1971:378 argues that Plutarch wishes Cato to be read in the light of Socrates' statements on his old age in Pl. *Apol.* 17C, 37D, 39B.

⁵³ Beneker 2012: 97-98 discusses Plutarch's characterisation of the tyrant Dionysius in the *Dion*.

⁵⁴ Teixeira 1995: 142-146 this explains why Cato's second speech is gentler in reference to the philosophers. Tyrants used force to control the people.

⁵⁵ Plato *Resp.* 1.331C. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.17.

⁵⁶ Cf. Annas 1981.

⁵⁷ Polemarchus continues his father's argument.

⁵⁸ Pl. *Resp.* 1.332B. For discussion of this critical issue of justice in Plato's *Republic* see: Jeffrey 1979, Young 1980, Lycos 1987, Dahl 1991, Carmola 2003, Becker 2005, Ladikos 2006, Mei 2007, Anderson 2016.

⁵⁹ For his philosophical perspective, see Plutarch's treatise *How to Profit by One's Enemies*. See the discussion in chapter four pages 129-131.

⁶⁰ Cic. *De Fin* 3.75-76.

Καῖσαρ εὖρη με μηδὲ ἀμύνασθαι δυνάμενον;

Why not also tie up your father, fine specimen of a son as you are, and bind his hands behind his back, until such time as Caesar arrives and finds me incapable even of defending myself?

Plut. *Cat. Min.* 68.4.

This detail is an important difference with Eumenes who makes this appeal since he was incapable of defending himself. There is an inconsistency in the protagonists' claim that they can kill themselves without a sword because they intend to die an honourable death. Their attitude towards supplication due to their honour explains why they suffered similar misfortunes. The critical issue for Plutarch is the protagonists' failure to exercise their reason appropriately. Cato is a problematic case because Plutarch never depicts him as properly exercising his reason in considering his son's and companions' advice like a philosopher.

The second speech addressed to Cato's philosophical companions, speaks of the mental processes and the role of persuasion and knowledge that can influence his decision on suicide or supplication. Cato directs his message towards the Peripatetic Demetrius and the Stoic Apollonides who were present in the scene to change his philosophy towards suicide.⁶¹ Cato in his speech appears to attempt to draw his companions into a philosophical and didactic discussion; however, he fails to convince either the Peripatetic or the Stoic to accept his position on suicide. Robert Wyllie explains the issue for Stoics of suicide who thought that there had to be a worthy reason behind the decision. As reflected in Eumenes' *apologia* suicide had to be ethically justifiable 'in terms of their idea of what would be acceptable to the man who was in possession of himself and lived his life according to reason.'⁶² Cato speculated on the possible choices his family and his companions made concerning his situation, interpreting their protection as imprisonment:

‘ἦ που καὶ ὑμῖν,’ ἔφη, δέδοκται βία κατέχειν ἄνδρα τοσοῦτον ἡλικίας ἐν τῷ βίῳ καὶ καθημένο υς αὐτοῦ σιωπῇ παραφυλάσσειν,

‘Have you two also decided to use force to stop a man of my age, and to sit there in silence as my warders?’

Plut. *Cat. Min.* 69.1.

Plutarch's argumentative strategy contrasting the actions of the old and the young is paralleled in the mass suicide scene of the Xanthians with the infinitive to restrain (κατέχειν). While preserving a positive view of Brutus, who attempted to use supplication to prevent

⁶¹ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 69.

⁶² Wyllie 1973: 15.

their suicide, Plutarch's interpretation of the Xanthians is more negative. Plutarch considers the act due to collective madness.⁶³ Plutarch in this case, however, does not highlight that the Xanthians' actions were a result of their desire for freedom, whereas Appian makes this point.⁶⁴ Plutarch's approach is similar here because his Cato does not refer to freedom as the motivation, in contrast with other surviving accounts of his suicide. For Plutarch, freedom as a motivation for suicide against tyranny was a good justification, depending of course on whom he was writing about.⁶⁵

Cato examines the second method that his companions could use against him instead of force, persuasion. This method involves the philosophers persuading him that there was no dishonour in supplication:

ἢ λόγον ἤκετε κομίζοντες ὡς οὐ δεινὸν οὐδὲ αἰσχρὸν ἔστιν ἀποροῦντα σωτηρίας ἑτέρας
Κάτωνα τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ πολεμίου περιμένειν; τί οὖν οὐ λέγετε πείθοντες ἡμᾶς ταῦτα καὶ
μεταδιδάσκοντες, ἵνα τὰς προτέρας δόξας ἐκείνας καὶ λόγους, οἷς συμβεβιώκαμεν,

‘Or have you come to argue that there is nothing dreadful or shameful if Cato, when there is no other hope of safety, should wait to have it granted by the enemy? Why not go further, and persuade me and teach me a new lesson, so that we can abandon those earlier doctrines and arguments by which we have lived our life,

Plut. *Cat. Min.* 69.1-2.

The philosophical doctrines and liberty that the protagonist has practised in action and speech are a way of life, which cannot be abandoned or taken from him. Cato in his discussion first avoids the difficulty of his position by formatting the rhetorical question as a collective perspective; he did not consider supplication of Caesar as an individual but as a group with his companions. This is seen in Plutarch's use of the first perfect plural indicative active verb ‘we have just lived’ (συμβεβιώκαμεν). Cato refers to an abstract collective conceptualisation of life as a philosopher, emphasising that his philosophy and political attitudes in life has not changed. This is a point reinforced by Cicero, who criticises Cato's attachment as a way of life to the Stoic doctrine that a wise man would never change his mind, or conceive he was wrong.⁶⁶ Plutarch's verb choice probably is deliberate here since there was a tradition where authors use the term about how long a man has shared his life

⁶³ Plut. *Brut.* 31.2.1.

⁶⁴ Plutarch apologised and presented Brutus in the best light possible, and hence madness was used to denigrate the Xanthians. Tempest 2017: 182-186 for the treatment of the sources and the influence of other accounts.

⁶⁵ App. *B. Civ.* 4.80. Cf. Hdt. 5.19.5.

⁶⁶ Cic. *Pro Mur.* 62. See also Tac. *Ann.* 16.26.4-5 Thræsea refers to his Stoicism similarly.

with his wife.⁶⁷ Underlying this use of language is a criticism of Cato's inconsistency because in his domestic relationship he exchanged his wife with his friend, as well as the fact that Cato made exceptions in legal and political judgements concerning family and friends.⁶⁸ In the *Should Old Men Take Part in Affairs of State*, Plutarch criticises a man who abandons his wife after a long period or takes a younger partner, comparing them to the elderly statesman who gives up his political career in exchange for contemplation.⁶⁹

Plutarch characterises Cato as a passionate statesman and philosopher, ruled by the spirited part of the soul. Plato and Plutarch viewed that the dominance of the spirit in a human soul meant that such a man would understand a situation in terms of shame and disgrace.⁷⁰ Plutarch could have represented Cato more negatively as a coward like other writers, who represented the protagonist committing suicide out of fear of Caesar.⁷¹ Plutarch's intention in the *Cato* is to demonstrate that it is the dominance of the spirit which prevents a man from approaching misfortune appropriately and beneficially. In his moral essay, *On Tranquility of Mind*, Plutarch states that his philosophically educated reader should not be annoyed, angry or sad in misfortunes.⁷² It is the problem of the spirit and the influence of his Stoic teachings which makes Cato's experience difficult and useful as a moral exemplum to Plutarch's readers.

As a hypothetical scenario in this inquiry, Cato did not take the option of supplication seriously and he dismissed receiving Caesar's enlightenment. Cato could not engage in his political life as a philosopher in a different way and adopt a new approach. The same philosophical thinking is seen in a passage of Dio Chrysostom (Plutarch's contemporary) in his discourse *Maintaining that Troy was not Captured*. Dio states that it is hard for men to forget what they have learned and to learn new things if others had made them believe falsehoods.⁷³ These references to important issues in Stoic and Platonic philosophy parallel Plutarch's engagement with Cato due to his anti-Stoic agenda, and as part of the contemporary tradition that preserved information about his character and education, as Alexey Zadorojnyi examines.⁷⁴

⁶⁷ Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 2.22.32.1.

⁶⁸ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 25.

⁶⁹ Plut. *An Seni.* 789B.4.

⁷⁰ Plut. *Tran. Animi.* 475D. For further discussion of the role of emotions on the spirit in the soul see Morphew 2018: 161-175.

⁷¹ Plut. *De Hdt. Mal.* 856 B.

⁷² Plut. *Tran. Animi.* 475 D, 476C: on the importance of philosophical arguments to support reason.

⁷³ Dio Chrys. *Or.* 11.2.5.

⁷⁴ Zadorojnyi 2007: 224-225.

Cato continued his commentary upon his situation by imagining a scenario where he and the other philosophers engage in a reciprocal relationship as supplicants:

ἐκβαλόντες καὶ γενόμενοι διὰ Καίσαρα σοφώτεροι μείζονα χάριν εἰδῶμεν αὐτῶ;

and become wiser thanks to Caesar, and be all the more grateful to him?'

Plut. *Cat. Min.* 69.2.

Cato's negative perspective of Caesar's wisdom is juxtaposed with the rational state of how philosophers live their lives (γενόμενοι διὰ Καίσαρα σοφώτεροι). This fits into a Platonic context, where Plutarch speaks about sophistic argumentative strategies. He is critical in a similar way to Cato because of the way that speech can be used to exploit audiences' emotions. The key point in these dialogues is that these orators believe they have become wise.⁷⁵ Other examples provide a similar perspective upon false wisdom: Dio Chrysostom attacks Epicurean philosophy by using the same expression.⁷⁶ Wisdom is a critical issue for understanding why philosophers act differently.

Cato singles out sarcastically two benefits that Caesar could provide them: wisdom (σοφώτεροι) and grace (χάριν). Resistance or compromise, two alternative methodologies to political situations divide the young and the old in this scene and are important in understanding Cato's and Caesar's conflict. It can be proposed that Cato's *apologia* belongs to a similar philosophical inquiry into family ethics, which is the focus of his essay *On Brotherly Love* because of the language parallels:

ὥσπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς χάριτος ἀξιοῦσι μείζονα τοὺς λαμβάνοντας ἡγεῖσθαι μικροτέραν δὲ τοὺς διδόντας,

Just as, then, we think it right that those who receive a favour should look upon it as of greater, and those who bestow it as of lesser value,

De frat. Amor. 487A Trans W. C. Helmbold.

Plutarch states that a good brotherly relationship can be observed in the reactions of both men to receiving or giving favour to another. Plutarch states that correct responses depend upon the older abandoning his arrogance and neglect in bestowing the gift, while the younger should lose his contempt and disdain. His interpretation goes further than Aristotle's similar view of brothers' relationships.⁷⁷ Plutarch's discussion reflects the Aristotelian

⁷⁵ Pl. *Grg.* 487D.2, *Phd.* 90C.2. Cf. Pl. *Euthyd.* 101E.

⁷⁶ Dio Chrys. *Or.* 12.36.4. The idea derives from the philosophical writings of Pos. Fragment 368. 72. Also see Dio Chrys. *Or.* 13.21.12.

⁷⁷ See Postiglione 1991: 127-128.

interpretation that the relationship is analogous to the timocracy.⁷⁸ Plutarch differs from Aristotle on the origin of the differences between some brothers, considering that they are due to inadequate education.⁷⁹ Plutarch uses the relationship between Cato and Caepio as a positive example.⁸⁰

The last part of the *apologia* sees Cato switching to the first person where he says how he will come to the final decision concerning his crisis. As seen in the first speech, Cato expressed that he could only be the master and possess liberty if he was able to put his thoughts into action:

καίτοι βεβούλευμαι μὲν οὐθὲν ἔγωγε περὶ ἑμαυτοῦ: δεῖ δέ με βουλευσάμενον εἶναι κύριον οἷς ἔγνωκα χρῆσθαι. βουλευέσομαι δὲ τρόπον τινὰ μεθ' ὑμῶν, βουλευόμενος μετὰ τῶν λόγων οἷς καὶ ὑμεῖς φιλοσοφοῦντες χρῆσθε: θαρροῦντες οὖν ἄπιτε, καὶ κελεύετε τὸν υἱὸν ἃ μὴ δύναται τὸν πατέρα πείθειν μὴ βιάζεσθαι'

Yet I have still not taken any decision about myself – but, once I have decided, I must insist on the power to follow the course of action I choose. I shall reach this decision in company with you yourselves, in a way, for I will be reaching it with the arguments that you too are accustomed to use. So go away in good heart, and tell my son not to impose on his father by force what he is unable to persuade him to do.'

Plut. *Cat Min.* 69.2-3.

Cato confirms his free status, which follows the Stoic view of the paradoxes.⁸¹ He had discussed these paradoxes recently with his companions and family. This study argues that Cato did not deceive the philosophers intentionally in the *apologia*, contrary to Zadorojnyi's view of the protagonist's deception. According to Plutarch, Cato has a resolution to commit suicide before he reads the *Phaedo* and he is not just inspired by the text. Cato also attempts to mirror his approach to his son and his companions like Socrates in the *Phaedo*; however, he fails to achieve true contemplation and to engage in a philosophical discussion.⁸² This is seen in the distinctions that Cato makes between his personal decisions and those that he would theoretically make to support others. Cato's thought here fits into the doctrine of appropriate actions developed by the Stoic philosopher Panaetius of Rhodes, the teacher of Posidonius as Joseph Geiger argues. According to the doctrine, it would not have been acceptable for every man in the same situation to take the action that Cato did. We have observed in the course of this analysis the importance for Cato of Posidonius and other

⁷⁸ Plut. *De Frat. Amor.* 486F-487C.

⁷⁹ Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1161A.

⁸⁰ Plut. *De Frat. Amor.* 487C.

⁸¹ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 67.

⁸² Zadorojnyi 2007: 217.

Stoics, whose philosophical thought had moved closer to Plato.⁸³ Cicero in *On Duties* makes clear that it would be acceptable for some people, such as Cato, to kill themselves.⁸⁴ Cicero states that Cato was an example of the wise sage who was right to commit suicide so that he would not submit to Caesar the tyrant.

Plutarch through Cato's speech does not oppose the protagonist's choice to commit suicide, as many Romans did; the issue is more upon whether the choice and the performance was right. Cicero in his defence speech *For Lucius Murena* criticises Cato's severity and views that this was due to his Stoicism. Of course, Cicero's criticism of Cato's Stoicism was a part of his strategy to win the legal case against the same man, who served as one of the prosecutors of Murena. This is a point that both he and Plutarch agree and they share an Academic interpretation against the Stoics that it is wrong for a wise man to not be moved by favour and to not forgive their enemies.⁸⁵ Cicero thought of Cato as a model of learning and as an example of a way to improve oneself in virtue.⁸⁶

Anger plays a fundamental part in the *apologia* scene and Cato's suicide and must be part of this inquiry into Plutarch's characterisation. A comparison can be made with Cicero's framework in books three and five of his philosophical volume *On Ends*. Cicero structured the later books of *On Ends* to counter the earlier broadly Stoic perspective of Cato who is the spokesman of book three. In book five, Cicero provides an argument on suicide deriving from the philosopher Antiochus of Ascalon, spoken by the Antiochean Pupius Piso Calpurnianus. Cicero in book five structures the account around a discussion he had as a student of Antiochus with Piso, and others. Antiochus looked back to and utilised Plato's and Aristotle's works believing that they represented a unified academy, the Old Academy distinctive from the New or Sceptical Academy of his day which he disagreed with.⁸⁷ Comparing Antiochus' perspective is interesting concerning how Plutarch sets up suicide as part of a family conflict. Piso counters an argument against self-love that actions of self-harm must be due to hatred of oneself, and he states:⁸⁸

Sed alii dolore moventur, alii cupiditate; iracundia etiam multi efferuntur et, cum in mala scientes irruunt, tum se optime sibi consulere arbitrantur.

⁸³ Posidonius taught Cicero, and Cato owned an edition of his work: Cic. *Att.* 16.11.4, *Att.* 16.14.4. See also Kidd 1988: 895, Keith Dix 2013: 220.

⁸⁴ Cic. *De Off.* 1.112.

⁸⁵ Cic. *Pro. Mur.* 61.

⁸⁶ Fehrle 1983: 5, 15-16. Dyck 1996: 282 argues that these passages may give a good indication of the moral perspective of Cicero's *Cato*.

⁸⁷ The Antiochean Piso's argument and discussion of self-love are grounded in the same context of Cato's discussion of οἰκείωσις in Book 3.

⁸⁸ Cic. *De Fin.* 3.60-61, 5.10.28. Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 5 = *Eth. Eud.* 4, 1138A5-14.

The motive with some is grief, with others passion; many are rendered insane by anger, and plunge into ruin with their eyes open, fancying all the time that what they do is for their own best interests.

Cic. *Fin.*5.10.29. Trans. H. Rackham.

Instead, Piso conceives that such actions are taken because the individual thinks they are acting in their interests due to self-love. Piso does not comment on whether suicide or self-harm is wrong.⁸⁹ Plato states that a man kills himself because of his self-love, which parallels closely Cicero's Piso's perspective.⁹⁰ Piso's Antiochean account of self-love in book five has been viewed as an adaptation of Aristotle's account on the same subject.⁹¹ Plutarch considered that the Peripatetics were separated as a school but they were Platonic in spirit. This context of self-love, in its negative meaning of selfishness, can aid understanding of why Plutarch undermines Cato's rational and virtuous representation through the influence of anger.

In *Avoidance of Anger*, Plutarch examines through the spokesman of his friend Minicius Fundanus, how anger can be cured in the soul.⁹² Plutarch's Fundanus makes several fundamental points on the subject which are connected with supplication: a man cannot appeal to another individual if they have contempt for them, and it is the role of the offender to display humility for this reason. Plutarch has similar feelings that a man should not display an impression of contempt for his household, though he treats this separately. Plutarch's verdict is that anger is a result of self-interest, i.e. an extreme form of self-love and discontent. The use of the same framework suggests that Plutarch viewed the destructive effect of anger in Cato's and Fundanus' households in similar ways. In terms of his anger, Cato's severity in all of his relationships with friends and family is a by-product of a form of Platonic self-love. Plato states in *The Laws* that self-love makes judgement difficult. Plato goes on to say that the lover should love justice instead of himself or his possessions.⁹³ Though Plutarch at several points in the *Cato* maintains that the protagonist acted from noble motivations in respect to justice and the Roman state's interests, he makes clear that the defence of his principles and Republican freedom and justice was excessive and illogical, and as damaging as his enemies' motivations which stemmed from self-interest.

⁸⁹ Piso unlike Cato in Book three of *On Ends* is less interested in the ethics of suicide, whereas evidence suggests that Antiochus considered the act to be impious and wrong: Plut. *Brut.* 40.4.

⁹⁰ Plat. *Leg.* 9.873C.

⁹¹ Brunner 2010:309-312 discusses the evidence for Antiochus' use of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and other writings.

⁹² Fundanus was well known for his anger.

⁹³ Pl. *Leges.* 5.731E-732A.

Parallelism and juxtaposition with the *Phocion*

Phocion was an Athenian general and statesman (402-318 BCE) and was active in politics for almost the entirety of his long life. He was known for his policy of compromise and friendship with the Macedonian rulers who came to dominate and control the whole of Greece after the battle of Chaeronea (338 BCE).⁹⁴

“εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα” ἔφη “τὴν πόλιν οὗτοι παραγηγόχασιν, ὅστ' ἔγωγε κἂν Νικοκλέα τις τοῦτον ἐξαιτῆ, δίδοναι κελεύσω. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἀπάντων ἀποθανεῖν εὐτυχίαν <ἂν> ἔμαυτοῦ θείμην. ἐλεῶ δ'” εἶπεν “ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ τοὺς ἐκ Θηβῶν δεῦρο πεφευγότας, ἀρκεῖ δὲ τὰς Θήβας κλαίειν τοῖς Ἕλλησι. διὸ βέλτιόν ἐστιν ὑπὲρ ἀμφοῖν πείθειν καὶ παρατεῖσθαι τοὺς κρατοῦντας ἢ μάχεσθαι.”

‘The men in question’, he said, ‘have reduced the city to such a state that even if it was the surrender of Nicocles here that was being demanded, I would recommend you to obey. I mean, if my death would save all of you I would count myself lucky to make the sacrifice. Athenians,’ he continued, ‘I feel sorry for the Theban refugees who have come here, but there’s no point in giving the Greeks more to weep about than Thebes. Rather than fight the victors, then, it is better for both them and us to negotiate and try to obtain concessions.’

Plut. *Phoc.* 17. 2.1- 17.5.1 Trans. R. Waterfield.

The extract describes the moment after the battle when Alexander III punished the Thebans and called for the Athenians who had advocated war with Macedon to be sent as prisoners to him. In his speech, Phocion shows that he would be willing to surrender Nicocles, his friend, and sacrifice himself. Plutarch could ignore whether a political action was just and focus on what was best for the city. It is also important that Phocion, for the majority of his long life, served as the Athenians’ general, leading them to victory in comparison with Cato whom Plutarch depicts on a few occasions serving in a military capacity.⁹⁵

This involves a form of supplication, petition. Cato had a strict but complex view about imprisonment and captivity. For Cato, it was a question of power through his ability to exercise his rationality.⁹⁶ Phocion after this passage petitioned Alexander and advised him to concentrate his attention on the Persians instead of the Greeks. Plutarch says that Phocion’s petition was designed in a way that took account of Alexander’s nature and the influence of passions. Phocion changed the Macedonian’s mind, whereas Cato failed to avert the civil war

⁹⁴ Frost 1997: 18 for Phocion’s ability to negotiate from a position of defeat.

⁹⁵ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 8-9, 12.1 as military tribune.

⁹⁶ Drogula 2019: 131, 137 it was part of Cato’s politics to be taken a prisoner in Rome to present Caesar as a tyrant.

when he could have acted as a conciliator between the senate, Caesar and Pompey. Plutarch characterises Phocion as the ideal politician who does not treat any citizens as enemies and acts against the men who opposed his acts in the state's interests.⁹⁷

No comparison survives with this pair. To understand Plutarch's overall views of his protagonists' characters, and specifically, their acceptance or rejection of supplication in a political relationship, the biographies and other writings must be consulted. Plutarch does not reference petitions in his essay *Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Public Affairs*; however, the focus upon persuasion and advice as important tools of the politician is worth examining. Plutarch makes several points in his discussion on whether old men should remain in politics. He considers that an old man who has been active for a long time in a political career should combat envy by continuing to be strong instead of submitting like a prisoner. This is seen in his language of 'naked and unarmed' (γυμνούς καὶ ἀόπλους).⁹⁸ This is problematic when compared with the *Cato*, because political rivalry was the main factor in the civil war's origins. Cato refers to himself with this description and it functions as an important symbol of his mistreatment by Caesar, whereas in the case of Phocion 'barefoot and unclad' (ἀνυπόδητος ἀεὶ καὶ γυμνός) is used to describe positively his sage-like appearance in the earlier thematic narrative.⁹⁹ Plutarch states later that if the political conflict goes beyond acceptable bounds, the older should suffer defeat and by his persuasion, educate the younger. This is where Cato is mistaken because he does not moderate his language and he becomes consumed with rage.¹⁰⁰ Plutarch's purpose in the *Phocion-Cato* is part of an inquiry into the approaches and motivations of both men in connection with justice and acting on behalf of community interests. Though Phocion suffers in his downfall at the hands of his enemies in contrast with Cato, Plutarch's sympathetic interpretation of his death suggests that he had a positive view of a statesman who could compromise. Plutarch's definition of advice later repeats that the politician must possess power and this is a point highlighted in the Phocion's case because of the power that he exercises as an advisor:

ἡ δὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἕξις, εὐβουλία καὶ φρόνησις καὶ δικαιοσύνη, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐμπειρία στοχαστικὴ καιρῶν καὶ λόγων, πειθοῦς δημιουργοῦς δύναμις οὕσα, τῷ λέγειν ἀεὶ τι καὶ πράττειν καὶ λογίζεσθαι καὶ δικάζειν συνέχεται·

⁹⁷ Plut. *Phoc.* 10.4.

⁹⁸ Plut. *An seni.* 787 F.

⁹⁹ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 27 and 68 in indirect speech which parallels the same thought process as the *apologia* it accompanies. *Phoc.* 4.2.

¹⁰⁰ Plut. *An Seni.* 795 A-B.

but the mental habit of public men — deliberation, wisdom, and justice, and, besides these, experience, which hits upon the proper moments and words and is the power that creates persuasion — is maintained by constantly speaking, acting, reasoning, and judging;

Plut. *An Seni.* 792.D. Trans. H.N. Fowler.

Plutarch does not view Phocion's use of supplications negatively within the biography. Plutarch in contrast with Eumenes does not criticise Phocion's fall because his character parallels Socrates.¹⁰¹ The Athenian democracy sentenced both Socrates and Phocion to death.¹⁰² Other scholars have discussed the scene; however, less attention has been drawn to Phocion's *apologia* in his trial. Phocion was not given a fair trial because he was not allowed to defend himself politically. Plutarch does not depict Phocion's *apologia*, only saying it was difficult for him to make himself heard by the audience. Plutarch reports that Phocion asked several short questions about the trial's justice, and then gives a short statement where he admits his guilt, and asks why his fellow companions should be killed since he thought that they were not guilty. Phocion's speech parallels Cato's in the way he exercises reason in his advice, as Raphaëla Dubreuil argues.¹⁰³ Other accounts give a different picture of the trial. Cornelius Nepos in his short account goes further, saying that the Athenians prevented Phocion from pleading.¹⁰⁴ Similarly, Diodorus of Sicily presents Phocion repeatedly attempting to deliver an *apologia*; it was the noise of his audience which prevented it from being heard.¹⁰⁵ The same description about this failed defence is not present in Plutarch's case. The biographer emphasises Phocion's self-sacrifice which was seen in his earlier speech.¹⁰⁶ Phocion attempts to save his companions with speech in both accounts but Diodorus frames it differently. In Diodorus' account, Phocion attempts to sacrifice himself only when he realises that he could not save himself and he appears more as a victim of his circumstances.¹⁰⁷ Plutarch plays down the self-serving aspect of Phocion's defence and states that nobody spoke up for him, and removes the emotional-theatrical experience.¹⁰⁸ Plutarch's literary choices are rather compelling for how the parallelism operates across the pair. By

¹⁰¹ Chrysanthou 2018: 115 argues that Cato's behaviour in his suicide is un-Socratic.

¹⁰² Plut. *Phoc.* 36.1-2.

¹⁰³ Dubreuil 2018: 266.

¹⁰⁴ Nep. *Phoc.* 4.2.

¹⁰⁵ Diod. Sic. 18.66.5-67.2.

¹⁰⁶ Plut. *Phoc.* 17. 2.1- 17.5.1.

¹⁰⁷ Tritle 1988: 6, 31-35, 147-148 argues that the main account behind Nepos, Diodorus and Plutarch was written by the Peripatetic Demetrius of Phalerum, and evidence suggests it was written in the tragic style. Similar arguments have been put forward for Duris of Samos due to the stylistic differences with Plutarch: Mossé 1998: 79.

¹⁰⁸ Dubreuil 2018: 268.

doing this, Plutarch succeeds in bringing Phocion's character closer to Socrates, who rejected supplication and fear.¹⁰⁹

The significance of the *apologia* within the *Cato the Younger*

Plutarch's intentions behind his characterisation of Cato in the *apologia* depend upon understanding the role and function of the speech within the biography's narrative. Does Plutarch's representation of Cato agree with his previous conduct, and what is distinctive about the protagonist's speech? Plutarch uses Cato's *apologia* to raise and discuss justice and freedom against human kindness and favour. Plutarch's Phocion's and Cato's motivations behind their actions, in relation to the justice or community interest dynamic, explain why they had different attitudes towards supplication. Plutarch generally depicted Cato's severity through his rejection of supplication and, for this reason; this focus on his anger can aid our understanding of his authorial intentions.¹¹⁰ Cato could be more flexible. Plutarch depicts him supplicating on behalf of others and he advises others how to petition because he understands their concerns as a community, but he will not share their behaviour and salvation.¹¹¹ I will first examine how Plutarch creates an educational framework for understanding Cato's attitude to supplication as a youth. The second section discusses the connected issues of Plutarch's republican sympathy for Cato and his depiction of Caesar as a tyrant, against the problematic role of righteous anger.

In the proem to the *Life*, Plutarch describes Cato's nature as inflexible and calm, taking it to mean 'without emotion'. Geiger considers the passage to have a 'Stoic colouring' and reveals that as a child his character was fully developed:¹¹²

Λέγεται δὲ Κάτων εὐθύς ἐκ παιδίου τῇ τε φωνῇ καὶ τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ ταῖς περὶ τὰς παιδίας διατριβαῖς ἦθος ὑποφαίνειν ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ βέβαιον ἐν πᾶσιν.

From his earliest youth, so it is said, Cato's unbending, impassive and totally steadfast character became clear in his words and his appearance and even the way he played.

Plut. *Cat. Min.* 1.2.

¹⁰⁹ For Plutarch, Phocion was convicted due to his speech not his character. For Plutarch's paralleling of Cato's anger with the Athenians in the theatre see Hughes 2008: 44-45.

¹¹⁰ Wussow 2004: 61.

¹¹¹ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 62.3, 65.6 and 66.

¹¹² Geiger 1971: 130 -131.

Plutarch explained that anger could have a great impact on his human responses to others: he was not swift to anger or bad-tempered, but when he did become cross he was difficult to placate (καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν οὐ ταχὺς οὐδ' ὀλισθηρός, ὀργισθεὶς δὲ δυσπαραίτητος).¹¹³ The adjective *δυσπαραίτητος* demonstrates Cato's difficulty in changing his mind. There was an important tradition associated with the term, for example, Polybius used the term to describe the Romans' anger.¹¹⁴ Andrew Erskine discusses Polybius' use of the term succinctly: the process of supplication (*παραίτεομαι*) involves the removal of anger in a person's soul by the petitioner. Erskine argues that the use of the verb reflects a defence in Athenian courts, specifically the persuasion of a jury.¹¹⁵

Plutarch discusses at the beginning of the biography how Cato's inflexibility meant the educational experience was a difficult one. There should be a persuasive discourse between the teacher and the student and its absence is seen in the later relationship between Cato and his son. Cato's failure in his *apologia* reflects his educational experience. He struggled because he conceived that persuasion, the teacher's act of bestowing knowledge involved submission. Due to his severity, Cato sought to dominate and resist the men that people in general feared. This meant that Cato would not compromise his principles by supplicating even if everybody did.¹¹⁶ Plutarch's interpretation is that those who do not have power find it difficult to argue against others, and are persuaded easily. This explanation shows why Cato in his youth argued with and questioned his teacher's knowledge. As Swain argues, this was not a problem so much of his education, but of Cato's true nature.¹¹⁷ Plutarch notes that Sarpedon, his teacher, like others could have beaten him but instead chose to develop Cato's reason. These two different methods in education: the use of persuasion or force are illustrated in Cato's interpretation in his *apologia* of his son's 'violence' and his allies' supplications.

Plutarch depicts Cato's severe response to his allies' supplications as motivated by anger because he uses the relationship to comment on Cato's and Caesar's enmity. Plutarch's portrayal of the protagonists of the Civil War involves an examination into how they uphold justice and *φιλανθρωπία*; in Caesar's and Cato's cases, neither of them preserves a balance between the two. Cato's rejection of his son's supplication makes a statement of the practice

¹¹³ Plut. *Cato Min.* 1.6.1. Jacobs 2017: 186 s18 recognises that this language to describe the severe character trait is also present for Coriolanus.

¹¹⁴ Polyb. 30.31.13.

¹¹⁵ See Erskine 2015, esp 9 for his definition of the supplication verb s.39 cites Johnstone 1999: 109-25, Hall 1995: 39-58, Hall 2006: 353-92.

¹¹⁶ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 1.2.

¹¹⁷ Swain 1990: 198-199. Cf. Drogula 2019: 24.

and how φιλανθρωπία and favour can be misused by a tyrannical *supplicandus* who abuses justice for power. Cato's oligarchic preference for conservative values including justice means that he is unable to adjust to changes in political circumstances. Plutarch defines Cato's character to show that his nobility and flaws lie in his rigid justice, which cannot be persuaded by kindness (ἐπιείκεια):

[...] διαφόρος δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀτενὲς, καὶ ἄκαμπτον εἰς ἐπιείκειαν ἢ χάριν, ὑπερηγαπηκῶς.

[...] but was particularly devoted to that doctrine concerning the good which taught that a concern for justice should be rigid and unbending in excluding any sense of mercy, favour, or gratitude.

Plut. *Cat. Min.* 4.1.

Plutarch criticises Cato for his oligarchic values as much as he condemns Caesar's passions. Both involve an imbalanced attitude to kindness through supplications.¹¹⁸

Plutarch's criticism of Cato's suicide belongs to the same philosophical framework since the protagonist's death prevents Caesar from having the same opportunity to show kindness and enable reconciliation. The general view of Plutarch's sources was that Caesar would have shown his usual clemency to Cato, although nobody knew this exactly.¹¹⁹ Plutarch, ignoring Cato's objections that supplication was dishonourable, writes:

τῷ γὰρ ὄντι σωθῆναι Κάτων ἀνασχόμενος ὑπὸ Καίσαρος οὐκ ἂν οὕτω δοκεῖ καταισχῦναι τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν,

And indeed it is true that, if Cato had brought himself to accept safety from Caesar, he would not so much have disgraced his own reputation as added lustre to Caesar.

Plut. *Cat. Min.* 72.2.

Plutarch earlier in the biography considered that Cato dishonoured the dignity of the office of praetor by appearing like a sage but failing as a statesman, by not wearing the shoes or tunic.¹²⁰ Plutarch used the same term in the *Comparison of Sertorius and Eumenes* in his judgement of their deaths.¹²¹ Similarly, Plutarch in this judgement of Cato criticises his suicide because these irrational choices reveal his severity. Plutarch's presentation of Eumenes' and Cato's *apologiai*, lies in his critical view of ancient Roman virtue as a purely

¹¹⁸ Plut. *Caes.* 4.4: Cicero recognises that Caesar's clemency hides his tyrannical purpose.

¹¹⁹ Plut. *Cato. Min.* 72.2. See Pelling 2011: 405 for discussion of Plutarch's interpretation of Caesar's clemency in this scene.

¹²⁰ Plut. *Cato. Min.* 44.1.

¹²¹ See chapter one page 47.

martial instead of philosophical value. This idea of Roman virtue as excellence in action, i.e. military deeds was prevalent in the republic and principate.¹²² This can be seen in the military themes of both *apologiai* of supplication and imprisonment, and Plutarch's negative judgements of their deaths. Plutarch's interpretation, namely that Cato's supplication would not have dishonoured him conveys something about how the biographer interprets his role as a philosopher and leader of men.¹²³ Plutarch's judgement is connected to his conception of Cato's sense of dishonour and republican freedom, which he sympathises with but also finds problematic. Plutarch uses the term in reference to protagonists or important figures that do not dishonour their ancestry.¹²⁴ A positive conception of honour is seen in reference to the Hellenic struggle for freedom against the Persians.¹²⁵ Cato's acts and speech are highly influential in inspiring others to imitate his virtue and republican principles. Plutarch does not view favourably Cato's position as seen in the *apologia* on the point of receiving Caesar's favour and kindness, actively using his suicide to reject his enemy's clemency as Catharine Edwards argues.¹²⁶ Within this reading, it is possible to interpret a selfish desire on Cato's part to glorify his deed by rejecting Caesar.

Other surviving sources express a similarly negative interpretation that Cato's suicide was unnecessary because he would have adorned Caesar's glory.¹²⁷ Plutarch adds that his sources viewed Caesar as having shown the same clemency to Cato as he did to his other enemies. Plutarch, at this point in the *Cato*, implies that Caesar could have been the ideal and moderate ruler seen in his presentation of Philip II and Alexander III, in contrast with the later Macedonian rulers who did not respect Hellenic freedoms. Plutarch's view of Caesar in his biography is much harsher because he adds a different interpretation; he cites the evidence of Caesar's *Anti-Cato*. Caesar's fury in that work suggested a different outcome, that he would not have been merciful, which highlights that Plutarch may have overall thought that Cato was right to commit suicide.¹²⁸ Plutarch's vocabulary use here contrasts the true vindictive nature of Caesar against the biographer's ideal of a philanthropic monarch seen in Alexander. This is seen in Plutarch's use of the rare term forgiving (εὐδιάλλακτος) only in

¹²² Edwards 2007: 90-91.

¹²³ Plut. *Cato. Min.* 54.3-4, 55. Pompey did not employ him in a military capacity.

¹²⁴ Plut. *Arat.* 1.3-4, *Cor.* 33.1 in reference to Valeria adorning her ancestors. Plutarch's use of the dishonouring verb is tied to a deed which shames the entire life of the individual, as well as his entire family. This is also seen in the works of Dio Chrysostom: Dio Chrys. *Or.* 31.151.

¹²⁵ Plut *Arist.* 12.1, *De Hdt. Mal.* 863F.

¹²⁶ Edwards 2007: 114.

¹²⁷ Val. Max. 5.1.10, App. *B. Civ.* 2.14.99.

¹²⁸ Plut. *Caes.* 54 apologising states that Caesar's motivation in his *Anti-Cato* was not due to hatred but political ambition.

each speech entitled *On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander*.¹²⁹ In the *Caesar*, Plutarch uses the episode of Cato's suicide to condemn Caesar's severity, showing less interest in the moral-political significance of the Stoic's suicide.

Plutarch criticises Cato in the *apologia* scene in a way which draws a complex tyrannical comparison with Caesar, because severity is incompatible with domestic scenarios in which people should act with kindness. Though Plutarch does not use the term righteous anger (μισοπονηρία) within the *Cato*, clearly Cato's main flaw is the excessive and destructive impact of this anger which manifests in his conflict with the enemies of the Republic. This term means the hatred of evil particularly when seeing it in the actions of others, which Plutarch praises and advocates in his essay *On Tranquility* as an alternative to self-interest.¹³⁰ Plutarch states that Cato did not act out of self-interest: instead, he was motivated on behalf of the Roman Republic.¹³¹ This form of anger, though justifiable, could harm a person's character if he experienced the violent and excessive part. Plutarch in *On the Avoidance of Anger* maintains that a man must relieve himself of the detrimental part, but the hatred of evil is nevertheless a sign of nobility.¹³² This is seen in Plutarch's praise of Timoleon, Dion and Brutus for their defence of freedom against tyrants.¹³³ Plutarch, in the short reference to Cato in the *Malice of Herodotus*, criticises writers who wrongly attribute passion or jealousy to great deeds in history instead of the noble motivations of magnanimity and hatred of evil.¹³⁴ This explains why Plutarch writes about Cato's enmity towards Caesar, for example in two episodes close to the *apologia*: Cato speaks to the people of Utica and Lucius Caesar, advising them how to supplicate Caesar correctly while considering it a disgrace to perform the act himself to his enemy. This was a difficult process for aristocrats like Cato to perform, since the problem was not so much the act of clemency in itself, but the 'debt of gratitude' that they owed to Caesar as a *supplicandus*.

Cato's enmity with Caesar combined with his conception of honour, means that he is incapable and hostile to the diplomatic act of supplication. Cato's perspective on this point is also due to a philosophical belief that Caesar's illegal actions have convicted him in terms of moral justice and this means that he has no legitimacy to judge and spare the defeated.¹³⁵ The crux of the ethical and political problem for Plutarch is whether Cato's actions benefitted the

¹²⁹ Plut. *Caes.* 54.1, Plut. *De Alex. Fort.* 1.332D, 2.337B.

¹³⁰ Plut. *De tranq. anim.* 468E.

¹³¹ Plut. *Cato. Min.* 19.2.

¹³² Plut. *Con. Ira.* 463B.

¹³³ Plut. *Comp. Dion. Brut.* 3.4.

¹³⁴ Plut. *De Hdt. Mal.* 856B.

¹³⁵ Plut. *Caes.* 64 and 66.

state. The same issue is paralleled in Plutarch's sole point of criticism of Phocion's leadership, of his trust in Nicanor whom he should have imprisoned.¹³⁶ Plutarch criticises Phocion because he acted out of good faith and justice but not, in this instance, on behalf of the community. Plutarch's criticism of Cato's decision to commit suicide instead of seeking salvation highlights a slight but important difference between his conception of justice and leadership to the *Phocion*. Plutarch defends Phocion's motivation in taking no action against Nicanor because of his trust, as well as the protagonist's attachment to the Platonic principle that he would rather be the victim of injustice than commit an injustice himself.¹³⁷ Plato argues in the *Crito* against the traditional Greek view of justice and reciprocity, stating that even the man who is wronged unjustly should not return the injury. It is true Socratic tranquility to suffer ill-treatment and death without excessive emotions such as anger or grief. For example, this is seen in Plutarch's description of Phocion's tranquility as a prisoner before his execution as the same mental state when he was elected as Athens' general for the first time. In this episode Plutarch refers to Phocion's calmness (*ἀπάθεια*), which was the same term used by the Stoics. The Stoics used it in a way to show they were unaffected by passions. Phocion similarly demonstrates calmness in crisis:

[...] ἐθαύμαζον τὴν ἀπάθειαν καὶ μεγαλοψυχίαν τοῦ ἀνδρός,

[...] and people were amazed by this composure and detachment.

Plut. *Phoc.* 36.1 Trans. R. Waterfield.

Cato's suicide and *apologia* represent a deterrent and flawed example of how a man should respond to a great crisis because the protagonist's contemplation of his action occurs in a state of irrational and excessive anger. In other biographies, Plutarch shows that it was more positive for a man suffering from temporary misfortune to continue the struggle or act as an advisor to reform the tyrant or to commit suicide for concord and the end of civil war such as in the case of Emperor Otho.¹³⁸ Plutarch's interpretation that it would have not been disgraceful for Cato to find salvation at Caesar's hands emphasises his preference for the reconciliation of friends and enemies which is the main message of chapters three and four's *apologiai*, since personal rivalries develop into larger and more destructive seditions and civil conflicts. Cato fails similarly to Coriolanus because of his severity which is an outcome of his oligarchic politics. It was Plutarch's interpretation that oligarchs tended to fail as statesmen

¹³⁶ Plut. *Phoc.* 32.3-5.

¹³⁷ Plut. *Phoc.* 32.3. Pl. *Crit.* 49A-E, *Grg.* 479B-E, 509C-E.

¹³⁸ Plut. *Otho* 15-17. See also Edwards 2007: 36-39.

because they were incapable of working with the people. They used force instead of persuasion to fix social disorders.¹³⁹ This point Plutarch highlights by Cato's mistaken interpretation of his son's use of persuasion and force.

It is important to consider how and why the exempla of Cato's suicide, including the *apologia*, influence the protagonists' family and allies to struggle and die for republican freedom.¹⁴⁰ Plutarch details how Cato's son who had broken down and opposed his father's suicide, died heroically against Caesar and Antony at Philippi. He lived up to the name and did not disgrace Cato.¹⁴¹ In terms of Plutarch's judgement of these men's deaths; he sympathised with the principle of Republican freedom against tyranny while expressing criticism at the inhumanity of Cato's suicide. On the other hand, Plutarch demonstrates in the *Phocion* that a Socratic death and Platonic teachings can be of no moral benefit for a descendant. Phocion's son ignores his father's instructions and takes vengeance by killing his father's enemies.¹⁴² Phocus acts ignobly for the sake of his desires, whereas Cato's son fought for freedom. The atheist philosopher Theodorus persuades Phocus to consider that it is not a dishonour to ransom his courtesan, a slave. Plutarch contrasts the inferior virtue and Greek conception of freedom against the Roman. Phocus dishonours himself by listening to philosophical advice which promotes the love of the body instead of the mind.

Conclusions

As this chapter has argued throughout, Plutarch's critical interpretation of Cato as a philosopher and statesman in his *apologia* and the following suicide scene is due to his irrational rejection of supplication. This is a consistent aspect repeated throughout Cato's biography. Plutarch wished to emphasise that it was because of Cato's severity and anger that he rejected his friends and enemies' supplications and from performing the act himself. Plutarch decided to represent the *apologia* as a part of a supplication scene, whereas Appian represented Cato's son making an exhortation. Plutarch highlights the flaws in Cato's moral character by presenting him as a harsh *supplicandus*. The biographer through the *apologia* also shows that the protagonist has a mistaken understanding of his family's and friends' philanthropic and protective acts towards him, construing them instead as a betrayal. The

¹³⁹ See Plati 2020: 59-60.

¹⁴⁰ Plutarch is not interested in the philosophical reasons why Cato defends freedom. Cato's view that only the wise sage is free, though underpinning his speeches before his suicide, was not a Stoic doctrine that was popular in Plutarch's time see Gallia 2012:19.

¹⁴¹ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 73.3.

¹⁴² Plut. *Phoc.* 36 and 38.

problem of anger dominating Cato's mind demonstrates that Plutarch conceived that in crises such as civil wars or the loss of political freedoms, it was the rational and beneficial choice for an individual to supplicate and persuade their rulers to govern fairly, excising anger from their souls. This political method is seen in Plutarch's representation of Phocion in his relationship with the Macedonian rulers, as I examined in the second section.

Plutarch characterises Cato as a severe and inflexible *supplicandus* in his *apologia* because he wishes to make a comparison between the protagonist's resistance of tyrants and his uncompromising defence of the Republic and the role of passions: specifically anger on his reason. This has been demonstrated by examining how Plutarch uses rare supplication vocabulary in the *apologia* scene and in his corpus. The chapter found that Plutarch uses the verb *καθικετεύειν* only in the distinctive context of domestic and political conflicts, particularly involving tyrannical figures. The evidence of the *Timoleon* where the eponymous protagonist and his companions supplicate his brother Timophanes with the same verb *καθικετεύειν* highlight how Plutarch parallels tyrannical aspirations with the dominance of the passions in the human soul. This framework including shared vocabulary explains why Plutarch represented Cato in the biography and the *apologia* scene as severe and emotionally unbalanced. Twice in the biography, Plutarch uses this verb of supplication, and it has been argued that Plutarch wishes the reader to remember the earlier supplication scene where Cato yielded to the persuasion of his family, friends and Cicero to abandon his political resistance. This scene is important because it links Cato's inflexible political stance on behalf of justice with other great Republican statesmen such as Metellus Numidicus. This supports this chapter's interpretation that Plutarch, through the protagonist's anger and irrationality in the *apologia* scene, undermined and dismantled Cato's Stoic arguments in defence of suicide. As has been demonstrated in the textual analysis of the *apologia*, Plutarch contrasts Cato's emotional behaviour and relationship with his family and companions with Socrates' experience in the *Phaedo* before his execution. As a Platonic philosopher, Plutarch intends his audience to discover the flaws in Cato's choices through Plato's writings, particularly the *Republic*, *Phaedo* and the *Laws*. The chapter also discussed how Plutarch responds to several source accounts concerning Cato, examining the evidence of Cicero's *On Ends* and *On Duties*. This study argues that Plutarch's main intention in representing Cato as a severe *supplicandus* should be seen as part of an inquiry into self-love in connection with his suicide. I also consulted the evidence of Cicero considering his representation of Antiochus of Ascalon's interpretation of self-love and suicide in *On Ends* Book five. Comparing Plutarch's representation of Cato's anger and his views of the passion in *Avoidance of Anger*;

the chapter found that Plutarch views that anger is the consequence of self-interest, which is a form of self-love and discontent. This means that though Plutarch does not judge Cato ever as acting out of self-interest, Plutarch intends the protagonist's inflexibility and anger to be read as fundamental character flaws and the reader is meant to recognise that they stem from his extreme conception of honour and justice. Cato's conception of these values condition his attitude towards supplication and political compromise.

The chapter discussed how Plutarch represents Phocion sympathetically as a Socratic figure in his trial and execution to counter his representation of Cato. Plutarch intended Cato's *apologia* to function as a flawed Socratic *apologia* and dialectical discussion when compared with Plato's *Phaedo*. In the final section of the chapter, the argument was made that Plutarch's Cato's harsh attitude towards supplication as a form of persuasion must be understood to reflect his experience of παιδεία. Sarpedon, his teacher, chooses to develop Cato's reason instead of disciplining and moderating his student. The problem, however, is that this form of παιδεία does not change Cato's true severe nature. The protagonist's harsh attitude to persuasion and other sources of knowledge means that he fails to properly engage in communication with his allies and enemies, as seen in the *apologia* scene. For this reason, Plutarch's Cato fails, while upholding reason and his way of life as the highest value, to understand that it would have been in Rome's interests and for the sake of justice for him to live instead of committing suicide. This is highlighted by the main question in the *apologia* of Cato whether suicide is the right political and moral choice. Plutarch ends the *Cato* with an important judgement: that if Cato had allowed himself to be saved by Caesar, i.e. as part of a supplication, he would not have dishonoured his reputation but added to his enemy's. It is this judgement that shows that Plutarch's main criticism of Cato stems from an interpretation that the protagonist's suicide, whether it was intended to or not, was observed by others as an act about his reputation and power instead as a defence of the Republic and justice. Other evidence from the *Caesar* has shown that Plutarch had a much more positive interpretation of Cato's suicide and his motivations. It has been argued that overall Plutarch interpreted Cato positively as being motivated by righteous anger against Julius Caesar, since the philosopher views in *Avoidance of Anger* that this is the only appropriate form of anger. The detrimental and violent form of anger; however, Plutarch rejects, and this explains his complex and critical interpretation of Cato as a *supplicandus* in the *apologia*-supplication and suicide scenes. Plutarch's preference for the control of anger in the soul and supplication to reconcile enemies which Cato rejects in his violent actions and his *apologia*, are supported by the

approach which Themistocles takes in his *apologia* to the Persian King, as we shall see in the next chapter.

Chapter 3: The *apologia* of Themistocles

Introduction

In the previous chapters, Eumenes and Cato direct their *apologiai* towards family units: the army and Cato's family and friends who control the protagonist's freedom. The main issues that conflict are materialism and self-advantage against moral justice. Both protagonists' appeals preserve a different conception of justice, and Eumenes' speech contains alternative meanings. This evidence has led to the interpretation that Eumenes' *apologia* is an appeal for self-preservation, i.e. it is supplicatory. The difference in this chapter is that Themistocles performs his *apologia* as a suppliant to his enemy, the Persian King, an act that Plutarch's Cato rejects in the same language. Themistocles demonstrates that through supplication and *apologia*, the passions of the soul, and specifically anger, can be calmed. Themistocles' actions on behalf of Greece in the Persian Wars stimulated the King's anger against him. This scene presents an important contrast with the previous chapters because it occurs in a different context, that of exile. Themistocles was exiled because he was accused of medising, conspiring with the Persians. Themistocles lost his citizenship, and the Athenians and Spartans pursued him, wishing to put him on trial. The exile was a significant episode in the biography because Themistocles had to adapt his character and use his character traits: his intelligence and trickery in response to his misfortunes. By seeking sanctuary with the Persians, the accusations of his medism were confirmed in the eyes of his opponents. Plutarch and other authors had to address the issue of whether Themistocles betrayed his Hellenic identity.

This chapter will explore how Plutarch, as part of his philosophical παιδεία, treats the two connected issues of the reconciliation of enemies and the control of anger in the soul. In the first part, I shall consider the influence of the evidence of Thucydides on Plutarch's intentions in the *apologia*. Diodorus of Sicily's alternative tradition to Thucydides shows that Plutarch could have written Themistocles' *apologia* within a trial. I shall then proceed to consider the second half of the *apologia*, which focuses upon reconciliation and supplication, concerning how the practice can calm the *supplicandus*' passions, specifically his anger. Due

to the focus on the emotions and vengeance in this passage, I will consider the role of the Peripatetic philosophy upon Plutarch's characterisation of Themistocles in this part, reading the *apologia* alongside a section of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. I will argue that Themistocles uses his speech to educate and attempt to hellenise the Persian King. Plutarch demonstrates that the King gradually through several episodes learns from Themistocles' advice while contrasting the aggressive behaviour of the Persians to his presence. In the second section, I will turn to how Camillus' promotion of justice upon the character of his Roman soldiers in their wars against barbarians and his punishment of traitors provides an alternative ethical methodology to Themistocles' deception.

Finally, I will discuss the significance of Plutarch's *apologia* in the *Themistocles-Camillus* concerning the conflict between self-advantage and justice, since the previous section shows that the Roman leader acted concerning the latter over the former. I shall also examine Plutarch's views of Greeks and the barbarians, and the role that παιδεία plays in his portrayal. I will take as a case study the scene where Themistocles is appalled by the irrationality of the Athenians, who force him to sacrifice three Persian princes to Dionysius. Education is the critical issue in the *Themistocles*, and it complicates the interpretation of Plutarch's attitude to the protagonist's performance of προσκύνησις.¹

Themistocles was an Athenian politician and general who successfully led the Greek forces against the Persians at Artemisium and Salamis in 480 BCE. He was ostracised and went into exile in 472 BCE. When both the Spartans and the Athenians wished to put him on trial, he sought sanctuary from the King in Persia. He supplicated Xerxes or Artaxerxes and received fair treatment from him, becoming the governor of Magnesia. Although he is likely to have died of natural causes in 459 BCE, Plutarch writes that in 460 BCE, Themistocles committed suicide by drinking the blood of a bull to avoid taking part in the Persian expedition in Egypt against the Athenians.²

Plutarch's account of Themistocles' supplication and speech features as a key part of the narrative of his exile, and the events that led to his suicide. Plutarch did not have to write this *apologia* in direct speech since he decided against this approach in his account of Themistocles' previous supplication of his enemy Admetus, king of the Molossians.³ In this

¹ I use Robin Waterfield's translation of the *Themistocles* and John Marr's translation of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*. I have also consulted Jeffrey Tatum's translation of the *Camillus*.

² Plut. *Them.* 31.5.

³ Plut. *Them.* 24.

episode, Plutarch reports several different traditions. Thucydides, for example, represented Themistocles making an *apologia* to Admetus.⁴

Plutarch comments on a controversy that divided his sources: to which King did Themistocles supplicate?⁵ Plutarch, on chronological grounds, argues for Thucydides' account that Themistocles spoke to Artaxerxes; however, he states that the dating has not been confirmed.⁶ Plutarch seems to make a point here in agreement with Thucydides and Charon against the popular and dramatic tradition. Charon of Lampsacus (c. 500 BCE) was a contemporary of the Persian War. The tradition represented by Ephorus' writing (405-330 BCE) Dinon (c. 360-340 BCE) Cleitarchus (mid to late 4th century BCE) and Heraclides of Cyme (born 400 BCE fl. c. 350 BCE) featured Xerxes as Themistocles' *supplicandus*, which would have aided a more dramatic retelling because the protagonist was responsible for the Persian defeat and the King's survival. Themistocles warned Xerxes that the Greeks planned on destroying the Persian bridge across the Hellespont trapping the Persians in enemy territory, in his second communication.⁷ Plutarch's account reflects the influence of both traditions; however, due to inclusion of figures that were associated with Xerxes or dead at the time of his son, the narrative indicates that his source featured the former King. Perhaps reflecting his ambivalence upon the identity, Plutarch does not in the *apologia* or later episodes name the Persian King (βασιλεύς).⁸ In terms of moral character, the historical identity of the Persian King did not matter, since both would have been consumed with vengeance. It was the stereotype of the image of an irrational and barbarian ruler which Plutarch addresses in Themistocles' use of παιδεία. This means the emotional force of the *apologia* is directed towards Persia as a community and Themistocles does not speak in detail of the harm he did the King.

Plutarch begins his account of Themistocles' supplication of Xerxes by detailing his reception at the Persian Court. Themistocles communicated with the Chiliarch Artabanus, revealing that he was a Greek speaker and his desire to discuss matters of interest with the King.⁹ Artabanus explained to Themistocles that he could only speak to the King if he performed the traditional Persian court practice of supplication (προσκύνησις). If he did not, others would have spoken as intermediaries to the King, who could modify Themistocles'

⁴ Thuc. 1.136.4.

⁵ Plut. *Them.* 26.1.

⁶ Thuc. 1.137.

⁷ Plut. *Them.* 16.4-5. The first deceived Xerxes at Salamis see *Them* 12.

⁸ Artabanus assassinated Xerxes in 465 and was executed by Artaxerxes. On Plutarch's vagueness of detail of which Persian King Themistocles speaks to, see: Scardigli et al 2013: 319 s.197 cites Russell 1973:57-59.

⁹ Plut *Them.* 27.2-5.

message. Artabanus knew that it would be extremely difficult for a Greek to perform the act because it was one of slavery and submission. Persian supplication symbolised the main cultural and political differences in the Hellenic conception of the barbarian other, which continues to be an important area of debate in scholarship.¹⁰ Artabanus' speech foregrounds the problems with Themistocles' supplication which Plutarch could not ignore but does not as a narrator comment upon. This reflects Plutarch's approval of Themistocles' pragmatic attitude; elsewhere he suggests that there is a difference between the Persian ritual and the full prostration.¹¹ It is through Plutarch's representation of characters in the text that we can see his discomfort with προσκύνησις. Plutarch finds the ritual problematic because a man was worshipped in the same way as a god. Plutarch views the full prostration as a shameful gesture taken from the Persians and used in the Greek states. The physical act of Themistocles' supplication marks the new political alliance that he makes with the Persians. His supplication and *apologia* enhance Themistocles' influence. Generally, Greek authors were critical of the Persian supplication because it was conceived as the opposite of the Athenian democratic ideal of freedom of speech.¹² But here, Plutarch makes an exception.

Themistocles' reply shows his detachment from Hellenic attitudes against Persian supplication: instead, he promises he will increase the reputation and power (φῆμην καὶ δύναμιν) of Xerxes and, through his influence, more Greeks will supplicate him.¹³ Themistocles opposes the expected customs and rules and expectations of his culture while adapting himself into the Persians' culture. This fits into Plutarch's general characterisation of a statesman who acts in the interest of the Greek or Persian community if it serves his ambition and fame. Plutarch defends Themistocles from an accusation that he supplicated for self-advantage because it is his ambition which is the main influence upon his political actions.¹⁴ Themistocles' promises to the Persians are very similar to his encouragement of the Athenians because he would persuade the Hellenic states to submit to them after the Persian war if they proved their courage.¹⁵ Similarly, John Marincola has argued that Themistocles succeeds not because of his great strategic intelligence, but because of his inter-personal

¹⁰ Hartog 1988 focuses on Herodotus, Hall 1989 focuses upon how the tragedians defined a self-image of Greek culture through the Persians and other foreign races, Georges 1994, Nippel 2002: 289, Gruen 2011, Jensen 2018. Harrison 2020: argues against the simple opposition between Greek and barbarian in previous scholarship.

¹¹ Plut. *de Sup.* 166A, Hdt. 2.80 apud Hall 1989: 97. Saïd 2002: 79-80 discussing the evidence from tragedy argues that foreign suppliants distanced themselves from προσκύνησις.

¹² Hall 1989: 98 s.196 cites Momigliano 1971: 513-18, Loraux 1986: 210-211.

¹³ Plut. *Them.* 27.4.

¹⁴ Durán López 2000: 167 makes this argument in her reading of the *apologia*.

¹⁵ Plut. *Them.* 7.3-7.4.

communication skills.¹⁶ Plutarch contrasts Themistocles' pragmatism with that of Aristides, who preferred a balance between what served the interests of the state against justice.¹⁷ Themistocles' pragmatism can be seen in his approach to supplication and *apologia*: he uses the practice to educate the King's moral character, and not to improve his power. Plutarch's account of the supplication focuses upon the mystery of Themistocles' unknown identity to the Persians. Plutarch is the only author to state that Themistocles performed προσκύνησις, and the biographer decides to reveal the protagonist's identity in speech immediately after he supplicates the King.¹⁸ This means that Plutarch creates in his structuring of the biographical narrative a close connection between the episode of Themistocles' discussion with Artabanus about προσκύνησις and the following supplication and *apologia*.¹⁹ There is a connection between Themistocles' adaptation of the supplication ritual and the interaction between Greek and Persian languages and culture. Προσκύνησις marks a beginning in an educational-cultural process between both the King and Themistocles because the protagonist's Greek speech, Plutarch says, was translated into Persian. Through the translation, Hellenic philosophical lessons are transferred to the King. Plutarch deemed it acceptable for Themistocles to use Greek speech because he was reforming the moral nature of the King and the Persians. There is, however, an inconsistency in Themistocles' behaviour and attitude because, at the beginning of the war, the protagonist was praised for his execution of a Persian interpreter who used Greek to translate Xerxes' demands.²⁰ Plutarch emphasises that it was the translation to a barbarian language that demeaned the Greek. Plutarch expresses no qualms about the Persian translation of Themistocles' *apologia*, probably because he viewed Themistocles' performance of supplication as a pragmatic political act suited to the foreign environment.

Themistocles' *apologia*: a commentary

Plutarch's literary focus is upon this early stage of the relationship between Themistocles and the King; however, he writes that Themistocles' successful learning of Persian led to him entertaining greater influence over the King. Themistocles announces his own name and

¹⁶ Marincola 2010:125.

¹⁷ Plut. *Them.* 3.2.

¹⁸ Plut. *Them.* 28.1.

¹⁹ Plut. *Them.* 27-28.

²⁰ Plut. *Them.* 6.2.

explains that he became his suppliant because the Greeks exiled him. In his appeal, Themistocles balances the harm he did to Persia against his good acts, maintaining that he achieved the latter because he saved Greece. Themistocles' defence is that he saved the Persians from similar persecution, paralleling his misfortune with theirs. This is illustrated in Plutarch's use of epistrophe in Themistocles' description of the two persecutions:

[...] ὑφ' Ἑλλήνων διωθείς,

[...] κωλύσαντι τὴν δίωξιν,

Plut. *Them.* 28.1.

The second part of Themistocles' defence focuses on his situation and how he can benefit the monarch and he sets out two options for his *supplicandus*.²¹ The first is seen in the Achaemenid benefaction policy, since Themistocles expects that either the King will graciously receive and forgive him, or he will have to use supplication to calm his anger, ensuring his survival. The other scenario involves Themistocles moderating the King's anger. The *supplicandus* should judge Themistocles' services to Persia by considering the identity of his enemies, the Greeks. His defence operates by opposing the moral and political virtue that the King will gain by protecting a former Greek general from his enemies with the alternative, the harming of Themistocles. Themistocles shows that the former choice is the rational one, whereas the latter is irrational because the King must yield to his anger. Themistocles contrasts Xerxes' potential responses to his supplication with the respective political and cultural identities of Greeks and Persians. This antithesis opposes Plutarch's conception of Greeks and non-Greeks elsewhere: the Greeks die in battle, whereas the others beg for their lives.²² The direct speech of the *apologia* ends at this point, but Plutarch recounts indirectly the supernatural forces that influenced Themistocles to seek sanctuary.²³ The King does not speak in response to the *apologia* and views with wonder Themistocles' mind and courage.²⁴

To understand Plutarch's authorial intentions concerning characterisation in *Themistocles* 28, it is crucial to examine how he adapts and changes the supplicatory appeal of one of his main sources, Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War*. Plutarch dramatises the scene and has Themistocles perform an *apologia* in direct speech because he is writing biography,

²¹ Plut. *Them.* 28.2.

²² Plut. *Quomodo adul.* 30C.

²³ Plut. *Them.* 28.3.

²⁴ Plut. *Them.* 28.3-4.

whereas in his *History*, Thucydides chose to represent the appeal within a letter to Artaxerxes. The two accounts are compared below:

‘Θεμιστοκλῆς ἦκω παρὰ σέ, ὃς κακὰ μὲν πλεῖστα Ἑλλήνων εἴργασμαι τὸν ὑμέτερον οἶκον, ὃσον χρόνον τὸν σὸν πατέρα ἐπιόντα ἐμοὶ ἀνάγκη ἡμυνόμην, πολὺ δ’ ἔτι πλείω ἀγαθὰ, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ μὲν ἐμοί, ἐκείνῳ δὲ ἐν ἐπικινδύνῳ πάλιν ἢ ἀποκομιδὴ ἐγίγνετο. καὶ μοι εὐεργεσία ὀφείλεται (γράψας τὴν τε ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος προάγγελσιν τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τὴν τῶν γεφυρῶν, ἣν ψευδῶς προσεποιήσατο, τότε δι’ αὐτὸν οὐ διάλυσιν) , καὶ νῦν ἔχων σε μεγάλα ἀγαθὰ δρᾶσαι πάρεμι διωκόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὴν σὴν φιλίαν. βούλομαι δ’ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπισχῶν αὐτός σοι περὶ ὧν ἦκω δηλῶσαι [...]

I, Themistocles, have come to you, a man who more than any other Greek did harm to your house, during the time when I was forced to defend myself against your father, who was attacking me; yet I did even more good at the time of his withdrawal, when I was safe and he was in danger. I am owed a favour in return (citing both the forewarning message sent from Salamis to withdraw, and the Greek failure to destroy the bridges at that time, which he falsely claimed had been due to him), and now I am here, an exile pursued by the Greeks because of my friendship for you, with the power to do you much good [...]

Thuc. 1.137.4.

‘ἦκω σοι, βασιλεῦ, Θεμιστοκλῆς ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἐγὼ φυγὰς ὑφ’ Ἑλλήνων διωχθεὶς, ᾧ πολλὰ μὲν ὀφείλουσι Πέρσαι κακὰ, πλείω δὲ ἀγαθὰ κωλύσαντι τὴν δίωξιν, ὅτε τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ γενομένης παρέσχε τὰ οἴκοι σωζόμενα χαρίσασθαί τι καὶ ὑμῖν. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν πάντα πρέποντα ταῖς παρούσαις συμφοραῖς ἐστὶ, καὶ παρεσκευασμένος ἀφῆμαι δέξασθαί τε χάριν εὐμενῶς διαλλαττομένου καὶ παραιτεῖσθαι μνησικακοῦντος ὀργῆν: σὺ δὲ τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἐχθροὺς μάρτυρας θέμενος ὧν εὐεργέτησα Πέρσας, νῦν ἀπόχρησαι ταῖς ἐμαῖς τύχαις πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἀποπλήρωσιν ὀργῆς. σώσεις μὲν γὰρ ἰκέτην σόν, ἀπολείς δ’ Ἑλλήνων πολέμιον γενόμενον.’

‘I am Themistocles of Athens, my lord. I have come to you as an exile, with the Greeks on my trail. It is true that I have been responsible for doing you Persians a great deal of harm, but this is outweighed by the good I did you when, as soon as Greece had been brought into a state of security and the safety of my personal affairs gave me the chance to do you a favour too, I put a stop to the Greek’s pursuit. As for myself, whatever happens will be consistent with my present misfortunes, so I have come prepared either to receive thanks from one who is merciful enough to forgive, or to avert the anger of one who holds a grudge. As far as you are concerned, you may take the existence of my enemies as proof of the service I have done Persia, and you can now use my misfortunes as an opportunity for a display of benevolence rather than for the satisfaction of a grudge. For if you keep me alive, you will be saving a suppliant of yours, but if you put me to death, you will be killing an enemy of Greece.’

Plut. *Them.* 28.1-3.

This letter functions as part of the narrative of Themistocles’ exile, juxtaposed with the downfall of the Spartan general Pausanias, who ‘medised’ and communicated through

letters with Xerxes.²⁵ The fallout resulting from Pausanias' death led to accusations against Themistocles in Athens. Medism was an accusation made by Greeks against Greeks acting or conspiring with the Persians.²⁶ Pausanias' medism differed from Themistocles' in that he adopted their clothes and manners, whereas Themistocles' interest was in their custom and language.²⁷ Thucydides' account of Themistocles and Pausanias is a digression separated chronologically from Thucydides' main narrative.

After Thucydides narrates Themistocles' escape from the Athenians at sea, he arrived in Asia and travelled further into the Persian Empire with a companion. It is only at this point that Thucydides states that Themistocles sends a letter to Artaxerxes. Themistocles does not ask for sanctuary from the Persian King; however, he supports his request by comparing his misfortune with that of Xerxes. Themistocles' reference to how he had saved Xerxes by the use of secret communication was well known from Herodotus' account. Nevertheless, Thucydides considers that Themistocles was not responsible for the protection of the bridges.²⁸

Herodotus, who narrated the major events of Themistocles' life in his *Histories*, did not narrate his exile and death.²⁹ Thucydides' representation of Themistocles generally disagrees with Herodotus' *Histories* because it does not present the negative aspects of his character: his use of money and his unpatriotic actions in the Persian war. For example, Plutarch in his narrative of events after the battle of Salamis does not interpret the second message Themistocles sends to Xerxes carried by the eunuch Arnaces as an act of medism, whereas Herodotus adds that Themistocles was motivated by his future self-interest in making Persia a place of sanctuary.³⁰ The letter persuaded Artaxerxes and he permitted Themistocles to come to the Court. Contrary to Plutarch, Thucydides states that Themistocles used the year he was given to learn the Persian language. Thucydides briefly speaks of the success of Themistocles' meeting with the King. The key difference between Plutarch and Thucydides is upon supplication; Thucydides does not mention the word.

Plutarch made a literary decision to adapt the communicative strategies seen in Thucydides' letter of Themistocles as a part of an *apologia* that the protagonist delivers in direct speech to the King. The vividness of the speech in this form contributes to the moral

²⁵ Thuc.1.128-136. See the discussion of Blösel 2012:226. Konishi 1970 demonstrated that the two men are paralleled against each other in Thucydides. See also Ellis 1994: 165-91.

²⁶ For medism see the useful discussion of the term in Graf 1984: 15-30. See also Tuplin 1997: 155-185.

²⁷ Thuc. 1.130.1 and 1.138.1.

²⁸ Thuc. 1.137.3.

²⁹ Pelling 2002a: 137 s.28 cites Nikolaidis 1988, Cf. Littman 1970: 53-7.

³⁰ Plut. *Them.* 16.4-5, *Arist.* 9. Hdt. 8.109-110.

educational message at its heart. Plutarch uses several elements from Thucydides' letter, for instance, the powerful opening, which in the *Life* would have been more dramatic because, to the Persians, the Greek exile was a stranger (ἤκω σοι βασιλεῦ, Θεμιστοκλῆς ὁ Ἀθηναῖος). Thucydides' Themistocles aggressively maintains that due to his service, it is Xerxes who owes him benefaction (εὐεργεσία ὀφείλεται).³¹ Plutarch rephrases the sentence removing benefaction (ὅ πολλὰ μὲν ὀφείλουσι Πέρσαι κακά) while Themistocles later supports his defence by referring to the benefactions that he bestowed on the Persians (εὐεργέτησα Πέρσας). The use of the debt that Themistocles owed the Persians collectively also changes how the King processes his argument. In Plutarch's version, Themistocles equates the two situations: of Athens' and Sparta's pursuit of him in his exile and the Greeks' in relation to Xerxes' return to Persia for the purpose of gaining sympathy. There is no hint or suggestion from Themistocles that Xerxes or Artaxerxes bear responsibility for the protagonist's misfortune and thus they do not owe him beneficial treatment for aid in the past. Themistocles uses the example of his misfortune to support his appeal since he had prevented the Greeks' persecution of Xerxes. The *apologia* directly links with Themistocles' earlier communication. Thucydides' Themistocles acknowledges the defeat of his enemy by the use of the word retreat (τὴν δίωξιν). Plutarch's Themistocles only in the second part of his speech refers to benefaction directly, in relation to his conflict with his former Hellenic allies.³² He construes this enmity as a service because it benefits Persia.

This reveals an important difference in how both authors represent Themistocles' character, in terms of responsibility and service. The key difference can be seen in one detail that Plutarch leaves out: the justification that Themistocles acted because he was forced to do so by Xerxes' invasion. According to Thucydides, Themistocles admits that he defended Greece out of necessity in an active sense (ἐπιόντα ἔμοι ἀνάγκη ἡμυνόμην). This places the blame upon Xerxes and changes the Athenian's responsibility. Plutarch's Themistocles recognises his responsibility for Persian suffering, reflecting his humility. Themistocles' approach in Plutarch's version also reflects more appropriately traditional Greek reciprocity; this is part of the speaker's educational purpose in his communications with the Persians. I define Plutarch's conception of Greek reciprocity as an exchange of gifts or favours. In the context of the supplications of these chapters the protagonist rejects or offers himself as an

³¹ Thuc. 1.137. Gygax 2016: 27 discusses the forceful nature of euergetism in this passage, that no gift was free.

³² For discussion of Persian Achaemenid internal policy, see Munson 2005:57.

object of practical and moral value to his enemy.³³ Involved in this reciprocity is the idea of retaliation or the return of harm, against which Themistocles advises.³⁴

Thucydides' Themistocles argues that he was pursued because of his friendship (φιλία) towards Artaxerxes and this is an important area of semantic and ethical difference with Plutarch's in which reconciliation is the speaker's primary motivation. Plutarch's selection and use of the material in the composition of the *apologiai* is motivated by the writers' style, specifically in using their works as models of literary mimesis. In the *Nicias*, Plutarch professes that he will not attempt to better the account that Thucydides gives, in contrast with Timaeus. I consider this as part of Plutarch's rhetorical strategy. The biographer borrows from different historical traditions to create his protagonist's moral portrait. Plutarch reveals his interest in the nature of historical and philosophical truth by how he appreciates the dramatic and powerful style of Thucydides.³⁵ Plutarch was interested in the style of his source in respect to how he could modify it for his philosophical purpose, as part of his inquiry about human nature and moral character.

Plutarch says that Thucydides was a worthy model because of his artistic methodology and use of different types of imitation.³⁶ Laura Bottenberg in her discussion of Plutarch's work *Whether Military or Intellectual Exploits Have Brought Athens More Fame* comments upon how vividness of representation (ἐνάργειαν) involves for Plutarch both senses of listening and visual perception. It is the visuality of speeches that creates images in the listener's mind and influences emotions.³⁷ Plutarch's *apologia* for Themistocles focuses on the emotional experiences of the *supplicandus* and his amazed reaction highlights the impact of the speech and action. Plutarch does not go into detail about the King's interpretation of the speech, instead commenting upon his realisation of the value of Themistocles as a suppliant. Thucydides influences Plutarch through his presentation of Themistocles' use of sophistic argument and style, and his attachment to reason as a supreme guiding principle. Plutarch writes about Themistocles' intelligence and sophistic speech in several episodes.³⁸ Plutarch's use of Thucydides' letter in the first half of the speech provides an important evaluative framework for the reader to assess events.³⁹

³³ Van Wees 1998: 18 refers to this definition as the narrowest meaning of reciprocity.

³⁴ Van Wees 1998: 20 cites Gouldner 1960 for his interpretation of negative reciprocity.

³⁵ Plut. *Nic* 1.

³⁶ Plut. *De glor. Ath.* 347A.

³⁷ Bottenberg 2017: 9.

³⁸ Plutarch's preference for Thucydides' narrative explains why his account opposes the view of other sources which presented a different characterisation of Themistocles. Stesimbrotus presented Themistocles differently as an Odysseus like figure, whose life was influenced by fortune instead of his intelligence see: Carawan 1989.

³⁹ Plutarch's emphasising and echoing of Thucydides' style and diction has been studied by Graninger 2010.

Diodorus of Sicily (1st century BCE) handles the Persian episode of Themistocles' meeting with the Persian King differently. In Diodorus' narrative, a friend of both men, Lysitheides acts as an intermediary in the negotiations.⁴⁰ Diodorus briefly narrates the meeting between Xerxes and Themistocles: the King, after listening to the Athenian learns that he has not been wronged and frees him from punishment. There is no mention of Themistocles' supplication. Diodorus' main focus in the story is on a Persian trial where Themistocles defends himself against Xerxes' sister, Mandane.⁴¹ Scholars have generally argued that Diodorus used Ephorus as his source.⁴² Plutarch was certainly conscious of this tradition; however, he chose to ignore it.⁴³ Mandane's sons had lost their lives at the battle of the Salamis, and she supplicated Xerxes to enact vengeance on Themistocles.⁴⁴ Due to his forgiveness of Themistocles, Xerxes refused. Mandace spoke to the Persian nobles and they influenced the people to take vengeance themselves. When the people arrived at the court, Xerxes called for a trial to take place, where Themistocles would be judged by the noblest Persians.⁴⁵ Themistocles in the meantime learned Persian and using it, in his unreported *apologia*, saved himself from punishment.⁴⁶ Xerxes gave Themistocles a Persian wife and slaves, and also three cities as a reward.⁴⁷ The democratic form of the trial reflects the Athenian legal system, which has been transferred to Persia by the author. The two episodes in Diodorus emphasise the theme of justice in connection with vengeance and punishment. Xerxes and Mandace are motivated in their feelings towards Themistocles in opposite ways; however, unlike in Plutarch's account, Diodorus has no interest in the moral lessons concerning anger and the calming of emotions as an ethical-therapeutic inquiry.

Themistocles' performance of *προσκύνησις* becomes the crux of the second half of his *apologia*. Themistocles' strategy involves setting out the two possible outcomes that he faces: he will either be reconciled with his enemy or he will have to avert the anger caused by the memory of his deeds. Reconciliation (*διαλλαττομένου*), Themistocles states, is a favour

⁴⁰ Diod Sic. 11.56.8.

⁴¹ Diod Sic. 11.57.1. I will discuss the connection of this scene with the episode of the sacrifice of the Persian youths at the end of this chapter pages 103-104.

⁴² Barrett 1977: 301-305. Podlecki 1975: 92-9 states that Ephorus could have consulted Ctesias' *Persica* for the invention of the trial story. See Gera 2007: 448-449.

⁴³ Before Themistocles' flight to Persia Plutarch speaks of the evidence that the Athenian's accusers used against him. This consisted of several letters written between the Spartan traitor Pausanias and Themistocles. Plutarch defends Themistocles by saying that he rejected Pausanias' attempts to sell himself over to the Persians: Plut. *Them.* 23. See also Diod. 11.54.

⁴⁴ Brosius 1996: 71-2 s.52 argues that the two women are perhaps the same, and Diodorus' and Phaenias' accounts represent the same instance.

⁴⁵ Diod Sic. 11.57.4.

⁴⁶ Diod Sic. 11.57.5.

⁴⁷ Diod Sic. 11.57.6.

(χάρην) which he will receive for his aid of Xerxes in the war. The last part of his *apologia* reveals Themistocles' main purpose to act as a philosopher and political advisor to Xerxes. Themistocles aims to heal the anger of the Persian King and this is not the first episode where pragmatically the protagonist uses anger as part of a political purpose:⁴⁸

ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν πάντα πρέποντα ταῖς παρούσαις συμφοραῖς ἐστὶ, καὶ παρεσκευασμένος ἀφ᾽ ἴγμαι δέξασθαί τε χάριν εὐμενῶς διαλλαττομένου καὶ παραιτεῖσθαι μνησικακοῦντος ὀργήν·

As for myself, whatever happens will be consistent with my present misfortunes, so I have come prepared either to receive thanks from one who is merciful enough to reconcile, or to avert the anger of one who holds a grudge.

Plut. *Them.* 28.2

Plutarch uses the technique of antithesis to contrast the two possible scenarios of friendship and enmity, which operate through the removal of anger. It is a form of supplication (παραιτεῖσθαι) which calms anger. For example, in his essay *On God's Slowness to Punish*, Plutarch states that speaking about the past is an important method to calm another person's anger.⁴⁹ This passage parallels Plutarch's commentary on the use of therapeutic methods to calm passions in the human soul in the *Moralia*.⁵⁰ For Plutarch, anger resides within the spirit (θυμοειδής), which reason, a superior part of the soul, should rule.⁵¹ Plutarch shares with Aristotle a similar use of rage (θυμός) as a synonym of anger, passion (ὀργή).⁵² The philosophical ideas behind this part of the *apologia* on anger control and gratitude reflect the influence of the Peripatetic writings on passions: what is important is that they concern the concept of vengeance, a form of punishment.⁵³ Plutarch through Themistocles examines anger which the concept of vengeance is associated with, but does not use the term τιμωρία or its synonyms, seen in Diodorus' account. Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* states:

⁴⁸ Plut. *Them.* 3.2-5. Themistocles employed Athens' anger towards Aegina as a motivation to construct the triremes which proved so successful against the Persian fleet.

⁴⁹ Plut *De sera* 551B.

⁵⁰ Plut. *De coh. ira.* 453B-C, 455E. For scholarship on this subject: Ingenkamp 1971 examined Plutarch's therapy concerning emotions in five works from the *Moralia*, Ingenkamp 2000, Van Hoof 2010, Nikolaidis 2011, Pinheiro 2016: 359-370, Gill 2018 discusses the use of therapy in the philosophical schools.

⁵¹ Plut. *De coh. ira.* 453B. Tsouna 2011: 205-209.

⁵² Striker 1996: 289.

⁵³ I agree with several scholars that Plutarch in Themistocles' *apologia* was influenced by the lost account of Phaenias of Eresus, a Peripatetic and associate of the second head of the school Theophrastus: Bodin 1915, Bodin 1917, Laqueur 1938: 1567, Frost 1980: 208-211, 215 argues that due to several thematic details between the two episodes of Artabanus' discussion with Themistocles and the προσκύνησις ritual that they derive from Phaenias. These themes include the cultural issue of Greek attitudes to προσκύνησις, Themistocles' identity as a Greek, his intelligence, and his anonymity.

διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπεῖθει αὐτοὺς οὐδεὶς, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖται. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ' οἷς τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως.

In default of this they still labour under the weight of resentment; because owing to its concealment nobody helps to persuade the sufferer out of it, and it takes him time to digest his anger internally. People of this kind cause a great deal of trouble to themselves and their closest friends. We call people irritable if they get annoyed at the wrong things, and too much, and for too long a time, and if they are only pacified by inflicting vengeance or punishment.

Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1126a. Trans. J.A.K. Thomson

Aristotle's characterisation of the irritable is the same seen in Plutarch's depiction of Cato's anger, which further demonstrates that his *apologia* scene is another inquiry into emotional reactions from a different point of view. The problem was Cato's inability, due to his emotional state, to meet and supplicate his enemy. Themistocles' argument operates by first examining reconciliation and the satisfaction of revenge, though he adds that this can occur with forgiveness, and second by opposing the sparing of the suppliant and punishment (κόλαση):

[...] νῦν ἀπόχρησαι ταῖς ἐμαῖς τύχαις πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἀποπλήρωσιν ὀργῆς.

[...] you can now use my misfortunes as an opportunity for a display of benevolence rather than for the satisfaction of a grudge.

Plut. *Them.* 28.2

The noun display (ἐπίδειξις) features as part of Themistocles' emphasis in visual terms of how Xerxes could use his positive treatment of the protagonist as a moral exemplum. The noun signifies the lesson of how a statesman should reconcile with their enemies instead of enjoying the pleasure of yielding to anger. Plutarch through his use of lexis contrasts the visual display of virtue with the gratification of emotions, specifically Xerxes' anger which would manifest in his punishment of Themistocles. Gratification is the right word to translate ἀποπλήρωσιν ὀργῆς, because Plutarch uses wordplay to complicate and defend Themistocles from the charge of supplication.⁵⁴ He links the idea of friendship (χάρις) with his earlier statement on Themistocles' service to Xerxes.

The Aristotelian image of digestion of anger (πέψαι), which occurs in the stomach, and the pleasure of action, parallels Themistocles' use of ἀποπλήρωσιν. It is only here in the

⁵⁴ LSJ s.v. ἀποπληρόω. They define the term as a 'filling, satisfying'.

Parallel Lives that the biographer uses the rare phrase combining the two nouns: satisfaction (ἀποπλήρωσις) and anger (ὀργή). The image of satisfaction reflects Plutarch's interpretation of anger as a 'kind of desire and appetite for causing harm in return' and his combination of the irrational parts of the soul: the appetite and the spirit.⁵⁵ Plutarch's philosophical model reflects his view that Plato's and Aristotle's systems were compatible.⁵⁶ Plutarch uses the term to describe the educational process of young students filling their heads like vessels completely with knowledge. The idea of a vessel of knowledge fits into a possible reading that this Persian King is the youthful Artaxerxes since, in a similar way to a Greek student, his moral character was still mouldable. This is underlined by the way that the King processes Themistocles' *apologia* in his mind, since he is struck by the speaker's boldness and he does not respond to the protagonist. In the King's conversations with his friends, while drinking and in his sleep, Plutarch does not show that the *supplicandus* understands the ethical lesson that Themistocles has taught him, since he only realises that the arrival of the protagonist is an event of good fortune.⁵⁷ This is not to say that this educational model of how a student should receive knowledge is the best, since Plutarch prefers an alternative metaphor of branding or enflaming of knowledge in the mind.⁵⁸ Themistocles chooses his metaphors and language to fit his Persian situation and this is seen in the King's appreciation of the use of examples. Plutarch and Plato reject the filling metaphor in reference to the processing of knowledge because the receiver is passive.⁵⁹ Themistocles chooses to use this vessel-filling metaphor instead of the enflaming of the mind image, because it shows that Plutarch considers that the Persians, particularly the King are comparable to Greek students beginning their philosophical education. For this reason, it is critical that Themistocles' focus in his *apologia* is on the Greek ethical lesson, which is important for all races: that a wise and civil response to supplication is an act of φιλανθρωπία.

Elsewhere Plutarch uses ἀποπλήρωσις to refer to how pleasures fill the body or stomach metaphorically in the same way as food and drink. The appetite is the place for this activity, as Plutarch makes clear in *Precepts of Health Care*.⁶⁰ Human custom or lifestyle

⁵⁵ Plut. *De virt. Mor.* 442B.

⁵⁶ See Beneker 2012:13-17.

⁵⁷ Plut. *Them.* 28.3-4.

⁵⁸ Plut. *De audiendo* 48C. For the idea of the mind as a vessel see Cic. *Tusc.* 1.61. See Roskam 2004: 102.

⁵⁹ Pl. *Grg.* 493E, Pl. *Prt.* 314A, Pl. *Phdr.* 235D, Pl. *Rep.* 9.586A1-B3. For scholarship on this subject: Hillyard 1981: 259, Warren 2011: 281-283 discusses how Plutarch adapts Plato's works in his polemic against the Epicureans in *That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible*. The vessel image represents the earliest stage of Greek παιδεία for adolescents: Plut *De prof. virt* 81C. See also Xenophon 2013: 134-136.

⁶⁰ Plut. *De tuenda* 132A. Plutarch groups the appetite and the spirit as parts of the soul which the rational part controls, and he compares anger with pleasure: Plut. *De virt. Mor.* 443C-D, *Plat. Quest.* 1008A-B.

perverts the original human natural state. It is custom that explains why men act like wolves and lions in the way they consume meat, providing an explanation of why civilised and uncivilised nations commit violence. Plutarch uses ἀποπλήρωσις in connection with pleasure in his Epicurean polemic work *Reply to Colotes in Defence of the Other Philosophers* to attack men who live like wild animals. Plutarch is clear that even if the order of law did not exist; the teachings of the philosophers Parmenides, Socrates, Heraclitus and Plato would be enough to prevent the degeneration of human society.⁶¹ For through their teachings man learns to respect justice. Plutarch's Themistocles in his *apologia* has two purposes: to heal the King's soul and to make him a just ruler. It is by the exercise of reason over his passions that means Xerxes will make the right choice to spare and befriend Themistocles.

Parallelism and juxtaposition with the *Camillus*

Marcus Furius Camillus (c. 446-365 BCE), a Roman soldier and leader, was exiled at the time of the Gallic invasion of Italy (390 BCE). It was after he received legal authority from the Romans, who made him dictator, that he returned to Rome. He defeated the enemy who had captured most of the city apart from the Capitol. As a result of his victory over the Gauls and his rebuilding of Rome, he was known as the second founder by the Romans. Due to the lack of a prologue and a corresponding *Comparison*, it is important to examine what both biographies can tell us about Plutarch's authorial intentions. Other scholars have discussed the problems the absences of these parts pose for understanding Plutarch's choices in making this pairing.⁶² Reading both biographies alongside each other, Plutarch develops in the longer and more complex *Camillus* several connected themes which were introduced within Themistocles' *apologia*: such as the nature of grace between individuals and communities of people, justice in government and warfare, and the opposition between reconciliation and conflict. Repeatedly, supplication is the recourse that both the unfortunate, such as the citizens of Sutrium and traitors or enemies rely upon, and parallels can be drawn with

⁶¹ Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1124E. See also 1125A for the need for a king to rule the people.

⁶² Duff 2008, Duff 2010: 45-46, 65 examines the themes and issues of the *Themistocles-Camillus* as a pair, and argues that the Roman biography complicates the themes of the Greek, Zadorojnyi 2006: 264, Larmour 2016: 4174-4177, Pelling 2011: 32-33 argues that there is a strong possibility that Plutarch did not write *Comparisons* in a few pairs, particularly in the *Alexander-Caesar*.

Themistocles' experience as an exile with his family.⁶³ Themistocles and Camillus both teach others that supplication is an effective method to earn reconciliation and calm anger.

I shall focus upon the main parallel of the protagonist's exile in the *Camillus* to understand why Plutarch represents Themistocles as a suppliant, and how he uses the *apologia* to defend himself. These biographies contain a similar story of a statesman suffering in exile; however, both protagonists react in different ways to the situation. Themistocles' reconciliation with the King could have harmed the Greeks whereas Camillus was eager to return and lead the Roman recovery. Also, the chronological difference that Themistocles suffered exile after his successes in the Persian war contrasts with Camillus, whose reputation is shaped by his salvation and recovery of the Roman state as an exile.⁶⁴

Plutarch characterises Camillus and Themistocles differently: the Roman prefers and upholds justice and a Roman version of φιλανθρωπία, whereas the Athenian is pragmatic and does not mind using deception against his enemies and allies.⁶⁵ The main point of comparison in both biographies is the protagonist's performance of προσκόνησις. Camillus' gesture is part of his prayer to the gods. Camillus' conception of moral and religious justice can be seen as a source of difference with the *Themistocles* and his argument and methods justify the vengeance and punishment of the Romans' enemies. There is a similar distinction between enemy and ally or suppliant in Themistocles' *apologia* and the argument differs because it is made by an exile. Plutarch portrays Camillus as a pious Roman who is concerned with acting justly towards his enemies. Near the beginning of the *Camillus*, the protagonist, observing the taking of the Etruscan city Veii, to which the Romans had been laying siege, defends their military action in prayer. The significance of Camillus' speech is due to it occurring within the Romans' completion of a sacrifice begun by a priest of Veii.⁶⁶ This priest prophesied that the side that completed the sacrifice would be awarded victory by the Gods. Themistocles in his *apologia* defends his actions concerning grace and service, and does not address the justice of his case directly, in contrast with Diodorus' account of the same scene. Camillus' speech in his act of prayer emphasises the theme of justice:

αὐτοί που σύνιστε Ῥωμαίοις, ὡς οὐ παρὰ δίκην, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀνάγκην ἀμυνόμενοι μετερχόμεθα δυσμενῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ παρανόμων πόλιν. εἰ δ' ἄρα τις, ἔφη, καὶ ἡμῖν ἀντίστροφος ὀφείλεται

⁶³ Plut. *Cam.* 32, 35.

⁶⁴ See Duff 2010: 47.

⁶⁵ Zadorojnyi 2006: 262. This is a trait that Plutarch ascribes to several protagonists of the *Lives* reflecting the biographer's political pragmatism. Also see Frazier 1995: 167-70. In some biographies pragmatism clashes with the protagonists' moral education: Xenophon 2016: 139.

⁶⁶ Plut *Cam.* 5.4.

τῆς παρούσης νέμεσις εὐπραξίας, εὐχομαι ταύτην ὑπὲρ τε πόλεως καὶ στρατοῦ Ῥωμαίων εἰς ἑμαυτὸν ἐλαχίστῳ κακῷ τελευτῆσαι.’

You know well that we Romans have not acted unjustly but instead have been compelled to defend ourselves and to exact vengeance from this city of hostile and lawless men. But’, he continued, ‘if the price for our success is some kind of reversal, then I pray that, for the sake of the city and the army of the Romans, it may fall upon me, though with as little harm as possible.’

Plut. *Cam.*5.6

Camillus has a different concept of debt and benefits and the role of reversal to Themistocles, since he does not act for his self-interest.⁶⁷ What is striking about this passage in terms of the dynamics between *Themistocles-Camillus* is that Plutarch’s ἀνάγκην ἀμυνόμενοι may recall Thucydides’ Themistocles’ defence of his actions, which he omits in *Themistocles*.⁶⁸ In a similar way to the argument made by Thucydides’ Themistocles, Camillus uses the idea of necessity to support his defence and retention of power. In comparing this evidence, it can be argued that Camillus in a similar way to Thucydides’ Themistocles defends himself with the support of justice. The idea of such a physical defence with the verb ἀμύνω is a theme which recurs in the *Camillus* concerning the warfare of the Romans, whereas Themistocles uses the verb in his defence of his inability to play the lyre. Themistocles considered it a greater achievement to make Athens a powerful and glorious city, an act which symbolises his ambition.⁶⁹ As Duff argues, Themistocles’ sophistic and arrogant speech in this episode emphasises his incomplete education and ‘bad or imbalanced character’ as well as foreshadowing the future narrative. Camillus’ speech reflects his consistent character as the defender of Rome and its values.⁷⁰

The sacking of Veii and the issue of Camillus’ sacrifice to the gods are important points of issue in connection with Plutarch’s account of his exile. The Romans accused Camillus of keeping the spoils from Veii, and in contrast with Themistocles, voluntarily leaves Rome before his trial because he deemed it shameful to pay the penalty.⁷¹ Camillus prays to the gods, wishing that if his exile was unjust, the Romans would learn through

⁶⁷ Plut. *Cam* 29.2-4: Camillus’ intervention preventing the Romans from submitting to the Gauls by paying a ransom. This contrasts with Themistocles’ defence in a letter to the Athenians that he would never sell himself to the enemy: Plut. *Them.* 23.4.

⁶⁸ Thuc. 1.137.4.

⁶⁹ Plut. *Them.* 4.

⁷⁰ Duff 2010: 48-49, 52. I agree with Duff that Plutarch viewed that deceptive acts were necessary for the survival of a people or city in war and that Themistocles’ leadership and ambition were important for the Greeks’ victory in the Persian war.

⁷¹ Plut. *Cam.* 12.

misfortune that they needed him. Plutarch states that Camillus was justified in his use of curse against his fellow citizens, and says that there were no Romans in his time who did not think that the subsequent invasion of the Gauls was a divine punishment:

οὐδείς δ' ἔστι Ῥωμαίων, ὃς οὐ νομίζει τὰς εὐχὰς τοῦ Καμίλλου ταχὺ τὴν Δίκην ὑπολαβεῖν, καὶ γενέσθαι τιμωρίαν αὐτῷ τῆς ἀδικίας οὐκ ἠδεῖαν, ἀλλ' ἀνιαράν.

Now there is no Roman who does not believe that the prayers of Camillus were followed by an immediate judgement and that he exacted vengeance for the wrong that had been done to him. But this was far from gratifying to him. On the contrary, it was a source of grief.

Plut. *Cam.* 13.1.

Plutarch's language suggests a different interpretation of vengeance as a pleasurable act, as seen in Themistocles' *apologia*, since Camillus could not have expected or intended the harm that his curse caused. Duff discusses how Plutarch's account of Camillus here develops more strongly the Achilles character model by his naming of the hero, whereas Livy only alludes to Achilles.⁷² Conversely, Dionysius of Halicarnassus' version of the curse is harsher than those of Livy or Plutarch, Camillus personally desires the Gods to take vengeance and harm the Romans.⁷³ Achilles in Homer's *Iliad*, after losing his concubine to Agamemnon, abandons the Achaeans in the Trojan War and curses them. He hopes that in their misfortunes, they will regret their mistreatment of him and realise his worth.⁷⁴ Camillus in his exile, unlike Themistocles, does not receive any aid which reverses his circumstances; instead, the Romans restored him because he commanded an army that could save Rome. Plutarch states that it was either fortune that influenced the events or the gods that intervened when they saw Camillus being treated without gratitude.⁷⁵ In the *Themistocles*, however, the protagonist argues from the opposite point of view that a superior should reconcile with their enemies, and that this will display the King's virtue.

The parallels of these scenes of supplication and prayer with the *Themistocles* problematise the interpretation of the previous biography, because Camillus' concern is with justice. Plutarch does not criticise Themistocles' προσκύνησις here, whereas in many other biographies his description indicates that he views the practice as divisive and problematic.

⁷² Livy 5.32.9. Duff 1999: 61, 66 the theme of the Roman's ingratitude with Camillus was present in the source traditions. For discussion of Livy's use of the Achillean curse, see Kraus 1994: 273-274.

⁷³ Dion Hal. 13.5.2-3. Poletti 2020 argues that this harsh 'prayer for justice' reflects prayer ritualism, specifically curse tablets.

⁷⁴ Hom. *Il.* 1.240-44.

⁷⁵ Plut. *Cam.* 13.2.

Uneasy questions appear in Themistocles' use of religion and superstition and his comparison of the human and divine with the title of King of Kings.⁷⁶

The significance of the *apologia* within *Themistocles*

The reason behind Plutarch's decision to provide Themistocles with an *apologia* in his supplication scene lies in the role of παιδεία in the *Lives*. In a similar way to Eumenes, Plutarch represents Themistocles as wise (σοφός), displaying a practical skill which is exercised in his political and military career.⁷⁷ Plutarch in this biography demonstrates in relation to the Athenians, the Persians and the King, the negative impact that passions have upon reason and human actions. First, this is seen in the role that ambition plays as a passion, driving Themistocles in his actions in saving Greece from the Persian war. Plutarch considers this ambition as a result of Themistocles' education and youth. I suggest that it was Plutarch's intention in the *Themistocles* to argue that the Athenian's ambition was necessary for Greece's salvation. This does not undermine the fact that, in terms of justice, Camillus was a superior moral and political example because he did not defect to the Gauls. To understand Plutarch's authorial intentions, it is essential to examine how and why he depicts Themistocles' rationality in his interactions with irrational audiences. The following episodes which I will examine are Themistocles' sacrifice of three Persian royal youths and his interaction with the Persians leading up to his suicide.

Plutarch's account of Themistocles' forced sacrifice of Sandace's three sons, the sister of Xerxes, appears as a curious addition in the biography. The episode's significance lies in its themes of reason and superstition, as seen in the Athenians' belief that the human sacrifice would ensure victory over the Persians. Plutarch does not refer to the episode again, and neither Xerxes or the Persians in the later supplication episode judge Themistocles as responsible for these actions. Indirectly, Themistocles uses the theme of salvation to support his suppliant appeal, whereas Camillus' exile is connected to his sacrifice. Plutarch attributes the story to Phaenias, and scholars discuss the problem of the episode in its relationship with surviving sources as well as the identity of Xerxes' sister.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Plut. *Them.* 28.3.

⁷⁷ Plut. *Them.* 2.4.

⁷⁸ Aesch. *Pers.* 464, Herod. 7.95, Paus. 1.36.2, Aristodemo FGrHist 104 F 1 (1,4) apud Carena, Manfredini et al 1983: 253. See also Schorn 2018: 177- 179 discusses the general scholarly consensus which argues against the sacrifice's historicity.

The sacrifice should be viewed as part of the wider significance of Plutarch's use of emotional experience in the biography.⁷⁹ Plutarch uses the passive aorist participle 'having been driven out of mind' (ἐκπλαγέντος) to convey the force of the emotional experience; other scholars discuss the physical metaphor associated with this term.⁸⁰ In this case, though passions motivate the people to commit an act against humanity; elsewhere Plutarch demonstrates that passions such as anger are useful but also problematic in war.⁸¹ Plutarch represents Themistocles as repulsed by the seer's pronouncement, and he judges negatively people who save themselves due to an emotional response instead of by the use of their reason, as we saw in the last chapter with Cato. It is also possible that Plutarch's defence of Themistocles in this sacrifice scene is actually condescending, since, as in other episodes before his flight to Persia the biographer represents the protagonist as the embodiment of Hellenic values against the barbarism of the Athenians and the Persians.⁸² It is the same Hellenic values, due to his ambition and self-interest, that Themistocles rejects by supplicating and submitting to the Persian King.

There is an important link between the theme of salvation in the *apologia* and the sacrifice scene, whether a person with the power of life and death acts rationally or irrationally. The link between the two scenes can be seen in Plutarch's use of Dionysius' epithet 'carnivorous' (ὠμηστής), which has a meaning of savagery and the concept of satisfaction in the Persian episode. Plutarch signifies that passions, particularly anger, change a pleasurable experience or moral character into a harsher and barbaric form.⁸³ Plutarch in both scenes examines the mental process to similar stimuli: in the Athenian case, they satisfy their emotions by sacrificing their prisoners. It is only in the latter Persian case, however, that Themistocles civilises the community through his engagement with their ruler.

Plutarch's positive account of Themistocles in the last period of his life operates by making an important differentiation between his political and moral aims as an advisor to the Persian King. The ethical lesson of Themistocles' *apologia*, on the control of anger, promotes the reconciliation of enemies. Themistocles in several episodes during his exile influences the King or other Persians to act moderately in personal conflicts. Plutarch

⁷⁹ Plut. *Them.* 13.2-3.

⁸⁰ Hunter 1986: 418, Konstan 2006: 152. Rosenbloom 2017: 22.

⁸¹ Plut. *Them.* 7 Themistocles incites the sailors to act against Architeles, a story Plutarch attributes to Phaenias. *Them.* 10 Themistocles uses superstition to persuade the Athenians to abandon the city to the Persians. *Them.* 11 Themistocles recognised that Aristides' anger, motivated by his conflict with him could have led to his defection.

⁸² *Them.* 13.2 apud Pérez Jiménez 2013: 57 s.16.

⁸³ Plut. *De coh. ira.* 462B on how anger imbues a different Dionysian experience for wine drinkers.

represents Themistocles in this capacity of reforming the Persians' ethical behaviour, instead of acting as a military advisor. This choice reinforces Plutarch's adoption of the tradition that Themistocles decided not to aid the Persians as a general against his fellow Athenians and committed suicide.⁸⁴ The alternative tradition, seen in Thucydides, is that he died from natural causes, but this did not lend itself to the apologetic framework of Plutarch's narrative. Plutarch in the *Cimon* for example gives the more negative account of Themistocles' death.⁸⁵ Plutarch concludes his account of Themistocles' suicide by stating that the Persian King continued to treat Themistocles' family members with φιλανθρωπία. There is a key connection between the two scenes of Themistocles' sacrifice of the Persians and his suicide, since he sacrifices to the gods beforehand.

The critical issue in Plutarch's account of Themistocles' death is that his honour motivates his suicide; this action symbolises a rejection of his decision not to aid the Persians against the Athenians. This reflects his purpose in the *apologia*; Themistocles seeks in speech and action to increase the fame and power of the King in an ethical but not a military sense.⁸⁶ Plutarch does not comment upon whether Themistocles was right to abandon his promises to the King. Plutarch shows through Themistocles' exile, that with παιδεία and φιλανθρωπία, the King can rule peacefully and successfully, relying on the virtues of his reformed character to resolve political conflicts. Ambition motivates Themistocles in his suicide, but in a similar way to the *apologia*. Plutarch represents this value more positively than in other biographies.⁸⁷ Plutarch interprets Themistocles positively because, even though he acts due to his ambition, instead of being motivated on behalf of the Athenians, his actions have a result of neither harming nor aiding his community.⁸⁸ His suicide serves as an effective statement against short-term self-interest. Wealth and further honours are provided to Themistocles by the King, even if they are not expected by the protagonist. The immoral argument on the benefits of advantage and supplication is seen in Coriolanus' *apologia*, the subject of the next chapter. Plutarch defends or undermines the protagonist's character through his justification of the motivations which underlie political actions, particularly within the context of political and moral inconsistency as seen in their relationships with the allies and enemies. As Laurel Fulkerson makes clear, there is an internal consistency in Themistocles' motivations towards the Greeks and the Persians, even though in practical politics his actions appear to be

⁸⁴ Plut. *Them.* 31.3-5. I discuss the influence of traditions on Themistocles and Coriolanus in chapter 4 pages 104-133.

⁸⁵ Plut. *Cim.* 18.5-6.

⁸⁶ Plut. *Them.* 27.4.

⁸⁷ Martin Jr. 1961: 337.

⁸⁸ See Duff 2010: 57-58.

inconsistent.⁸⁹ Themistocles' *apologia* and supplication are controversial because he had declared to the Greeks in the earlier narrative that he would never sell himself to the enemy, and his mistreatment of the Persians. Plutarch, nevertheless, redeems Themistocles' character by showing the positive effect of his political actions on the Persians and the Greeks. This can be seen in his teaching of φιλανθρωπία to the King and his attempt to reform the moral behaviour of the Persian court, as Kenneth Mayer argues. Mayer recognises that unlike other traditions such as that discussed by Diodorus, the memory of Salamis, which is a subject of Themistocles' *apologia*, does not enflame the Persians.⁹⁰ These values emphasise that a Persian King can experience a peaceful and successful reign if he values Greek παιδεία and φιλανθρωπία.

Though in a practical sense, Plutarch's Themistocles was successful through his *apologia* in instilling a philanthropic attitude in the King, it is possible to read a negative interpretation into the protagonist's motivations: specifically his ambition and self-interest. Plutarch makes two different points in his use of the *apologia* on the Persians: the ethical message is correct; however, Themistocles fails to understand the message himself in reference to the powerful role that ambition as a passion has on his life. Also, due to the lack of philosophical παιδεία in his early education, Themistocles fails to understand that his new position as an advisor and close confidant of the King will lead to members of the Persian elite envying his reputation and conspiring against him. This mirrors his earlier relationship with the Athenians, which led to his exile.⁹¹ This is the main interpretation of Pérez Jiménez who reads between the lines and argues that Plutarch had a much more critical view of Themistocles' character in Persia, which would have been seen in the lost *Comparison*.⁹² Though this is possible, since Plutarch does not hide the negative qualities of Themistocles' character, it seems more likely, considering the evidence of the *apologia* as an ethical lesson, that the biographer took a balanced approach in the *Comparison* as he did in the narrative.

Conclusions

This chapter has shown that Plutarch in his writing of Themistocles' *apologia* was influenced by several historical sources. The examination of the primary evidence has shown that Plutarch decided to write Themistocles' *apologia* in direct speech in contrast with the account

⁸⁹ Fulkerson 2012:65.

⁹⁰ Mayer 1997a: 302

⁹¹ Plut. *Them.* 29.5.

⁹² Pérez Jiménez 2013: 51-57.

of the letter which he found in Thucydides. Plutarch shows his debt to Thucydides because the first half of Themistocles' *apologia* reflects the historian's work, and the biographer expresses his preference for this author on chronological grounds. I have also shown that since Plutarch was well versed with the source traditions concerning the supplication episode, he intentionally presented the *apologia* in direct speech. Due to the evidence of surviving sources such as Thucydides and Cornelius Nepos, Plutarch rejected writing an exchange between Themistocles and the King through letters and he also chose to ignore the version which included a dramatic Persian court trial, as seen in the evidence of Diodorus deriving from Ephorus' *History*.

The textual analysis has shown how both parts of Themistocles' *apologia* are connected to a Hellenic ethical lesson that the protagonist is attempting to instil in the Persian King's soul. I demonstrated this in the chapter by examining how the second part of the *apologia* moves away from Thucydides' account and parallels the ethical thought seen in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. This provides an important context for understanding Plutarch's philosophical, specifically Peripatetic lesson on the passions. It also explains the probable influence of the Peripatetic account of Themistocles' *apologia* written by Phaenias, as other scholars have argued. Themistocles' *apologia* as a philosophical exchange with the King operates on two connected levels: the first concerns the protagonist's development of the King's ethical nature, particularly in two connected aspects: anger control in the soul, and the reconciliation of enemies through supplication. Plutarch highlights the positive role of supplication here because he uses the verb *παραιτέομαι* which is used in scenarios where anger is calmed in a person's soul. At the end of the biography, the outcome of this lesson is seen because Xerxes treats the members of Themistocles' family with *φιλανθρωπία* after the protagonist's suicide. The second level concerns Plutarch and his audience, as well as the issue of philosophical *παιδεία*. This chapter has argued that the issue of the Hellenic philosophical education in the foreign environment of Persia was Plutarch's main intention in writing Themistocles' *apologia*. This aids understanding of why Plutarch decided to only refer to the Persian King ambiguously instead of identifying him as Xerxes or Artaxerxes since it was the stereotypical image of an irrational and barbarian monarch that interested the Platonic philosopher. Themistocles' ethical education of the King, and through him the Persian Court, explains why the biographer does not criticise the protagonist's supplication of the King.⁹³ It is also important that Plutarch uses the metaphor of the satisfaction of anger

⁹³ Since the *Comparison* does not survive with the *Themistocles-Camillus*.

(ἀποπλήρωσιν) whereas he generally uses it to describe the passive transfer of knowledge. I have argued that Plutarch in this scene is making a comparison between the irrational Persians and Greek students beginning their philosophical studies. I argued that Plutarch in the *Themistocles-Camillus* considers the ethical lesson on human passions and reason as fundamental. The dangers of an irrational audience overpowering a leader can be seen in Plutarch's handling of the episode of the sacrifice of the Persian youths which also derives from Phaenias.

Plutarch does not view this basic educational process: the passive transfer of knowledge from a teacher to the student as the best, instead preferring an active and engaging teaching model, which is seen in the metaphor of the enflaming of the mind. This corresponds to the education of older students. Plutarch uses Themistocles' *apologia* and his supplication to emphasise how fundamental the ethical lessons of anger control and reconciliation of enemies are, as well as their significance as the beginning stage of philosophical studies.

This chapter has also examined how the similar themes of φιλανθρωπία and justice, control of anger, supplication and the reconciliation of enemies operate as Roman values in the parallel life of Camillus. The main difference which this study found between the two biographies is that Camillus performs the προσκύνησις as the act of prayer to the gods on behalf of the Romans and justice, which contrasts with the motivation of self-interest in the *Themistocles*. Camillus uses this act to justify the vengeance and punishment of Rome's enemies whereas in Themistocles' supplication, the protagonist could be perceived as becoming the subject of the Persian King.

Plutarch's main intention in his writing of Themistocles' *apologia* concerns his inquiry into whether self-interest or moral justice and community interests should form the statesman's main motivations. This is a philosophically and politically engaging exercise for Plutarch's audience because Themistocles delivers his *apologia* to the King as a part of a distinct Persian court supplication ritual, called προσκύνησις. As this chapter has discussed, in the majority of the *Lives*, Plutarch has a negative judgement of Hellenic individuals who perform προσκύνησις. This was the typical view of Greek writers such as Herodotus and Xenophon concerning the court ritual. Plutarch's *apologia* of Themistocles is an exceptional discourse because the biographer ignores the hostile tradition of his sources on the protagonist's 'medism' and has a positive appreciation of Themistocles' supplication. In this respect, Plutarch, though he uses Herodotus' evidence in the biography, does not make the same judgement that Themistocles' self-interest was a negative character motivation.

Plutarch believes this because Themistocles' political and military strategies have the practical result of enabling Greece to survive and succeed against the Persians. This is significant, because as Plutarch demonstrates repeatedly throughout the biography and in the *apologia*, it is self-interest that lies behind Themistocles' ambition. This explains why Plutarch does not criticise Themistocles' self-interest and supplication, motivation and practice being tied together. Plutarch uses the *apologia* to show the positive but also negative effects of the protagonist's pragmatism. In the last section, I argued that Plutarch's decision to represent Themistocles committing suicide instead of serving as a general to the Persians also fits into the same framework as the *apologia* concerning self-interest and justice. Plutarch judges Themistocles positively because his suicide benefits Greece; however, the biographer also states that the act was motivated by his self-interest in connection with his reputation. In the next chapter, a similar Themistoclean approach to supplication is seen in Coriolanus' *apologia*, the problem, however, is that he uses the practice to reconcile with his enemy only in the interests of his advantage and utility. Unlike Themistocles, however, Plutarch's Coriolanus uses supplication with his enemy to satisfy his vengeance, an act which will harm his new allies the Volscians but also his new enemies, the Romans.

Chapter 4: The *apologia* of Coriolanus

Introduction

The subject of this chapter is Coriolanus' *apologia*, which can be read as representing the opposite moral argument to that made by Themistocles. Coriolanus supplicates for his advantage and the satisfaction of his anger, whereas Themistocles seeks sanctuary from his enemies. There is a marked difference between Coriolanus' performance of supplication and his conception of himself as a suppliant. Supplication is an act of submission and honouring of another, which does not fit well with Coriolanus' personality. This is demonstrated by his rejection of two suppliant groups: the senators, and the priests before the gates of Rome.¹

There is a similarity in the way both protagonists use their reputation, symbolised in their names, in their appeals to their antagonists. Themistocles utilises his name as part of his account of his services to Persian King, whereas Coriolanus acknowledges that his reputation reminds the Volscians of defeat. It is through supplication that Themistocles achieves his reconciliation. Coriolanus' speech focuses upon the practical benefits of an alliance rather than justice, like Eumenes' and Themistocles'. The *apologia* as a supplication speech manifests as part of the important dynamic seen in the *Coriolanus-Alcibiades* between private morality and the public good.² Coriolanus establishes a new relationship with the Volscians and Tullus against the Romans, which he will break by yielding to his mother's supplications.³ As Susan Jacobs discusses, Coriolanus does not act as general for the Volscians because he cares for their interests, but rather to satisfy his vengeance. This affects the nature of the 'service' that Coriolanus promises Tullus.⁴

To begin, I will show through a textual analysis that Plutarch edited Dionysius of Halicarnassus' account of Coriolanus' and Tullus' meeting, and that he may have been

¹ Plut. *Cor.* 30.3-5, 32.1-2.

² Verdegem 2010:255.

³ For scholarship on female supplications see Naiden 2006. Naiden only briefly discusses these speeches. Several scholars have examined female supplication speeches: Macauley 2016, Buszard 2010.

⁴ Plut. *Cor.* 35.4, 23.3, 27.3, 30.1. Jacobs 2017:195.

influenced by Livy's account.⁵ Plutarch made several key changes in his presentation of Coriolanus' supplication because he decided to represent the protagonist's character differently. Plutarch introduces a theme of enmity into his description of the relationship of the two men, and this explains why the biographer reshaped the supplication of his source. Plutarch's literary choices in Coriolanus' *apologia* reflect the influence of an episode in Dionysius' narrative where Coriolanus justified his defection before a Volscian assembly.⁶ Plutarch's use of quotations prompts the reader to interpret Coriolanus' *apologia* in the light of several intertexts from Homer's *Odyssey*. I shall examine the significance of the Achilles-Odyssean characterisation model on Coriolanus in connection with the theme of supplication. I will argue that Plutarch's purpose here is to contrast Coriolanus with Odysseus and Themistocles because he does not possess the same intelligence and emotional outlook as the Homeric hero. Coriolanus does not educate his *supplicandus*; whereas, in the *Themistocles*, Plutarch indicates that the King develops ethically due to the Athenian's advice. I will contextualise Plutarch's purpose in Coriolanus' *apologia* with the support of the key texts, *On Exile* and *How to Profit by One's Enemies*. These writings will form the subject of the discussion because they are works of philosophical advice, to aid Roman citizens who suffered the misfortune of exile and to engender better relations between enemies. Coriolanus abuses the main ethical messages of these writings. In the second section, I will discuss how the shorter account of Alcibiades in exile and his chameleon (Odyssean) character functions alongside Plutarch's characterisation of Coriolanus. The *Coriolanus* and *Alcibiades* are important because they are examples of deterrent paradigms, statesmen who harmed their home states, whereas Themistocles' and Camillus' behaviour in their exile did not.⁷ Plutarch's handling of παιδεία in Coriolanus' *apologia* complicates and raises problems when placed in parallel with the *Alcibiades*.

In the last section, I will consider the results of this analysis, exploring the role of the *apologia* within the narrative of the *Coriolanus* in light of the *Comparison*. The *Comparison* does not judge or refer to the *apologia* scene; however, exile as an event is an integral part of Plutarch's moral evaluation of the protagonists' actions. Plutarch's representation of Coriolanus in the *apologia* should be read in connection with his narrative of his trial and

⁵ It is the consensus of scholarship that in this biography Plutarch favoured Dionysius' account: Russell 1963, Albini and Pelling 1996: xxii-xxv, Duff 1999: 205, Verdegem 2010a: 36, Pelling 2002b.

⁶ Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 8. 6.4. Ahlrichs 2005 recognises that Coriolanus' earlier actions are a feature of Dionysius' speech.

⁷ See Jacobs 2017, Russell 1966: 37. Lucchesi 2013: 211-227 argues that desire connects the protagonists' public and private lives. Duff 1999:288 argues that in Alcibiades' case, it is difficult to know if Plutarch intended him to be interpreted as a negative or positive moral example.

exile. Plutarch explains Coriolanus' exile was due to his failure to conciliate and understand the people.⁸ Secondly, I will consider the *apologia's* relationship with the episode of Valeria's divine inspiration and appeal to Volumnia to supplicate her son. I will argue that Plutarch wishes this episode to be read against Coriolanus' supplication because of the biographer's interest in the issue of Roman citizenship. Plutarch's defining character statement that Coriolanus' failure to restrain his anger was 'effeminate weakness' explains why there is a meaningful comparison to be read between the protagonist's and his female relatives' supplications.⁹

Gaius Marcius Coriolanus received his honorific cognomen because of his courage and deeds at Corioli (493 BCE). After failing to achieve his ambition of becoming a Roman consul, the Romans exiled him in a trial due to his tyrannical behaviour. As a member of the senatorial class, Coriolanus had a harsh attitude towards the Roman people. He was put on trial because he prevented the Roman people from receiving grain from Sicily. Coriolanus wished the Senate to use the issue to force the people to yield the political gains which they had received in the first secession of the plebs (495-493 BCE).¹⁰ Seeking vengeance against Rome, he turned to the Volscians, who had been at war with the Romans.¹¹ Coriolanus supplicated his antagonist Tullus Aufidius, the leader of the Volscians. Coriolanus, unrecognised by the Volscians, sat as a suppliant at the hearth, in Tullus' home. Tullus' servants informed their master about the presence of the stranger who veiled himself in silence.¹² Tullus' arrival causes Coriolanus to unveil himself and he delivers an *apologia* as a part of the supplication ritual.¹³

Coriolanus first asks Tullus if he recognises him, and launches into an account of his mistreatment by the Romans and how he had harmed the Volscians in the earlier war.¹⁴ Plutarch's main focus in the first part of the speech is upon the name that the Romans gave him in honour of the sacking of Corioli, a city associated with the Volscians. The name is the only thing that he possesses, he has lost everything else.¹⁵ Coriolanus identifies himself as an exile and a suppliant. He does not supplicate to receive sanctuary. Coriolanus' explanation replaces the traditional purpose of supplication: one connected with the preservation of life,

⁸ Plut. *Cor.* 18-20.

⁹ Plut. *Cor.* 15 at his trial. I used Ian Scott-Kilvert's translation for the *Coriolanus*, apart from the last sentence of the *apologia*. For Dionysius' *Roman Antiquities*, I consulted Earnest Cary's translation.

¹⁰ Plut. *Cor.* 7.2.

¹¹ Plut. *Cor.* 20.5-22.1.

¹² Plut. *Cor.* 21.1.

¹³ Plut. *Cor.* 21.2.

¹⁴ Plut. *Cor.* 8.1, 9 Coriolanus fought the men of Antium see *Cor.* 12.4, 22.1.

¹⁵ Plut. *Cor.* 21.3.

with his course dominated by vengeance. He explains this by saying that his presence signifies that he does not fear death. The last part centres upon the theme of practical advantage: Coriolanus wishes his misfortunes and military abilities to be of practical value to Tullus and the Volscians.¹⁶ Coriolanus ends by saying that if Tullus does not wish to use him; it is against his interests to spare an enemy if they do not serve a practical purpose. Tullus' favourable acceptance of the suppliant is completed by his short speech where he tells Coriolanus to rise from the hearth, and he expresses that Coriolanus will be of great practical aid to the Volscians.¹⁷

The narrative after the *apologia* concerns Coriolanus' leadership of the Volscians against Rome. Coriolanus was prevented from laying siege and sacking Rome by the intercession of his family, in particular his mother Volumnia.¹⁸ Tullus, who had been jealous of Coriolanus' successes in the war against Rome, with the support of other conspirators, killed the Roman leader as he began to make an unreported *apologia* justifying his military decision to end the Volscian war.¹⁹ Tullus forced Coriolanus to defend himself before the Volscians. In a similar way to the *Eumenes*, Plutarch explains that the Volscians' later defeat by the Romans was a punishment for Coriolanus' assassination.²⁰

To support my argument in this chapter that Plutarch suppressed the Themistoclean aspects in his portrayal of Coriolanus, it is important to understand how he worked within a tradition that shaped his interpretation of the character.²¹ Donald Russell has discussed the tradition connecting Coriolanus and Themistocles, but he did not consider why Plutarch chose to not pair these two men in the *Parallel Lives* series, only considering that his literary choice was significant.²² By not making this pairing, I argue that Plutarch wished his reader to consider the differences but also similarities in his representation of Coriolanus with his earlier *Themistocles*. Surviving sources reflect the influence of earlier accounts that connected the stories of Themistocles and Coriolanus. Cicero is the most significant commentator. He views Coriolanus negatively as a traitor to his country, and it is in this capacity that he is important because he influenced later accounts.²³ In his *On Friendship*, Cicero considers whether it would be right for Coriolanus' friends to support him, and

¹⁶ Plut. *Cor.* 21.4.

¹⁷ Plut. *Cor.* 23.5.

¹⁸ Plut. *Cor.* 34-36.

¹⁹ Plut. *Cor.* 39.

²⁰ Plut. *Cor.* 39.

²¹ Nerdahl 2012: 333 on the relationship between the *Coriolanus-Alcibiades* and *Themistocles-Camillus*.

²² Cic. *Brut.* 41-43 apud Russell 1963: 27.

²³ For a flawed but good summary of the tradition see Lehman 1952: 329. He does not examine why different authors wrote about Coriolanus.

condemns such behaviour because the Roman acted against his country.²⁴ Cicero condemns Themistocles in the same way, in association with Coriolanus. Within the criticism of the plea of friendship, there is a denigration of alliances between traitors or enemies of the state, which supplications can form.²⁵

From the evidence of surviving sources, Plutarch used Dionysius of Halicarnassus' account as his main source for Coriolanus' supplication. Dionysius wrote the first part of the *Roman Antiquities* during Augustus' reign (c. 8/7 BCE). Plutarch chose Dionysius because his history was the only expansive and authoritative account of the life of Coriolanus. Livy for instance provides a short mention of the Volscians' reception of Coriolanus, and his account of Coriolanus is a summary in comparison to that of the Greek writer.²⁶ Writing in c. 20 BCE, Livy shares with Plutarch the theme of vengeance as the uniting factor between the two enemies. Livy states that the Volscians treat Coriolanus with kindness and he stayed with Tullus. Livy portrays Tullus and Coriolanus differently, and their hatred of Rome increased as a result of their new relationship. Livy has an interest in analysing how and why this new relationship, which originated as a result of a supplication, led the Volscians to war. Livy states that Coriolanus was exiled because he abandoned Rome before his trial, whereas Dionysius' and Plutarch's narratives show that it was Coriolanus' speech and behaviour which led the plebeians to exile him. Livy does not include Coriolanus' speech before the Volscians which justified his switching sides.²⁷ Dionysius and Livy represent Coriolanus as a pious and just figure in his relationship with the gods, and in his reasons why he acts against his people.²⁸ Plutarch's intentions in writing this biography represent a revision of Dionysius' characterisation of Coriolanus.²⁹

Coriolanus' *apologia*: a commentary

Dionysius' narrative is close to Plutarch's account; however, there are several key differences in his characterisation and the handling of themes. Dionysius divides the *apologia* into indirect and direct speech sections, but they are connected by topic. Plutarch wrote Coriolanus' *apologia* in direct speech:

²⁴ Cic. *Amic.* 11-12.

²⁵ Cic. *Amic.* 43.

²⁶ Livy 2.35.6-7.

²⁷ It is unclear if Plutarch used Livy but he would have likely had some knowledge of his account see Albini and Pelling 1996: XIII, Russell 1963: 21, Buszard 2010: 100.

²⁸ Lehman 1952: 333.

²⁹ Russell 1963: 21.

ὑπὸ τούτου μισούμενον ὁ Μάρκιος ἑαυτὸν ὡς οὐδένα Ῥωμαίων ἐγίνωσκε· πολλάκις γὰρ ἐν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ προκλήσεσι κατὰ τὰς μάχας γενόμενοι, καὶ κομπάσαντες διὰ τὸ ἐνάμιλλον, οἷα νεανιῶν πολεμικῶν φιλοτιμίαι καὶ ζῆλοι φέρουσιν, ἴδιον προσεκτίσαντο τῷ κοινῷ τὸ κατ' ἀλλήλων ἔχθος. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μέγεθός τι φρονήματος ἔχοντα τὸν Τύλλον ὀρῶν, καὶ μάλιστα δὴ Οὐολούσκων ἐπιθυμοῦντα Ῥωμαίους λαβὴν παρασχόντας ἐν μέρει κολουῶσαι [...]

Marcus knew that this man hated him more bitterly than any other Roman. They had often hurled threats and challenges at one another in the battles they had fought, and out of the rivalry and boasting which ambition often provokes among young warriors, a private and personal animosity had grown up between them which went far beyond the hostility that prevailed between their respective peoples. At the same time, Marcus sensed that Tullus possessed a certain magnanimity, and also that there was no other Volscian who was so passionately determined to revenge himself on the Romans [...]

Plut. *Cor.* 22.1-2.

καὶ παρελθὼν εἰς οἰκίαν ἀνδρὸς δυνατοῦ, δι' εὐγένειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις πράξεις μέγα ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ φρονούντος καὶ τὸ ἔθνος ὅλον ἄγοντος ὡς τὰ πολλά, ᾧ Τύλλος Ἄττιος ὄνομα ἦν [...]

and going to the house of an influential man named Tullus Attius, who by reason of his birth, his wealth and his military exploits had a high opinion of himself and generally led the whole nation [...]

Dion. Hal. *Rom Ant.* 8.1.4.

This changes the dynamic of the supplication scene and adds to the dramatic visuality of Coriolanus' veiling. As part of his criticism, Plutarch makes the relationship between Tullus and Coriolanus of a personal or private nature, whereas Dionysius' Coriolanus speaks of how his previous deeds harmed the Volscians publicly.³⁰ Plutarch represents Tullus as Coriolanus' emotional double, for this reason, the biographer in contrast with Dionysius focuses in the *apologia* and supplication on how anger can be practically used for self-advantage.

Plutarch defines Coriolanus' character in this scene by the use of a single saying by Heraclitus. It is this line that marks the main change between Plutarch's account and Dionysius'. Plutarch uses the quotation in his essay, *On the Avoidance of Anger*, in his treatment of this emotion and how to control it for the reader's benefit. This essay has much material in common with the *Coriolanus*.³¹

μαρτυρίαν ἀπέλιπε τῷ εἰπόντι· “θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπὸν· ὁ γὰρ ἂν θέλη, ψυχῆς ὠνεῖται.”

³⁰ Dion. Hal. *Rom. Ant.* 8.1 apud Ahlrichs 2005: 303 s.6.

³¹ Duff 1999:89.

In short, Marcius acted as a living illustration of that famous saying: ‘It is hard to fight with anger, for whatever it wants, it will pay the price, even at the cost of life itself.’

Plut. *Cor.* 22.2.

Plutarch’s use of Heraclitus’ saying reflects Plato’s influence. Plato, in his discussion of different forms of physical or philosophical education, states that prioritising gymnastics will have a detrimental effect on the student’s intelligence. Such a man prefers force instead of persuasion and he resembles a savage animal.³² Plato writes about the spirited or passionate man, whose soul and reason are dominated by the passions. Plato and Plutarch see the spirited man as the opposite of the philosopher who exercises his reason and is an example of gentleness.³³ It is the lack of gentleness (πραότης) that exposes the weakness of Plutarch’s Coriolanus in the crisis of supplication. Dionysius’ Coriolanus argues for Tullus to show similar qualities, and as a *supplicandus* he should not display his strength against the weak, but exercise kindness.³⁴ Plutarch reverses Dionysius’ argument of supplication and humanity, to argue that the choices of life and death must rest upon the practical value of the powerless enemy. Elsewhere in the *Coriolanus*, Plutarch states that the senators viewed Coriolanus as a positive example because he refused to interpret gifts and wealth as virtues over his martial success in battle. The problem, however, is that Coriolanus’ virtue motivates his deeds. Coriolanus mistakenly conceived that virtue consists purely of courage.³⁵ Michael Nerdahl is right that Plutarch characterises Coriolanus in a way that recalls the Homeric hero Achilles, who was the greatest fighter among the Achaeans. Achilles did not possess Odysseus’ self-control and wisdom. The motif of Achilles is important in other biographies as part of Plutarch’s depiction of the passionate man.³⁶ The quotation neatly illustrates Coriolanus’ characteristics and the significance of supplication in the biography as an economic exchange. Coriolanus’ failure to master the passions in his soul, and his desire to be the strongest, explains his attitude to supplication.

The episode of Odysseus supplicating the Phaeacian king Alcinous is an important influence behind Coriolanus’ supplication. It contains several common elements such as the concealing of the suppliant, the significance of the hearth as the place of the supplication, and

³² Plat. *Rep.* 3.411C-E.

³³ Plat. *Rep.* 3.410C-E.

³⁴ Dion Hal. *Rom. Ant.* 8.1.5.

³⁵ Plut. *Cor.* 10.3-4.

³⁶ Plut *Alex.* 4.7. See Vorhis 2017: 88-95 on the Achilles motif in Curtius’, Arrian’s and Plutarch’s representation of Alexander the Great. On the relationship between passions and ambition see Wardman 1955: 103.

the audience's reaction of silence and amazement.³⁷ Reflecting the influence of the Themistocles episode, another parallel with the *Odyssey* is the dramatic suspense created by the protagonists' delay in revealing their names. There is a difference in timing in both episodes: Odysseus receives hospitality and it is the next day that he reveals his identity.³⁸ The use of the quotation problematises Coriolanus' character because only here does he resemble Odysseus:³⁹

λαβὼν γὰρ ἐσθῆτα καὶ σκευὴν ἐν ἧ μάλιστα μὴ δόξειν ὅς ἦν ἔμελλεν ὀρώμενος, ὥσπερ ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἀνδρῶν δυσμενέων κατέδου πόλιν.

Ἦν δ' ἐσπέρα, καὶ πολλοὶ μὲν αὐτῷ προσετύγχανον, ἐγνώριζε δ' οὐδεὶς. ἐβάδιζεν οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ Τύλλου, καὶ παρεισελθὼν ἄφνω πρὸς τὴν ἐστίαν ἐκάθισε σιωπῆ, καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἠσυχίαν ἤγεν. οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν θαυμάσαντες, ἀναστῆσαι μὲν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν – ἦν γάρ τι περὶ αὐτὸν ἀξίωμα καὶ τοῦ σχήματος καὶ τῆς σιωπῆς –, ἔφρασαν δὲ τῷ Τύλλῳ περὶ δεῖπνον ὄντι τὴν ἀτοπίαν τοῦ πράγματος.

So Marcius dressed himself in clothes which completely transformed his normal appearance, and like Odysseus, 'Into the enemy's city he stole disguised...'

When he had found his way to Tullus' house, he quickly entered, took his place by the hearth in silence and, covering his head, seated himself there without uttering a word. The people of the house were astonished at his behaviour but did not venture to disturb him – for there was an air almost of majesty about his bearing and his silence – but they told Tullus, who was at supper, of this mysterious event.

Plut. *Cor.* 22-23.1.

Coriolanus acts like Odysseus, but this is a superficial comparison. Plutarch wished his audience to interpret Coriolanus' character through two different images of Odysseus: one as a spy harming his enemies and the other as a suppliant seeking aid from the Phaeacians. Coriolanus' motivation is vengeance against his people through his enemies' aid. His appearance does not have the same purpose, Coriolanus does not hide because he wishes to harm the Volscians instead, he draws upon his supplicant self-image to justify his vengeance against their shared enemies.⁴⁰

³⁷ Ahlrichs 2005: 312 argues that Plutarch stylises the scene in a similar way to his account of Themistocles' supplication to Admetus in Plut. *Them.* 24.1-3. Nerdahl 2007: 88 s. 97 is less sure about the influence of the Alcinous and Arete supplication scene in Hom. *Od.* 7.141-169, s.98 Nerdahl recognises that the theme of amazement and the delay in revealing the name parallels the Alcinous scene. The Thucydidean account of the same episode has been viewed as influenced by the Phaeacian episode see Newton 1984: 5.

³⁸ Hom. *Od.* 7.233.

³⁹ Hom. *Od.* 4.246 the quotation relates to a different context. Helen recounts to Odysseus' son Telemachus a story of her recognition of Odysseus when he infiltrated Troy disguised as a beggar.

⁴⁰ Nerdahl 2007: 124 argues that Plutarch characterises Coriolanus through the juxtaposition of motivations with Odysseus.

Plutarch's use of images is particularly vivid here; he focuses on the clothes and expression to reveal Coriolanus' character to his audience. Dionysius' account of the scene has a different emphasis:

φυλάξας δὲ νύκτα καὶ ταύτην σκοταίαν ἤκεν εἰς Ἄντιον, τὴν ἐπιφανεστάτην τῶν ἐν Οὐολούσκοις πόλεων, ἠνίκα περὶ δεῖπνον ἦσαν οἱ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ παρελθὼν εἰς οἰκίαν ἀνδρὸς δυνατοῦ, δι' εὐγένειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις πράξεις μέγα ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ φρονοῦντος καὶ τὸ ἔθνος ὅλον ἄγοντος ὡς τὰ πολλά, ᾧ Τύλλος Ἄττιος ὄνομα ἦν, ἰκέτης τοῦ ἀνδρὸς γίνεται καθεζόμενος ἐπὶ τῆς ἐστίας.

Having waited, therefore, for a night — and a dark one — he went to Antium, the most important city of the Volscians, at the hour when the inhabitants were at supper; and going to the house of an influential man named Tullus Attius, who by reason of his birth, his wealth and his military exploits had a high opinion of himself and generally led the whole nation, he became his suppliant by sitting down at his hearth.

Dion. Hal. *Rom Ant.* 8.1.4.

Plutarch develops the depiction of the infiltrator seen in Dionysius' narrative in his vocabulary use. Plutarch employs the rare verb *παρεισέρχεσθαι* instead of Dionysius' *παρέρχεσθαι*, which is extremely common. Plutarch uses *παρεισέρχεσθαι* about acts of deception, and in cases where individuals or groups change their clothes to appear as slaves or women.⁴¹ The literary parallel in terms of language with the example of Clodius indicates Plutarch's message that Coriolanus' emotional actions were not acts of nobility but of weakness.⁴²

Coriolanus supplicates to emphasise his disgrace and anger. Plutarch's use of the term 'to veil' (*ἐγκαλύπτειν*) indicates that for the reader the act of covering oneself was visually important in signifying how the figure suffers the misfortune. Other uses of veiling by Plutarch indicate how a figure or group feels shame or distress in his suffering.⁴³ Plutarch stresses this by depicting the scene in such a way that it is Tullus and his servants who perceive the stranger covering and uncovering. Coriolanus does not explain his thoughts until he delivers the *apologia* and there is no direct commentary upon why he acts dramatically. It is only here that Plutarch uses the two terms to veil and unveil (*ἀποκαλύπτειν*) in supplication. The other usages connected to the death of a protagonist or a moment of extreme misfortune. This highlights why the author wrote the scene in a different way to Dionysius. For Plutarch, the use of the verb *ἐγκαλύπτειν* is connected to a moment when the

⁴¹ Plut. *Ant.* 5.9.3, 10.8.2.

⁴² Plut. *Cic.* 28.1.

⁴³ Plut. *Apoph. Rom.* 13 200F. See Massey 2018: 506-507.

protagonist seems to accept his death passively. Plutarch uses tragic clothing to add to the atmosphere in several scenes, for example, Perseus of Macedon's appearance in Aemilius Paulus' triumph.⁴⁴ Paulus views Perseus as a cowardly enemy because of the ignoble manner of his supplication, instead of choosing to commit suicide. Similarly, it is through supplication that Coriolanus can express that exile represents the death of his character, which the last line of the *apologia* confirms.⁴⁵ The theatricality of the veiling emphasises that Coriolanus' actions are not straightforward like his simple character, but he uses the spectacle to support his appeal. That the supplication occurs in silence (ἡσυχία) which has a meaning of peace in a philosophical sense, also deceives the reader about Coriolanus' moral character.⁴⁶

Plutarch's intention in his use of the veiling and clothing of the suppliant Coriolanus is to show through Tullus' mistaken perspective and his servants' that he is not Odysseus or Themistocles. Coriolanus does not resemble these men because he does not exhibit the human virtue of accepting and enduring his exile. The way Plutarch clothes and veils Coriolanus reflects the concerns and approaches of other writers on the use of slave disguise by leaders. Michele George argues, in his discussion of slave disguise in these scenes, that clothing hides elite status. George states that due to the anonymity and lack of interest, not all authors describe the clothing as servile, though it is meant to be read in this way.⁴⁷ Coriolanus in an earlier episode in Plutarch's narrative of the Volscian War considers that slavery is one of the worst fates that a human could face. Coriolanus when asked which prize he desired for his successes desired a Volscian friend who had given him hospitality in the past, to receive his freedom. The theme of hospitality connects both episodes.⁴⁸ The clothing and veiling are significant in connection with Plutarch's depiction of Coriolanus possessed by anger.⁴⁹ As Douglas Cairns discusses, authors use veiling to make a statement about the emotional experience of the sufferer, in situations where the person is in a critical political position.⁵⁰ Coriolanus' veiling parallels how his class, the Roman patricians responded to his exile; the key difference is that they displayed humility.⁵¹ Coriolanus' true nature reflects the way he

⁴⁴ Plut. *Aem.* 34.

⁴⁵ Plut. *Cor.* 23.4.

⁴⁶ Plut. *De exil.* 603E Plutarch through the philosopher Zeno speaks of the benefits of exile on a small island. Exile can afford a person the peace which is not found in contemporary public life for the elites of the Roman Empire see Nesselrath 2007:96.

⁴⁷ Plut. *Caes* 38.2, Cass. Dio. 41.46.2-4, Ap. *Bel.* 2.56-58 apud George 2002: 41 s.1.

⁴⁸ Plut. *Cor.* 10.3.

⁴⁹ See also Plut *Ti. Gracch.* 10.5-7. Cairns 2001: 19 on how Demaratus' veiling expresses the anger he feels.

⁵⁰ Cairns 2002 identifies that it is difficult to distinguish between shame and anger in these scenes.

⁵¹ Plut. *Cor.* 18.6, 20.5. See Nerdahl 2007: 124.

hides his identity from Tullus and his household. Coriolanus outwardly acts like his fellow Roman patricians at the moment of his exile, but he does not show the same humility or pity. Dionysius' Coriolanus does not hide his elite appearance, and in his language, he recognises in his exile and supplication the debasement of his power. The general respect Coriolanus shows to Tullus and his acceptance of his fate highlight that, in Dionysius' account, justice in connection with vengeance drives his action instead of his passions.

Plutarch emphasises the performance aspect of Coriolanus' supplication because he is meant to be perceived in a similar way to an actor. His audience would likely have detected Coriolanus' veiled and silent appearance as the tragic depiction of Achilles.⁵² Plutarch conveys the underlying emotional weakness of Coriolanus with this profession. This weakness connects Coriolanus' self-destructive act as a suppliant with the tragic fall of other protagonists such as Pompey, Alexander, Demetrius, Antony and Alcibiades.⁵³ Alexander's life is an example of self-destruction because his successes and failures are due to the relationship between his spirit (θυμός) and his self-control (σωφροσύνη). Alexander degenerates later in his life because he loses his self-control as a result of long drinking sessions. Mossman argues that Plutarch uses tragic patterning and imagery for the purpose as a technique to examine the interplay between passions and self-control or reason. These figures are self-destructive because of the effect of different emotions such as pride or arrogance upon their character. Plutarch describes Pompey in his defeat in a similar way to Ajax who cannot defend himself due to fear.

The veiling act has the effect of drawing greater attention to Coriolanus' body as a suppliant, which emphasises his weakness. The unveiling operates as a narrative divide separating the *apologia*, which functions as Coriolanus' self-representation, from his deceptive appearance as an Odyssean beggar. Coriolanus disguises himself because he has a practical purpose, not because he feels humiliated pathetically. Plutarch uses the antonym of covering, to uncover (ἀποκαλύπτεσθαι). The verb appears immediately in the sentence introducing the *apologia*, so it likely signifies that, in speech, Coriolanus reveals his character which he had suppressed. Plutarch uses the verb elsewhere when he states that the evidence of an immoral character appears through the misuse of power and position.⁵⁴ The unveiling suggests that Coriolanus views his enemy as his superior in the ritual because Plutarch says in

⁵² Ar. *Ran.* 911-13, Aesch. *Myrmidons* fr.132b or Aesch. *Phrygians* apud Cairns 2001: 19-30, s.20 cf. Muellner 2012.

⁵³ The tragic pattern of how a protagonist's use of power leads to his fall has been discussed by Papadi 2007: 128. See also Mossman 1988: 92.

⁵⁴ Plut. *Comp. Dem. Cic.* 3.2.

the *Roman Questions* that this is the correct gesture concerning people worthy of the honour.⁵⁵ Plutarch wishes his reader to see the underlying moral and emotional weakness within Coriolanus. This weakness is due to the absence of philosophical παιδεία in Coriolanus' life.

Plutarch juxtaposes the image of the intelligent Odysseus who deceives his opponents with Coriolanus' characterisation as an Achilles-like figure because the biographer wishes to highlight the main character flaw of the protagonist. Achilles was an important mythical figure for Plutarch because he was the prime example of a man who lacked the virtue to curb his anger, and it was this passion that led to his death.⁵⁶ Coriolanus' greatest virtue of courage and manliness (ἀνδρεία) is responsible for his successes and failures in the biography.⁵⁷ Coriolanus' inability to communicate with other people was due to the absence of Hellenic παιδεία. Plutarch depicts Coriolanus in a similar way to other Romans of the early Republic. The Romans of this period are characterised as privileging martial valour and strength as the greatest virtues while neglecting culture and learning.⁵⁸ The Greeks according to Plutarch recognised that there were different levels of virtue. Valour was inferior to virtue in general which encompassed education, and other forms of leadership in politics or the military.⁵⁹ These Roman and Hellenic concepts of virtue were important as a part of the ideals of masculinity. Plutarch favours a combination of παιδεία and Hellenism to aid a person's self-control. This is part of Plutarch's philosophical message as a Platonic teacher.⁶⁰

The parallelism of the veiling with Plutarch's representation of Alcibiades πολύτροπος

Plutarch's use of the veiling in Coriolanus' supplication foreshadows Alcibiades' chameleon-like character. Nerdahl argues that Alcibiades' exile reflects events in the *Odyssey* and therefore a link must be made with Coriolanus' Odyssean appearance.⁶¹ Plutarch highlights in the introduction to the scene that the disguise made the protagonist resemble a man that was unlike him, Odysseus. Plutarch poses a framework here for how to compare the differences and similarities between Alcibiades and Coriolanus in exile.

⁵⁵ Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 266C-D.

⁵⁶ Nerdahl 2012: 337-338.

⁵⁷ For scholars' discussion of Hellenic and Roman conceptions of virtue: Cohen 2003: 145, McDonnell 2003.

⁵⁸ Pittard 2011: 37.

⁵⁹ For Greek views of virtue see Roisman 2003: 128-141.

⁶⁰ Connolly 2003: 289.

⁶¹ Nerdahl 2007: 140.

Plutarch characterises Alcibiades as an Odyssean figure by the use of the adjective much wandering or shifty, versatile (πολύτροπος).⁶² Using this adjective, Plutarch makes an important statement about Alcibiades' character in his marvellous adaptation of Greek or barbarian cultures.⁶³ Alcibiades adapted his exterior clothing and deeds in different environments for the purpose of manipulation. Plutarch is clear that these were not examples of character change.⁶⁴ For example, Alcibiades' Spartan-like lifestyle was a façade and his true character was seen in his affair with the wife of the Spartan King Agis.⁶⁵ Simon Verdegem and others have recognised that Plutarch writes about Alcibiades' adaptability as a key part of his character at the most dramatic point of the narrative: his first exile in Sparta.⁶⁶ Plutarch disguises Coriolanus in his supplication because he wants to contrast him with Odysseus the trickster, who uses language to persuade, whereas the Roman cannot hide the fact that it is his vengeance that influences his interactions. Coriolanus does not possess Alcibiades' charm or his flexibility.⁶⁷ Coriolanus did not need to possess the same charm, since his rejection of traditional supplication highlights that he is not using the practice to engender pity from Tullus. The question is why Plutarch chose to disguise him in his supplication. Reading the *Coriolanus* alongside the Athenian life, it is through Alcibiades' chameleon-like characterisation that we uncover the thinness and simplicity of Coriolanus' suppliant appearance. Plutarch compares the character disguises of both men in the focalisations of audiences with the verb not to trust (ἀπιστεῖν).⁶⁸ Plutarch intends to show that Coriolanus' character does not change. This is clear from how Plutarch characterises both protagonists; however, it is through the supplication and *apologia*, that the biographer highlights the differences in their characters. Also, the apologetic characterisation of Alcibiades in his second exile, in contrast with the surviving histories, suggests that it was part of Plutarch's purpose for Alcibiades to emulate Themistocles as part of his biographical framework against the inferior Coriolanus, as Jacobs argues.⁶⁹

The veiling and unveiling are a significant part of Plutarch's depiction of Coriolanus' emotional experience of his misfortune. The wearing of similar clothing features in Plutarch's

⁶² Plutarch describes Alcibiades with this term in *Alc.* 2.1, 24.5, and it was associated with Odysseus: *Hom. Od.* 1.1, 10.330.

⁶³ Fulkerson 2012: 62 argues that Coriolanus' character is excessively rigid because of the dominance of his emotions. Alcibiades in contrast with Coriolanus experienced a Platonic and Hellenic education.

⁶⁴ Cf. Verdegem 2010: 263. Also see *Nep. Alc.* 11.3.

⁶⁵ *Plut. Alc.* 23.6-9. Verdegem 2010: 270.

⁶⁶ Verdegem 2010: 269.

⁶⁷ Duff 2005: 160 an important difference Plutarch sees between Coriolanus and Alcibiades is the latter's rhetoric. See also *Plut. Alc.* 10.3-4, *Comp. Cor. Alc.* 3.3-6.

⁶⁸ *Plut. Alc.* 23.3.

⁶⁹ Jacobs 2017: 223. See also *De prof. virt.* 85A.

interpretation of how misfortune can transform a man into a philosopher, due to the loss of possessions and freedoms which are associated with vices. In *On Tranquility*, Plutarch states that if a man suffers exile or is a victim of envy, he should imitate the lives of men who became philosophers in this way, such as Zeno, and Diogenes and one of the benefits of such a life is silence.⁷⁰ Plutarch, however, addresses politicians in these cases; he did not claim that his readers should become philosophers, only benefit by their example.⁷¹ Coriolanus' approach and interpretation are underpinned by his valuing of his honour more than his life and a part of Plutarch's lesson is that Coriolanus perhaps would have acted differently if he had experienced a philosophical education. This can be seen if we compare Dionysius and Plutarch's versions:

“εἰ μήπω με γινώσκεις ὃ Τύλλε” εἶπεν, “ἀλλ' ὀρῶν ἀπιστεῖς, ἀνάγκη με κατήγορον ἑμαυτοῦ γενέσθαι· Γαίός εἰμι Μάρκιος, ὁ πλεῖστα σὲ καὶ Οὐολούσκους ἐργασάμενος κακά, καὶ τὴν οὐκ ἔῴσαν ἀρνεῖσθαι ταῦτα περιφέρων προσηγορίαν τὸν Κοριολανόν.

If you do not recognise me even now, Tullus, or if you cannot believe your own eyes, then I must act as my own accuser. I am Gaius Marcius, the man who has done you and the Volscian people more harm than any other, and the name of Coriolanus which I bear makes it impossible to deny the fact.

Plut. *Cor.* 23.2

Δύναιο δ' ἄν, ἔφη, τοῦτ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ μάλιστα μαθεῖν ἐμοῦ, ὃς ἐν τῇ μεγίστῃ πόλει κράτιστός ποτ' εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων δοκῶν νῦν ἔρημος καὶ ἄπολις καὶ ταπεινὸς ἐρριμμένος τοῦτο πείσομαι, ὃ τι ἂν ἐχθρῶ ὄντι σοι δοκῇ. ὑπισχνοῦμαι δέ σοι τοσαῦτ' ἀγαθὰ ποιήσῃν Οὐολούσκους φίλος τῶ ἔθνει γενόμενος, ὅσα κακὰ εἰργασάμην ἐχθρὸς ὢν.

“And this,” he said, “you may learn most clearly from my own case. For though I was once looked upon as the most powerful of all men in the greatest city, I am now cast aside, forsaken, exiled and abased, and destined to suffer any treatment you, who are my enemy, shall think fit to inflict upon me. But I promise you that I will perform as great services for the Volscians, if I become their friends, as I occasioned calamities to them when I was their enemy.”

Dion. Hal. *Rom Ant.* 8.1.6.5

Plutarch's Coriolanus has not learnt and has not changed as a result of his misfortune, whereas Dionysius' *apologia* contains an educational intention seen in Coriolanus' use of the infinitive to teach (μαθεῖν). Dionysius' Coriolanus is a traditional moralist, since he argues that Tullus should not see him as his enemy. He states that fortune is unpredictable for

⁷⁰ Plut. *De tranq. Anim.* 467D, 603E.

⁷¹ Van Hoof 2010:13, 133-138.

humankind; for this reason, he should be spared. Plutarch's Coriolanus expresses his anger at his mistreatment, while Dionysius' Coriolanus wishes Tullus to understand his misfortune by observing how he has lost power. Plutarch's changes to the historical narrative create a negative exemplum of how someone should not approach misfortune and supplications.⁷² A traditional Roman exemplum as defined by Rebecca Langlands contains: a hero, a story and a moral lesson. These stories serve as important tools of moral education and demonstrate how in different situations moral virtues are useful.⁷³ The purpose of the hero is the most significant aspect of the exemplum: he must act in the interests of the Roman community, not for himself. Coriolanus' supplication fits the definition of a negative exemplum because all the elements are deterrent: the Roman acts for his self-advantage and an enemy. Many heroes are successful in turning a moment of misfortune to their advantage; however, why they act politically is the most important factor.⁷⁴ Exempla frequently contain internal audiences' reactions of admiration and wonder at the hero's deeds. Coriolanus' supplication in speech and action underlines how much he has not changed emotionally in a similar way to his enemies: the Volscians and particularly Tullus. Coriolanus' experience at the end of the biography concerning the supplication of his family mirrors Tullus' in this episode, providing evidence of the protagonist's inadequate philosophical παιδεία. It is the audience's reactions of wonder and amazement, a key part of Roman exempla and Plutarch's approach, which underlines Coriolanus' and Tullus' failures in their moral learning.⁷⁵

Plutarch responds to Dionysius' Themistoclean portrayal of Coriolanus as a flawed but moral figure. If, as other scholars have argued, Themistocles' supplication of Admetus in Thucydides influenced Plutarch's approach in Coriolanus' meeting with Tullus, the protagonist's argument based on advantage does not fit well when compared with Dionysius' Coriolanus' *apologia*.⁷⁶ Plutarch in the *Themistocles* did not include an *apologia* in direct speech at this point.⁷⁷ The original enmity theme influenced Plutarch in his overall approach as well as his use of the separate speech of Coriolanus to the Volscian Assembly in the *Roman Antiquities*. This Dionysian public speech examines why Coriolanus was exiled and criticises the tribunes for their attempts to destroy the Roman noble, reflecting the historian's

⁷² Langlands 2018 discusses these aspects of the Roman exemplum.

⁷³ See Langlands 2018 for the use of exempla as part of Roman education.

⁷⁴ Langlands 2018: 55, 67-85.

⁷⁵ Langlands 2020: 80 discusses the parallels between Plutarch's use of wonder (θαῦμα) and the Latin terms of Roman writers.

⁷⁶ Thuc. 1.136.137. Ahlrichs 2005: 312-313, Cesa et al 1994: 204. This supplication is important because it takes place at the hearth of Themistocles' enemy.

⁷⁷ Plut. *Them.* 24.

political views.⁷⁸ The moralism of Dionysius' Coriolanus, in explaining how he had been mistreated by the Romans and their failure to reward him for his services, appears more justifiable because he is not angry. Plutarch dilutes the tribunes' treatment of Coriolanus in his trial seen in Dionysius' account; his focus on the protagonist's vengeance makes the reader believe that the protagonist was responsible for his exile. Plutarch transposes the idea from Dionysius that Coriolanus felt his life was not worth living if his vengeance was not satisfied; however, it is much more powerful because it is used within the private supplication scene. Dionysius' Coriolanus regrets the loss of his country and his friends as a result of his exile, a misfortune felt by many, while the other is completely insensitive.⁷⁹

By modifying the reference to misfortunes in Dionysius' account, Plutarch demonstrates through Coriolanus' speech how the protagonist has not learned from his exile. Plutarch's use of poverty and dangers (πόνων καὶ κινδύνων) emphasises Coriolanus' lack of consideration of justice, i.e. his future deeds because he does not care about harming his community:

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τῶν πολλῶν πόνων καὶ κινδύνων ἐκείνων ἐκτησάμην ἔπαθλον ἢ τὸ παράσημον ὄνομα τῆς πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔχθρας. καὶ τοῦτό μοι περίεστιν ἀναφαίρετον. τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ὁμοῦ πάντα φθόνῳ δήμου καὶ ὕβρει, μαλακίᾳ δὲ καὶ προδοσίᾳ τῶν ἐν τέλει καὶ ἰσοτίμων ἀπεστερημαί, καὶ φυγὰς ἐλήλαμαι καὶ γέγονα τῆς σῆς ἐστίας τῆς σῆς ἰκέτης [...]

This title is the one and only reward I have received for all the toils and perils I have endured, and it is a badge of enmity to your country. This at least can never be taken away, but everything else has been stripped from me by the jealousy and insolence of the people, and the cowardice and treachery of the magistrates and the members of my own class. I have been driven out of Rome as an exile, and now I sit as a suppliant at your hearth [...]

Plut. *Cor.* 23.4-23.6.1

φέρε δὴ, τίς ἂν εἶην ἀνὴρ, εἰ δόξης καὶ τιμῶν, ὧν προσῆκέ μοι παρὰ τοῖς ἐμαυτοῦ πολίταις τυγχάνειν, παρὰ τῶν εὖ παθόντων ἀποστερηθεὶς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πατρίδος [...]

Come now, what kind of man should I be if, deprived as I am of the glory and honours I ought to be receiving from my fellow citizens to whom I have rendered great services, and, in addition to this, driven away from my country [...]

Dion Hal. *Rom. Ant.* 8.7.1.

⁷⁸ Pelling 2019: 208 argues that Dionysius was critical of the growing plebeian influence in the political order. See also Schultze 1986: 139-40.

⁷⁹ Dion Hal. *Rom. Ant.* 8.1.3.

The comparison of the two texts shows that Dionysius' Coriolanus does not explicitly blame the Romans for his exile in his supplication speech. Instead, Plutarch uses the loss of status to demonstrate how Coriolanus and Tullus have a mistaken view of politics and military service. Plutarch combines the adjective ἀναφαίρετον which means 'not to be taken away', and the perfect first-person verb 'to be robbed' (ἀπεστέρημαι). Plutarch's Coriolanus uses this language to argue that exile has taken away all his honours and status, leaving him his cognomen. Plutarch uses the verb ἀποστερεῖν in the context of soldiers who are dishonoured.⁸⁰ The verb features in the episode of the ignoble supplication of Perseus of Macedon to show the sufferer's lack of virtue. Roman judgement is harsh because moral character is meant to be imitable.⁸¹ Plutarch in *On Tranquility* states that the ideal politician exercises self-control and should be able to endure the loss of his reputation.⁸² Plutarch rarely uses this vocabulary within character speeches; it features here in a scene where Coriolanus appears in disguise, in a way that recalls a tragic actor. Plutarch in this attitude towards Coriolanus criticises men who do not exercise reason in crises. This can be seen by comparing Favorinus' views on this scenario in his fragmentary work, *On Exile*. Favorinus of Arelate was a Roman sophist and Academic Skeptic (c.80-160 CE). Favorinus uses the example of actors playing the parts of kings and tyrants to compare the experiences that the elite feel in misfortune. Heinz-Günther Nesselrath discusses how Favorinus uses the simile of life as a drama in a different way to the Stoics and Cynics in the sense of enduring misfortune.⁸³ Favorinus' interpretation is similar to Plutarch's depiction of Coriolanus as a suppliant. Favorinus contrasts a hidden, internal character from external appearance.⁸⁴

Plutarch uses similar imagery in his essay *On Exile*, and he says that a person must be rational when suffering misfortune. They should recognise the emptiness and weakness of their fears in a similar way to how tragic masks terrify children until they turn them around.⁸⁵ Favorinus' similar thoughts on exile and use of tragedy in his philosophical writing are likely because he was a close friend and correspondent of Plutarch, and they were Academic philosophers.⁸⁶ Favorinus has a similar view that virtue cannot be taken away and explains

⁸⁰ Plut. *Pomp* 30.3 in reference to how Lucullus was being robbed of his glory by Pompey's appointment to replace him in command. *Mar.* 24.1, *Sul.* 44.2 in reference to their honour.

⁸¹ Plut. *Aem.* 26.7-12- 27.1.

⁸² Plut. *De tranq. Anim.* 7.

⁸³ Nesselrath 2007: 101-102.

⁸⁴ Favorinus *On Exile* 3.3.

⁸⁵ Plut. *De exil.* 600D-E.

⁸⁶ Bowie 2002: 50-51.

this by using the example of Odysseus as a beggar before the suitors.⁸⁷ Favorinus' discussion in *On Exile* criticises people who outwardly pride themselves in their clothing and the symbols of their status and name while hiding their shameful souls. Favorinus states that it would be better for these men to abandon the symbols, for example their clothing, so that they reveal their true selves. Plutarch, in his essay *On Tranquility*, says that misfortune cannot make a good man cowardly or immoral, since his view and approach to life cannot be dispossessed.⁸⁸ In Coriolanus' *apologia*, the problem is the type of man he is and supplication does not engender a different attitude to life.

The use of supplication by the protagonist: the themes of enmity and friendship

Dionysius' Coriolanus has a different interpretation of supplication from his biographical counterpart. He acts rationally and sits down as a suppliant in Tullus' house. His calmness indicates a different emotional state to a man driven by vengeance. His appeal to Tullus reflects the Hellenic values of moderation and gentleness. Plutarch's Coriolanus argues differently since he does not mention these character qualities:

[...] τῷ σὲ ποιεῖν ἑμαυτοῦ κύριον. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ σοὶ θυμὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἴθι, ταῖς ἑμαῖς συμφοραῖς, ὧ γενναῖε, χρῆσαι, καὶ κοινὸν εὐτύχημα ποιήσον Οὐολούσκων τὴν ἐμὴν ἀτυχίαν, τοσοῦτῳ βέλτιον ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν πολεμήσοντος ἢ πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὅσῳ πολεμοῦσι βέλτιον οἱ γινώσκοντες τὰ παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις τῶν ἀγνοούντων.

[...] and already I have made a beginning by putting myself in your hands. Noble Tullus, if you are eager to fight your enemies again, take advantage of my disgrace and make my misfortune the Volscian people's good fortune. I shall fight even better for you than I have fought against you, because the most dangerous opponents of all are those who know their enemies' secrets.

Plut. *Cor.* 23.3-4.

[...] διηγησάμενος δ' αὐτῷ τὰς κατασχούσας αὐτὸν ἀνάγκας, δι' ἃς ὑπέμεινεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καταφυγεῖν, μέτρια ἠξίου φρονῆσαι καὶ ἀνθρώπινα περὶ ἀνδρὸς ἰκέτου καὶ μηκέτι πολέμιον ἠγεῖσθαι τὸν ὑποχείριον μηδ' εἰς τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας καὶ τεταπεινωμένους. ἀποδείκνυσθαι τὴν ἰσχὺν ἐνθυμούμενον, ὡς οὐ μένουσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς πράγμασιν αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τύχαι.

[...] Then, having related to him the dire straits which had forced him to take refuge with his enemies, he begged of him to entertain sentiments of moderation and humanity toward a

⁸⁷ Fav. *De exil.* 20.1-21.1. Favorinus' Odysseus features in his beggar's disguise in the later narrative in the *Odyssey*, where he returned to Ithaca to face the suitors.

⁸⁸ Plut. *De tranq. Anim.* 475E.

suppliant and no longer to regard as an enemy one who was in his power, nor to exhibit his strength against the unfortunate and the humbled, bearing in mind that the fortunes of men are subject to change.

Dion Hal. *Rom Ant.* 8.1.5.

The biographer was more interested in contrasting Coriolanus' harsh character with the moderation of other groups, such as senators and female members of his family immediately after his sentence of exile. Plutarch, here describes the emotional effect of anger on Coriolanus' mind and body and demonstrates why he will struggle to forgive and moderate his feelings to the Romans in the later part of the biography. All these groups at different points in the narrative engage in supplication. Coriolanus' supplication represents a fundamental alternative to these examples. Coriolanus explains that it is his vengeance that drives him, not asylum. Coriolanus does have some knowledge of the right moral and emotional response to the crisis of his exile since he orders his family to bear the collective misfortune calmly. Coriolanus was incapable of exercising his reason over his emotions, and this was, as Pelling argues, his main character flaw.⁸⁹ Plutarch's use of Coriolanus address to 'his misfortunes, noble Tullus' (συμφοραῖς, ὃ γένναίε) recalls Dionysius' Veturia's criticism of her son's actions towards Rome. The mother of Coriolanus, Veturia, in a section of her speech, where she explores Coriolanus' relationship with the Volscians and what he owes them, makes the point that other Romans who had suffered exile acted more nobly and bore the experience with moderation.⁹⁰ Dionysius' protagonist shows a greater knowledge of philosophical παιδεία and Plutarch uses this argument about misfortunes and kindness in other Lives; however, he did not always excuse the protagonist from supplicating.⁹¹

Plutarch emphasises the issue of self-advantage in Coriolanus' *apologia* by repeating the comparative adjective advantage (βέλτιον). In doing so, Plutarch links Coriolanus' misfortunes and his ability as a warrior. The biographer uses antithesis to contrast how Coriolanus says he fought against the Volscians, and how much better he will fight as their allies. Plutarch contrasts by the use of participles the role of spies and traitors, those who possess the knowledge of their enemies' secrets (γινώσκοντες) with people who lack the same knowledge (ἀγνοούντων).⁹² This recalls the Odyssean image of the spy and it emphasises that Coriolanus is not acting in the interests of a community but his own self-advantage. This continues the theme of perception and hidden identities of the enemy, ally

⁸⁹ Plut. *Cor.* 21.1-3.

⁹⁰ Dion Hal. *Rom. Ant.* 8.49.6.

⁹¹ Plut. *Aem.* 26.8-10, *Nic.* 27.4-5.

⁹² Plut. *Fab.* 11.1.3. Plutarch uses this language to describe how Hannibal watches the Romans.

and suppliant seen through the use of the same vocabulary, highlighting the immorality and deceptive qualities of men like Coriolanus and Tullus.

At the heart of this *apologia*, Plutarch explores through supplication the nature of friendship and enmity. In *On how to profit from your enemies*, Plutarch considers that benefits, in the moral sense of the word, are found best in situations where an enemy or friend is in need or is injured by others.⁹³ Plutarch makes a point that the treatment of enemies is comparable to how one treats his friends.⁹⁴ Coriolanus' attitude towards his enemy is in his view wrong because of his misconceptions about his real allies, the Romans, due to his anger. Coriolanus has the wrong emotional outlook: true benefits are discovered when someone praises their enemy or does not hate them if they experience good fortune, because this will also lead the person to not envy his friends' and family's good fortune.⁹⁵ Coriolanus is mistaken in his perspective because of his lack of philosophical παιδεία: moral benefits can only be achieved by training (ἄσκησις). The inadequate education of the protagonist explains his mistaken view of benefits in a practical instead of a moral sense.

In the last line of the *apologia*, Plutarch develops the themes of enmity and friendship in his adaptation of Dionysius' speech:

[...] εἰ δ' ἄρα, οὐτ' ἐγὼ βούλομαι ζῆν οὔτε σοὶ καλῶς ἔχει σφάζειν πάλαι μὲν ἐχθρὸν ἄνδρα
καὶ πολέμιον, νῦν δ' ἀνωφελῆ καὶ ἄχρηστον.'

[...] But if thou hast given up hope, neither do I wish to live, nor is it for thine advantage to spare one who has long been an enemy and a foe, and now is unprofitable and useless."

Plut. *Cor.* 23.4. Trans. B. Perrin.

[...] εἰ δέ τι ἄλλο γινώσκεις περὶ ἐμοῦ, χρῆσαι τῇ ὀργῇ παραχρῆμα καὶ θάνατον χάρισαί μοι τὸν τάχιστον αὐτοχειρία τε καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐστίας τῆς σεαυτοῦ καθιερεύσας τὸν ἰκέτην.

[...] However, if you have any other purpose concerning me let loose your resentment at once and grant me the speediest death by sacrificing the suppliant with your own hand and at your own hearth."

Dion Hal. *Rom Ant.* 8.1.6.10- 8.2.1.

Plutarch's designation of Coriolanus as a hateful man (ἐχθρὸν ἄνδρα) and enemy (πολέμιον) can explain the biographer's literary and moral purpose. Plutarch would have been influenced by Dionysius' interpretation that justice and virtue should influence a man in

⁹³ Plut. *De Capienda* 90F.

⁹⁴ Plut. *De Capienda* 91D.

⁹⁵ Plut. *De Capienda* 91B.

his relationships with others.⁹⁶ The language of the four words ἐχθρὸν ἄνδρα καὶ πολέμιον belongs to a classical literary tradition on the treatment of friends and enemies.⁹⁷ For example, in Euripides' *Children of Heracles*, a servant tells Heracles' mother Alcmena that their hated enemy Eurystheus who had persecuted her son in his lifetime had become their captive. Eurystheus fled from battle but was taken alive. Plutarch had some knowledge of the play since he alludes to it in *The Stoics speak more paradoxically than the poets*.⁹⁸ The servant says that it is a pleasure to see a hated enemy suffering the greatest misfortune.⁹⁹ The main moral issue in this tragedy is the conflict between vengeance and forgiveness: this is seen in Alcmena's desire to punish Eurystheus and the Athenians' responsibility to protect all suppliants.¹⁰⁰

This tradition influenced Plutarch, who countered the traditional view of the Greeks that enemies should be punished and not forgiven. Plutarch demonstrates his view on this subject in *On How to Profit from your enemies*. The final thesis of this study is that Plutarch thought that there are no friends or enemies absolutely, and for this reason: these groupings are less important to Plutarch than the moral and practical opportunities which conflict offer.¹⁰¹ A man can become a better human being by observing the moral failures of his enemies or other nations.¹⁰² Plutarch as a narrator in the *Eumenes* refers to the protagonist in captivity with the same phrase. Plutarch's language use in this passage, including the adjective 'in hand, in captivity' (ὑποχείριος) resembles Coriolanus' appeal in the *Roman Antiquities*.¹⁰³ In both instances, Plutarch frames the protagonist's character through the connected themes of supplication and death, in the case of Eumenes his lack of practical value to Antigonus and the questioning of his treatment contribute to a negative judgement that he supplicated his conquerer. Eumenes appears less bold in his conversation with Onomarchus in contrast to his *apologia* to the Macedonians where his desire for death counters the accusation of supplication. The case is the opposite in the *Coriolanus* because the relationship, unlike in the *Eumenes*, is not between former friends, but enemies. Eumenes

⁹⁶ Dion. Hal. *Rom.* 8.25.2.2: This is the argument of the senator Minucius to Coriolanus in the first embassy.

⁹⁷ For other examples of this issue of the treatment of friends and enemies, and the hateful man see Soph. *Phil.* 1300, Eur. *Antiope*, Eur. *Ion.* 1043, Eur. *Supp.* 494, Xen. *An.* 1.20. See also Arr. *Anab.* 5.18.

⁹⁸ Plut. *Mor.* 1057 E. Helmbold 1959: 30.

⁹⁹ This was a common view in Greek culture see Dover 1974: 183-4.

¹⁰⁰ Burnett 1998: 152-154.

¹⁰¹ Dion. Hal. *Rom.* 8.1.6: Plutarch does not mention friendship (φίλος) in Themistocles' and Coriolanus' *apologiai*, whereas Dionysius does. Plutarch equates friendship with supplication in the *Themistocles*, in a similar way to Dionysius' Coriolanus.

¹⁰² Plut. *De Capienda* 87 D-F. See the discussion of Capriglione 2008: 22-27, 28 Plutarch sets out a social code of behaviours or appearances.

¹⁰³ Dion Hal. *Rom.* 8.1.5.5.

had previously acted against Antigonus' interests when the former had saved him.¹⁰⁴ Plutarch believed that enmity in contrast with friendship could have better moral, social and material benefits.¹⁰⁵ Plutarch states that a man demonstrates his virtue by rejecting the opportunity of taking vengeance against his enemy, thus treating him in the same way as his friends. Antigonus fails because he kills his former friend, and in the supplication scene Tullus spares Coriolanus due to his practical military value. Supplication represents a potential bridge in all four *apologiai* between enemies: Coriolanus, Tullus and Antigonus all fail because they are not interested in friendship but in their self-interest.

Plutarch's Coriolanus neglects the moral principles of human behaviour while privileging the practical in his performance of supplication. Coriolanus considers the practical benefits of the relationship over the moral profit that he and Tullus could derive from the experience.¹⁰⁶ This represents a reinterpretation of Dionysius' narrative; his Coriolanus does not ignore the issues of justice in his relationship with the Volscians and the Romans. Dionysius' Coriolanus promises to do the Volscians great services in a similar way to Plutarch's Themistocles and both end with a paradoxical argument concerning death. If Tullus has no purpose for him, Coriolanus wishes to be sacrificed at the hearth. Dionysius' representation of Coriolanus is closer to Plutarch's Themistocles, because Coriolanus asks Tullus to commit sacrilege. Coriolanus uses the same rare verb to sacrifice (καθιερεύεσθαι).¹⁰⁷ Plutarch, due to the sacrilege of the act, though preserving a similar idea of the King killing Themistocles, removes the sacrifice theme from his account of the supplication scene. This argument of punishment and satisfaction as an alternative to friendship in the previous passage resembles Themistocles' strategy in his supplication scene.¹⁰⁸ Coriolanus believes that his death should serve the emotional purpose in satisfying Tullus' anger. Plutarch states that Coriolanus places himself, i.e. his vengeance and spirit, as an object to be used by Tullus (θυμὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν). Due to the domination of passions upon his mind, Coriolanus is wrong to perceive courage as strength. Coriolanus considers the practical position of his enemy, not the morality of the choices that a *supplicandus* must make about whether to let a suppliant live or die. This would be a sacrifice because of the location, but Plutarch chose to not use this language. Dionysius' Coriolanus' *apologia* reveals a

¹⁰⁴ Plut. *Eum.* 10.4.

¹⁰⁵ Pérez Jiménez 2005: 353, 364 argues that Plutarch's use of style contributes to the main philosophical messages of the essay.

¹⁰⁶ Capriglione 2008: 29-33.

¹⁰⁷ Plut. *Them.* 13.2 Plutarch uses it in the episode of the sacrifice of the Persian prisoners, which I discussed on pages 103-104.

¹⁰⁸ Plut. *Them.* 28.2.

conscience; for instance, he repeatedly refers to himself as a suppliant (ικέτην) and emphasises the hearth.¹⁰⁹ Plutarch's Coriolanus uses similar language (γέγονα τῆς ἐστίας τῆς σῆς ἰκέτης) but in a justification of supplication due to his exile, and at an earlier point in the *apologia*. Plutarch detaches the Roman protagonist from the gods due to his preference for profit and utility over justice. When Coriolanus threatens Rome in a later episode, and the city is saved by interventions of the protagonist's family, Plutarch shows that it was through sacrifice and supplication that aid and rewards from the divine are bestowed.¹¹⁰ Plutarch adapts Dionysius' language to bring attention to the Themistoclean-Odyssean character model but also to reject it.

This interpretation is supported by the evidence of Cicero in his essay *Brutus*, where he details how writers wrote about Coriolanus' and Themistocles' deaths.¹¹¹ Cicero is speaking to his friend Atticus in a dialogue. Cicero first says that Coriolanus and Themistocles were exiled unjustly and their suicides excused their traitorous actions against their states. Atticus had written an account of Coriolanus' life, and Cicero states that he differed on how the Roman died. Atticus replies to Cicero, making a point that rhetors writing history dramatise their accounts, in contrast with factual and more trustworthy narratives. For example, Atticus cites the example of the story of Themistocles drinking bull's blood as a sacrifice, found in the accounts of Clitarchus and Stratocles, contrary to Thucydides' version that the Athenian died of natural causes.¹¹² This sacrifice imagery was an important theme that connected Themistocles and Coriolanus. Cicero through Atticus emphasises how both figures were similar, whereas, in a letter to Atticus, he stresses that Coriolanus' reconciliation with the Volscians was an impiety, while suicide redeems Themistocles.¹¹³ Death excuses the latter from his earlier political alliance with his enemy, a tradition that Plutarch also follows within the *Themistocles*.¹¹⁴ Cicero and other writers use the sacrifice theme to demonstrate different approaches to the characterisations of Themistocles and Coriolanus. Plutarch must have been conscious of this tradition, his suppression of this Themistoclean detail takes away from the pious and sympathetic Dionysian characterisation. Evidence of Plutarch's choice is seen in his decision to contrast Coriolanus with positive and non-emotional statesmen such as Metellus, Epaminondas and

¹⁰⁹ Dion. Hal. *Rom. Ant.* 8.1.5 and 8.1.6.

¹¹⁰ Plut. *Cor.* 37.

¹¹¹ Cic. *Brut.* 43.

¹¹² Thuc. 1.138.4. See my discussion of Plutarch's account of Themistocles' suicide on pages 103-104.

¹¹³ Cicero states how Coriolanus' life could be made to resemble that of Themistocles. See Douglas 1996: 33 on *pateram*.

¹¹⁴ Cic. *Att.* 177. IX.10.3.

Aristides.¹¹⁵ In Cicero's writing, both figures were considered positive examples because of the nobility of their suicides.¹¹⁶

The final sentence of the *apologia* serves as an indictment of Coriolanus' lack of *παιδεία*, but it also establishes the beginnings of the future conflict between the protagonist and the Volscians and Rome and the gods of the city. It is the act of supplication that the individuals and groups engage in communication with each other. Coriolanus understands a part of the philosophical lesson correctly but he does not apply it properly because of the dominance of anger, hence his focus on self-advantage instead of justice. Plutarch in *On Exile* states that it is not right to grieve and yield completely in misfortunes. The advice of a friend must be well directed and the sufferer must examine all his relationships and his misfortunes rationally.¹¹⁷

On Exile is a key text to understand Plutarch's view on the subject; it may have been published roughly around the inception of the *Parallel Lives* project or near the end of the philosopher's life.¹¹⁸ The text is significant, in contrast with other writings on the subject because for Plutarch, as an active member of the local government throughout his lifetime, understood why exile would be viewed with great concern as the loss of a political career. Failure and other misfortunes allow a man a moment of peace to come to a greater understanding of his situation and to free himself of the negative and difficult aspects of governance.¹¹⁹ These supplication scenes provide different ethical methods and reactions to the loss of political freedoms in exile or military defeat. This will be demonstrated by analysing Plutarch's similar methodology in his narrative of Alcibiades' exile.

Juxtaposition and parallelism with the *Alcibiades*

Alcibiades was an Athenian politician and general (450-404 BCE). Plutarch considers that the moral problems in Alcibiades' life originated in the power of the passions over him, specifically contention and ambition, which were also Eumenes' flaws.¹²⁰ In contrast with Coriolanus, however, who had an inadequate education, Socrates taught Alcibiades, whom

¹¹⁵ Plut. *Comp. Cor. Alc.* 4.6.

¹¹⁶ Várhelyi 2012: 126.

¹¹⁷ Plut. *De Exil.* 599B.

¹¹⁸ Opsomer 2002: 286, Nesselrath 2007:92 s. 18 cites Caballero and Viansino 1995:8. If the essay *On Exile* is a late work, it is likely to be close in date in time to the publication of the *Coriolanus*.

¹¹⁹ Van Hoof 2010: 120-150.

¹²⁰ Plut. *Alc.* 2.1.

Plutarch says was one of the few men who could control and develop the Athenian's moral character. Alcibiades was exiled for the first time at the beginning of the Silician expedition, the Athenians accused him of committing sacrilege in the affair of the Mutilation of the Herms (415 BCE). He sought sanctuary in Sparta where his advice led to a number of successes against Athens (415-412 BCE). When Alcibiades fell out with the Spartans, he served the Persians until 412-411 BCE. In 407 BCE he returned triumphantly to Athens and aided the city-state until the defeat at Notium. After the Athenians were defeated in the Peloponnesian war, Alcibiades sought sanctuary in Persia; however, before he was able to meet Artaxerxes his enemies assassinated him in Phrygia (404 BCE).

The episodes of Alcibiades seeking sanctuary in Sparta in his first exile and Andocides' trial are the main narrative parallels to Coriolanus' trial and exile, which involves supplication and *apologia*.¹²¹ Andocides was an Athenian orator (c.440-c.390 BCE). In terms of chapters, these episodes are paralleled together, whereas other biographies do not maintain the same structure. This section will examine Plutarch's authorial intentions in this episode concerning the character traits and themes explored in Coriolanus' *apologia*. The *Roman* life, coming first in this biographical pair, sets up the expectation of a similar episode in the Greek life.¹²² Reading the *Alcibiades* episode leads to a re-evaluation of the *Coriolanus* supplication scene, and complicates interpretation because the Athenian's character is elusive and persuasive in his adaptation of the lifestyles of different cultures.

The main parallel between the episodes in the biographies is how legal conviction conditions the protagonist's behaviour and attitude to his misfortune. There is an important difference in that Alcibiades does not stand trial; however, he wished to defend himself against his enemies' accusations.¹²³ The main trial which Plutarch narrates is that of Andocides whose confession leads to the arrests and exile of many Athenians including Alcibiades.¹²⁴ Verdegem argues that Plutarch extensively treats this episode because of its thematic potential.¹²⁵ Plutarch links Alcibiades' behaviour in his exile with the confession of the orator Andocides; both figures lie and harm others intending to save their lives.¹²⁶

¹²¹ Plut. *Alc.* 23.

¹²² Pelling 1986 argues that the *Coriolanus* represents a simpler pattern of the failure of a statesman in his relationship with the people and this explains why Plutarch reversed the order of these two Lives, placing the *Coriolanus* first.

¹²³ Plut. *Alc.* 19.

¹²⁴ Plut. *Alc.* 21.

¹²⁵ Verdegem 2010: 254 argues that the main point of the episode is to show that the Athenian people were motivated by anger.

¹²⁶ Plut. *Alc.* 21.1. Verdegem 2010: 262. Plutarch in his characterisations of Andocides and Timaeus link these men with Odysseus.

Coriolanus before his trial asked the tribunes to swear that they would not lie or change aspects of his accusation. Andocides and Alcibiades act because of the fear of death.¹²⁷ It is important to compare the scenes to understand how Plutarch emphasises key issues through language:¹²⁸

ἀλλ' ὁρῶν ἀπιστεῖς, ἀνάγκη με κατήγορον ἐμαυτοῦ γενέσθαι.

If you cannot believe your own eyes, then I must act as my own accuser.

Plut. *Cor.* 23.2.

[...] οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἀδείας καὶ σωτηρίας τί γὰρ ἔδει με δεῦρο ἦκειν φοβούμενον ἀποθανεῖν; [...] οὔτ' ἐγὼ βούλομαι ζῆν οὔτε σοὶ καλῶς ἔχει σφάζειν πάλαι μὲν ἐχθρὸν ἄνδρα καὶ πολέμιον,

[...] but I have not come to ask for safety or protection – for why should I have come here if I were afraid to die – [...] I have no desire to live, nor will there be any advantage in saving the life of a man who has for so long been your implacable enemy,

Plut. *Cor.* 23.3-4.

οὔτος ἀναπειθεὶ τὸν Ἀνδοκίδην ἑαυτοῦ κατήγορον καὶ τινῶν ἄλλων γενέσθαι μὴ πολλῶν: ὁμολογήσαντι γὰρ ἄδειαν εἶναι κατὰ ψήφισμα τοῦ δήμου, τὰ δὲ τῆς κρίσεως ἄδηλα πᾶσι, τοῖς δὲ δυνατοῖς φοβερῶτατα: βέλτιον δὲ σωθῆναι ψευδόμενον ἢ μετὰ τῆς αὐτῆς αἰτίας ἀποθανεῖν ἀδόξως,

He pointed out that if Andocides confessed he would, according to the terms of the people's decree, be immune from punishment, whereas no one could ever tell what the verdict was going to be in a trial, and influential people like him had more to fear than anyone else. Given that the same charge was involved, it was better to tell a lie and save one's life, he argued, than to suffer the ignominy of death;

Plut. *Alc.* 21.3. Trans. R. Waterfield.

φοβούμενος δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ παντάπασι τῆς πατρίδος ἀπεγνωκῶς ἔπεμψεν εἰς Σπάρτην, ἀξιῶν ἄδειαν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι καὶ πίστιν ἐπὶ μείζοσι χρεῖαις καὶ ὠφελείαις ὧν πρότερον αὐτοῦς ἀμυνόμενος ἔβλαψε.

Since he was afraid of his enemies and had completely given up on his native country, he sent a message to Sparta, asking for asylum and promising to render them the kind of service and assistance that would outweigh the harm he had done them before when they were on opposite sides.

Plut. *Alc.* 23.1. Trans. R. Waterfield.

¹²⁷ Plut *Alc.* 23.1, 24.3 and 28.1. apud Jacobs 2017: 201 s.41.

¹²⁸ There may also be a link in the important source of Andocides' trial: Andoc. *De mysteriis* 6.3.

The main difference in the use of characterisation in both *Lives* is how fear or its absence affects their decision to seek exile with their enemies. Alcibiades is a superior moral example because even though Athens threatened his life, he never sought to seek revenge against the city. There is a selfish part in Alcibiades' character. Alcibiades' political actions are directed towards his self-preservation while Coriolanus' self interest is displayed in his valuing of manliness and courage. For this reason, apart from the Roman's justification against traditional supplication, the reader would expect Alcibiades to supplicate his enemies, whereas in the case of Coriolanus due to his valuing of courage it is striking that he allows his enemy the freedom to spare or kill him. This is Plutarch's main point, since Coriolanus performs the supplication because it is the mechanism for him to communicate with Tullus. By achieving an alliance with the Volscians and Tullus, Coriolanus serves his self-interest, i.e. his vengeance against the Romans. Alcibiades, unlike Coriolanus 'who abandons his family but also his city to return to the Volscians', achieved considerable success in his attempt to recover Athens' fortunes.¹²⁹ This is important because Plutarch subtly distinguishes Alcibiades' and Coriolanus' characters in how they approach events which threaten their lives and the nature of their vengeance. Plutarch highlights these differences by his lack of dramatisation of Alcibiades' experience in Sparta. Coriolanus exploits the idea of self-accusation in the last part of his speech, but he acts for a different reason to Andocides and Alcibiades since he rejects using supplication for his self-preservation. There is an issue in both *Lives*, of trust and personal loyalty of individuals to communities. Coriolanus plays on this idea when he asks if his enemy can trust his eyes and Plutarch emphasises the protagonist's concern that he does not deceive Tullus. This is not a good thing because due to his lack of παιδεία, Coriolanus does not know he is in the wrong.

From the outset, Alcibiades as a fugitive acts with a similar honesty as Coriolanus, because trust is an issue that separates him from his people.¹³⁰ Andocides' deception involves the condemnation of a number of his household slaves; because of this he was able to convince the Athenians to trust his evidence. The nature of the rhetoric and honesty of the speaker in these critical scenes has an important impact on how audiences within and outside the text judge the truth.

In these passages, Plutarch comments upon the main issue of the *Coriolanus-Alcibiades* of the dynamic between private morals and community interests.¹³¹ Andocides and

¹²⁹ Verdegem 2010: 261-262, Jacobs 2017: 212.

¹³⁰ Plut. *Alc.* 22.1-2.

¹³¹ Verdegem 2010a: 28.

Timaeus succeed and survive because of their manipulations. As Verdegem considers with several questions, it is not clear what Plutarch's interpretation of this deception was. On this point, Plutarch did not agree with Thucydides, who, while not naming Andocides, does say that the informant's actions benefited the city.¹³² As Verdegem argues, the key point of these episodes is to show the immorality of men using the argument of common advantage to achieve their ends and survival.¹³³ There are a number of issues with Coriolanus' *apologia*: as a proposal, his speech was immoral; however, it was also an honest reflection of his flawed character. There is a problem with the interpretation of Coriolanus' rejection of supplication by comparing his case with the traitors in the *Alcibiades*. Andocides and Timaeus are inferior examples because they prefer to lie and sacrifice others to preserve their lives. Indeed, as we have seen, Plutarch in respect to moral character condemns men who cling onto life when suicide or death was more honourable.¹³⁴ Coriolanus reflects this line of thought, by not understanding and misusing traditional supplication, and by allowing the dominance of his spirit over his mind: his life serves as an example of moral failure. Like Cato the Younger, the theme of the rejection of supplication is used by Plutarch to underline a flaw within his moral characterisation, of the dominance of anger upon his actions and attitudes. The significance of Coriolanus' emotional weakness symbolised through supplication will be explored in the following section.

The significance of the *apologia* within *Coriolanus*

Plutarch in the *Comparison* does not comment explicitly on Coriolanus' supplication of Tullus in his exile; however, the exiles of both protagonists are important in shaping his interpretation. Plutarch's main examination is how Coriolanus and Alcibiades gained and used their power and he concludes that their success and failure depended upon the use of persuasion.¹³⁵ Plutarch establishes that the main difference between their characters and political abilities can be seen whether they possess the quality of persuasion and gratitude (*χάρις*).¹³⁶ This explains why, as a powerful and sophistic speaker, Coriolanus was incapable of the same political success seen in the case of Alcibiades, who could charm the Athenians.

¹³² Thuc. 6.60.

¹³³ Verdegem 2010: 255.

¹³⁴ Verdegem 2010: 262 s.142 cites Pelling 1992: 11 and Albini & Pelling 1996 recognises the important role of sanctuary in these episodes.

¹³⁵ Cf. Jacobs 2017: 225, Verdegem 2010a:24, 27.

¹³⁶ *Comp. Cor. Alc.* 3.2.

Coriolanus' lack of persuasive ability is consistent with the harshness of his *apologia* and supplication performance.¹³⁷ This is seen in Plutarch's use of the term ingratitude (*ἄχαριτιν*) in his final judgement of Coriolanus.

Plutarch detects that there was an inconsistency in Coriolanus' character, in that he refused to engage in a friendly manner with the people in political elections while hating them when he did not succeed. Plutarch states that it was not wrong to turn against the people as Metellus, Aristides and Epaminondas did, and he uses the verb form *ἀφαίρειν* instead of the adjective *ἀναφαίρετον* to describe the ability of the people to take away status and freedoms.¹³⁸ These men had greater political skills and moral character than the protagonists, and Plutarch wishes the reader to have his narratives of their exiles in mind because both failed to respond correctly to the loss of honour.¹³⁹ For Plutarch, these men were moral paradigms because they were not angry when they experienced exile or other misfortunes and were willing to reconcile with the people. Though Coriolanus may act in similar ways, in that he did not supplicate the people; overall, his actions were motivated by anger and he did not act in his city's interests. Plutarch does not condemn Coriolanus for supplicating to his enemy, probably because he does not do so for personal salvation.¹⁴⁰

The significance of the supplication scene can be examined by the impact of Coriolanus' decision to ally with his enemy, leading to the war with Rome. This decision will establish a contradiction and conflict between Coriolanus' domestic motivation before his break with Rome, and his actions as a traitor. Plutarch underlines the flaws of Coriolanus' character in his supplication by his approach to the episodes in the second half of the biography, involving female members of his family as suppliants.

This is demonstrated by other evidence of Plutarch's literary changes when comparing Dionysius' representation of Coriolanus' attitude and performance of supplication in his trial. Dionysius' Coriolanus does not show the same contempt for the people and he relies on citizens he saved in battle to supplicate for him. Dionysius states that Coriolanus showed his body and scars to his audience in his public supplication.¹⁴¹ Plutarch does not represent Coriolanus in the same way at this point and he says that though the people expected the defendant to appeal in an *apologia*, he chooses instead to treat them with

¹³⁷ *Comp. Cor. Alc.* 1.3.

¹³⁸ *Comp. Cor. Alc.* 4.5-6.

¹³⁹ Plutarch is concerned with how statesmen should correctly respond and interact with the populations of their cities.

¹⁴⁰ In the *Comp. Cor. Alc.*, Plutarch shows more interest in the problems of how the protagonists relate to personal honour and the people.

¹⁴¹ *Dion. Hal. Rom Ant.* 7.62.3.

contempt. Plutarch uses Coriolanus' display of his body within his appeal for the consulship connecting it with an antiquarian account upon how politicians solicited the people with humility.¹⁴² Both acts influence the people to view Coriolanus positively; however, Plutarch's literary choices regarding supplication and character makes his protagonist appear as a negative figure at his trial, and explains his condemnation.

Coriolanus rejects the humiliation and deference to groups or individuals who have wronged him, but this does not stop him appealing through the rituals.¹⁴³ There is a difference between the physical performance of the ritual and Coriolanus' interpretation of why he is performing supplication. Coriolanus for Plutarch is an abnormality within his order, for example, senators on a number of occasions supplicate to heal civil divisions, and it was not morally right and politically effective for someone to rule tyrannically over the people without their consent.

Coriolanus' *apologia* and supplication are morally inverted by the approach Plutarch takes in the scene where Valeria persuades Volumnia and the protagonist's family to intervene in the conflict.¹⁴⁴ This episode is important because Plutarch shows that the Roman gods support the women, and they inspire Valeria's mind to go to Volumnia. Valeria receives this inspiration while she and the other Roman women are supplicating to Jupiter Capitolinus at his altar. Plutarch in the previous section had discussed with the use of Homeric quotations how the gods influence Valeria's moral action and it is important that this divine intervention comes after the male senators and the priests fail in their supplications to Coriolanus.¹⁴⁵ Plutarch represents the Romans after this outcome passively trusting their affairs to fortune instead of actively resisting the Volscians. The involvement of the gods in connection with the Roman women's supplications contrasts with the negative example of Coriolanus appealing to his enemy at Tullus' household hearth. Coriolanus' services on behalf of the Volscians and for his emotional satisfaction harms Rome and its gods too. Plutarch underlines the disparity between the Roman women who are concerned for their community and Coriolanus by a number of parallels in the scene where Valeria goes to Volumnia. Valeria enters and speaks to Volumnia and Vergilia, the wife of Coriolanus who are seated

¹⁴² Plut *Cor.* 14, 15.1 for the antiquarian account and the display of the scars respectively. It is not found in Dionysius' history. Verdegem 2016:170. On political canvassing as supplication see Cic. *Leg agr.* 2.71, Morstein-Marx 1998: 267-270.

¹⁴³ Plut. *Rom Ques.* 49 considers different reasons why politicians at this time humiliated themselves in Rome.

¹⁴⁴ Plut. *Cor.* 33.4.

¹⁴⁵ Plutarch is very clear in his emphasis that it was the Roman women not the men who saved Rome. See Ahlrichs 2005: 373 s.279 cites Dion. Hal. *Rom Ant.* 8.40.1. Valette 2012: argues that the story in Dionysius' account problematises the connections between religion and politics in Rome.

and Volumnia sits with Coriolanus' children on her lap. As Bernhard Ahlrichs discusses, unlike the Dionysian original, Plutarch chose to stage the scene dramatically and the Roman women form a ring which resembles a tragic choir.¹⁴⁶ Valeria's mention of friendship and peace opposes Coriolanus' supplication which appealed to Tullus' vengeance. Plutarch in his writing of Valeria's speech repeats the same language of testimony that he used to introduce the episode of Coriolanus' supplication of Tullus:¹⁴⁷

[...] καὶ μαρτυρήσατε τῇ πατρίδι μαρτυρίαν ἀληθῆ καὶ δικαίαν,

[...] and help us to bear this true and just testimony for your country,

Plut. *Cor.* 33.4.

Plutarch plays upon the image of Coriolanus concealing his character and emotions as a suppliant by his use of the adjectives true and just. The Roman women do not conceal their appearances as suppliants. The values of Coriolanus as a warrior and his desire for rewards are contrasted in the *apologia* and here, juxtaposed with the womens' traditional role as suppliants.¹⁴⁸ Valeria in her speech refers to the womens' supplications as a vessel to carry a testimony to Coriolanus. They use supplication on behalf of the community not for their own advantage. Part of the testimony is the fact that Rome has not thought about or physically punished Volumnia as a retribution for her son's actions. This use of testimony opposes its earlier use where Plutarch characterised Coriolanus as the embodiment of anger. Plutarch uses the supplication of the Roman women, particularly Volumnia to confirm the major flaw of the dominance of passions, specifically vengeance in Coriolanus' soul. Immediately after Coriolanus fails in his attempt to achieve the consulship, Plutarch details extensively Coriolanus' character, showing that due to his emotions he did not respond to reverses well. The main mistake was Coriolanus' belief that Roman virtue was courage which was best displayed through conquering opponents in battle, when in fact it was effeminate weakness to fail to control the emotion of anger.¹⁴⁹ Duff discusses how Coriolanus' mistaken view of bravery conflicts with Greek philosophical thought on self-control.¹⁵⁰ It was the absence of *παιδεία* which explains why Coriolanus' was unable to use reason to exercise self-control over his emotions. Plutarch's characterisation of Coriolanus in these terms, like Eumenes,

¹⁴⁶ Ahlrichs 2005: 372-373.

¹⁴⁷ Plut. *Cor.* 22.2.

¹⁴⁸ Plut. *Cor.* 4.2. Plutarch uses testimony in his description of the rewards Coriolanus received for his successes in battle.

¹⁴⁹ Plut. *Cor.* 15.4-5.

¹⁵⁰ Duff 1999: 211 s.19 for the ancient evidence and see Foucault 1985: 75-7, 170-4.

reflects Plato's description of the constitution timocracy.¹⁵¹ Plato defines the timocratic man as someone simple, who focuses on physical exercises and hunting and whose occupation is a soldier or general and ambition and love of victory are the values which dominate this character type. Paradoxically, Volumnia, in her upbringing of her son, instilled and developed masculine values.¹⁵² Plutarch's characterisation of Coriolanus stands starkly against his positive representation of women who rely upon the pathetic gesture and speech as suppliants to end the conflict. Coriolanus prefers to live in a warrior society instead of a political community or family unit. Coriolanus' sole attachments are his 'ties of personal dependence and guest-friendship' which involve supplication.¹⁵³ In short, Plutarch uses supplication and the *apologia* and the later episodes of Volumnia and Coriolanus to show the differences but also similarities in their characters. Ultimately, the author judges the women as superior in civic virtues because they display this quality on behalf of the community in their supplications which save Rome.

Conclusions

Plutarch's main intention in Coriolanus' *apologia* is to demonstrate the great danger of an exiled statesman using the supplication ritual and *apologia* as tools to reconcile with his enemy for the immoral purpose of harming his home state or city. The fundamental problem with Coriolanus and his attitude to supplication is found in the way that Plutarch chose to represent his character in terms of the soul: Coriolanus is unable to exercise his reason because anger dominates his spirit. Plutarch's characterisation of Coriolanus as a spirited or passionate man also reflects the influence of Plato on different forms of education in the *Republic*. In the textual analysis of the *apologia*, I showed how Plutarch made several changes to Dionysius of Halicarnassus' account of Coriolanus' *apologia* to Tullus, and how Livy's account may have influenced the biographer's view of the protagonist's vengeance against the Romans. This chapter argued that Plutarch intends his audience to read Coriolanus' irrational and immoral *apologia* against the wise and pragmatic character representations of Themistocles and Odysseus. This also explains why Plutarch closely adapted Dionysius' version of the *apologia*, since the historian's Coriolanus in his moralism and supplication closely parallels Plutarch's Themistocles. Plutarch demonstrates the failure of Coriolanus to act in the same way as Odysseus and Themistocles, focusing that this is due

¹⁵¹ Plat. *Rep.* 8. 545 B- 550 B.

¹⁵² Plut. *Cor.* 16.4-7, 17.7 apud Buszard 2010: 107-108 s.72.

¹⁵³ Cornell 2003: 81.

to the effect of anger on his mind. I also showed in the chapter that Plutarch was likely influenced by a tradition seen in the works of Cicero which made a comparison between the lives of Themistocles and Coriolanus. Plutarch interprets Coriolanus' character flaws as due to an education focused on military and physical development. Plutarch is clear that the study of philosophy would have helped the protagonist control his anger and exercise his reason. The biographer also expresses sympathy with Coriolanus' case because he accepts that there were no teachers of Hellenic παιδεία present at this point in Rome. This means that Coriolanus' case should be viewed more as a theoretical example since he shares the same virtues of courage with the cases of the early Romans and the Macedonians. The main thesis of the chapter is that Plutarch's main intention in Coriolanus' *apologia* was to demonstrate his philosophical principles through a deterrent example. Plutarch's Coriolanus in the *apologia* deliberately misapplies the biographer's philosophy on the importance of reconciliation of enemies and supplication, seen in *How to Profit from your enemies*. As I discussed in the chapter, Plutarch's purpose in writing about the enmities of individuals is also seen in his representation of Antigonos' treatment of Eumenes.

Conclusions

In this thesis, I have demonstrated how Plutarch uses the *apologiai* as the main part of his characterisation technique in connection with the four eponymous protagonists of the *Eumenes*, *Cato the Younger*, *Themistocles* and *Coriolanus*. The dissertation has sought to show that these *apologiai* and the supplication scenes which they belong to should be observed as an ethical project. The close parallels between the misfortunes of defeat and exile and the similar rhetorical methodologies of Eumenes and Cato, and Themistocles and Coriolanus, respectively strengthen this interpretation. Certainly, a development in Plutarch's approach to the misfortune suffered by these protagonists can be inferred. If Themistocles' *apologia* was, as I have argued, the earliest example of a protagonist's *apologia* in relationship with the other examples, it would explain why the Themistoclean character model is so significant in the other *Lives*. The evidence of Dionysius' representation of Coriolanus as much closer to the Themistocles' model and Plutarch's deliberate modification of this speech from the *Roman Antiquities* supports my argument. Themistocles' *apologia* is significant because it is the only *apologia*, apart from Coriolanus', which is successful due to the use of sophistic wisdom in persuading the listener. I have also detected other links between the *Eumenes* and the *Coriolanus*, which scholars have argued are biographies that were written and published near the end of the series. This study found that there are several connected themes between the two Lives: their enemies who are responsible for the protagonists' deaths receive a similar punishment, the enmity theme between noble individuals, the protagonists possess the same character flaws of contention and ambition, and there is also a close use of vocabulary between both scenes particularly the use of the significant phrase hostile man and enemy (ἐχθρὸν ἄνδρα καὶ πολέμιον).

This study has argued that Plutarch decided in these four biographies to write an *apologia* for the protagonist because of his interest, and that of his audience, in discussing the judgement of the protagonist's moral-political character. The key question to consider is to determine the motivation that led the protagonist in each case: self-interest, moral justice or acting on behalf of the community. The answer to this inquiry is complex, in all four *apologiai*, and particularly and uniquely in the case of Themistocles, who is the only protagonist to supplicate for the sake of his own life. The *apologia* is used by Plutarch to uphold an honourable and just image of the protagonist's self-representation of his character.

The protagonists manipulate the themes of moral justice and self-interest as part of their persuasive and deceptive discourse.

All the protagonists, including Themistocles, use the *apologia* to consider their past and future relationships with their audience and the benefits and harms of their past deeds. By focusing on others, they reject that their *apologia* and deeds were motivated by their self-interest. Indeed, this seems to be Plutarch's underlying point of interpretation, since all the protagonists are motivated by something of personal value tied to the preservation of their reputation: Eumenes and Cato the Younger use the *apologia* to appeal for the return of their sword so they can die a noble death. Themistocles and Coriolanus have different reasons for wishing to receive sanctuary and aid from their enemies. The former acts more like a traditional suppliant wishing his life to be spared, whereas the latter misuses the ritual because he wishes to utilise his enemy's vengeance and resources to satisfy his own vengeance against his former allies. The protagonists' attachment to their reputation, which serves as the main evidence in their *apologiai*, means that they place their reputations above their own lives. This is seen in the way that Eumenes, through the narrator's definition of his speech, and Cato and Coriolanus reject the traditional purpose of supplication. Considering Plutarch's positive interpretation of traditional supplication in misfortunes such as exile and defeat, I conclude that the biographer did not regard this practice as shameful in itself. Rather, Plutarch forms different judgements concerning the moral behaviour of Eumenes and Cato the Younger on the issues of supplication and death; the former failing to commit suicide in contrast with the latter. Plutarch makes the opposite judgement on supplication and suicide if we compare his judgement of Cato at the end of his biography with his view of Eumenes' character in the *Comparison of Sertorius-Eumenes*. Although, as I have argued, Plutarch's 'inconsistencies' in some of his interpretations may reflect a dialectical and sceptical approach to the biographies and his engagement with his audience, who is invited to reinterpret and reread them. The question of self-interest or moral justice and their relationship with community interests is the common thread which appears in Plutarch's interpretation and approach in these *apologiai* and *Lives*, which contain several interconnected aspects. First, Plutarch judges a protagonist who dishonours himself or makes an inappropriate political choice. This is the case of Cato's suicide, because the act does not benefit his community, as well as the case of Eumenes, the real motivation of whom was his self-interest, which was seen in his greed, ambition and rivalry. This also explains why Plutarch has a positive view of Sertorius in his death scene: his motivations in life were different to those of Eumenes'. Plutarch states that the Roman protagonist did not dishonour

himself even though he was also physically overpowered. Conversely, Plutarch (at least in the main narrative) does not criticise the self-interest of Themistocles, which particularly stemmed from his ambition, because his political and military deeds ultimately benefitted the Greeks and harmed the Persians. Plutarch's approach in Themistocles' *apologia* also explains why the biographer depicts his death as a suicide because it could be construed as a rejection of the 'promises' that he made as a suppliant to the Persian King.

Second, inconsistencies and problems appear in judging the *apologia* as a speech against Plutarch's representation of these deeds in the previous narrative, which constitute in text. The protagonist's representation of his deeds in his *apologia* is extremely problematic when they are used to glorify the protagonist's reputation. For example, Plutarch's Themistocles' supplication and *apologia* to the Persian King, as discussed in chapter three, does not sit well with the protagonist's rejection of selling himself to the Persians and his harsh treatment of the Persian who delivers Xerxes' demands in the Greek language. Third, Plutarch's critical interpretation of his protagonists' character and motivations are also seen in his literary choice of representation of the protagonists' reason and soul dominated by anger, as in Cato's and Coriolanus' cases, or without anger in the case of Eumenes.

Plutarch's treatment of anger and human vices such as contention are meant to be seen as having a deliberate impact on whether the protagonist is judged truly to be acting with φιλανθρωπία in relation to his audiences. By analysing all the *apologiai* together, it can be seen that Plutarch is making an important moral argument that φιλανθρωπία, which is the opposite of self-interest, is best seen through supplication and kind treatment by a *supplicandus*. Although Eumenes does not explicitly supplicate the Macedonians, his *apologia* discusses the role of φιλανθρωπία and self-interest in the situation of the exchange of himself as a prisoner for the Silver Shields' baggage. Themistocles uses the supplication to show the importance of φιλανθρωπία and reconciliation of enemies to the Persians. It is the Roman examples of Cato the Younger and Coriolanus who use the *apologia* to reject supplication. In doing so, they reject the bonds of human kindness they owe their families in both cases. For example, although the supplication of Coriolanus' family, and in particular his mother, does not bring true reconciliation, it does end the conflict between Rome and the protagonist. The real issue in these examples is how Plutarch represents the anger of the protagonists and of the Persian King as *supplicandus*. Only in Cato's case does Plutarch partially justify the cause of his anger as the hatred of evil; however, due to the detrimental and harmful form his anger takes, the biographer does not excuse the protagonist for his severe actions against his family, and thus his *apologia* fails as a defence of suicide. I have

shown that this framework on anger in the *Cato* corresponds to that of his *On the Avoidance of Anger*. The relationship between justice and φιλανθρωπία is seen in similar ways in Plutarch's use of the phrase in the *Eumenes* and *Coriolanus*, which indicates that these *apologiai*-supplication scenes are meant to read as alternative moral-political exercises from which the reader can learn. The *apologiai* belong to an ethical inquiry into how humans should act and treat friends and enemies, as I have explored in the comparative discussion of Plutarch's *How to Profit from your enemies*.

As this dissertation has shown through the textual analysis of the *apologiai*, Plutarch's authorial intentions can be demonstrated by examination of his adaptation of sources, and the influence of historical traditions on the protagonists. One finding of this dissertation is that in each *apologia*: Plutarch's interpretation of the protagonist's character should be viewed as connected to his interest in Platonic and Peripatetic philosophies. The Peripatetic influence can be seen in Plutarch's focus on the emotional experiences of the protagonists and their audiences in these scenes of the *apologiai*. Themistocles' use of the *apologia* also concerns supplication as a method to calm and remove anger in an enemy's soul, and he promotes the reconciliation of enemies. This is a lesson that the other protagonists fail to heed and exercise in their *apologiai*, and which Coriolanus only focuses on in terms of utility and self-interest. Coriolanus' *apologia* operates with a similar moral framework as Themistocles'; however, the Roman protagonist shows no understanding of the lesson personally, and he uses the supplication practice as part of a long-term process to satisfy his emotional defect, his vengeance, which is symptomatic of his self-interest.

This dissertation has also found that all the protagonists possess a problematic or inadequate grasp of παιδεία, which affects their ability to endure and respond appropriately to misfortune with the same tranquility as a philosopher like Socrates would display. This can be seen in the framework used by Plutarch to compare Cato's failure to die like a philosopher and Phocion's Socratic death in the companion biography. Plutarch makes a similar point about Eumenes attempting to flee death and the main criticism of his cowardice and supplication stems from the lack of spirit and correct attitude which he showed in his imprisonment.

This study has contributed to our understanding of Plutarch's literary and philosophical intentions in his use of *apologiai* and supplications in the *Eumenes*, *Cato the Younger*, *Themistocles* and *Coriolanus*. The dissertation has demonstrated the significance of *apologia* and supplication within Plutarch's moral characterisation of these protagonists,

James Day

while it has also furthered understanding of his biographical techniques and approach, and his use of earlier sources in the *Parallel Lives*.

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James Day

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