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Disabled Teachers

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD

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Abstract

This thesis is a study of the discourse on disability as it is encountered by disabled teachers within schools. This discourse is researched through three primary strands of data. The first source of data resulted from interviews conducted with teachers with disabilities. Nine teachers were interviewed. I also interviewed headteachers so as to set the analysis of the discourse in the fuller context of practices within schools. Three headteachers were interviewed. The third strand of data used in this thesis consisted of equality legislation and supporting documents. The question under investigation was this: ‘how does the discourse on disability within schools constrain, restrict or empower disabled teachers’? The method of analysis used was that of discourse analysis.

My theoretical analysis follows the work of Michel Foucault whom I chose because his analysis of the normalising and disciplinary discourses in society offered theories of society that supported the rubric of Disability Studies with a focus of disability in line with the social model of disability.

The main conclusions of this thesis are that schools as disciplinary institutions are constrained themselves to operate through normalising and disciplinary discourses. These discourses constrain all teachers. The Equality Act 2010 is premised on the basis of formal equality and, as such, would posit that all teachers in schools are constrained in identical ways. My analysis refutes that view and I argue that the discourses through which teachers are constrained to act constrain disabled teachers more than others because the practices of these discourses posit a non disabled person.

However, I show also the ways the teachers interviewed resisted the subjection offered. Foucault's theory of the care of the self, in particular, begins to offer a nuanced way to analyse this resistance. I end the thesis with suggestions for implementing change.

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Chapter One: Introduction

Introduction

Disability can be described as needing the support of an array of actors: therapists, dedicated educators, medical staff, social teams and so on. Alternatively, it can also be viewed that an array of actors: therapists, dedicated educators and social teams and so on are supported by disability. This latter view is a way of saying that disability can be viewed as a social construction and that without this entourage of actors disability would disappear as an object of concern. The field of critically oriented research that has become widely known as *Disability Studies* addresses the problematic of disability.

Disability Studies has many adherents hailing from diverse perspectives and spanning both of the above views of disability. This spectrum spans across those who address the problematic of disability through a critical appraisal of these actors e.g. who are they, how do they function, etc, to those who advocate the view that disability is a socially constructed entity. Oliver (1999) provides a good introduction to the positioning of disability in society and as a subject of research. Oliver's position at bottom is that research is always an act of production so we should always ask ourselves 'what type of persons do we want to produce by our research'?

Before going on I address the question of terminology. Mike Oliver was one of the most active Disability Studies scholars in the UK. Oliver & Barnes (2014) insisted on the use of the term 'disabled people' for the naming of disability. However the term 'people with disabilities' has come to the fore in recent years as it is said to emphasise that the person is not defined by their disability. But this is the point that Oliver & Barnes were making, that

disability is a lived experience, not an addendum. In this thesis I will use the two terms: ‘disabled people’ and ‘people with disabilities’ interchangeably and with no assumption of preference implied.

Disability Studies points out the irony that disability is everywhere spoken about but is never anywhere to be seen (Rousmaniere, 2013). Except in schools. Schools have made it their business to set up and institute a separate educational system for pupils with disabilities termed ‘special educational needs’. This term has been replaced by the term ‘special educational needs and disabilities’ (SEND) by the Children’s and Families Act 2014 (UK Gov, 2014) , though the term ‘SEN’ continues to be used widely even by the government’s own publications (see UK Gov 2020). The meaning of disability in relation to education has always seemed to be frustratingly self-referential within the system of special educational needs. For instance does special education mean that these pupils are exempt from normative expectations and outcomes of education or have ways been found so that these pupils can access the normative curriculum? Perhaps when a clear answer as to what special education is actually intended to achieve and how it will do so is arrived at then a clearer understanding of disability’s position in relation to society will also result.

Schools have teachers with disabilities. Teachers with disabilities are not prominent in the population make-up of the teaching body. An article by *The Guardian* (2012) indicated that the evidence pointed to approximately 1% of teachers being disabled. Teachers within schools do not fall under the umbrella of this separate educational system for pupils with disabilities. The route for ensuring equality for teachers with disabilities is through legislation, namely the Equality Act 2010. Within schools then there are two systems of legislation that specifically address the issue of disability. With both systems operating

within the same institution: interaction, cross-over, borrowing and exchange of terminology occurs between them, and in this thesis one chapter looks specifically at this interplay. It is a topic which I believe would support a whole thesis. The focus of this thesis is however teachers with disabilities.

Relatively speaking, there is very little work that has been done researching the experiences and positioning of teachers with disabilities in schools, and the vast majority of that work centres on, or partially includes, research with what is often termed ‘trainee’, ‘probationary’ or ‘student teachers’. Reading these works have been valuable in educating and introducing me to the topic of teachers with disabilities as a research activity, but it also left me wanting to know more, wanting a more critical and substantial engagement with the discourses of disability interactant with discourses of the teaching profession. Student teachers are in a relatively powerless position and the intersection of the discourses of disability and the teaching profession would very much be affected by this weak positioning of student teachers. For a much more substantial and robust investigation into the intersection of disability and the teaching profession I decided that I would focus solely on researching the experiences and positing of disabled teachers who have had years of experience in the teaching profession. The teaching experience range of nine the teachers I interviewed for this thesis varied from three years to twenty five years with the median being approximately ten years.

Further, I did not find any instances of research in the literature which involved research into the role of headteachers as managers of teachers with disabilities. I decided that this was a vital missing component in the research and that I would include this missing component in my work. The research questions follow from this foregoing context.

The Research Question

The research question(s) I address in thesis are:

1. How are disabled teachers constrained or empowered by the dominant discourses which operate within the school as the school functions to carry out its day to day activities and seeks to complete its stated rationale for being?
2. How does the system set in place to ensure equality, namely the Equality Act 2010, affect the career chances of teachers with disabilities and is this legislation effective in achieving the equality it has been set in place to establish?

A brief outline of the methods I followed are that I interviewed teachers with disabilities *as* teachers with disabilities. I then interviewed headteachers *as* headteachers. These headteachers either self-identified as having a disability or not, though it was not a question I asked.

An engagement with legal documents was also required in order to set the work in the context of wider political and social underpinnings. The focus was given to the Equality Act 2010, and here again I could easily say that this aspect of my work could become a whole thesis on its own as it soon became clear to me that disability legislation is a good avenue through which to study governance by the state in general. Disability as a legal entity is covered throughout the thesis but much more specifically in chapter eight which is directed solely towards equality law and on disability as a legal entity. Chapter nine follows from this and looks at how equality law is adopted or used in school.

Later on in this introductory chapter I give a synopsis of the chapters in this thesis in turn. Doing this allows me to set the scene for the reading of this thesis by highlighting in one place the important threads that run through the thesis and to indicate how these threads relate to each other and how one thread gives rise to another. It allows me to underline and underscore important theoretical aspects of each chapter and to say why they are important to the thesis and suggest where they conceptually fit in to the narrative I develop. My hope and aim would be that by the end of reading this chapter, and indeed the thesis, the reader would want to know more.

Disability Studies

I agree with Titchkosky (2008) when she writes that a key element of Disability Studies expresses the opinion that nothing more can be learnt about ‘impairments’ from the study of how people with disability ‘overcome’, ‘succumb’ or ‘cope’ with disabilities. My thesis then is not a study into what impairments there are, and what does that mean, how do people describe their impairments, and so on. The thesis I present here is a critical engagement with disability as a discourse in society. Disability Studies critiques the way disabled people are made the subject of observation, objects to be studied, to be classified, to be categorised and objectified by others. Such activities are often carried out on the basis of furthering the cause of people with disabilities. But as Harpur (2012) notes, for the purposes of advocating for people with disability it is not necessary to categorise or describe a person’s disability. Neither is the practice of rank-ordering disability, often done through practices of counting and measuring, to be welcomed (Titchkosky, 2003).

Disability Studies brings our attention to the objectification and separating out of people with disabilities for no good reasons and that this occurs in several different places and on several

different levels. So for instance Siebers (2010) has highlighted that the use of machines and aids pass without comment when the user is an able-bodied person but becomes a problem when people with disabilities use the same. Likewise people with disabilities are admonished over and over again to try to be 'more independent' yet able-bodied people have fewer problems and face less questioning when asking for the help they need. Parker & Draves (2018) write that one of the lessons Disability Studies has to offer has nothing to do with disability but offers a reminder in a normalising and anonymising society that interdependence is a defining characteristic of civilisation, whether we want to acknowledge it or not.

Disability Studies implicates the manner in which the medical profession and the legal profession collude in this objectification of disability. Diedrich (2005) noted that through medical classification, disability gained currency in the judicial and psychiatric fields thus solidifying disability's status as a medical entity. The point may be extended on if I follow Foucault. To follow Foucault would be to trek along lines of enquiry that would seek to reveal how people are constructed as being different in order that they may be subjugated. Diedrich continues that before its medical classification disability did not exist as a separate entity within society. Diedrich is followed by both Liasidou and Charlton in critiquing the role of the law in the objectification of disability. Liasidou (2016) writes that discrimination against people with disabilities is not eliminated by law, on the contrary, the law creates disability through the language of deficit it uses to describe people it labels as 'disabled'. Charlton (2010) follows by noting that the law serves only to legalise the poor material and social conditions many people with disability find themselves in, it does not aim to eradicate these conditions but naturalising them by describing them as an a-priori and extant fact of life. This approaches a point that I will bring out later in this chapter from Foucault's work on

the construction of certain groups as being abnormal through activities of state-sponsored knowledge creation. These selfsame groups the law then claims to protect through equality legislation.

Disability Studies scholars and activists then have taken specific aim at the manner in which people with disabilities are objectified in various ways and at different times. The term 'The Medical Model' of disability was coined to describe the manner in which disability is first and foremost seen as a medical problem requiring ever greater attention from medical professionals. These medical activities were seen to result in greater and greater use of dividing practices, objectification and loss of narrative by disabled people. Critique focused on the institutions, the hospitals, the clinics, the therapy rooms and the medical profession in general that were seen to be primarily responsible for this objectification. This process of objectification was seen to feed into social and cultural attitudes and views such that the net result was that disabled people came to have poor material and social standing due to negative images and perceptions of disability generated by these medicalised views of disability (Corker, 1999; Davies, 2010; Linton, 2010,).

Meekosha & Shuttleworth (2016) point out that some branches of Disability Studies were often modelled on Marxist approaches. This later began to give way to, or to include, approaches that followed the work of Foucault. This began to occur primarily because Foucault's work was seen to entail a more nuanced, detailed, thorough and encompassing model of power than the Marxist-materialist view of institutions and ideologies. It is for these and similar reasons that I myself follow the work of Foucault in this thesis.

I turn next in this chapter to outlining the central tenets of Foucault's work that can be used to both follow and develop Disability Studies. In the following chapters I repeatedly call upon the work of Foucault and highlight the features of his work that lead to a practical applicability within Disability Studies.

Disability Studies with Foucault

An answer Foucault (1994a) gave in interview reveals how he conceived of the social and political world and the approach he took in his work. Following Foucault's work on sexuality, the interviewer alluded to the impossibility of distinguishing the differences between fact from fiction in books on sexuality in general. Foucault replied that it wasn't a question of distinguishing fact from fiction, an archaeological (historical) study of the discourse on sexuality would focus on the relationship between what people do, what they are obliged to do, what is allowed and what is forbidden. Foucault very much based his work on the experiences of people and anything outside this was of little interest to him.

Foucault was not necessarily interested in whether things were true or not, he was interested in the way that discourses came to enable or constrain people and under which conditions these could be reversed (Butin, 2009). To follow Foucault then in the study of disability is not to be concerned with what disability is and what it is not but to be concerned with how the discourse on disability can act to constrain people. To hold to such a view exposes one to the risk of being mistaken and leaves one 'vulnerable to the perfect hindsight of those who adopt firm positions' (Rabinow, 1994, xix).

Nevertheless, I believe that in Disability Studies Foucault is well worth following. From the foregoing brief exposition of Disability Studies it may be becoming clear that there is a

problem with the subject of disability. If the subject of disability is not viewed as being a social construction but is a fixed entity such a view acts in the service of maintaining the dichotomy abled / disabled. If on the other hand disability is accepted as a construction then the problem arising is how would it be possible to un-construct disability. Foucault offers ways forward with this paradox by revealing how the production of the knowledge of disability is related to the ability to wield power over people that are so deemed. He then asks the open question, ‘what, if anything, do we want to do about it?’ In this thesis I argue that disability is a discursive entity and I adopt Foucault to begin to find a way out of the dilemma.

Foucault does not offer the simplistic solution that a firmly established subject such as the subject of disability can be reversed in a simple manner. For Foucault (1994b) it is about ‘problematization’, of investigating the acts, the thoughts and the practices that bring the object in to being. The problematic of the object does not exist separate from its relationship with politics, laws and regulations, yet it cannot be expected that politics would find a solution such that the problem would cease to be a problem. As Gordon (1994) points out, Foucault never looked for simple or singular, fundamental causes for problems. His investigations always involved a multiplicity of objects, domains and layers. Neither were objects considered to be fixed but were considered to be mobile. If it is considered how the meaning and definitions of what is considered to be a disability and what is not changes over time and place, then it can be concluded that the study of disability itself needs to be mobile and one that will allow, and account, for the changes in human practices and relations. Central to Foucault’s work is how this multiplicity of objects and relations come to form a *discourse*. He defines discourses thus:

Discursive practices are characterised by the demarcation of a field of objects, by the definition of a legitimate perspective for a subject of knowledge, by the setting of norms for elaborating concepts and theories. Hence each of them presupposes a play of prescriptions that govern exclusions and selections.

Foucault (1994c, p11).

Foucault is claiming that discourses are linked to knowledge, as also is the play of exclusions and selections. This wilfulness of knowledge involved in the setting of norms and in the governing of who and what is selected or excluded Foucault terms *the will to knowledge*. He posits many examples of the will to knowledge after Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza and so on. In *The Will to Knowledge* (Foucault 1994c) selects two of these knowledge systems that he then contrasts. The first type of knowledge he terms the ‘the Aristotelian’ model of knowledge. This mode of knowledge offers pleasure through the sensations such as the happiness of contemplation. This form of knowledge can be characterised as ‘the desire to know’. The second type of knowledge follows Nietzsche and is characterised by the fact that interest is always prior to knowledge and it subordinates knowledge to its interests. Both types of *the will to knowledge* offer forms of pleasure that go to reinforce their use.

Foucault does not insist that all knowledge is self-interested. One of the central tenets of Foucault’s thesis is that he is interested in the type of knowledge that is serviceable to power and the mechanism by which this knowledge becomes attached to power, not whether or not the knowledge is true or false (Gordon, 1994). Different types of knowledge allow themselves to be used in different ways by power, but it is those forms of knowledge that can be used in the most instrumental manner that are of the most use in the service of power.

Foucault illustrates that knowledge is the main avenue through which power has come to be exercised in modern society. I will expand on this.

In *Discipline & Punish* (1975) Foucault writes that the human sciences have had so little good to say about human multiplicity. For a long time I held this to be critique in the sense that the human sciences need to respect and represent multiplicity better. But Foucault was saying something much more fundamental than this. It is not that the human sciences have nothing good to say about human multiplicity but that negative statements about human multiplicity is all they ever have to say and there is a reason for this. As Harwood (2004) found in her study of queer young people, negative statements about queer people is all that is ever allowed to be said. Following Foucault, Harwood determined that this is so because the discourses involved were drawing from human sciences which are regulated so that they only ever produce knowledge about queer people that is negative.

Foucault's thesis is that these human sciences are not just complicit in the subjugation of individuals but that without their existence such subjugation would not be possible. These sciences provide the knowledge about what multiplicities there are and in what ways they can be considered deficient relative to the norm. It is with some irony then that the law seeks to guard and protect from discrimination the selfsame multiplicities that these knowledges create.

Disability Studies following Foucault would consider that disability is to be understood as singularities of human difference that have been compressed by these human sciences into an object that is now presented as 'disability'. The truth of these singularities, what they are and how many of them exist and so on does not determine how people come to experience

disability. The experience of disability is determined by the creation of knowledge about disability and by the practices that surround and support these knowledges that in themselves give rise to the opportunity to create new knowledge about disability. In like manner, Foucault (1994d) did not deny the existence of madness, his concern was with how madness become linked to, and conceived as, a mental illness.

For Foucault, the techniques of power have become so sophisticated that individuals assume that the subjectivity that is offered them is their own subjectivity and a truth of their own making (Fischer, 2009). Foucault's project is not to falsify present systems of knowledge or to suggest a society outside of power relations. Foucault's project is to illustrate and expose how present systems of knowledge offer forms of subjectivity under the guise of being natural, neutral or the height of human progress and to ask if we are happy with these or would we like to try other forms of knowledge, other subjectivities and other relations of power.

This is a brief outline of Disability Studies that would follow Foucault. Foucault is not the only writer whose work is considered and applied in this thesis, but thinking and ideas after Foucault form many of the central theoretical themes I develop. At the outset of my PhD journey I had no idea that Foucault's work spanned such a wide array of social theory. I also had no idea just how much of this theory I would be able to use and adapt. From the outset of my journey, Foucault seemed to offer a detailed and relentless critique of normalisation, he seems to have critiqued normalisation where-ever he found it. This critique of normalisation and his theory about the centrality of power in social theory indicated to me from initial readings of his work that his work was a very good candidate on which disability within society could be critically researched.

I now turn to introducing the ideas and work in each chapter of this thesis.

The Chapters in this Thesis

Chapter two: Meeting the literature begins with an exploration of the political and critical perspectives I would want to see in research about disability following the critique offered of research about disability by Disability Studies. Disability Studies has mounted a sustained and well-argued critique of a strictly medical model of disability for long enough and hard enough now such that I posit that current research into disability should begin from a *social model* of disability that foregrounds the social and political. There is no apolitical research in disability whether it is admitted or not. In this chapter I place a question mark against any research about disability that does not foreground a social model of disability and I show why I am reluctant to use or follow any ideas, findings or suggestions from research that uses a medical model to situate disability in society. To use knowledge produced in such a manner would only be to repeat its knowledge-as-instrument premise. Disability Studies requires that research into disability forefront the social and cultural underpinnings of disability. The growth in the use of medical knowledge in an instrumental manner to ever ‘discover’ new disabilities just bears out Foucault’s critique of the will to knowledge that is used to exclude, constrain and assign to the margins.

I then argue in this chapter that the literature on teachers with disabilities that rejects a deficit-medical model of disability can be divided into two camps. The first camp attempts to research disability as a discursive construct. The critique I offer here is that these authors simultaneously research disability as both a social construct and as a truth; that is, they go seeking for the ‘truth’ of disability having declared an understanding that disability must be

understood in no such terms. I further critique that in accepting, or overlooking, many of the objects in their research data as being non-discursive much of their work does not engage the discourse. The second general approach that is used to rebut the deficit-medical model of disability uses an identity based approach, often involving an attempt to reverse the binary abled/disabled. I critique these approaches for the limited scope they offer for change by positing the binary as a given. Reversing the binary is done by highlighting the 'benefits' of disability but in so doing they undermine their own argument for equality. I conclude the chapter with research which I deem are examples to follow and emulate.

In *Chapter Three: Disability and Discourse* I set out from several different angles how disability can be seen to be a discursive construct. This consists of understanding disability both as a *discursive object* and as a *discursive practice*. I begin the chapter by focusing on Foucault's work in his book *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. In this book Foucault sets out a detailed method for the revealing of discursive objects within society. I then broaden this out to bring to light disability both as a discursive object that is constructed through knowledge and as a practice by which people come to *confess* that they are disabled through repeated experiences of practices of subjection.

An important part of the process by which disability is *discovered* as an object is through processes of *normalisation* which are central to the deployment of *disciplinary power*.

Disciplinary power can be viewed as a type of power that seeks to control our behaviour that we come to internalise. Once internalised we then come to discipline and restrict our own instincts, behaviours and desires. These two themes: normalisation and disciplinary power are carried through this thesis and an understanding of these terms is central to the understanding of what I have written here in my thesis.

In *Chapter Four: Methodology* I set out the social theory that underpins my approach to epistemology and I note the difference between discourse theory and *doing* discourse analysis. I set out how I conducted the discourse analysis for this thesis and critique the use of interview as a research method for data collection.

Social theory is often described and understood in terms of the *structure* versus *agency* debate. The position I hold is that we are constrained by discourse in what we can think and do but we are not determined by discourse, we have agency. There can be no belief in *false consciousness* after Foucault so the discourses that constrain us are hidden in plain sight disguised as having bases in nature, narratives of progress and the order of things. These claims to be based on nature or on some type of *social contract* is what makes them so constraining as they then become difficult to refute. I spend a considerable amount of time in this chapter developing a poststructural understanding of social theory that both acknowledges the constraining nature of discourse yet also allows for agency of the subject. I tentatively draw from phenomenology to buttress my claim to the agency of the subject.

Discourse analysis is viewed as being an informed theory-led process where, following the advice of St Pierre (2011), closeness to the data is to be valued over any efficiency that ‘coding’ of the data may offer. I note that one of the main advantages of using interview as a research method is its practicality of use. Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982) write that Foucault has shown us how the processes of objectification and subjectification occur in society and suggests that perhaps we should avoid repeating these ourselves with the people we research. I conclude then that interview should not be conducted as a detached search for objective truth neither should it be conducted in such a manner that it tends towards the confessional.

In *Chapter Five: Discourses which Constrain* I begin the analysis of my data. Foucault's analyses were described as always being detailed, layered, involving a multiplicity of objects and domains and not looking for one single fundamental causal factor. In this chapter I provide an analysis of some of the main constraining discourses that I identified in the interview data with the teachers. I identify discourses which govern pupil-teacher relations, teacher-teacher relations and also the discourse of 'learning'. I endeavour to pick out and to illustrate how these discourses affect what it would be possible to think, say and do as a teacher in schools.

I also identify the discourse of neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism should be taken seriously as a discourse that affects power relations and practices across society. But it should not be taken as a singular determining discourse that can be used to fully unpack all relations of power and practices. I show from the data that the constraining of teachers with disabilities goes beyond what a simple deductive neo-liberal analysis would allow. Nevertheless, neo-liberalism is retained as an important discourse of and for analysis throughout this thesis.

Chapter Six: The Special Educational Needs Discourse is devoted to the analysis of just one discourse, that of special educational needs (SEN). SEN is the system of education in the UK by which pupils with disabilities are governed. My work's focus is on teachers with disabilities but the issue of SEN arises because the teachers would often describe themselves and other adults as having a 'special educational need'. Whether or not teachers with disabilities have special educational needs is not important in a discursive investigation, what is important is how the teachers come to interchange the terms so freely.

An opportunity is offered here to compare Foucault's understanding of discourse with other poststructural understandings of discourse. Foucault was almost unique in his understanding of discourse as comprising both linguistic practices and material practices (Olssen, 2014). Therefore, for two discourses to be interchangeable both the linguistic and the material practices must also be identical, it is not enough to dismiss the substitution of one discourse for another as just being a linguistic operation. In this chapter then I show how the processes of normalisation, subjectification and relations of power are identical for both teachers with disabilities and pupils with special educational needs. This equivalence in the content of the two discourses, I conclude, is what enables the interchange of the two discourses to happen in an unproblematic manner.

Chapter Seven: Subjectivity: the primary reason I decided to have this focus on subjectivity was because I wanted to present a subject who resists. To study subjectivity runs the risk of returning to centre stage the subject, but it is a risk worth taking. If my thesis exclusively focused on discourses that constrain then I might be in danger of creating what Harwood (2004) terms a 'wounded truth' narrative, that is a study that speaks only of deficit. There are many other ways by which resistance can be offered such as through collective action, reversing the discourse, legal redress and so on. Foucault agreed that subjectivity was not the only means by which resistance can be mounted. Looking at resistance through the study of subjectivity however allows me to simultaneously investigate more closely the conditions under which agency can arise.

Following Kant, Foucault continues an interest in the study of what we have become in modern society. Foucault suggests that if we ever were to carry out such a study it would comprise three strands; the axis of actions, the axis of power and the axis of ethics. These

axes of investigation I choose to interpret as, following Deleuze (2006) , investigations into how we are constituted as *subjects of knowledge*, as *subjects of power* and thirdly as the *care of the self*. Agency is studied using an understanding of the three levels of relations of power that Foucault noted, namely: subjection, governmentality and relations that tend towards being adversarial. I focus on analysing relations of power that tend towards dominance or being adversarial in this chapter. From this I do a comparison and look for conditions that may lead to one rather than the other.

The final section of this chapter focuses on the care of the self. Meekosha & Shuttleworth (2016) write that the move in Foucault's work to the care of the self can be viewed as a move from an emphasis on resistance based around the subject's entrapment in systems of power to one based on practices of the self that lead to social and personal transformation. Foucault (1994d) indicated that this shift in his work can be described as a shift from work on the passive subject to an active subject. In this section I focus on the care of the self as an act of governing the relation between self and others. I explore how attempts are made to instruct and direct the teachers as to how they should govern the relationship they have with others and how the teachers resist this and try instead to establish relations based on a governing of their own choosing.

In *Chapter Eight: Governmentality* and the following chapter, I turn to dealing with the law and matters of equality under the law. I begin with a brief exposition of equality law on disability noting that at bottom the law warrants the use of 'reasonable adjustments' as the means by which equality will be achieved. I then move onto investigating the 'truth' of disability. I conclude that statements such as a sign displaying the words 'disabled toilets' cannot be a simple truth but is better understood as an intersubjective truth, that is these

statements are true for some people but not for others. I argue that the law then makes a category mistake in claiming that ‘having a disability’ is a truth that everyone would recognise as truth; i.e. a transubjective truth. I argue that disability must be understood as a singularity rather than as a constant, singularities that are made into the object disability through the processes of categorising in terms of, and relative to, the norm.

I note the degree to which formal equality forms the bedrock of the state’s understanding and implementation of equality law. I critique formal equality for its tendency to force everyone to conform to the cultural dominant and its repeated insistence on measuring, viewing and expressing equality in terms of, and relative to, the cultural dominant.

Having established the status of disability in relation to truth and to the law I am then in position to explore the use of disability law as a tactic of government, what Foucault termed *Governmentality*. It is also necessary to understand the rise of the *disciplinary society* as a prelude and condition for present day neo-liberal governmentality. I show from the data that not only do the teachers find the law ineffective in achieving equality because it is phrased in terms of ‘reasonableness’, but also this term is useful for, and follows from, neo-liberal governmentality principles of governance in which people should come to govern themselves in line with the disciplinary society.

Chapter Nine: Governance is based on the data gained in the interviews with three headteachers. I will remain ever grateful to the headteachers that came forward and offered themselves to be interviewed. I begin the chapter by situating the role of the headteacher as a ‘middle manager’ for the state; a state that is currently governed through neo-liberal governmentality. Using the work of others I chart the evolution of the rise of the ‘Super

Head' as a headteacher who can be trusted with being given autonomy on the understanding that such autonomy is never exercised in practice. This status is granted because these headteachers have demonstrated over a considerable length of time that they will oversee the application of stringent neo-liberal practices. I use data from my interviews as evidence to support the analysis.

I then turn to the discourses from which these headteachers spoke. I found that they overwhelmingly spoke from a discourse of formal equality. This discourse allows equality to be spoken of in abstract terms which does not actively force the speaker to question their views and actions. The data indicated that the headteachers engaged in actions which were less than what would meet the standards of equality.

In-line with neo-liberal efficiency drives, government policy and documents for schools on equality allow, and even encourage, equality for disabled people to be counted in terms of costs. It is found then that headteachers are weary and reluctant to employ teachers with disabilities. I conclude by noting that the discourses of *law as formal equality*, *disability as a medical condition* and *neo-liberalism as a practice of governance* circulate and reinforce each other.

Chapter Ten: Conclusion completes the thesis. I begin the chapter by assessing to what degree this work has been able to address the research questions posed at the beginning of the thesis. I then move onto making some suggestions arising from this. I make a definite attempt to focus on concrete actions that we can all do, indeed cannot be done by individuals, to further the cause of equality for teachers with disabilities.

Chapter Two: Meeting the Literature

Introduction

In this chapter I review some of the existing literature in the research area of teachers with disabilities. I review a total of nineteen articles. These articles were first selected for reading because they offered ideas and content that was relevant to my work. Other articles besides these nineteen were read. For this review I have selected the ones where I thought the authors had attempted to critically engaged with research into teachers with disabilities. I also include other articles from which I highlight and discuss points I believe are salient. Included in this number is the one Doctoral thesis I was able to locate that was relevant to my study. The discussion and the material covered in this chapter paves the way for *Chapter Four: Methodology* in the sense that this chapter offers rationale and discussion on what I envisage good conduct of disability research following Disability Studies may entail.

There is not a lot of extant literature on the subject of teachers with disabilities, a fact berated and mentioned often in the literature. A book entitled *Enhancing Diversity: Educators with Disabilities* (Anderson et. el, 2002), was the only complete book on the topic to be found. At the time of my writing this chapter, it has been eighteen years since that book was published, so whilst I do draw from the book, I restrict myself to reviewing and including the contents of approximately a quarter of the contents of that book. The reason for this may become apparent in reading this chapter.

This review considers the range of approaches and ontology that were found in the literature and critique is offered along the way, probably a little more critique than just a simple review would conduct. In line with Disability Studies, ethical assessment is considered as important

as content so *the social model of disability* forms the framework by which much of the review is centred. Disability Studies is the study of the positioning of disability socially, culturally and politically and for now I will term this view of disability ‘the social model of disability’, but this term has a more definite meaning which will be visited in the next chapter. In this chapter I question much of the rationale of the research discussed and the resulting ethical issues that arise there from. I do not consider myself beyond being capable of making ethically poor decisions and that is not a reason to avoid centring ethics. In time someone may come along and say “*Mark Lyn was ethically wrong for.....*” and that is perfectly ok.

The analysis I offer here regarding content and epistemology points the way towards approaches I myself take in this thesis. So, for example, in this chapter I offer analysis of research that takes a narrative and the-giving-of-voice approach. I critique this approach not necessarily because it poses too strong a subject but that it serves to fix the subject. I can also see from the research data shared by these authors that often such an approach does not engage with the discourses in a critical manner. This then forms a useful occasion for me to point this out and explain why I will not be following such a style of research myself. That is not to say that I take nothing from such research.

The view that one takes on disability will direct the manner in which research on disability is undertaken and the direction towards which the research will move as it progresses. In fact it could be argued that disability research is always a contestation over what disability is, more than what people with disability may be doing or engaged in. As someone who is approaching disability very much from a critical theory perspective, I am as focused on the view that is taken on disability in the research as much as the actual research done. I view

disability research as a contestation over what disability is rather than what disabled people can or cannot do.

The social model of disability is the prevalent basis on which research on disability is now widely accepted and operationalised. As such it can be easily argued that discussions around any piece of research should include a critique of the research relative to the social model; that is how the research describes disability, how it actions disability, how it positions disability and so on. And this should be done before going on to assess and critique other aspects of the research. A piece of research that made little or no attempt to engage with disability on a cultural or social level, that was mindless of tendencies to normalise, to essentialise, to cast as deficit, any piece of research that was not conscious of these tendencies and made no attempt to counter them would hold little academic or ethical value for me and as such there would be little point in my seeking in them ideas, ways forward and inspiration.

I have structured this review in the following way. First, I highlight the ways by which disability is cast as a deficit in research. I then move on to approaches premised on a decision not to cast or understand disability as a deficit in the research. Finally, I highlight those examples of work that I consider make good on addressing people with disability as people deserving of respect and dignity and from whom I have learnt the most. By reviewing research in this way, I understand that I am setting aside somewhat the view of the researcher who is objective and neutral in their work in favour of one that posits a researcher with a prior understanding of disability that influences the research.

A Deficit Understanding

The most obvious manner in which disability can be cast as a deficit is to use language which directly describes it as a deficit. This still does occur, but thankfully is rarely done. So for instance Karp & Keller (2002) in their research of twenty five educators and their experiences of teaching, describe one of their research participants as ‘coming from a dysfunctional family’ and referring to another teacher as using the pupils as his ‘legs’. Karp & Keller’s work warrant this criticism, and perhaps they make their mistakes, because they make no attempt to situate disability in anything other than an individualized context and the result is an article which presents disability as an individual tragedy over which some succeed whilst others succumb.

Gerber (2002) actually states that social and cultural aspects will not be considered in his study of a teacher in his first two years post qualification. The resultant research is an individualised account of disability in which the research subject is repeatedly cast in a subordinate role because the discourses that constrain him are not explained as anything other than facts of the world. An individualised account of the world is posited. So, for instance, secrets to this teachers ‘success’ are listed as overcoming by hard work, resilience and flexibility. There is nothing wrong with these qualities as such but by quoting them as reasons why a person with disabilities has been ‘successful’ implies that those people who are not ‘successful’ only have themselves to blame and that social and cultural oppressive structures have nothing to do with the material circumstances some people with disabilities find themselves in. Gerber (2002) would need to critique why a person with disabilities has to ‘work hard’ and be ‘resilient’ rather than just presenting them as facts or findings.

There are many ways in which the discourse, or even the ethics, of disability as a deficit sits comfortably in research. For instance Rhodes & Brown (2002) point out that non-disabled university students gain a more positive attitude about people with disabilities when they are given a course on the history of the treatment of people with disabilities. Such an approach would be problematic in casting disability as an a priori deficit if the course did not explore and explain why people with disabilities have been treated this way. There are many, many instances reported in the literature that I think need to be problematized as research. For example, reporting acts of politeness and respect such as moving a desk as a ‘reasonable adjustment’ or posing questions of the form ‘can disabled people teach?’, the latter occurs repeatedly in the literature.

The last manner in which people are cast as a deficit that I want to point out is the self-demeaning statement that goes unchallenged or un-theorised by the writer. So for example Brock (2007) in her study of teachers whose purpose is to offer insight for school leaders, begins her paper with a brief explanation stating that disability is a social construct and that laws and policies now acknowledge that disability arises because of discriminatory practices rather than within-self factors. The work consists primarily of a collection of quotes from teachers organised under different headings and concludes with a list of recommendations that school leaders could put into place. Along the way teachers give vivid accounts of instances of discrimination and sometimes make self-degrading remarks. Brock (2007) allows these self-degrading remarks to go un-commented or un-theorised as if they were just facts of the world. The result is that disability is reified as a deficit condition, even despite Brock’s introductory remarks about the social construction of disability.

Ginver & Ferrell (2002), in their study of two student teachers who attempt to qualify as special educational needs teachers, do similar to Brock (2007) in that they allow self-demeaning statements to pass un-commented on and un-theorised. These authors could be criticised even further in that they subsequently go and find corroborating evidence to back up these self-demeaning statements from professors that teach these student teachers. The article is full of rich data and detailed instances of at times quite upsetting instances of discrimination, data that I have used as secondary data elsewhere in this thesis. But the underlying narrative is one of subordinate and deficit people who, unlike other people in the world, rely on others to help and support them.

Narrative is a very powerful means by which we are socialized. But without some following-through on a stated understanding of the constructed nature of disability, all we are left with too often is a narrative that tells a deficit account of disability and that acts to further socialise ourselves into this understanding of disability. When no attempt is made to counter the deficit view of disability then it becomes more difficult for me to understand and accept what a researcher has ‘found out’ whilst doing their research.

A non-Deficit Understanding

Disability as Discourse

The first category of research I want to cover here are those very few studies which attempt to look at disability from a discursive approach. Ferri et. al. (2005) represent one of two such comprehensive attempts I present here. This work is built on a data set of four teachers who were each interviewed three times. Each successive interview was based on emerging themes from the previous interview. The results are presented as detailed portraits of each of the interviewees with a ‘discussion and implications’ section to round out the paper at the end.

In the introduction to this paper the authors establish that disability is a socially constructed artefact. The paper's focus is on 'Learning Difficulties' and the four teachers have been recruited because they self-identify as having such. The paper begins with a description of the way in which the medical paradigm of disability has created discourses which are designed to maintain dominant paradigms of thought. The authors note that 'Learning Difficulties' must be understood in the present socio-cultural context where at this particular time in (Western) human history, verbal-linguistic and logical-mathematical abilities dominate and that this is only one of many possible definitions of intelligence or ability.

But this early conviction of the social construction of disability is not brought with full force into the analysis of the interview data because the authors choose to research how these teachers construct their own understanding of learning disability rather than researching how learning disability becomes constructed through practices of power and knowledge. It is as if the teachers themselves are deemed to be free to choose their own social construction of learning disability so disability becomes an individualised construction.

The analysis focuses on how the teachers use and navigate different discourses and different subject positions to effect different outcomes, identities, reverse the binaries and achieve a whole host of other results. This is one common manner in which discourse analysis is used but the problem here is that it does not allow the authors to actually get to grips with the discourse on disability and to engage the discourse. Discourses are presented as something similar to rides that can be taken to destinations of one's choosing. Discourses understood in this manner does not explain how these discourses then come to constrain individuals.

The authors conclude that their research indicates that people deemed to have ‘Learning Difficulties’ must be understood as singularities and that we can learn much from them as they are a source of great expertise. What the authors claim can be learnt is the complexity of living and being. There is circularity in the rationale for the research and its outcome. At the outset, disability is posited as a discursive construct and the research then shows that nothing can be learnt from disability other than complexity and singularity, and that is because disability is a discursive concept that holds no real coherence.

This claim that disability has a lot to teach but then failing to find exactly what it does teach occurs several times in the literature and is often mirrored or runs alongside the paired concepts disability-as-construction / disability-as-real in the same piece of work. One such work is that by Vogel & Sharoni (2011). The purpose of this study was to investigate how the twelve teachers involved in the study perceived their disability, its impact on them as children, as students of higher education and now as teachers. The authors claim that disability is a universally understood and experienced phenomenon around the world, yet they conclude that each teacher had a unique story to tell and this is a reflection of the complexity of human experiences. This failure to find any coherence in disability still occurred despite the authors excluding one teacher from the study because the teacher did not have the right ‘type of disability’.

Another paper that makes claims about what disability can teach is Anderson (2006). This paper is itself a literature review rather than research in the field. Here the author posits that disabled teachers ‘embody pedagogies of justice, interdependence, and respect for difference’ (p368). Anderson writes of classrooms as ‘ethical spaces’, of teachers as ‘valuable sources of lived experience’, of the ‘complexity of embodied identity’ of ‘bodies of possibility’ and of

‘wisdom imparted’, but it is never clear from the paper exactly what wisdom can be imparted, what learning can be gained and the specifics of this learning. Anderson presents the social of disability as a complexity, a complexity that arises for the author because having posited disability as being able to teach something which is a constant he comes up against the fact that it is a singularity in the outcome. It would have been good for Anderson to have described in detail one instance in which these ‘ethical spaces’ were used to teach something specific against the dominant discourse. A focused discussion and critique could then be engaged asking questions about the dominant discourses such as; which other discourses are invoked, how do they circulate, how do they interact with other discourses, how are they being used and how can they be resisted?

The second paper that deals with disability as discourse is that by Valle et. al (2004). The purpose of this research was to investigate the perceived risks and benefits of ‘coming out’ as a teacher with disabilities. The structure of this paper begins with declaring that disability is a socially constructed concept and talks about Foucault’s work on the abnormal and the normal. It then proceeds to investigate how teachers navigate the discourses around disability and of the normal and the abnormal before returning to conclude that those who educate student teachers should frame disability as human difference or variance rather than as deficit. The work involved research with four special educational needs teachers who self-identified as ‘learning disabled’.

The authors offer a descriptive account of the data on the whole with some critical analysis but not so much as to break up the flow of the teachers’ narratives of their lives. For example, the authors describe how one participant’s exposure to disability socio-cultural theory allowed him to understand how those who are ‘learning disabled’ are just like other

marginalised groups and how for this teacher disclosing disability is now a powerful act of resistance. They also mention the benefit the participants feel when they accept the socially accepted label 'learning disabled' because they are not then just 'stupid'. The subjects talk about their experiences as children of special education of being 'repeatedly tested' and one subject recounts being 'beaten-up' in the playground for being unable to do multiplication tables.

Despite claiming that disability is a social construct and a discursive object, the authors use Foucault at the beginning of the paper in such a manner that the subject position 'disabled' becomes rarefied and is then described as something 'misunderstood' and appears as a reason for oppression and this creates a sense of disability as identity that runs throughout the paper. This is furthered by a linking of Bakhtin's theory of the self as text and a focus on life-story as narrative. So, for instance, when one participant mentions that she discloses her 'learning disability' to inspire her 'learning disabled' pupils, this does not bring critique by the authors of the fixed subject assumed, the reifying of disability or of the identity invoked. The sense of subject is further reinforced by the way the data is presented as detailed portraits of each participant. In this manner things appear to happen to these teachers because they are disabled rather than a result of discourses of which a deeper analysis could be obtained. Thus, when a pupil describes being 'beaten-up' in the playground over their inability to do times tables, the discourses about normalising pedagogy and schools as disciplinary institutions which could be engaged are not.

The topic of special educational needs and experiences of being a teacher with disabilities is mentioned many times in the literature. The connection is often the link between being a teacher with disabilities and being a teacher of special educational needs. The study by Valle

et. al. (2004) mentions the teachers' experiences of special educational needs as pupils themselves but does not dwell on it or offer much in the way of analysis. This area does seem to be a sparsely researched area and so in need of much research work. Much of what is in the literature focuses on what knowledge and expertise disabled teachers can bring to the further development of special educational needs or how the teachers used their experiences or positionality of being disabled to aid their special educational needs pupils.

In the introduction to the book *Enhancing Diversity: Educators with Disabilities* the editors (Clayton, Anderson & Karp, 2002) tackle head on the relation between special educational needs and teachers with disabilities. They quickly come to the point and note that special educational needs professionals felt threatened and were reluctant to share power with teachers with disabilities. The authors also noted the paternalistic view that many of these professionals had of pupils with disabilities. At this point in the article I felt the authors were beginning to get to grips with the discourses. It is also one of the few times in the literature I felt that the study of power was being given prominence and focus. Unfortunately the article soon gives way to a narrative of 'complexity' fore-grounded by language of deficit and subordinate relational positioning.

Another move towards the analysis of power can be seen in the study mentioned above by Ferri et. al (2005). In this instance one of the teachers expressed a desire to subvert the special educational needs 'system' but was aware of his relatively very low position of power in attempting this. The authors follow this in their conclusion to ask whether given special education's basis in oppressive medical foundations if special education should be allowed to continue. But as noted and critiqued above, the authors at the same time are also adamant that teachers with 'learning disabilities' offer much 'expertise'.

This narrative of ‘learning from disability’ that I mentioned earlier is present in much of the literature and can be seen in the next study reviewed, this time in the form of the question, “What can special education learn from disability?” Ferri et. al. (2001) conducted a study of three teachers with a view to studying their experiences of special educational needs as pupils and how this would impact on their present positions as special educational needs teachers. None of the teachers were able to provide any specifics about what their experiences of being pupils of special educational needs informed on how they themselves taught their disabled pupils. Offerings were at the level of motivating the pupils, keeping high expectations, an ethic of care and a desire to ensure that their pupils did not have to go through the rituals of silence and shame that they endured as pupils.

Gerber’s (2002) work, as mentioned above, followed the first two years of the career of a special educational needs teacher. The participant was clear that he had inside knowledge of what he, as a teacher with disabilities, could bring to special educational needs. What this consisted of was a determination on the teacher’s part that the pupils ‘make it’, but other than that there were no real specific pedagogical insights that were offered by him. This overall notion, so prevalent in the literature, that something can be learnt from disability nearly always seems to merely, and rightly, equate to a desire to curtail the effects of schools as a disciplinary institution. One of the very few instances I found in which a specific claim that disability can teach something new, is given by Parker and Draves (2018). I cover this paper below in the section *Examples to Follow*. And this claim to having something to teach is not applicable just to, or directed solely towards pupils with disabilities, but to all pupils.

Disability as Identity

The second approach that is taken to avoiding or resisting viewing disability as a deficit is to view it as an identity, often in the form of a group of people that are oppressed. Under this heading of 'identity' I would place a range of strategies including reversing the binary, a politics of identity, the giving of voice and standpoint, amongst others than can be found in the literature. Work that relies on a sense of identity posits a fixed and stable subject. In this section I will summarise research that approach disability research from one of these perspectives.

The first work I focus on is that by Riddick (2003). This was a study of thirteen teachers and trainee teachers using semi-structured interviews where the purpose of the study was to investigate the degree to which teachers who had been diagnosed with dyslexia used coping strategies in the classroom. Further aims of the research were to gather their experiences of teaching and investigate the degree to which their experiences as pupils influenced the manner in which they taught pupils with 'literacy difficulties'. The results were presented in the form of excerpts from the interviews under specific headings. The results indicated that the teachers felt that the need for high literacy standards did not automatically exclude a teacher with dyslexia from becoming a teacher so long as they had the right coping strategies. The teachers on a whole, and overwhelmingly so, indicated that as pupils themselves school had been a very negative experience. This type of 'voiced' approach often reports rich data.

One of the main findings of this work was that the teachers researched thought that being dyslexic was an advantage to them rather than a disadvantage when it came to teaching pupils with 'literacy difficulties'. As before, no specific pedagogical insights or tools were mentioned that might be a source of this advantage except that being dyslexic gave them

greater empathy and understanding of children who were 'struggling'. The words 'empathy and understanding' were repeated by several teachers and this highlights one of the problematics with the 'giving of voice research' and that is that it appears too easily that the same voice gets repeated over and over again. This is so because Riddick offers only minimal input in the way of critical engagement with these narratives and the work moves towards its conclusion that disability has advantages. The reversal of the binary becomes the theoretical approach to the social in disability. In the conclusion Riddick briefly sets the work in an anti-discrimination perspective and speaks of the need for greater equality. If being disabled has 'advantages' expressed in these terms then a possible question arises as to the point and focus of any move towards equality and what type of equality is then envisaged?

I now turn to a study focused on identity and its intersection with segregation. Solis (2006) frames his article at the beginning by exploring his own reasons for segregating himself from an ableist world before going on to discuss his research work with his special educational needs pupils around the issue of being segregated in schools. Solis seems to find a mirroring of his insights of the 'complexity' of segregation reflected in the insights of the pupils he investigates. In the introduction Solis positions disability and impairment as both being social constructs but that they also have real, personal corporeal and biological implications and will later in the conclusion to the article claim that disability offers empowerment through identity. He goes on to say that the disability community having thrown off the medicalised paradigm must now define themselves through new perspectives.

At the heart of Solis's work is the theme of giving space to marginalised voices. He begins his study with his twelve pupils by consciousness raising exercises such as discussing depictions of disability in ten picture books. The purpose of his work is to advance the

political awareness of his students over their classification and segregation. Solis concludes that the emotional aspect of their work demonstrated a profound level of self discovery and self-empowerment. But I have to question the ethics of the work. Solis already knew that segregation was wrong, he didn't really have to go and 'find out' from the pupils their views about it and they may well not have viewed it in terms of identity but in terms of their experiences of the school as a disciplinary institution. The data quoted indicate very strong negative emotions being evoked in the children's writing and there is a sense that Solis is taking advantage of the student's voices to further his own research. He seems to justify this by claiming that their writings gave him the courage to write the article. And further, it wasn't a case of Solis giving his pupils voice, they already had a voice and may have been well aware of their situation. This giving of voice, this telling of narrative, over and over again, goes towards the maintaining of a position based on identity.

A paper which is very strong on standpoint is that presented by Pritchard (2010). Pritchard argues for the need to recruit more disabled people to the teaching profession. She approaches this from a perspective that could be described as 'radical politics'. She notes, for example, that segregation is always associated with the devaluing of others. She is critical of the process of 'giving voice' as works based on this approach are just easily incorporated into the mainstream and she instead advocates for collective action to check systematic discrimination and oppression by an increase in visible presence. Pritchard centres the importance of the visible presence of the teacher from a minority as a 'sources of resistance, solace and resolution for the students that they teach' (p44). But she oversteps the mark in claiming that, because she is a woman and is also disabled, this allows her special privilege and insight on issues of social justice 'with all staff'. This claiming of a special place of

privilege for those who are disabled is one that I have noted as being prevalent in much of the literature in Disability Studies.

The final paper included in this section follows on from the last in that it takes identity a degree further. This paper concerns the intersection of disability and race. Dooley (2003) argues that there is a disparity between the number of pupils from ethnic minority backgrounds in special education and the number of ethnically diverse teachers there to teach them and so her paper is a call for special needs university departments to recruit more trainee teachers from ethnic minorities. The need to bring critical analysis rather than identity based reasoning to this problem I think would have been obvious. Dooley (2003) does, however, make the point that teachers from ethnic minorities are far less likely to view pupils from an ethnic minority as being disabled. This seems akin to a solutions-focus approach and therefore though it does seem to solve the problem addressed, it views progress as a process that is though accepting a fixed view of the world. Dooley writes much about the issue of the need for role models but in the manner in which Dooley proposes solutions, the view of the more perfect role model of ethnic minority teachers with disabilities eludes her.

Papers that I have grouped under this sections *Disability as Identity* tend not to theorise disability but focus much more on practical steps that can be taken to improve the life chances of people with disabilities. Corylell et al (2002) writes that the advantages of this approach include the fact that strong clear measures that can be taken to help in practical matters, such as the process by which teachers who are hearing impaired congregate together in certain schools. Another measure that can be taken according these authors is the location of teacher training in urban areas near hearing-impaired communities. However the use of identity can lead to a strong fixing of positions and the world. So for example in Corylell et al

(2002) work one teacher in this study is quoted as saying that ‘they prefer to teach their own’.

Another Doctoral Thesis

A search of the British Library’s data base revealed one previous Doctoral thesis on the subject of teachers with disabilities. This was a work by Bar-Tikva (2008) whose work involved researching three teachers. In this work a narrative and life-story approach is taken in which the focus of the research is to investigate the degree and the many ways in which the ‘professional self’ develops in light of the teachers’ life stories. This interplay of professional knowledge and life story is theorised as developing an identity for each teacher. Bar-Tikva makes no reference to the social model of disability but looks for coherence and meaning in the structure of the narratives that are given by the teachers.

Examples to Follow

In this section I want to cover those papers that I consider to be examples to follow for myself. None of these examples take a discursive approach to disability or discuss disability as an identity but they are clear in what they posit and there is no mention of the ‘complexity’ of the issues that seems to arise when disability is described as a social discursive construct but then investigated as a non-discursive object.

The first work that I want to highlight does not focus directly on teachers’ experiences but is an instance of research which demonstrates how a discourse of deficit becomes transformed into a discourse of disability which then allow a solidifying and operationalisation of a people-as-deficit platform from which power can be wielded. Rousmaniere (2013) in her historical investigation into teaching through the lens of disability notes a few things. The

first was that whilst the teaching profession consisted of a revolving door of young women, wages were kept low and this situation suited the employers. The second thing she noticed was a strong tendency to normalisation in the recruiting practices and the literature of what a good teacher should be. The third point was that the accountability agenda in schools causes an increase on the mental and physical stress on teachers. The fourth point was that there had always been an underlying narrative as teachers as being inadequate, as always deficient in some way.

Chmielewski (2019), following on from Rousmaniere (2013), identifies a time in the history of the New York City Board of Education in which the collapse of the four points noted above was achieved to the detriment of teachers. What Chmielewski (2019) found was that the increased stress and illness caused by the accountability agenda was deemed to be a disability and as such the teacher could be forcefully retired on a disability pension which was considerably less than a teacher's pension. This work then illustrates how a discourse of deficit-teachers and discourse of disability-as-deficit were merged into one and how anyone who was already described as being deficit in some manner can come to be defined as being disabled.

Chmielewski's (2019) work illustrates a lot of other important points about the workings of discourses and how they get co-opted in the service of power. For instance the extant and perverse eugenics discourse of racial purity got taken up and extended to now cover the importance of the making sure that first mothers, and then teachers, should be of the correct pedigree to be able to foster the healthy development of the child. Also illustrated is the manner in which the doing-it-for-the-children discourse was used as a cover for these extensions and abuses of power. Teachers were required to undergo medical examinations

and pressure placed on headteachers to report any teachers who were ‘physically or mentally unfit’ to teach or those teachers with ‘physical defects’. Any concerted opposition to this onslaught would result in further discursive moves. So for example a media campaign would be started to panic parents into believing that ‘some diseases are more harmful to children than contagious illnesses’ (p180).

Chmielewski’s (2019) work is to be valued for two reasons. The first is that it critically engages with the discourse of disability as deficit. It illustrates how diverse discourses come together to form relations of power and it illustrates the vested interests behind these relations of power. It is a very clear illustration of how and *why* disability comes to be socially constructed. The second reason is that it forms a part of the historical backdrop against which the employment of teachers with disability should be understood.

The second example I argue is worth following is one that challenges established classroom pedagogy in a specific and meaningful way. Cassidy & Draves (2018) write of the experiences of music teachers who are visually impaired. One of the things which struck me as I read it was how well written it was and I think one of the reasons for this is that it establishes itself within the camp of the social model of disability and follows consistent lines of arguments throughout the paper that position the world and events in the world relative to the social model of disability. There is no deficit language used by the author or quoted by the author that others have used, there is no fixing of positions or referring to things as being ‘complex’. The authors do undertake some essentialising such as claiming that being disabled allows a teacher to ‘foster compassion for students and families’ and there is some reversing of the binary: ‘being disabled is an asset’. However the authors are clear in their mind what it

is they want to illustrate and this essentialising is not, nor does not, form part of their main message.

The article is full of details that explain some of the socially created barriers placed in the way of teachers with disability. For instance the authors explain that many teachers are reluctant to ask for accommodations because of the countless forms that need filling, the limitations placed on some trainee teachers by their professors who suggest that it would be better for them to go and work in special education as they are likely to end up as special needs teachers anyway, the practicalities of having a music-score available in Braille readily, and the silencing of teachers by having conversations about them without them being present; 'how will she know if a pupil has left the classroom' (p45) being one example given.

Cassidy & Draves (2018) main argument, however, is directed to the way the music-score takes precedence in the learning and teaching of music in Western society. The authors not only challenge this as being a potential problem for people with disabilities but for all those learning or wanting to learn music. Teachers who are visually impaired rely heavily on aural skills in their teaching and the authors posit this as a model for a better way of learning music. They posit the learning of aural skills in music education should be prior and are perhaps more important than learning to play from notation. It could be assumed that such a focus on aural skills would disadvantage those who are hearing impaired but it is for those who are hearing impaired to make that judgement. The authors argue that a better musical pedagogy could be arrived at if it were understood that there is more than one way to effective teaching, that the narrative of the teacher who 'does it alone' is just a myth and that in actuality schools and teaching involves much more interdependence than is acknowledged, championed and celebrated.

These two papers are examples to follow because of the clear and concerted way they engage with the discourses around disability. Both papers illustrate how discourses that were external to disability come to affect those who are deemed to be disabled. The papers are also focused on what it is they want to say, dwelling on the details and bringing out things in their specificity and locality. Neither paper is concerned with what disability is or isn't but only on how the discourses come to constrain some people whilst giving others the freedom to act.

Conclusion

This chapter forms an important part of my thesis because in it I begin to introduce arguments and positions that will be developed throughout the thesis. Doing this against existing literature and concrete examples of other research allows for different approaches as well as my own approach to be contrasted and evaluated. I am heavily in debt to all the authors mentioned here. All of the literature reviewed here has been of benefit to myself and I have taken many ideas and used them throughout this thesis as well as many of the quotes and suggestions encountered here. The lines of critique stated here are developed throughout the thesis and this review of the literature serves to enrich, deepen and give the thesis focus and clarity.

A review of the literature on teachers with disabilities cannot be just a rehearsal of who found out what and when they found it out. The manner in which things were 'found out', which objects were held to be constant, what was assumed at the outset of the research and the way that the discourse on disability was engaged is more important than a consideration of who found what out when. It is important because it is more important to try and engage the dominant discourses of disability that exist in society, discourses that define people as a

deficit, discourses that define people at the margins and hold them there (Williams, 2005).

Without this focus it is easy to fall back, time and time again, to a default understanding of disability or a ‘medical model’ of disability. Assessment of disability research should assess how these dominant discourses are engaged and the extent to which they do, or they do not, get reproduced unproblematically in the research.

In the next chapter *Disability & Discourse*, the social model of disability is outlined and is folded within that chapters ongoing focus which is to develop an understanding of disability as a discursive object and a discursive practice.

Chapter Three: Disability & Discourse

Introduction

In the last chapter, *Meeting the Literature*, I reviewed some of the research that has been done in the area of teachers with disabilities. I found that, relatively speaking, there has not been a great deal of work done in the English speaking Western world on the topic. Much of what has been done included interview data which was used mostly to construct research of the narrative genre. Some of the research self-reported as being discursive in nature and I critiqued the way an understanding of disability as discourse was being used in much of this research.

In this chapter I set out the position on discourse that I follow in this thesis. There is an operational difference between viewing something as a discursive object or practice and the process of doing discourse analysis. Some schools of discourse believe that discourse can be and is an activity that is: vocal, variable and immediate whilst other schools consider discourse should be considered as something which is more constitutive, fundamental and constraining. The methods of discourse analysis that will be applied and used by a researcher will follow the view of discourse held by that researcher. The process of doing discourse analysis is covered in the next chapter, *Methodology*. In this chapter I focus on the ways that disability can be understood to be a discursive object and also as a discursive practice.

I begin then with an exposition of Foucault's view on discourse. Foucault was one of the original writers who began our present-day focus on discourse analysis, though he never engaged in any of what is now termed 'discourse analysis' of the present-day genre. His studies were of a historical nature. He never for instance analysed interview data as I do in this thesis. I begin by briefly reviewing the methods by which Foucault used to establish the discursivity of objects. I then briefly review the position on discourse of two other

prominent thinkers who I describe as being of the critical theory genre of research. These are Parker and Wetherell. Wetherell's work in particular is more focused on the doing of discourse analysis. I juxtapose their position with and against Foucault's position. In this chapter the focus, however, is examining disability as a discursive object and practice. This enables a much clearer and firmer foundation on which to do the actual research work involving discourse analysis.

An understanding of *normalisation* is central to my work because I believe it is one of the main avenues through which we understand disability in the present day. Normalisation was one of the major themes in Foucault's work. In this chapter then I review how Foucault understood normalisation. Following Foucault, I argue that one of the principle classification systems used in society today is that of the normal/abnormal. Disability as a construct follows from this paradigm of normalisation.

Then finally, I turn to examining *the social model of disability* and attempt extending that out to be a discursive theory of disability. At this point I bring in other Disability Studies authors who have written on the topic of the discursivity of disability to buttress my arguments. I end with a view of disability as a discourse and as a discursive practice which follows Foucault's work on discursive practices.

Discourse

Foucault

In the *Archaeology of Knowledge* (Foucault, 1989) Foucault describes in detail his understanding of discourse and its use in his *archaeological method*. Foucault used his archaeological method for the researching of the history of knowledge. Foucault begins by setting out his position on the method of the study of history by which he has researched madness, the origins of psychology, illness and the beginnings of clinical medicine, the

sciences of life, language, and economics. These he terms 'discourses'. In this book, Foucault is suggesting that history be studied as if it contained continuous and discontinuous elements that are both structural and historical in nature.

Foucault first notes the practice of forcing upon a discourse a unity that it does not possess. These unifying practices include the segmenting of knowledge into subjects, the enclosure of words into books and more importantly the notion that there is a secret origin to the discourse. This secret origin Foucault says prevents the irruption into the light of day of what he describes as 'a real event'. On this 'real event' he writes: 'Discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and when it occurs' (p28). In *Chapter Eight: Governmentality* I develop an understanding of the relation between discourse that presents disability as a constant and disability as an *event* - a singularity; a singularity that is compressed into the object 'disability' by discourse.

The foundation of Foucault's analysis of discourse is what he calls *the statement*. A statement cannot be defined in simple linguistic terms. A statement relies on the context it is used and its relation to other objects around it. Fadyl et.al (2012) gives the example of the phrase 'I am disabled'. The meaning of this statement is meaningless without a context in which it is given. The meaning of this phrase would be different when applying for a job as opposed to when trying to access services for disabled people.

Foucault next wants to decide on rules or criteria by which to group these statements. The most obvious criteria would be to group them according to the objects that they refer to; statements which refer to the same object can be said to form a group. But such an understanding would assume a linearity of history, it would assume that the objects we refer to today are exactly the same objects that were referred to in the past. So Foucault inverts this. He says that statements can be grouped according to how they 'disperse objects'. Such a

grouping would be found in no a priori place such as a book. Such a grouping will be called a *discursive formation* and will consist of objects and modes of statements that will obey and be conditioned by their *rules of formation*.

An example could be the discursive formation of *normality*. Discourses that belong to this formation are the discourses of disability, delinquency, homosexuality, madness and so on. What all of these discourses have in common is that they distribute objects that can consistently fall into the dichotomy normal/abnormal, that is they disperse objects in exactly the same way. In chapter six, *The Special Educational Needs Discourse*, I show how the discourse on SEN and the discourse on teachers with disabilities distribute objects in identical ways. These two discourses then can be said to belong to the same discursive formation.

Foucault points out that the conditions necessary for the appearance of an object of discourse are restrictive. It is not possible to speak of anything at anytime one chooses. This is not a negative effect of power whose purpose would be to mislead, hinder or prevent discovery of. Power is best understood in terms of its positive effects; what it achieves. The object does not lie in limbo somewhere waiting to be discovered or freed. It exists only under the positive conditions of a complex set of relations. 'These relations are established between institutions, economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems and norms, techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization (p49)'.

It was important for Foucault to highlight that the point is not to try to penetrate the discourse to see the things beneath, its referent, the things in the real world to which it might point, to make it a sign of something else. Neither should we understand discourse as a linguistic meaning-making activity. Foucault wants to remain at the level of discourse itself, its tangled plurality, of incomplete formed and deformed objects superimposed on each other. The task is as he puts it:

A task of no longer treating discourses as a group of signs but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course, discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this *more* that renders them irreducible to the language and to speech. It is this 'more' that we must reveal and describe

(Foucault, 1989, P54)

Foucault adds to this understanding of discourse in *The Order of the Discourse* (Foucault, 1981). Foucault begins by emphasising that in every society serious attempts are made to control the 'formidable materiality' and 'chance events' of a discourse. He notes that western thought has taken care to reduce to the smallest possible size the space between thought and speech so that 'discoursing' should be understood as little more than a bridging between thought and speech. But as discourse is reduced to mere speech, access rights to it must also then be limited. He notes that there are principles of internal exclusion, such as assigning an author to the discourse or limiting it to a certain discipline; principles of external exclusion such as prohibition on who can speak and the *will to truth* that are used to limit the access rights to the discourse.

The *will to truth* is established on the principle that the discourse is linked to truth and this tends to exert a pressure and a power of constraint on discourse such that they seek to ground themselves in some truth of naturalness, sincerity or science. Foucault gives the examples of how the economic discourse has come to argue itself as a form of morality and justify itself in terms of wealth production. Or the way the penal system first sought to ground itself first in justice then in sociological sciences. This *will to truth* must be understood as a *will to power*.

An essential part of Foucault's work is to illustrate how discourses through their various disguises of truth creates subjects of their own choosing over whom they then exercise a power. The discourse of economics as both a morality and a means of wealth has come to dominate the discourse of equality for people with disabilities as will be seen throughout this thesis.

Foucault remembers a time when discourse was understood as an event; discourse not only announced what was going to happen but would help to make it happen: 'dispensed justice and gave everyone his share' (p54). This was the 'truth' of the discourse. It was only later that there was a shift of focus from what the discourse did to what the discourse said.

Discourse can be originally understood as an action that was going to produce subjects of a certain type. Foucault understood subjects as only arising in discourse:

'How, under what conditions and in what forms can something like a subject appear in the order of discourse? What place can it occupy in each type of discourse, what functions can it assume, and by obeying what rules? In short it is a matter of depriving the subject (or its substitute) of the role of the originator, and of analysing the subject as a variable and complex function of discourse'.

(Foucault, 1994e, p221)

Foucault (1981) continues that there are four important aspects that must be addressed if we are to understand discourse in its proper place. These four principles are a reiteration of much of what he said in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. These four are: *A principal of reversal*: when we remove the processes of reification of the author, the discipline and the will to truth, we must not assume that underneath them there is a great unsaid. *A principle of*

Discontinuity: We must not imagine that underneath the principles of the rarefaction of discourse there is a truth remaining to be released by the granting of the power of speech. Discourse must be treated as discontinuous practices which cross, juxtapose and even oppose each other. *A principle of specificity*: We must not assume that ‘the world turns towards us a legible face’ (p66); that there is a pre-discursive reality that exposes itself to us. We must think of discourse as the violence we do to things and it is this action that gives discourse its apparent regularity. *The principle of exteriority*: to understand how discourses operate, rather than move towards the interior, its hidden nucleus, we must move towards its exteriority; the external conditions of possibility for the discourse to exist in the first place.

A difference needs to be made between the materiality of the discourse and any sense of reality that it is claimed a discourse points to or refers to. The discourse does not point to a pre-existing reality but it creates its own objects that it posits as reality. This construction of objects itself consists of material objects and practices and are an essential component of making the discourse appear true. Drayfus & Rabinow (1982) point out two examples from Foucault’s work. In *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1975) the close connection and the interplay of materiality and discourse is demonstrated both in the exploration of the Bentham’s Panopticon and the penitentiary as a means of punishment, in both instances the importance of the material in the discursive is emphasised. In *Madness and Civilisation* (Foucault, 1988), the discursive invention of the sciences of the mind are shown to have their basis in the leper houses of an earlier period which were used for segregation but also simultaneously for surveillance and observation.

It is through his work on *genealogy* that Foucault is able to demonstrate more closely how the discursive and the non discursive interact, especially so through his development of the

theories of bio-power and disciplinary power. For example in *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1975) describes how the development and deployment of disciplinary power reverses the power balance between the court and the prison so that the court becomes subordinate to the prison. The system of discipline that is perfected in the prison is one that is exported throughout society: in schools, in factories and in offices, such that the court itself becomes subordinate to the prison. But yet the prison is just an illustration of disciplinary power taken to its furthest extent. Disciplinary power is dealt with throughout this thesis but especially so in *Chapter Eight: Governmentality*.

In the *History of Sexuality vol.1* (Foucault, 1976) Foucault describes the transference of sex into a discourse. This was accomplished by an incitement to talk about sex, to talk about sexual desires, to confess, to talk through the ‘endless mill of speech’. Once sex was understood in terms of a discourse it could then appear to be implicated in wider discourses such as those of economics and politics and be shown to be the problematic disturbing them. Sex also became a preoccupation for the architects and builders of schools. Layout of classrooms, fixtures, the shape of tables, all these physical artefacts of the school were subjected to the new discourse on sex. This discourse on sex would ultimately allow a new type of power named bio-power to be deployed further into the social body. Bio-power would use this discourse on sex through a re-visiting of the Christian Confessional to create a subjected individual. Dreyfus & Rabinov, (1982) point out that this subjugated individual is the contemporary and completion of the objectified individual of disciplinary power. At several points in this thesis I refer and highlight the subjugating practice of getting people to *confess*.

In the foregoing I have tried to illustrate Foucault's position on discourse, what it is and what it is not, what it may consist of, what it does and some examples taken from his literature to begin to show and explain how it accomplishes actions. I now turn to a brief consideration of how other prominent academics in the field, who adopt an approach to discourse in line with critical theory's understanding of the social, position themselves with regard to discourse. I mainly juxtapose these positions against Foucault's.

Parker

In *Discourse Dynamics* (Parker, 1992) Parker sets out his position on discourse. Parker's position to discourse bears a lot of similarities to Foucault's position. Parker maintains that discourse constructs representations of the world that appear to be true but in fact are not. Further, objects that exist outside of discourse are given another reality when brought inside discourse. Parker raises many issues that give opportunity and context to cover Foucault in a little more detail. The context of the two authors in relation to each other is that Parker is writing after Foucault.

Parker sets the aim of this book as the laying out of his position on discourse but also as an aid to those who are now involved in the then new field of study termed *discourse analysis*. Discourse analysis arose because Foucault and others had fore-fronted discourse as a worthy area of social science. This new area of study had taken off in several and contradictory directions. Among others, Parker takes specific aim at what he terms 'high poststructuralists' and the "immanentists" that he claims have separated discourse from any connection it had with the material and have presented discourse as an object that can be understood using a type of linguistic analysis. Both Parker and Foucault then understand then that discourse can not and should not be reduced to the lingual.

Reading Parker there a sense that he has worked ‘backwards’. It is not difficult for me to read into Parker’s work that he decided on a desired position in which he would like his theories to point and has then gone about understanding discourse so as to arrive at this position. Parker differs from Foucault on a few points but all of these differences can be traced back to differing positions on the relationship between power and truth.

Parker contends that discourses produce ideologies which oppress. Foucault was against the idea of ideology as it suggested a division between truth and knowledge. If there is ideology that is a false representation of knowledge then that posits a true version of knowledge and reality to be found elsewhere. Identical to Foucault’s position on power, Parker states that ideology exerts power without there needing to be a subject. Further, Foucault often spoke of the ‘abuse of power’ so by corollary there is some ‘legitimate’ use of power that Parker would agree with and that was not ideological in purpose. So on one level there is much room for agreement between the two writers also.

To go further, Foucault expressed a close link between power and knowledge and Parker acknowledges this link but there is definitely a sense in which Parker wants to hinge knowledge to truth. Parker explicitly claims that the purpose of his critical-realist position is that there is a reality outside discourse that he is trying to understand. Parker’s repeated allusion to ideology and repressive structures is very much the domain of normative politics. Foucault’s understanding of power, truth and knowledge is much deeper, further reaching than the normative forms of a politics of emancipation that Parker wants us follow. At times Foucault posits a co-dependency or a mutual basis between the dominated and dominant. These positions make Foucault politically a difficult person to follow at times. Foucault’s

understanding of ‘freedom’ is the freedom to act and not freedom as some pre-defined destination.

Foucault was against the idea of ideology as it suggested that we are somehow repressed; what he termed the *repressive hypothesis*. This hypothesis suggests that power’s main goal and action is to repress (Foucault, 1976). Foucault disagreed with this position because of the implied relation between truth and freedom; if power repressed then truth would make us free. But ‘truth’ is one of the main guises in which power masks itself and presents itself. It then uses this status of being a true discourse as a strategy of exclusion (Foucault, 1981). Further, opposition to a ‘repressive’ view of power is often implicated in the wider deployment of the power-discourse it claims to be opposing. For example, in the *History of Sexuality vol 1* (Foucault, 1976), Foucault states that we must not suppose that by saying ‘yes’ to sex we are saying ‘no’ to power; ‘on the contrary, one tracks along the course laid out by the general deployment of sexuality’ (p157). Foucault would want us to desist from the battle over truth as he sees this as playing an essential role in maintaining the current structuring and functioning of our society. In its place should be a debate over the status of truth and the role it plays in the economic and political spheres (Foucault, 1994f). I tackle Foucault’s problematic with ‘truth’ in detail in *Chapter Eight: Governmentality*, specifically the ‘truth’ of disability.

Parker seems quite clear that social conditions are preconditions for discourse. These preconditions, which are often based on unequal structural and material conditions (capitalism, patriarchy, colonialism) and to this can be added ablism.

Foucault maintains though that if all power did was to repress then no one would serve it (Foucault, 1994f). Power then must be understood as a productive force producing

discourses, pleasures, forms of knowledge and subjects. Foucault would want us to resist and transform these oppressive structures and discourses, but not as the subjects of these selfsame discourses that name and entrap us.

Wetherell

Wetherell's position is similar to Parker in that she uses Foucault to support her theories and ideas. My analysis of her position on discourse will be to understand her as being in line with Foucault.

Wetherell is involved in the business of discourse analysis, that is she is involved in using talk-as-data to analyse discourse. In general, discourse analysis focuses on language, dialogue and talk and in its immediate approach discourse analysis takes the view that discourse is transmitted through talk, subjectivity is experienced through talk and subject positions are arrived at and negotiated in the course of a conversation. Wetherell, like Parker, maintains that contradictions in talk are an important juncture as these points indicate the existence of discourse and the contradictions contain valuable pieces of information that can reveal how the social world is being organised by discourses. Wetherell is somewhat critical of Foucault's disinterest in actual linguistic performance as this has led others to use and work with ambiguous and ill-conceived understandings of discourse. For example conceiving of discourses as being like the clash of 'tectonic plates'. In contrast to this Wetherell and Potter are interested in discursive instantiation (Wetherell & Potter, 1992).

The book *Mapping the Language of Racism* (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) in my view remains one of the most incisive pieces of work by Wetherell and the one in which she remains most in line with critical theory as opposed to a more postmodernist approach. Wetherell has

maintained a position consistent with this work so I will take that as license to represent the position to discourse taken in *Mapping the Language of Racism* as 'Wetherell's position', and of course Potter's at the time of writing.

In preparation to working with every-day talk an important adaptation made by Wetherell is to replace the term *discourse* with the term *interpretive repertoires*. Interpretive repertoires can be considered systems of signification: broadly discernible clusters of speech and figures of speech around certain metaphors. These interpretive repertoires are used for the active manufacturing of the self and the carrying out of various actions. This is broadly in line with Foucault's position that discourses construct. Discourses construct objects of which they speak and discourses construct subjects over which power can be exercised.

Interpretive repertoires are predominantly a way to understand how the content of a discourse is organised in language. Wetherell uses interpretive repertoires for instance to show how racist discourse (i.e. speakers), continually 'double backs on itself' to maintain its position. Wetherell does not subscribe to the notion that racism is a question of personal failing moral standards. She situates racism in a historical context and describes it as a form social pathology that is shaped by relations of power and conflicting vested interests. Again then she is in line with Foucault that discourses consist of material structures and that locally restricted practices and tactics of power find their base of support and their conditions elsewhere (Foucault, 1976).

For Wetherell, subjects are constituted by discourse and therefore lack a priori intentionality regarding the local re-construction of oppressive regimes. This is similar to Foucault's position. But she does allow for the use of intention in analysis. By this she hopes to achieve

a 'double movement' between representing discourse as constituting subjects and presenting discourse as doing ideological work. This is in contrast to Parker where ideology is said to be unintentional, but Wetherell's position is at the risk of positing a free subject that is outside of discourse. This tension between structure and agency runs throughout social science and one way poststructuralists thinkers seek to resolve this tension is through involvement of psychoanalytic theory (see Burr, 2003).

Wetherell like Parker, positions herself aligned with normative politics; she is against racism and her work here is as much a work against racism as it is a work on the study of discourse. In *The Knots of Power and Negotiation, Blank and Complex Subjectivities* (Wetherell, 1994) she struggles with a more abstract theoretical approach to discourse where she is critical of Parker for taking an asymmetrical approach in his work: the discourse of the dominated as truth and the discourse of the dominant as ideology. She states the words of the powerful and the powerless must be treated as equivalent, that is they both construct rather than describe. But she has to return also to politics, to ethics and to materiality through a recognition of the different 'discursive contexts' in which the words are given.

There can also be said to be a commitment in Foucault's work to fighting oppression, but this is more implicit. In the revealing of the fabrication of the delinquent and the pervert as acts of power there is an implicit commitment to fight injustice. Foucault was however mistrustful of how those who advocated normative politics reformulated problems to fit into their own agendas and how they were disinterested in the problems in the form that people actually expressed them in: questions about women, about medicine, about the environment, about delinquencies, about minorities (Foucault, 1994g).

Despite his indifference to normative politics, I, like Wetherell and Parker, believe Foucault is worth following as much as possible because he encourages a detailed study of the actual construction of the discourse: its material, its linguistic, its structural and its cultural elements. Foucault in his approach to analysis always involved the search for ever wider entrapments of power, his approach allowed for and encouraged a resisting or undoing of discourses at a much deeper level. Hoy (1986) puts up a spirited defence of Foucault against those who would attack him for his 'failure' to view power in such a manner that it would be conducive to the practices of normative politics. Hoy demonstrates for instance that the Marxian notion of freedom is just an abstract concept as it posits the possibility of a society absent of the concept of power against which freedom would be defined.

To follow Foucault in Disability Studies would counter the tendency to think in terms of 'how are disabled people being oppressed here' but to think more in line with an enquiry of the form 'how are people being defined in order that they may be oppressed'? This is somewhat removed from a normative political approach to politics that would seek to fight for justice and equality for disabled people.

Normalisation as Episteme

From the perspective of disability studies, *normalisation* has always been a growing area of interest for me. Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982) pointing out that Foucault saw normalisation as a new paradigm by which discourse could be analysed gave me extra impetus to continue in this vein. Both in *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality vol. 1* Foucault comes close to stating that normalisation represents a new *episteme*. An episteme can be thought of as the totality of all relations across society that govern and determine which discursive formations will be important in the functioning of that society (Foucault, 1989).

The use of normalisation as a socialising practice casts the web of power much deeper into the social fabric than the law is able and achieves results that the law acting on its own could not achieve. In *Discipline and Punish*, (Foucault, 1975), Foucault gives an example of the use of the norm tied to a circular pattern of knowledge and power in his exposition of the fabrication of the 'delinquent'. The use of the norm in criminology and psychology establishes the 'criminal' as existing before the crime and even outside it; as an individual who could be shown to have been 'abnormal' before the crime. Foucault highlights in many ways that it is the violation of the norm that is to be punished rather than the violation of the law. On the basis of these norms and under the authentication by the 'sciences' a new individual termed the 'delinquent' becomes fabricated, defined and specified, but notice not in terms of the law but in terms of the norm. Once this is achieved the 'delinquent' becomes established as a truth.

For Foucault, normalisation as episteme develops because sovereign power shifts from being expressed as power over death to one of being power over life. Historically, sovereign power moves from being repressive to being productive, that is power would come to operate by generating forces, making them grow and ordering them. This is expressed as a life-administering power, power to ensure life and make it grow. The abolition of the death penalty can be seen as a milestone along this path. The death penalty was abolished because a power over life should not be expressed as a power over death (Foucault, 1976).

This power over life originally consisted of two separate strands; a power to discipline and a bio-politics of population. These two strands would come together to form bio-power. This new power could not be wielded using instruments of law, as the law par excellence is death.

A different type of power would be needed to take charge of life and such a power would be best expressed through continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms. The law, or the rule of law, does not disappear but acts more and more through the norm and exercises power by distributing subjects around the norm; qualifying, measuring, appraising and rank-ordering. To accomplish these outcomes, the judicial institution and the means of administering the law becomes distributed into the medical and administrative apparatus of the state. "A normalising society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centred on life". (Foucault, 1976, 144). Another milestone in this process is that people now come to view resistance to power also in terms of life; demands for the basic needs of life, a search for an essence of life and the right to reach one's potential and so on.

The momentum of this analysis could lead one to conclude that the insistence on being granted human rights is viewed by Foucault as just a wider deployment and entrapment of power, but he stops short of that here. But it is important to understand how appeals to equality or freedom expressed in terms of life relate to power and normalisation; how we can become entrapped in a wider deployment of power and normalisation through appeals to 'life'.

Foucault (1975) states that it is easy to see how the norm functions within a system of formal equality. It imposes a homogeneity but it also '...individualises by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities and to render the differences useful by fitting them one to another' (p184). Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982) take this point further and state that normalising judgement begins with an initial premise of equality amongst individuals which leads to an initial homogeneity from which the norm of conformity is drawn. But once the apparatus is in motion there is a finer and finer differentiation and

individuation which ranks individuals and separates them. *Chapter Nine: Governance* deals at some length with the outcomes of this process of normalisation linked to the practices of formal equality.

Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982) state that normalising technologies have an almost identical structure to that of the natural sciences. Normalising technologies define a sphere of organised human activity or behaviour, these serve to define what is normal. At the same time practices or behaviour which fall outside this definition are defined as abnormal and in need of normalisation. In this way abnormalities are created which must be treated and reformed and so normalising power is exercised and spread. Foucault states that all the reformist legislation, despite the appearance of emancipation given by the processes of continual re-writing and the revising of them, present only forms that make normalising power even more acceptable (Foucault, 1976).

The use of the norm as a way to govern society is made to appear natural and as such it is difficult to critique. There are no areas of the social in which it does not appear. It appears in madness/reason, in sexuality, in race, in disability. One of the ways in which normality can be identified is to ask 'does it indicate the presence of its other?' So for example if someone was to say that they are an 'electrician' the world does not automatically divide itself into the electricians and the non electricians. But if the same person were to say that they are employed then there is a conceptual dividing between those who are employed and those who are not employed. This effect would become much more amplified if the person was to say that they are unemployed. So employment status is a norm that is used to govern society in the form of the norm. Often though the norm is not specified, only the abnormal. So for example what it means to be able-bodied is only understandable as the 'other' of what it

means to be disabled. And as in the case with disability, often the norm has more power to govern if the abnormal is highlighted as per the example of employed/unemployed.

Disability as Discourse

The Social Model of Disability

Any work on disability in the UK should mention the *social model of disability*. The social model was amongst the first attempts made by people with disabilities in the UK to try to move the agenda away from an understanding of disability as a deficit condition and to try to situate it in a social and political context. It remains the first point of contact in the study of disability studies at all levels. Whether as a point of departure or arrival, the social model now acts as a central theme around or against which any analysis can be positioned. It has been described as a type of radical modernism that shifts attention to the political (Oliver & Barnes, 2012; Corker, 1999). The name ‘the social model’ is in opposition to a ‘medical model’ of disability which can be described as a type of functional analysis of disability in society where disability is viewed primarily as being a problem to be addressed using medical means alone.

The social model began to emerge through the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS); a group formed in the early 1970s. Prioritising Marxist or materialist analysis over another emerging initiative that prioritised cultural values and representation, they began to define themselves as an oppressed group within society. A salient point of this analysis was that oppression involved the placing of barriers in the path of disabled people by society. These barriers then impeded the greater participation of disabled people in society. These barriers centred around material aspects and included items such as flights of stairs, inadequate public and personal transport, rigid work routines in offices and factories. The

Open University at that time was working to develop a program that would address the politics of disability. Involved in this project were disabled academics Vic Finkelsein and John Swain and others. Mike Oliver would join the team later and together they quickly coined the term 'the social model of disability'. (Shakespeare, 2010; Oliver & Barnes, 2012).

The social model of disability splits disability into two concepts: impairment and disability. Impairment can be seen as a form of biological diversity over which oppression experienced as disability is produced (Gable, 2014). Under the social model the focus of analysis for action is shifted from individual impairments to an analysis of the organization of society.

The focus is placed 'on structural aspects of the social and material conditions experienced by disabled people in the family, education, income and financial support, employment, housing, transport and the built environment' (Oliver & Barnes, 2012, p). Gramsci's term 'hegemony' was used to indicate the depth of the ideology that fostered disability oppression.

The social model played, and continues to play, an important part in refocusing attention away from a medical, and by implication, a deficit view of disability. The material, the structural, the cultural, the institutional and the medical are all placed relative to each other in the model. The authors and proponents of the model have continued to develop and modify the model to offer a more flexible view of disability in the light of postmodernist critique, but the distinction between impairments and disability still remains.

But it can be argued that impairment and what is considered impairment will vary historically and with cultural developments, developments in technology, medical developments and a range of other social and material aspect, and these will vary between individuals also. The thinking of impairments as fixed 'real' objects then needs revisiting. Oliver & Barnes (2012)

themselves concede then that some impairments are social constructions and began to mention the importance of the discursive in their analysis.

Disability as Discourse

As Corker notes (Corker, 1999; Corker & Shakespeare, 2002) the modelling of impairment as a constant allows it to act as the basis of identity in a modernist politics of emancipation and identity. She notes further that by implying that impairments are constant, unitary and identical in effect, something that can be bracketed out, serves to reinforce the naturalness of the simple binary normal/impaired into which the population can be divided.

If the distinction between impairment and disability is removed in the social model then we are left just with disability and it can then emerge as a problematic that includes the material, the structural, the medical, and the cultural and there is no more recourse to the idea of fixed identities based on fixed notions of impairment. Disability can then be viewed as discursive object in society. Dudley-Marling (2014) points out that a person on their own cannot be considered disabled, thus indicating the relativity of the term 'disability' rather than it being an absolute term. Disability can be described as a description used to describe relativity between two people, and this choice of the criteria for describing a relation can be considered arbitrary.

Titchkosky (2003) reminds us that practices that surround society's 'problem people' are often more than a reaction to an existing 'problem' but are created through discursive practices by which individuals and populations are constituted as a problem. Tremain (2001) has highlighted that it is on 'impairment' that disciplinary power acts on to divide and separate out an individual as disabled. Disciplinary practices act to produce the illusion of

pre-discursive impairments. Normalising practices then lead people to believe that their identities are the cause, not the effect, of their subjection (Peers, 2015).

The discursivity of disability means that it needs to be repeatedly rediscovered and each rediscovery entails the possibility of the assembling of a slightly different object. This helps explain the recurring finding of the ‘complexity’ of disability in the research literature highlighted in the previous *Chapter Two: Meeting the Literature*. The insistence of the medical paradigm to define disability, its stability and the pre-eminence of that paradigm and authority over disability can only be maintained through repeated discursive work (MacLure, 2003); the tests, the measuring, the questionnaires, the categorizing, etc. All couched within the language of science to give it the authority of truth. What Runswick-Cole (2011) would describe as the ‘seeking out’ of disability and difference. The discursivity of disability results in the rediscovery of a slightly different object each time that go to make up the growing array of discovered ‘disabilities’, and so the *disability industry* continues and expands.

The disability discourse is a discourse of normality in which disability is not presented as a part of the spectrum of human diversity but as being outside of this, as being abnormal. The word ‘norm’ first appeared in the English language in 1840 (Davis, 2010) and as Linton (2010) has pointed out, it is a term which has become synonymous with disability, a way of avoiding talking about disability. The word ‘disability’ itself is a way of avoiding having to describing how people actually differ. When it is used in its various officially-sanctioned forms it categorising and serves to police variation (Garland-Thomson, 2010). But discourse must not be understood only in terms of the linguistic.

It is one of the central tenets of discourse theory that speech is productive; it constructs rather than merely describes. But merely describing the world differently will not affect any real changes in the world. The linguistic is just one aspect of how discourses makes a certain thing happen. Feely (2016) notes that the emphasis in poststructuralism discourse theory on the linguistic with a perceived neglect of the importance of the harsh material reality of life for many disabled people has led many critical Disability Studies scholars to turn away from poststructural discourse theory and turn towards critical realism and to effectively re-essentialise impairment.

Although Foucault is often grouped amongst the poststructuralists his understanding of discourse, especially his understanding of the materiality in the discourse, is much different to most poststructuralist's understanding of discourse. I will try then to outline some of the important components that a discourse of disability following Foucault could entail, an outline that would explain the processes of how discourse constructs disability; that is disability as a discursive practice.

A Foucauldian Discourse of Disability

Foucault was very critical of the human sciences, noting that they have had so little good to say about human multiplicity (Foucault, 1975). This is not an appeal for the human sciences to do better but more a statement that indicates that the condition of many individuals within society would not be so poor if it were not for the existence of these human sciences. As noted throughout this chapter, Foucault through his work on madness, on sexuality and on the criminal, indicated over and over again the importance of *dividing practices* in the operation of today's disciplinary society. Dividing practices are practices of power that come to divide individuals along a continuum inferior to superior. Foucault himself was critical of the notion

that the intellectual was someone who spoke for others or who would act as the saviour and guardian of others. His works on the penitentiary and the asylum stood as examples for others to follow and not as theory to be copied. However, his work on disciplinary power and bio power are of central importance for the understanding of how a discourse of disability would operate in contemporary society. I will use much of Foucault's work with the understanding being that no attempt is made for a term by term copying of concepts. It is especially important not to copy term for term from his work on the applications of power. This is so because the workings of power must be brought out in their specificity.

The following exploration of a discourse of disability in society is contingent on local investigation. Some of the components may be present locally or all of the components may be there. There will also be many components to the discourse that are there but would not immediately be revealed by only following Foucault's own work.

Feely (2016) gives a good synopsis of what a possible Foucauldian discourse of disability could look like. Feely himself dismisses the viability of the discourse model. But he does this because he includes it in the poststructuralist camp of theories of discourse that ignore the material. To answer Feely's critique then I illustrate how a Foucauldian theory of disability could include much more than just the linguistic. Feely writes that a Foucauldian discourse on disability would begin with the dividing and normalising practices involving arbitrary scientific categorization and practices of 'powerful' social science discourses such as psychiatry which produce devalued subjects. Through further processes of subjectification those individuals that have been authoritatively classified as impaired come to accept their subject positions and also make public declarations of such, as for example, 'I am a person

with an intellectual disability'. These subjects then involve themselves in a form identity politics and come together as a political group and demand emancipation as disabled people.

This is a good synopsis by Feely and it can be broken down further. Above I cited Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982) as stating that people become objectified by a disciplinary power and subjectified by bio-power. It is perhaps best not to see the process as so distinct or linear but it is good to identify the specific technologies by which objectification is accomplished and also how subjectification is accomplished. Feely's model ends in a political manoeuvre that is best considered under Foucault's work on *Governmentality*, a topic I cover in detail in *Chapter Eight: Governmentality*. Governmentality refers to the process by which subjects of disciplinary power appear to be governed as if they were subjects of law.

Objectifying practices are very much tied to disciplinary power. *In Discipline and Punish* Foucault (1975) charts the evolution of a type of power based on the disciplining of the body so that it begins to evolve into what he termed 'the body-machine-complex'. This object is originally utilized in the name of efficiency and productivity of the factory workforce but will be taken up later first by medicine and then by the prison. Through constant processes of separation, analysing and differentiating to ever smaller degrees the threshold by which it is possible to consider someone a different type of individual is lowered and people are more easily made into objects. The process of objectification results in a submissive subject over whom and about which more knowledge can now be produced.

Foucault said that there are two meanings to the word subject; "subjected to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to her own identity by a conscience or self knowledge" (Foucault, 1994h, p331). Whilst disciplinary power objectifies it also works to produce both

types of subjects. Through deeper and deeper penetration into the social fabric assisted by the judges of normality: the teacher-judge, the social-worker judge, the doctor-judge , we experience a totalising power. Eventually we internalise this process and we begin to behave as if we are being watched (Foucault ,1975).

This process of subjectification is furthered by the belief and the practice of the repressive hypothesis. As noted earlier, the repressive hypothesis maintains that we experience power only as repressive and therefore the way to freedom lies in telling or arriving at the truth. Subjugation involves a process of confessing which follows a revisiting and reworking of the concepts of the Christian Confessional, ‘We have since become a singularly confessing society’, (Foucault, 1976, p59). In education, in medicine, in family relationships, one confesses or is forced to confess. In this way the process of subjectification is completed and we confess the truth of our objectified selves that we have been led to believe.

Feely noted that the discourse found its completeness when disabled people engage in a political process as disabled people. An important part to note is that this is part of a wider deployment of power which only follows the pattern by which those who are dominant in society constitute themselves through the exclusion of, and in oppositions to others: the criminal, the mad and the pervert and so on (Foucault, 1994i). This political process is what Foucault termed governmentality. Governmentality is concerned with the use of the law as a tactic of government to achieve certain political aims. An immediate example of this is the use of equality legislation; the difference between those who are deemed normal and those deemed abnormal is now given a legal status.

But much more than this is achieved. Through equality legislation itself principles of governing society on a certain rational basis is demonstrated and reified. So for example to maintain that it would be too expensive to carry out certain acts to establish equality reifies a certain economic rationality as one of the main guiding principles by which society should be governed. And there is more. Foucault noted how the criminal was created by the selective application of the law, but always directed towards the same individuals (Foucault, 1975). Likewise with equality legislation, a selective application of equality law but always directed against the same groups in society, alienates those groups and fosters public hostility towards those groups and so neutralises that group's own appeals for equality and their rationale for equality legislation. In *Chapter Eight, Governmentality*, I detail the neo-liberal and disciplinary principles which current equality legislation follows and is therefore based on.

Foucault wrote that in order to understand a discourse you have to look wider rather than deeper (Foucault, 1981). Because of this breadth of coverage in the analysis of discourse it can make it appear that there is no way out of the encirclement; we appear to be trapped. But analysis is made broad so that a clearer path out of the encirclement can be sought.

There are several avenues that can be explored and taken in order to find a way out. The first is that the breadth and thoroughness of the analysis itself increases the combative resources of the subject. Another avenue is to identify the role of truth claims in the discourse and how they can be undone. So for example O'Brien (2003) points out, it is not the label 'normal' that is to be contested but the use of the label to achieve certain aims i.e. to define and control the subject, this is what is to be contested. Another avenue may be through law itself. Gordon (1994) points out that the use of a radical approach to law can be useful in combating the excesses of power. Gordon also notes that the rise of disciplinary power and the penitentiary

actually represented a defeat for the rule of law; recall from above that the courts become subordinate to the prison. An alliance then may be able to be formed between those who are subjected to disciplinary power and those in favour of a radical reform of law. Another avenue is the *care of the self* that refuses the subjection and attempts to turn one's existence into a work of aesthetics; 'The transformation of one's self by one's knowledge is I think, something rather close to the aesthetic experience' (Foucault, 1994a, p131). In *Chapter Seven: Subjectivity* I look at how the teachers interviewed for my work began to use their subjectivity to, amongst other things, achieve a *care of the self*.

Summary

In this chapter I have laid out the position on discourse I adhere to in this thesis. It is one that follows the work of Foucault. This understanding of discourse allows for, and depends on, an interconnectedness between discourse, power, knowledge and subjectivity. In this chapter I have laid out a discursive view of disability that follows Foucault's reading of discourse. I have stressed that this is a model only, a panoramic view of some aspects one can expect to be found in a discursive research on disability, but this model does not determine, limit or control the research process or the work. Initially it was actually the work of Wetherell and Parker that gave me important pointers and frames of reference that I could use, adapt, understand, agree and identify with to get the work underway. And so I am grateful to both these authors for their work.

The next chapter, *Methodology*, sets out the methodology that I use to conduct my research. Methodology is understood in its broadest sense that includes a consideration of the theoretical underpinnings of the whole research project. That chapter follows, links and extends this chapter in important ways. For example Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) following

Foucault, and encompassing structural, phenomenological and hermeneutic theory, point out the manner in which research itself creates individuals as objects whilst simultaneously creating them as subjects over which the researcher will decide the truth. The methodology employed then should avoid repeating this process.

Chapter Four: Methodology

Introduction

In the last chapter I developed an understanding of disability as a discursive object and also as a discursive practice. This chapter extends on that work with the primary goal of detailing how the actual discourse analysis is done, though the activity of doing research has to be set in a broader context of the theoretical underpinnings of the whole research approach. I begin the chapter then with establishing the theoretical underpinnings of my work.

Philosophical Underpinnings

Introduction

A basic understanding of much of social theory can be gained through rehearsing the debate between structure versus agency. This structure versus agency debate has been long running in social science. A simple form of the debate would follow from the consideration of the question: 'if people are free to act then why does society seem to endlessly reproduce itself with such flaws'? As someone who has produced a piece of research that follows the critical theory end of the spectrum of possible answers to such a questions I begin below my exploration of this question from a view of the subject being confined by structures. I proceed from there by noting that structuralism seems to be a point of departure, arrival or reference for many theories of social and psycho-social sciences. Foucault (2003) noted that structuralism can be seen as a marker along-the-way of what he termed the European preoccupation with formalism.

Following the claim that phenomenology gave way to structuralism (Foucault, 2003, Moran, 2002), an understanding of some of the aspects of phenomenology helped me to develop my overall methodological approach and understanding. According to Morgan (2002), an understanding of phenomenology will always be a useful tool as a critique and reminder that the subjective view of experience is necessary for a fuller understanding of the nature of knowledge; as opposed to a purely structural understanding of experience. Williams (2002) in writing on structuralism and post-structuralism, reminds us that there will always be ‘an excess’ of the subject that any structure will not be able to account for.

Some proponents of the hermeneutic schools of thought argue that structuralism oversteps its claim to validity because it fails to account or allow for historical events and neither does not allow for the free expression by the subject (Thompson, 1981). Interpretive hermeneutics has a part to play in critical theory methodology. Devenney (2002) writes that proceeding along hermeneutical lines of enquiry is the only way that interpretive social science research can effectively be deployed. Ricoeur (1981) from a synthesis, or meeting, of hermeneutics and phenomenology goes on to develop a position of critical philosophy whose task is to precisely unmask the interests which underlie the enterprise of knowledge and which serves to conceal interests under the guise of a rationalisation.

Given the foregoing, I adopt what could be described as a post-structural approach to research. I develop and explore my understanding of this type of post-structuralism below. I understand it as accepting of the centrality and importance of structure both in terms of social theory and also in the political sense, but also an understanding that structures are not fixed and do not have the base or foundations which their adherents presuppose. In fact, a central theme of post-structuralism is to identify how oppressive structures are erected but then given the guise of naturalness or neutrality.

Structuralism and Post-structuralism

One of the main the advancements that structuralism offers is that it begins, in its linguistic phase, to explain how a shared meaning becomes possible in language. Secondly, structuralism as an explanatory model of society begins to formulate and make understandable how society continually reproduces itself into seemingly an exactly repeated social order. Notwithstanding these advancements that a structuralist understandings offers, it has its critiques. Besides the critique of structuralism offered above, one of the main critics of these Levi-Strauss inspired understandings of the social order, is the absence of an explanation as to how these structures come about in the first place. Or the anomaly held by some structural Marxists of advocating a deterministic understanding of society yet relying on those within the determined structure to somehow overthrow it. (Finlayson & Valentine, 2002).

I do not aim to adopt a Levi-Straussian critique of structuralism here, but structuralism is indicative of the direction I move in, namely how systems or structures of society rely on exclusions that the advocates of such systems deny and seem oblivious to. Devenney (2002) writes that all systems of structure, of politics, rely on acts of exclusion that becomes elided in order for the structure to appear to be of a natural order and that any sense of autonomy is highly constructed and structured. Devenney uses the example of the system of rights to illustrate his points. One of the purposes of liberalism is to guarantee individual rights and liberties to all, yet at the same time a central aim of liberalism is to protect the social good. These conflicting interests give rise to what are considered 'rights' which are the outcome of the tension between the two opposing impulses within liberalism. The outcome of the tension is not symmetrical, it has no natural order or appeal to nature but is simply based on enabling the actions of some whilst limiting the actions of others. Wetherell & Potter (1992) writes

that one of the most striking things about liberalism, and for which it is to be critiqued, is its insistence of rights as a property that exists outside of society.

The law can be critiqued in a similar manner. The liberal narrative of law holds that the sovereign and the people must abide by the law, yet the sovereign has the ability to suspend the law; in fact, the maintenance of democracy often depends on it (Devenney, 2002). The power of the sovereign relies then on a structural preposition for which no natural grounding, such as Rousseau's *Social Contract*, can be found. Foucault (1975) pointed out that the formal egalitarian framework works in tandem with disciplinary mechanisms to maintain the illusion of an egalitarian framework. *Chapter: Eight Governmentality* critiques the law as a system of truth in detail.

For Devenney (2002), it is not that exclusions and violence are needed in order to arrive at our liberal democratic state that he contests. There is a sense in which Devenney posits that consensus within society can only be arrived at with some forcing, violence or exclusions. For Devenney, what is to be critiqued is the manner in which exclusions and the use of violence become elided and a narrative or claim of natural origin or truth is fore-grounded as the basis for liberal democracy. It is by this elision that people become defined at the margins and forced to stay there. Real ethics then cannot be guided by claims to some natural law but by the manner in which this use of force and exclusions are justified. And as they are no longer based on appeals to an a-priori entity that exists outside the structure, such as nature or a social contract, then they can be challenged and changed.

It is not that post-structuralism is arguing against the existence of these structures and against the ability of these structures to limit and affect the horizons for some while broadening out the horizons for others. Rather, post-structuralism critically engages with these systems to lay

bare their taken for granted assumptions, their exclusions and the exertions necessary to make the particular appear as the general. In my theorising of the social realm I retain this idea of structure, of society operating as a system of structures or series of structures; otherwise I am left with the theory of the radically free subject of liberalism that only serves to elide the presence of vested interests and powerful forces and acts to retain the status quo. The proviso being that whilst no event is understood as unconditioned, there is also no absolute conditioning origin but that there is 'an excess' of the subject beyond what the structure can account for, produce or contain.

My analysis of the interview data from the teachers or head teachers then is in-line with this understanding of the constraining nature of structures. In Chapter Two: Meeting the Literature, I critiqued the manner in which research that claimed to be of a discursive nature allowed a strong sense of the liberal, individual and radically free subject to emerge. The main way this resulted was because the research data was presented as a series of individual interviews and stories. In this way events appear to happen to individuals for individualised reasons and the structures that may constrain them are never really brought to the fore and the discourse is never really engaged. A simple narrative of disabled people being oppressed because they are disabled is the result without any detailed analysis of how or why. I do not then follow this format, neither do I give any background information about the individual teachers; again to resist any notion that individual competencies or chance-events are the main determining aspects in people's lives. Remaining close to a structural and discursive understanding was my aim when presenting the data and the analysis.

Doing Discourse Analysis

Several approaches, theories and considerations are involved in my approach to the actual doing of discourse of analysis. Gee (2005) notes that there are many different ways to do analyse discourse and encourages each person to develop their own approach.

Data as Content or Process

One of the widely accepted tenets of discourse analysis, in fact maybe the one reason to do discourse analysis, is the belief that discourse constructs; language does more than merely describe but it constructs as it goes along. An immediate way this can be evidenced is claimed to be in the contradictions that are seen in people's speech as they construct in one direction and then another (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). A Foucauldian understanding of discourse analysis would be more along the lines of using data to reveal *that* objects have been constructed. A decision then has to made in the research as to how it will be shown that discourse is being used to construct. Using the language-data as process entails observing and commenting on how language is being used to construct in the interview itself. This is the approach taken by the field of discourse analysis known as *discursive psychology*.

Alternatively the language-data can be taken as content; that is, to take the language more on face-value as a reflection of events that transpired elsewhere and that indicate how subjects and objects are constructed in discourse and how these play-out in the world outside the interview (Taylor, 2001). There is a problem with the latter stance in that the narrative given in interview cannot be corroborated whilst the former stance requires no need for corroboration and appears to be more objective and transparent. At this point I would like to pause and reflect on the purpose of my research and on the role the intellectual should take in critical research of this kind.

Role of the Intellectual

There is some discussion amongst Disability Studies scholars as to what research with and about people with disabilities should involve. Oliver & Barnes (2012) write that research about people with disabilities should produce useful knowledge for disabled people that aids in their fight against oppression. As such, the focus should be on actions in the real world that constrain people. Elsewhere Oliver (1999) writes that we produce ourselves through research, the implied question being what type of selves do we then want to produce? It is not a case of making things up. Foucault (1994f) wrote that his works were, in a sense works of ‘fiction’, but that he always tried to conduct the most exact and differential analysis to bring things out in their specificity and detail. The point of his books, he said, was so that those who read them and he himself came out transformed at the end with a different relation to the world. Foucault also consistently in his work fore-grounded the relation between power and knowledge, indicating the many ways how one produced the other.

In many places in his writing, Foucault (1994f) writes about what he thought the role of the intellectual should be. He notes that the problems in society cannot be easily solved, and certainly cannot be solved by the intellectual involved in and restricted to textual, academic and scholarly research. Rather, the role of the intellectual is to work in collaboration with non-intellectuals which will consist of listening to their problems: “What do mental patients say? What is life like in a psychiatric hospitals? What is the work of a hospital orderly like? How do they deal with what they experience?” (p285)

Foucault (1994f) writes that he tries to pose problems in their full complexity such that they ‘...silence the prophets and law givers, all those who speak for others or to others... and to restore to the people directly their right to speak’ (p288). Foucault is very careful to get a

grip on power for the sake of those enmeshed in these power relations and to show or highlight how: in their actions, their resistance, their rebellion, they can escape these power relations, transform them and ‘cease being submissive’ (ibid, p294). There is a slight sense in which Foucault can be accused of going against his own words here and of overstepping the mark in telling others what to do. For instance, ‘acting submissive’ itself can be an act of resistance that those in a position of oppression need not qualify to others (Sherry, 2010). But Foucault also seems to be saying that his work highlights how people rebel and transform the situation themselves and that this is what he is reporting on.

Data as Content or Process

Returning, then, to the question of whether to use the data as process or content the answer will be that the data be used primarily as content. Using the data as process can produce some insightful research into the nature of subjectivity, but it also tends to reduce that subjectivity to an effect or artefact of language. The structures and the discourses which constrain people are more than an effect of language, as has been discussed in *Chapter Three: Disability & Discourse*. Further, when variations in one person’s talk are taken into account across a whole interview, what I find emerging from the data is a more consistent narrative than suggested by discursive psychology, or a narrative that tends towards a direction, against which local variations can be analysed.

So, for example, in *Chapter Seven: The Special Educational Needs Discourse* I indicate how the teachers would often talk of themselves as having a disability in one part of the interview and in another part distance themselves from disability. Structures associated with being constrained because of disability are not an artefact of language and cannot be so easily undone. It is better, then, to try to associate both talk which embraces disability and talk

which distances disability as being part of the structure of the discourse of disability rather than the appearing and disappearing of a structure entirely language bound. The danger of using either schools of discursive analysis is that I claim in my interpretive hermeneutics a knowledge of the interviewee that may be described as being more than they seem to have of themselves.

More often than not however the question of content or process did not arise as the statements that give rise to the most insightful analysis involved no judgement of truth or of process. So, for example, in *Chapter Six: Discourses Which Constrain* a teacher indicates that the pupils seeing her struggle to navigate the normalised physical environment results in her authority being diminished. In this case it is not a question of whether or not her authority is actually reduced or not, the important point is to ask why does she think this to be the case. Neither do I think it is the case that she wants to construct herself as a teacher who lacks authority. As indicated in chapter six, the answer I assume is that struggles that demonstrate an undisciplined body affect the ability to project disciplinary authority onto others. Likewise in *Chapter Seven: The Special Educational Needs Discourse*. It is not a question of whether or not the teachers actually have special educational needs, the question is, ‘why do they repeatedly describe themselves as having special educational needs’?

But yet this accepting of the interview data as being content remains informed by a knowledge that data can be used as process. So, for instance, I often refer to an interviewee as ‘...constructing a story of...’. And again, as with the above, sometimes the important point is not whether the story is true or not so much that such a story is being constructed. In *Chapter Eight: Governmentality* I deal at some length with the status of statements as true or not. In general it makes no sense trying to analyse a

statement about the self as being true or not. The really important parts of my analysis do not hinge on, or rest on, whether any one statement is true or not. In one of the few quotes I repeat and refer back to throughout this thesis, I aim for my engagement with the material to be substantial as much as I aim for it to be ‘correct’ (Scheurich & MacKenzie, 2005, p862).

The Statement

As noted in *Chapter Three: Disability & Discourse*, Foucault (1989) *In The Archaeology of Knowledge*, sets out a detailed methodology as to how he has studied or come to understand discourse. Central to his understanding of discourse is the *statement*. The statement is not to be understood in linguistic terms. In chapter three, I describe how Foucault relates the statement to discourse by the fact that a collection of statements go to form a discursive formation which then becomes a discourse. For the purposes of doing discourse analysis of ongoing interview speech I choose to understand a statement as being an utterance that makes something either appear to be natural or attempts to create a unity by the use of a truth-claim. Of the statement Foucault writes:

‘One should not be surprised, then, if one fails to find structural criteria of unity for the statement; this is because it is not in itself a unit, but a function that cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities, and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in time and space’ (Foucault, 1989 p98).

So, for example, a teacher referring to themselves or adults as ‘having special educational needs’ is attempting to form a unity that makes both disability and special educational needs appear natural and the statement itself comes from a discourse of exclusion. *Chapter Seven:*

The Special Educational Needs Discourse shows that there, indeed, is a unity between the two statements: 'having a disability' and 'having a special educational need', and the unity is that both statements are from identical discourses. The concept of the statement is useful as it allows for a conceptual linking of itself to a discourse to which it contributes. That is, discourses can be identified by their statements.

There still remains a lot to do however in identifying these statements, the discourses from which they evolve and the structures which they can then be shown to disrupt and 'cut across'. Returning to the example of the teacher that aligned navigating a disabling environment and maintaining her authority as a teacher:

G: Erm, yes I think yer because the onus, I mean the issues for me, the hardest things with the wheel chair are keeping up the pace that you need to during a day at school when there's such poor access that's very difficult and also keeping that authority with the students

Int: In what sense

G: Erm, in that if I'm struggling to get through a door I don't want to see them I don't want them to see me

The teacher is here making a link between being disabled and losing authority. The statement is making the two things appear related and naturally so. The discourses of normalcy that engages us all makes it difficult to identify this statement as *a statement*. Seeing and understanding that there is nothing natural about this relation relies on an understanding of

other discourses, namely discourses of normalcy and discourses of disciplinary power. So there is a sense in which I arrive at identification of this statement via a hermeneutics.

In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* Foucault very much sets out something akin to a structural procedure for the identification of statements and discourse but I am using a hermeneutical or iterative approach to arrive at statements and their discourse. Yet I want to retain the concept of the *statement*. Foucault differentiated between statements and commentary (Foucault 1981, 1989). He said that there was potentially an endless amount of commentary that could be attached to a statement, but that the statement was singular in importance as the source for all this commentary. Foucault (1989) also indicated that not everything that could be said is said; indeed there is only a limited space for a number of statements at any one time. These statements, then, must represent the most pressing, the most important and the most central discourses. In *Chapter Eight: Governmentality* I use the concept of the statement much more directly and in much greater depth to explore Foucault's problematic with *truth*. From there I go on to develop a theory of *the truth of disability*.

Hermeneutics of Suspicion

Critical theory, or a hermeneutics of suspicion, informs my approach to research. The three masters of suspicion: Marx, Nietzsche and Freud look upon consciousness as in some sense 'false' and seek to transcend this by a critique of what Thompson (1981) describes as a 'reductive interpretation'. I am not suggesting that this 'false consciousness' can be removed to reveal a 'true consciousness' lying beneath. A post-structural understanding of 'consciousness', particularly after Foucault, posits that experience is largely constructed through discourse, and that we cannot escape discourse to dwell in some natural non-

discursive realm. But a hermeneutics of suspicion implies that everything can or should be critiqued, everything questioned. As Foucault said everything is dangerous:

My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper and pessimistic activism. (Foucault, 1994j, p256)

Critical theory has a willingness to be ‘ever digging at foundations’ (Agger, 1992, p11).

Kincheloe and Mclaran (2005) note that critical theory has a role to play in ensuring that qualitative research does not simply reproduce structures of domination. These authors go on to state that we have become so accustomed to domination rather than equality that mainstream research practices very easily become implicated in the reproduction of oppressive systems.

Phenomenology

Despite phenomenology’s belief in the radically free individual, I believe that some of phenomenology’s adherents offer much that Disability Studies can learn from.

Phenomenology seeks to avoid the separation of subject from object: the objective person researching the subjective person that much of social research is premised on.

Phenomenology sidelines theoretical theorising and replaces it with the giving of a detailed description of the phenomena under study to explain experience in its totality. The positing of entities outside experience is ruled out as meaningless (Maran, 2000). Intuition plays a large part in phenomenology. So to take an example from my experience; after my very first interview with a teacher, one of my first thoughts was how disability could be used and was

being used as a means to discipline both disabled and non-disabled teachers over the issue of workload. This was borne out in a much more concrete and detailed way through analysis as shown in *Chapter Six: The Special Educational Needs Discourse*

Foucault's works are often described as being phenomenological in nature (see Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). St. Pierre (2011) writes that Foucault's works on relations of power are only descriptions, albeit very powerful descriptions with real material import. Foucault did very much theoretical theorising, but only within the context of actual human experiences. Both phenomenology and Foucault then are only interested in human experience.

As quoted above, Williams (2002) wrote that there is an excess of the subject, something left over that a structural understanding of the world, or even of the self, cannot account for. And, as I quote a few times in this thesis, de Beaugrande (1997) writes that specialised knowledge becomes locked-up in discourses that people cannot understand; they fail to make the connections that would allow them to begin to resist the discourse and so end up feeling alienated and filled with anxiety. But this does not mean that they do not know that they are constrained. They know that they are constrained and may find their own manner in which to express this. Understanding research as involving or including a phenomenological component allows for expressions that reveal and contain knowledge only the adherents can understand and impart and that requires no external qualification by others. It therefore entails identifying and synthesising an understanding of the subject's phenomenological narrative with the structures that are theoretically posited.

I find the writings of de Beauvoir (1997) outstanding in this regard. de Beauvoir on the one hand posits quite a strong subject of womanhood from which she writes yet on the other she

is quite clear that whatever biological or even psychological differences exist between men and women these differences only have meaning against an existentialist, economic and moral backdrop. For de Beauvoir the dominance of one over another can only occur if there was a prior intention to dominate. She is striking in her simple refusal to accept women's domination by men or to enter into debate about the material, technical or even 'rational practicalities' on which the domination is justified, rationalised or explained away. Writing from a position of her experiences, she explains in detail how it feels to be dominated as a woman and in places she vividly portrays the effects of this domination on subjectivity, whilst always conveying the message that such domination is simply wrong.

To follow de Beauvoir then is to allow for the subject to speak. They may not be as eloquent and as well practiced as de Beauvoir, but in their own words, using their own understanding, they can speak.

Doing Discourse Analysis

Methodology goes beyond and includes much more than research methods. Billig (1988) writes about the need to use scholarship in place of methodology. Jackson & Mazzei (2018) advocate a methodology that thinks with theory where there is no division between theory and data. Smith and Hodkinson (2005) following Habermas, reiterate that an insistence on an unproblematic technical approach to research deflects attention away from value and purpose and makes radical critique much more difficult to mount.

Foucault, in his work, does not differentiate between method, data, theory and practice (Fischer, 2009). He does, however, give some insight into how he approached his research work:

Do we need a theory of power? Since a theory assumes a prior objectification, it cannot be asserted as a basis for analytical work. But this analytical work cannot proceed without an ongoing conceptualization. And this conceptualization implies critical thought – a constant checking.

(Foucault, 1994h, p327)

Foucault, then, is describing that the progression of his work continues along a path that involves a constant back-and-forth, checking of the conceptualisation and analytical work; a constant checking between the theory and the data as the analysis proceeds; from context to language, from language to context (Gee, 2004).

Given all of the foregoing, I approached the task of doing discourse analysis via an iterative route; from theory to data and from data to theory. Discourse analysis should not however consist of things just ‘bolted together’ (Wetherell & Potter, 1988). The qualifier must be the degree to which the approaches and techniques are used alongside a considered theorisation of the domain. For instance, as I have theorised a post-structuralism in which the subject cannot be fully contained within the structure, I can then allow, and must allow, the subject to speak from places and to say things that are phenomenological in nature, i.e. to speak in a descriptive manner and to speak from their own experiences. These utterances inform on my work and may also represent points of departure from how I have framed my work as being primarily discursive and point to other, alternative or future work that can be carried out. To imply that somehow my work represents a closure on the topic would imply that I have carried out a complete process of representation. Usher & Scott, (1996) write that such claims of representation are only ever operations of power.

Doing discourse analysis for me involved an iterative approach, where the data and theory are visited in turn, where the data informs on the theory and the theory informs on the data with a view to unearthing how discourse is being used to constrain, construct and make things appear as natural. So whilst working, a piece of data may have led to the development of theory or I may have allowed theory to structure and scaffold the understanding of the data which may also then lead to an extension on the original theory.

Method

The sample

An initial review of the literature revealed that whilst much work had been done into researching the experiences of student teachers with disability, very little had been done using the experiences of teachers already established in the profession. I decided that this was going to be one of the areas that I would focus on. The review of the literature also revealed that no work had been done involving researching with headteachers in this area.

I viewed the inclusion of data from headteachers as important for several reasons. The first is that in researching the discourse of teachers with disabilities in schools, a wider spectrum of data would be needed other than that just from the teachers. To restrict myself to collecting data from teachers only would be more in line with a narrative research approach rather than one based on the analysis of discursive formations. Whilst the teachers were not creating discourse but using those around them, discourses that enable and constrict them, the study of these discourses is best done from a wider range of participants, as they enable and constrict others differently. I hoped that a more thorough understanding of the dynamics of the discourses would be thus gained.

Secondly, all research involves a degree of objectification, so from an ethical point of view I consider the question of ‘why should the teachers be the only ones who are objectified by this research’? The teachers are not alone in the field of play. This objectification can be somewhat nullified if assumptions of neutrality, representation and even emancipator potential are interrogated and changes made in the methodology accordingly (Usher and Scott, 1996). Based on what I have written in this chapter I claim to have attended to these points as best I can. And further, following Ellsworth (1989): *Why Doesn't This Feel Empowering? Working Through the Repressive Myths of Critical Pedagogy*, I think it is best not to assume or claim that my research is emancipatory at all but to leave it to others to decide for themselves.

And finally data from headteachers should be included because although the teachers cannot avoid being caught up in discourses which constrain, they are not the authors of these discourses, though they may fold these discourses within themselves such that they come to govern themselves in line with these constraining discourses. There is room for the theorising and analysis of an immediate institutional regime of disciplinary power applied to teachers. Hook (2007) theorises what he terms ‘micro-sovereignities’. He notes that Foucault wanted to shy away from reducing the anonymity of disciplinary power to institutional relations but also that Foucault spoke of the ‘officer’ who oversaw the administration of disciplinary power. In this sense, the role of the headteacher as an ‘officer’ or mini sovereign is an important one to analyse in this discursive formation. In *Chapter Nine: Governance*, the role of the headteacher as a ‘middle manager of the state’ and as the single source of authority within schools is revealed. But of course it is to be understood that headteachers themselves

are also constrained in their actions by discourses of disciplinary power. In total nine teachers were interviewed and in addition to this three headteachers were also interviewed.

Interview as Method

The primary method of data collection I chose was that of *The Interview*. Fontana & Frey (2005) write of the ubiquitous use of the interview in society and the media so much so that it has become part of our culture; we expect and think we understand the interview, whereas the reasons to which it is now put would have seemed absurd even just one hundred years ago. Very much has been written about the interview as an epistemological tool, but following on from the comment by Fontana & Frey (2005) about the ubiquity of the interview, I personally think that the ubiquity of interview and how we have come to understand interview is part of the culture of confession that Foucault writes about; “We have since become a singular confessing society” (Foucault, 1976, p59).

In *Chapter Three: Disability and Discourse* I explain Foucault’s understanding of the process of objectification; first people are made objects and then, through processes of subjection, they come to accept their status as that object. Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982) point out that research and researchers should avoid repeating and strengthening these tendencies through the research process itself. Following then, the very many attempts that are made to refine interview as an epistemological tool can be said to serve and reinforce this objectification as it seeks to obtain the truth of a purer and purer subject.

It is not that some of the suggestions and points made about interview as an objective research tool are not valid; it is just that they do not result in the objective research claimed. This is so because, from an epistemological point of view, there is a double hermeneutic

involved in social research: interpreting the actions of someone who is themselves interpreting the world which includes what they know about the social theory that the researcher claims to be producing. Dealing with humans often involves much more complexity than suggested by such procedures and any consistency achieved in the research is often an achievement of the researcher rather than the process (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). From a methodological point of view, interviews are cultural and social events and a specific form of social interaction (Rapley, 2001) and should not be viewed as neutral invitations to talk (Merino & Tileaga, 2011). And in claiming or seeking objectivity in design, qualitative research may merely be revealing its positivist underpinnings. All this strenuous effort in the name of reflexivity may represent just a watering-down of post-structuralist critique of the status of knowledge and has the effect of trying to divorce power from knowledge and to reduce the ethics of this relationship to that of technical matters only.

An important reason why I chose interviews as the primary means of collecting data is its practicality of use. Very early on I considered the use of collective biographies (see Davies, & Gannon, 2006) because I liked the way such collective biographies are pedagogical and developmental in nature and do not rely on unidirectional methods such as interview. But to use collective biographies would have entailed gathering together a group of teachers over a few sessions. Such an endeavour may be possible for an institution or in an institutional setting, but for me working on my own, to have established such a research environment with my limited resources and limited access to teachers would have been much more difficult. So interview was chosen for its practicality. Though at the time writing this, online-working has become standard practice and so the potential to do group work is now much higher and been made more amenable.

And interviews are also very convenient for the actual gathering of the data. The discourse on teachers with disabilities is all around us, in news print, in teacher's publications, in legislation etc. In hindsight, I doubt if there are many, or any, of the conclusions and processes I have drawn on in this thesis that I could not have arrived at using this other wealth of information. Rapley (2001) came to a similar conclusion. What interviews do is to deliver the data directly to my recording devices.

I chose interviewing as the primary data collection tool because of the foregoing, and its use is also to be qualified by the foregoing. As noted above, much has been written in an effort to refine *The Interview* so that it delivers ever increasing qualities of 'objective' data; advice such as: avoid leading questions, pay attention to the use of hypothetical or speculative questions, ask indirectly for information, etc. is offered in abundant amounts (See Cohen. et. al. 2011). As noted above, such advice is valuable, but it will not lead to the objective data that is claimed by such procedures – which is not to say such instructions do not contain important information about how better to conduct interview.

One of the main points I think to be important in interview is the issue of the leading-question, though Wetherell (2004) points out that people's repertoire in interview are basically the ones they use outside interview and they do not suddenly start making repertoire up. The topic of the leading-question remains important if it is accepted that interview is a social event in which people out of conventional politeness work towards agreement and consensus in conversation. For the purposes of analysis then, when I came to analyse the data I focused on taking information off-question. That is if I deemed or reported that something important was said, it could only be so if the interviewee offered this information when the question asked by myself was about something entirely different. So for instance, any

reporting of the teachers talking of themselves as role models, used talk that was the result of an entirely different question other than me asking about role models (see below for list of questions used for these semi-structured interviews). On the occasion where I felt the interviewee and the initial question asked were in agreement and they gave what I considered to be important information, I reported this in the analysis as ‘they were prepare to construct a.....’.

The next point about interview concerns the role of the interviewer. As the claim to achieving objective research through interview is not being claimed here, there is no need to adhere to the notion of the near-absent interviewer whose function is to asks neutral questions and then remain silent and detached while the answer is given. On the contrary in fact. Wetherell & Potter (1992) recommend that the interviewer take a much more interventionist approach, pressing the interviewee, driving out contradictions or in the words of Griffin (2007, 266) the interviewer is there to ‘shake things up’ a bit. Towards the beginning of interviews I would restrict myself to asking for clarification of points but later in the interview as we both felt a bit more comfortable with each other I would often be a bit more active and purposely oppose points made, point out contradictions in answers given and maybe in stances taken or follow the lead of the point they were making beyond what they may have intended. Though such an approach moves away from objectifying the interviewee on the one hand, on the other it can be said to tend towards the confessional, of getting people to confess, so the confrontational-interventionist role also required tempering.

In terms of validity and reliability as understood in their positivist frames, such a more engaging and interventionist stance to interviewing is likely to increase validity and reliability. There is now much less probability that the question has been misunderstood, that

the answers are not ‘genuine’ or that the answers given are what the interviewee thinks are expected, or that the responses are heavily guarded. Such a more engaged approach to interview may also have the result of leaving the interviewee with a feeling that they have actually been interviewed, that it was worth their time, that their views were taken seriously and that they have made a valid contribution. I think the data I gathered following such an approach to interview was informative, layered and at times very personal.

In actuality, the vast majority of the important information and analysis such as the discourse on special educational needs and inter-teacher relations had nothing to do with the questions that were on the interview schedule. Another example of this is in *Chapter Nine:*

Governance. This chapter dwells almost exclusively with the issue of formal equality but questions about equality, formal or otherwise, were not a whole or part of any question I asked the headteachers in the interviews on which this chapter is based. Others such as the teacher’s views on the un-usability of the law to address their concerns and also discourses of teacher-pupil relations can be linked indirectly to the questions I asked, though nearly always mentioned totally off-question.

Ethics Clearance and Interview Questions

As part of receiving ethics clearance from the University’s Ethics Committee, the schedule, or series of questions to be used for interview for both teachers and headteachers had to be submitted. The questions chosen for the teachers were:

1. Talk about your current role and how long you have been in your current role.
2. How and why did you come to show interest in my work?

3. Tell me about your early teaching experiences.
4. How were you recruited to this post and did that involve any declaration of disability?
5. Was there any part of the recruitment process that you found positive or negative?
6. Ongoing: how have things been on an ongoing basis with regard to the interaction between school and your disability?
7. Role models: how do you see yourself as a role model for others?
8. What are your plans for the future in regards to your career?
9. Is there anything you would like to see change in relation to how disability is situated in schools?
10. Is there anything else you would like to mention, ask me or talk about?

All questions produced information of value to my research. As stated above, the most valuable pieces of information collected were not a reflection or in direct answer to these questions. At the time of writing the questions I envisaged that the questions were to have the purpose of raising and covering what I thought would be central issues to my work.

Questions 1 – 3 were designed as introductory questions. Questions 4 and 5 were designed to research legal aspects of disability. Question 6 was offered as a means for the opening up of the interview process so that the interviewee could talk about what they wanted to talk about. Question 7 was designed to investigate issues of diversity and difference. At the time of writing Question 7, I was interested in the manner in which the teachers would view disability as being a matter of diversity and difference such that a disabled person becomes a person who models diversity and difference for everyone. But in using the term ‘role model’ I used a term that I have later come to critique in this thesis. Though, to reiterate, the information on roles models that I have used was taken off-question and before this question was asked, which was relatively quite late in the interview. Questions 8 – 10 were designed to bring the interview to a suitable cadence, focusing on the future and again allowing the discussion to be taken over by the interviewee.

All teachers interviewed were asked all of the questions in this order. But as noted above, my role in the interview was not to be a passive recipient of knowledge, so follow-up questions would always depend on answers to the last question asked. Interviews would always be preceded by up to ten minutes of informal talk, as the key to the interview room was collected, as we moved to the interview room, etc. On a few occasions when something would be said during this time that I thought was important I would always ask the interviewee to repeat or rehearse this again in interview. Only audio recorded data was used throughout the research with teachers and headteachers. I wanted to strictly focus on the discourses that were being used.

Recruiting and Interviewing Teachers

Teachers were recruited via word of mouth, adverts placed in libraries, on information sharing internet sites used by people with disabilities and also at teacher union conferences. Teachers who identified themselves with the word ‘disabled’, that is teachers with disabilities, were asked to help me complete my research by making themselves available for interview. It was up to the teachers themselves to decide if they were disabled. If I was asked ‘What disabilities are you looking at’ or questions of that order I would simply reply that I was looking at disability in general. As noted in *Chapter Two: Meeting the Literature*, some studies ruled out certain willing-participants as having the ‘wrong type of disability’ or not being disabled in a particular way or not ‘severe’ enough. These authors have their reasons for doing so, for which I critiqued in chapter two. For the purposes of my research I considered a focus on the details of someone’s disability be only objectifying in nature.

The first ten teachers who agreed to take part in the research I thanked them for their kindness and made arrangements to interview them. Each teacher was sent a consent form that they signed and returned to me at the beginning of the interview. The interviews took place in pre-bookable interview rooms in libraries around England. The closest suitable library to where each teacher lived was chosen by agreement as the venue. The interviews were audio recorded. Of the ten teachers who volunteered their time to be interviewed, nine attended their interview. Material and contact details of various bodies were on hand to be offered anyone that became emotional disturbed due to the interview processes. This was never needed however.

Transcribing and Analysing the Interview

The recordings were transcribed verbatim by myself and I understand that the act of transcribing is itself an act of interpretation (Gee, 2005; Billig 1999). The act of transcribing, or of following transcribing notation such as those set out for conversational analysis, I soon realised can act as a normalising tool. Many people who are considered disabled have patterns of speech for which the meaning and conventions of transcribing using conversational analysis would simply mislead. And when so many things in life are normalised it becomes easier to understand why some disabled people can then be described as presenting with ‘complex needs’.

A transcription always imposes meaning on an interview. A means of limiting this process of imposing meaning is to not add any punctuation at all to the transcript, especially so as noted above, these teachers often used inflexion, pauses, repetitions and so on for reasons that are not what they are conventionally assumed to be used for. As with all research though, I cannot fail to represent, to interpret, to decide for others. So the convention I adopted for reporting interview data is to use as little punctuation as possible in the transcript. This at times will mean that no punctuation is present in what is a long extract and at other times I use punctuation to clarify meaning. As Potter and Wetherell (1987) indicated, we all feel like we talk like characters in a play but we don’t. People don’t necessarily talk in recognisable sentences and so I include a minimum of punctuation.

Where it is not clear from the recording what was being said then square brackets are used to indicate that some words are lost: [...], with the length of the brackets being an indication of how much I believed to be lost. Where I have been unsure exactly what was said then I placed the words I believe I could hear in the square brackets.

Analysing the Data

The first stage of analysis involved transcribing and, as Wetherell & Potter (1988) indicated, there is no better way to get to know your data than to transcribe it yourself. St. Pierre (2011) writes that she encourages her students not to code their data as what often happens is that rich insights are replaced with static and shallow offerings after coding. St. Pierre, instead, asked her research students to stay close to the data but not 'code'. But some coding, some simple coding, of the data is needed in order to help manage it and make locating of information easier. I had over three hundred pages of interview transcript data so some management of it was necessary. Analysis consisted, then, of reading through the transcripts and creating an expanding list of categories under which I placed quotes I thought were important. These important quotes initially created the categories, though the number of categories had to be kept to a workable number, so after a while the process was reversed and new data was placed into existing categories with perhaps a re-naming of the category to represent the wider array of data now under that heading.

For each chapter of analysis I carried out a new reading of the data with a specific focus for information on that chapter's theme. In this manner the data often revealed new insights to me each time I read it. For example, for *Chapter Seven: Subjectivity*, reading participant J's transcript *for subjectivity* highlighted the dynamic of the whole conversation in a way that I had not noticed on prior readings.

The next phase of analysis involved writing. Richardson (2003), in *Writing: A method of Enquiry*, describes how writing itself is an important part of the analysis. Foucault (1994f) said that one of the purposes why he wrote was to find things out and he had very little idea what a book was going to be about until he had written it. I also found that writing one

chapter helped with the development of another chapter as the ideas, understandings and insights would develop. So whole chapters were written then set aside while other chapters were written. Sometimes two or three chapters would be written before the first chapter would then be returned to and revised or re-written before submitting the draft to my supervision team.

Working with Documentation

Much of this thesis focuses on analysing documentation such as the 2010 Equality Act, papers published by the government or policies on equality that schools house on their websites. As this information is publically available on the internet I decided that I could use this information in the writing of this thesis under standard *fair use* terms as they are understood in law.

Chapter Eight: Governmentality in particular uses documentation and equality law and offers analysis and critique. Such documents form a very important component in the discourse of teachers with disabilities and are often referred to by actors in the discourse. Analysis of these documents tracks much along the lines of analysis of the interview transcripts. There is a back and forth between theory and the data to arrive at an analysis that highlights the presence of the different discourses within the documents which may not at first appear present or obvious.

Compiling the Thesis

All of the teacher's interviews were transcribed and the chapters based on the analysis of this data drafted before work began in earnest on recruiting and interviewing headteachers. It took a considerable amount of time to recruit the three headteachers who eventually came forward

and so kindly offered their time and effort. These headteachers had an interest and willingness both to help me and to help the cause of teachers with disability and I will remain eternally grateful to them. The questions for these interviews are presented in the appendix. The teachers were interviewed between September 2018 and March 2019. The Headteachers were interviewed between November 2019 and June 2020

I tried a whole range of methods to recruit headteachers for my research. The tactic that finally worked was that the educational publication *SecEd* published an article I had sent them which highlighted my work and asked for headteachers to come forward to help me complete my work. This article is presented in the appendix . From this I was eventually able to interview two of the three headteachers. The first interview took place in person at the headteacher's school, the last two were online due to restrictions in place. These interviews were transcribed, analysed and then *Chapter Nine: Governance*, was written. The chapters *Introduction* and *Conclusion* to the thesis were written last.

In general the writing of the thesis became easier over time as each chapter added more depth and insight to my understanding. The purposeful interlacing of the writing – writing then setting aside before returning to write again – helped to integrate the thesis early on as one document, one story, rather than a series of discrete chapters that then needed to be integrated. The first chapter written was for the requirements of the upgrade from the MPhil program to the PhD, *Chapter Six: The Special Education Needs Discourse*. This chapter required many supervisor-reviewed drafts over nine months to get up to the standard for the upgrade. *Chapter Eight: Governmentality* was the second chapter drafted and was set aside for a year between drafts. *Chapter Three: Disability and Discourse* and this chapter, *Chapter Four: Methodology* were the most difficult ones for me to write, taking up to five months

from first drafting to get up to the standard to submit for reading to my supervision team.

These two chapters were more difficult I think because they required more critical engagement with and synthesis of social theory than the other chapters.

Summary

In this chapter I have described, storied and justified how my research work came to be in its present form. I began with considerations of philosophical underpinnings that explained how a post-structuralist understanding of structure and of the ‘excess of the subject’ informs the social theory in my work. I described how the imputes to carry out the work was informed by a critical theory approach to research, namely to be always digging and asking questions lest the research merely re-produces oppressive structures and discourses.

In this chapter, I have also written about my primary method for collecting data namely *The Interview*. I have described and critiqued interview as a research method noting its strengths as being practicality of use and have accepted it as a research method whilst arguing that despite its many qualities, as an epistemological tool it does not primarily deliver objective data. I have said that I was pleased with the detail, breadth and usefulness of the data that it allowed me to assemble. I concluded the chapter with an account of how this thesis was put together.

The establishing of the theoretical understanding of disability as discourse in chapter three along with the focus in this chapter on how to simultaneously operationalise theory and research practice in tandem prepared the ground-work for me to show how I conducted the research work. The next five chapters then in this thesis focus on the analysis of the data.

Chapter 5: Discourse which Constrain

Introduction

An important aspect of any discursive study is to understand the context of the study. While some authors such as Billig (2005) suggest that the ideological history of a discourse must be sketched, it must be remembered that Foucault (1989) understood that discourses were non-linear and to suggest that for example our understanding of disability is the same as it was one hundred years ago, or to suggest that a discourse has a trajectory, would be to misunderstand the workings of discourse according to Foucault. This does not dismiss the value of noting past events, it is just to point out that the present is not a linear machination of the past. In this thesis I am interested in the discourse of teachers with disability as a practice rather than the non-linearity of the history of the discourse. Important it is then to study the context in which the discourse under study is situated.

In this chapter I highlight what I consider to be the most important discourses that frame the understanding of the arena in which teaching must take place and frame the teaching profession as a 'profession'. These discourses foreground the context in which the 'experiences' of teachers with disabilities are to be understood. I follow Rose (1998) in the understanding of the concept of 'experiences'. Experiences are to be understood as created through devices of 'meaning production' that produce the phenomenon we call 'experiences' and not necessarily understood as processes of reflections on actions that subsequently come to teach us how to understand the world. So I therefore understand 'experience' as being in large part produced by and through discourse.

One of the main aims of my work is to investigate the conditions under which discourses cohere towards domination and under which conditions the power relations supporting these discourses can be reversed. *Chapter Seven: Subjectivity* provides an in-depth examination of power-relations and how they can tend towards domination or can tend towards allowing for acts of freedom. To be able to understand the conditions under which freedom or domination may be approached it is necessary to identify and understand the important discourses which constrain and from which the teachers may want to break free from.

But where to look for these constraining discourses? Following Potter & Wetherwell (1987), I understand that what is important in the materiality of the discursive formation of the education system with reference to teachers with disabilities will be pointed out by the interviewees themselves. The teachers did not explicitly say that these discourses were the most important ones to them or were able to give them a name. In fact one of the discourses covered here was only mentioned once by one teacher but the mentioning of the item by the teacher clearly represented *a statement* (Foucault, 1989) as explained in *Chapter Four: Methodology* and was therefore of prime importance.

The discourses to be studied in this chapter arise out of critical analytical work of the data so that the most important discourses that act to constrain in schools are revealed. Foucault (1994h) indicated that preconceived theory assumed a certain objectification and so cannot be the basis of analytical work but yet analytical work cannot proceed without ongoing conceptualisation. So what is needed is a constant back and forth, ‘a constant checking’ between the data and theory. In this manner theory is used to illuminate the data and create the clearest and most critically plausible insights.

Based on this constant back and forth between the data and critical theory, four discourses of the general school environment were identified as being the most important ones to focus on when considering discourses that constrain. These four discourses are: neo-liberalism, learning, teacher-pupil relationships and teacher-teacher relationships. The study of teacher-management relations forms an important part of this thesis and is covered throughout the thesis and in particular in chapters six, seven and nine.

I now focus on the four discourses I have identified as being important constraining discourses.

Neo-Liberalism

I begin with an exposition of the neo-liberalism discourse as it relates directly to school practices. In *Chapter Eight: Governmentality* neo-liberalism is again revisited but this time in relation governance' by the state.

Many academics and authors have described and analysed schools as neo-liberal institutions; I use the work of these authors here. Neo-liberalism extends the concepts of the market to the operation of the state and from there to all of its functions and institutions. Where liberalism championed the free market and saw state intervention as an incursion into the freedom derived from laissez-faire, neo-liberalism espouses state intervention as a means to ensure efficiency of the state. Its overall approach is one of economic rationality which is applied as a cost-benefit analysis. Neo-liberalism actually sees this approach of cost-benefit as one that people naturally aspire to in the personal approaches to their lives as a means to maximize their own personal benefits. The neo-liberal state sponsors and encourages this individualism as a means to micro manage towards the ideal of economic rationality. The school becomes

envisaged as a place into which the unmanaged sinking of resources must be avoided. Instead of this, the school must illustrate how it returns benefits expressed in terms of economic rationality (Olseen, 2003; Apple, 1999).

The teachers interviewed often expressed this pivot towards what could otherwise be described as managerialism. The excerpt below shows some of the tensions involved in this pivot:

I think that's quite hard when you're disabled because the line manager certainly in teaching is the person who is observing your lesson and who's making judgments about your professionalism and if you're going [..] 'cos you know it's very easy for it to feel like you're going and saying I can't do something and I need your help with this and for me I would rather that wasn't my line manager because I think I'd like to keep you know my line manager I'd like it to be someone I discuss the teaching with rather than, I think, or maybe it ought to be the special educational needs coordinator because there is somebody who has some insight.

(Participant G)

In the interview, the discussion at this point was centred on the topic of reasonable adjustments and the problematic of how they are managed, who manages them and what are the procedures used in schools to access them. Participant G in this extract voices a concern between perceived 'professionalism' and the need to have her needs met. G's perception of professionalism is that it is alien to other human concerns such as need, care for the self or care for others. G understands that management are there strictly to do a professional job which she understands as being limited to activities such as observing lessons. The

wellbeing of the employee is not something in which G expects her line manager to be involved in. In fact G's narrative suggests that the need for any such consideration as to G's wellbeing on the part of her line manager would be detriment to G professionally.

The description of work-related relationships offered by this excerpt posits these relationships as being cordial, distant, restricted to the consideration of technical issues, and the active shunning of the personal. Under neo-liberalism, matters of equality are often recast as technical issues or matters of choice rather than anything to do with structural processes (Peeters, 2019). G then wants to outsource the personal in the relationship between herself and her manager to the special educational needs co-ordinator who she hopes may have some 'insight'. *Chapter Seven: The Special Educational Needs Discourse* deals with this referral to SEN that the teachers repeatedly made about themselves and their desires. *Chapter Eight: Governmentality* deals with the relocation of the political, under neo-liberalism, to spheres of life that involve the individual whilst also limiting the remit to that of only technical matters.

Under neoliberal management of schools the focus is placed on the examination performance of the pupils. League tables and use of parental choice in line with these league table results dictate the context will be a focus on improving exam results; all that is left for the school to do is to decide how that outcome will be achieved. A culture of blame develops in which teachers experience disempowerment and an increasing sense of alienation (Lingard et.al 2014).

The extract below illustrates how this culture of blame within the teaching profession is operationalised:

Yeh, it's all the other shit that you have to do, and, constantly, this is what I really hate, right, this is what we get, WHAT ARE YOU DOING, WHAT ARE YOU DOING, to make sure that this kid gets this grade? WHAT ARE YOU DOING? I'm like, teaching outstanding lessons, but that's not enough.

(Participant C)

There is a strong sense of blame in this narrative as C places emphasis on the implied imperative 'WHAT ARE YOU DOING?' to which C reiterates that all her lesson observations have been judged as being 'outstanding'. Following Foucault's (1994h) understanding of power as existing in relations that have to be enacted to exist, power can only be exercised through neo-liberalism to the extent to which it is re-enacted time and time again. There can be no settling onto a final neo-liberal state, the potential for ever more improvement is how neo-liberalism governs. Teachers have to be exhorted time and time again to attain higher and higher levels of 'efficiency' and to be held to higher and higher levels of account. The following excerpts illustrate the feelings such practices engender:

... erm, they looked through my books and they reflected what I had the kids go out and do afterwards which again I really shouldn't have gotten into trouble for but it's just you know they find a way of just not be happy with you no matter what so..

(Participant J)

in secondary schools the focus is on the students to the point where there is no praise for teacher. It's all negative isn't it?

(Participant G)

...all the middle managers wanted to be heads so they all try to prove themselves and the way how they proved themselves is by excessive monitoring and so they had evidence and my last school was so small they just could not do that

(Participant D)

The neo-liberal style of management is to decide on outcomes and then enact some limited and narrow discussion with staff by which these outcomes can be 'arrived and agreed' upon. Tools such as league tables are used as substitutes for inclusion and the use of real democratic values (Stangvik, 2014). A certain disinterest and an aversion to listen to the real concerns of teachers, especially those that do not impact on students' grades in an obvious manner become embedded into the management style with its sole focus on exam outcomes. The excerpt below gives a good summation of this experience:

It's more, it's just very corporate, in some ways it's lost it's, to me it's lost its warm cuddly feel, the way that I work and the support that I feel it has lost its supportive cuddly feel.

(Participant E)

One of the most important points to be drawn from the analysis of neo-liberal practice is to consider how the teachers come to govern themselves in line with neo-liberal management

practices. A central aim of governmentality in the mould of neo-liberalism is that people come to govern themselves towards achieving neo-liberal aims and objectives (Rose, 1999). *Chapter Eight: Governmentality* deals with this topic in detail. The following excerpt is an illustration of how this governing of the self in the purpose of neo-liberalism can play out:

Yes, well I was off school anyway for a maternity that caused the problem, the acceleration of the problem, but I ended up being off by ten weeks earlier than I would have been. Which is quite a lot.

(Participant G)

One of the matrices by which she measures her experiences is by how much time she has had off from work. The interviewee did not say that others had said to her that that was a long time to have had off work, she concluded that for herself. In this way she illustrates how she has internalised or folded within herself neo-liberal ideas that establish the central importance of work in people's lives. A critique of the importance and focus given to work over the care of the self and of the care of others in neo-liberal management ideology has been highlighted by many feminist writers (see Lynch et. al 2009).

The neo-liberal technology of leading others to govern themselves in line with its principles affects subjectivity; what the teachers are prepared to do. Two of the teachers stated a strong correlation between the lack of care they showed for themselves and their willingness to work as hard as possible to retain their positions. The following excerpt illustrates the effect of this on teachers:

...and then [my husband] said to me at some point you've got to make a decision about are you going to continue in this vein and just work and sleep and eat, that's it or are you going to have a life.

(Participant C)

In *Chapter Seven: Subjectivity* I write about subjectivity at length in relation to relations of power. Neo-liberalism is not given specific focus there because a simple framing of power as neo-liberalism would miss the nuances and specificity of power. The analysis of the excerpt below illustrates the nuances and the specificity involved in the workings out of relation of power.

All the teachers interviewed had mixed experiences with management over the course of their careers. One of the most positive statements made about the relationship with management is given below:

No, no, is the answer to that, it's not and you know, and this is another reason why I wanted to speak to do this because you know I have been supported until they can't support me anymore, you know, they've been absolutely amazing, my employer, you know they've done lo[...] they've done as much as they can for me. I've had Occupational Health Support, I get access to work support and school just go along with it and they just say to me [anything] you need you've just got to say and [we'll do what we can] you know, to help you. So they have been amazing. But part of that, you know, because I worked there for years and you become part of the furniture and I have taught some of my ex-students are parents of my current

students, so that's, that's beautiful and I love that and I think because I have that established presence and the Management know that I can do a good job and get good results and I think that's why they're supporting me.

(Participant C)

As much as this statement appears to be a positive endorsement of management, it contains many points that need to be problematized. The involvement of Occupational Health Support and Access to Work are bodies which have been set up and funded to offer adjustments to people with disabilities so that they can continue in work. They have the status of statutory bodies, to be invoked and called upon when required. It is a part of the Equality Act 2010 that employers must make 'reasonable adjustments' to working conditions and practices so that a person with a disability can continue to work in a more appropriate manner. Participant C's praise, and gratitude, of management for allowing these bodies to come in and act then has to be seen in this light. The showing of such praise and gratitude for the undergoing of a statutory process reveals a power differential between C and management centred around disability. Disability is here being understood as a problem, as a nuisance that the school has been very kind to have had to put up with. This highlights one of the outcomes that can occur when disability is presented as a problem to be dealt with using an individual rights based legislation. The individual is left to assert their rights against powerful institutions.

There is also a neo-liberal sense of exchange between participant C and management, of being given something not because it is the way everyone should be treated, but because management stand to profit. In the latter part of her narrative she seems happy to accept this exchange. But by stating that she is kept in post because management know that she can do the job there is a tacit acknowledgement that that is the sum total of her worth; to be able to

do a job. But even that is not enough in her assessment. To this has to be added the fact that she has been there a long time and have taught the parents of some of her present pupils. Despite her opening praise for management, she is aware, or she is willing to construct a story, that her case is the exception and that disabled people in her position are normally discarded even if they are able to do their jobs well.

These neo-liberal management practices in schools are a very important axis along which the treatment and outcomes of teachers with disabilities can be traced. For instance in *Chapter Six: The Special Educational Needs Discourse* I illustrate how a combination of excessive work load and economic factors result in the removal from post of teachers with disabilities who are unwanted in the neo-liberal drive to improve efficiency measured in terms of student grades.

But neo-liberalism alone is not sufficient to explain the treatment and outcomes of teachers with disabilities in schools. Notice in C's narrative above, securing good results was not enough for her to account for her continued feeling of security in post, she needed to add more than this to her account. Neo-liberalism is only one means or tool by which power can be rationalised or enacted, it does not represent power itself. If neo-liberalism as efficiency did represent power, or the sum total of its desires, then the case and cause of people with disabilities would be much simplified. As I explained in *Chapter Three: Disability and Discourse*, neo-liberalism represents and presents as an example of exercise of disciplinary power and the principle that people should be separated into the good and the bad as one of the means by which control of society is achieved. Neo-liberalism itself is interested in the cultivation and the optimization of differences, it is not indifferent to them (Lemke, 2001). In neo-liberalism, difference is first fabricated and then measures put in place to ensure that

difference must always be experienced in terms of competition. *In Chapter Eight:*

Governmentality I illustrate the processes by which neo-liberal governmentality fabricates differences in order to govern.

Learning

To continue this exposition of neo-liberalism, power and disability in schools I now look at pedagogy and learning. Neo-liberalism requires fast efficient results. As such it must have a model of pedagogy that delivers efficient learning. The notion of having a model of what is envisaged to be good pedagogy is one that predates the advent of neo-liberalism. Biesta (2006) theorises that from Kant, through to Piaget and even including Freire, education is premised on the idea that we know what the essence of a human being is or should be and so education becomes based on a version of humanism. Using this a-priori knowing of the essence of humanity, education becomes a socialisation process, of inserting bodies into a pre-existing ideal. Gaining an education could have been considered an open process but with the application of this a-priori model of humanity it becomes a closed process where the destination is known beforehand. An ideal pedagogy must also then be considered to be pre-known and fixed.

Education has become defined as ‘learning’ in recent years, where learning is understood as a technical process where humanistic ‘needs’ are to be delivered. It becomes possible now to use language such as ‘the learning needs of the student’ and for efficiency to be measured as the delivery of those needs (Biesta, 2006). The outcome is that education now becomes a type of science, a type of orthodoxy to be delivered efficiently using a limited set of predefined pedagogical tools.

Others have also challenged this tendency towards orthodoxy in pedagogy and its focus on assessment as a means of measure. The use of early childhood play as a means of assessment has come under strong critique from academics who champion the right of children to play without it being pathologised along predetermined lines and co-opted in the service of assessment (see Bartlett, 2011). Following on from this is the critique offered by advocates of children with disabilities. Children with disabilities should not be judged as deficit in relation to other children simply because they may do things in a different way. There are many ways in which things can be achieved and these should be viewed as different ways of doing things not deficit ways (see Burke, 2012). This critique of pedagogy fits in with the overall critique of normalisation. In line with the use of the norm elsewhere in society, what is considered normal pedagogy is created out of arbitrary processes which may involve a degree of humanism.

Pedagogy then is a political topic but one that is closed by neo-liberal management practices. The following excerpt illustrates how received understandings of pedagogy can play out:

I did and then we could control their computers [...] but, it's just that the human personal interaction is much better for learning than me going on their screen and saying this.

(participant A)

The teacher in this case had been experiencing pain and needed to sit down to alleviate the pain. But she would not let herself do that because of the perceived need of the pupils for constant human interaction with the teacher.

This need to deliver continuous interaction has become an orthodoxy of good pedagogy. Even though in this case the technology existed for her to teach by broadcasting to the pupils' computers', some other perceived need, that of human interaction was judged to be more important. Notwithstanding the efficiency that teaching the pupils directly to their computers would add in line with neo-liberal goals, the expectation that the teacher must be constantly interacting with pupils remains one of the central tenets of received wisdom on pedagogy. As noted in *Chapter Two: Meeting the Literature*, Parker & Draves (2018) were the exception amongst disabled teacher academics in that they were willing to positively challenge the received wisdom on pedagogy in a meaningful way to assert that there are multiple pathways to effective teaching.

Foucault (1981b) argued that we should not be distracted by the contradictions in discourses, discourses are not the outcome of simple straightforward calculations but an assemblage brought together under different technologies and for differing reasons that are often opposed. The contradictions in fact go to give the resulting apparatus its appearance of solidity and suppleness. Contradictions will exist in the discourse of pedagogy that will appear to be against the aims and efficiency sought by neo-liberalism but the discourse may be stronger and more resilient to criticism because of these contradictions. To quote from Chmielewski (2018) on modern pedagogy , all that matters is that obedience be valued above creativity and initiative, as the mechanical grind of the school as a kind of 'modern factory' continues . This closing off of the discourse on pedagogy becomes a mechanism by which teachers with disabilities are silenced and are denied the opportunity to make a contribution in schools, one that would be based on their knowledge.

Where received wisdom on pedagogy was placing the limiting condition on the teachers they rarely challenged it in a consistent manner, but would instead indicate that perhaps their careers as teachers were in question or should be brought into question. The following excerpt illustrates:

...as me modelling and showing how it should be done. It's not the same, and because I have, was able to do that in the past and now I can't, I know it's different. The kids are still getting good outcomes, the kids are still learning what I want them to learn, I know how to [work] the exam boards, that's fine, but as far as, getting up on my feet and running round the class with the kids like I use to do.

(participant C)

Notwithstanding the pupils getting good grades as before, the teacher is concerned about failing the pupils because she cannot model in her drama lessons as before. This juxtaposing of the narrative of humanistic pedagogy and neo-liberal ideology is what gives the school's discourse on accepted pedagogy its power to be used as a tool for the subjection of teachers. On the one hand humanistic ideals such as the importance of an arbitrary and unspecified kind of interaction is mandated as being essential but at the same time what is actually valued are the efficient delivery of grades and exam results. Outcome alone is judged as not being sufficient but the process to be followed is also judged as insufficient. Pedagogy becomes an arbitrary tool through which power can be deployed. As shown in this thesis on a few occasions, where teachers adopt a pupil-centred approach to education they come under heavy criticism. As Foucault (1981b) noted above, the contradictions within the discourse gives it its suppleness and strength.

There may also be an implied critique against the 'learning' narrative in the excerpt above. Learning and passing exams is not equivalent to gaining an education and the teacher is quite right to sense that this does not represent an education even as she expresses it in terms of pedagogy. But because the terms of the discourse on education is based on learning and exams the importance of gaining an education becomes difficult to express. Such a discussion about education may also remove the need to deliver through the normalised pedagogy that she judges herself as failing to deliver. At other times she is more succinct and clear about the need to engage her pupils in a wider interpretation of classroom practices:

Now, kids are so used to seeing me walking with sticks sitting down a lot, not getting up, {laughter} making them do all the work, that they just accept it, and they'll, you know they'll walk in the room and go 'miss what do you want me to do for you today?' So they know, that they have to do more. Now some people might say that's a good thing and I think it is because they know that they have to take responsibility, because I'm not getting up. If you want me you have to come over here because I'm not coming to you. So, we, you work round it. So I think there is that issue that they know I've got a disability but they can see me working around it, they can see me making it work, with their support.

(Participant C)

Here the same teacher, participant C, is telling of the need for the pupils to adapt more to her needs couched in an overall narrative that it will be good for them to learn to take a greater amount of responsibility for themselves. However she was not able to maintain this narrative.

The discourses of normalisation and resistance to normalisation criss-cross the interview. Just before making the first quoted statement above where she states her feelings are that she could no longer deliver under the correct pedagogy her ambiguity began to arise as seen in the excerpt below:

And I don't think that's really about me, or well no, I don't think it's about employers, I think it's more about me, because, ere with my condition deteriorating

(Participant C)

The direction of this narrative goes one way in asserting that the difficulties she is facing about her future is not of her making but of exclusionary practices in society. Her narrative then reverses completely to posit an individual cause for concerns of her future being legitimately based on her disability.

Another example of the struggle to navigate the tendency to accept the discourse on normalisation even as it is being resisted is shown below. Nearly all the teachers interviewed spoke of negative feedback of lessons observed. In this case the teacher had been criticised for not attending to low level disruption that she could not actually hear herself because of her disability.

Yer, that, I understand you need to be hold up to the same standards as any other teacher but you've got to make allowances for a teacher with a disability so I think the more I think about that she was just so, so unnecessary to bring that up she, like for me low level disruption should

have been [...] it shouldn't have been something that I have to get penalised
for

(Participant J)

The teacher in this case did not challenge the senior member of staff who had observed her lesson but retained a determination to stand up for herself on the grounds that 'it is not fair' if this was to happen again. The teacher has a sense of the 'unfairness' of what she has been criticised for and also states that 'allowances' need to be made for teachers with disabilities, even as she agrees that she should be held up to the same standard as other teachers. This is a contradiction that represents her attempt to navigate the powerful dominant discourses of normalisation against her own feeling of injustice. The teacher did not indicate exactly how she would challenge, what parts of the discourse on pedagogy she would accept and which parts she would challenge. It is unreasonable to expect any one teacher to be able to understand exactly how the discourse on pedagogy is built up of a combined neo-liberalism and an arbitrarily applied and sanctioned humanism. In addition to this, as discussed in *Chapter Three: Disability and Discourse*, for an effective defence would be needed an analysis of normalisation on which disability is established along with an understanding of disciplinary techniques of power under which disability begins to have the meaning that it does.

de Beaugrande (1997) writes that specialised knowledge becomes locked-up in discourses that people cannot understand, they fail to make the connections that would allow them to begin to resist the discourse and so end up feeling alienated and filled with anxiety. The discourse on pedagogy is based on humanistic ideas of what a human being should be, is enforced under a neo-liberal management regime that begins with the institutional practices of repeated lesson

observations authorised under a need to continuously improve exam results, extends out to performance management of individual teachers and ultimately links itself to claims about the better economic performance and efficiency of the state. It becomes difficult, if not impossible, for any one individual to challenge this discourse. It mirrors and is similar to the expectation that individuals should gain redress to power-imbalances through their own individual appeals to rights in law and the challenging of powerful institutions.

Relations Between teachers and pupils

Relations between teachers and pupils often centre on behaviour management. The reason for this is because the relations between pupils and teachers are primarily based on power.

Behaviour management is often specifically mentioned as one of the criteria by which teacher competence should be assessed. Behaviour management is often a criteria in lesson observations and is mentioned explicitly in the UK Government's teacher standards (see DfE,2011). There are two aspects to this form of power I want to emphasise, namely Foucault's understanding of disciplinary power and also his understanding of pastoral power.

Foucault's (1975) idea of disciplinary power is explained in some detail in *Chapter Three: Disability & Discourse* and also *Chapter 8: Governmentality*. Here I focus more on how it applies and is applied to schools. In an understanding of society managed by disciplinary power, the school takes its place as a disciplinary institution alongside the factory, the army and the prison, as institutions where disciplinary techniques are applied and refined to ever greater degrees of gradation. The teacher likewise takes her place as judge, alongside all the other judges, the social-worker-judge, the doctor-judge, the supervisor-judge, etc, as an operative in a disciplinary system where the level at which the right to punishment, to correct and to discipline is increasingly lowered and accepted.

This disciplinary power can be expressed in quite crude a manner as the following excerpt shows when this teacher speaks about interaction with her pupils:

...and we had a system as well so they know how to not ask these stupid questions as well so they only asked you questions that I could actually answer, which is you know, but you have to train them to do that so erm ...

(participant A)

In this excerpt the power to judge is exemplified in the classification of questions as being stupid or otherwise. Relations of power are also shown in the desire to 'train them' to do certain things.

The application of disciplinary power is often expressed in less overt ways but can still be read and identified in the most common classroom acts. The following excerpt illustrates this:

...when I mark their books I'm like the hands go up as soon as I'm 'like let me do the register and then I will read your feedback to you if I can'...

(participant B)

This innocuous interaction belies its quite deep seated and well rehearsed implementation of disciplinary power. The pupils are disciplined to the extent that they 'know' not to call out but to put their hands up. And further, they have to wait until other disciplinary activities such as doing the register are completed first. The aim of disciplinary power is illustrated

well here which is to produce bodies that are docile and regulated; the pupils sit quietly and put their hands up if they want to speak.

This docility and regulation in schools is achieved through endless and repeated exhortations over the minutest of details such as how to sit, where to sit, when to sit, when not to sit, etc. It trains the body to be a certain type of body, to have certain abilities and not to have others. This disciplinary power eventually becomes folded within the self so that we continually act as if we are being watched by one of our many judges. The teacher of course, as the master of ceremonies, has to embody this disciplined and productive body. Problems, however, begin to appear when the image of the disciplined teacher-body is brought into doubt.

Consider the following:

G: Erm, yes I think yer because the onus, I mean the issues for me, the hardest things with the wheel chair are keeping up the pace that you need to during a day at school when there's such poor access that's very difficult and also keeping that authority with the students

Int: In what sense

G: Erm, in that if I'm struggling to get through a door I don't want to see them I don't want them to see me

Throughout the interview, G had told a narrative of having very positive relationships with pupils so it could be just as easy for G to frame this episode as a demonstration of problems with the built environment she may have told her pupils about, a demonstration from which

pupils could learn and come to understand her better through. But there is a much stronger discourse framing this as a certain type of experience. In this excerpt she is worried about her ability to keep her authority with the pupils. She is the one that links her demonstration of disability to a sense of authority. This doubt about her authority is solely based on her ability to, or inability to, keep up the performance of a disciplined and able body that is able to perform acts in a certain and correct manner such as opening the door in the correct manner. G is aware that if she is not able to fulfil and perform the disciplined-body role then her authority as a teacher, that depends so much on insisting that others do so, is brought into question.

Other teachers also questioned their ability to be a teacher in similar ways and these were also often given specific reasons such as ability to spell or the ability to be ‘adequately’ mobile around the classroom. These can also be understood as doubts arising from the ability to embody the perfectly disciplined body required of a disciplinary society. In these cases the teachers have folded within themselves the specifics of a disciplinary society and a disciplinary school and mistook these beliefs as natural pre-discursive reasons for them to question their ability to teach. The ability of the discourse on normality to produce an endless list of requirements of the disciplined-body ensures that specifics can always be invented if none are not already available. Consider the following excerpt:

D: Yes, yer, because if the children were considered a bit of a pain they didn't want teachers like that and obviously teaching your voice is your profession so I thought that they were quite [...] the school, there were two village schools and they had just shut one of their village schools because they didn't have enough children so they

were really eager to erm get more children they wanted to advertise themselves and I thought that they might not want a teacher who was [unable] to speak clearly.

Int: Do you question your ability to do the job within yourself

D: erm no, but, [...] the children I think I have always been a bit worried that the parents might say something erm, because there's been times where it's been quite a lot worse than how it is at the moment.

In the interview the participant had just explained that teachers' views on pupils with disabilities were on the whole very disparaging in general. The participant adds herself to this list of the disciplined-deficient with the assertion that in teaching your voice is your profession and then continues with this narrative to reason why schools would reject her. The teacher is aware that her undisciplined body is understood to be problematic in the teaching profession and expresses that in quite stark and simple terms, "I thought that they might not want a teacher who was [unable] to speak clearly". Asked about her ability to teach she answers that she does not doubt her ability to do the job but yet she is enveloped by the awareness of something else; of a disciplinary society that insists that bodies be disciplined in the correct manner.

As mentioned above, Foucault (1994h) also identified a second type of power at work in society. This form of power he termed pastoral power. Foucault notes that Christianity was perhaps unique in creating the role of the pastor whose power was expressed in terms of

saving the individual in the next world. Pastoral power is an individualising power that requires knowledge of the innermost secrets of the individual in order to operate. It is different from sovereign power. In sovereign power the subject is expected to sacrifice herself for the sovereign but in pastoral power the pastor must be prepared to sacrifice herself for the safety of the flock. The ecclesiastical institutions which created this form of power may have fallen away but its function continues in modern state institutions, in philanthropists' ventures, in medicine, education and so on. This narrative of the need to care is illustrated well in the excerpt below:

I think when you don't know any different either like I remember my so called mentor at the school saying you can leave because I was on long term supply with my teaching [...] she was like you can just say that you're not coming back but the attitude that I have is once you commit to something you're committed and I didn't want to leave my kids but she just said they're not going to care but I'm like I care and I will consider myself a failure [...] so it's sort of..

(Participant J)

Participant J, for reasons not disclosed in interview, is dismissive of the advice from a more experienced colleague. Her reason for being so dismissive may just be based on the poor advice she believes she has received as told in this excerpt. Note the extent to which she has folded the commission to exercise pastoral power within herself. She uses the words 'commitment', 'failure' and 'care' to express the degree to which she feels responsible for the children even at the expense of her own wellbeing and the need to leave a situation in a school that was threatening that wellbeing.

There is nothing wrong with the need to care other than when it is exercised as an act of power. In pastoral power care is exercised on the basis that the pastor knows what is best for the flock. The exercise of limit and of control over others becomes disguised as a need to care. This pastoral power is itself often deployed against people with disabilities in the positing of the need to take care of the 'helpless' which at once creates and maintains the discourse of disabled people as helpless. As Rose (1999, p55) illustrates: 'These knowledges seek to conjure up in reality the things they have already conjured up in thought'.

To exercise pastoral power as a teacher one has to have knowledge of the pupils as well as know what is best for the pupils. Consider the extract below:

and I'd rather exit before I got to that point because I don't want to be on long-term sick cos then the kids haven't got a teacher and they deserve better because I'll tell you now they haven't got owt else, the community I work in

(Participant C)

In this extract the teacher is once again alluding in the interview to the fact that the pupils at her school come from what is generally known as a poor or a low socio-economic background. This she assumes is a negative because the children haven't got 'owt'. Whatever her assumptions about this it is almost certainly a distortion as she herself is not part of that community. Her willingness to stand up for the disadvantaged is admirable but following Foucault, Blacker (1998) advises intellectuals to give up the pursuit of trying to save the downtrodden, but instead to focus their attention on practices within their own institutions that thwart and pervert their 'good intentions'. This advice is good for teachers also.

This exercise of pastoral power by C, on deciding what is better for other people leads her to continue to a second act of pastoral power and that is to sacrifice herself for the good of the pupils. This narrative of knowing what is for the good of the pupils, of having come into teaching to make a difference in the life of the pupils, of doing it for the good of the pupils, of sacrificing themselves for the good of the pupils ran throughout many of the interviews. It dovetails well with the neo-liberal discourse of both higher and higher grades and also of pedagogy, that the children need a certain type of teacher and that that teacher will come and should work hard to save their lives. It also dovetails well with the discourse of normalcy and the disciplined body, that if you don't have a perfectly disciplined body then it is an act of selflessness to sacrifice one's self for the good of the children by removing oneself. All of these discourses have in common that they form a distraction from any examination of the structural and material causes of inequality within society and replaces this with a narrative of hard work and individual merit. *Chapter Eight: Governmentality* illustrates how we are taught to attribute inequality and its solution to be solely the domain of the individual and not the domain of the state. This narrative of the need to 'work hard' is unpacked in more detail in chapter six but much more so in chapter nine.

Teacher – Teacher Relations

The interview data highlighted that teacher-teacher relations are important. Without fail, all the teachers spoke about relations they had with other teachers within their schools. There are a few well researched and documented characteristics and theories of the teacher to teacher relationship that I discuss here, basing the inclusion of these theories on the presence of certain data in my interviews. The characteristics of these teacher to teacher relationships will of course vary from place to place and also interact to either

reinforce or contradict each characteristic. The first of these characteristics that I consider is the culture of independence amongst teachers. This relational characteristic is mentioned often in the literature and it often tends towards isolation of teachers.

Consider the following excerpt:

No, it was just 'you don't need that B' I was like hmm, so at my last school it just, managing people was not given time erm, and it just yer, I can control my own reactions to things other, I just don't like it, it's just not something I'm interesting in...

(Participant B)

Here participant B is explaining why she is not interested in being a manager. The reason she gives is that if she is not a manager but is working alone she can 'control my own reactions to things'. A' Vila de Lima (2003) writes that this tendency for independent working amongst teachers becomes engendered during teacher training where great emphasis is placed on individual assessment and evaluation. This leads further to a tendency for teachers to be competitive even to the point of wishing others less success than one would want to admit.

Participant B below demonstrates this competitive relation in teaching:

At that time I probably was the best person, no sod it, I was the best person for the job because I had the special needs experience and interestingly there was only two people who's ever at that school got all of their kids, the equivalent kids, their Cs and it was me

(Participant B)

Note the objectifying of pupils as being 'equivalent' or not to each other and this dovetails with the narrative of her sense of superiority over other teachers which is again another objectifying narrative. It is a narrative that follows on from an educational system in which to succeed each pupil must do better than every other pupil.

Abandoning what were false pretensions to modesty, she proclaims 'sod it', she was the best person for the post. Not only that, she was perhaps the best teacher in the school. Other teachers at times in interview also often constructed their ability to teach, or do other things, as being higher or greater than other unnamed teachers.

This competitiveness amongst teachers can act to constrain and limit the possibilities for others who they perceive as being given an unfair advantage in the race. Consider the following excerpt:

Yes, so with the example of assembly in my first school I think the head teacher would be quite [good with it] I think the rest of the staff would have thought it's absolutely ridiculous, so I think there would have been quite a backlash with it, they weren't, like they weren't the most pleasant set of people...

(Participant D)

The conversation in the interview at this point was around the wish for D to be given a specific and known point in the Achievement Assembly where she would be called to talk. All teachers were called upon to present certificates to their classes in these assemblies but the order would be random. This randomness added to D's anxiety and

tension and so she would have liked to have been given a specific point and time at which she knew she was going to be called on to speak. D anticipates other staff's reaction to such a move as one that they would ridicule. No preferential treatment or advantage could be afforded to anyone that would make it easier for them. D would just have to be treated like everyone else and if that caused her excessive anxiety then that was just too bad.

But one of the outcomes of this tendency towards independence is that it leads to isolation. As A'Vila de Lima (2003, p198) illustrates: 'The complex practice of learning to teach entails technical as well as emotional aspects, and learning to manage these occurs often in a context of profound professional and personal isolation'. All teachers have to contend with this isolation. Jacqueline et.al. (2005) through her work with special educational needs teachers, stress the importance of relationships and the failure to establish sufficient and supportive relationships amongst colleagues as being one of the most important factors in the decision of teachers to resign from their posts. In *Chapter Seven: Subjectivity* I detail an instance where the management of the school had directed a teacher to manage the relation between herself and others such that she would be more isolated.

Teachers do form relationships with each other in school, though Jacqueline et.al. (2005) and A'Vila de Lima (2003) note that many of these relationships tend to be distant and collegial in nature. Deeper relations formed can be analysed by borrowing from the theory of homophily in social network theory; the pitfall with much of the literature in this area being that it tends to naturalise the subject and take the subject based on disability, race, and gender as being a-

priori. I will modulate the effects of this pitfall by a focus on how people act to position others rather than how people position themselves. In this light then consider the following excerpt:

I thought that children with disabilities behind the scenes like in the staffroom were treated as if a bit of a pain [.....] a different school so I didn't want to, so knowing that sort of attitude can exist in schools obviously it's not said

(Participant D)

Here the discourse of normalisation leads to the deficit modelling of children with disabilities and of them 'being a bit of a pain'. D still has some work of interpellation to complete to include herself in the category of which other teachers in the staffroom speak, but the discourse that she uses to separate herself out, both physically and mentally, is clearly not of her own making. *Chapter Seven: Subjectivity* investigates the subject and subjectivity in detail looking at the manner in which discourse constitutes the subject and the degree to which individuals may try to resist such an operation being imposed on the self.

Homophily in social network theory investigates the degree to which people who are similar tend to form social networks with others who are similar to themselves. As I noted above, much of the theory assumes a-priori subjects. I will choose then to understand homophily as the way people who are constructed in a certain way by discourse tend to form social networks with others who are similarly constructed by discourse. Examples of this tendency to homophily were given by the teachers I interviewed. The following is such an example:

I mean it was, it was [an interesting] place to work it was very like a Stepford Country Club, it was very, very weird environment and if you weren't in the clique and I wasn't any of that then you were definitely excluded, erm, very, I mean it was fine I'm quite [.....] but it was a very interesting, and I've said that to other people, other teachers that have left like how it's very Stepford, I mean like yer, it was totally that [..... (laughter)] it was lovely honestly and then loads of the senior management changed and then it was very awkward, once that senior management changed, cos there was loads of people who were ineffective

(Participant A)

Participant A is here describing the behaviour of a 'clique' in her school who had the power to 'exclude'. The use of the word 'exclude' is telling, only those in a dominant position are able to raise feelings of being 'excluded' in others. Note also how, as participant A feels excluded, she in turn practices the 'excluding' of others as being 'ineffective'. Excluding others then is part of the culture of teaching at this school.

McPherson et.al (2001) indicated a tendency for social networks with high levels of homophily to be formed by members from the dominant social group; that is people from dominant social positions in society form exclusive social networks consisting of others from the same dominant group. Moolenaar et.al (2012) writes that these cliques provide stability by reinforcing values and routines but they also act to limit individuals through 'group think' and limit the establishing of new resources such as the formation of new relationships with others outside the group. Some of the dynamics of this 'group think' mentality is illustrated in the excerpt below:

A: I don't know really, I think, erm, I think people on a one to one level maybe outside were different, you know they would be accepting ..

Int: Accepting

A: [...] I'm talking about the secondary school.

Int: Your work colleagues.

A: Yer, yer, and then, but when it came to their job role like different, ere, they had different priorities and goals and I think sometimes they would be less sympathetic [...]

In this extract participant A describes how, once outside the school building and away from the groups of others, people would act differently, more as individuals, more 'accepting'. Once back in the building then their other 'priorities' would once again take over. Whatever these other priorities were, they led to them being 'less sympathetic'.

These cliques formed by members of dominant social groups act as a power block within the teaching body that act to reinforce existing routines and norms and also tend to exclude others. They can form reservoirs of routines and values that reflect those of the dominant social group. There is then a tendency of such groups to act as conservative forces within the teaching profession. This tendency towards conservatism amongst teachers can be seen in this excerpt:

Int: And you said that that's enough, the kids need something else

J: Or they just need to stop they shouldn't be looking at something that
I don't think

Int: Do you often feel at odds with other teachers about special needs
children or children with disabilities?

J: I think a lot of us feel the same but most of them choose to play the
game and I don't like playing the game

Participant J was talking about an incident where she was reported to management by another teacher. Participant J had ended an assessment task prematurely for a child that she thought had special educational needs. She ended the task early because in her opinion the pupil should not be sat there 'looking at something' she clearly could not do. This type of 'speaking up' for pupils with disabilities was common amongst the teachers interviewed.

Participant A in this excerpt describes the conformist manner of teachers in this regard; 'they just play the game'. The teachers are often aware of the ineffectiveness of special educational needs pedagogy and instruments but they choose to 'play the game', that is to behave as if these instruments had the importance attached to it by management, the special needs co-ordinator or the SEN industry. One of the student teachers in A'Vila de Lima (2003) study gradually came to the view, over the course of the year, that

teachers were ‘conformists and uninterested’. But this also needs to be understood in the context of other discourses, discourses which serve to silence, dictate and construct power relations that tend towards domination. What I have shown in this chapter are the discourses that constrain teachers and act towards a tendency to make many teachers, and hence the culture in the school, ‘conformist and uninterested’

Conclusion

There are other discourses that I could have selected out of the data to illustrate the constraints within which ‘experience’ in the teaching profession is framed. I chose these four because they are amongst the most important discourses for framing an understanding of the ‘experiences’ for teachers in general and for teachers with disabilities in particular. I hope that my engagement with the material has been substantial as much as it has been ‘correct’ (Scheurich & MacKenzie 2005).

The discourses that I have chosen to high light in this chapter namely: neo-liberalism, learning, teachers-student relationships and teacher-teacher relationships do not operate in isolation. They should be understood as interacting and supporting each other. So, for instance, an example of how these discourses could interact could be that the practices of neo-liberalism lead to the professional isolation of individual teachers which allows for the status quo to continue unchallenged. A pressure, or insistence, to conform ensues and thus silencing comes to operate. This then creates a subsequent void through the absence of any meaningful resistance or counter-culture into which the dominant social groups come to act, and are allowed to act, in support of the status quo that benefits themselves and are also in line with school management desires.

The outcome is not determined beforehand however. For instance, as noted in *Chapter Seven: Subjectivity*, the teachers would often bring discussions of their disabilities into class discussions or lessons. Such an activity would seem to be contrary to the rule of disciplinary power as explained in this chapter. These *constraining discourses* then only indicate how they pre-dispose conditions so that ‘experience’ is formed in a certain manner. The constraining discourses are also strong indicators of where the strongest challenge needs to be mounted in attempts at changing the experiences of the teachers.

In the next chapter I continue with this look at discourses which constrain teachers and come to govern how they experience the world. The next chapter, however, is devoted to the study of just one discourse namely ‘the special educational needs discourse’.

Chapter 6: The Special Educational Needs Discourse

Introduction

In the previous chapter I looked at general discourses that constrain all teachers and highlighted and indicated the manner in which these discourses may go to constrain teachers with disabilities more than non-disabled teachers. These discourses centred around pedagogy, power and schools as disciplinary institutions where the ability to wield power itself relies on the deployment of the norm and the ability to embody the norm. Many of the points raised in the last chapter are given an even more immediate context and exposure in this chapter, especially as regards to the issue of power.

A reminder about terminology: I personally prefer to use the term 'disabled people' as disability is often a lived experience and not just a property of a person in the abstract (Oliver & Barnes, 2012). But I understand also that such a term can also imply a certain amount of determinism and rigidity of identity. I also then choose to freely use the term 'people with disabilities'. I consider the use of the word 'impairments' to be misleading in that it claims to be a neutral term, a term that merely describes what it sees and somehow sits outside of discourse. Tremain (2006) argues that disciplinary practices produce the illusion of pre-discursive and 'natural' impairments. The topic of disability as discourse is discussed in detail in *Chapter Three: Disability & Discourse*.

In this chapter I look in a very particular manner at the discourse of special educational needs as encountered in schools with respect to teachers with disabilities. In the interview data from teachers, the discourse of disability and that of special educational need would often be used interchangeably. The analysis of this chapter could concern itself with the question of

whether or not teachers with disabilities should be classed as having a special educational need but that is not the point of this chapter. Special educational needs and disability are both discursive in nature and therefore it makes no sense to talk about the truth of the discourses. The conflating of special educational needs for children and disability in adults may seem unproblematic or natural but this is to miss an important part of the discourse on teachers with disabilities. The apparent naturalness of this fit, the ease by which one term can be substituted for the other allows me to analyse the positioning of teachers with disabilities in relation to pupils with special educational needs. Focus in this chapter will primarily be given to the conditions of possibility that allow the two discourses to be used so interchangeably.

Many of the teachers (six out of nine) interviewed suggested in their interview that they perceived, understood and accepted that a teacher with disabilities could be described as a teacher with special educational needs. In this chapter I explore these statements in an attempt to analyse how the terms teacher with disability and teacher with special educational needs become seen as synonyms.

Four of the nine teachers interviewed either currently worked in special educational needs or had spent a significant amount of time prior working in special educational needs to which they referred. So there is some evidence that there is a disproportionately large proportion of teachers with disabilities working in special educational needs settings. They also spoke about encounters with other disabled teachers that also worked in the SEN sector. The teachers often commented that they felt that they had an affinity for working in the special educational needs sector on account of their disability, maybe even having an insight that went beyond merely having experienced identical situations to that of their students as the following excerpt indicates:

Int: Do you have any, so you teach special needs, did you say?

I: Yes, I probably have, they're not officially diagnosed though but you know when you know,

Here participant I indicates that she has an ability to identify a child with a special educational needs; 'you know when you know'.

In the Children and Families Act (2014) the term 'Special Educational Needs' is defined as follows:

Paragraph 20: When a child or young person has special educational needs

(1) A child or young person has special educational needs if he or she has a learning difficulty or disability which calls for special educational provision to be made for him or her.

(2) A child of compulsory school age or a young person has a learning difficulty or disability if he or she—

(a) has a significantly greater difficulty in learning than the majority of others of the same age, or

(b) has a disability which prevents or hinders him or her from making use of facilities of a kind generally provided for others of the same age in mainstream schools or mainstream post-16 institutions.

(3) A child under compulsory school age has a learning difficulty or disability if he or she is likely to be within subsection (2) when of compulsory school age (or would be likely, if no special educational provision were made).

(4) A child or young person does not have a learning difficulty or disability solely because the language (or form of language) in which he or she is or will be taught is different from a language (or form of language) which is or has been spoken at home.

(Children and Families Act Part 3:20. 1 - 4)

This definition has not changed since its creation in the Warnock report (1978). It is a definition limited to cover children and young people of compulsory school age and purports to describe the fact that this group need additional or different educational provision from that of their peers in order to learn and make progress. In this chapter I investigate how it is possible that this discourse specifically created for children becomes applied to adults with disabilities.

In this chapter I illustrate the different ways in which teachers with disabilities use the term ‘special education needs’ to refer to teachers with disabilities and matters arising around teachers with disabilities. The special educational needs discourse itself is central to the study of education and has been dealt with many times elsewhere in the literature. My work here then is not a detailed analysis of the special educational needs discourse but should be seen as an addition to the understanding of this discourse in the terms and of the form Foucault suggests that we may one day return to an understanding of discourse:

What are the modes of existence of this discourse? Where has it been used, how can it circulate, and who can appropriate it for himself? What are the places in it where there is room for possible subjects? Who can assume these various subject functions?

Foucault(1994e, p222)

Of this list of questions, I here address more directly the questions ‘Where has it been used, how can it circulate, and who can appropriate it for herself’? In this chapter, I argue that the reason why the discourse of teachers with disabilities and the discourse of children with special educational needs appear to be interchangeable is because the materiality of both discourses are so similar that this interchange appears natural and unproblematic.

When teachers are referred to as having special educational needs what seems to go unnoticed is the implied transformation of teachers from the status of adults to that of pupils. But that is not my point in this chapter and such a discussion should lead off into a discussion of the suitability of special needs education for children as it is currently structured and not just a discussion of its suitability for adults. Such a discussion would also be related to and be a subset of the discussion around the power differentials between management, teachers and pupils, as very briefly touched on here but more so in the last chapter. My focus here is the use of the discourses and how they relate to each other. So I further argue that in schools, the discourse of teachers with disabilities is subordinate to the discourse of special educational needs. The special educational needs discourse is the preferred discourse.

Teachers with ‘Special Educational Needs’

Even though I was specifically interviewing these teachers about their lives as teachers with disabilities they would often talk about themselves or other teachers as having a ‘special educational need’. They would very seldom talk about children as having disabilities but nearly always as having a special educational need. It seems quite clear that they equated or conflated the two terms. Further, in the following excerpt it becomes quite clear that the management of the school this teacher was working at also saw special needs in children as being synonymous with disability in adults:

E: Its quite strange because when I was going through this process with the sort of disciplinary, I went through all the policies and I found the disability policy and it had my name on it,

Int: Why did it have your name on it

E: Because I'm the SENCo and it's a case of ‘will be reviewed by’ or ‘was reviewed by last year’ and I think to myself I never saw that and so there is policy regarding disabled erm staff but I've never seen I've got no idea who is disabled in this school

Int: What did it have to do with the SENCo anyway?

E: Cos I'm perceived as the SEN guru or the disability guru

The casual manner by which the name of this Special Educational Needs Co-ordinator (SENCo) was forwarded without his knowledge onto the equality policy for staff suggests that management viewed the matter as one that was almost intuitive. That is that the skills and knowledge of the special needs manager and the requirements of knowledge to manage the equality policy for staff were identical. Many of the terms for disability such as ‘dyslexia’ that the teachers would use to describe themselves are of course common to the language of special educational needs.

In *Chapter Nine: Governance*, I illustrate how most schools maintain a single policy document on equality for staff and pupils with no explicit separation between staff and pupils in the document. I argue that this reduces the problematic of equality to that of an abstract problem and fails to address the actual concrete practices by which inequality arises for people positioned differently. If a school has a single equality policy for both staff and pupils then it is very likely that the SENCo for the school would be involved in the drafting of the policy. As one head teacher told me in interview after confirming that her school maintained a single policy for both staff and pupils: ‘*equality is equality*’.

In discussing matters regarding themselves, their disability and the school, two of the teachers suggested that the SENCo of the school should be involved. One teacher suggested that the SENCo should be present at the initial job interview. The other teacher suggested, after repeatedly stating the difficulty posed of not knowing who to go to in management for matters relating to her disability, that it would be helpful if she had one person who she could go to talk to about the adjustments she needed and that person could be the SENCo for the school.

During the interviews the teachers would claim that they acted as role models for children as the following excerpt indicates:

you know schools are full of students [if] they're SEN students and what are we telling them if they never see a disabled teacher you know we're telling them they're not going to get a job they're not going to be able to work

(Participant I)

So here a link is being made between themselves as being disabled and the children as being disabled. So there is not a conceptual difference in being a disabled teacher and pupil with special educational needs for participant I.

The teachers would also make the links between themselves as people with disabilities and themselves as having a special educational need or in the need of the services of the special educational needs co-ordinator (SENCo). The following is an excerpt from an interview:

I think, I think that what I find in my team is that everyone is there for a reason and it's either because they have some form of SEN themselves or the child [has] or they know someone with SEN could be a sibling, they are there for a reason because they've got a link to do it so therefore they have empathy for it and they've got an understanding

(Participant E)

Here the teacher quite unconsciously describes adults as having special educational needs and does not take the time or see the need to express this statement in the terms of adults with

disabilities and children with a special educational need. Just everyone, both adults and children, have special educational needs.

But the teacher also borrows from another discourse, that of the teacher who ‘saves the pupils’. As I showed in *Chapter Five, Discourses which Constrain*, teachers often speak from this narrative of being there for the children, of sacrificing themselves for the children or worrying about the children. Aligned with this is the discourse of role models by which teachers see themselves as acting as role models for the pupils. Teachers of course are not the inventors of this discourse, but what the discourse of role models allows is a naturalisation and an expectation of differential school experiences based on pupil privilege and social capital. By saying that this particular teacher acts as a role model for those particular students elides the question of why they need to have individual role models in the first place given that we have a school system that claims to be comprehensively equalitarian.

As indicated in this chapter and highlighted in other chapters, teachers with disabilities are often drawn, encouraged or expected to move towards working in special educational needs settings. Rousmaneire (2013) is critical of the way in which teachers with disabilities are excluded to marginal and parallel institutions of special educational needs through institutional practices, values, and professional norms. In chapter 7, *Subjectivity*, I explore how one of these teachers use their position of special educational needs educator to answer back to the discourses that would tend to constrain her, including the special educational needs discourse.

There were other instances in the interviews where teachers would borrow from discourses of pedagogy in to discourses of adults as in the following:

I think schools need to practice what they preach because you know you get INSET (in-service training) where senior management will say 'Don't talk at the children for too long', three hours later YOUR'RE still sat there bored out your brain, so they make up all the right noises on paper, or you know in talk, but they don't practice what they preach.

(Participant B)

Of all the many ways that this teacher could have critiqued the behaviour of management she chooses to borrow from the discourse of pedagogy and to place herself as a pupil in a classroom where the management are the teachers. Metaphors reveal and conceal (Weatherall & Priestley, 2012). What this story reveals is the judgement of this teacher towards senior management. What it perhaps conceals, though not very well, is that there is a differential in power between teachers and management that is similar to that between pupils and teachers, that this is an unspoken rule and that the teacher does not like it. In *Chapter Nine: Governance* I explore this growing division of power between teachers and headteachers that culminated in the rise of the present day 'Super Head'.

In *The Order of Discourse*, Foucault (1981) sets out his position on discourse as an event, an event that has not only a linguistic component but also, perhaps more importantly, a material component. Amongst poststructuralist thinkers Foucault perhaps stands out because of his insistence in the importance of the material in the discursive (Olssen, 2014). According to Foucault (1981), when discourse is understood to consist merely of the linguistic, only the signifier is put at risk but never the signified, and the materiality of the discourse is elided. So, whilst I agree with Burr (2003) that the choice of words one uses is important, Foucault is

telling us to look beyond the linguistic because words alone do not have the power for the discourse on adults with disabilities to become a discourse of adults with special educational needs.

The discourse on special educational needs and the discourse of adults with disabilities must share some material similarities such that the simple and easy substitution of one for the other goes unnoticed and the two are equated. It should not be dismissed as just being a linguistic artefact, slips of the tongue or a mixing up of terms. Teachers with disabilities are subjected to and feel subjected by the discourse on special educational needs as my examples above begin to show. Requesting that the SENCo sit in on interviews with disabled teachers cannot be adjudged to be a linguistic slip. This particular example is an indication that whatever else the relations between the two discourses are, the discourse on teachers with disabilities is subordinate and should be brought into subordination to the discourse on special educational needs as indicated by the willingness of this teacher to grant the SENCo the power to decide on her future. Through this way of reasoning the school is absolved of any understanding of disability outside of its present understanding of disability as special educational needs.

I am indebted to Hook for helping me to begin to gain a clearer appreciation of how Foucault understood discourse. Hook (2001) assesses that Foucault in *The Order of Discourse* is making a distinction between discourse as an instruments of power when understood as a practice of the material, and discourse as an effect of power when understood only as a linguistic practice. Analysis that restricts itself merely to the latter runs the risk of colluding with ongoing regimes of power. The following excerpt is an example that illustrates the effects of power but we have to look elsewhere, to the material, for the process by which the discourse is produced.

B: Yer for the kids because there's a legal box they have to tick and they somehow forget about the Equalities Act. yer, its exactly that you know they or we know [.....] dyslexia is not necessarily it's not mind altering but there is a certain limit, there are certain limits which come with me with being dyslexic like my handwriting's crap I take longer to process stuff, my spelling's not great most of the time with the kids at school it's a joke we all, it's good humoured the kids know I'm dyslexic it's fine but when it comes to structuring my thoughts I have a way of working I have spent thirty seven years working my way of working when you then as a school try and tell me you're not allowed to do that then I am massively impeded and, it's when you've got people who haven't got a bloody clue who are not qualified in it telling you well this is what it means it doesn't mean that it means this and I'm like what you don't really know what you're on about gov and that's what I came up against

Int: People not qualified in dyslexia

B: People not qualified in special needs whatsoever. You know you've got me I've got a PhD in special needsness. I've got ten years experience of working with wobbly kids. Don't tell me my own life experience and that of lots of other people. It really annoyed me, yer.

Notice how the retelling of this begins with her experiences about a lesson observation feedback session but crosses over into a description of working with special educational

needs children and then back again. She is speaking of someone who has criticised her claims to knowing her own disability based on their knowledge of special educational needs.

Her mixing of the narratives of her life experiences of dyslexia:

I have spent thirty-seven years working my way of working when you then
as a school try and tell me “no you’re not allowed to do that”

(Participant B)

and teaching experience:

I've got ten years experience of working with wobbly kids. Don't tell me my
own life experience and that of lots of other people

(Participant B)

are an indication that what she is saying is that teachers who use their school training on special educational needs are not as qualified as she is because of her life experience of being disabled. Furthermore she feels a resentment and a subjection by teachers who use their school knowledge of special educational needs to try to assess her disability, or limit her ability to say how her own dyslexia affects her personally.

This teacher is making a link between her knowledge of being dyslexic and working with children who have dyslexia and is using this as a platform to critique those ‘who haven’t got a bloody clue and are not qualified’. All teachers receive training in special educational needs, both during initial teacher training and on an ongoing basis. In the present climate of formal inclusion, all teachers have to be aware of special educational needs and consider themselves qualified to teach such pupils. So there is no teacher who is ‘not qualified’ in

special educational needs. So her assertion that there are teachers who are not qualified in special educational needs 'whatsoever' must be taken as a refutation of special educational needs and this training to know her disability. The context here is of receiving negative lesson observation feedback where the embodiment she claimed for her disability has been challenged. She is in turn challenging special education to know her disability. She is asserting that teachers who do not have a disability have no authority to speak about disability and that attempting to do so from a special educational needs trained basis is a totally inadequate place from which to speak:

I am massively impeded and, it's when you've got people who haven't got a bloody clue who are not qualified in it telling you "well this is what it means - it doesn't mean that it means this" and I'm like "what! you don't really know what you're on about gov!" and that's what I came up against

At other times she was quite vitriolic of the role of the SENCo, describing it as a 'bloody boring job' i.e. useless job. She appears to feel subjected by the SEN discourse in schools but her rejection of it is through how it personally impacts on her rather than seeing it as an ideological object to be critiqued. In fact she was quite happy to use the discourse of special educational needs at other times to resist subjection by management in her recalling of this same incident:

twelve kids five of whom were dyslexic so I would do power point print it out give it to them and we all, I'd ask them what they wanted cos it's part of meeting the kids needs, you say, you talk through how to help them through their needs and what they're wobbling with so, I did that and this woman

just decided that power point was too fancy [I...] trying to convey to her
you're going to be crippling me, you're basically gagging me

(Participant B)

Note the claim to be 'meeting the kids' needs', which is a narrative taken from the special educational needs discourse. Here again also can be seen the constraining discourse of the requirement to deliver teaching through normative pedagogy as detailed in *Chapter Five: Discourses which Constrain*.

This teacher does have some reservations about the special educational needs discourse as being one suitable for pupils. There is an indication of this ambiguity regarding the status of official special educational needs as truth in her need to make up alternative names for it: 'special needsness'. In her reference to 'box ticking' by the school there is also a reference to the school itself not being dedicated to its own discourse on special educational needs but to me merely going through the motions.

This teacher understands the ways in which the discourse of special educational needs affects and informs on her experiences as a disabled teacher in schools. But her ability to do that may be affected by her position within special educational needs. She includes in her argument the fact that she is better qualified in it than others because of her PhD in 'special needsness' and so illustrates a vested interest in continuing the selfsame discourse by which she feels subjected, namely that of special educational needs. In *Chapter Two: Meeting the Literature I* critique this idea that disability is a constant that can 'teach us' things. However, participant B is using the discourses she finds around her to fight back. Foucault (1994g) noted that subjection is never total or complete and those who are enmeshed in these power relations,

through their resistance and their rebellion, can transform them and so cease to be submissive. This teacher has begun to use the same discourse on special educational needs to begin to challenge the power relations she finds herself immersed in. I cover this point in greater depth in *Chapter Seven: Subjectivity*.

The Materiality of the Discourse on SEN

Many academics have critiqued special educational needs as a deficit model of disability and indeed as a deficit model of education. A brief analysis along the lines coherent with Disability Studies would offer that from the perspective of the social model of disability, the education and the educational outcome of children with disabilities should be decoupled from their disability. Special education does the opposite. It tightly couples the education of children with disabilities to their disabilities and the use of the word ‘needs’ allows this coupling to be elided by appearing to be natural.

But there are three main areas of the special educational needs discourse that I want to briefly mention before exploring the similarities in the discourse of teachers with disabilities. In this way I illustrate the equivalence of materiality in and of both discourses. These three areas are: normalisation, intervention and removal. Normalisation refers to the production of the normal and the abnormal, intervention refers to the process of support and, thirdly, removal refers to the uses to which the discourse on special educational needs can be put to remove pupils from the mainstream setting.

First then, Dunne (2009) critiqued the way in which special educational needs acts as a normalising lens. By seeking to know the particulars of each individual child, the normal from the abnormal is easily established and maintained. Special educational needs serves to

maintain the normal in education by acting as a conduit by which those who are deemed not normal can be ignored rather than allowing for the education system to adopt a broader remit of the 'normal'. Runswick-Cole (2011) argues that teachers and researchers play their part in maintaining normalism (or abelism) by repeatedly seeking out disability and difference. This brings me to the second aspect.

Second, the process by which special educational needs is established is a well known one. In cases where the process is initiated by the school it will very often be the class teacher who highlights that there is a 'problem' with a certain pupil. Over the course of time and after a series of interventions by an array of professionals, the child's special educational needs may be progressively judged to be greater and greater to the point where others come to define the 'needs' of the child and a Statement of Educational Needs (currently being replaced by Education, Health and Care Plans) is issued by the local education authority.

The third aspect of special educational needs that I want to highlight and compare with the discourse on disabled teachers is that of the uses to which it can be put to serve other purposes. In *The Irresistible Rise of the SEN Industry* (Tomlinson, 2012) Tomlinson returns to a topic she and others began many years previously. In the 1980's, Tomlinson and others began to theorise that with changing political and economic circumstances, special education was going to be increasingly used as a catch-all category for those pupils for whom the school offered very little. This was so because removed from the economy was a wide swathe of working-class jobs that these pupils would traditionally be expected to fill and for which the school served the purpose of preparing them for. Tomlinson returns to the topic decades later because she sees fresh and added impetus for the school to intensify this process with the ever increasing mantra of the raising of standards in education. She notes that ever since the 19th

century the 'raising of standards agenda' has always been accompanied by means of accommodating elsewhere those who would otherwise interfere with this agenda. This suits well the invested interests of the army of people employed in the special education 'industry' that would like to see this industry expand.

These three strands of the discourse on special educational needs I will next try to locate and compare in the discourse on teachers with disabilities as a means to explain and understand why the two discourses appear so interchangeable.

Parallel Discourses for Teachers

Normalisation

In *Discipline and Punish* (1975) Foucault argues that the constant processes of measuring and examining administered across and by all state and allied institutions lowers the threshold by which it becomes possible to consider someone as an individual. By corollary it becomes possible to more easily define the abnormal from the normal by the same constant measurement practices. Through such repeated practices the norm is established such that any deviation from the norm needs to be accounted for. In that way homage is paid to the norm and its strength increases. Consider the following excerpt:

No, no you don't but then I think as I've taught a bit longer because I've taught in a couple of schools I think I've got a better idea of the times I find it stressful also we had a lot of OFSTED visits, we had three OFSTED visits just under four years of teaching erm and so I want the headteacher to just mention to an OFSTED inspector it's not because she is really nervous it's just her voice. It

will partly be because I am nervous, but say an OSTED inspector wouldn't think, and question my ability

(Participant D)

By making such moves about the need to declare disability in order to account for variation from the norm a contribution to the discourse on the normal is made. A similar move is made in the discourse of special education needs where deviation from the norm must be accounted for and in so doing the norm becomes centred and reified. Other teachers interviewed continued this discourse of the norm. For instance another teacher spoke of not revealing disability in front of an OFSTED inspector for fear of 'letting the school down':

I think, we have recently had OFSTED and they did come to my classroom for a lengthy bit but luckily it was maths so spelling wasn't too much of an issue erm, I don't know what I would do, I think erm, just through fear myself of letting the school down erm, not letting them down but to having that view

(Participant H)

In chapter five, I explained how Foucault (1975) cited the school as one of the central institutions in society for the deployment of what he termed *disciplinary power*. As with lesson observations, it is at the points where the school (or agents of the state) as disciplinary institutions deploys its most powerful tools in the service of normalisation, in this case an OFSTED lesson observation, that those teachers who are disabled often suffer their greatest reversals.

Lesson observation is one of means by which the discourse on normalisation is enforced, but to better answer Foucault's (1994e) question 'how can it circulate', we need to look elsewhere. Teacher standards in education (see DfE,2011) exist , but these are so vague that they are near meaningless for any concrete analysis regarding the source of the normality imposed on teachers with disabilities, this vagueness only allows them to be used to enforce other arbitrary agendas.

A much better candidate for analysis would be pedagogy, and ability to deliver pedagogy in a normative manner. *Chapter Five: Discourses that Constrain* outlines this normative discourse on pedagogy in some detail. Nearly all the teachers interviewed cited pedagogy as the main area of contention and confrontation between themselves and management. Very experienced teachers would have quite trouble-free and happy careers until issues to do with delivering teaching through normative pedagogy started to develop. There is nothing obvious or inevitable about this. Pedagogy becomes a central issue because it is around pedagogy that the most forces in the service of normalisation are centred and as noted above it is around pedagogy, in the form of the lesson observation, that the school deploys its most powerful and disciplinary tool.

Consider the following excerpt from an interview

Gosh, erm, I think there is a level that you have to be at as a teacher you can't just, and I don't, I don't just mean erm written English I think it's spoken English as well, when somebody turns up and doesn't pronounce their words properly or use the wrong grammar and that's coming from me

and I'm dyslexic I don't even really understand grammar I think that's not right either so

(Participant F)

In this excerpt the teacher is talking about the importance of normative pedagogy but she soon runs into an ambiguity. She begins by claiming that there is a minimum level of written English that a teacher should be able to master. But noting that she herself probably falls below this abstracted threshold, she begins to rethink what she is saying. The threshold she posited was not one of her own making but borrowed from somewhere else. It does not have the meaning, neither can she give it the meaning, she thought it had. As she herself embodies, it is possible to be a teacher and to teach whilst falling short of the same standards of normative pedagogy she has unconsciously internalised. Other discourses of normalcy to do with the school's central role and position in society in establishing disciplinary power as demonstrated by Foucault (1975) and the norm of parents with the most cultural capital (Gee, 2005; MacLure, 2003) add to this tendency to cohere to the normal in schools.

These dominant discourses of normalcy produce disability (Corker, 1999) whose effects can be seen in the linguistic but whose production can only fully be understood in the material. Siebers (2010) writes that status minority/majority rely on power differentials and has nothing to do with numbers. This knowledge of normalcy produces a power to decide who is normal and who is not. The following excerpt from an interviewee gives an example of how this knowledge of the normal and the abnormal is wielded as the power to exclude and subject others to it:

and he came in one morning and said E, I went to the pub last night me and my mates thinks that someone with a stammer should never teach because the job is 90% speaking

(Participant E)

This person's mentor and head of department is not falling back on established categories of who is able to teach and who is not but is deciding who 'should' and 'should' not teach. He is not denying that the teacher has the ability to speak, he is defining his way of speaking as being unsatisfactory for the purposes of teaching. He is, thus, exercising power based on a knowledge of the normal and the abnormal, power that is here being wielded in very offensive and destructive ways.

The discourse of normalcy is difficult to resist, however, despite its tendency to offend, constrict and subject. Campbell (2015) contends that all people with disabilities confront the daily challenge of internalised ableism. The following excerpt is of a teacher trying to reconcile the forces of normalisation with the feelings of disempowerment she no doubt feels, evident by her ambiguity and the need to reverse her own narrative to make it true that she is somehow deserving of less:

And I don't think that's really about me, or well no, I don't think it's about employers, I thinks it more about me, because, ere, with my condition deteriorating.

(Participant C)

The teachers interviewed responded to the normalising discourse in different ways. Below, I follow the classifying categories that Corrigan et.al. (1985) used in their study of gay men to help me classify responses to normalcy.

Hegemonic normality

Normality was often located elsewhere, for instance one participant gave the following description:

[.....] no, no, no not the way that like people.... just the way everything's discriminated, And you know, you go to a conference and every where's got you know [...] everywhere [standing] all day most of the time and you're like, you know all the bits where you would be [...] or wherever or like standing. You know so from my perspective as someone with a physical disability its exclusionary. So, so I had those experiences (basically) that meant why would I tell people.

(Participant A)

Non disabled people have the capacity to 'stand all day' and have the power to discriminate over 'everything'. The world here appears as somehow alien to her, exclusionary, and over which she has no control, means of entrance or expectations of having her needs met like everyone else. Under these circumstances she chooses to govern the relation between herself and others by not talking about her disability to others. By so doing she hopes to avert the normalising discourses that would be directed at her.

Complicit normality

At other times in the interview she would position herself as the independent, strong operator of neo-liberalism and of normality:

So I don't really know why she was like that, it's very odd, it's; it's like she didn't believe me 'cause I didn't look disabled, I think, because I wasn't crying in the corner, I mean I might be at home but ..

(Participant A)

She might not have the physical strength or abilities of an able bodied person but she has the emotional strength and abilities. She does not look disabled. This last claim was repeated elsewhere in the interview by participant A.

Subordinate Normality

Is this school disability friendly? in some ways; they let me in so I guess yes but in different ways I just don't know

(Participant E)

The one-sided narrative of acceptance of disability can be seen here. They let him into the school because they are 'friendly' rather than him having an equal right to be there as anyone else or that he is well qualified with a PhD or even that he is a good teacher who gave a good job interview.

All participants were ambiguous about whether or not they were disabled. They would talk about the benefits of being a disabled teacher; being a role model for the pupils or being able

to understand the pupils and their carers' concerns about schooling and disability. Or they would tell a story of how the restrictions placed on them by their disability resulted in them being evaluated in a negative light by management and in the midst of the story claim that they had no such restriction anyway. Succumbing to the discourse on normality and the pressures to accommodate oneself to it is, I argue, is one of the reasons for this behaviour. Another reason is bound up with the teaching and learning discourses I covered in chapter five. The following excerpt is one such example:

If you're telling me not to use Power Point you're expecting me to write on the board legibly coherently and in a timely fashion and you want the kids to be able to read it and actually learn from my handwriting; my handwriting is like a dog's dinner and if you're putting me under pressure to write on the board and, you're bang out of order so the school, the school, one of the things I do say to the schools is one of the things I will do is I will use Power Point. As much as anything because it is my prompt. Erm now I can do chalk and talk, anybody, if you're a decent teacher, you can do chalk and talk but to tell me that I have to do chalk and talk is very different than if a computer packs up.

(Participant B)

She begins by explaining the legibility of her handwriting as being 'like a dog's dinner'. But on reflection of what is accepted as being a good teacher, as someone who can 'chalk and talk' her narrative switches to the opposite pole as someone who can write on the board whilst they teach. Because the narrative of what a 'good teacher' should be able to do cannot be challenged or changed, her ability to write on the board has to change instead. As stated in

Chapter Five: Discourses which Constrain very rarely did any of these interviewees questioned or challenged the generally accepted list of items that a ‘good teacher’ should be able to do and as such they were not able to offer a more comprehensive challenge to the normalising and humanistic discourses within it.

The following is an example of how the discourse of normalisation can play out causing one to alternate between abled and disabled.

I think for the role I am in, being, having some form of disability allows you to have a lot of empathy to both the students and parents and I think that’s really great and I jelled really well with the old head and the head left in July and I’m struggling with the new head who I don’t think gets me and they don’t get my quirksiness and that is my current struggle

(Participant E)

Notice how disability is described as something to be proud of and to be shared at the opening of the excerpt. In the presence of the old head with whom a good relationship was maintained disability could sit comfortably. In the presence of the new head disability must be made to disappear and is re-presented as a more acceptable and benign form of normality, namely ‘quirksiness’.

None of the teachers explicitly related the problems they faced as people with disabilities to this normalisation. Instead a type of natural understanding of problems arising from ‘impairments’ was often posited. I say more about this in detail in *Chapter Seven*:

Subjectivity where I explore how these discourses of SEN, of impairment, of law, of accepted pedagogy and of normalisation go to form the subjectivity of these teachers.

I next go on to the second criteria of comparison of the discourses of special educational needs and teachers with disabilities. This considers the intersection between the disabled and the environment and how in both the cases of children with special educational needs and teachers with disabilities, decisions around disability ultimately involve a power dynamic favouring the views and ‘expertise’ of others.

The process of receiving redress

The process by which teachers with disabilities gain redress against a normalising society is similar to the manner in which special educational needs provides its services. This process is through appeals to outside bodies or others to come and decide for people with disabilities what will be offered. Teachers spoke of having used the *Access to Work* scheme created by the government. Access to Work is a government funded scheme where adjustments needed in the workplace to allow disabled people to be employed in a normalising environment are funded by the government. Under present UK law an employer must make ‘reasonable adjustments’ to allow for an employee with a disability to be able to continue in employment or be employed.

The existence of this allowance in law and its wording is well known by most people with disabilities. In my view however, the use of the term ‘reasonable’ as an adjective to the word ‘adjustments’ allows for a space to open up where others are to decide the extent or the limits to which a disability should be or is disabling; this is the space that will be funded. Once these adjustments have been made it becomes expected that the disabled person will be able to fulfil

expectations along normalised lines. This discourse of ‘reasonable adjustments’ is explored and critiqued at length in chapters eight and nine. Disabled people on the whole have oriented themselves to this understanding of allowing others to decide, or negotiating with others, the limits of their own disabilities. In the excerpt below even whilst talking of possible changes and improvements that schools could make for teachers with disability, the form and language of the law is referenced and the use of ‘correct terms’ established and checked:

Int: Erm, so the question is, is there anything we should be changing between the way how schools treat and manage teachers with disabilities

E: I think there's a lot that could be done in a school I think that there should be REGARD for them, if that's the correct term; they should work with those people and help them and support them [...] facing barriers or not

Through the law others become the final arbitrator of what disability means and the law also supplies the language of ‘unreasonableness’ by which demands from people with disability can be legally refused as the following excerpt illustrates.

I mean nothing I've asked for has been [...] the furniture in my classroom where it is quite important for access so I asked if it could just be put out as a notice that if people move the furniture in my classroom that they put it back was turned down was told its unreasonable and not possible

(Participant G)

In this instance what is reasonable is what is normal; class teachers normally have to put their classroom back themselves at this school so it is 'unreasonable' to ask otherwise.

One teacher retold a story of an adjustment she requested in order to gain access to a building where she had been invited to speak in the role of an outstanding headteacher. The adjustment made still did not allow her to gain access to the building but she was told that 'a reasonable adjustment' had been made and she should expect no further assistance.

In *Legalising disability*, Campbell (2015), notes that seeking political change through law is always doomed to fail because the law itself is normalising. And the title of her article is apt. What would be considered requests for politeness or respect from others tends to take on legal forms when requested by people with disabilities. As I highlighted in *Chapter Two: Meeting the Literature*, moving a desk or holding up a display for someone as they speak is reported in the literature as a 'reasonable adjustment'. In these ways disability becomes reified and more radical claims to redress are sidelined through the process and operation of law itself.

Foucault (1975) indicated that one of the effects of being repeatedly subjected to disciplinary power was how we come to govern ourselves in line with its requirements. When the topic of reasonable adjustments came up again later in her life this teacher's response was in line with perceived expectations and desires of management:

Not do, well the second time Access To Work came in I didn't want them
in because the school's got no money and I said if they come in then they

will suggest all sorts of equipment they have to pay the school has to pay 20% but they insisted because they wanted them to buy a printer for my building for me but that everyone could use and I said they won't do that that's not what they fund so they came in recommended lots of stuff, err, which school then refused to get so it really was a bit of a waste of time

(Participant G)

In *Chapter Eight: Governmentality*, I investigate the law as a means by which the government uses equality legislation itself to further its cost-cutting 'austerity' agenda whilst absolving itself of the risk in the social by transferring unmanageable expectations and responsibilities onto the individual.

Removing the Unwanted

Many of the teachers interviewed spoke of the impossible burden placed on all teachers in the form of workload:

No, but it was massively different when I was part-time in terms of workload because the work was crazy when I first went back after maternity leave. In my second job it was much better [in terms of] workload the headteacher being a single mum so she understood what it was like to be a working mother and but I paid for an extra day of childcare so I could do the work outside of work so wasn't [doing that] in the evenings.

(Participant D)

This quote about workload is important because it shows the arbitrariness of at least some of the quantity of workload and that headteachers have some discretion over the amount of workload they choose to impose on teachers. The workload can be more or it can be less.

Chapter Nine: Governance charts the rise the ‘Super Head’ as someone who can be trusted to insist on ‘more’. With the growth of academisation of school’s the workload tends to be much more:

Academy X in this area are renowned for like killing teachers, you know, working them to the bone, if you can't keep up, get out. And our CEO is ex Academy X.

(Participant C)

Rousmaniere (2013) noted that with the growth of the accountability agenda in schools the historical and vitriolic mantra of teachers as being somehow ‘broken’ has intensified. Words such as ‘teacher burn-out’ have come into use. Rousmaniere (2013) describes how teachers have historically, at different periods and at different times, been described as ‘broken’, ‘inadequate’ or ‘abnormal’. What Rousmaniere’s work leads to is to notice that rather than address the working conditions that may cause ‘teacher burn-out’ the blame becomes deflected and the discussion about ‘teacher burn-out’ masks and replaces the discussion that should be taking place about teachers’ working conditions. The use of the narrative on ‘broken teachers’ in this way allows for intolerable working conditions to be imposed. Just as with the legalising of the poor material circumstances mentioned in *Chapter One:*

Introduction, the poor working conditions of teachers becomes institutionalised.

Chimielewski (2018) follows up on Rousmaniere (2013) with historical research detailing the case of the New York City Board of Education which followed this narrative of ‘broken teachers’ but took it one step further. What occurred was the fabrication of disability in

teachers that were older, experienced and therefore more expensive to employ. Having been labelled as disabled the next step was to label them as being unfit for work. They could then be forced to retire early on a much reduced pension and be replaced with teachers that were generally younger, less experienced and therefore less expensive to employ. The state of New York chose to ignore this, just being grateful to receive the unexpected savings in revenue.

The fabrication of disability then became a means to remove teachers who were going to interfere with some other set agenda. This is in parallel to Tomlinson (2012) who argued that the fabrication of special educational needs had become a means to remove pupils who were going to interfere with the set agenda of raising standards. And in both cases an excessive and unnecessary agenda is made possible through the scapegoating of disability. The discourse on disability becomes an enabler for these other discourses.

A similar 'forcing out of work' was seen in my data. Two of the older teachers I interviewed were facing being forced out of work. The following is an excerpt from one of the interviews:

G: I mean ideally I'd like to go back and do a few more years I'm 50 next year erm but I don't, and it's hard to have that conversation with school. I feel I'm in quite a precarious situation because if I stay, I don't think I'm fit to teach any more they start trying to sack me.

Int: Do you think so

G: Yer

Int: How sack you, dismiss you or

G: Yer, for being unable to teach

Int: Is that even legal

G: Well they have to come to an agreement but it can happen that the two things, it comes like a race to the finish line [but] as the two things happen simultaneous and at the moment my head's put me under pressure I think she, she hasn't seen me in the time I've been off she wants me to go into school cos she wants to know, I think, whether I'm going to be fit to teach anymore or not

Note in this extract the return of the discourse of 'fit' and 'unfit' with regard to teachers and its inherent link to disability in this case. There are many other ways G could describe what she is trying to say without resorting to the negative finalising value judgements 'fit' and 'unfit'.

Education in recent years has seen an ever increasing workload placed on teachers in the name of 'Excellence' and also by the Raising of Standards Agenda. Tomlinson (2010) argued that this would need to be accompanied by a growth in the special education student population as a means of removing those pupils who would interfere with this agenda. Likewise the same agendas of 'Excellence' and also the 'Raising of Standards' has had a similar effect of linking itself more closely to disability and the possible removal from post for teachers. There is a fear and a much stronger association between disability and being dismissed:

I've got a colleague that I use to work with, and then I bumped into her at another school, and er, she said 'can I just have a word with you'. I was like yer, so we found her a little quiet spot and she was like 'I've been diagnosed with MS as well. I was like 'have you told err, your principal? 'I daren't, daren't tell him'

(Participant C)

The capability procedure is a legal procedure that schools can use to effect the improvement in performance of a teacher who is deemed to be failing or to remove that teacher from post. There is a greater and more vindictive use of capability procedures by some schools to ensure that people who are caught in (or have been driven into) the disability trap are removed from their posts. There is ample evidence from the teaching unions that schools are resorting to capability procedures as a means to save money and also to increase academic results whilst using fewer resources. See (NEU, 2019; NASUWT, 2015). Participant C had firsthand experience of this process:

C as a Union Rep I see, I must have had 15 or 16 capability cases this year and one worked through it.

Int: Is that an increase on.

C: Yeh

Int: A big increase or little [].

C: A big increase, but er, a bigger increase as well from people who like me are dodging that bullet, by dropping responsibilities, requesting part-time hours, finding ways of working round positions they find themselves in

One of the most bewildering stories I heard from an interviewee was that of a teacher who wanted to lighten her workload by relinquishing her responsibility points. The head teacher refused her request to do so and informed her that she (the teacher) would need to use legal routes if she wanted to relinquish the responsibility points. Such a process could easily end up as a capability procedure.

Teachers, both disabled and non-disabled, seem to be faced with a trap, something I termed above 'the disability trap'. I do not mean to be disparaging to people with disabilities.

Foucault (1981) wrote that we must understand discourse as an event or as something that was going to make a certain thing happen. The analysis of the discourse on disability should not follow a simple analysis of the experiences of people with disabilities but should be mindful of it as a discourse that is going to produce subjects of a certain type, subjects who are positioned in a specific manner.

As noted in Chapter Two: *Meeting the Literature*, some authors both talk about the social construction of disability and also of the need to understand disability better. This is a contradiction. If we believe that disability is a socially constructed concept then our analysis must include an analysis of how it accomplishes the task it has been constructed to do. In that sense if disability is experienced or understood as a deficit then that is because it is doing exactly what it was designed to do and that is also why impairment must not be split off from the conceptual understanding of disability as discourse. It is through the narrative of

‘impairments’ by which people become identified for subjugation as being disabled. The discourse on disability will contain certain material conditions, linguistic statements, institutional practices and reified cultural beliefs that will ensure that disability is only ever understood as a deficit.

The disability trap for teachers, disabled and non-disabled teachers alike, then consists of the declaring, suspicion or suppression of a disability, legal frameworks, capability procedures and an unsustainable workload. As noted earlier, the workload that a headteacher can place on staff is arbitrary so the disability trap should not be taken as a mandatory occurrence. It is a trap laid out that can be deployed to serve a variety of purposes and mainly remains a threat. But it is frequently directed against those who are considered disabled.

Conclusion

The discourse on teachers with disabilities can be used interchangeably with the discourse of special educational needs because the material circumstances of the two discourses are similar. But there is more: whilst teachers may be described as having a special educational need, children are very rarely described as having a disability. The discourse of special educational needs is the one created and owned by the school. The discourse of teachers with disabilities is subordinate to the discourse of special educational needs and is the preferred discourse. This is why the teachers interviewed often expressed a wish that the two were the same or equivalent discourses:

school policies are very much about being inclusive to students but not really to adults

(Participant E)

‘Inclusion’ is very much a word borrowed from the discourse of special educational needs and its use is closely allied with the model of disability as special educational needs, where educational experience is tightly coupled with disability and contingent on it and so needs to be ‘included’. The word ‘inclusion’ itself represents a position of subordination with respect to that to be included.

As mentioned in *Chapter Two: Meeting the Literature*, Givner & Ferrell (2002) conducted a narrative study of trainee teachers with disabilities. One of the teachers in that study concluded that she had never felt disabled until she came to work in special educational needs. And the other side of this coin is that there is not a distinct, different and radical discourse of teachers with disabilities that can begin to inform on the discourse of special educational needs.

Keller et.al. (2002) noted in their study that many professionals who worked in the special educational needs sector felt threatened by a strong group consciousness of disabled people and were unwilling to share power with them. If the discourse of adults with disabilities was not already subordinate to the discourse of special educational needs then it would have to be made so for the continuation of the special educational needs industry.

To follow Foucault, according to Butin (2009), is not to be interested in whether certain voices are correct or not but to investigate relations of power and to consider under which conditions relations of power can be reversed and under which they cohere towards immobility. It is more important to improve the combative recourses of the subject rather than arguing from fixed subject positions: teacher, student, abled, disabled. It may not be advisable to posit or concede one model of disability for children and another for adults in schools.

Including teachers with disabilities within the remit of special educational needs may well be one way by which this discourse could be radically influenced and changed by the relatively more powerful position of teachers with disabilities (above that of pupils with disabilities).

The next chapter, *Chapter Seven: Subjectivity*, follows on from here. In that chapter I explore how the subjectivity of the teachers are intertwined, constrained and formed by the discourses I have laid out in *Chapters Five: Discourses which Constrain* and this chapter.

Chapter Seven: Subjectivity

Introduction

We think of ourselves as human beings free to act as we choose, that is we see ourselves as the free and sovereign subjects of liberalism. Critical theory since Marx has been problematizing such a view of ourselves in the world and relation to the world. Critical thinkers have tried to show us exactly what we are subjects of. For Althusser we are subjects of ideology, for Foucault we are subjects of discourse, for Derrida we are subjects of language, for Lacan we are subjects of the unconscious, for Kristeva we are subject of the ‘stranger within’ (see Williams, 2002). We experience ourselves according to the subject that we have become, this is termed subjectivity. Subjectivity becomes important in the name of freedom; what can we do and who we can become? If we are not the free and sovereign subjects of liberalism that is free to become, then we may ask ‘what are we and how are we constituted’?

In *Chapter Three: Disability and Discourse*, I explained that Foucault (1994e) saw the subject as constituted in or as an affect of discourse. Discourse creates subjects with whom certain power relations can be better ensured. Foucault’s (1975) analysis of the creation of the modern day ‘delinquent’ who can then be used to achieve certain tasks in the service of others is a good example of this. For Foucault power exists in relations rather than being a property of the state or of institutions. Foucault (1994d) explains that it is not so much that subjectivity is the only useful point of resistance against political power but that freedom and domination depend on relations one has with oneself and also with others. The study of the subject and subjectivity comes into importance because power is related to the subject. In this

chapter I use data from the interview with the teachers to investigate freedom and domination through a study of subjectivity.

The Subject

Foucault (1994h) writes that the central aim of his work has been to investigate the ways human beings are made into subjects. He states that there are three modes of objectification that transforms human beings into subjects:

The first are modes of enquiry that try to give themselves the status of science. The objectivising of the speaking subject of philosophy and linguistics, or the objectifying of productive subjects who labour are examples given by Foucault.

The second mode of how we are made subjects are through what he terms ‘dividing practices’. The subject becomes either divided within herself or divided from others. Examples he gives are the division between the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminal and the ‘good guys’. The third mode is that human beings turn themselves into subjects. The example he gives is that men and women have learnt to recognise themselves as subjects of sexuality.

I choose to understand these three categories as the categories of knowledge, power and ethics and these will be the categories under which I address subjectivity in this chapter. I owe a debt of gratitude to Yates & Dave (2010). These authors pointed out that a Foucauldian study of subjectivity could be carried out under the categories of knowledge, power and ethics, the details and basis of which I describe below. In preparing to write this chapter it became increasingly difficult to conceptually separate out knowledge, truth and power in

general but it is a tension I will allow to exist in the text. Foucault himself indicated that in the study of the ontology of the subject, relations of knowledge, power and ethics cannot be considered completely foreign to each other (Foucault, 1994k).

In *What is Enlightenment* Foucault (1994k) states that Kant's early work suggested that Enlightenment was a continuous process of critique as to the question of what we have become in modern society. Foucault continues that such a study of the ways that we have come to constitute ourselves as subjects and to recognise ourselves as such would be 'genealogical in design and archaeological in its method'. The 'systematicity', that is the practical systems, of such an investigation would cover three broad areas:

...the axis of knowledge, the axis of power, the axis of ethics... How are we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our own actions? (p318).

It is from here that Yates & Dave (2010) use this categorisation as a means to study subjectivity in their work that is a discursive analysis of adults with learning disabilities. Deleuze (2006) also uses this categorisation of knowledge of self, power, and ethics in his assessment of how Foucault understood the study of subjectivity. Deleuze (2006) suggests we advance our understanding of our subjectivity through the consideration of a series of questions:

What can I know or see and articulate in such and such a condition for light and language? What can I do, what power can I claim and what

resistances may I encounter? What can I be, with what folds can I surround myself or how can I produce myself as a subject?

(Deleuze, 2006, p94).

Whilst I can attempt to conduct an analysis of the teachers as subjects of knowledge, power and ethics, there is a more important point. Mayo (2000) notes that many studies conducted by writers who use Foucault rarely investigate whether their research-participants are themselves involved in an analysis of how and why they come to be so constituted.

Foucault's invocation of Kant was to stress that Enlightenment involved an ongoing critical analysis of how we have come to be constituted as subjects. The posing of the questions of knowledge, power and ethics of the self by Deleuze (2006) as quoted above also implies a focus on understanding our own subjectivity in an ongoing analysis as to what we have become subjects of and what kind of a subject do we want to be and why?

It has become common practice to identify the various subject positions that speakers adopt during a conversation to be the focus of a study in discourse analysis. Whilst such an analysis has its value, I agree with Rose (1998) that to reduce the subject to an artefact of language is to misunderstand that language is not the primary means of the making up of a person. Rose writes that subjectivity is always an act of folding the outside within oneself. Several studies of discourse analysis exist where the rationale given for the study is so that government and governmental bodies in their planning can take heed to the way that people constitute themselves and give themselves an identity. Such an understanding of the relation of discourse to subjectivity is a reversal of the understanding that the contents of the discourse gets folded within oneself. In this chapter I will use the rationale that discourses have the potential to be folded within the self and so come to form subjectivity.

My work is only very small in scale and I could not hope to present it as a representation of all the types of subjectivity adopted or available to teachers with disabilities in general. I do not then primarily investigate the range of subject positions that people are able to adopt during the course of the interview. I am more interested in the forces that maintain and are needed to maintain a particular salient subject position as examples of the interplay of knowledge, power, and ethics. I focus on answering the questions: how and under what conditions do relations of power tend towards freedom and how and under what conditions do they tend towards domination as a way of suggesting how the combative resources of the subject can be understood and bolstered.

Subjectivity

There is a latent tension between structure and agency in any work on subjectivity. For discourse analysts the problem is this: how can the subject be both a product of discourse and an originator of her own thoughts and actions such that she becomes accountable for them because she had a choice as to how to act? These tensions exist in Foucault's work also. Foucault demonstrated how disciplinary power and bio power together determined the actions and subjectivity of the individual yet he was still interested in how a subject can free themselves from these constraints. In short how can the subject be both an effect of discourse and yet simultaneously possess agency?

This question of an individual who is constituted by discourse, or a structural understanding of the subject, yet has agency is one that has haunted social science as Burr (2003) explains at some length. Foucault eventually settled on a position and Hoy (1986) follows. Hoy (1986) points out that a structural understanding of what an individual *can do* does not claim to

explain what an individual *will do*. Agency is to be understood as a selection of options from a range offered by the structure or discourse. Foucault (1994d) states that the subject can ‘constitute themselves’ in an active fashion but they may not invent new models but use the models they find around them, imposed on them by their culture, social group or their society. But the unanswered question still remains as to why an individual chooses one path or becomes attached to a particular position (Burr, 2003).

To arrive at his stance on subjectivity, Foucault (1993) reconsidered his earlier work and concluded that when he wrote *Discipline and Punish* he focused too much on techniques of domination. He would now come to understand the operation of power as a complex relation that included a subtle integration of coercive-technologies and the technologies of the self. Technologies of domination must be examined for the way they access technologies of the self. That is, techniques of the self become integrated into structures of coercion and domination. Elsewhere he repeats that he has insisted too much on technologies of domination and from then on will be more interested in studying the interactions with oneself and others through technologies of individual domination and technologies of the self that one exercises upon oneself (Foucault, 1994l).

Foucault posits then the existence of an area interior to us where we exercise technologies of the self that are separate and autonomous from external technologies of subjugation. Hook (2007, p268) theorises this space as a place where there can be a ‘phenomenology of effect’. Hook theorises that governments rely on the individual to deliver its power-agenda and therefore manipulates this free space within individuals to over-determine that the state’s perpetual agenda of directed-hate is enacted throughout society. Hook (2007) approaches this

space from a point of view of psychology but agrees that we may not know the detail of its psycho-processes.

Deleuze (2006) carries out a brief survey of Foucault's work to claim that just as he and others (see Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982) have been able to identify a thread of power in Foucault's earlier work that was to come to the fore in his later works, so too there can be discerned a consistent thread of a concern with the individual in Foucault's work that was to come to the fore in his work on sexuality. This thread, claims Deleuze (2006), consists of a pre-occupation in Foucault's work with the folding of the exterior into the interior of the self.

This domain of the self and of subjectivation is as, Hook (2007) stated, not an unproblematic one. For instance *In the History of Sexuality: The care of the Self* Foucault states that our present day understanding and use of sexuality is part of a deployment of power and to say 'yes' to sex is not an act of defiance but to only fall into a wider deployment of power.

Foucault (1994d) later states that rather than talk about being sexuality liberated it is more meaningful to talk about the freedom to be able to express and choose one's sexual desires.

How then are we to interpret an expression of sexual desire? This problematic is explored in more detail below in the section *The Care of the Self*.

A careful and considered approach is needed in the study of the subject and subjectivity under the model that the latter Foucault posits of knowledge, power and now ethics of the self. Foucault's earlier works show that it is clear that people are constrained in their actions by considerable forces, not least material forces, but to posit a subject without agency, without some power over the self, would be to posit an extremely limited individual. There is

an 'excess' of the subject that a structural analysis cannot account for (Williams, 2002). I take my cue from Hook (2007) in that the details of this agency may never be fully understood.

The remainder of this chapter focuses on investigating, in the light of accompanying theory, some of the ways the teachers as subjects of: knowledge, power, and the self are produced by, constrained, and resist the discourse of disability as it operates in schools. As noted above the distinction in the analysis between knowledge, power, and the self interlock and intertwine and so will the analysis.

Subjects of Knowledge

For Foucault knowledge exists in discourses. This is how Foucault links power to knowledge. The discourse creates a certain knowledge about subjects over whom power can then be exercised in the name of that knowledge. 'There can be no knowledge without a particular discursive practice and that discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge that it formed' (Foucault, 1998, p201).

Foucault, writing of eighteenth century disciplinary institutions of law, economics and science noticed that:

...the formation of knowledge and the increase of power regularly reinforce one another in a circular process such that any mechanism of objectification could be used as an instrument of subjection, and any growth of power could give rise to possible branches of knowledge.

(Foucault, 1975, p 224)

Foucault often wrote of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory and how they had shown that any formation of great systems of knowledge had the effects of enslavement (Foucault, 1994a). He acknowledges that knowledge does not necessarily automatically become embroiled in power nor that knowledge cannot be true (Foucault, 1994d). What his work is pointing out is that modern systems of power have found a way of linking knowledge to truth such that power becomes wielded through the creation of knowledge. These relations of power-knowledge are not static but subject to constant modification and continual shift (Foucault, 1989). Knowledge then can be contested as part of an attempt to shift power relations and to establish alternate subjectivity. Knowledge will affect or grant subjectivity, accepted in the name of knowledge by some, and refused in the name of knowledge by others.

The following excerpt illustrates how a new subjectivity is arrived at through a certain knowledge of disability, namely that of what dyslexia is or isn't. This teacher was diagnosed with dyslexia whilst he was doing his BEd and the conversation at this point in the interview is about being diagnosed. It is quite a long excerpt but it is worth quoting in its entirety

H: Erm I don't think so, I think what it did make, it was more like a, OK now I understand some of the traits that I have cos, in my head even though I was going through teacher training and we had talks on dyslexia I still really, people see dyslexia as a really like people read the words backwards or they need the colour [...] they need that colour overlay to help them but for me it was more traits, my short term memory is really quite bad and I thought my memory is awful but I never really clicked that could be down to dyslexia or I read at a really

slow pace because I am struggling, not struggling but it just takes me a bit more time to understand and take in what I'm reading

Int: In a sense then it's been quite liberating for you then hasn't it?

H: Er, yer, I'd say that its really helped me understand some things that er, I just thought, oh that's H he's like that erm, and erm, it has, it has helped me understand more things that I can do to help me like post-it notes all over my classroom erm and I had a real, when I was diagnosed I had a real concern about reading aloud to my class, even before I was diagnosed. Before, when I was going into uni training to teach, one of the tasks were to share a book. I had a real anxiety about that because my reading, sometimes when I read I sometimes don't read the punctuation or I misread a word or I stop to think about that word and I have real anxiety about that but I found that with more practice I actually, I love reading books to my class now. I don't think I'd ask a child. I started off by saying "OK, who wants to read? Does this child want to read? Does this child want to read?" But I am now so secure in that and I, just the practice and the practice. I (still) understand that I'm going to get it wrong. That's made me more confident in it

Notice how before he was 'diagnosed' even though he was being instructed on what dyslexia is, he never identified with or recognised himself as being dyslexic. It seems the knowledge of what dyslexia is and isn't did match up with the experiences he was having. And even if

they did, as long as he himself was not labelled as being dyslexic it was not useful knowledge that he could use to inform his subjectivity. He could not for instance generalise across and conclude that other people have difficulty fitting into the norm so therefore he should not worry too much if he couldn't either. Not fitting into the norm was understood as strictly a private and case-by-case matter. It was only when the label was applied to him rather than others that there was a dramatic change in his subjectivity.

He seems to have willingly accepted the label of dyslexic under the medical scientific process of 'being diagnosed' even though he did not recognise dyslexia in himself as it was previously explained to him. The scientific process of 'being diagnosed' over-rules whatever he might have known about himself before. If you read his excerpt closely, the changes in behaviour that have been affected by this scientific process of diagnosis amounts to the placing of 'post-it notes all over his classroom', something he could have thought to have done before but no doubt would have been wary of revealing his need to do so and probably would have been raised as an issue by management. But now that he has been 'diagnosed with dyslexia' he now is enabled to do what he needed to do all along. What he gains in subjectivity is much more than what he gains behaviourally or practically from being diagnosed as being dyslexic. He gains a certain sense of freedom.

Being now known as dyslexic, he is able to take up that established and accepted position with respect to normality. Nothing about his abilities has changed and no modifications or adjustments are available to change his abilities. What this accepted knowledge has changed for him is his subjectivity. Notice how often in his narrative he uses the words 'anxiety' and 'concerns' to describe his pre-diagnostic self and afterwards the words 'secure' and 'confident' come to replace them. His subjectivity is still affected by normalcy but now rather

than being afraid of his differences he can work with them and accept them in a more settled way as he has agreed to have those differences acknowledged and policed in manner that normalcy will sanction, though restrict. Dyslexia has given him something like a passport with which to negotiate and be allowed in to the world of normalcy. So, when an assistant head after having had repeated problems with him handing in reports with errors commented “it’s almost like you’re dyslexic” he acknowledges that he is, and only then could progress be made towards completing the reports to the expected format.

But he does not have *carte blanche*, he has to take up his place in the hierarchy of normalcy. He also will be subjected to the school’s understanding under its special educational needs knowledge as to what he can and cannot do. He now has to know and accept that there is something *wrong* with him, that others are more expert in it than he is and he has to govern the relationship with himself and others in the light of this. Talking about a recent visit by OFSTED he said:

so spelling wasn't too much of an issue erm, I don't know what I would do, I think erm, just through fear myself of letting the school down erm, not letting them down but to having that view

(Participant H)

Whilst he may feel comfortable talking to colleagues about his dyslexia, there was a limit to which that would be attempted. He wasn’t going to explain his dyslexia to the OFSTED inspector. He was just happy that he ‘did not let the school down’, the same school that are now well informed of his dyslexia. The governing of himself, his dyslexia and his relation to the school now involves ‘not letting them down’, but if the school knows he is dyslexic then

how could his spelling be ‘letting them down’? There is a complex relation and narrative still going on in his head. He does not have full freedom.

This case also highlights another important point. In *Chapter Two: Meeting the Literature* it was often claimed in the literature that disabled teachers can be used to further enhance the knowledge that schools had and used about disabled children. Such a view takes a rather naive and simplistic view that this knowledge is unhinged from power. Such a view also wants to reify the purity or truth of the knowledge and so reinforce a scientific or medical understanding of what disability is or isn’t. Before H was diagnosed with dyslexia, he never saw himself as being dyslexic but after diagnosis it was he who had to adjust himself to the knowledge of what dyslexia was. At the time of being diagnosed, he did not, and may not have been in a position to have concluded that he did not meet the criteria of being dyslexic based on what he had previously been told dyslexia was. He did not need a colour overlay over his text to be able to read it or he didn’t read words backwards. Whatever further explanation was given him about dyslexia he did not decide that he did not sufficiently meet the criteria to be classed as a dyslexic.

I now move onto another participant to illustrate another example of subjectivity linked to knowledge.

In *Chapter Seven: The Special Educational Needs Discourse* I detail at some length how participant B resisted the knowledge that special educational needs claimed to have of her as someone who described herself as being dyslexic. Alongside her claim to an exalted position of the knowledge about dyslexia – she had “thirty-seven years of experience” (her age) – she placed a further claim that she had a ‘PhD in special educational needs’. Her position on the

status of special educational needs or professional knowledge about disability is then ambiguous. At times she would borrow from the medical knowledge of dyslexia to bolster her sense of self-esteem:

... but one of my standard scores was one hundred and thirty-eight and I can't remember which bit it was and a couple of the other ones [are] reported as being [...] within average ranges so with average ranges would mean eighty-five upwards so you've got... I am this person with this stupidly big discrepancy between parts of my cognitive ability

(Participant B)

Here she highlights that one of her scores from her tests for dyslexia was as high as one hundred and thirty-eight whilst her other scores were in the average range, with the average being eighty-five. Dyslexia has both subjugated her and provided her with knowledge of her superiority. Throughout the interview she spoke repeatedly about dyslexia: being dyslexic and working with pupils that had dyslexia. There is a sense in which she is endeared to the knowledge that she is dyslexic and would not really want to let go of it:

...so, yer, I am and I think, it's quite nice for the kids to see that I'm a doctor, they know I take my work very seriously my kids at schools [.....] because I'm part time they know that when I'm not being paid to work I volunteer in a school, they know I volunteer for charities they know that I tutor so that they know all the other stuff I do and they all know that it's absolutely tied to my doctorate and tied to my dyslexia and all the rest of it [laughter]

(Participant B)

She will below describe herself as having a ‘doctorate in dyslexia’. In the extract above she describes that she is ‘tied to her dyslexia’ with some humour added at the end. Much of her life and her thinking about life is refracted through the lens of dyslexia and when she comes to describe herself in the classroom it is very much a story centred around the knowledge of dyslexia:

Or, they think its brilliant because there's a lot of us in the special needs department who have dyslexia, so we are all very open about it and we're all quite (open) that you know dyslexia is not necessarily a helpful term because its huge erm, but we're all quite open about what bits we struggle on and actually at times if I can't spell a word I'm like miss just double check my spelling and that's across the kids and the kids will check my spelling and so I'm very open about it. The kids also know I'm doctor B so they know, 'what are you a doctor of' dyslexia 'but you can't spell' so it's quite, and there's a few of us and actually it was the same in my last school amongst, between the kids and the staff that where ever I worked staff have been very open about having dyslexia or what ADHD or whatever erm, the sort of neuro-diversities

(Participant B)

Her ambiguity about special educational needs and dyslexia within it continues: “dyslexia is not necessarily a helpful term” it’s “huge”, but it still remains very central to her narrative where images of freedom, dynamism, trust and camaraderie play out in quite vivid terms. Her dyslexia is the key to her being able to describe the scene as such.

In this extract there is also a strong sense of an alliance between teachers with disabilities and pupils. But an alliance against whom? It is an alliance against normative school pedagogy which insists on, amongst other things, the ability to spell correctly even, in the midst of learning how to spell as part of an education. B seems to be intent on inciting the children to join her in protest which they may do if they experience pedagogy around spelling as an absurdity. Notice how often the word 'open' is used in this narrative. It is an alliance then against disciplinary power as it is applied through the pedagogy of spelling that insists that spelling be done correctly. It is an alliance against the belief that because people with dyslexia are poor spellers, they should be ashamed of their spelling abilities and try hide it. It is also a direct alliance against management. After being asked if this type of behaviour was ever mentioned after a lesson observation this is the answer that was given:

Yer, absolutely yer, it's part of this whole debacle where they took me on, yer absolutely and I was like 'no I do that because I'm dyslexia and I'm not wrong' erm [double check that] so yer it has done and I'll [.....]

(Participant B)

My spelling is poor, and I may have options that are not open to B. When I am being observed teaching, I do many things to avoid making spelling errors. This can involve having written down difficult but important words on a piece of paper, avoiding using certain words, making sure that all the writing is done before the lesson observation and such strategies. Many, if not most teachers would do the same. These activities could be described as either trying to govern the relationship between self and management or maybe even tending towards being dominated. B sees no need to do this. Foucault (1994h) indicated, there is a

mutual incitement and provocation between power and resistance. B's actions indicate that trying to 'govern' the relationship between herself and management is not a viable option for her and that the path that leads towards provocation is the only path that will lead to her freedom.

The classroom in general was often cited as a place where the teachers said that they tried to educate their pupils about 'real disability':

Yeh, so we did, so we did do that as when I was form tutor as part of our role as a form tutor when we do talk about disabilities and tolerances and things like that and I said you know disability doesn't mean somebody with a white stick or in a wheel chair disability means loads of different things
[.....]

(Participant A)

Yes, exactly, which is kind of why I wanted to do this question and answer session with the staff, well I do it with the kids you see my tutor group every year, not right at the beginning but a few months in I'll have a tutorial and I'll just ignore what I'm supposed to be doing and I'll just say you can ask anything and I say I can't promise you I'll answer it but if it's too personal I'll explain that but you can ask anything and they do and that, and that works really well like you say you have to have that safe environment to do that.

(Participant G)

Participant's A remarks imply that she wants to debunk any idea that her disability is like other disabilities, e.g. "in a wheel chair" or having a "white" stick.' Her remarks about disability could be taken as a little unfortunate and need not be dwelt on here other than to say there is going to be the inevitable folding of the outside onto the inside. This will be manifested as maybe shown here in terms and contexts that are immediately inexplicable but have to be understood as the ways that we come to internalise, to different degrees, the discourses that subject us. This is not the only statement of its kind in my data.

However, all the participants showed stiff resistance to normalising discourses that grant full personhood to some whilst denying it to others (Rose, 1998). Certain statements taken in isolation and at face value would seem to support well-worn beliefs that people with disabilities are maladjusted, lack confidence, have poor self-image, and many other of a thousand tropes. It is better to ask 'how has someone come to believe this about themselves (or others), under what conditions and with what force' rather than take it as empirical evidence of what it claims to say. This is what is valuable about Foucault's work; he puts all our values and beliefs up for question, and in the process often releases those defined at the margins and forced to stay there through his thorough analysis taken from first principles.

Participant G's invitation to her pupils to talk bears no indication or inference that disability can be or is a negative. At the beginning of that excerpt she mentions a question and answer session with staff. G had asked the headteacher if she could speak to staff about wheelchair etiquette briefly at the beginning of the staff meeting. What was happening at the time in the school was that staff were grabbing the handles of her wheelchair and pushing her without asking her or seeking her wishes. Also, the area which had been designated for her to store her wheelchair in the staff room was often being used for the storage of other items instead.

This request to speak to staff was denied by the head teacher. This was the same school management that had suggest that G put a flag on her wheelchair and blew a whistle as she went round the corridor so as to increase the awareness of others to her presence. No matter how absurd the knowledge on one hand or how practical and important it is on the other, knowledge about disability must only be allowed to flow in one direction at this school.

Subjects of Power

One of the most informative insights about power of the many lessons Foucault teaches on the topic is that we are not subjects of the Sovereign to whom sovereignty has been distributed in the form of legal rights and the law. The juridical-discursive concept of law is by no means adequate to describe how power is exercised (Foucault, 1976). To understand power, it must be studied in its specificity (Foucault, 1994f). The book *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1975) has been one of the stalwarts for those who would want to conduct Educational Research after Foucault. In that book Foucault develops in detail his understanding of disciplinary power as a type of regimented power that gets driven into the soul to such a degree that we come to behave as if we are being continuously watched. Power has to be understood as being productive rather than repressive, it produces the subject that acts in accordance with its designs. I have drawn on this understanding of power as disciplinary power throughout this thesis.

To study power in its local specificity it must be understood to exist in relations and its mode of operation is to “act upon actions: an action on an action, on possible or actual future or present actions” (Foucault, 1994h). Power as understood as *relations of power* then can only be exercised over those who are free to act; we must allow them to act in order that we may constrain them (Tremain, 2015). There is a relationship of mutual incitement and struggle

between freedom and power. Domination only exists over those for whom all possible means of mobility is removed. Any intensification of power intended to suppress insubordination can only bring power up against its outer limits: domination of the other or their transformation into an adversary. (Foucault, 1994h).

Foucault (1994d) theorises three levels of power, offering a more thorough analysis of power than his previous works suggested: strategic relations, governmentality and domination. Strategic relations involve ‘games between liberties’ where the control of one over the other is contested and refuted. Governmentality represents an ethical dimension of power where one governs the relationship of self to itself and also governs the relationship with others. The analysis of this level of power is important because it is often through such techniques of government that domination is arrived at and maintained. And finally there is domination itself. *Chapter Nine: Governance* charts the changes in the role and status of the headteacher over recent decades to become the present day ‘Super Head’. This move through several stages of governmentality can be viewed as a move towards relations of power that tend ever more towards domination.

The levels of power that are referred to as governmentality are dealt with in the following places: in the next section of this chapter I deal with *The Care of the Self* where I look at the technologies of government or governmentality of the self, *Chapter Eight: Governmentality* looks at governmentality at the level of the state and in *Chapter Nine: Governance* I interrogate technologies of governance by the school. In this section I examine subjectivity in relation to power that has been pushed towards being adversarial and subjectivity that has been pushed towards being dominated.

Subjectivity Affected by Being Dominated

If power exists in relations, then as it tends towards domination it can be assumed that there will be a building up of the view that power wants to dominate. To the extent that domination is victory over freedom then the victory can only be complete when the dominated know that they are dominated. So, some expression or interpretation of ill-intention from power directed at self is expected. Such a view is expressed by participant J below.

I really shouldn't have gotten into trouble for it but it's just you know they
find a way of just not being happy with you no matter what

(participant J)

In many ways I would describe participant J as 'a fighter'. There are other participants I could easily draw on to illustrate her point above. Participant J was on the verge of actively looking for a way out of the teaching profession as she had grown tired of the workload and of negative feedback and comments made by management centred on her disability. In that sense she is not dominated by power as she may exercise her right to just leave the teaching profession.

I look at the narrative of participant J primarily because her narrative throughout the course of the interview changed from describing herself as a 'social justice warrior' at the beginning of the interview, to advocating taking a view of disability as an opportunity for personal development towards the end of the interview when she succeeds in reversing the binary able/disabled or at least finds accommodation within that binary . First, I highlight tendencies in her narrative that make this orienting towards being dominated by power more amenable.

Like many of the participants, if not nearly all, participant J showed ambiguity about the nature of disability when difficulties with others arose:

Int: You mentioned having issues with the schools, you said that they were always issues with schools.

J: Yes but part of it is I think is me and part of it is I don't, I have not really met a teacher in this country that's happy as a teacher in this country [unfortunate to say] and I have a habit of making life more difficult for myself.

As Dudley-Marling (2004) noted, nobody can be disabled on their own. In the interview these instances of ambiguity as to who she was would only come in relation to other people or the environment. A certain fluidity of self is of course important else reversion to fixed and static positions will result. Foucault (1994d) in fact notes that the focal point of living ethically is to learn to play games of power without wanting them to tend towards dominating others. But it is not certain that J has a clear and critical understanding of disability in a social and cultural context to make the kinds of compromises that will still allow her to retain her combative resources. Consider the following:

I can only imagine what these kids feel like of being in class of not knowing what the hell the teacher's talking about being afraid to put my hand up because I was that child worried I was going to say the wrong thing because I didn't hear correctly or just I had low self-confidence when I was a child anyway (Participant J)

She is suggesting here that she had low self-esteem as a child because of her hearing loss. In much of her narrative she spoke about the need for social justice but the connection to subjectivity was on the whole absent. She does not conclude that the sense of low self-esteem as a child with a hearing loss in that classroom was probably almost wholly the result of how she was treated in that classroom. To what extent could a child be held responsible for its own self-esteem? The answer is probably none. This notion of self-esteem is very much an individualising creation in which people are to be held responsible for the position in society they find themselves. Rose (1998) explains that self-esteem is an expression of the relation of the self to the self that is made governable by others. It becomes possible to govern another person by the relationship they have with themselves and to hold them accountable for that in an individualising manner. A child in a classroom should never be judged according to some notion of self-esteem.

Participant J also included in her narrative:

due to the hearing loss and that's not fair but I didn't fight it because I don't do that. I just kind of take it, bitch about it to someone else (laughter) and then [.....] blame, which I know

(Participant, J)

Deleuze (2006, p94) as quoted previously suggested that in examining subjectivity we ask ourselves “What can I do, what power can I claim and what resistances may I encounter?” In the situation described here, J does not try to claim any other power and hence meets no resistance. It is not that she has no power or that she does not exercise any power at all. What she refuses to do, for now, is to challenge the existing power relation. Instead she folds it

within herself and ‘bitches’ to others about it later. It is easy to surmise that what she folds within herself will eventually come to affect her subjectivity. Her ambiguity and uncertainty are again highlighted in the following excerpt:

...but there would still be part of me that would wonder if me asking for help in what I needed would work against me by saying I need this, because I don't need a lot

(Participant, J)

Note how she first identifies the discourses that would be against her ‘what I needed would work against me’ which she then immediately reacts to by claiming ‘because I don’t need a lot’.

The point at which she turned more fully from being a ‘social justice warrior’ in the interview was at the point where I was asking for her insights and thoughts about the limits of disability; when can a reasonable adjustment be considered too much or when can a person’s disability be considered to be incompatible with a job? Before she was quite sure:

Yes, in terms of the fact that even with the disability you can accomplish whatever and that you shouldn't let it stop you from doing what you want to do and what you can do and don't let anyone tell you otherwise

(Participant, J)

But after arriving at the point in the discussion where a close relative of hers was refused the role of a policeman because of his hearing loss and subsequent discussion around this she changed her stance. She concluded that it was right for him to have been rejected from joining the police because of his hearing loss.

This is just the type of arm-chair philosophising and speaking for others that Foucault (1994i) was against. Only those who understand and have their own interests at heart should engage the struggle (Blacker, 1998). It is not for others to decide for people with a hearing loss whether or not they should fight to join the police. In making such judgements, invariably dominant and normative discourses are invoked to form opinions. This becomes our own will to knowledge as we profess to know what is best for other people. It is for people themselves to decide which battles should be fought. J was quite adamant that coming to this county and being a teacher was the hardest thing she had ever done. But she did it. In invoking normative discourses about what others should or should not do she loses sight of the specificity of her own struggle. She concludes the interview soon afterwards on a note far removed from that of the social justice warrior that she started out on:

Yer and like for me like what we mentioned earlier I now have a lot of empathy for kids that struggle and so I think that's what's made me a better teacher and that's what's made me a better human being so I think instead of looking at it as stopping them from doing something they have to think about now what they're able to do because of it but that will only come with personal development and change I think that's it for me

(Participant, J)

The binary able/disabled is being reversed here as she attempts to find accommodation within it. People with disabilities should now look to the positives of being disabled. This represents a fixing of the positions and relations able/disabled; this distinction is no longer to be contested. Further analysis of her narrative reveals she understands that it is not a disabling society that is stopping people from achieving but it is the disability and they should not let that stop them from achieving. The advice is that each individual disabled person look about them and see what is the best that they can do. The dominant normative strategies of neo-liberalism of turning people to think only in terms of personal development and personal change has now been completed in J. In *Chapter Eight: Governmentality* I look at how we are led to be subjects of a certain type that values qualities of personal development and so have no need to ask for structural and material changes in society.

Participant J is attempting to make all the right moves as a free subject of liberalism, but the forces arrayed against her are more than she can combat. And it is not reasonable to expect any one person to be able to combat such overwhelming forces. It is a shame that so often the humanistic attempts to bring about a more equal society so often end up as just another form of domination as Foucault has shown with, for example of so-called prison reform, and with so-called sexual liberation. Campbell (2015) notes that until the idea of the autonomous sovereign liberal subject is overthrown and replaced with a humanness that is understood in terms of relationality the paternalistic strategy of 'care' will be needed as a protectionist measure for those at the margins.

Subjectivity Pushed Towards Being Adversarial

As noted above, Foucault (1994h) wrote that when power over-steps its mark it will come against its limit resulting in domination of the other or their transformation into an

adversary. So both are born of the same origin but the outcome is different in each case. In *Chapter Six: The Special Educational Needs Discourse* and as discussed in this chapter, the intransigence and insubordination of participant B has been well illustrated. I do not need to repeat those excerpts here. Participant B's narrative also included references to her being 'the best choice', 'being very good', being 'a specialist' and being 'smart. For the purposes of my analysis I do not need to include those quotes here either.

What I want to focus on is an analysis of the resources she is able to draw on to arrive at such a subjectivity. Participant B's view of management and experiences of repeated confrontation over many things, including issues that centred around her disability were almost identical in nature to participant J's experience that I have just covered above. It cannot be concluded that the difference in subjectivity is based only, or even mainly, on different events or ethos in the schools they had worked in. I postulate that the differences in subjectivity are mainly due to the resources that each are able to draw on. I will attempt to identify the resources that participant B was able to draw on to stiffen her resistance to domination. She presented a very consistent narrative of both her high ability as a teacher and also of resistance to domination.

To begin with then, despite her many pupil-centred narratives, B was the only teacher interviewed that was prepared to express how they governed the relationship with themselves and the pupils in the following way:

It's nothing to do with teaching the kids. It's to do with rescuing the kids and transforming their lives. I think this, I know I don't want to take the kids

home, I've got two kids and I've got a child growing that's enough now, but
I think, especially younger teachers there's an ideal as, idealism

(Participant B)

She is aware of imposing personal limits between herself as a teacher and herself in other capacities especially that of a parent. I covered in *Chapter Five: Discourse Which Constrain* Foucault's theory of pastoral power that must always be 'prepared to sacrifice itself for the life of the flock' (Foucault, 1994h). This becomes expressed in education as a narrative of 'saving the children'. B seems to transcend this 'need to save the children' or at least have a wish to do so. Further to this, she worked part-time as a teacher and part-time for a children's charity so there she again maintained a distance from being embroiled with the school.

The next point I want to raise is centred around meeting her own needs and not wavering or doubting herself because of these needs. This point is as much an effect as an affect of subjectivity, but it is still worth making. The part of our subjectivity that is not determined by discourse can perhaps take something from it and use it. Consider the following excerpt from her interview:

Int: Ms B I see that you are dyslexic, what support would you need to
be able to do, make a success of this job

B: On paper they have their 'Is there anything we can do to make your
job more accessible [...] and I've always said generally not

Int: On paper

B: Erm, yer, on paper, they say the option, I always say I need
sometimes need more time to read stuff, erm

In this excerpt the near-constant insubordination and intransigence to forms of authority, law or management, is again present. But after asking for what she needs from a power structure, the good intention of which she is doubtful, she does not return that doubt upon herself. The ambiguity of law and of the process of equality is not her ambiguity but is the ambiguity of law. Her actions indicate that she is quite clear about that. In her narrative throughout the whole interview, she does not tell of a point anywhere where she re-considered or questioned anything she had done in the past to gain equality. In chapters eight and nine this ambiguity of and in law and of equality legislation and policy is discussed in detail.

My final point is the most important. She has outside resources that she can draw on to bolster the combative aspects of her subjectivity:

Or the conversation ended when I wrote, the discourse between us ended when I said if you continue to do this, I will sue you for discrimination basically. My dad works for Citizen's Advice so me and my dad put together a stonking 'don't you dare tell my daughter that she can't use what she needs'

(Participant B)

And:

No, I was near it and if they had carried on then I would have, I'm feisty and I would have gone for the jugular, I'm also privileged in like my parents, there's a lot of financial capital and a lot of cultural capital behind me, I am very lucky not everybody has that

(Participant B)

And:

...but she is used to not having people argue back and I am head strong, very head strong with lot of amazing back up and a support network that would walk over hot coals for me and again not everybody has that so fortunate

(Participant B)

She is aware of her privileged position. Her financial privilege means that she is not dependent on immediate employment for financial well-being. Her cultural privilege gives her the cultural capital to refuse to be intimidated by class, language or social status. Her words, actions and intentions are far less likely to be doubted and brought into question by a potential third party. Of more importance as a lesson for my work is the fact that she is able to call on help from others who are also in a position of authority.

Because power is so diffused in modern society it becomes more difficult to focus the struggle against it. But also, because it is so diffuse, many others are also empowered and their help is essential in the struggle. Deleuze and Foucault (1972) in conversation made the point that the struggle belongs to those who are subjugated by power in its specificity but if

others want to help then they can do so by fighting alongside them precisely at the point where they suffer the oppression. In the excerpt above, help was available, not in the form of overseeing or directing the struggle, but right at the specific point where it may be needed.

The Care of the Self

The care of the self represents the last period of Foucault's work. As noted above, at a certain point Foucault (1994i) said that he had focussed too much on the study of power and was from then on more interested in studying the care of the self. In critiquing Foucault for his over-focus or over reliance on power in his analysis of society, many writers (Scheurich & McKenzie, 2005; Said, 1986) either ignore or dismiss this phase of his work and suggest that what he should have done instead was to have wrote the genealogy of resistance just as he had written the genealogy of power.

Foucault did make some clear statements on the issue of resistance. Firstly, he notes that we have as a society become more concerned with truth rather than the care of the self and wonders why this should be so (1994d). He goes on to state that resistance then will need to take the form of playing another game of truth or holding trump cards in the game. In other places (Foucault, 1994h) he suggests that we refuse the subjectivity of individualism offered us today in favour of a new subjectivity of our own making. The challenge being '...we need to produce something that doesn't exist yet, without being able to know what it will be' (Foucault, 1997f, p275). Finally, Foucault does say that in order to understand relations of power we do need to investigate forms of resistance to power (Foucault, 1994h).

Too simple and too narrow a focus on resistance risks the fixing of positions abled/disabled and descending into a kind of identity politics that pays homage to the power. People are not oppressed because they are disabled, such a view only naturalises disability as something worthy of oppression. Disabled people are oppressed because other people oppress them through a process that can be termed ableism. That is the other side of the coin and that story needs to be told from that other side. The question of why ableism occurs has been explored in *Chapter Three: Disability and Discourse* and in *Chapter Nine: Governance* there is an exploration of how it is done. It may be good for Disability Studies to find a way to express freedom that does not rely on reifying disability or in foregrounding it as an object. This is Foucault's challenge.

Still, for a long time, I struggled to understand why Foucault had framed this phase of his work, the care of the self, as he did in terms of the contents of his books *The History of Sexuality Volumes II & III*, (Foucault 1985; 1986). Like Doran (2015), I found the books atheoretical and its 'authoritarian, rule-based' (Besley, 2015, p1447) descriptions of Greco-Roman life left me wondering why these books were held up to be the completion of the journey for Foucault's followers. It was Doran's explanation that Foucault was using the Greco-Roman subject to illustrate how a subject can be concerned with freedom and truth despite surrounding discourses that helped me to understand and move forward. Foucault was not holding up authoritarian rule-based subjectivity as the ideal, it was just one example of how a subject can be concerned with its own freedom in the midst of discourses that would want to constitute it in a certain way. Doran (2015) explains that Foucault's turn to the care of the self was a long time in coming. Foucault could see in his research that people were able to turn themselves into a different type of subject than the one suggested by dominant discourses so he had to start researching both parts of the subject and power dyad.

The books on sexuality II & III were first steps along the road but the result were works that appeared merely phenomenological in nature.

This phase of Foucault's work can be understood as a return to allowing space for the subject that is not just an effect of power or of discourse. Recall from above, Foucault allowed for an area interior to the self that was free from, or beyond technologies of domination and where technologies of the self could operate. This space Hook (2007, p269) described as allowing for a 'phenomenology of effect' to occur. Both Besley (2015) and Doran (2015) stop a little short of this and deny that Foucault was now allowing for some type of phenomenology in his work. But I think Foucault is allowing for a theoretical space within the self that is free, if only free to choose from a range of given options. The following quote from Foucault, cited in Besley (2015, p1445) indicates Foucault's thinking further:

We have to make distinctions. In the first place, I don't think there is actually a sovereign, founding subject, a universal form of subject that one could find everywhere. I am very sceptical and hostile towards this conception of the subject. I think in the contrary that the subject is constituted through practices of subjection, or, in a more anonymous way, through the practices of liberation, of freedom, as in Antiquity, starting of course from a certain number of rules, styles and conventions that are found in the culture.

Foucault, cited in Besley (2015, p1445)

This mirrors the quote from Foucault (1994d) above where he says that we use discourses not of our own making and he links this process more explicitly to the possibility of

freedom. He will say in the same interview that the shift in his work to the care of the self represents a shift from the passive to the active subject. Foucault is positing more in his later works than that we have a choice as to how we are constituted by discourse. We can either be the passive subject of disciplinary power or we can be active in constituting ourselves as something more, but using those discourses we find around us, that are imposed on us. Yates & Hiles (2010) use the example of the liberal discourses of 'rights' as one such discourse that can be used in the name of freedom.

So it is problematic. On the one hand poststructuralism has critiqued liberalism for its theory of the 'choosing subject', yet here Foucault is suggesting something similar. On the one hand Foucault always warned about being entrapped in wider deployments of power, yet he is suggesting that if we choose those selfsame discourses then it is an act of freedom. Yates & Hiles (2010) suggest we proceed, but proceed with caution and always be suspicious of the objects of knowledge that we use.

To begin the analysis of the data then; Foucault (1994d) said in interview that one of the lessons one learns by the care for the self is that by doing that it becomes possible to care for others through managing how the relationship between self and other is governed, though the interviewer had to press him to concede that the care of the self involved the care for others. The following illustrates the kind of problems that can occur when we transfer how we care for ourselves on to others. This is what one of the teachers said in relation to one of her pupils:

I knew her mum actually through a choir that I sing in erm and she had similarly cerebral palsy to me and I was the only teacher who ever, got her

to do her homework. She was very lazy and I think that's the thing. I think that there's a kind of tip-toeing around isn't there? Sometimes students [...] like she's you know, she's a great girl but really lazy and it wasn't her cerebral palsy that's making her lazy. She was just quite lazy and so everyone would be going 'oh yes its really difficult for her' My argument would be, 'yes it's difficult for her so probably she needs to try more than anybody else'.

(Participant G)

Some disabled pupils are lazy and some non-disabled pupils are lazy and if this pupil has found a way of using her disability as an excuse to be lazy then that is probably quite smart of her in the way of a child. The teacher is trying to pass onto the pupil what she herself has learnt from her experiences about the need for hard work as she indicated elsewhere in interview:

G: Well because I'm disabled so they think that must mean that I'm not as good at doing my job as other people, the kids never think that but the adults do

Int: What marking the books or planning the lessons?

G: Everything, yer I think everything really and they, but by the same token they also don't understand that the fact that I do that job means that I do nothing else

In *Chapter Six: The Special Educational Needs Discourse* I used much of this teacher's narrative to build up the theory of the *Disability Trap*. This teacher's career was in danger as, amongst other things, she could no longer keep up with the workload. In line with the stance taken in this thesis, I cannot say that she is wrong to have worked so hard, as Corker (1999) maintains: to suggest that particular augments and experiences are wrong is to be ruled by theory. I can only critique it. Further, it is one thing for the teacher to work very hard, but it is another to pass that on as an instruction to someone else. The pupil in this instance may actually know more than the teacher because there is the danger of a 'supercrip' mentality creeping in with this type of advice as shown in the following excerpt:

I don't, well look, it's quite strange that as compared to my siblings I've got far more qualifications than them. However they left school with far more than me and it's very much your chip on your shoulder that drives you and that is what my last book was very much about; researching dyslexics who were successful and I compared it to those who were not successful, who were less successful to find common ground. I'm driven to make a difference

(participant E).

There is a sense in this extract that E feels like he has been 'driven' more than others and that is the secret of his success and also that of other disabled people that have been successful. It is fine for him to have worked hard to achieve what he has achieved but it is problematic for him to tell other disabled people to do the same. Peers (2015) notes that in all her time as an athlete and competing in the Paralympics, despite her designs to use the platform of her success to say something other about disability, she was always silenced on this and was used

instead to convey the normative message of the ‘courage to overcome adversity’. Peers (2015) concluded that although she thinks the ‘supercrip’ useful for the purposes of analysing normalising discourses, she probably only did harm to the cause of disability and that those who outright refused to join her in the quest for hyper-normality probably knew much more than she did.

The word ‘impairments’ allows itself to be used in the service of allowing others to govern disability. The word ‘impairments’ allows the knowledge of others to gain the status of informed participants. From that position they can then come to govern disabled people. My own disability varies with my pleasures and desires. It is not a module that can be taken out, repaired and replaced. To talk about my disability in the terms that impairment allows is to subject my whole self to be governed and judged by others. That is not to say that others cannot help it is to say that I do not want my whole being subjected to public scrutiny in the way that people with disabilities always have their selves transformed into public property.

To return to Foucault’s explanation of the care of the self; the care of the self is a concern for ethical living based on the self. Foucault (1994i) wrote that because we have been taught that morality is based on external rules, it is difficult for us to envisage a morality based on the care of the self. Doran (2015, p150) writes that Foucault emphasised that the care of the self involved avoidance of an ‘unhealthy curiosity’ with others. The care of the self can also be understood in terms of resistance, how one actively resists power relations that tend towards domination.

Foucault (1994a) wrote that the care of the self as a practice of freedom and a life of aesthetics is the ability to define and live one’s life based on what one has learnt. A practice of

freedom for the teachers then would be to be able to define for themselves what disability is for them and how they would like to govern themselves in relation to themselves and govern the relationship between self and others. Following Foucault, Yates & Hiles (2015) adds to this by saying that finding out from the participants themselves what they find ‘intolerable’ about how they are governed and told to govern themselves should be the focus of the work on ethics.

Finding ways to help them with this specific problem should be the outcome or aim of the research. As noted above, Mayo (2000) critiqued much work that claimed to follow Foucault by stating that these works never contain any consideration as to how the research participants were involved in a discussion with self about being constituted as subjects of a certain type. Illustrating how the research participants are involved in a discussion about their own constitution as subjects, and knowing how they would like to govern the relationship with themselves and with others, I can now see are two sides to the same coin.

Participant A in her interview exhibited something of a journey in her narrative of how she had come to govern the relationship between self and others. Consider the following extract:

You know so from my perspective as someone with a physical disability it’s exclusionary. So, so I had those experiences [basically] that meant why would I tell people.

(Participant A)

Here participant A is saying that she manages the relationship between herself and others by keeping quiet about her disability, somewhere else in the interview she would say that she would hide her disability:

Int: We have a problem with teaching as performance don't we?

A: But actually that's one of the ways, one of the ways I got round it was actually through the idea that it wasn't actually me as a disabled person I could hide my disability by performing [...] classroom..

What she found 'intolerable' was the manner in which she felt unable to manage the relation between herself and others as seen in the excerpt below:

It's always strangers I would say or people who know you less that might make a comment about it erm, does it bother me? I think it probably does a little bit, not in a kind of like I'm going to get upset, it's just annoying I think

(Participant A)

Here participant A is describing how others, especially strangers feel free to pass derogatory remarks about her disability and she does not see the power relation as being one in which she is able to answer back or to prohibit such derogatory remarks. At other times however she would act in a more determined manner to govern the relation between herself and others:

So from bad experiences if I didn't have to say it I wouldn't do. Now I'm like
[...] I'm going to just like, yeh, this is me this is what you get, you know I
can't change it

(Participant A)

Participant A is stating here that from now on she is going to take charge of the relationship between herself and others: 'this is what you get'.

Participant F in her interview indicated a consistent narrative of governing the relation between herself and others by refusing to be cast as a deficit by others. In the excerpt below she also refuses to categorise herself:

A bit like somebody would say', 'are you a poor reader', I'd go, 'no I'm a slow reader', but I read it three times but my god by the time I've read it I really know, I know what it says as opposed to chooo

(Participant F)

There are other extracts I could have chosen, ones which reference disability, such as the one below:

I'm actually quite proud of saying, 'gosh look where I've got to and I'm a dyslexic artist', and people go, 'oh don't put yourself down', and I'm thinking in my head actually I'm not putting myself down I'm putting myself [up] I'm really proud of what I've done, I know the effort the work I've gone through and I know I [.....]

(Participant F)

One of the themes running through this thesis is that one should not tell another person what to do, one can only help them at the point where they ask for assistance. So if people with disabilities want to express freedom in terms of disability then that is their choice. As Foucault indicated, we are only using the discourses we find around us that have been imposed on us.

However, I want to highlight that in the first extract from F the discourse of disability is not being drawn on; it does not reference that normalising discourse. Participant F only references herself as a 'slow reader', an attempt on her part at a description of things she can and cannot do without labelling them as being a disability or 'poor'. This excerpt illustrates well what I became increasingly interested in whilst doing this research work which is to examine ways in which one can break out of the encirclement of the discourse on disability in which both oppression and freedom are expressed in terms of disability; i.e. 'disabled people are oppressed so they need to be protected as disabled people'. By proceeding along these lines a way may be found to resist the subjugation offered. Foucault writes:

The conclusion would be that the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualisation linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality that has been imposed on us for centuries. (Foucault 1994h, p336)

Foucault is here saying that we need to find new forms of subjectivity that are not of the type of individualisation that is linked to the state. Consider the following excerpt:

Yeh, and [...] it was really bizarre I found it really odd. I mean in the end I had to get intervention in, I had to get, we had to have a meeting, our deputy head.

(Participant A)

Participant A is not facing the struggle alone, not as the individual that the discourse might have interpolated, but she is seeking alliances with others who can help her in some aspects of the specificity of the struggle. And it could be understood that she is doing this through discourses she finds around her such as 'seeking support'. Participant A would at other times also resist attempts to separate her out and individualise her:

I think if you don't understand how pain works in the body you don't really know the effect of it and in teaching you feel the, it's so hierarchical, isn't it, it's so [...] politics personally, you know oh we can't tell the teachers that because of, you know, and like they're adults they're not students, we should be able to share [.....]

(Participant A)

Here participant A is alluding to the fact that she is being instructed by management to govern the relation between herself and others through a silencing, through a keeping of herself to herself and of not seeking the companionship of others. Through such isolating practices the subjection of a person as a 'disabled person' is made easier. The opposite, of seeking

companionship or of sharing what she wanted to say about her disability would be to experience life as a valid member of a community who has information about the diversity of the human condition she would like 'to share'. Note how participant A places herself within the context of schools as disciplinary institutions; 'it's so hierarchical'. This attempt by the school of instructing her how to govern the relation between herself and others she finds intolerable and is resisting. Foucault (1994h) said that we face a form of power today that is both individualising and totalising. The totalising power of the hierarchical disciplinary school is being used in the service of trying to individualise participant A and isolate her.

Attempts to manage the relation between self and others in opposition to directions from the dominant group may be better conducted from a position of power-relations that tend not towards being dominated. Participant A illustrates the combative resources she can deploy in the following excerpt:

Yes there was an issue [.....] at that time and, so we got the deputy head, another head of department in and her and she was like, 'I oh didn't realise' and I'm like, 'you're a', you know that kind of feigning ignorance, and I'm like, 'do my crutches not tell you anything the fact that I was off like months not tell you anything'?

(Participant A)

The discourse of disability as a deficit would be much more difficult to construct without the underlying discourse of normality, individualisation and disciplinary power. Examples of breaking out of, or resisting, each of these discourses has been offered above. I conclude that if ways can be found to break out of these discourses in the terms they are originally

constructed, i.e. normality, individualisation and disciplinary power, then maybe freedom can be spoken about not in terms of disability but in terms of freedom itself. I end this section, then, with some excerpts from the teachers about how they would like to govern the relationships between themselves and others.

I've never had a chat with someone saying 'Er look we know that you've got dyslexia with a stammer what, just what can we do to support you with your job and your work', never had that, never been mentioned at all.

(Participant E)

...they don't seem to allow me is to have an attitude to play things how I want to play things

(Participant, G)

Being different, I don't want to be treated differently but in order for me to thrive sometimes I have to be treated a bit differently

(Participant J)

I would like the opportunity to be openly dyslexic I just think with the people I work with

(Participant H)

And finally, participant F, in the excerpt below, seems to have taken on the care of the self in its much fuller meaning in that she also understands the importance of not dominating herself either:

... no I think it's good that you have to jump through some hoops sometimes that take you totally out of your comfort zone they almost test your theory on yourself of yourself

(Participant F)

Doran (2015) suggested that in order to truly care for yourself you have to become a theorist of the self as F is illustrating above.

Conclusion

The way I have covered subjectivity in this chapter is just one of several that could have been chosen. For instance, I could have chosen to study subjectivity through an exploration of truth: subjects of truth. Our everyday understanding of knowledge is that it needs to have the status of truth for it to be understood as knowledge. Foucault presents a much more troubled relationship between knowledge and truth and he also links 'games of truth' to freedom. So 'truth' would be another candidate through which to view subjectivity; how do the participants attempt to establish the truth about themselves, through which games of truth and following what rules?

What I have attempted to do in this chapter is to use my interview data to follow a path that Foucault suggests would be necessary, or productive, if ever we were to conduct a study of how we have come to be constituted as subjects in modern society. That is to investigate subjectivity through an examination of how we are constituted as: subjects of knowledge, subjects of power and as subjects in relation to the self and others. I hope I have had some success in focusing on these topics as they appear in their specificity, i.e. teachers in schools in general and in my data in particular.

I have tried to show how subjectivity is constrained by knowledge and power and also how subjectivity begins to escape the constraints of power and knowledge. In this chapter, power was seen to be related to subjectivity in the sense that the knowledge one accepted or rejected about oneself influences the relationship one assumes with others and the powers that one allows others to exercise over the self. This is the part of subjectivity attached to or depended on discourse. There is another part of subjectivity attached to the material. This concerns issues such as what relation one has with teaching, one's employment status and financial situation. Most importantly, for the purposes of my work it was seen that the external resources one is able to draw on in the struggle are paramount. There is another part of subjectivity that is autonomous of discourse, that is independent, the functioning of which we may never know. This part of subjectivity may relate to issues such as the care of the self which it was concluded is a private matter for each individual. The one central tenet of this care of the self that could be analysed by another was to identify the manner in which one wanted to manage the government of the relationship between the self and others.

I concluded by positing the theory that if resistance could be presented in terms of the underlying discourses that allow for disability to be constructed as it presently is, namely: normality, individualisation and a totalising disciplinary power, then freedom could be spoken about not in terms of disability but in the terms of freedom itself.

Chapter Eight: Governmentality

Introduction

In this chapter I critique the form of current legislation on equality and ask questions as to why it takes the form and use the words that it does. I set aside a historical analysis of the process by which it has evolved and focus instead upon a political analysis. This involves an assessment of the political context in which Equality Policy has to operate as well as a political analysis of the things it is used to achieve. A historical analysis would complement this work, but I have deemed this to be beyond the scope of my work. A combined historical and political analysis would begin to form what Foucault termed a ‘genealogy’.

Current legislation centres the word ‘reasonable’, i.e. reasonable adjustments, of which a historical analysis would have been educational and informative to my work. I argue instead that if current equality policy for people with disabilities centres so heavily the term ‘reasonable adjustments’ then the term can be critiqued as is, as it is the central theme of equality legislation. The current UK policy on equality is the Equality Act 2010 (UK Government 2010) and this is used as the bases for this chapter.

I begin the chapter with an exploration of ‘truth’. Foucault had a problematic with truth and I take the opportunity to explore this problematic and come to an understanding of how Foucault understood truth. I then extend this out to consider what can be said to be ‘true’ about disability and people with disabilities and the status of such truths. The subject of truth is important because equality policy bases itself on truth, the truth of what disability is and therefore how it disadvantages disabled people. The social model of disability opposes this view by positing that it is a normalising society that disadvantages disabled people. An alternative to basing equality legislation on truth would be to base it on equality, on the

equality of outcomes sort. I then move on to examine what relation the truth of disability has with Equality Legislation. There is then analysis of the current political situation in terms of what Foucault termed *governmentality* (Foucault, 1991). The chapter concludes with a section on how this equality legislation has and can be used by the teachers in my study given this political context.

The chapter is central to the thesis in that it seeks to establish the political foreground against which schools practise and in which equality policies evolve and operate. *Chapter Five: Discourses which Constrain* makes direct reference to the development of the political analysis developed here and contains examples of situations relating to the ability of the teachers to deploy the theories of power that are expounded on in this chapter. *Chapter Nine: Governance* follows directly from this chapter in that governmentality refers both to a relation of power and a practice. In chapter nine some of the principles of governmentality covered in this chapter are revisited in an analysis of the governmentality practiced by the school.

For the analysis to be specific it is important that the wording and form of current equality legislation be known and that is covered next.

Disability Equality Law: The Equality Act 2010

The Equality Act 2010 (EqA) (UK Government, Equalities Office & Equality and Human Rights commission (2010) distinguishes between *discrimination arising from disability* (s.15) and *discrimination because of disability* (s.15) The EqA defines disability as having an impairment that has substantial and long term effects on the ability to carry out normal day to day activities (s.6).

For the case of discrimination *because of disability*, discrimination occurs if the disabled person is treated less favourably than a non-disabled person would be, the reverse is not considered to be discrimination. This is so for the purposes of allowing for ‘reasonable adjustments’. Asymmetry in the treatment of people with disabilities vis-à-vis the non-disabled is allowed but this should not be understood as licence to practice positive discrimination (s.15; s.149; s.159). An example given by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (2019) could be that of a charity providing free travel for people with disabilities but not for others. Ignorance of the presence of a disability cannot be used as a defence.

For the case of discrimination *arising from disability* the following holds. Formal equality is based on the notion that *like should be treated as like*. Establishing that unequal treatment has taken place relies on the possibility that a suitable comparator can be found to establish the basis of *less favourable* treatment. This is not always possible such as in the case of a pregnant woman (Fredman, 2011). The EqA then rather than asking for the case of *less favourable* treatment to be proven only asks for *unfavourable* treatment to be proven, hence removing the need for a comparator to be found. The stringency of the provision is relaxed by allowing for a defence of ignorance of the person's disability or that discriminating in such a manner is a proportionate means of achieving legitimate objectives.

Whilst it may seem intuitive to place discrimination *because of disability* under the category of direct discrimination and discrimination *arising from disability* under the category indirect discrimination the EqA makes no such assertion. Indirect discrimination is covered under section 19 and states that actions that may adversely affect a group as a whole are only

defensible if an adequate justification can be shown and that there are no other means by which the same outcome can be achieved.

A duty is placed on service providers and private bodies providing a public service to make reasonable adjustments in order to accommodate the needs of disabled people. There are three situations or scenarios in which this is stipulated, two require anticipatory action the other one is in response to a request (s. 20). It is required of service providers and private bodies that provide a public function to take reasonable measures to have in place services and physical structures that will avoid the arising of disadvantage to people with disabilities. Schools are exempt from this as this would be covered as a part of their planning duties as places of education. But schools are not exempt in the role of an employer. Where an auxiliary aid would reduce substantial disadvantage then reasonable measures must be taken to provide that auxiliary aid. An employer is bound by these duties but only in a reactive manner, that is an employer need only provide these auxiliary aids for an identified disabled employee. Employers are generally not allowed to attempt to ascertain disability status before the offer of a job is made.

In addition to these specific duties there is public sector equality duty placed on all public authorities or those who exercise public functions to have due regard to promote policies that eliminate discrimination and advance equality of opportunity (s 149).

To summarise, the substance of the law comes down at bottom to a statement of the form; it is not permissible to directly discriminate against people with disabilities so long as, and up until, adjustments that are considered 'reasonable' can be made. Indirect discrimination, as with all groups, may be justifiable in the achieving of otherwise unachievable goals.

I next turn to examining what the truth of disability could be and how identical it is to the image of disability as presented in law.

Truth

For a very long time I could not come to an understanding of Foucault's position on truth. In many places he seems to refute the possible existence of truth itself and this must be one of the main reasons why students are often warned to stay away from 'dangerous' Foucault. And such advice seems self-evident when one is researching people who have been defined at the margins and forced to stay there as you want the 'truth' of their situation to be made manifest so that the equality can be addressed. Like at so many other points of potential stagnation with my understanding of Foucault, I am again indebted to another who began to show me the way forward; Seals (1998) it was this time who pointed to me the way. Seals uses his understanding of Foucault to illustrate that rather than the popular misconception that Foucault did not believe in truth; the truth of the matter is that Foucault did believe in truth and Foucault's position on truth is far removed from the popular postmodernist position that all truth is relative.

Following the example of Seals, I understand that Foucault did not necessarily dispute the authenticity of law, or even the case that we should be ruled by law. What Foucault objected to was how partial or non-truth was made to be appear as 'the truth' and how the judiciary, or the power of the judiciary, was made to appear to be 'the law' but not necessarily carried out through the legal processes but through processes of governmentality. Through these practices of governmentality the Disciplinary Society is increasingly refined and the processes of governing through the norm become less and less identifiable. Gordon (1994)

writes that the rise of the disciplinary society actually represented a defeat for the rule of law. Foucault (1994m) highlights how the high ideals of reformers on penal policy, such as Beccaria, so quickly gave way to the penitentiary and the disciplinary society organised and enforced through the norm, so much so that now the judicial system increasingly substitutes concern for the norm for respect for the law (Foucault, 1994n). An example of this was given in *Chapter Four: Methodology* where it was noted that the fabrication of the delinquent was as someone who had transgressed the norm not the law.

The rise of the disciplinary society and the tactic of governing through techniques of governmentality forms the basis of one of Foucault's most important observations and critiques of normative politics; if real power is not exercised through political or legal means then why do we continually posit a judicial subject that is constrained and governed by the law? (Foucault, 1994f). The state increasingly tries to monopolise all forms of power (Foucault, 1975) and one of the ways it does this is to try to control technologies of domination by encoding them as forms of law (Foucault, 1976). But to posit a judicial subject is to totally misunderstand the operations of power. The state, despite its best efforts, cannot manage or control all the relations of power (Foucault, 1994f). This latter point is why the practice of governmentality becomes central to an understanding of the state, power and the law and the state's attempt to rule through governmentality rather than through law.

The analysis of Foucault's position on truth begins with his claim that there are two histories of truth, one internal to truth and one external. Foucault (1994m) writes that the internal history of truth is the one that regulates itself. I choose to understand this internal history and regulation of truth as being those ontological theories of truth: truth as correspondence, truth as coherence, truth as performativity and so on. When Foucault talks about truth, especially

about truth and knowledge, he is frequently not referring to the internals of truth. The external history of truth involves an arena in society where what Foucault calls certain games are played, games through which certain forms of subjectivity are formed and certain types of knowledge come into being. Foucault (1994m) claims that judicial practices are one of the key methods by which subjectivity is defined in Western society along with forms of knowledge and relations between people and truth.

This type of truth, that builds itself around power and attaches power to itself, can be explored through the notion of the *event*. Unlike structure, the event must be considered as an irrational, unstructured happening or as a singularity (Foucault, 1994f) . McWhorter (1994) expounds on the event well and I use her work here. Presenting thinking in terms of the event rather than in terms of structure has important implications for truth. Truth in Western society has become a categorisation process in which the idea of ‘origin’ is central. We imagine an origin of things, a natural state of things and then form truth and knowledge by categorising around that origin. Differences become simply submerged with the *same* and act like graduations of the same. But as these systems of classification are not a-historical, they have no origin, they can only be maintained through an act of power. Foucault’s claim then is that the insistence upon a rational order that privileges similitude, constancy and maintenance of identity at the expense of difference is not as it claims, simply the right way to think, it is rather one way of thinking among many others.

McWhorter (1994) goes on to explain that Foucault does not exhort us to extract ourselves from regimes of power; that would be impossible, but he does caution us to be ever vigilant, especially when regimes of power claim to have nothing to do with power at all.

Foucault suggests that timeless truth as an organising principle, of a series of power-knowledge regimes, has become so powerful that they almost eclipse every other possibility of thought. Thus the political question is not error, illusion, alienated consciousness or ideology but truth itself

(McWhorter , 1994, p165).

Foucault does not deny the possibility of objective truth as Seals (1998) illustrates. As noted before in this thesis, the basic unit of analysis of discourse for Foucault was the *statement*. Seals (1998) explains that Foucault indicated the presence of three different types of statements. In this understanding of *statement* the subject of the statement is not the author of the statement or who the statement is deemed to be about but is the type of subjectivity expressed by the statement.

Firstly there are uni-subjective statements. These statements authorise only one subject. So, for instance, a statement at the preface of a book explaining why the author wrote the book, authorise only one subject on the determination of the truth or falsity of this claim and their positionality qualifies the truth or falsity of the statement. It makes no sense for an objectivist to argue or to try and uncover the ‘real’ reason, as opposed to the stated reason why the author wrote the book. The rules as to the truth or falsity of this statement do not follow the rules by which objective knowledge is ruled. Seals (1998) writes that postmodernists and objectivists play a conscious game of polemics through their repeated construction of category mistakes.

Intersubjective statements are those statements for whom truth or falsity engages a number of people. So for instance later in the book there might be a statement such as ‘As has already

been shown'. For some people this statement will be true whilst for others this statement will be false.

Transsubjective statements are those statements that require no specific positionality of the subject. That is these statements transcend the positionality of the subject in time and space and are not affiliated or linked to any linguistic differences. Such statements may be mathematical formulae or mathematical rules presented in the book. Transsubjective statements are to be taken as objective statements.

Foucault is primarily interested in the intersubjective statement and how they end up being placed in a 'category mistake'. When this occurs truth becomes embroiled with the 'will to truth' that fails to recognise that 'true' and 'truth' can mean different things in different contexts and that the meaning of the word 'knowledge' likewise varies. If, however, we accept and understand these variations in the meaning of truth and knowledge then knowledge becomes contextualised without becoming hopelessly relativised. Further, objective knowledge, or a set of transsubjective statements can be produced about the positionalities that intersubjective statements require for them to be taken as true.

So examples in the field of my work could be as follows. When the teachers describe themselves as having special educational needs as detailed in *Chapter Seven: The Special Educational Discourse*, it is not a question of determining the truth or otherwise as to whether teachers with disabilities have special educational needs but of determining their positionality and why they have said that. Likewise, a sign displaying 'Disabled Toilets' is an intersubjective statement and will require one positionality to make it true and a separate positionality to make it false. It is true for some but not for others. A transsubjective statement

would be a detailed description of what the person can and cannot do, though this would be difficult to arrive at in an objective manner outside of cultural norms and tropes. But there is no fixed link between this transsubjective statement and the intersubjective statement ‘has a disability’.

As noted in *Chapter Six: The Special Educational Needs Discourse* the teachers displayed quite an array of ambiguity as to whether they were disabled or not. What they are in fact doing is navigating this intersubjective truth ‘disabled’ which attaches itself to transsubjective truth. In my own personal case the transsubjective truth is that I often repeat words when I speak. This is labelled to be a stammer but that is not a transsubjective truth it is an intersubjective truth, the truth of ‘impairment’. Through repeated processes of normalisation and subjection I have come to accept that I do have a stammer and that I am disabled. The term ‘impairment’ presents itself as a transsubjective truth, as mere description of what is ‘wrong’, but it is no such thing. Its ability to always be defined as a deficit is an indication of its constructed nature that is built on the vested interests and power structures notably those involving the disability industry.

‘Impairments’ can be viewed as objects that people are attached to in order that their difference be policed and disciplined. If difference is so attached to an impairment then it can no longer be viewed as a singularity but as a ‘truth’ category over which the medical profession and others hold authority. Ricoeur (1981), updating Marx’s theory, indicated that the productivity of rationality, not surplus-value, is now the main feature of capitalism and how it is authorised is through the use of science and technology to legitimate itself.

The use of the paired terms disabled/impairment and race/ethnicity can be viewed as being very similar. Tremain (2006) charts the recent coming of the term 'impairment' and writes that discursive practices produce the illusion of natural and pre-discursive 'impairments'. Harvey (1990) illustrates how the use of the term 'ethnicity' in place of the term 'race' allows racist discourses to continue unabated. Likewise, the use of the term 'impairment' in place of the term 'disability' allows ableist discourses to operate in the cold light of day in a liberal democracy.

As Sears (1998) indicates, it makes no sense to follow the popular-postmodernist path and hold that there is no truth. What needs to be done is to identify how truth gets co-opted in the service of power. The term 'disability' is a deficit term, it can be no other as it is formed out of disciplinary and normalising practices. The insistence that it is not a deficit term but an objective term sows much confusion as it confuses its position of truth as an intersubjective with that of a transubjective term. The teachers may not be able to fully identify or express this relationship, but they are drawn towards acknowledging their significant differences from others but yet resist the deficit person which is interpolated to attach itself to the category 'disabled'. The following is a good example of a teacher detaching themselves from the negative term 'disability' and attaching themselves to the singularity that is difference:

Why don't I see myself as being disabled, because I see myself as having barriers or differences I don't see myself impaired, God, that's a [...] it's such a, to see yourself as being impaired or less of then you're dis-abled, you're disabled because you're lacking ability and so you see yourself as being different you're not talking about ability you're talking about different types of strengths and weaknesses, you're different, you've got

different things to bring to the table and that's why I don't see myself as
being disabled

(Participant E)

Participant E gives a very close approximation to my understanding of the intersubjective and transsubjective truth as regards disability. He departs from this line of argument only in saying that he has 'barriers'. There is also an attempt to reverse the binary normal/deficit in the use of his terms 'different strengths and weaknesses' but on the whole, there is a strong sense that he wants to get away from the 'term 'disabled' whilst conveying that he does have significant 'differences'. Participant E expresses as well as could be expected the relation between transsubjective and intersubjective truths as regards disability and difference.

In describing people as 'has a disability' then the law makes a category mistake and presents disability as a transsubjective statement when in fact the statement 'having a disability' is an intersubjective statement of which analysis can follow as to the positionality required to make that statement true, the obvious candidate being a position that normalises. Further, returning to McWhorter (1994), the statement 'has a disability' confines difference to be a variation within sameness and precludes an understanding of disability as being a singularity and is an exercise in power that reinforces the norm as the origin around which classifications must take place.

The law itself acknowledges that disability is a singularity by providing for adjustments to be made based on individual differences. Where it errs is to try to depoliticise equality for disabled people by defining 'reasonableness' which can then also be used as a rationale by which people can be governed along neo-liberal lines as explained below in this chapter.

The transsubjective statement of the detailed description of what each individual can and cannot do would preclude any language of 'reasonable adjustment' which only serves to

reference the norm through the term 'reasonable'. What is far removed from what a non disabled person could do is now defined as 'unreasonable'. There is no real advancement made. A detailed description of what a person can and cannot do can only be answered by a detailed list of arrangements that will enable them to carry out the task as a non-disabled person would, if indeed that is at all necessary. The word 'disability' merely points to a person who is not included in the norm. As noted in several places throughout this thesis, Foucault showed time and time again that the law operates more and more through the norm, privileges the norm and substitutes its rightful place for the norm. The law's inability to take its rightful place, or to understand the present place it currently takes, can be understood as a result of the rise of the disciplinary society administered more and more through practices of governmentality. I turn next to the topic of disciplinary power as a preliminary to describing how governmentality effects equality legislation.

The Rise of the Disciplinary Society

In *Discipline and Punish* (1975) and *Truth and Juridical Forms* (1994m), Foucault charts in detail the rise of the disciplinary society. Before the Early Middle Ages, disputes between parties were settled by trials such as those involving tests of strength or tests of life and death. It was not a question of truth but of right. This was also one of the primary ways by which wealth circulated or was recycled. The Sovereign then begins to appropriate this judicial process as a means to gather to themselves this wealth. The modern judicial system begins to take shape by which the prosecutor stands in the place of the Sovereign who, in order to avoid the trial of strength or of life and death institutes the judicial trial and hence the idea of truth as a means of settling disputes is born. The inquiry, or the trial, becomes a specific

institution, a judicial institution of power management, a way of authenticating truth. The inquiry becomes a form of power-knowledge.

The rise of capitalism and the moving of people from the countryside into the towns and cities saw a further transformation of the judicial system. Wealth was no longer held in immutable and immovable objects such as land and estates but was transformed into stocks and machinery in factories and warehouses. This wealth had to be protected. To achieve this the focus of law needed to shift from what people were accused of having done to what they might do. A means was needed whereby people could be controlled. We then arrive at the disciplinary society. Control of individuals at the level of their potentialities' could no longer be left in the hands of an autonomous judiciary. The administration of the disciplinary society would be through the examination rather than through the enquiry. The examination would become a means by which people could be divided between the normal and the abnormal by a finer and finer grain of graduation.

The disciplinary society relies on two pillars namely surveillance and correction. Surveillance is sometimes carried out by a separate body such as police, but often the functions of surveillance and correction are carried out in tandem, or a judicial power is added to the institutions of surveillance as judicial power becomes dispersed ever deeper into the social body. Foucault asks for instance, why must it be necessary to punish and reward someone in order that they be taught something in schools? These disciplinary institutions, the factory, the school, the prison, the psychiatric hospital attaches people to themselves in order that they be attached to apparatus designed for the normalisation of the individual.

Governmentality

To further understand the form that law on equality presently takes, an understanding of what Foucault termed *governmentality* is needed. Governmentality can be thought of as both a power-relation and a practice of the state. Between relations that tend towards being adversarial and those that tend towards domination there is the state of relations that may involve governmentality (Foucault 1994h). Neo-liberalism can be understood as a type of governmentality that answers this question: how can a polarization of income be achieved without creating a dualism that leads to the type of radical and adversarial politics of the early twentieth century? (Lazzarato, 2009). Foucault's explanation of governmentality goes back to Machiavevilli's *The Prince* and is concerned with answering the question: how can the Sovereign maintain the illusion of sovereignty and hence maintain his fragile link to power (Foucault, 1991).

In *Governmentality* Foucault (1991) summarises the process. The art of government can be viewed as a practice that developed opposite to that of Machiavevilli's *The Prince*.

Machiavevilli's *The Prince* admonishes the sovereign on how to maintain his grip on power following the judicial theory of sovereignty of the day which was to constantly attempt to draw a line between the power of the prince and any other form of power because in that way the power of prince could be justified. The advent of the art of government does the opposite, it attempts to present a continuity of power between that of the sovereign and his subjects; when the state is well run then the head of the family will know better how to direct the family and each individual will in turn behave as they should. It is this model of the father caring for his family that would begin as the basis of the art of government to be replaced with a much more definite focus on economy that was to develop into governmentality.

Two things were to separate governmentality from the judicial framework of sovereignty. The first was the problem of the population. It was found that the population had its own regularities: death rates, diseases etc so that the model of the caring father had to be overturned in which the family now becomes an important unit of measure and also of unit of governance. The use of statistics on the population would play an important role in this. The second thing that would separate governmentality from the judicial framework of sovereignty follows on from population and that is the advent of the political economy. A focus on the economy will help transform rule from that of the sovereign to one based on government where the instrumentality of economic knowledge will now be used to control society based on notions of security. Exercised correctly, government through economy will need and require a form of surveillance and control over the entire state in line with the attentiveness of that of the patriarch over the family from which this economic watchfulness draws its metaphorical existence.

Whereas sovereignty relied on the instrument of law, law and sovereignty are inseparable; governmentality relies on the things it manages and an intensification of the processes by which it manages them. Law now becomes merely a tactic to be deployed. But the importance of the sovereign does not disappear. The triad sovereign-discipline-government now operate. Foucault emphasises that the problem we face today is not the power of the state but how the state has become governmentalised so much so that governmentality and the techniques of government have become the only political issues.

Foucault (1994p) states that liberalism can be primarily viewed as a response to excessive government. Liberalism is a philosophy of government that posits that one should not govern too much, the fact that it is often associated with the market is just the form of the political

economy it has encountered. Neo-liberalism began to be developed in West Germany right after the war where the ‘excess’ of government was that of Nazism and war. But a paradox soon develops in that these early neo-liberals believe that the market cannot be left to its own devices, it actually needs to be managed to sustain itself. This leads the neo-liberal state to intervene in the market more, not less. By providing good economic performance, a rationale for the new German state could be found (Lemke, 2001). What Foucault termed ‘American Neo-liberalism’ was to develop by extending this economic mandate for the reason of the state’s existence to the management of the state as a whole. The rationale of the market was to be extended to the management of the family, birth control, delinquency and so on, and the market would then stand as a kind of permanent tribunal over the governing of the state (Lemeke, 2001).

Despite its liberal claims, neo-liberalism represents an encroachment on liberty as commonly understood under liberalism. Neo-liberalism sees no room or gap between the concepts of a limited domain of liberty and the legitimate domain of government intervention, but this is to be elided by the appearance of governing from afar. This also has the advantage of inducing individuals to take on the responsibility to govern themselves and to confront risk on their own. The primary way that this is going to be done is that ideas and practices of freedom as entrepreneurial individuals is going to be organised and distributed throughout society. A form of sovereignty limited to guaranteeing economic activity is going to be produced and from this a set of social relations will be generated by which people can be led without the necessity of government being obviously responsible for them or their actions. Disadvantage and exclusions can then be framed as matters of choice rather than outcomes of structural processes (Lazzarato, 2009; Lemeke, 2001; Rose, 1999).

One way to illustrate the operation of these forces is by a close examination of government publications on equality. I next turn to analysing a document on equality that was produced by the UK government at the same time that the Equality Act 2010 came into force.

HM Government Equality Strategy - Building a Fairer Britain

This document (HM Government, 2010) was published in December 2010 just a few months after the 2010 Equality Act became law and, as such can be taken as a further more descriptive indication of the government's understanding and positioning on equality. Of the twenty nine page document, I need only focus mainly on the single page introduction by the then Home Secretary and Minister for Women and Equalities, Theresa May MP. This single page introduction is here quoted for ease of reference.

Equality is at the heart of this Coalition Government. It is fundamental to building a strong economy and a fair society; and in these difficult economic times equality is even more important. As we rebuild our economy it is essential that we make sure we benefit from the talents of everyone in the UK. As we take the difficult decisions necessary to tackle the UK's record deficit we are determined to do so fairly, protecting the most vulnerable and prioritising equal opportunities for all.

This strategy is built on two principles of equality: equal treatment and equal opportunity. As a country we have come a long way in the last fifty years: from the Equal Pay Act in 1970 to Civil Partnership Legislation in 2004; we are a more diverse and tolerant country, and

we should be proud of that fact. But the reality remains that despite more and more legislation from government, too many people's life chances still depend on who they are or where they come from, not their effort or ability.

This strategy sets out a new approach to equality. One that recognises that we still need specific action to deal with specific problems, but that we need to move beyond defining people simply because they've ticked a box on a form. We will work with people, communities and businesses to empower them to enact change. We will take a new approach by tackling the causes of inequality as well as using targeted action to deal with its consequences. We will ensure accountability by shining the light of transparency on organisations, allowing their performance to be challenged and acting as a driver for change.

Equality is key to all our work. That is why I have set up an inter-ministerial group to ensure that we continue to drive work to support this strategy across government, working closely with all those involved: this strategy is just the start of this work.

Equality underpins this coalition's guiding principles of freedom, fairness and responsibility. But in the end, it will take all of us working together to build the strong, modern and fair Britain that we all want to see.

(HM Government, 2010)

Reference to the economy is made four times in the opening paragraph. As noted above, governmentality relies on notions of economy combined with mechanisms of surveillance. One of the ways this greater surveillance will be enacted here is through the greater targeted interventions, 'delivering help where it is needed most'. This phrase is repeated throughout the document. In order to identify people in need of these more targeted interventions they will need to be identified and qualified as such using even more stringent means of assessment. Thus, despite the documents stated aim of wanting to 'move away from the identity politics of the past' (p6) more, rather than less, emphasis will need to be placed on the categorising of people.

This even more 'targeted' placing of resources is also likely to have two results. One is to create difference as divisive whilst also increasing the gap between those who receive the target resources and the new entrepreneurial citizen left to fend for themselves. Thus an increase in the stigma of, and separation between, those who will now receive help and those who do not will be the result. Venn & Terranova (2009) write that because neo-liberalism relies on competition, difference must always be produced as division or be used to create division.

As many authors (Lazzarato, 2009; Lemke, 2001; Rose, 1999) have also explained, government by neo-liberalism is enacted through the use of the economy to set a new agenda where financial concerns over the management of all aspects of society take priority and are clearly seen as being the right thing to do. Stated in the opening paragraph of this document is the need to recover from 'the UK's record deficit' that is being posited as a reason for the fore-fronting of economics in the designing of equality strategy. One of the main strategies by which better economic performance can be achieved according to this document is through

the use of 'flexibility', again, repeated throughout the document. Whilst the benefits to the employee of being flexible are mentioned in the document the section on Modern Workplaces (p15) highlights to a greater extent the benefits to businesses in having staff work flexible hours with a case study (p16) to back up these points. In this section there is a mirror of the 'reasonable adjustments' ideology where there is stated a need to review the ban on age-discrimination to allow for 'beneficial or justifiable age-based treatment'. So here, within a document on equality, space is being created to sanction discrimination and inequality.

The document repeats often the importance of securing work, working hard etc whilst at the same time the security of that work is being constantly undermined within the document by the use by other notions such as 'flexibility', or the importance of 'company profits' and 'compromise'. Foucault (1994m) wrote that one of the guiding tenets of disciplinary society organisation is to ensure that the maximum amount of labour be extracted from individuals. Here we see neo-liberal governmentality positioning itself in order to be able to do likewise and extract the maximum labour with minimum cost to itself as the welfare state is reduced in the name of flexibility.

In the second paragraph of this document the government sets out the models of equality that it sees as being correct and that it intends to use. These are the Equal Treatment Principle and Equal Opportunities. As the document itself states, there are many differing models of equality from which the government has chosen these two. The equal treatment principle, commonly referred to as formal equality, is best summed up in the phrase that *like should be treated as like*. To treat like as like requires a comparison of two people. This leads to one of the main critiques levelled at formal equality, the idea that two people can be stripped of their social and cultural underpinnings and then be compared in the abstract. Or to put it another

way, we need an abstract person against whom all comparisons can be made. Such a person of course does not exist so what occurs in practice is that comparison is made against the cultural dominant. The result of this process is that a strong pressure is placed on all others to conform to the cultural dominant (Fredman, 2011).

We meet this abstracted person later on in the document (p6), 'No-one should be held back because of who they are or their background. But equally, no-one should be defined simply by these characteristics'. This statement does well in identifying that some people are kept behind simply because of who they are, or who they are not. But the statement goes on to do harm by suggesting that the reason these people are kept behind is because of some personal innate characteristics thus allowing for the emergence of a blame of those discriminated against to fall on themselves for having certain 'characteristics' that the government is urging us to overlook. It further continues the assumption that people from other groups form some monolithic entity with characteristics that are standardised and very easily identified.

But this blaming of others for being discriminated against is evident in the Equality Act 2010 itself. The Act names ten 'characteristics' of people that it aims to protect. By naming them as characteristics certain things become possible. The first is that the binaries between the normal and the other become reified. Also, by naming them as 'characteristics' there is an implied suggestion of behaviour that is somehow deviant or abnormal but nevertheless will be protected under the Act. Absent also in this wording are of course the 'characteristics' of the dominant groups. By not mentioning the characteristics of the dominant groups the apparent neutrality and naturalness of these groups' positionalities is strengthened by this silence.

The other model of equality that the document champions is that of *equal opportunities*. The meaning of the term equal opportunities is so varied and ambiguous as to render the term used on its own as meaningless. Equality of opportunity is claimed by all political stances from those who advocate libertarian capitalism to those advocates of an interventionist welfare state. The use of the 'term equal opportunity' allows the document to use the word 'equality' throughout in very ambiguous ways without setting out much detail, if any, about what equality actually is, what needs to change and how the government intends itself to bring equality about. The following citation (p9) is typical of the meaningless use of language in the document. This cited statement merely states that equal opportunities means equal opportunities:

Equal treatment and equal opportunities for all does not mean uniformity - it means giving everyone an equal right to be treated fairly as an individual, recognising both their needs and their talents and giving them an equal opportunity to progress.

(HM Government, 2010, p9)

Continuing on, the second paragraph states that despite an increasing level of legislation being enacted towards establishing equality, inequality continues. This phrase reveals and accomplishes certain things. The first is that it begins to distance the government from being responsible for inequality in society and will, later in the document, allow them to transfer this responsibility to no-one in particular. For instance, guidelines will be set and organisations will be encouraged to publish data on equality but what action will be followed and by whom is left blank. It allows equality to be cast as a complex issue that somehow despite best efforts remains unsolvable and thus expectations can be suitably lowered. Taken

at face value it would also reveal a surprising disbelief in the government to affect change through its primary legitimate role. One of the primary roles of the executive branch of government is to propose laws for the legislature to debate.

Foucault (1991) wrote that under the operation of the sovereign, the law was inseparable from the sovereign, but under governmentality the law becomes but a tactic of government. The law, in fact, itself now tries to establish the truth of itself rather than presenting a sovereign right (Foucault 1981). The invention of the field of the study of jurisprudence can be viewed in this light. Law as tactics and law as truth allow the government to distance itself from its own equality laws. The success of a law is a reflection of sovereign power not of truth. Foucault (1981) maintained that one way to understand discourse was as an event that was going to be made to happen. The success of equality legislation depends on sovereign power (its use or non-use), resistance to the sovereign and where the law sits in relation to the social discursive formations for which the government itself is partly responsible for creating. Neo-liberal Governmentality presents a form of sovereignty that limits itself only to economic matters.

Yet despite this failure in achieving equality we are also told in paragraph two that we are a more diverse and tolerant country than we once were, a claim that again will be repeated throughout the document. That the word 'tolerant' should be used when speaking of equality signifies the power relation envisaged in the document of an unmoving centre whose largess (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) is only amplified by its ability to tolerate those around them. The claim that we are a nation of tolerant people continues an old narrative begun elsewhere and it is difficult to see what positive function towards equality its claiming serves, not least because it is premised on a claim of superiority over other nations. If all nations were nearly

equally intolerant it would not represent much of a claim. Repeated several times in the document the only evidence offered is that of a poll conducted by the government which showed that 85% of respondents agreed that people from different backgrounds in their local area 'get on well together' (p20). The government need only to have a look at actual data, to data on imprisonment, on health, on wealth distribution, on employment rates, on housing, on income, on a whole range of measures to establish how equal a society we are.

In the third paragraph we are informed that government will 'empower' people, communities and businesses to enact change. This empowering of others to act is again repeated often in the document and is again easily identified as another important feature of governmentality under neo-liberalism that serves several features central to its deployment. By placing onus on others to act the idea of entrepreneurial self or subjectivity is enacted (Lazzarato, 2009). This new empowered entrepreneurial self will be taught to hold itself responsible for its own fate and therefore have no need to be critical of government. Enacted through the use of words like 'choice' and 'merit' throughout the document it has the appearance of naturalness and common sense. By empowering a range of non political organisations the arena becomes de-politicised (Lazzarato, 2009) and any potential opposition is fragmented (Rose, 1999), it allows the government to lead without taking responsibility. It does this by stipulating much of the work as being only of the status of 'guidelines' which organisations need only 'have due regard to', in this way the government can claim to be merely pointing the way (Lemke, 2001). This fragmentation also paves the way for the introduction of competitive markets into areas that have been previously managed by the state (Lazzarato, 2009) under the previous collectivist governmentality. Indeed the document proposes the establishment of the Education Endowment Fund over which different organisations can bid.

One example of this collaborative working that is given in the document is as follows:

...ensure school leaders have the freedom to innovate, the powers to maintain discipline fairly and are encouraged to share with other schools what they have learnt in addressing the causes of inequality. (HM Government, 2010, p12)

This statement has the effect of allowing some actions and disallowing others. It displaces the expert or the academic from having a leading role in describing the operations of inequality or at the very least places their knowledge subordinate to that of school leaders. Hence another source of alternative or potentially resistant view is removed and so continues the anti-intellectualism in British Education observed by Hodgson & Standish (2009).

Equality is not defined in this statement but whatever it is its entirety can be observed and identified at the school level, by the school and has something to do with discipline. Further down the page it is stated that the government will fund research into a child's home environmental factors that affect their ability to take better advantage of their of schooling. This posits that the cause of inequality is related to the child's home environment and not structural inequalities in society. This statement clearly sets out the central role of the school in the maintenance of the disciplinary society with its overt reference to discipline and its need for surveillance of the child's home environment by the school.

In paragraph three it is stated that we need to 'move beyond defining people simply because they've ticked a box on a form'. Such a statement is an incredible simplification of the discursive formations which come to form subjectivity along with the material forces by

which people's lives become constrained. The abstract person of formal equality is here present in the idea that people can choose who they want to be by the box they choose to tick and that how they are perceived by others is arbitrary. In an ideal world it would be good if we perceived each other in the terms the document suggests but there are several moves towards the distribution of power that would need to be traversed before such a state is achieved. This box-ticking we learn later (p7) has been part of the reason why the gradual evolution of equality law led to a 'strands-based' approach to equality legislation with different laws to protect different groups, a situation the unification of equality law under the Equality Act 2010 claims to rectify.

Such a narrative of 'strands' and 'unification' reveals a utilitarian approach to equality law and over-simplifies the interaction between dominant and non dominant positions of power. A simple minority-model of equality for all groups becomes easily envisaged by this unifying of equality law. But it is worthwhile detailing the discursive formations or relations of power for some of the main groups for whom these relations tend towards being dominated. In this way it can be more clearly understood the actions that would really need to be taken to tackle inequality.

For the case of women a critique from the standpoint of critical theory could be as follows. Foucault repeatedly indicated that power was productive. If it was only repressive then no one would follow it. Power operates by creating forms of knowledge (Foucault, 1994f). Women come to identify with these forms of knowledge but as well as being beneficial they are also oppressive (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). This subordinated position becomes folded within the self (see de Beauvoir, 1997). There is then what Rose (1999, p128) terms a 'psychiatrization of women' along with a trivialisation of their situation (Bolt, 2018) which

is fuelled by a repeated and wilful misunderstanding on the part of men who fail to listen to women's attempts to clarify and to explain (Kitzinger & Firth, 2005).

For the case of the working class, wealth needs to be understood in terms of both employment and welfare. Welfare was set up to serve the interests of capital by maintaining the social structure necessary for capitalism to flourish. Whilst welfare was always presented in terms of scarcity that needed careful governmental management and oversight it played a central role in pacifying and eliding from the exploited classes their exploitation (Nickel, 2009, Donzelot, 1991). By instilling an ideology of entrepreneurship that creates fragmentation and insecurity within society, neo-liberal capitalism is able to reduce welfare to a minimum at very little risk to itself. On the contrary, the risk that is accumulated by capitalist venture is spread to the working class. Two of the many ways it can be seen to do this is by the opening up of public services to marketisation (Hursh, 2006) and, contrary to Keynesian liberal capitalism, by only stimulating demand and not supply (Lazzarato, 1999).

For the case of race, Foucault (1976) explains that racism in its modern form arose out of the intersection of the discourses of pure-blood and that of sexuality. Others have followed Foucault and developed on this theory. For Feldman (2018) racism is best understood as a similar case to that of the creation of the delinquent (see Foucault, 1975). By creating a class of people as a permanent enemy of the state the illegalisms of capitalism can be more easily elided and class struggle itself becomes mystified under a form of racial capitalism. For Rasmussen (2011) the bio-power deployed by the state for the governance of the population is not amenable to the exercise of its sovereign power to intervene into the lives of individuals and selected groups. Racism then becomes a technology by which the modern state maintains the legitimacy to exercise sovereign power. Rasmussen & Harwood (2009) in

their study of 'illegal immigrants' illustrate that for those outside the legal remit of the state there is no need for the state to resort to power as governmentality but raw sovereign power can be wielded in its stead. For Lazzarato (1999) the move from liberal capitalism with its emphasis on exchange to neo liberal capitalism with its emphasis on competition creates general insecurity in the population which the state aims to nullify through deploying racism and a constant state of war.

All these theories centred on race have in common the concept that racism is a technology of government deployed by the government for the benefit of government. If this is the case then the best way to counter racism would be to counter the manner in which the state uses racism as a tactic of power. Following Foucault (1981), this may involve challenging the manner in which the state has become overturned by governmentality itself.

For the case of sexuality, Foucault (1976) illustrates how the discourses on sexuality were invented by those who govern as one of the key ingredients by which bio-power would be deployed in the management and control of the population. And like all identities, a question is to be placed as to our seeking of freedom (or equality) in the terms that it has been used for our subjection (Rose, 1999).

The point is well made; people are positioned differently by the different discursive formations that enact subjectivity, namely from the foregoing, gender, race, class and sexuality. As such, a detailed understanding of disability would describe it in terms of its positionality and constitution with respect to present practices of governmentality, disciplinary power, bio-power, capital, liberalism and neo-liberalism.

Reasonable Adjustments

The term 'reasonable adjustments' which is the flagship term of disability equality legislation can now be better understood in the context of governmentality and the use of law as tactics of governmentality. The term 'reasonable adjustments' sits well with how neo-liberalism governmentality would like to govern.

The House of Lords Select Committee 2015 - 16 (HOLSCED) that was set up to assess the impact of the Equality Act 2010 on people with disabilities published a report which included a statement that disability is unlike other protected characteristics such as race because the equal treatment principle, or formal equality, is not enough to ensure equality (House of Lords, 2016). Such a statement begins to frame the debate and follows my point above that inequality must be understood in its specificity but my main point of critique here is on the implied 'unreasonable adjustments' that the term "reasonable adjustments" subsequently envisages.

The term 'reasonable adjustment' presupposes an imaginary conflict between those who on one side hold a given adjustment is right and those who on the other side hold to the view that it is unreasonable. The government then positions itself as an independent arbitrator in the conflict. People with disabilities are made to appear as the enemy of those who would advocate moderation amidst the implied imperative that not too much adjustments should be made for people with disability. Donzelot (1991) writes that the shift in governance from an understanding of a collective security against the risk attendant upon life in society towards a neo-liberal governmentality is accompanied by an obligation to limit the burden one places on society. In this way the risk of the social is increasingly placed upon the individual with the state presenting itself as a mere referee in the process. So, for the case of disability, the

risks involved in the social, in the creation of an increasingly standardised and normalised society are not shared collectively but are transferred to those to whom these norms exclude. Fredman (2011) writes that we should not worry about the costs of seeking substantive equality because the cost has already been paid by those who have already been excluded.

The government has had a pre-occupation with the issue of 'costs' linked to disability anti discrimination legislation for a long while. Throughout the period prior to the introduction of the 1995 Disability Discrimination Act (HM Government 1995) the government's main argument was that the costs to businesses of such legislation would be prohibitive. This follows the point noted above that governmentality seeks a type of sovereignty limited only to the economic. But the actual costs involved in providing these reasonable adjustments are in fact minimal. A research paper by the House of Commons in preparation for the 1995 Disability Discrimination Act (House of Commons Library, 1995) estimated the total costs of all foreseeable reasonable adjustments across industry to be approximately one billion pounds. HOLSCED were critical of the government's repeated use of 'costs to business' as reason for failure of the Act to affect any real positive substantive change in the lives and wellbeing of people with disabilities.

As the arts of governmentality shift from collectivist welfarist solidarity to one of neo-liberal entrepreneurship the notion of the entrepreneurial self is distributed throughout society in order to govern in that fashion. The term 'reasonable adjustments' and the mechanism for securing them in practice follows neo-liberal governmentality by emphasising that costs are always the most important consideration in any circumstance that it deems so fit and that individuals have to bear the risks involved in the social and the exploits of capital themselves.

For instance HOLSCED was critical of the repeated cases where the onus was on individuals alone to bring legal action against large corporations.

The mechanisms for gaining redress are so cumbersome and imposing that people are led to govern themselves by limiting their expectations for redress and for dignity. *Chapter Nine: Governance* cites one headteacher who wonders why no disabled staff come forward and make requests for adjustments. That chapter deals with this issue in more detail and explores the mechanisms in schools by which teachers may be discouraged from seeking adjustments. Rather than calling them 'reasonable adjustments' the government could just as easily have termed these adjustments 'disabled adjustments' or just 'adjustments'. Such a terminology would have enabled a conceptual power shift towards disabled people to be able to determine what is needed versus the power of others to decide what is 'reasonable'. In using the term 'reasonable adjustments' difference is created as divisive. The tension so created is relayed on down to each successive stage of the implementation of the policy. So for instance HOLSCED contained testimony where people with disabilities were now being described as the recipients of favouritism.

But alongside the governing from afar there is also a governing from near in the implementation of the Equality Act 2010. Released alongside the Equality Act are statutory codes of practice for various strands such as employment, services, public functions and associations. The code of practice on Employment gives some examples and advice on reasonable adjustments in the workplace. Examples include altering a physical feature that presents an obstacle to a person with disabilities, offering car parking spaces to a disabled person who needs it for purposes of mobility and the problems caused to a person with visual impairment by clear glass in doors and its need for replacement.

On the surface this may seem like a step in the right direction but these are guidelines only. What these guidelines do accomplish is to depoliticise the issue of what is a reasonable adjustment and presents it as merely a technical issue. Though not legally binding, because of the advice's legal status, a space is created outside the government's stated sphere of control and a means to govern within that sphere is simultaneously created (Rose, 1999). In this manner the government becomes detached from the political involvement and evolution of the process but is still able to dictate the process at the same time. Tremain (2015) states that people must be allowed to move in order that they be constrained. So by allowing adjustments to take place but acting to limit those adjustments the possibility and the question of more far-reaching adjustments is averted.

HOLSCED felt a need to remind the government that ultimately it is their responsibility to provide equality for disabled people; i.e. a part of sovereignty that they cannot just decide to abdicate. The report continues that the current ad hoc process by which everyone waits for problems to arise before addressing them is unsatisfactory and that much more should be done to ensure that problems do not arise in the first place. Many witnesses to the committee felt that the Equality Act 2010 had done much to weaken or even retard the position of disabled people in society. Many felt that the incorporation of the UN Convention on the Rights of persons with Disabilities (UN, 2008) into UK law should be done immediately. This UN document however accepts and incorporates the term 'reasonable adjustment' with its own ongoing narrative of 'costs'.

There is a further point I would like to make. The Equality Act prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities on two grounds: *discrimination arising from disability* (s.15)

and discrimination *because of disability* (s.15). Discrimination because of disability is the form of direct discrimination that the legislation outlaws full-stop. It is lawful to allow for discrimination arising from disability if it can be shown to be a proportionate means of meeting a certain end. However, in only allowing for 'reasonable adjustments' it is also then becomes lawful to allow for direct discrimination if it is 'reasonable'. *Chapter Nine: Governance* cites from the government's own policy for schools where the government itself in effect equates 'reasonable adjustments' to 'justifiable direct discrimination'. The stated corner-stone of equality legislation for all categories of protected characteristics of disallowing direct discrimination is not achieved for people with disabilities. In that way the law presents itself as ambiguous. On the one hand direct discrimination is outlawed but on the other it is allowed when 'reasonable'.

The Experience of the Teachers

The teachers on the whole experienced the law and the ability to gain reasonable adjustments as a negative experience. The following extracts illustrates:

Not do, well the second time access to work came in I didn't want them in because the school's got no money and I said if they come in then they will suggest all sorts of equipment they have to pay the school has to pay 20% but they insisted because they wanted them to buy a printer for my building for me but that everyone could use and I said they won't do that, that's not what they fund so they came in recommended lots of stuff ere which school then refused to get so it really was a bit of a waste of time

(Participant G)

Note here the internalisation of the discourse of economics in regard to whether or not equality is to be established. Before the process of requesting reasonable adjustments had even begun G had governed herself to the point of deciding that the request had little chance of succeeding irrespective of her legal rights and the school's obligations. The legal process is not one that is aiding her; there is not a legal process in place that functions so that she can get the adjustments she needs to be able to operate in a normalised world. Despite the setting of processes of request and appeal in law, for participant G it's not a process she can access so it terminates as being 'a waste of time'.

Foucault (1994m) noted that the judicial process was once a test of competing strength or of right before its evolution into a process of truth but that this judicial process of truth was just a technology of power presented as a process of truth. The legal process as seen here is still a technology of power and only those for whom the relations of power do not tend towards domination and who have allies in the fight can wield it. From the teachers I interviewed, it is quite clear that often the relations of power between teachers with disabilities and the schools they work in tend towards relations of domination. And the law is complicit in this as per the disciplinary society by framing the law in such terms that it has little real and substantive effect on equality. People with disabilities are limited to only expecting 'reasonable' equality. Participant G would go on to add:

Int: Right I think we've probably been speaking for at least an hour you know G, so is there anything else you would like to mention or talk about or ask

G: No, I mean I haven't changed my mind about disabled teachers but I think as an individual disabled teacher that the odds are stacked against you being able to stay in your job

Participant G's experiences have taught her that the individual teacher, faced with the forces arrayed against her has little probability of staying in post.

But the process is begun elsewhere through a neo-liberal governmentality that prepares people to expect a life of inequality as expressed in interview below:

I see that some ways the world is not fair to people who have barriers or disabilities but sometimes you need to see the bigger picture and that is what I saw, I saw the bigger picture and thought that I just needed to get through that and then I will be able to do the job I wanted to do

(Participant E)

Even before there are instances of inequality, participant E has been taught to overlook them when they do occur because one of the neo-liberal truths of the world is that the world is not fair so there is very little point expecting to be treated with fairness. There is some bigger picture in a neo-liberal competitive land in which, if local and immediate unfairness is overlooked, a place of relative privilege over others is promised. For this teacher the promise was forever only contingent as he encountered repeated and career-threatening conflicts because of the forces stacked against him after qualification and throughout his teaching career.

Foucault (1994f) wonders how we have for so long insisted on seeing ourselves as judicial subjects when power does not operate through the law. In a disciplinary society the law can only be an instrument of power as the law is subordinate to the disciplinary institutions. The law can only be wielded by those in positions of power. *Chapter Seven: Subjectivity* illustrated how subjectivity is determined by the ability to wield power. Where the power relation between the teacher and the school tends towards domination then that teacher will be unable to wield the law-as-power and may find herself in the *disability-trap* upon trying to claim reasonable adjustments as detailed in *Chapter Six: The Special Educational Needs Discourse*. Where the power relation tends towards being adversarial then claiming reasonable adjustments may become an act of defiance. Between these poles we have a certain governmentality which answers this question: how can teachers with disabilities be governed by the school in such a way that they come to govern themselves to be in line with the school? This is the focus of the next chapter, *Chapter Nine: Governance*.

Conclusion

People with disabilities are in the position of having their differences categorised and meaning given to their differences by others. These categorisation processes come to form the basis of a law which determines the point at which it is 'reasonable' to discriminate. This discrimination in an open liberal democracy is carried out by renaming difference as impairment and by creating a governmentality by which it can be easily understood and accepted that the economic costs of not discriminating would be too high. By this process there is no standing effective law prohibiting direct discrimination against people with disabilities.

Foucault suggested that the problems we face today is not that of the of power of the state but of the governmentalisation of the state. As such it has to be assumed that one of the best ways to affect positive change for people with disabilities is to address or reverse the governmentalisation of the state. The coming of the disciplinary society also must be understood to represent a defeat for the rule of law. Both neo-liberalism and the disciplinary society govern society in ways that by-pass, manipulate and silence law or co-opt law in their service. The return of the rule of law in an open and liberal democracy may be one of the ways that positive change can be affected for people with disabilities.

Chapter Nine: Governance

Introduction

This chapter is based on analysis of the data from the interviews I had with the headteachers. I interviewed three head teachers. These interviews were focused on asking them about their experiences of employing or managing teachers with disabilities. The questions in interview are given in the appendix. Headteachers, like everybody else, are constituted and constrained by discourse. Whilst all headteachers do not speak from an identical set of discourses, analysis in this chapter proceeds by identifying the main discourses from which all of head teachers spoke in interview with myself and investigating how these common discourses interact with discourses of disability to affect the employment and management of teachers with disabilities.

In looking at the data it became apparent that the headteachers first and foremost operated with a model of equality premised on formal equality. This is not a discourse of their own making, neither are they free to speak from any other discourse as headteachers. This does not mean that they speak from this discourse all of the time as I will illustrate in this chapter, it could be that they only speak from this discourse in their role as headteachers. The Equality Act 2010 centres formal equality as the mandatory model of equality, so it is to be expected that this will be a discourse from which they speak and also how they will seek to operationalise equality.

Neo-liberalism has been discussed at length in *Chapter Five: Discourses which Constrain* and *Chapter Eight: Governmentality*. As I explained in these chapters, neo-liberalism is a central constraining discourse but whose effects needs to be understood as interacting with

other power relations. Neo-liberalism's agenda of ever greater financial efficiency is one of its main aspects that this chapter draws on. For a more comprehensive reading on the topic I refer the reader to the afore-mentioned chapters.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. At the start of the chapter, I focus on establishing the key role of the modern headteacher as a 'middle manager for the state'; as such they have no choice other than to speak from a discourse of formal equality. Neither do they have a choice other than to act as middle managers of a state that at the moment is overcome by neo-liberal governmentality, a state of governance I discussed in the last chapter. That the headteachers have no choice other than to speak from a discourse of formal equality does not and should not preclude close and critical analysis of the data. The wielding and deployment of power in the form of formal equality is what there is, what there is to analyse, and what has to be analysed if a deeper understanding is to be gained of how disability is positioned in schools and how it plays out for teachers so positioned.

I then examine the view of disability that these headteachers adopt, a view that affects how they may try to implement this formal equality mandated by government, to the degree to which they have any freedom to act in this area. I then examine formal equality at some length, retaining the focus on how it plays out in schools, rather than on formal equality generally. This section begins with a broader investigation and discussion of how the headteachers talk about and use formal equality before focusing on the employment of staff with disabilities under a regime of formal equality. The chapter then ends with the specifics and analysis of reasonable adjustments as the mechanism used for establishing formal equality for people with disabilities.

I am indebted to the three headteachers that came forward and gave their time and energy to offer an interview. They were all motivated by a desire to see an advancement in the cause of people with disabilities. The headteachers either felt that they had information, experiences and insights that could benefit this cause or actually realised they had no such special insights but recognised the need to try to help regardless. As I mentioned to all of the headteachers, none of us are authors of the discourses from which we speak. For instance it was only on a very late draft of this thesis that I myself deleted a statement where I wrote that 'I had been blinded'. As a further example of this speaking from discourses handed to us I relayed to one of the headteachers my own experience of being interviewed and speaking from the position of where I am.

Last year a final-year psychology student needed males to interview for her final year project on masculinity. It was only when I attended the interview I realised how desperate she had become to find anyone to not only come forward but to actually speak. In that interview I spoke at length about my views and experiences. A look of great relief increasingly came over my interviewer's face as finally she felt that she was getting useful data on masculine discourses, data that I gave and that I have no doubt she was very critical of. I very much hope she was. But without access to such data for critical researchers it becomes more difficult to clearly identify dominant constraining discourses and begin to find ways to undo them.

I concluded in the last chapter that between relations of power that tend towards domination and those that tend towards being adversarial there is governmentality. The critical question for this chapter flows from the following quote:

so there's a range of disabilities I suppose you're right we don't have anybody who is coming to me on a regular basis and actually saying 'can you make adjustment for me' we're not really having that so people are obviously managing that or I'm such a person that I'm putting them off coming for any assistance, I hope not.

(Interview with HT3)

The question is: what are the processes and the relations of power that exists and operate in schools by which teachers come to govern themselves so that they do not present themselves with requests for reasonable adjustments?

The Headteacher: From Lead Professional

to Chief Executive

To fully understand the actions and deeds of a headteacher, it is necessary to understand how those who occupy this role are positioned. Headteachers, like everyone else, are constrained to act by discourse and by material circumstances and, like everyone else, they should not be understood as radically free agents who are in a position to act as they please. Education in the UK, like in much of the Western world, has undergone a transformation in recent decades. Although legislation about curriculum, special educational needs, inclusion and a whole range of other measures have been brought in, it can be argued that the transformation has primarily focused on the governance of the school and its relation to the state. Starting with the 1988 Education Reform Act which saw the introduction of The National Curriculum, marketisation of schools and open enrolment, through to the present aim of the government of the academisation of all state schools, education in the UK has shifted in line with the underlying principles of state governance from collectivism to neo-liberalism. Central to that

change has been the reworking of the role of the headteacher from one of lead professional amongst equals to one of chief executive over others. This change in role and subjectivity of the head teacher gives an important direction to the understanding of how policy operates within schools. I use the work of others, with illustrations from my own data, to chart this change in the role of the headteacher which is central to understanding how teachers are managed in schools and come to govern themselves.

Tseng (2015) looked at the UK government's policy and legislative documents from the 1980s onwards in her study of the changing role of the headteacher. She describes the transformation in the role of the headteacher in this time period by conceptualising it as being divided into three stages, namely from headteachers to managers to leaders. In line with *Chapter Five: Discourses which Constrain* and *Chapter Eight: Governmentality*, Tseng notes the transformation through successive, intricate and imperceptible discourses of neo-liberalism of the headteacher from lead professional to one that now encapsulates 'performative professionalism' with a narrow focus on measurable outcomes and school performance. This transformation was accomplished through successive policy and legislation initiatives by which the role and focus of the headteacher was increasingly directed towards financial and performative metrics.

It is worth pausing here and looking at how the subjectivity of the headteacher is now enacted after these successive transformations towards narrower and narrower outcomes. Keddie (2015) notes that this neo-liberal entrepreneurialism becomes internalised by the headteacher and affects their subjectivity. Consider the following excerpt from one of my interviews with a headteacher:

HT2: Yer but I mean I worked an eighty hour week right through

Int: Eighty hour week did you say

HT2: Eighty hours and sometimes more but certainly eighty but I did that because I was communicating with people all the time, you've got to create an environment where you're talking to people all the time and they're supporting you by listening to your arguments and working with you and analyse what you do. You know, I had people commenting on my performance all the time and I got my deputy to embark on a research project called *Could do Better*; everybody could take part and say how I could do better it was very helpful

Int: Could you have done the job on less than eighty hours a week do you think HT2

HT2: Not effectively. I always felt I wanted to do more, I worked right through the holidays, in the holidays I wouldn't work so much as eighty I would work fifty or sixty in the holidays but I worked every single day of the year, in fact I've got to tell you I still do

HT2 seems to enjoy being engrossed in her work, which is not a matter for anyone else to judge. But it is worth noting why we may find 'pleasure in work'. Foucault (1994a) indicated that forms of power rely on offering forms of pleasure. Neo-liberal discourse offers us a kind

of ‘pleasure in work’ narrative that we readily take-up. But Foucault also noted that both the capitalists and Marx were mistaken when they posited that work was central to the human sense of existence and self worth (Foucault, 1994b). This belief in the ‘benefits’ of work was to be understood only as constructed through the discourse of capitalism that has penetrated deeply into our existence.

There are several points from this excerpt that I can analyse for its neo-liberal underpinnings. Keddie (2015) noted the manner in which headteachers in the academy-chain she studied expected hard work alone to overcome structural social disadvantage. If HT2 is working at this high rate it is within reason to assume that within a discourse of ‘performative professionalism’ (Tseng, 2015) that she expects teachers to do likewise and that any disadvantage they face is to be overcome by working harder. Note also the project *Could do Better* in which she invited others to analyse her performance and to give feedback on how she could improve her performance. These draw upon the discourse of the self as an entrepreneurial self.

This internalisation of the self as an entrepreneurial self is not benign, accidental or incidental and it is an important part of how headteachers come to govern the school in line with neo-liberal governmentality. And although presented as ‘natural’, the normalisation of neo-liberal concepts such as the ‘entrepreneurial self’ is not unproblematic because, at the very least it overrides the need for an analysis of structural social disadvantage in favour of a need for ‘hard work’. A teacher with disabilities facing social, environmental and structural disadvantage is likely to be, first and foremost, directed towards a narrative of ‘hard work’ to overcome these disadvantages, whether internalised or expressed outwardly, as I detailed in *Chapter Five: Discourses which Constrain* and *Chapter Seven: Subjectivity*.

It is no surprise that HT2 undertook the project *Could do Better* because the internalisation of the entrepreneurial self, or at least a willingness to draw from this discourse, has become a pre-requisite of being a head teacher. Tseng (2015) charted the rise of the ‘superhead’ through successive refinements and incarnations of the narrative of the importance of ‘leadership style’. These superheads are deemed to be effective and inspirational leaders who possess the powers to turn ‘failing’ schools around. But Tseng notes that the conferring of this privilege or title is contingent on the ability of the headteacher to internalise and demonstrate the entrepreneurial self. The individual must demonstrate the ability to govern themselves in line with this ideology.

Internalisation of neo-liberal discourses is accomplished through the ‘regulated spaces’ of acquiring qualifications to be a head teacher such as the National Professional Qualification for Headship (NPQH). Headteachers are then allowed to exercise these skills under a set of government technologies such as school inspections, league tables and market competition. Those who are the most successful at this process will then be given the ‘freedom’ to become superheads in which they are allowed to exercise autonomy with an understanding that the exercising of real autonomy is never attempted. Through such technologies, the state perfects the art of governing from a distance while economic and certain social criteria are foregrounded and other forms of professional expertise and knowledge are gradually marginalised. Keddie (2015) names this process ‘responsibilisation’. Monk (2005), in a study into school exclusions, also charts the rise of this superhead and notes also that they are deemed to be above and beyond human rights law.

The excerpt from one of my interviews below is a demonstration of this superhead subjectivity:

HT1: Yer, I live straight opposite a school erm and it's a school in trouble and there's a part of me itching to get in my chair and go over there and go and sort a few bits of it out erm yer I know there's things out there that I can do when I've finished here

HT1 here gives no indication that she knows any details of why the school is 'in trouble' and has expertise in that area but this does not deter her in her confidence of being able to go over there and 'sort a few bits out'. She had indicated at times in the interview that she had been seconded to 'sort out' other 'failing' schools in the past. It does not seem to matter what the particular difficulties or circumstances a school may be facing, the same neo-liberal approach of hard work and discipline will be applied and the result is always assured, namely, a 'successful' school. But each such 'success' measured along narrow lines of 'outcomes' and economics will also narrow the definition and the range of meanings of what it is to be a person and will narrow the definition and the options of what it is to be in a community and what a community is and can be. It will also narrow the understanding of how people are constrained by discourses and material circumstances and instead be overlaid with a narrative of the need for hard work.

The headteachers in general believed in the singular importance of leadership as the following excerpts illustrate:

Yer, I think so, I put it down, I've got to tell you, to headteacher leadership cos in a lot of schools additional support needs, special needs are just put onto one side as if they were separate but in fact they're intrinsic to the whole and the headteacher has got to be part of this the whole time...

(Interview with HT2)

This notion of the superhead, that one headteacher can on their own ‘turn a school around’ is a good indication of the power differential between headteachers and teachers that has multiplied under the neo-liberal governance in schools. Tseng (2015) notes that headteachers are now positioned as the eminent leader in schools with teachers cast as mere followers, but also notes that, in practice, leadership needs to be distributed; in fact, everyone is encouraged to take a ‘leadership’ role in schools. But this ‘leadership’ by others in schools must be understood as a smaller scaled versions of the ‘leadership’ that the headteacher possesses, namely internalisation of the entrepreneurial self performance-managed and regulated under technologies that ensure a strict compliance to the ideology. Keddie (2015) uses the term ‘regulated self-regulation’ to describe this process. And just as Tseng (2015) noted that headteachers had become middle managers of the state, Monk (2005) notes that headteachers have become de-facto employers of teachers. This is what one head teacher had to say about her actions on being seconded to another school to ‘turn it around’:

I’ve turned another one round whilst I was doing this one I was asked to go and run a local church school the head had unfortunately had a serious heart problem erm and they were without the head teacher for about a year so I was doing four miles here four miles back but again it was really because they had some really good teachers there young teachers that just needed that “come-on, lets gets you moving “ and that’s what we do here and I think any of my staff would say that they like working here because erm they know they’re not going to be here long but they’re going to learn so so much.

(Interview with HT1)

Note the focus on disciplining the teachers first and foremost and probably getting them to ‘work hard’; “come-on, let’s get you moving”. Note also the expectation that teachers would not be at her school for long but would soon be wanting to move on. HT1 had a strong narrative in the interview of training her teachers to be ambitious future leaders and headteachers and moving them on to other schools. There is no expectation that someone would want to stay and become part of a community and maybe develop relationships with other teachers and with parents. There would be no up-take of the entrepreneurial spirit from a teaching candidate that did not demonstrate such ambition and therefore may be less likely to be offered a post. This is very much in line with the sense of dynamism noted by Keddie (2015) that has been borrowed from the world of business and enthuses the discourse of neo-liberal school management in the recent years.

There is now a large differential in the power relation between teachers and headteachers in contrast to what Tseng (2015) termed the ‘democratic period’ from the 1940s to the 1970s. As mentioned above, Tseng (2015) noted that teachers have become mere followers of headteachers whilst headteachers have been positioned as the single powerful leader. She describes this as being a vertical management structure. Monk (2005) noted that teachers were increasingly portrayed as a ‘troublesome burden’ on headteachers. Keddie (2015) noted that along with this increase in the differential of power there was an accompanying deliberate increase in the difference in pay between teachers and headteachers. There is then a vertical management structure from the state to headteachers to teachers in which “autonomy” (regulated self-regulation) is granted to those who have demonstrated an ability to not challenge and ask questions (Tseng, 2015). To be ‘successful’ in this regime is to show an ability to govern oneself along neo-liberal lines in which the metrics of ‘outcomes’ and economics are the sole consideration.

How the Headteachers Conceive of

Disability

As the Equality Act 2010 and all of its supporting documentation and legislation is premised on the notion of a strict formal equality from which deviation will not be allowed, it was important to analyse how the headteachers viewed disability, as this would be the basis they would use when applying that strict formal equality.

On the whole the headteachers spoke from a point of view of disability framed in medical and deficit terms. To have a disability was to have a difficulty, to have a problem and to be the recipient of the help from others over and beyond the able-bodied. Consider the following except:

I gave you the example of that head of economics who was absolutely fantastic and couldn't see the board and his pupils loved him you know and he managed very well actually without a support worker and he'd worked it through but if he needed support he could have had it, Then we've had people in wheel chairs who you know needed someone to take them around the place and it can all be managed if you look at the detail

(Interview with HT2)

On first reading HT2 tells a positive story of this teacher who is 'fantastic'. Throughout the interview HT2 very much dwelt on the hero half of the disability-as-villain-or-hero continuum, speaking of the ability of a disabled person to 'light up the room'. However, it is possible to read into this narrative that the person being spoken of was all the more 'fantastic' because they could do it 'without support'. Note also, on the other hand, that it is perfectly

acceptable for a disabled person not to expect to be able to navigate the building on their own but to need someone to 'take them around the place'. HT2's understanding of disability then is of a person who is in need of the help of others but that it is 'fantastic' when it turns out that this need will not be required after all. But however it turns out, disability is something that is in need of 'management'.

Another head teacher understood disability thus:

It would probably be me or, you know, it depends what the adjustment would be, if it would be some sort of physical erm change to the, maybe they needed a special chair or some new equipment and it's simple in that sense its buying something, spending some money, my business manager would do that, we've done that, we've bought people special keyboards but that's not so much disability it's just work related, maybe injuries, sore back, special chairs, but if it was something more sensitive where we may have to, I can't really think of an example, but if it was more to do with [kind of] the human aspect of it then I would, then I would, I would speak to that person obviously if they wanted to share anything with me

(Interview with HT3)

For HT3 disability is only disability when it is somehow mixed up with tragedy. Having a sore back or an injury and only requiring special equipment and that being the end of the

matter are not ‘so much disabilities’. Disability is something more problematic, something needing closer management and surveillance, something that involves ‘sensitivity’ and the ‘human aspect’. Note also the way how he sees it as something requiring a confessional, ‘to share’ with him in private. This is not a discourse of HT’s own making. In one of the interviews with the teachers I myself at one point began to speak of disability along very similar lines.

Another way in which disability was viewed was through the lens of special educational needs. Consider the following:

in the classroom when he first started he got himself in such a state over it and he was working with [name of teacher] which was really good with the children in there and she did an amazing job with him and you could go and watch him and he didn’t stammer when he was teaching [either]

(Interview with HT1)

HT1 is here describing the placing of a student teacher in with the special needs teachers and her special needs pupils. The special needs teacher is described as having done an ‘amazing’ job with the student teacher, the metric being that she has cured him of his stammer using her special needs insights and knowledge. Disability then is something to be reduced or cured with the right techniques, management and encouragement in line with the ideology of special educational needs. *Chapter Six: The Special Educational Needs Discourse* is devoted to exploring and analysing this single topic.

These are just a few of the many instances in the data that I could use to indicate similar points. What I have done is to select one instance from each headteacher to illustrate how they as headteachers viewed disability. As I show later, simply because they expressed an understanding of disability in these terms as headteachers does not necessarily mean that is how they always saw disability. In their subject positions as *headteacher*, disability was viewed as springing from a medical understanding in which people had individual difficulties that, with management and attention, they could be helped to overcome. The headteachers did not for instance see disability in terms of the social model of disability where the environment, the way the job of a teacher is constructed and the expectation to conform to social norms were the difficulties. Any difficulty was nearly always attached to the individual person. This is the view of disability that they are likely to take forward in dealing with equality in terms of formal equality. Formal equality as a model of equality will not challenge this view of disability or give them pause for thought about how they see disability.

Formal Equality

The Equality Act 2010 is founded on the principle of formal equality. Though a variation of the principles of formal equality is allowed in the form of ‘reasonable adjustments’ for people with disabilities, this in no way strays very far from the principle of formal equality in the sense that not too much adjustment will be made. Although the Equality Act 2010 states that people with disabilities should be treated ‘more favourably’ than nondisabled persons it cannot be effectively argued that the aim of this policy is other than to establish metrics and systems that effect equivalent formal equality for people with disabilities but certainly not to offer more than formal equality. The only argument that can be made, and that I make throughout this thesis, is that the use of ‘reasonable’ adjustments is to arrive at a position that is less than that of formal equality for disabled persons, whether by design or in practice. For

the purpose of my analysis I will understand that the aim on the Equality Act is to achieve formal equality for people with disabilities.

In terms of formal equality, reasonable adjustments can be understood as being ‘reasonable’ to others by not giving disabled people an ‘unfair advantage’. Fredman (2016) describes such approaches to equality where an ‘exception’ is made in the formal equality as ‘exceptionalist’ approaches. Such approaches, she writes, are unlikely to challenge the underlying imbalances of power but allow the discourse of normalism to continue unabated.

As described in the last chapter, *Chapter Eight: Governmentality*, formal equality is premised on the ideal that two people who are alike should be treated equally. But how is it to be determined that two people are alike? The only way this can be done is to find an abstract person against whom both parties can be compared. As this is not possible, what happens in practice is that a person who embodies the dominant culture is used as a comparison. This results in strong pressure being exerted on others to conform (Fredman, 2011). A similar effect can be seen when a member of an oppressed group begins to voice their grievances and the dominant replies with a plea for ‘everyone to come together’. There is no abstract neutral place for this ‘coming together’ so it is in effect a request for the oppressed to be quiet. Formal equality then favours those in a dominant position because it uses them as the given neutral point.

The headteachers often spoke from a position that indicated that they understood equality as formal equality or spoke highly of formal equality programmes. The following is one such instance:

See we have children who are Turkish here and they don't speak English at home so they're at an immediate disadvantage. So how can we get around that? Well, we work differently with both children as much as we can because we know that they're not going to get that support at home

(Interview with HT1)

Being bilingual or 'don't speak English' as HT1 terms it is not the catastrophe she seems to be assuming that it is. In fact Martin (2002) has indicated the many educational advantages for children who are bilingual, and that being bilingual, far from being a problem, is actually an asset in the learning process. It only tends to catastrophe when the school is rigidly and restrictively monolingual and mono-cultural. Note also how HT1 assumes a disadvantaged home life. I would have thought the opposite would have been true, that the parents would be more concerned to make sure the child was settling into the new school and new culture. In HT1's view there is great emphasis on conforming to the dominant on moving the pupils to the dominant because that is the only manner in which equality can be experienced in her model. Note also she 'works' with the children not with the school. Martin pointed out that taking a whole-school approach to multi-lingualism rather than using a 'replacement model' of language acquisition was an essential component of establishing equality in schools.

The Department for Education guidance for schools: *The Equality Act 2014 and Schools* (DFE 2014) reiterates the importance of sticking to formal equality and it also enshrines an abstract notion of equality by the way it presents itself as one document applicable for both children and adults in schools. All the headteachers, when asked, said that they had followed suit and produced one policy on equality for their school to cover adults employed at the school and pupils.

There is not anything inherently incorrect or misplaced about having one policy to cover both students and staff. Consider the following:

We've got a couple of kids in wheel chairs erm who are have got assistance and we move them. We've got a boy who's seriously significant condition, a wee boy, just a youngster, erm but they seem to think the building's good that's quite nice to hear that. But you are right. Maybe from a teacher's point of view, if you were a teacher within a wheel chair I am not sure, you know, you might have to get everything lowered on the wall

(Interview with HT3)

At the end of excerpt the headteacher concedes that more changes to the physical environment would make themselves apparent if consideration were to be given to adults with disabilities rather just children. Why 'everything lowered on the wall' is not done for the children anyway is not clear. Adults may also give another opinion about the building being 'good' if they have to be 'moved' and are not able to move around independently. But my point is that having to consider the restrictions placed on adults may lead to a less restrictive environment for children. So there is benefit in keeping one equality policy. Where I offer critique is that it leads to the policy being written in abstract terms as lists of aims and objectives without any detail about how inequality actually affects people positioned differently. It does not indicate what exactly needs to change for whom and how these changes will be bought about.

All the headteachers indicated that their school had written their own policy themselves and often involving some type of committee. Not all headteachers were in a position in interview to indicate that they were familiar with their own equalities policy or showed a detailed understanding of the contents of the Equality Act 2010. It is worth taking a brief look at one of the equality policies from one of the schools. For the purposes of anonymity I paraphrase rather than quote directly.

Central to this policy is providing 'equal opportunities'. In *Chapter Eight: Governmentality* I noted that the government also used this term and I critiqued it as being an ineffectual term; no one would disagree with it but, at the same time, it is almost a meaningless term. Bullying is described in this school's equalities policy as being an abuse of power and also often being an unconscious act by the perpetrator. Discrimination on the other hand is something people may 'experience'. Note the difference in the active and passive language used for bullying as opposed to discrimination. One of the main reasons why formal equality advantages the dominant is that it is written in abstract and passive terms that avoids describing the behaviour of the dominant, behaviour that leads to the discrimination. Discrimination of course involves an abuse of power and is often unconscious as it forms part of the dominant discourses within society and until discrimination is understood and tackled in those terms the fight against it will be a difficult one.

Formal equality as presented in the Equality Act 2010 can be ineffective because it relies on the individual to make a complaint of discrimination rather than requiring others to be active in ensuring equality and then holding them to account for this. The onus is placed on the victim of discrimination to be aware of all the facts and then having the resources to follow through with a legal procedure. This is very rarely likely to happen. In *Chapter Eight:*

Governmentality, I cited the House of Lords report that was critical of expecting individuals to bring cases against powerful institutions. Consider the following as an indication of the ineffectualness of these procedures and principles:

I've actually seen just in the last week a disabled person erm for interview, she wasn't successful in the job [interview] and she might well have been, she was good. But as I say, we had a kind of sitting tenant and it's always difficult to move a sitting tenant when they're doing such a good job, but I don't see many

(Interview with HT3)

First note the abstract language 'she wasn't successful', not 'I didn't give her the job'. But in effect he did actually did 'give' the job to someone. Formal equality requires that like be compared with like but in the selection process that is being described here by HT3, like is not being compared with like. What is being done is that someone who has been given the opportunity to do the job for some months is being compared with someone who has not had that opportunity. For a fair comparison to be made then the external applicant should also have been given the opportunity to do the job for equally as long. This may be impractical but it is unfair to carrying on a narrative claiming that a formal equality procedure has been followed with some being 'unsuccessful'. So, seeing HT1 was going to give the job away anyway he might as well, in the interest of equality, have given it to the applicant as she was 'good'.

HT3 will at other times speak from a narrative of merit:

I would say in a year we maybe have two or three applicants who have ticked the disabled box some of them don't meet the minimum requirement so we don't see them, but if they do meet the minimum requirement we will always see them, I think that's a good thing, personally, if they meet the, if they have the skills and experience to teach that subject erm they should be seen I think that's good,

(Interview with HT3)

The problem is that despite being qualified some people will never be given the opportunity to attain the 'skills and experience' if they have been discriminated against in the past. And further, what are these minimum requirements other than being a qualified teacher that enables you to apply for the job? HT3 points the way to this answer elsewhere:

...but I think a disabled person who is the right person to connect with young people would find that, would be seen as equally cool if you get what I mean, that's the way kids they are like, yer, so I'd love to see your research when you've finished with it Mark

(Interview with HT3)

So it becomes circular. Opportunities are given to the 'right person' who then will build up experience and skills and these experience and skills will be used as a justification for selecting them as being the 'right person' next time round also.

This criterion for being 'the right person' is just an example of what Fredman (2016) indicated when she said that the basis on which merit is judged is a product of the dominant

group. Such practices of ‘merit’ reflect and reinforce existing patterns of advantage and disadvantage (Burton, 2014). People can be deprived of the means to acquire such ‘merit’ under regimes of formal equality and so for ever be disadvantaged despite great effort on their part.

The second example of recruitment practice follows on from this and demonstrates how people can be actively deterred from pursuing their application for employment. Consider the following, it is quite long, but it is worth quoting in its entirety so that certain points can be seen:

Int: Why did she apply for the job, then? do you not think that she thought she could do the job?

HT1: Well we, we did, erm we never ask directly [put it] that way, we always sort of say, erm, you know why here why [name of school] that’s what we do erm and when it’s a physical job we kind of sort of do some scenarios erm and you could see her panicking when we came up with this scenario which is that, not a very nice one but, a child’s been sick, err, and there’s vomit all over the toilet and everywhere erm and you need to use certain ways of dealing with that and [...] that and looking after, erm and you could see that she was erm beginning to come to that conclusion in the end, and then when we asked her

Int: Did she answer the question?

HT1: She, she did but you could see that the misgivings were coming in and then at the end when we asked you know, is there any reasonable adjustments, she actually said then she has fibromyalgia and a lot of pain and she wouldn't be able to bend down erm and do some of those jobs so erm she did say would we keep her on file if anything came up that she [...] for such as dinner lady erm and that but erm we did contact her but she'd got a job in the meantime erm at a desk job err which is probably more suited to her err but we've not had anybody other than her and [student teacher] we've not had anybody err apply

HT1 in my view did not want to give this applicant the job. The Disability Act 2010 dissuades employers from asking questions about health or disability except where it is claimed to be specific and central to the job. Earlier in the interview, HT1 had said that looking at the applicant she could tell that she would not be able to do the job. The applicant had the same disability as the headteacher and the headteacher had used that as a basis for her assessment of the applicant as "... and you just knew she wouldn't be able to do the job".

Having decided that the applicant would not be able to do the job, HT1 then proceeded along a line of interviewing by which the interviewee would see and confess that they would not be able to do the job. HT1 begins by describing scenarios that are designed to illustrate to the applicant that she would not be able to do the job and continues the process until she arrives at the scenario of the child who has been sick. There is no suggestion that training will be provided or that this may be an infrequent occurrence that most people would be

uncomfortable with, rather than liking, or any suggestion that support will be offered at difficult times.

HT1 is not trying to promote the post on offer so much as to put the applicant off. There is no inquiry of what reasonable adjustments would be needed as the nature of the applicant's disability is said to unfold or which of the tasks she would be able to do without adjustments and how she could do the others with adjustments. There is just the pursuit of the logic of amplifying the disability. In practice, this has the effect of presenting the applicant as being more and more 'unsuited' to the post while adjustments could then be presented as being more and more 'unreasonable'. There is then the conclusion that she is not suitable for the job which the applicant is led to confess herself. HT1 even goes so far as to suggest that she knows what is best for the applicant, over and above what the applicant knows herself, and that is to work elsewhere at a desk job.

I am unsure if HT1 is following a discourse of 'care' or a discourse of 'efficient worker'. These translate into motives of being kind or it could be that she is avoiding a potentially 'inefficient' worker as a gate-keeper of a neo-liberal managed institution where the most labour is to be extracted with the least costs incurred. But the mechanism by which someone can be denied a job is in play. HT1 had just said in the interview with me that her disability was not going to 'defeat' her but she was going to make whatever adjustments she needed. She does not seem ready to extend that privilege to this applicant.

The presence of formal equality and the medical model is on display in this example. One reinforces and invokes the other. The 'more' disabled a person can be constructed as being or can be made to confess the easier it becomes to sideline and dismiss them through formal

equality channels and arguments. Campbell (2015) writes about collusion between law and the medical profession. The law not only refuses to mention the oppositional discourses of ableism but colludes with the medical profession on the definition of what it means to be a human being.

But HT1 did not have this formal equality and medical view of disability in her personal life.

Consider the following:

Int: Where does that come from do you think? How is that that
 organisation could be so brilliant but the one next door terrible?
 what is that?

HT1: I think it's that the people that lead

Int: the leaders

HT1: actually see people and value people, whatever they are and not,
 and not going to think "I got to comply with this rule. I think I'm
 complying with this rule", the rules go out the window, they find a
 way through

This was part of a considerable length of approximately 30 minutes pre-interview conversation that was recorded between HT1 and myself in which we spoke about experiences of disability. At this point HT1 was saying how impressed she was with the management and facilities on offer for people with disabilities at a local event she had just

attended and how they had managed a group of children with disabilities who ‘as a group of children they all had quite difficult needs you know; they were very you know emotionally challenged and everything’. Asked about how it could be that some organisations get it ‘right’ for people with disabilities and some do not HT1 indicated a need for the rules go out of the window and alternate ways found through. This contrasts directly with her refusal to find ‘a way through’ for the disabled applicant above.

In general, it felt like I had spoken to two different people that day: one person who I had began with and we just spoke about disability, our experiences and views, and then a second person once the formal questioning started. Whilst speaking as a headteacher HT1 became a person who was much more constrained to talk through discourses of formal equality and discourses of disability as a medical issue. Foucault in answering a question posed about the status of medicine in law points out that the way in which a science can function within a system of law is a huge problem. He concludes by saying:

What matters is for this conflict between law and knowledge, so difficult to resolve, to be effectively worked through at the heart of society that the society would define a different relation to law and to knowledge

(Foucault 1994c, p290)

To extend Foucault, he is asking if there is not a different configuration, a different way such that the medical view of disability does not become so entangled and enshrined within equality law. When the headteacher is summoned to speak as a headteacher her talk of disability is restricted to that of a science of disability which is the one sanctioned and enshrined in law. When she speaks as an individual then her words are

no longer confined to this medical view of disability enshrined in law but she uses a different source of knowledge from which to speak about disability and even equality.

Reasonable Adjustments

The DFE (2014) makes an astonishing admission in its advice to schools about the implementation of the Equality Act 2010 (EqA). It states that under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA) that the EqA replaces, schools could justify direct discrimination but under the EqA direct discrimination is prohibited. The DFE (2014) document continues by stating that failure to make a reasonable adjustment can no longer then be justified, it says: ‘the fact that it must be reasonable provides the necessary test’. This in itself can best be described as a circular argument. The document states that it will be up to the school to consider what is reasonable and costs will play an inevitable part. The circle is completed by the following statement:

A minor change for schools is that a failure to make a reasonable adjustment cannot now be justified, whereas under the previous disability discrimination legislation it could be. However this change should have no practical effect due to the application of the reasonable test.

(DFE, 2014, P28)

So, claiming justifiable direct discrimination and having the power to decide on ‘reasonableness’ are equal, they are both the same and have the same practical effect. Or to put it bluntly, ‘reasonable adjustments’ can and may have the same effect as justifiable direct discrimination. Both justifying direct discrimination and saying an adjustment is

‘unreasonable’ were at different times legal and, in practice, have the same effect. If something was previously deemed to be justified direct discrimination it can now be deemed to be an ‘unreasonable’ adjustment instead.

Formal equality tends to benefit the dominant and readily copies and repeats the status quo. A statement of this form, as that above from the DFE, should come as no surprise then when it turns out, perhaps stated more explicitly than in other areas or for other ‘characteristics’, that formal equality in effect may amount to little in real terms. For the case of disability, under the use of reasonable adjustments to effect formal equality, the result may be equal to direct discrimination as stated by the DFE (2014). Equality in this form simply does not go far enough to reverse discrimination.

The direct discrimination is enacted in practice for people with disabilities through the way that others come to decide what disability is, what adjustments are needed and when adjustments will not be granted based on their own assessment of what is reasonable.

Consider the following except:

Absolutely, yes, it was one of these Saturday [.....] which always takes place in a pub. It was a historical sort of building in [name of town], erm, but when I’d mentioned to them that I was coming in a wheel chair said, O, they’d bring this ramp erm and I’d raised my concerns about the portable ramp erm and I ended up not being able to go in because the ramp wasn’t adequate but the lady felt that she had made a reasonable adjustment, rather than checking prior that if any of the attendees had a disability or had a need, they didn’t do that

(Interview with HT1)

In another incidents of which she spoke, HT1 had been invited to go and give a speech as an inspirational headteacher and staff at another school were organising the event. When HT1 pointed out that the ramp provided was not suitable she was simply told that a reasonable adjustment had been made and that should be the end of it.

Not only do others decide what is 'reasonable' but there is a pressure applied to disabled persons to minimise request for adjustments in the first place: Consider the following:

So someone said to me they would need adjustments, whatever. I would have a separate interview with them, but also a formal interview, I mean they had to prove themselves at a formal interview, because they had to get the trust of all their colleagues but I always interviewed them personally first so that they understood that we were in it for them as well and I could see what they needed

(Interview with HT2)

HT2 is telling of a potential pre-interview for a job applicant in which the focus would be the teacher's disability. The purpose of this pre-interview was that she could 'see' and decide for herself what adjustments the teacher may need, it wasn't enough for the teacher to simply inform her of what she needed. From here the applicant would move on to 'prove themselves' at a separate interview and get the 'trust' of their colleagues. Note the implied power imbalance in these statements of someone needing to prove themselves to others and gain their trust. The language she uses is laboured with expectations of the candidate being deficit. It is easy to imagine that processes such as this can lead to a teacher wanting to present their disability in a manner so that there appears to be the need for a minimum

requirement of adjustments and making only minimum requests. Recall from *Chapter Five: Discourses Which Constrain*, the teachers who declared ‘she does not need a lot’. And teachers would be reluctant to go through one of these special interviews every time they made a request for an adjustment. The effect is that there is both a pressure to minimise the adjustments requested and to minimise the number of requests made.

Headteachers are reluctant to employ people with disabilities:

HT{}: ...there I would be able to find items discussed where some headteachers have said you know, we would like to know what would the adjustment be that you would have to make 'cause it might be a significant adjustment

Int: And, what is the significance of the significant adjustment?

HT{}: Costs probably, but as I say, that's not applied to me, yer, but I know that other colleagues and I'm going back now two and a half years, this did come up.

The headteachers do no individual wrong in foregrounding the potential costs of adjustments because it is the DFE (2014) that informs them that disability can be counted in terms of costs. It is not difficult to image a myriad of ways by which this anxiety over costs can be communicated to teachers and applicants. Throughout this chapter I have illustrated management and governance practices that may tend to minimise requests made for

adjustments. Having interviewed three headteachers and found these illustrations, there will be many more ways in which such preferred governing of the self can be communicated.

There is a strange mechanism at work with ‘reasonable adjustments’. As I indicated in *Chapter Two: Meeting the Literature*. Requests from people with disabilities for respect and politeness are transformed into legal requests or terms. But in the meeting of these legal requirements there is a sleight-of-hand by which the meeting of these requests for respect do not reappear in the legalistic terms they were transferred into by Equality Act 2010 but in the natural-sounding terms of ‘reasonableness’, which now invests others with the power to act.

The political nature of adjustments should not be allowed to hide behind the word ‘reasonable’ but should be thrown back into the political arena in which they belong, termed what they are – ‘disability adjustments’. I end this section with an excerpt illustrating how these disability adjustments could look, and they are in no way ‘reasonable’ as we have come to understand the term in our neo-liberal way of thinking:

My son had, because it's my son he doesn't have the details, he had recently erm an English teacher who was completely deaf and so in the classroom with the English teacher there was another teacher or another person [who did the speaking] he said it worked very well and he, but what I am wondering is who paid for that other person, it's not my school by the way, [.....] concept of it, when I knew I was going to be speaking to you tonight I said to him erm,, is there any disabled teachers in your school

(Interview with HT3)

Conclusion

The governing of disability in school revolves around three discourses which interlock, intertwine and reinforce each other, namely efficiency, the medical model of disability and formal equality. They all define problems and their solutions in simplistic, rational and technical terms; they all disperse objects in a similar fashion. And in their deployment, they define people as being at the margins and force them to stay there or to adapt to dominant norms. How these discourses interlock and intertwine can vary, but a pattern emerges in my data and in my analysis. The headteacher as a mini-sovereign exercises relations of power that allow disability to be treated solely as a medical problem that needs careful and close management; people must be interviewed about their disability, they must have something to confess, to 'share', they may be led to believe certain things about their disability. Disability may be amplified as a problem leading to pressures placed on teachers to minimise the effect of their disability. Teachers in this relation of power are not in a position to readily question how the headteacher has framed the problem. The headteacher will decide what is best for the person and procedures of formal equality or discussions around reasonable adjustments, in appearance or reality, completes the process.

I began the chapter by pointing out that between relations of power that tend towards domination and those that tend towards being adversarial there is governmentality. The question I asked then was: what are the processes and the relations of power that exist and operate in schools by which teachers come to govern themselves so that they do not present themselves with requests for reasonable adjustments?

My answer is this: disabled teachers faced with the array of forces described in this chapter against them learn to govern themselves in such a manner that any adjustments or changes

they may need to make are done as best as they can by themselves, or they fold the discourse of disability as deficit within themselves rather than to have to undergo these processes which are led by others. This folding within self and making-do has been demonstrated multiple times throughout this thesis. Asking for reasonable adjustments opens the self up to scrutiny and critiques of ability to work hard, of having to confess to being deficit and granting the power of others to decide for them. Foucault indicated that this is the manner power is wielded under governmentality, not to govern directly but to govern how others come to govern themselves (Foucault, 1994d).

Chapter Ten: Conclusion

Introduction

To conclude this thesis I turn first to the question of the research questions and then move on to drawing out some suggestions and strategies that follow from that and from the thesis in general.

Answering the Research Question

My research question(s) I address are:

1. How are disabled teachers constrained or empowered by the dominant discourses which operate within the school as the school functions to carry out its day to day activities and seeks to complete its stated rationale for being?
2. How does the system set in place to ensure equality, namely the Equality Act 2010, affect the career chances of teachers with disabilities and is this legislation effective in achieving the equality it has been set in place to establish?

Answering Question One

Schools are disciplinary institutions which act to constrain and govern people within them. As disciplinary institutions, the school relies on discourses of normality, of hierarchy, of high levels of sovereign power wielded by the headteacher, of the entrepreneurial individual, of an instrumental view of education that is to be delivered in an instrumental way and finally of an understanding of disability in terms of special educational needs. Teachers with disabilities

are constrained so that in their words, actions and being, they do not interfere, interrupt, challenge, attempt to alter, bypass, circumvent, subvert or reduce in any way the strength of these discourses, something they are very likely to do when they are given the chance to speak.

All teachers are constrained by these discourses and as such formal equality would suggest that fairness and equality exists. But such a conclusion would be in error. People with disabilities are impacted much more negatively than non disabled teachers by these constraining discourses. I make my arguments for this for each of these discourses in turn next.

The discourse of the neo-liberal entrepreneurial self comes ready-made with the requirement to work hard. The teachers in my study that were middle-aged were struggling with this requirement. This requirement to work hard presents itself as open ended and without limits, balances or checks so that there is little criteria around which to resist it or to question it. In chapter six I illustrated the arbitrary nature of the workload headteachers can impose on teachers. But in the system of 'regulated self-regulation' (Keddie, 2015), as described in chapter nine, headteachers are expected to demand the maximum from teachers. The result is that the limits of this workload are to be found at the boundaries of what it is considered a non disabled person could do. Headteachers are, therefore, reluctant to employ people with disabilities for fear that they may not be able to keep up with this ruinous work load. Teachers that are non disabled view becoming disabled as being a tragedy for their careers because they assume that it will be perceived as them now being unable to manage this workload.

In chapter five I critiqued the agenda of ‘learning’ in schools. Learning is an instrumental view of education in which outcomes are pre-determined and as such it is possible to standardise pedagogy aimed at delivering this learning. Keddie (2015) uses the term ‘diliverology’ for the instrumental method of pedagogy that results from this fixed and closed view of both what education is and the best way to deliver the much valued ‘learning outcomes’ within it. This standardised pedagogy becomes normalised around what an able-bodied person can do and is couched in humanistic terms, notwithstanding the conflict with the efficiency this mechanical-like ‘diliverology’ would suggest. The presenting of standardised pedagogy as humanistic requirements, of ideals, of what is best for humanity, makes it the more difficult to refute. Teachers with disabilities are thus expected to do things with their bodies and use their bodies in identical ways to able-bodied people in order to meet the requirements of this set and rigid pedagogy.

There is ‘prejudice’. I need to explain this. To just use the word ‘prejudice’ in the simple understanding of the word would be an act of reifying difference and setting difference as naturally arousing feelings of antagonism and hostility. There is no such automatic impulse to difference in human nature (Coleman-Brown, 2010) , or at the very least the meaning we give to difference is dependent on the discourses that enmesh us (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). In chapter eight I explained that under neo-liberal governmentality, competition is one of the central ideologies that underpin present day society. To reinforce this sense of competition, difference must always be presented as divisive and made to be experienced as such. An example of this was illustrated in the House of Lords report (2016) in which some people are now of the belief that disabled people get preferential treatment. Hook (2007) theorises further that governments manipulate our own technologies of the self as an instrument in its technologies of power to over-determine that hostility towards certain others becomes

experienced as our own technology of the self; we come to believe that hostility against others is in our own best interest. Practices such as homophily as described in chapter five, ‘birds of a feather stick together’, serve to make this disdain for difference seem natural and to institutionalise it.

The existence of special educational needs means that there is already a well established discourse for the understanding of disability in schools. This bases itself on a medical and individualised understanding of disability so that disability comes to be addressed at that level. The school possesses certain technologies, knowledges and expertise by which to govern disability. Foucault (1994c) terms such technologies ‘the will to knowledge’. The school’s investment in these technologies is vast and is not to be challenged in any way. Teachers with disabilities must subject themselves to this understanding of disability and allow themselves to be governed by it. Other teachers then, who may not be disabled themselves, are given the authority to inform disabled teachers what their disability means and of best ways forward.

There is a discourse of normality running through schools and a preference for the normal. In chapter five I analysed participant C’s praise for the management of her school. Despite meeting all the expected milestones such as excellent lesson observations and good exam results she did not explain her continuation at the school in terms of excellent lesson observations and good exam results. There was a strong narrative of gratitude in her talk, but it was unclear exactly what it was she had to be grateful for.

This question of normality leads finally to the importance of situating schools as disciplinary institutions. Foucault’s (1975) thesis is that disciplinary institutions attached to themselves

individuals so that they may be disciplined; that they may learn how to use their bodies in a certain manner in the service of capitalism and that they may be disciplined through the use of their bodies. This disciplining of people through their bodies means that a body that cannot conform to the expected norm remains forever 'abject' (Butler, cited in Samuels, 2002) .

Without this theory of disciplinary power the preference for the norm is difficult to establish and to identify and we are left only with examples of its effects such as participant G's inability to clearly articulate the reason as to why she thought that her ability to exercise authority with the pupils was somehow diminished by her disability being demonstrated against a normalised environment. Or why participant D was almost convinced that no one would want to employ her as a teacher because of the differences in the way she spoke which involved no question of not being clearly understood.

The working environment of the school makes it difficult to resist these discourses and for change from beneath to be effected. In chapter five I described the isolation in which many teachers work, an isolation that is in part a result of the competition encouraged by the school. In chapter nine I described the rise over recent decades of the headteacher from that of lead professional to the present position of chief executive. Headteachers can in effect be considered mini-sovereigns. Monk (2005) suggests that headteachers are even held to be beyond the restraint of human rights law. This authority of the headteacher may only be challenged using extreme measures.

The teachers in my study can and do resist and fight back. A central component, and condition in this resistance is the ability to draw on the help of others. In resisting against a situation they find intolerable they begin to gain a position of freedom and decide for themselves how they would like to govern the relation between themselves and others.

Answering Question Two

Attaining a situation of formal equality is not an automatic, simple, mandatory outcome for teachers with disability. By the government's own admission, the process of trying to achieve formal equality via the mechanism provided of reasonable adjustments can be described as being equivalent to allowing for direct discrimination. This is so because ultimately another person will decide on the needs of a disabled person via the mechanism of reasonable adjustments. The data in this thesis has illustrated the techniques headteachers can use to circumvent the requirements to provide for even formal equality. In addition to these techniques, the requirement to provide reasonable adjustments itself can be used as a means or rationale to avoid employing teachers with disabilities. This has the very unfortunate consequence that people who are thus served unfairly are led to believe that they are subjects of law and have undergone a fair recruitment process as mandated by law. They may even be led to confess that they are not suitable for the job they had been hopeful of obtaining. The result is that the teachers develop a mistrust of law and see it as being ineffectual to aid them. The one-sided power relation between an individual and the institution of the school means that only those individuals who can draw on other sources of power are able to wield the law in their defence and begin to insist on equality and redress the imbalances under the terms the law allows.

Ways Forward

Hodgson & Standish (2009) critique the way that work that claims to follow Foucault is often too concerned with reaching conclusions despite Foucault clearly indicating that subjectification and resistance are ongoing processes. Foucault himself wanted to separate the activities of analysis from solution-finding. He stated that people who provide analysis should not have to provide ethical principles or practical advice at the same time. The

analysis provided should be there so that others who are engaged in the struggle can elaborate and transform the analysis themselves (Foucault, 1994a). As someone ‘engaged in the struggle’ I am going to attempt some answers, some suggestions about ways forward. I understand that these are not definite answers, though I hope them to be good answers. Elsewhere, Foucault (1994g) writes that once the spokesperson who assumes to speak for others is silenced it will be a matter of working through things a little by little, of maybe not solving problems but introducing modifications which change the terms of the problem.

First, an understanding of the **political rationality** under which we currently live will help to situate the potential scope of modifications possible and which modifications may work best. Although the state should be challenged for its current practices it is probably best to discourage intervention by the state. Foucault (1994l) explains that intervention by the state can only ever lead to greater and greater individualisation. The state’s sole rationale for being is simply to exist and to thrive. The population is nothing more than something the state takes care of for the state’s benefit, a resource that it manages through the deployment of biopower. The state is always looking to strengthen itself and so there is deeper and deeper deployment of this biopower to manage people-as-resource and this tends towards greater and greater totalising and individualising. Foucault explains that political theorists have not understood the system of rationality under which they operate. Instead of understanding the specifics of the rationality under which we live, political theorists posit rationality in general as the problem.

Parker & Draves (2018) write that one of the lessons Disability Studies has to teach, is to remind us is that **interdependence** is a defining character of civilisation. Notwithstanding the attempted essentialising of what civilization is by Parker and Draves, it is clear that the

disciplinary and normalising society lowers the conditions under which someone can be considered an individual and isolated as such (Foucault, 1975). What I suggest then is that we move to resist all the techniques and ways that disciplinary power and the school **individualises** people and interpolates them as individuals. The social model of disability for example is a model against this individualising of the outcomes of normality visited on people with disabilities. We should always look for solutions which are located as far away from individual people as much as possible. An example of this would be an accessible environment for all. Advocating for a pedagogy aimed at comprehensive education for all rather than one aimed at maximising individual educational results can also help in resisting an individualising ideology.

Friendship has a large role to play in resisting the disciplinary processes. Chapter five illustrated the isolation almost inherent in the teaching profession. Participant A explains about her work colleagues:

I don't know really, I think, erm, I think people on a one to one level maybe outside were different, you know they would be accepting.

(Participant A)

It is interesting that friendship is more easily established outside of the school building. The reasons for this are several and have to do with competition between teachers, homophily, work load stress and many more as mentioned above. But these discourses are also discourses of the disciplinary society which is inimical to friendship. Foucault (1994q) notes that from the sixteenth century onwards a range of texts begin to appear that criticise friendship as being something dangerous. With the subsequent suppression and attempted removal of

friendship in society certain individuals will be ‘revealed’ and made the subject of disciplinary and normalising power. He continues that disciplinary institutions are inimical to the existence of friendship and these institutions therefore actively move to diminish and minimise friendship. Rabinow (1994) points out that what Foucault was really against, and which his work was directed towards highlighting and critiquing, was the general impoverishment of social relations.

One or two scenes of camaraderie amongst the teachers were depicted in chapter seven. I am not against such friendship but what I am suggesting is the use of a friendship that distances itself from identity as much as possible. Harwood (2010) suggests that taking a firm position as a ‘Disability Studies’ scholar may not be conducive to the overall progress of people with disabilities. Sticking firmly to a fixed identity may make it more difficult to get along well with other people. We open up to difference not to celebrate difference as such but to create more inclusive conditions (Butler, 2004, cited in Jackson & Mazzei, 2018, p721) There are other, maybe better ways to increase the **combative resources of the subject** other than through identity; better because they allow more readily for change. Friendship is to be used as a means to confuse and thwart attempts by disciplinary power to isolate and individualise people so that they can then be targeted. As shown in this thesis, the teachers that were able to draw on the support of others were the most successful in resisting relations that may otherwise tend towards being dominated.

Increasing the combative resources of the subject is just part of **the care of the self**. I suggest education is also a vital component in this process, but not education that would tend to reinforce identity. In chapter two I briefly mentioned the work of de Beauvoir (1997) and her persistence in simply refusing any explanation that could be used to rationalise the

dominance of one over another. de Beaugrande (1997) writes that knowledge is caught up in discourses that we struggle to comprehend and unravel and so we become disaffected. So every effort should be made to arrive at a specific analysis of the problems. But this may not be easy. I have illustrated in this thesis instances where I think it would be unreasonable to expect any one person to fully grasp the multiplicity of discourses that constrain them. A lack of a full and clear understanding of these discourses may lead to doubt. The teachers who resisted the discourses of normality combated it with a certain persistence. Participant B gave a good example of this as cited in chapter six:

If you're telling me not to use Powerpoint you're expecting me to write on the board legibly coherently and in a timely fashion and you want the kids to be able to read it and actually learn from my handwriting; my handwriting is like a dog's dinner and if you're putting me under pressure to write on the board and, you're bang out of order so the school, the school, one of the things I do say to the schools is one of the things I will do is I will use Powerpoint. As much as anything because it is my prompt. Erm, now I can do chalk and talk, anybody, if you're a decent teacher, you can do chalk and talk but to tell me that I have to do chalk and talk is very different than if a computer packs up.

(Participant B)

Whether she can or she can't write on the board in the form that management expect, either way, she is not conceding the point that someone else has the authority to tell her how to manage her disability or that her ability to teach is placed in doubt. The main discourse that is constraining B is the discourse on learning, on the ability and insistence that children learn

only from a very narrow array of normalised pedagogical tools, as discussed in chapter five. This discourse on learning is well mounted and difficult to assail. B doesn't attempt to. But neither does she yield the point. B had a PhD in Education so probably was aware of the learning versus education debate, but whether she was or she wasn't, she chooses not to meet the argument in the terms in which it is offered but in terms which place her in a more powerful position other than someone who needs to be told what to do. As Foucault (1994d) suggested, play another game of truth with other trump cards, but not a game that is totally different from the original game of domination by truth.

'The most common way people give up their power is by thinking they don't have any' (Alice Walker cited in Rasmussen & Harwood, 2009, p16). As Campbell (2015) noted, all disabled people internalise the subjection meted out to them and one of the most erroneous practices I find in the literature are those places where it is 'explained and discovered' that people with disabilities are 'maladjusted' or some other similar negation. It is not a subjectification of our own making or of our own choosing. It was Eleanor Roosevelt who said 'no one can do anything to you that you are not already doing to yourself'. However, there are severe limits to this kind of 'freeing of the self' thinking. Rasmussen & Harwood (2009) suggest that this type of the care of the self is not a viable or a robust enough strategy of resistance for those who fall outside of the remit of where power as governmentality can or does exist. For the purposes of teachers with disabilities, the use of Foucault's emphasis on the care of the self as a means of resistance has been shown in chapter seven to be perhaps an outcome of the struggle that is a viable strategy of resistance. Doran (2015) suggests that this care of the self was a personal project of Foucault on himself and that it is a lifetime, lifelong project for anyone that would choose it. Still, I believe used on its own it is not sufficient

enough to combat the overwhelming discourses in the opposite direction and it serves to individualise oppression if it is not understood as a strictly personal narrative.

The materiality of the discourse needs to be disrupted and none more so than the **schools as a disciplinary institution**. Foucault wrote:

The real political task in a society such as ours is to criticise the workings of institutions that appear to be both neutral and independent, to criticize and attack them in such a manner that the political violence that has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them.

(Foucault, quoted in Besley, 2010, p1448)

If there is one technology that has to be attacked and changed it would be where the school deploys its most disciplinary mechanism: **the lesson observation**. In my data by far the most conflict with the school and the subjugation of teachers occurred around lesson observations. It is in this single tactic of power in which normalising practices of pedagogy and embodiment are presented as objective truths that the school has chosen to concentrate its disciplinary power. It is the focal point for the deployment of disciplinary power by the school. But in deploying so much of its disciplinary power into one mechanism perhaps schools have erred in that the school has created a focal point against which directed resistance can be mounted. Realising this may be an important pillbox.

There are many ways in which the lesson observation as a tactic of power can be assailed. One tactic could be that the contradictions in the discourse be used as a point of attack. I

noted in chapter five that teachers were required to produce excellent exam results but that this was not a sufficient condition, neither was it sufficient to produce excellent observed lessons as judged by senior management. The contradictions, or the gap in this rigid dyad of requirements created by the claim that they are not related, that one does not lead to the other so therefore meeting only one would not be sufficient, or that it is possible to have one without the other, can be exploited. The contradictions between neo-liberal efficiency and the demand for humanist pedagogy can also be exploited for the purposes of resistance. The aim is not to disprove the discourse of lesson observations but to disrupt it, to show that it has no basis in the logic of the rationality it claims and so to weaken its ability to discipline teachers so severely. As Hook (2001) points out: the point is to show up the gaps and short comings in a given discourse.

Increases in **workload** must be resisted. As indicated in chapter six, the workload that a headteacher places on her teachers is arbitrary. Increased workload may result in better exam results but that is not the same as a comprehensive and useful education to prepare students for a diverse and liberal society. Any strategy or rationale that can be deployed to reduce the existing workload placed on teachers must be looked at. Foucault (1994) asks us to consider what management of people are made possible by a particular discourse. The insistence on greater and greater workload results in people being singled out as being disabled whilst simultaneously the subject position 'disabled' allows the narrative of workload to be possible and carry on unabated; those who say they cannot cope with the workload open themselves up to being deemed disabled. This disciplinary mechanism was illustrated in chapter six and given the name 'the disability trap'. Whilst producing excessive amounts of work may be a route through and up the teaching career path it thus reveals itself to be a normalising discourse that benefit some and restrict others. It needs to be challenged and reversed.

The practice of **knowing people by their ‘impairments’** has to be challenged. The difficulty with this is that the school’s own discourse of disability, namely special educational needs, specifically designates pupils according to disability. Having attached the label to the child in the first place the process may later involve a teacher ‘seeing through’ the label to see a ‘real’ child underneath. The teacher may then be heralded for her wisdom and humanity but it’s a practice that favours the teacher more than the child.

As I have argued throughout this thesis, the word ‘impairments’ attaches to itself people who can then be known and governed by others according to their ‘impairments’. Someone’s ‘impairments’ becomes acceptable as public knowledge. This is accompanied by a silencing of disabled people to speak for themselves so that the professional voice, the owner of the narrative of ‘impairments’, remains clarion and unchallenged. This silencing of disabled people has also been shown in many places in this thesis. This in itself is reason to stop knowing and speaking of people by their ‘impairments’. I will use the word ‘disability’ instead now. But I think a much more important reason to stop knowing people by their disability is that it objectifies them and reduces them to their disability in the eyes of others. People are not just their disabilities. If the individualising offered by the state is to be challenged then I suggest that the practice of knowing people according to disability be overturned.

I suggest that we critique and speak about **practices of employment** that allow privilege and disadvantage to circulate. I am often struck by the abstract person of difference that an institution posits in their ‘inclusive’ recruitment drives. For instance why must it be necessary that there are no gaps on a person’s cv? How can a person who may have been repeatedly the object of discrimination be expected to have a full cv? What if the person needed some time

away from a normalising society? If the post is for that of a teacher then why does the selection process have to range over their entire career? A focus needs to be maintained on the exact purpose of the selection process. Is it possible that the skills and qualifications required for the post can be assessed through the selection process alone? To base selection on how previous employers have selected or chosen to treat someone may just repeat a discriminating pattern. Recruiting 'through' the actions of previous employers is an example of the type of 'order' that is easy to obtain but may be inimical to the rule of law. I return to this point later.

Many of these employment practices mirror the rise of the disciplinary society in which we learn to police each other, but the result is that we only select people who are identical to us. In these ways disadvantage may follow people around, as do privilege. And some of these practices are just simply unfair such as the granting of posts to internal candidates as illustrated in chapter nine. If a fair means of selecting between internal and external candidates cannot be found then it may be considered best that internal candidates not be allowed to apply for posts.

A person with a disability presenting themselves as a candidate at interview may have had to travel a lot further and advanced much more than a person without a disability. This is so because the person with a disability has had to combat a normalising society along the way. Some authors often refer to the subjectivity so stiffened as 'advantages of disability' as illustrated in chapter two. Having obstacles placed in your path though should not be imagined as an 'advantage'. This way of thinking follows from, excuses, and allows practices of inequality through the idea of the entrepreneurial self. It is nonsensical that the notion of 'merit' be maintained but only applied in a fashion that favours people who have had to

travel the least whilst at the same time cheering those who have come the furthest as having ‘overcoming’ disability.

And finally this discussion around merit and hence formal equality brings me to the subject of **law**. Foucault (1994i) states that there is a tension between law and order because when you try to reconcile the two law just becomes integrated into the social order. Law always refers to the judicial system and order refers to an administrative system. I suspect that Foucault worked with two theories of law. Just as he (1994m) noted that there were two histories to truth, one internal and one external so I think he believed there are two histories to law. In the same article he indicates that the state took over the judicial process for its own gain. Foucault’s life work was to illustrate that if we project our current understanding of objects back into history then we end in error; things are non-linear. Likewise with law, there may be an understanding of law that we have lost full sight of and this understanding of law Foucault criss-crosses with our present understanding of law as a state-sponsored judicial process and which is synonymous with order.

This contradictory understanding of law can be seen in the literature of Foucault and his close adherents. Gordon (1994) illustrated that the rise of the disciplinary society represented a defeat for the rule of law. Gordon also states that Foucault was forming alliances with ‘radical lawyers’ and that he had begun to understand and use the ‘enemy’s enemy’ approach i.e. law is the enemy of disciplinary society so ally with law to defeat the common enemy. This is in spite of Foucault (1976) himself emphasising that we are not subjects of law but subjects of power. We have two views of law in the Foucauldian literature. The first understanding of law is that it is just a system of ‘illegalisms’ (Deleuze, 2006, p26) that is used to serve the interests of the ruling class (Foucault, 1975). The other understanding of

law is that it is in permanent tension with the social order established by political technologies (Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982)) and is incompatible with order (Foucault, 1994m). In fact Deleuze seems to be alluding to some legitimate system of law somewhere else. Foucault seems to hold out an almost romantic image of law, of a law that is separate from the sovereign that can be used to decide on justice and equality.

The granting of the post to the internal candidate in chapter nine can be seen as an example of order that is inimical to the rule of law. Real formal equality would have required a completely different selection process be used to assess between an external and an internal candidate. But this may have resulted in a loss of order. The need to maintain order here then is chosen over the need to rule by law. The ‘radical use of law’ then can be an insistence that the current law be used and applied regardless of the disorder it may cause, especially so as avoiding disorder is the reason for the law not to have been used in the first place. This insistence on the use of law at the inconvenience of order may be deployed with some of the range of issues highlighted above, particularly issues to do with workload and with lesson observations. And there may be a range of other disciplinary procedures that rely on order or gain their power from being able to give order but are inimical to the use of law. These can then be resisted through law. This will not be unproblematic however. Campbell (2015) warns that the use of the law to effect change just reinforces ableism. Foucault (1975) also indicated that the use of the law as defence against domination may serve only to reinforce the state’s power to discipline. But the risk may be worth taking to loosen the hold of the relations of power that tend towards domination for some teachers.

The present form of equality law for people with disabilities is centred on the provision of ‘reasonable adjustments’. I have argued throughout this thesis that it is an inadequate piece

of legislation to address the forces opposing the establishment of equality for people with disabilities. It is a form of law that brings order and places the power to decide that order in the hands of others. Following Foucault, if we were ever to look for new laws then we should not look for them to also bring order. So rather than ask for, or look for, more detailed legislation that may for instance define more closely what disability is and what it isn't, offering different systems of protection to differing groupings and so on, I suggest that legislation should be of the most simple form. A suggestion would be: 'It is illegal to discriminate against disabled people'. Such a simple piece of legislation would remove the right and legal means of others to discriminate. Campbell (2015) notes that until the idea of the autonomous sovereign liberal subject is overthrown and replaced with a humanness that is understood in terms of relationality the paternalistic strategy of 'care' will be needed as a protectionist measure for those at the margins. So there is a risk in suggesting such minimalist legislation in a society where competition is the overriding guiding principle by which we are governed. There can be no assumption of ensuing order with such sparsely worded legislation but moves along these lines would at least leave open the possibility for disabled people and their allies to put up a fair fight and not be hampered by legislation that tells how to fight and places the power to decide in to the hands of others.

We must, in general, act to ensure laws be enacted that limit the normalising, disciplinary and individualising practices of the state. For example Foucault (in Gordon, 1994) posited exploring means to deny government the right to write off people's miseries in terms of profit and loss in accounting for the general good. Without these practices of normalising, disciplining and individualising the creation of the disabled person as a deficit would be much more difficult to achieve.

There can be **no certainties**, but strategies of resistance must be based on careful analysis aimed to bring out the detail and specificity of the problems. Advancements can and will be co-opted into the service of power but we must always be moving on and trying something new (Foucault, 1994q). This is how Foucault defined freedom. Where there is the possibility and conditions for change then we are always free.

What I have learnt

Before commencing this work I held to the view that people who denied their disability were doing that from a position of weakness and from having succumbed to the forces of ableism and a desire to be other than what they really are. I no longer hold to that view. I understand better the trap people are caught in. Disability is constructed to be something negative, it is not an objective, natural object, neither is it objectively negative. But the construction of disability as a negative is denied and mystified such that it becomes difficult to articulate or narrate the discursive process. Those who adhere to a view of disability as a definite identity and those who do not are both involved in an act and quest for freedom. Garland-Thomson writes that the resistance of people to claim the identity 'disabled' is in part a reflection of the lack of ways available to understand disability that are not oppressive (Garland-Thomson, 2010).

Appendix A.

Teacher consent forms



PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

Title of Research Project: Difference and Diversity: Teachers with Disabilities -
Discourse and Subjugated Knowledges

Brief Description of Research Project, and What Participation Involves:

Thank you for showing interest in my doctoral research project. There is no obligation on you to take part in this work. The work is specifically looking at the experiences of teachers with disabilities. These experiences may vary widely along a continuum that begins at having experienced a very positive environment. I am hoping to interview approximately ten participants in total involved in this work who are teachers with disabilities. I will also seek the views of approximately ten head teachers (or senior managers) though no participants will be sought or accepted from the same school.

If you agree to participate then you will be asked to take part in two interviews with myself. I will ask you to provide contact details so that I can contact you to arrange an appropriate time and place for the interview. I have provided my contact details at the end of this form.

The interviews will last approximately sixty minutes and be audio recorded. The first interview will take the form of a semi-structured conversation in which you will be encouraged to talk freely about your experiences as a teacher, using focus areas such as applying for positions; early teaching experiences; the work environment; reasonable

adjustments in the workplace; career development You will be asked to speak freely about your experiences of being a disabled teacher and this narrative will guide the interview. The second interview will be an opportunity for you to reflect on the previous interview having had a chance to read and reflect on the transcript and comment on anything you said previously, to add to it or clarify it. Ideally the interviews would take place approximately three months apart. These interviews can take place at your school, in a local library or at the University of Roehampton. You will also be offered the opportunity to submit a piece of writing in any form you may wish about your experiences or thoughts.

Investigator Contact Details:

Name	Mark Lyn
Department	Education
University Address	Erasmus House, Roehampton Ln, London
Postcode	SW15 5PU
Email	lynm@roehampton.ac.uk
Telephone	020 8392 3000



Consent Statement:

Please sign both copies and keep one copy for yourself, returning the other one to me.

I agree to take part in this research, and I am aware that I am free to withdraw at anytime during the phase when the data is being collected for the project and a set date after the second interview will be given before which I may withdraw. I am free to withdraw without giving a reason and understand that if I do withdraw all information that I have given will be deleted from the project and not used. (Please note however, that data may still be used in a collated form if you withdraw after the set date given for complete withdrawal).

I also consent that any written materials produced by myself in the course of my participation and given to the investigator can be used for any purposes by the investigator that are consistent with this research work.

I understand that the information I provide will be treated in confidence by the investigator and that my identity will be protected in the publication of any findings. I understand that the data will be collected and processed in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and with the University's Data Protection Policy. All information given will be held in the strictest confidence to ensure anonymity. However where it is deemed that the health or safety of yourself, myself or a third party has been compromised then this guarantee of confidentiality may need to be removed.

Name

Signature

Date

Email address and or telephone number for contact

purposes.....

Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of this project or any other queries please raise this with the myself or you can also contact my Director of Studies. However, if you would like to contact an independent party please contact the Research Lead in the School of Education

Director of Studies Contact Details:

Name Professor Debbie Epstein
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Research Lead in the School of Education

Name Professor Vini Lander,
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Telephone 0208 392 3865

Appendix B

Headteacher consent forms



PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

Title of Research Project: Difference and Diversity: Teachers with Disabilities -
Discourse and Subjugated Knowledges

Brief Description of Research Project, and What Participation Involves:

Thank you for showing interest in my doctoral research project. There is no obligation on you to take part in this work. The research is looking at the experiences of teachers with disabilities. These experiences may vary widely. I am hoping to interview up to ten teachers with disabilities to understand their perspectives. I would also very much like to gain the perspective of head teachers and senior managers, with regard to the employment of disabled teachers or indeed being a disabled head teacher or senior manager themselves. To ensure that there are professionals from a wide range of schools, no participants from the same institution will be used in the research.

The interview will last approximately forty five minutes in which time you will be asked to explore the research topic guided by a set of ten questions that I will ask you. The interview will be audio recorded. The focus of the interview will be on the 2010 Equality Act and its implementation, declaration of disability at point of job application, teachers with disability as role models and the built environment. This interview may take place at your place of work.

Investigator Contact Details:

Name Mark Lyn
Department Education
University Address Erasmus House, Roehampton Ln, London
Postcode SW15 5PU
Email lym@roehampton.ac.uk
Telephone 020 8392 3000



Consent Statement:

Please sign both copies of this form, keeping one of them for your records.

I agree to take part in this research, and I am aware that I am free to withdraw at anytime during the phase when the data is being collected for the project. A set date will be given before which I may withdraw. I am free to withdraw without giving a reason and understand that if I do withdraw all information that I have given will be deleted from the project and not used. I understand that the information I provide will be treated in confidence by the investigator and that my identity will be protected in the publication of any findings. I understand that the data will be collected and processed in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and with the University's Data Protection Policy. All electronic information will be backed-up and held at the University of Roehampton. (Please note however, that data may still be used in a collated form if you withdraw after the set date given for complete withdrawal).

All information given will be held in the strictest confidence to ensure anonymity. However where it is deemed that the health or safety of yourself, myself or a third party has been compromised then this guarantee of confidentiality may need to be removed.

Name

Signature

Date

Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of this project or any other queries please raise this with myself or you can also contact my Director of Studies. However, if you would like to contact an independent party please contact the Research Lead in the School of Education

Director of Studies Contact Details:

Name Professor Debbie Epstein
Department Education
University Address Erasmus House, Roehampton Ln, London
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Research Lead in the School of Education

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Appendix C

Teacher interview Schedule

1. Talk about current role and how long in current role.
2. How and why did you come to show interest in my work?
3. Tell me about your early teaching experiences.
4. How were you recruited to this post and did that involve any declaration of disability?
5. Was there any part of the recruitment process that you found positive or negative?
6. Ongoing: how have things been on an ongoing basis and with regard to the interaction between school and your disability?
7. Role models: how do you see yourself as a role model for others?
8. What are your plans for the future in regards to your career?
9. Is there anything you would like to see change in relation to how disability is situated in schools?
10. Is there anything else you would like to mention, ask me or talk about?

Appendix D

Interview Schedule for the Headteachers

1. Details of number of years in current post – how you got to this post and a bit about career background?
2. How and why did you come to show interest in my work?
3. How does this work compare and fit in with other work on equality in your opinion?
4. What are the procedures in regard to recruitment {such as information given on the application forms} that this institution uses. How were these arrangements arrived at?
5. Do these arrangements generally work well and would you like to see any changes?
6. Let's talk about role models, your view on them and the ways a teacher with disabilities can be a role model {unspecified to who}.
7. Is this the same as for say a female teacher or other groups that may be discriminated against or is it different?
8. What about the built environment in your institution in relation to people with disabilities?
9. Equality legislation: what are you able to tell me about any legislation regarding equality that your institution is aware of or is this mostly handled by the LEA/HR?
10. Is there anything else you may like to tell me, ask me or talk about?

Appendix E

News paper article

A word for and from Teachers with Disabilities

This an article about my current research work with teachers with disabilities but before I begin then, a story. A good friend of mine who is also a stammerer like myself once told me this. At the time she worked at a well known adult education institution in London as a librarian. Problems would arise when she worked at the issuing counter. The problem was that the queue of people waiting to be served felt that they had to wait much longer than usual. Tempers would flare and the tut-tutting would get audibly and, if you can imagine, visually louder also. So it was suggested that she wear a badge saying 'I am a stammerer, I need more time to speak'. I have had the benefit of years since hearing this story to try and work with the story in my thinking. One question I keep asking myself is this: who was the wearing of the badge meant to help the most; my friend or the people in the queue?

Part of the research work for my PhD saw me recently interviewing experienced teachers who also had disabilities about their experiences, knowledge and insights of being disabled in schools. The interviews touched on a wide range of issues and this information I hope to disclose and share with as many different people on and through as many different platforms as I can over time. There seemed to be a few common themes running through all what was said. Common themes included selection of employment, aspirations to senior levels, pedagogy and special educational needs.

One of the central themes which came out was that these teachers felt that they needed someone to actually listen to them when they speak. One teacher who worked as a SENCo summed up this sentiment by saying: *I've never had a chat with someone saying 'S..., look we know that you've got dyslexia with a stammer what, just what can we do to support you with your job and your work', never had that, never been mentioned at all.* To be sure, this question of 'help' arises not because of the inherent *helplessness* of people with disabilities but because so much in the world and in the environment is designed for, arranged, assumes and was built for those who embodied as non-disabled.

Mentioned also was the issues of who to go to and seek out with requests for dialogue? One teacher interviewed was quite sure that this person should not be their line manager. Many schools are now very large institutions and from the point of view of individual teachers, faced with what can seem like a phalanx of management, who exactly can and should be approached regarding what matter can seem daunting.

Two other teachers thought the SENCo for the school should be the go-to person for teachers with disabilities. Having the SENCo be involved with the accommodation of teachers with disabilities of course raises a whole set of questions and posits another whole set of assumptions. As many schools, if not most, maintain only one equality policy document for both staff and for pupils, the SENCo is already involved to some degree or another. Here I

advocate for neither position regarding the involvement of the SENCo other than for clarity. If the SENCo is going to be directly involved then it needs to be clear why that decision has been made and what are the advantages and disadvantages of such of this? What message does it convey and what statements does it make true?

But there is also, and there has to be, an ethical onus on the school to act a priori. One head teacher I interviewed had recently become disabled. Although she had other close members of her family that had always been disabled, becoming disabled herself seemed to have been an epiphany-like experience for her. Not only did she arrange for alterations to the physical layout of the building to suit her own new means of mobility, she went further than this. She contacted and brought in a range of organisations with people with a wide range of disabilities to come into the school to make recommendations on what else could be changed for others even though such people remained yet unseen by the school. So for example the staffroom now appears to be multi-coloured in decor. The reason for this is that people who are partially-sighted can navigate their way around the environment much better if things which are physically different and not connected to each other are of contrasting colours to other objects around them.

You may notice I have not mentioned anything to do with legal due process; the omission is intended here. Anyone who has begun to study Equality Law to any depth will soon realise that it is not an unproblematic arena that offers all the knowledge needed to arrive at an expected solution. Take for example the legal practice known as *levelling down*. What this means is that in some cases a practice may not be termed to be discriminatory if everyone is equally negatively affected by it. One of the most striking things that I have observed whilst researching disability over the past five years is how often what would otherwise be understood as the granting of respect or being polite tends to take on legal terms when done for people with disabilities. Here then I want to foreground the importance of ethics. The ethics of supporting each other with the risks in the social. Ethics seemed to be missing in the story of my friend and the wearing of the badge saying 'I am disabled'.

As the above mentioned head teacher told me in interview; she has observed over the years that the difference between an organisation that get a lot of things right for disabled people and an organisation that gets a lot of things wrong is the people at the top. Ethics understood and implemented as a static check-list will come too late to save us. Although I take issue with the language used, the Equality Act 2010 does allow for '*more favourable treatment*' to be applied to the employment of people with disabilities, so why not take encouragement from that and ask what more can be practically done to accommodate people with disabilities as employees in schools. A few suggestions could be: where can information about the ample amounts of money available through the Access to Work Scheme be made available to staff and stop the scheme being one of the best secretes of the modern era; which forums and methods of communication can be established so that people with disabilities employed in schools can be actually heard; will there be that one go-to person in management mention above; which organisations with disabled people can be invited into schools to offer advice and recommendations? Nearly all forms of affirmative action are explicitly outlawed in the

Equality Act 2010 but none of these suggestions listed here can be said to contravene this law.

My research work will soon be drawing to a close. I only need more head teachers who are prepared to offer a few moments of their time to be interviewed. I write this article in the hope that it will lead to someone stepping forward. I also write this article to share with you some of the things people who work in schools and are disabled would like to see.

Mark Lyn is a Lecturer who lives and works in London and is studying for his PhD at Roehampton.



A study in Diversity

I am a teacher living and working in the London area in the 4th year of my part-time PhD at Roehampton University. The focus of my study is to engage with teachers with disabilities and to talk about central issues in teaching and disability. The work can be viewed in a wider sense to be the study in the area of diversity in general. I am disabled.

I hope that this research will involve me meeting and interviewing teachers around the London area and wider. Myself and the teacher will meet and talk for about an hour. I hope that this will be as much as something that we do together as is feasible within academic research. I will also have pieces of writing that I have collected to show you and invite you to do some writing of your own if you so wish after the interview.

All participants will of course be able to fully withdraw from the work at any point, though past a certain date the data will already be in a collated (anonymous) form and it would be impractical to remove all the data you provide after that point. You will be informed of the date by which full withdrawal can take place.

The work in the later stages I hope will also include the view's of Head Teachers.

If you wish to participate in this research project then please email me at the address below.

Thank you.

Mark Lyn

lynm@roehampton.ac.uk

(Feb, 2019)

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End of Thesis

Thank you.